Part 1. Money of Account and Interest

Chapter 1. Money of Account

§ 1. Dollar, cent, and mill.

The money of account in the State shall be the dollar, cent, and mill; and accounts in public offices and proceedings in court shall be in conformity herewith; but this section shall not affect an account, charge, or entry originally made or a contract expressed in other money of account, but the same shall be reduced to dollars and parts of a dollar in an action thereon.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 5437. P.L. § 7129. G.L. § 2841. P.S. § 2674. V.S. § 2300. R.L. § 1995. G.S. 79, §§ 1, 2. R.S. 72 §§ 1, 2. R. 1797, p. 576, § 1. R. 1797, p. 577, § 3. 1795, p. 34.

Chapter 3. Interest

§ 31. Repealed. 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 26, 1968; 1969, No. 118, eff. April 22, 1969.

History

Former § 31. Former § 31, relating to legal note of interest, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 5438; P.L. § 7130; G.L. § 2842; P.S. § 2675; V.S. § 2301; R.L. § 1996; 1866, No. 61 , § 1; G.S. 79, § 3; R.S. 72, § 3; 1836, No. 11 , § 1; 1822, p. 9; R. 1797, p. 473, § 1, R. 1787, p. 170 and amended by 1961, No. 224 , § 3; 1963, No. 123 ; 1965, No. 100 , § 1; 1967, No. 58 , § 5; No. 68, § 1; 1967, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 1. The subject matter is now covered by § 41a of this title.

§§ 32-34. Repealed. 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 26, 1968.

History

Former §§ 32-34. Former § 32, relating to application of payments on an obligation, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 5439; P.L. § 7131; G.L. § 2843; P.S. § 2676; V.S. § 2302; R.L. § 1997; 1866, No. 61 , § 2. The subject matter is now covered by § 47 of this title.

Former § 33, relating to computation of interest, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 5440; P.L. § 7132; G.L. § 2844; P.S. § 2677; V.S. § 2303; R.L. §§ 1998, 1999; 1866, No. 61 , § 3. The subject matter is now covered by § 49 of this title.

Former § 34, relating to recovery of usurious interest, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 5441; P.L. § 7133; G.L. § 2845; P.S. § 2678; V.S. § 2304; R.L. §§ 1999, 2000; G.S. 79, § 4; R.S. 72, § 4; 1836, No. 11 , § 2; 1822, p. 10; R. 1797, p. 473, § 1; R. 1787, p. 170 and amended by 1961, No. 224 , § 4; 1965, No. 100 , § 2. The subject matter is now covered by § 50 of this title.

Chapter 4. Interest

Subchapter 1. Interest Generally

History

Revision note—

The heading and designation for subchapter 1 of this chapter were added subsequent to the enactment of subchapter 2 in order to conform the organization of the chapter to the general organizational scheme of V.S.A.

Implementation. 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 20, provided: “This act [which amended sections 1304, 1845, 2201, 2202, 2204, 2218, 2223-2225, 2227, 2230, 2233; added sections 506 and 1212; and repealed sections 1256(b), 2226 and 2234 of Title 8; and added sections 41a and 2356a; amended sections 42, 50, 2405, 2406, and 2603 (a), (b); and repealed sections 41, 2355(i) and 2356 of this title; and amended section 2903(b) of Title 12] shall take effect from passage [April 30, 1980]. However, a grace period of six months will be permitted for mechanical conversions. Furthermore, this act shall not apply to the annual percentage rates of loans originated on or before May 15, 1980, which exceed the provisions of this act but which comply with existing law. The terms of any loan in existence upon the effective date of this act [April 30, 1980] shall not be changed unless the lender and borrower agree to the change.”

ANNOTATIONS

Governing law.

In action to recover in Vermont amount due on loan executed in Connecticut, interest could only be recovered as provided by this chapter. Fishbein v. Guerra, 131 Vt. 493, 309 A.2d 922, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 337 (1973).

§ 41. Repealed. 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. April 30, 1980.

History

Former § 41. Former § 41, relating to legal rates of interest, was derived from 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.) and amended by 1969, No. 66 , § 1; 1973, No. 230 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; No. 222 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1975, No. 106 , § 1; 1975, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.); No. 216 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1977, No. 28 ; 1977, No. 138 (Adj. Sess.); 1979, No. 11 , § 1; No. 82. The subject matter is now covered by § 41a of this title.

Implementation. For implementation of 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.) provisions, see note set out following heading for this subchapter.

§ 41a. Legal rates.

  1. Except as specifically provided by law, the rate of interest or the sum allowed for forbearance or use of money shall be 12 percent per annum computed by the actuarial method.
  2. The rate of interest or the sum allowed:
    1. For single payment loans by lenders regulated by Title 8 and federal savings and loan associations, the finance charge shall not exceed 18 percent per annum.
    2. For a retail installment contract the finance charge shall not exceed 18 percent per annum of the first $500.00 of the balance subject to finance charges and 15 percent per annum of the balance subject to finance charges in excess of $500.00.
    3. For a bank credit card account or revolving line of credit the rate shall be the rate agreed upon by the lender and the borrower. However, except for cash advances, no finance charge may be imposed for any monthly billing period in which there is no previous balance, or during which the sum of the payments received and other credits issued are equal to or exceed the amount of the previous balance.
    4. For a loan or extension of credit secured by motor vehicles, mobile homes, travel trailers, aircraft, watercraft, and farm equipment, of the current and previous model year, the interest rate shall not exceed 18 percent per annum.  For a loan or extension of credit secured by such collateral older than the current or previous model year, the interest rate shall not exceed 20 percent per annum.
    5. For an installment loan not otherwise limited by subdivisions (1)-(4) of this subsection, the interest rate shall not exceed 24 percent per annum on the first $1,000.00 of the aggregate balance outstanding; and shall not exceed 12 percent per annum of the aggregate balance outstanding in excess of $1,000.00; or 18 percent annual percentage rate on the aggregate balance outstanding, whichever is higher.
    6. A lender may charge interest rates on loans secured by deposits in excess of the rates otherwise allowed in this section only to the extent that such higher rate is required to comply with Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank, and Federal Reserve Board regulations.
    7. For a loan or extension of credit secured by a subordinate lien against real estate, the interest rate shall not exceed 18 percent per annum.  All such lien documents shall include a power of sale pursuant to 12 V.S.A. chapter 172, subchapter 4.
    8. For a loan or extension of credit secured by a first lien against real estate, the interest rate may be the same as may be charged by any financial institution or seller of residential real estate under the provisions of the federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, as amended.
    9. For a retail charge agreement the finance charge shall be the rate or rates agreed upon by the parties to such charge agreement but not to exceed 21 percent per annum. However, no finance charge may be imposed for any monthly billing period in which there is no previous balance, or during which the sum of the payments received and other credits issued are equal to or exceed the amount of the previous balance.  The term “billing period” shall mean the time interval between periodic statement dates.  A billing period shall be considered a month or monthly if the last day of each billing period is on the same day of each month or does not vary by more than four days therefrom.  For a retail charge agreement, the periodic billing can be no less than 1/48th of the balance as of the last advance.
  3. For the purpose of this section, the term “lender” shall include natural persons, partnerships, associations, and corporations or other entities whether organized under the laws of Vermont, of the United States, or of any other state or country who make or who have made a loan or loans subject to the laws of Vermont.
  4. Actuarial method
    1. Unless otherwise specifically provided by law, all interest on closed-end accounts, loans, or extensions of credit charged under this or any section shall be computed only on the outstanding balance subject to finance charge by the actuarial method of calculation. On all closed-end accounts, loans, or extensions of credit, interest shall be based on a 365-day year and on a 366-day year during a leap year, except in the case of loans secured by residential properties or to finance income producing business or activity where a 30-day month 360-day year interest calculation may be used. Interest shall not be paid, deducted, or added to principal in advance, except that the advance collection of interest for a period not to exceed 30 days shall be permitted upon origination of a mortgage loan.
    2. “Actuarial method” means the method of allocating payments made on a debt between the amount financed and the finance or other charges pursuant to which a payment is applied first to the accumulated finance or other charges and any remainder is subtracted from, or any deficiency is added to, the unpaid balance of the amount financed.  The Commissioner may adopt rules not inconsistent with the Federal Truth in Lending Act further defining the term and prescribing its application.

HISTORY: Added 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. April 30, 1980; amended 1981, No. 89 , § 7, eff. May 13, 1981; 1981, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 9, 1982; 1983, No. 37 ; 1983, No. 214 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 1985, No. 36 , §§ 1, 2; 1987, No. 32 , § 2; 1995, No. 9 , § 1; 1995, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 41, eff. Jan. 1, 1997.

History

References in text.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, referred to in subdiv. (b)(6), is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1811.

The Federal Home Loan Bank, referred to in subdiv. (b)(8), is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1421 et seq.

The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, referred to in subdiv. (b)(8), is classified principally to 12 U.S.C. §§ 4a, 24, 27, 29, 51b, 51b-1, 72, 85, 86a, 92a, 93a, 95, 214a, 248, 248a, 342, 347b, 355, 360, 371a, 412, 461, 463, 481, 1425a, 1425b, 1431, 1464, 1724, 1726, 1728, 1730g, 1752, 1757, 1763, 1785, 1787, 1795-1795i, 1813, 1817, 1821, 1828, 1831d, 1832, 1842, 1843 and 3501-3524 and 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a, 687, 1602-1607, 1610, 1612, 1613, 1631, 1632, 1635, 1637, 1638, 1640, 1641, 1643, 1646, 1663, 1664, 1665a, 1666, 1666d, 1667d and 1691f.

The Federal Truth in Lending Act, referred to in subdiv. (d)(2), is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.

Revision note

—2020. In subdiv. (b)(5), preceding “of this subsection”, substituted “subdivisions (1)-(4)” for “the preceding subdivisions” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

—2014. In subdiv. (b)(7), substituted “12 V.S.A. chapter 172, subchapter 4” for “ 12 V.S.A. § 4531a et seq.” to reflect repeal of latter by 2011, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

Amendments

—1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (d)(1): Added “except that the advance collection of interest for a period not to exceed 30 days shall be permitted upon origination of a mortgage loan” following “in advance” in the third sentence.

—1995. Subdiv. (b)(3): Rewrote the first sentence and deleted the third through fifth sentences.

—1987. Subdiv. (b)(3): Inserted “or” preceding “revolving line of credit” in the first sentence, deleted “or an insurance premium financing loan made by the insurer or wholly owned subsidiary of the insurer” thereafter, and rewrote the last sentence.

—1985. Subdiv. (b)(5): Deleted the last sentence.

Subdiv. (d)(1): Deleted the former second sentence and substituted “loans secured by residential properties or to finance income producing business or activity where a 30-day month 360-day year interest calculation may be used” for “mortgage loans eligible for sale to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage Association, or the Government National Mortgage Association in which case the calculation required by such agency for such loans may be used” following “case of” at the end of the present second sentence.

—1983 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (b)(3): Deleted “retail charge agreement” preceding “bank” in the first sentence and substituted “such aggregate balance” for “the first $500.00 of such periodic aggregate balance and a periodic rate of one and one-quarter percent per month to such aggregate balance in excess of $500.00” following “per month to” in that sentence.

Subdiv. (b)(9): Added.

—1983. Subdiv. (b)(5): Inserted “higher education or” preceding “the physical renovation” in the second sentence.

—1981 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (b)(8): Added.

—1981. Subdiv. (b)(7): Added.

Implementation. For implementation of 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.) provisions, see note set out following heading for this subchapter.

CROSS REFERENCES

Rate of interest on loans by pawnbrokers, see § 3867 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

Constitutionality.

Award of statutory prejudgment and postjudgment interest did not violate due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as the 12 percent interest rate was reasonably related to making plaintiffs whole and thus passed rational basis review; there was no constitutional mandate that the statutory interest rate be pegged to the national prime rate. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gritman, 2016 VT 45, 202 Vt. 155, 146 A.3d 882, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 46 (2016).

Applicability.

Where construction contract did not contain provision for prejudgment interest awards or any other applicable interest rate provision, trial court’s application of a 6% interest rate, in the absence of any mention of interest rates in the contract itself, and contrary to the clearly-enumerated statutory rate of 12%, constituted an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. New England Partnership, Inc. v. Rutland City School District, 173 Vt. 69, 786 A.2d 408, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 273 (2001).

Credit sale of household goods and appliances did not constitute a transaction within the scope of the legal interest rate laws, since the allegedly usurious charges were not based on a loan or forbearance of money. Lowell & Austin, Inc. v. Truax, 146 Vt. 448, 507 A.2d 949, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 418 (1985). (Decided under prior law.)

A bank in this state could not recover more than six percent interest allowed under this section though loans were made, and the securities taken therefor were executed, in state where higher rate was allowed. Farmers' Bank v. Burchard, 33 Vt. 346, 1860 Vt. LEXIS 113 (1860). (Decided under prior law.)

Where promissory note was made in Canada and indorsed in this state, in both of which places the rate of interest was six percent, and payable at a day certain in the state of New York, where the rate of interest was seven percent, and not paid when due, both makers and endorsers were liable to pay seven percent interest, the governing law being the law of the place of performance. Peck v. Mayo, Follett & Co., 14 Vt. 33, 1842 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1842). (Decided under prior law.)

—Generally.

8 V.S.A. § 2233 requires a court to declare a loan unenforceable if the lender received additional monies from a variety of other sources, whether interest, consideration, finance charges, discounts, or other charges, that exceed what is allowed by 9 V.S.A. § 41a(d) . That statute is not limited to an excess rate of interest, but rather encompasses excessive interest, consideration, and charges collected vis á vis the outstanding balance. Ag Venture Fin. Servs. v. Montagne, 421 B.R. 65, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4017 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2009).

Whether a transaction is usurious was not to be determined by its form; rather, the whole transaction and the interest of the parties, particularly the lender, were to be gathered from all the circumstances and events which preceded and accompanied the transaction. Brown v. Pilini, 128 Vt. 324, 262 A.2d 479, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 228 (1970). (Decided under prior law.)

To constitute usury, it was essential that an excess of the legal maximum rate of interest prescribed by this section be exacted in consideration of a loan of forbearance, but the extent of the advantage or the amount of the surplus in excess of legal interest was wholly inconsequential. Farnsworth v. Cochran, 125 Vt. 174, 212 A.2d 818, 1965 Vt. LEXIS 221 (1965). (Decided under prior law.)

A contract was usurious when any premium, profit, bonus, or charge was exacted or required by the lender in excess of the money actually loaned, which, in addition to the interest stipulated, rendered the return to the lender greater than the lawful rate of interest. Farnsworth v. Cochran, 125 Vt. 174, 212 A.2d 818, 1965 Vt. LEXIS 221 (1965). (Decided under prior law.)

To constitute a usurious transaction, there must generally be: first, a loan express or implied; second, an agreement that the money or thing loaned shall or may be returned; and, third, an agreement that a greater rate of interest than is allowed by law shall be paid. Gleason v. Childs, 52 Vt. 421, 1880 Vt. LEXIS 154 (1880). (Decided under prior law.)

To constitute usury, there was required to be an intent, or corrupt agreement, to take illegal interest. Farmers' Bank v. Burchard, 33 Vt. 346, 1860 Vt. LEXIS 113 (1860). (Decided under prior law.)

The question of usury was divisible: the first matter to be ascertained was whether too great interest had been taken or secured; the next was whether it was done corruptly, or, in other words, with intent to violate the statute. Bank of Burlington v. Durkee, 1 Vt. 399, 1829 Vt. LEXIS 4 (1829). (Decided under prior law.)

Compounded interest.

Although courts rarely, if ever, as between debtor and creditor, enforce an executory contract for payment of compound interest, yet payment of it is not necessarily in a legal sense payment of a usury; and if a debtor knowingly, understandingly and unconditionally paid it under no peculiar circumstances of oppression, it could be recovered back. Culver v. Bigelow, 43 Vt. 249, 1870 Vt. LEXIS 80 (1870). (Decided under prior law.)

Computation of interest.

Subsec. (a) of this section allows simple interest and not compound interest to be accorded to judgment awards. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 149 Vt. 365, 543 A.2d 1320, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 43 (1988).

Construction.

This section did not declare in what cases interest should be taken or that it should be paid in any case; its effect was to prohibit it from being taken above a given rate. Norman v. American Woolen Co., 117 Vt. 28, 84 A.2d 125, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 97 (1951). (Decided under prior law.)

Construction with other laws.

Statute was not being applied retroactively and Secretary of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources could impose penalties under 10 V.S.A. § 8010 because although violation began prior to effective date of statute, violation went beyond period in issue. Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 652 A.2d 988, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 175 (1994).

Environmental Law Division properly found that defendant received economic benefit by waiting until 1992 to complete $10,000 worth of landscaping where defendant had use of monies which should have been spent on landscaping in 1989 and 12% interest rate over one-year period to estimate defendant’s avoided cost was reasonable measure of defendant’s additional economic benefit gained from noncompliance. Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 652 A.2d 988, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 175 (1994).

Maximum rate of interest allowed by this section and section 34 of this title set a limit of policy beyond which an obligation to pay interest would not be enforced. Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 127 Vt. 229, 245 A.2d 891, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 212 (1968). (Decided under prior law.)

Contracts.

Tribal sovereign immunity did not bar a suit involving payday loans made by a “tribal lending entity” because Vermont borrowers could sue tribal officers engaged in conduct outside of Indian lands for prospective, injunctive relief based on violations of state and substantive federal law occurring off of tribal lands. Gingras v. Think Fin., Inc., 922 F.3d 112, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 12104 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 856, 205 L. Ed. 2d 458, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 90 (2020).

In contractual dispute, trial court erred in awarding interest to plaintiff at rate of 1 1/2% per month; evidence did not support finding of an agreement concerning interest and therefore statutory rate of 12% per annum applied. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. King, 155 Vt. 1, 580 A.2d 971, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 129 (1990).

A contract affected with usury was valid to every intent, except as to the excess above legal interest. Farmers' Bank v. Burchard, 33 Vt. 346, 1860 Vt. LEXIS 113 (1860). (Decided under prior law.)

Forbearance of existing debt.

Money paid above legal rate for forbearance of existing debt was usury. Hawkins v. National Life Insurance Co., 57 Vt. 591, 1885 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1885). (Decided under prior law.) ; Hathaway v. Hagan, 59 Vt. 75, 8 A. 678, 1886 Vt. LEXIS 24 (1886). (Decided under prior law.)

Usury could exist where a money debt was created and forborne by agreement of the parties, even though there was no loan of money. Jackson v. Kirby, 37 Vt. 448, 1865 Vt. LEXIS 8 (1865). (Decided under prior law.)

Particular transactions.

Conduct by lender clearly ran afoul of 9 V.S.A. § 41a(d)(1) , which allowed interest to be charged only on the outstanding balance. Having violated § 41a(d)(1), the creditor had also contravened both the first and second sentences of 8 V.S.A. § 2233(a) : it violated the first sentence of § 2233(a) by charging interest greater than authorized by § 41a, when it charged interest on a sum greater than the outstanding balance, and violated both sentences by receiving greater “consideration” than authorized by § 41a, when it collected interest both from debtor and its investment account with respect to the $477,865 in the suspense account. Ag Venture Fin. Servs. v. Montagne, 421 B.R. 65, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4017 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2009).

Mortgage transaction in which memorandum of agreement provided for 8 percent interest rate, divided into 6 percent interest payment and 2 percent fee for consulting services, sale and purchase agreement signed three months later provided for interest at 6 percent and a payment of $25 per month, with a final $150 payment, for consulting services already rendered at buyer’s request, loan amortization schedule set interest rate at 8 percent, and payments records kept by mortgagee showed that 8 percent of each payment constituted interest, was, under all the circumstances and events preceding and accompanying the dealings, usurious as a matter of law in that it provided for interest above 6 percent maximum provided in this section. Crocker v. Brandt, 130 Vt. 349, 293 A.2d 541, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 282 (1972). (Decided under prior law.)

Where defendant engaged in the collection, brokerage and financing business endorsed notes taken by plaintiff used car dealer from his customers, and, in consideration for endorsing the notes, received 6 percent interest on them and retained a 10 percent handling charge, giving the remainder of notes’ value to plaintiff, defendant’s retention of the handling charge amounted to an interest charge to plaintiff over and above the 6 percent interest, the transactions constituted loans from defendant to plaintiff and the handling charge was usurious where the legal interest rate was 6 percent. Brown v. Pilini, 128 Vt. 324, 262 A.2d 479, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 228 (1970). (Decided under prior law.)

Where lender of $4,900 received from borrower $5,200 in cash and notes which were considered by parties as good, $500 note given in addition by borrower to lender, as part of same transaction, to pay in part for furnishing money, was usurious. Strong Hardware Co. v. Gonyow, 105 Vt. 415, 168 A. 547, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 233 (1933). (Decided under prior law.)

Where intermediary acted bona fide in arranging loan, without intention of contracting for usurious interest, additional two percent received by him was not usury. Ricker v. Clark, 54 Vt. 289, 1881 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1881). (Decided under prior law.)

Where it was agreed between directors and plaintiff that if he would accept office of treasurer, provide and advance funds for company to carry on business, and act as treasurer, he should be paid three hundred dollars per year and one percent a month for money advanced, contract for interest was usurious. Waite v. Windham County Mining Co., 37 Vt. 608, 1865 Vt. LEXIS 37 (1865). (Decided under prior law.)

A loan of money which included sale of property at less than value was a cover for usury and excess interest could be recovered. Austin v. Harrington, 28 Vt. 130, 1855 Vt. LEXIS 148 (1855). (Decided under prior law.) ; Low v. Estate of Mussey, 36 Vt. 183, 1863 Vt. LEXIS 59 (1863). (Decided under prior law.)

A contract between a commission merchant and an owner of property entrusted to him to sell, which provided that commission merchant should make advances of cash to owner from time to time, as the property was delivered, and should be allowed a specified commission for the money advanced, and five percent for the money so advanced was usurious and void to the extent of the five percent. Burton v. Blin, 23 Vt. 151, 1851 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1851). (Decided under prior law.)

Pleadings.

Purchasers’ complaint which asserted that seller violated this section and which incorporated mortgage agreement explicitly designating an amount as prepaid interest was sufficiently specific to state a claim. In re Peterson, 93 B.R. 323, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 2277 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988).

Recovery of excess interest.

Where note was for double amount of loan and life insurance policy with creditor as beneficiary was taken in amount of note to secure debt, administrator of debtor could recover from beneficiary proceeds of policy in excess of actual debt plus legal interest. Coon v. Swan, 30 Vt. 6, 1856 Vt. LEXIS 158 (1856). (Decided under prior law.)

In order to recover back money paid as interest beyond the rate of six percent upon note, it was not necessary that money should have been paid pursuant to usurious agreement made at time note was executed. Stevens v. Fisher, 23 Vt. 272, 1851 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1851). (Decided under prior law) .

Bank note was not void as usurious by reason of interest, which was due after 64 days being expressed at the rate of 360 days to a year, that being a general custom at banks, but the interest in excess of the legal rate was required to be deducted. Bank of St. Albans v. Stearns, 1 Vt. 430, 1829 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1829). (Decided under prior law.)

Sales of stock or securities.

A sale of shares of stock with yearly dividends on all unpaid shares reserved to seller in lieu of interest was not usurious although seller received more than legal rate of interest upon purchase price of shares. Hancock v. Clark, 68 Vt. 302, 35 A. 317, 1896 Vt. LEXIS 84 (1896). (Decided under prior law.)

The sale of mortgage securities at a premium could not subject the party to an action to recover back the premium on ground of usury. Culver v. Bigelow, 43 Vt. 249, 1870 Vt. LEXIS 80 (1870). (Decided under prior law.)

Semi-annual interest payments.

Contract for payment of interest payable semi-annually at statutory rate was not usurious. Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Gale, 105 Vt. 3, 162 A. 899, 1932 Vt. LEXIS 180 (1932). (Decided under prior law.)

Cited.

Cited in R. Brown & Sons, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 144 Vt. 142, 473 A.2d 1168, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 423 (1984); Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20734 (D. Vt. 1986); V.J. Processors, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 679 F. Supp. 399, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13591 (D. Vt. 1987); H. A. Eddy Oil Co. v. St. Peter, 149 Vt. 201, 542 A.2d 257, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 618 (1987); Consumer Credit Insurance Ass'n v. State, 149 Vt. 305, 544 A.2d 1159, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 31 (1988); Highgate Assocs. v. Merryfield, 157 Vt. 313, 597 A.2d 1280, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 179 (1991); P.F. Jurgs & Co. v. O'Brien, 160 Vt. 294, 629 A.2d 325, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 61 (1993); Abbiati v. Buttura & Sons, Inc., 161 Vt. 314, 639 A.2d 988, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 15 (1994); Bianchi v. Lorenz, 166 Vt. 555, 701 A.2d 1037, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 180 (1997).

§ 41b. Rent-to-own agreements; disclosure of terms.

  1. Definitions.   In this section:
    1. “Advertisement” means a commercial message that solicits a consumer to enter into a rent-to-own agreement for a specific item of merchandise that is conveyed:
      1. at a merchant’s place of business;
      2. on a merchant’s website; or
      3. on television or radio.
    2. “Cash price” means the price of merchandise available under a rent-to-own agreement that the consumer may pay in cash to the merchant at the inception of the agreement to acquire ownership of the merchandise.
    3. “Clear and conspicuous” means that the statement or term being disclosed is of such size, color, contrast, or audibility, as applicable, so that the nature, content, and significance of the statement or term is reasonably apparent to the person to whom it is disclosed.
    4. “Consumer” has the same meaning as in section 2451a of this title.
    5. “Merchandise” means an item of a merchant’s property that is available for use under a rent-to-own agreement. The term does not include:
      1. real property;
      2. a mobile home, as defined in section 2601 of this title;
      3. a motor vehicle, as defined in 23 V.S.A. § 4 ;
      4. an assistive device, as defined in section 41c of this title; or
      5. a musical instrument intended to be used primarily in an elementary or secondary school.
    6. “Merchant” means a person who offers, or contracts for, the use of merchandise under a rent-to-own agreement.
    7. “Merchant’s cost” means the documented actual cost, including actual freight charges, of merchandise to the merchant from a wholesaler, distributor, supplier, or manufacturer and net of any discounts, rebates, and incentives that are vested and calculable as to a specific item of merchandise at the time the merchant accepts delivery of the merchandise.
      1. A “rent-to-own agreement” as defined in subdivision (7)(A) of this subsection is not: (8) (B) A “rent-to-own agreement” as defined in subdivision (7)(A) of this subsection is not:
        1. a sale subject to 9A V.S.A. Article 2;
        2. a lease subject to 9A V.S.A. Article 2A;
        3. a security interest as defined in 9A V.S.A. § 1—201(a)(35); or
        4. a retail installment contract or retail charge agreement as defined in chapter 61 of this title.
    8. “Rent-to-own charge” means the difference between the total cost and the cash price of an item of merchandise.
    9. “Total cost” means the sum of all payments, charges, and fees that a consumer must pay to acquire ownership of merchandise under a rent-to-own agreement. The term does not include charges or fees for optional services or charges or fees due only upon the occurrence of a contingency specified in the agreement.
      1. “Rent-to-own agreement” means a contract under which a consumer agrees to pay a merchant for the right to use merchandise and acquire ownership, which is renewable with each payment after the initial period, and which remains in effect until:
        1. the consumer returns the merchandise to the merchant;
        2. the merchant retakes possession of the merchandise; or
        3. the consumer pays the total cost and acquires ownership of the merchandise.
  2. General requirements.
    1. Prior to execution, a merchant shall give a consumer the opportunity to review a written copy of a rent-to-own agreement that includes all of the information required by this section for each item of merchandise covered by the agreement and shall not refuse a consumer’s request to review the agreement with a third party, either inside the merchant’s place of business or at another location.
    2. A disclosure required by this section shall be clear and conspicuous.
    3. In a rent-to-own agreement, a merchant shall state a numerical amount or percentage as a figure and shall print or legibly handwrite the figure in the equivalent of 12-point type or greater.
    4. A merchant may supply information not required by this section with the disclosures required by this section, but shall not state or place additional information in such a way as to cause the required disclosures to be misleading or confusing, or to contradict, obscure, or detract attention from the required disclosures.
    5. Except for price cards on site, a merchant shall preserve an advertisement, or a digital copy of the advertisement, for not less than two years after the date the advertisement appeared. In the case of a radio, television, or Internet advertisement, a merchant may preserve a copy of the script or storyboard.
    6. Subject to availability, a merchant shall make merchandise that is advertised available to all consumers on the terms and conditions that appear in the advertisement.
    7. A rent-to-own agreement that is substantially modified, including a change that increases the consumer’s payments or other obligations or diminishes the consumer’s rights, shall be considered a new agreement subject to the requirements of this chapter.
    8. For each rent-to-own agreement, a merchant shall keep the following information in an electronic or hard copy for a period of four years following the date the agreement ends:
      1. the rent-to-own agreement covering the item; and
      2. a record that establishes the merchant’s cost for the item.
    9. A rent-to-own agreement executed by a merchant doing business in Vermont and a resident of Vermont shall be governed by Vermont law.
  3. Cash price; reduction for used merchandise; maximum limits.
    1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, the maximum cash price for an item of merchandise shall not exceed:
      1. for an appliance, 1.75 times the merchant’s cost;
      2. for an item of electronics that has a merchant’s cost of less than $150.00, 1.75 times the merchant’s cost;
      3. for an item of electronics that has a merchant’s cost of $150.00 or more, 2.00 times the merchant’s cost;
      4. for an item of furniture or jewelry, 2.50 times the merchant’s cost; and
      5. for any other item, 2.00 times the merchant’s cost.
    2. The cash price for an item of merchandise that has been previously used by a consumer shall be at least 10 percent less than the cash price calculated under subdivision (1) of this subsection.
    3. The total cost for an item of merchandise shall not exceed 2.00 times the maximum cash price for the item.
  4. Disclosures in advertising; prohibited disclosures.
    1. An advertisement that refers to or states the dollar amount of any payment for merchandise shall state:
      1. the cash price of the item;
      2. that the merchandise is available under a rent-to-own agreement;
      3. the amount, frequency, and total number of payments required for ownership;
      4. the total cost for the item;
      5. the rent-to-own charge for the item; and
      6. that the consumer will not own the merchandise until the consumer pays the total cost for ownership.
    2. A merchant shall not advertise that no credit check is required or performed, or that all consumers are approved for transactions, if the merchant subjects the consumer to a credit check.
  5. Disclosures on site.   In addition to the information required in subsection (d) of this section, an advertisement at a merchant’s place of business shall include:
    1. whether the item is new or used;
    2. when the merchant acquired the item; and
    3. the number of times a consumer has taken possession of the item under a rent-to-own agreement.
  6. Disclosures in rent-to-own agreement.
    1. The first page of a rent-to-own agreement shall include:
      1. a heading and clause in boldface type that reads: “IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THIS RENT-TO-OWN AGREEMENT. Do Not Sign this Agreement Before You Read it or if it Contains any Blank Spaces. You have a Right to Review this Agreement or Compare Costs Away from the Store Before You Sign.”; and
      2. the following information in the following order:
        1. the name, address, and contact information of the merchant;
        2. the name, address, and contact information of the consumer;
        3. the date of the transaction;
        4. a description of the merchandise sufficient to identify the merchandise to the consumer and the merchant, including any applicable model and identification numbers;
        5. a statement whether the merchandise is new or used, and in the case of used merchandise, a statement that the merchandise is in good working order, is clean, and is free of any infestation.
    2. A rent-to-own agreement shall include the following cost disclosures, printed and grouped as indicated below, immediately preceding the signature lines:

      Click to view

  7. Required provisions of rent-to-own agreement.   A rent-to-own agreement shall provide:
    1. a statement of payment due dates;
    2. a line-item list of any other charges or fees the consumer could be charged or have the option of paying in the course of acquiring ownership or during or after the term of the agreement;
    3. that the consumer will not own the merchandise until he or she makes all of the required payments for ownership;
    4. that the consumer has the right to receive a receipt for a payment and, upon reasonable notice, a written statement of account;
    5. who is responsible for service, maintenance, and repair of an item of merchandise;
    6. that, except in the case of the consumer’s negligence or abuse, if the merchant, during the term of the agreement, must retake possession of the merchandise for maintenance, repair, or service, or the item cannot be repaired, the merchant is responsible for providing the consumer with a replacement item of equal quality and comparable design;
    7. that the maximum amount of the consumer’s liability for damage or loss to the merchandise is limited to an amount equal to the cash price multiplied by the ratio of:
      1. the number of payments remaining to acquire ownership under the agreement; to
      2. the total number of payments necessary to acquire ownership under the agreement;
    8. a statement that if any part of a manufacturer’s express warranty covers the merchandise at the time the consumer acquires ownership the merchant shall transfer the warranty to the consumer if allowed by the terms of the warranty;
    9. a description of any damage waiver or insurance purchased by the consumer, or a statement that the consumer is not required to purchase any damage waiver or insurance;
    10. an explanation of the consumer’s options to purchase the merchandise;
    11. an explanation of the merchant’s right to repossess the merchandise; and
    12. an explanation of the parties’ respective rights to terminate the agreement, and to reinstate the agreement.
  8. Warranties.
    1. Upon transfer of ownership of merchandise to a consumer, a merchant shall transfer to the consumer any manufacturer’s or other warranty on the merchandise.
    2. A merchant creates an implied warranty to a consumer, which may not be waived, in the following circumstances:
      1. an affirmation of fact or promise made by the merchant to the consumer which relates to merchandise creates an implied warranty that the merchandise will substantially conform to the affirmation or promise;
      2. a description of the merchandise by the merchant creates an implied warranty that the merchandise will substantially conform to the description; and
      3. a sample or model exhibited to the consumer by the merchant creates an implied warranty that the merchandise actually delivered to the consumer will substantially conform to the sample or model.
        1. Maintenance and repairs.

          (1) During the term of a rent-to-own agreement, the merchant shall maintain the merchandise in good working condition.

          (2) If a repair cannot be completed within three days, the merchant shall provide a replacement to the consumer to use until the original merchandise is repaired. Replacement merchandise shall be at least comparable in quality, age, condition, and warranty coverage to the replaced original merchandise.

    3. A merchant is not required to repair or replace merchandise that has been damaged as a result of negligence or an intentional act by the consumer.

      (j) Prohibited provisions of rent-to-own agreement. A rent-to-own agreement shall not include any of the following provisions, which shall be void and unenforceable:

      (1) a provision requiring a confession of judgment;

      (2) a provision requiring a garnishment of wages;

      (3) a provision requiring arbitration or mediation of a claim that otherwise meets the jurisdictional requirements of a small claims proceeding under 12 V.S.A. chapter 187;

    4. a provision authorizing a merchant or its agent to enter unlawfully upon the consumer’s premises or to commit any breach of the peace in the repossession of property;
    5. a provision requiring the consumer to waive any defense, counterclaim, or right of action against the merchant or its agent in collection of payment under the agreement or in the repossession of property; or
    6. a provision requiring the consumer to purchase a damage waiver or insurance from the merchant to cover the property.

      (k) Option to purchase. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time after the first payment, a consumer who is not in violation of a rent-to-own agreement may acquire ownership of the merchandise covered by the agreement by paying an amount equal to the cash price of the merchandise minus 50 percent of the value of the consumer’s previous payments.

      ( l ) Payment; notice of default. If a consumer fails to make a timely payment required in a rent-to-own agreement, the merchant shall deliver to the consumer a notice of default and right to reinstate the agreement at least 14 days before the merchant commences a civil action to collect amounts the consumer owes under the agreement.

      (m) Collections; repossession of merchandise; prohibited acts. When attempting to collect a debt or enforce an obligation under a rent-to-own agreement, a merchant shall not:

      (1) call or visit a consumer’s workplace after a request by the consumer or his or her employer not to do so;

      (2) use profanity or any language to abuse, ridicule, or degrade a consumer;

      (3) repeatedly call, leave messages, knock on doors, or ring doorbells;

      (4) ask someone, other than a spouse, to make a payment on behalf of a consumer;

      (5) obtain payment through a consumer’s bank, credit card, or other account without authorization;

      (6) speak with a consumer more than six times per week to discuss an overdue account;

    7. engage in violence;
    8. trespass;
    9. call or visit a consumer at home or work after receiving legal notice that the consumer has filed for bankruptcy;
    10. impersonate others;
    11. discuss a consumer’s account with anyone other than a spouse of the consumer;
    12. threaten unwarranted legal action; or
    13. leave a recorded message for a consumer that includes anything other than the caller’s name, contact information, and a courteous request that the consumer return the call.

      (n) Reinstatement of agreement.

      (1) A consumer who fails to make a timely payment may reinstate a rent-to-own agreement without losing any rights or options that exist under the agreement by paying all past-due charges, the reasonable costs of pickup, redelivery, and any refurbishing, and any applicable late fee:

      1. within five business days of the renewal date of the agreement if the consumer pays monthly; or
      2. within three business days of the renewal date of the agreement if the consumer pays more frequently than monthly.

        (2) If a consumer promptly returns or voluntarily surrenders merchandise upon a merchant’s request, the consumer may reinstate a rent-to-own agreement during a period of not less than 180 days after the date the merchant retakes possession of the merchandise.

        (3) In the case of a rent-to-own agreement that is reinstated pursuant to this subsection, the merchant is not required to provide the consumer with the identical item of merchandise and may provide the consumer with a replacement item of equal quality and comparable design.

        ( o ) Reasonable charges and fees; late fees.

        (1) A charge or fee assessed under a rent-to-own agreement shall be reasonably related to the actual cost to the merchant of the service or hardship for which it is charged.

        (2) A merchant may assess only one late fee for each payment regardless of how long the payment remains due.

        (p) Prohibition on rent-to-own businesses and licensed lenders. A person engaged in the business of selling merchandise under a rent-to-own agreement subject to this section shall not engage in any conduct or business at the same physical location that would require a license under 8 V.S.A. chapter 73 (licensed lenders).

        (q) Enforcement; remedies; damages. A person who violates this section commits an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title.

(1) Cash Price: $ (2) Payments required to become owner: $ /(weekly)(biweekly)(monthly) s (# of payments) = $ (3) Mandatory charges and fees required to become owner (itemize): $ $ $ Total required fees and charges: $ (4) Total cost: (2) + (3) = $ (5) Rent-to-Own Charge: (4) - (1) = $ (6) Tax: $ (7) Do not sign before reading this agreement carefully

HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 15a; amended 2015, No. 55 , § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2015; 2021, No. 20 , § 8.

History

Revision note

—2014. In subsec. (a), substituted “9A V.S.A. § 1—201(b)(35)” for “section 1—201(37)” for purposes of clarity due to the revision of that section.

Amendments

—2021. Subdiv. (a)(4): Deleted “(a)” following “2451a” and changed “subsection” to “section” preceding “2451a”.

—2015. Section amended generally.

CROSS REFERENCES

Procedure for adoption of administrative rules, see 3 V.S.A. chapter 25.

§ 41c. Rent-to-own; assistive devices.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Assistive device” means any item, piece of equipment, or product system, whether acquired commercially off-the-shelf, modified, or customized, that is used or designed to be used to increase, maintain, or improve any functional capability of an individual with disabilities. An assistive device system, that as a whole is within the definition of this term, is itself an assistive device, and, in such cases, this term also applies to each component product of the assistive device system that is itself ordinarily an assistive device. This term includes:
      1. wheelchairs and scooters of any kind, and other aids that enhance the mobility or positioning of an individual, such as motorization, motorized positioning features, and the switches and controls for any motorized features;
      2. computer equipment with voice output, artificial larynges, voice amplification devices, and other alternative and augmentative communication devices or any devices used for the purpose of communication;
      3. computer equipment and reading devices with voice output, optical scanners, talking software, braille printers, and other aids and devices that provide access to text;
      4. hearing aids, telephone communication devices for people who are deaf, and other assistive listening devices;
      5. voice recognition computer equipment, software and hardware accommodations, switches, and other forms of alternative access to computers;
      6. environmental control units;
      7. simple mechanical aids that enhance the functional capabilities of an individual with disabilities; and
      8. durable medical equipment.
    2. “Assistive devise lessee” means an individual with a disability or a person renting or leasing on behalf of an individual with a disability who is renting or leasing an assistive device for the purpose of increasing, maintaining, or improving any functional capability related to the individual’s disability.
  2. A person in the business of renting, or renting to own, an assistive device to assistive device lessees who rents an assistive device for more than 60 days or who rents an assistive device to own shall offer such assistive device lessees a purchase option with reasonable terms and conditions. Such a purchase option may be exercised at any time by the assistive device lessees, the reasonable terms and conditions of which shall be included with the consumer’s periodic billing.
    1. A person in the business of renting products that may be assistive devices may include the following question in its rental application:
      1. If an assistive device lessee answers “yes” to the question or requests additional information, the business entity shall provide the following statement:

        ASSISTIVE DEVICE PURCHASE OPTION RIGHTS

        IF YOU ARE RENTING THIS PRODUCT AS AN ACCOMMODATION FOR A DISABILITY OR AS AN ASSISTIVE DEVICE, THE DEALER IS REQUIRED TO OFFER YOU A RENTAL TRANSACTION THAT INCLUDES A PURCHASE OPTION. UNDER THE PURCHASE OPTION YOU MAY ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OF THE PRODUCT AT ANYTIME BY TENDERING AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE CASH PRICE OF THE PRODUCT LESS 50% OF ALL PREVIOUS RENTAL PAYMENTS YOU HAVE MADE. OR, ONCE YOU HAVE MADE RENTAL PAYMENTS EQUAL TO 200% OF THE CASH PRICE YOU MAY ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OF THE PRODUCT BY PAYING $1.00.

        BEFORE YOU DETERMINE WHETHER TO ELECT A TRANSACTION WITH OR WITHOUT A PURCHASE OPTION, THE PERSON IN THE BUSINESS OF RENTING OR RENTING TO OWN THE ASSISTIVE DEVICE MUST FULLY DISCLOSE THE TERMS OF BOTH TRANSACTIONS.

        THE VALUE OF A PURCHASE OPTION DEPENDS ON MANY FACTORS, WHICH MAY INCLUDE: (1) HOW LONG YOU INTEND TO USE THE PRODUCT; (2) THE CASH PRICE OF THE PRODUCT; AND (3) THE COST OF MAINTAINING THE PRODUCT.

        ASSISTIVE DEVICE PURCHASE OPTION RIGHTS: IF YOU ELECT A RENTAL TRANSACTION WITHOUT A PURCHASE OPTION AND YOU CHANGE YOUR MIND AT A LATER DATE AND DECIDE TO ENTER INTO A PURCHASE OPTION TRANSACTION, PAYMENTS THAT YOU HAVE MADE WILL NOT BE APPLIED TO THE NEW TRANSACTIONS.

      2. The rental dealer may add additional information or explanations to the information required by subdivision (A) of this subdivision (1), as long as the additional information is not stated, utilized, or placed in a manner that will confuse the assistive device lessee or that will contradict, obscure, or distract attention from the required information. The additional information or explanation shall not have the effect of circumventing, evading, or complicating the information required by subdivision (A) of this subdivision (1).

        ARE YOU RENTING THIS PRODUCT AS AN ACCOMMODATION FOR A DISABILITY OR AS AN ASSISTIVE DEVICE?

        YES _______________ NO _______________

    2. Failure to comply with this section is not a violation if the assistive device lessee fails to inform the rental dealer that the product is being rented as an assistive device after the rental dealer makes the written inquiry in subdivision (1) of this subsection.
    1. When periodic payments made by an assistive device lessee, exclusive of payments for service, total 200 percent of the bona fide cash price, the person in the business of renting or renting to own the assistive device shall notify the individual with a disability and the assistive device lessee that the individual with a disability and the assistive device lessee have the option of acquiring ownership of the assistive device upon payment of $1.00, at which time the rental or rent-to-own agreement shall terminate. (c) (1) When periodic payments made by an assistive device lessee, exclusive of payments for service, total 200 percent of the bona fide cash price, the person in the business of renting or renting to own the assistive device shall notify the individual with a disability and the assistive device lessee that the individual with a disability and the assistive device lessee have the option of acquiring ownership of the assistive device upon payment of $1.00, at which time the rental or rent-to-own agreement shall terminate.
    2. The term “bona fide cash price” means the price at which a merchant, in the ordinary course of business, and taking into account the value of the merchandise and its retail price in the trade area, would offer to sell the merchandise to consumers for cash.
  3. Under a rent-to-own program, at any time after the initial payment, the assistive device lessee may acquire ownership of the property by tendering an amount equal to the cash price of the merchandise minus 50 percent of all previous rental-purchase payments made.
  4. When an assistive device lessee has acquired ownership of an assistive device under this section, the person in the business of renting or renting to own shall offer, for a reasonable price and term, a contract to maintain and service the device.
  5. This section shall not apply to assistive devices provided pursuant to a Medicare or Medicaid contract that either includes provisions for the acquisition of ownership or prohibits purchase or the acquisition of ownership by an assistive device lessee.
  6. A violation of this section is deemed to be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce and a violation of chapter 63 of this title and all remedies and penalties available to a consumer or the Attorney General under that chapter shall apply, and the Attorney General shall have the same authority to make rules, conduct civil investigations, and enter into assurances of discontinuance as provided under chapter 63, subchapter 1 of this title.

HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 26.

History

Amendments

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Deleted “, but is not limited to” at the end.

Subdiv. (a)(1)(D): Substituted “people who are deaf” for “the deaf”.

1999, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 provided: “This act [which added this section and §§ 2467-2470 of this title] shall apply to assistive technology devices purchased by, or leased or transferred to a consumer after July 1, 2000.”

§ 42. Permitted charges.

  1. Except for interest as provided in this chapter, a lender shall make no charges against a borrower for the use or forbearance of money other than:
    1. the reasonable cost of credit investigation and appraisal fees;
    2. the reasonable cost of title evidence, including abstracts, legal opinions, or title insurance;
    3. the reasonable cost of protection against insurable hazards;
    4. the reasonable cost of creditor life or disability insurance, or of a debt protection agreement as set forth in 8 V.S.A. § 10405 , if agreed to by the borrower;
    5. the filing and recording fees, and other official fees, including fees required by Federal Housing Agencies, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and the Federal National Mortgage Corporation;
    6. the reasonable value of services rendered in connection with the making of any loan of $4,000.00 or less or any loan or loan commitment of any amount or manner of payment to finance an income producing business or activity subject to such rules as the Commissioner of Financial Regulation adopts;
    7. the reasonable cost of private mortgage guaranty insurance subject to such limitation as the Commissioner of Financial Regulation has approved; and
    8. the reasonable fees associated with a credit card, agreed upon by the lender and borrower, including late charges and over-limit charges.
  2. A borrower may procure an opinion and abstract of title from an attorney of his or her choice acceptable to the lender, or hazard insurance in a company or in companies of his or her choice acceptable to the lender, and in such cases the lender’s acceptance shall not be unreasonably withheld.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 26, 1968; amended 1969, No. 66 , § 2, eff. April 17, 1969; 1973, No. 222 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. April 3, 1974; 1975, No. 216 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. March 27, 1976; 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. April 30, 1980; 1985, No. 36 , § 3; 1989, No. 225 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 1995, No. 9 , § 2; 1995, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; 2005, No. 70 , § 3; 2021, No. 20 , § 9.

History

References in text.

The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, referred to in subdiv. (b)(5), is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.

Amendments

—2021. Subsec. (a): Deleted “herein and hereinafter” preceding “provided” and inserted “in this chapter” following “provided”.

—2005. Subdiv. (a)(4): Inserted “or of a debt protection agreement as set forth in section 10405 of Title 8”.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities” in subdivs. (a)(6) and (7).

—1995. Subsec. (a): Added “and” following “approved” in subdiv. (7) and added subdiv. (8).

—1989 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, and securities” for “commissioner of banking and insurance” in subdivs. (6) and (7).

—1985. Subdiv. (a)(6): Deleted “single payment” preceding “loan of” and substituted “$4,000.00” for “$2,000.00” thereafter and inserted “of any amount or manner of payment” following “commitment”.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(6): Substituted “single payment loan of $2,000.00” for “loan of $1,000.00” preceding “or less”.

—1975 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(6): Added “or any loan or loan commitment to finance an income producing business or activity” preceding “subject to”.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(5): Added “including fees required by Federal Housing Agencies, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage Corporation” following “official fees”.

Subdiv. (a)(7): Added.

—1969. Subdiv. (a)(1): Added “and appraisal fees” following “investigation”.

Subdiv. (a)(6): Added.

Subsec. (b): Original undesignated last paragraph designated as subsec. (b).

Implementation. For implementation of 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.) provisions, see note set out following heading for this subchapter.

§ 43. Deposit requirement prohibited; exception.

A lender shall not, as a condition to granting or extending a loan, require a borrower to keep or place any sum on deposit with the lender or nominee of the lender, except for deposit arrangements directly related to secured credit cards in a manner consistent with rules adopted by the Commissioner, rules that shall include disclosure requirements, and specific types of alternative mortgages approved by the Commissioner as provided in 8 V.S.A. § 1256 .

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 26, 1968; amended 1977, No. 184 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1995, No. 9 , § 3.

History

References in text.

8 V.S.A. § 1256 , referred to in this section, was repealed by 1999, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 27, eff. January 1, 2001. For present provisions pertaining to alternative mortgages, see 8 V.S.A. § 2216 .

Amendments

—1995. Inserted “secured credit cards in a manner consistent with rules adopted by the commissioner, rules that shall include disclosure requirements and” following “related to”.

—1977 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

§ 44. Certain charges not usurious.

Agreements to maintain with the lender non-interest bearing reserves or deposits with which to pay when due taxes and insurance premiums, or agreements clearly set forth in the loan contract for the payment of reasonable delinquency or deferral charges, shall not be construed to be interest or a prohibited charge within the meaning of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 26, 1968.

§ 45. Prepayment of loans.

A borrower may prepay a loan at any time, without prepayment premium or penalty.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 26, 1968.

§ 46. Exceptions.

Section 43 of this title, relating to deposit requirements, and section 45 of this title, relating to prepayment penalties, shall not apply and the parties may contract for a rate of interest in excess of the rate provided in section 41a of this title in the case of:

  1. obligations of corporations, including municipal and nonprofit corporations; or
  2. obligations incurred by any person, partnership, association, or other entity to finance in whole or in part income-producing business or activity, but not including obligations incurred to finance family dwellings of four units or fewer when used as a residence by the borrower or to finance real estate that is devoted to agricultural purposes as part of an operating farming unit when used as a residence by the borrower; or
  3. obligations to finance the purchase, construction, or improvement of property for seasonal or part-time occupancy and not as a place of legal residence; or
  4. obligations guaranteed or insured by the United States of America or any agency thereof.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 26, 1968; amended 1969, No. 66 , § 3, eff. April 17, 1969; 1973, No. 222 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 3, 1974; 1975, No. 216 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 27, 1976; 2009, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 24i.

History

Revision note

—2006. The undesignated paragraph following subdiv. (4) was rewritten to be included in the existing introductory paragraph in order to state more directly, and to clarify, the intention of the section.

Revision note—. Reference to “the foregoing section 41” changed to “section 41a of this title” in light of the repeal of § 41 of this title, relating to legal rates of interest, and the enactment of § 41a of this title, relating to the same subject matter, and for purposes of conformity with V.S.A. style.

Reference to “the foregoing sections 43 and 45” changed to “sections 43 and 45 of this title” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (2): Substituted “four units” for “two units” following “family dwellings of”.

—1975 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “(a)” following “section 41” near the end of the section.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1969. Subdiv. (2): Inserted “when used as a residence by the borrower” following “two units or less” and “farming unit”.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in R. Brown & Sons, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 144 Vt. 142, 473 A.2d 1168, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 423 (1984); H. A. Eddy Oil Co. v. St. Peter, 149 Vt. 201, 542 A.2d 257, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 618 (1987).

§ 47. Application of payments.

  1. On a note, bill, or other similar obligation, payable on demand or at a specified time, with interest, when a payment is made, the payment shall be applied: first, to liquidate the interest accrued at the time of the payment; and second, to extinguish the principal.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, payments shall be applied to interest, principal, and escrow charges, if any, before any portion of the payment is applied to late fees, delinquency charges, deferral charges, or any similar fees or charges.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 26, 1968; amended 2019, No. 20 , § 104.

History

Amendments

—2019. Added the subsec. (a) designation and subsec. (b).

ANNOTATIONS

Legacies.

Where a legacy bore simple interest, payments were to be applied first to extinguish the interest and then the principal sum. Trustees of Bradford Academy v. Grover, 55 Vt. 462, 1883 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1883). (Decided under prior law.)

§ 48. Excess insurance, proceeds.

If a loan is paid before its due date as the result of the death of a borrower insured under a creditor life insurance policy and the insurance proceeds exceed the amount owing on the loan with interest, the excess shall be refunded to a beneficiary designated by the borrower, or to the estate of the insured, or applied in reduction of the debt.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 26, 1968.

CROSS REFERENCES

Credit life insurance generally, see 8 V.S.A. chapter 109.

§ 49. Computation of interest.

When a note, bill, or other similar obligation is payable on demand or at a specified time, with interest annually, the annual interest that remains unpaid shall bear simple interest from the time it becomes due to the time of final settlement; but if in a year, reckoning from the time the annual interest began to accrue, payments are made, the amount of those payments at the end of that year, with interest thereon from the time of payment, shall be applied: first, to liquidate the simple interest accrued from the unpaid annual interest; second, to liquidate the annual interest due; and third, to extinguish the principal.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 26, 1968.

§ 50. Penalties.

  1. When a greater rate of interest than is allowed by law is paid, the person paying it may recover the amount so paid above the legal interest, with interest thereon from the time of payment and all expenses of collection, including reasonable attorney’s fees, in a civil action on this statute.
  2. Except as otherwise expressly authorized by law, a lender shall not knowingly or willfully make any contract, express or implied, that directly or indirectly calls for the payment of any interest or finance charge in excess of the legal rate as set forth in section 41a of this title.  The section shall be enforceable only to the extent herein provided and the lender shall have no right to collect any interest or charges whatsoever and shall have a right to collect only one-half of the principal.
  3. Any person, partnership, association, or corporation and the several members, officers, directors, agents, and employees thereof, who knowingly or willfully contracts for or collects any sum in excess of legal interest for the loan, use, or forbearance of money, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, shall, for the first offense, be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Upon conviction for violating this section in any transaction entered into or consummated after a first conviction hereunder, the offender shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 377 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 26, 1968; amended 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. April 30, 1980.

History

Amendments

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “finance charge” for “discount” following “interest or” and “41a” for “41” following “section” in the first sentence.

Implementation. For implementation of 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.) provisions, see note set out following heading for this subchapter.

ANNOTATIONS

Accrual of right of recovery.

Where mortgage and note were executed for $1,000, but defendant, after counting out $1,000, took back $100, being usury agreed upon, and thereafter annual interest was paid upon the note until it became due and was paid off, the right to recover for the $100 usury did not accrue until the note was paid. Harvey v. National Life Insurance Co., 60 Vt. 209, 14 A. 7, 1887 Vt. LEXIS 85 (1887). (Decided under prior law.)

Amount of recovery.

Where clear proof was lacking of a wrongful intent to violate usury law on part of mortgagee, subsec. (b) of this section, under which lender could collect only one half of the principal and no interest or charges, would not be applied, but mortgagors would be entitled to benefits of subsec. (a) of this section, permitting recovery of usurious interest. Crocker v. Brandt, 130 Vt. 349, 293 A.2d 541, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 282 (1972). (Decided under prior law.)

Applicability.

Penalties given by the usury laws of one state were not recoverable in the courts of another state. Blaine v. Curtis, 59 Vt. 120, 7 A. 708, 1886 Vt. LEXIS 12 (1886). (Decided under prior law.)

Recovery of usury paid to a national bank could not be had under this section since all state laws on subject of interest and usury paid to national banks had been superseded by federal statutes. Dow v. Irasburgh National Bank, 50 Vt. 112, 1877 Vt. LEXIS 71 (1877). (Decided under prior law.) Hill v. National Bank, 56 Vt. 582, 1884 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1884). (Decided under prior law.) Cohen v. Welden National Bank, 102 Vt. 120, 146 A. 252, 1929 Vt. LEXIS 153 (1929). (Decided under prior law.)

Construction.

This section is remedial and not penal. Hubbell v. Gale, 3 Vt. 266, 1830 Vt. LEXIS 68 (1830). (Decided under prior law.)

Effect of separate agreements.

Although the payment of usury upon a note would be deemed a part of payment of the note if the note included both the money loaned and the usury, yet if separate notes were given for the usury, whether at the time of negotiating the loan or afterwards, and the usury when paid was applied upon such notes, the debtor could treat such payment as having no connection with the legal demand and sue to recover it. Nichols & Bliss v. Bellows, 22 Vt. 581, 1849 Vt. LEXIS 103 (1849). (Decided under prior law.)

Effect of settlement or discharge.

A sealed release or receipt, “in full settlement and payment for all extra or unlawful interest,” executed at the time the money was loaned, and a part of the transaction of borrowing, was not a bar to a recovery of the usury. Herrick v. Dean, 54 Vt. 568 (1882). (Decided under prior law.)

A discharge executed by the borrower, under seal, imported a consideration, and was sufficient on demurrer to bar recovery. Wing v. Peck, 54 Vt. 245, 1881 Vt. LEXIS 101 (1881). (Decided under prior law.)

Although parties mutually intended that the payment of a balance found due on settlement would settle everything between them, yet it would not have that effect as to usurious interest previously paid and which was not in fact reckoned in the settlement, nor in dispute between them. Rowell v. Marcy, 47 Vt. 627, 1874 Vt. LEXIS 120 (1874). (Decided under prior law.)

Effect of voluntary payment.

A voluntary payment of usury did not preclude the party making it from recovering it back in a suit brought by himself for that purpose. Wheatley v. Waldo, 36 Vt. 237, 1863 Vt. LEXIS 66 (1863). (Decided under prior law.)

To recover under this section, it was not necessary that the money should have been paid in pursuance of any usurious agreement. Stevens v. Fisher, 23 Vt. 272, 1851 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1851). (Decided under prior law.)

Persons entitled to recover.

The purchaser of property subject to a mortgage given to secure notes drawing usurious interest who assumed payment upon notes could not recover money paid for such interest thereon. Spaulding v. Davis, 51 Vt. 77, 1878 Vt. LEXIS 125 (1878). (Decided under prior law.)

An accommodation maker of a promissory note could not avail himself in a suit upon the note of a payment of usury thereon by the party accommodated. Cady v. Goodnow, 49 Vt. 400, 1877 Vt. LEXIS 28 (1877). (Decided under prior law.)

The right to recover usury was personal to debtor as the party who furnished the funds. Low v. Estate of Mussey, 36 Vt. 183, 1863 Vt. LEXIS 59 (1863). (Decided under prior law.)

If a third party contracted with debtor, for valuable consideration, to pay usurious notes, and executed his own notes in lieu of those of debtor, action to recover usury was required to be brought in name of debtor; but if new notes were mere substitutes without new consideration, the third party could recover usurious interest paid by him. Hazard v. Smith, 21 Vt. 123, 1849 Vt. LEXIS 8 (1849). (Decided under prior law.)

The right of a bankrupt to sue for and recover back money paid by him as usury was not such a right of property as vested in the assignee in bankruptcy. Nichols & Bliss v. Bellows, 22 Vt. 581, 1849 Vt. LEXIS 103 (1849). (Decided under prior law.) Lafountain v. Burlington Savings Bank, 56 Vt. 332, 1883 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1883). (Decided under prior law.)

Plaintiff was entitled to recover, although no money had been paid directly by plaintiff to defendant, where plaintiff had executed to defendant notes which included the usury and had secured payment of same by mortgage, and plaintiff subsequently had sold the mortgaged premises and allowed to the purchaser, towards the price, the amount of this incumbrance upon them, and executed a deed, which was not to take effect unless the notes were paid by the purchaser, which purchaser did. Nelson v. Cooley, 20 Vt. 201, 1848 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1848). (Decided under prior law.)

Right to recover usury was right of property which passed to and vested in assignee in bankruptcy. Moore v. Jones, 23 Vt. 739, 17 F. Cas. 686, 1848 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60 (1848). (Decided under prior law.)

Persons liable in action for recovery.

Intermediary who received bonus for arranging usurious transaction was party to contract, although not named on note, and thus liable in action to recover usurious interest received by him. Williams v. Wilder, 37 Vt. 613, 1865 Vt. LEXIS 38 (1865). (Decided under prior law.)

Pleading.

Where usury was included in mortgage notes, and a bill of foreclosure was brought, the defense based upon the usury was required to be raised in that suit, or the decree would conclude the right; but if the original contract was not usurious, subsequent payment of usury upon it had no legal connection with it, and the amount so paid could be recovered back in an action for money had and received, notwithstanding a decree of foreclosure might have been obtained, without any allowance for the usury so paid. Grow v. Albee, 19 Vt. 540, 1847 Vt. LEXIS 77 (1847). (Decided under prior law.)

Goods sold and delivered, in payment of usurious interest, could not be charged on book and recovered for in an action on a book account; the recovery was required to be pursued in mode pointed out by this section. Allen v. Thrall, 10 Vt. 255, 1838 Vt. LEXIS 50 (1838). (Decided under prior law.)

Proof.

If the penalty provided in of this section was to be invoked, the debtor was required to prove the transaction was a loan and usurious and also that the lender entered into the contract knowingly or wilfully with a wrongful intent. Farnsworth v. Cochran, 125 Vt. 174, 212 A.2d 818, 1965 Vt. LEXIS 221 (1965). (Decided under prior law.)

It was the obvious purpose of the Legislature that to invoke the harsh penalty of this section the debtor was required to show with clear proof that the lender, with full knowledge of the usurious nature of the agreement, deliberately went forward with the transaction. Farnsworth v. Cochran, 125 Vt. 174, 212 A.2d 818, 1965 Vt. LEXIS 221 (1965). (Decided under prior law.)

Questions for jury.

The question whether a transaction was a usurious loan, or a bona fide sale with an option or agreement to repurchase, was generally for the jury. State v. Bosworth, 124 Vt. 3, 197 A.2d 477, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1963). (Decided under prior law.)

Setoff.

Where mortgage securing usurious notes was foreclosed, but security was less than debt, mortgagee could, in suit against him to recover the usury, offset the amount by which the notes exceeded the security. McDonald v. Smith, 57 Vt. 502, 1885 Vt. LEXIS 86 (1885). (Decided under prior law.)

Subchapter 2. Disclosure

§ 101. Borrower’s notice.

A demand note shall contain on its face the following notice in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type:

NOTICE TO BORROWER: THIS IS A DEMAND NOTE AND SO MAY BE COLLECTED BY THE LENDER AT ANY TIME. A NEW NOTE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED MAY CARRY A HIGHER OR LOWER RATE OF INTEREST.

HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 106 , § 3.

§ 102. Co-signer’s notice.

If a lender requires the signature of an obligor jointly and severally the instrument evidencing the obligation shall contain on its face the following notice, conspicuously placed, in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type:

NOTICE TO CO-SIGNER: YOUR SIGNATURE ON THIS NOTE MEANS THAT YOU ARE EQUALLY LIABLE FOR REPAYMENT OF THIS LOAN. IF THE BORROWER DOES NOT PAY, THE LENDER HAS A LEGAL RIGHT TO COLLECT FROM YOU.

HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 106 , § 3.

ANNOTATIONS

Guarantor.

This section did not apply to a guarantor of a promissory note. Vermont Development Credit Corp. v. Kitchel, 149 Vt. 421, 544 A.2d 1165, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 44 (1988).

Cited.

Cited in R. Brown & Sons, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 144 Vt. 142, 473 A.2d 1168, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 423 (1984).

§ 103. Residential real estate loans.

  1. For any fixed-rate loan, secured by a lien against real estate, used or to be used by the borrower as a residence, the rate of interest and other terms of the loan shall be for the duration of the loan at no more than the rate and terms established in the commitment letter for the loan by the lender, whether or not conditioned on future actions or events, and not the date of execution or closing of the transaction, unless specifically disclosed to and agreed to by the borrower on the date the commitment letter issues.  The provisions of section 50 of this title shall apply to any violation of this section.
  2. For any variable-rate loan, secured by a lien against real estate used or to be used by the borrower as a residence, the lender shall disclose any introductory discount or similar reduction from the index or other measure fixing the rate or other terms of the loan at the time the loan commitment letter issues.  Any subsequent adjustment above the initial amount discounted, not disclosed as provided in this subsection, shall have no legal force and effect.
  3. The Commissioner of Financial Regulation may adopt rules specifying the form, content, and timing of commitment letters required by this section. The Commissioner may order any person to make restitution to any person injured as a result of a violation of this subchapter and may impose an administrative penalty of up to $1,000.00 for a violation of this subchapter. The Commissioner may order any person to cease violating this subchapter.

HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.); amended 1997, No. 98 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 16, 1998; 2015, No. 23 , § 88.

History

Amendments

—2015. Subsec. (c): Substituted “adopt” for “promulgate” preceding “rules” in the first sentence.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

§ 104. High rate loans.

  1. The Commissioner may adopt disclosure rules for loans secured by a first lien on residential real estate in which the borrower is expected to be charged in excess of four points or interest in excess of three percent over the rate established pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 3108 , or both, on the loan. The rules may provide for restrictions on representations by the lender regarding the disclosures required by the rules.
  2. The Commissioner shall notify all mortgage lenders of the interest rate determined under 32 V.S.A. § 3108 annually.
  3. The Commissioner may impose an administrative penalty of not more than $5,000.00 on any person that fails to comply with the provisions of this section. The Commissioner may order a lender to refund any discount points or other charges paid by a borrower who has not received disclosures required by the rule.

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 98 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. April 16, 1998; amended 2015, No. 23 , § 89.

History

Amendments

—2015. Subsec. (a): Substituted “adopt” for “promulgate” preceding “disclosure rules” in the first sentence.

Subchapter 3. Funded Settlements

§ 201. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Disbursement of loan funds” means the delivery of the loan funds by the lender to the settlement agent in one or more of the following forms:
    1. cash;
    2. wired funds or electronic transfer;
    3. certified check;
    4. checks issued by a governmental entity or instrumentality;
    5. cashier’s check, teller’s check, or any transfer of funds by check or otherwise that is fully collected and unconditionally available to the settlement agent;
    6. checks or other drafts issued by a state-chartered or federally chartered financial institution; checks or other drafts issued by a state-chartered or federally chartered credit union; and
    7. checks issued by an insurance company licensed in the State of Vermont.
  2. “Disbursement of the settlement proceeds” means the payment of all proceeds of the transaction by the settlement agent to the persons or accounts designated to receive the proceeds.
  3. “Lender” means any person who is in the business of making loans secured by a mortgage on real estate and to whom the debt is initially payable on the face of the loan documents.
  4. “Loan closing” means the time a borrower executes any loan document or becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction, whichever occurs sooner.
  5. “Loan documents” means the note evidencing the debt due the lender, the mortgage securing the debt due the lender, and any other documents required by the lender to be executed by the borrower as part of the transaction.
  6. “Loan funds” means the proceeds of the loan to be disbursed by the lender to others at closing.
  7. “Settlement” means the time when the settlement agent has received the loan funds, loan documents, and other documents and funds to carry out the terms of the contract between the parties, and the settlement agent reasonably determines that all conditions of such contracts have been satisfied. “Parties,” as used in this subdivision, means the seller, purchaser, borrower, lender, and settlement agent.
  8. “Settlement agent” means the person responsible for conducting the settlement and disbursement of the settlement proceeds, and includes an individual, corporation, partnership, or other entity conducting the settlement and disbursement of the settlement proceeds. The lender may be the settlement agent.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 55 , § 2.

§ 202. Applicability.

This subchapter applies only to transactions involving loans made by lenders, which loans are secured by a first lien on owner-occupied one-to-four-unit residential real estate, including first and second homes.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 55 , § 2.

§ 203. Duty of lender.

  1. The lender shall, at or before the loan closing, cause disbursement of loan funds to the settlement agent; however, in the case of a refinancing, or any other loan where a right of rescission applies but has not been exercised, the lender shall, prior to 2:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time of the first business day after the expiration of the rescission period required under the federal Truth-in-Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.), cause disbursement of loan funds to the settlement agent.
  2. If the lender is acting as settlement agent, the lender shall cause disbursement of the settlement proceeds at the loan closing, or, for any other loan where a right of rescission applies, the lender shall cause disbursement of the settlement proceeds on the first business day after the expiration of the rescission period.
  3. The lender shall not be entitled to receive or charge any interest on the loan until disbursement of the settlement proceeds.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 55 , § 2.

§ 204. Duty of settlement agent that is not a lender.

A settlement agent that has received the loan funds from the lender shall cause disbursement of settlement proceeds at the loan closing, or, for any other loan where a right of rescission applies, the settlement agent shall cause disbursement of the settlement proceeds on the first business day after the expiration of the rescission period.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 55 , § 2.

§ 205. Commissioner’s powers.

  1. The Commissioner may:
    1. impose an administrative penalty of not more than $1,000.00 for each violation upon any person who violates or participates in the violation of this subchapter, or any lawful regulation or order issued thereunder;
    2. order any person to make restitution to any person injured as a result of a violation of this subchapter; and
    3. order any person to cease and desist in any specified conduct.
  2. The powers vested in the Commissioner by this subchapter shall be in addition to any other powers to enforce any penalties, fines, or forfeitures authorized by law.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 55 , § 2.

§ 206. Consumer remedies.

  1. A lender or settlement agent who violates any provision of this subchapter and causes actual damage to a consumer is subject to a civil action by the aggrieved consumer in which the consumer has the right to recover the greater of actual damages in an amount determined by the court or, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, an amount determined by the court of not less than $250.00 nor more than $1,000.00, plus costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney’s fees.
  2. Liability under subsection (a) of this section is limited to actual damages, plus costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney’s fees, if the lender or settlement agent shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid any such error.
  3. An action may not be brought pursuant to this section more than two years after the loan closing has occurred.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 55 , § 2.

Part 2. Negotiable Instruments and Documents of Title

Chapter 20. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act

History

Applicability of 2003 enactment. Pursuant to 2003, No. 44 , § 4, 9 V.S.A. §§ 270 through 290 (Chapter 20), which were enacted by 2003, No. 44 , § 1, applies to any electronic record or electronic signature created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored on or after the effective date of this act [January 1, 2004].

§ 270. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 271. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Agreement” means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances and from rules, regulations, and procedures given the effect of agreements under laws otherwise applicable to a particular transaction.
  2. “Automated transaction” means a transaction conducted or performed, in whole or in part, by electronic means or electronic records, in which the acts or records of one or both parties are not reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course in forming a contract, performing under an existing contract, or fulfilling an obligation required by the transaction.
  3. “Computer program” means a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in an information processing system in order to bring about a certain result.
  4. “Consumer” means an individual who obtains, through a transaction, products or services that are used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and also means the legal representative of such an individual.
  5. “Contract” means the total legal obligation resulting from the parties’ agreement as affected by this chapter and other applicable law.
  6. “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
  7. “Electronic agent” means a computer program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.
  8. “Electronic record” means a record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.
  9. “Electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.
  10. “Governmental agency” means an executive, legislative, or judicial agency, department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality of the federal government or of a state or of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of a state.
  11. “Information” means data, text, images, sounds, codes, computer programs, software, databases, or the like.
  12. “Information processing system” means an electronic system for creating, generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying, or processing information.
  13. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, governmental agency, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  14. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  15. “Security procedure” means a procedure employed for the purpose of verifying that an electronic signature, record, or performance is that of a specific person or for detecting changes or errors in the information in an electronic record. The term includes a procedure that requires the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or other acknowledgment procedures.
  16. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
  17. “Transaction” means an action or set of actions occurring between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, or governmental affairs.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 272. Scope.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, this chapter applies to electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a transaction.
  2. This chapter does not apply to:
    1. a transaction to the extent it is governed by a law governing the creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
    2. a transaction to the extent it is governed by a state statute, regulation, or other rule of law governing adoption, divorce, or other matters of family law;
    3. a transaction to the extent it is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, other than 9A V.S.A. §§ 1-107 and 1-206, Article 2, and Article 2A;
    4. court orders or notices, or official court documents, including briefs, pleadings, and other writings, required to be executed in connection with court proceedings; or
    5. any notice of:
      1. the cancellation or termination of utility services (including water, heat, and power);
      2. default, acceleration, repossession, foreclosure, or eviction, or the right to cure, under a credit agreement secured by, or a rental agreement for, a primary residence of an individual;
      3. the cancellation or termination of health insurance or benefits or life insurance benefits (excluding annuities);
      4. recall of a product, or material failure of a product, that risks endangering health or safety; or
      5. a right to cancel a home solicitation sale required pursuant to section 2454 of this title;
    6. any document required to accompany any transportation or handling of hazardous materials, pesticides, or other toxic or dangerous materials.
  3. This chapter applies to an electronic record or electronic signature otherwise excluded from the application of this chapter under subsection (b) of this section to the extent that it is governed by a law other than those specified in subsection (b).
  4. A transaction subject to this chapter is also subject to other applicable substantive law.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 9.

History

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(3): Substituted “9A” for “9”. su

§ 273. Prospective application.

This chapter applies to any electronic record or electronic signature created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored on or after January 1, 2004.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

History

Revision note

—2020. Substituted “January 1, 2004” for “the effective date of this chapter” for purposes of clarity.

§ 274. Use of electronic records and electronic signatures; variation by agreement.

  1. This chapter does not require a record or signature to be created, generated, sent, communicated, received, stored, or otherwise processed or used by electronic means or in electronic form.
  2. This chapter applies only to transactions between parties, each of which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means. Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ conduct.
  3. A party that agrees to conduct a transaction by electronic means may refuse to conduct other transactions by electronic means. This subsection may not be waived by agreement.
  4. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the effect of any of its provisions may be varied by agreement. The presence in certain provisions of this chapter of the words “unless otherwise agreed,” or words of similar import, does not imply that the effect of other provisions may not be varied by agreement.
  5. Whether an electronic record or electronic signature has legal consequences is determined by this chapter and other applicable law.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 275. Construction and application.

This chapter must be construed and applied:

  1. to facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other applicable law;
  2. to be consistent with reasonable practices concerning electronic transactions and with the continued expansion of those practices; and
  3. to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 276. Legal recognition of electronic records, electronic signatures, and electronic contracts.

  1. A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.
  2. A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.
  3. If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law.
  4. If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 277. Provision of information in writing; presentation of records.

  1. If parties have agreed to conduct a transaction by electronic means and a law requires a person to provide, send, or deliver information in writing to another person, the requirement is satisfied if the information is provided, sent, or delivered, as the case may be, in an electronic record capable of retention by the recipient at the time of receipt. An electronic record is not capable of retention by the recipient if the sender or its information processing system inhibits the ability of the recipient to print or store the electronic record.
  2. If a law other than this chapter requires a record to be posted or displayed in a certain manner, to be sent, communicated, or transmitted by a specified method, or to contain information that is formatted in a certain manner, the following rules apply:
    1. The record must be posted or displayed in the manner specified in the other law.
    2. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (d)(2) of this section, the record must be sent, communicated, or transmitted by the method specified in the other law.
    3. The record must contain the information formatted in the manner specified in the other law.
  3. If a sender inhibits the ability of a recipient to store or print an electronic record, the electronic record is not enforceable against the recipient.
  4. The requirements of this section may not be varied by agreement, but:
    1. to the extent a law other than this chapter requires information to be provided, sent, or delivered in writing but permits that requirement to be varied by agreement, the requirement under subsection (a) of this section that the information be in the form of an electronic record capable of retention may also be varied by agreement; and
    2. a requirement under a law other than this chapter to send, communicate, or transmit a record by first-class mail may be varied by agreement to the extent permitted by the other law.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 278. Attribution and effect of electronic record and electronic signature.

  1. An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.
  2. The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a person under subsection (a) of this section is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the parties’ agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 279. Effect of change or error.

If a change or error in an electronic record occurs in a transmission between parties to a transaction, the following rules apply:

  1. If the parties have agreed to use a security procedure to detect changes or errors and one party has conformed to the procedure, but the other party has not, and the nonconforming party would have detected the change or error had that party also conformed, the conforming party may avoid the effect of the changed or erroneous electronic record.
  2. In an automated transaction involving an individual, the individual may avoid the effect of an electronic record that resulted from an error made by the individual or on the part of the individual in dealing with the electronic agent of another person if the electronic agent did not provide an opportunity for the prevention or correction of the error and, at the time the individual learns of the error, the individual:
    1. promptly notifies the other person of the error and that the individual did not intend to be bound by the electronic record received by the other person;
    2. takes reasonable steps, including steps that conform to the other person’s reasonable instructions, to return to the other person or, if instructed by the other person, to destroy the consideration received, if any, as a result of the erroneous electronic record; and
    3. has not used or received any benefit or value from the consideration, if any, received from the other person.
  3. If neither subdivision (1) nor (2) of this section applies, the change or error has the effect provided by other law, including the law of mistake, and the parties’ contract, if any.
  4. Subdivisions (2) and (3) of this section may not be varied by agreement.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 280. Notarization and acknowledgment.

If a law requires a signature or record to be notarized, acknowledged, verified, or made under oath, the requirement is satisfied if the electronic signature of the person authorized to perform those acts, together with all other information required to be included by other applicable law, is attached to or logically associated with the signature or record.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 281. Retention of electronic records; originals.

  1. If a law requires that a record be retained, the requirement is satisfied by retaining an electronic record of the information in the record that:
    1. accurately reflects the information set forth in the record at the time and after it was first generated in its final form as an electronic record or otherwise; and
    2. remains accessible to all persons who are entitled to access by statute, regulation, or rule of law, for the period required by such statute, regulation, or rule of law, in a form that is capable of being accurately reproduced for later reference, whether by transmission, printing, or otherwise.
  2. A requirement to retain a record in accordance with subsection (a) of this section does not apply to any information, the sole purpose of which is to enable the record to be sent, communicated, or received.
  3. A person may satisfy subsection (a) of this section by using the services of another person if the requirements of that subsection are satisfied.
  4. If a law requires a record to be presented or retained in its original form, or provides consequences if the record is not presented or retained in its original form, that law is satisfied by an electronic record retained in accordance with subsection (a) of this section.
  5. If a law requires retention of a check, that requirement is satisfied by retention of an electronic record of the information on the front and back of the check in accordance with subsection (a) of this section.
  6. A record retained as an electronic record in accordance with subsection (a) of this section satisfies a law requiring a person to retain a record for evidentiary, audit, or like purposes, unless a law enacted after January 1, 2004 specifically prohibits the use of an electronic record for the specified purpose.
  7. This section does not preclude a governmental agency of this State from specifying additional requirements for the retention of a record subject to the agency’s jurisdiction.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

History

Revision note

—2020. In subsec. (f), substituted “January 1, 2004” for “the effective date of this chapter” for purposes of clarity.

§ 282. Admissibility in evidence.

In a proceeding, evidence of a record or signature may not be excluded solely because it is in electronic form.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 283. Automated transaction.

In an automated transaction, the following rules apply:

  1. A contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms and agreements.
  2. A contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual, acting on the individual’s own behalf or for another person, including by an interaction in which the individual performs actions that the individual is free to refuse to perform and which the individual knows or has reason to know will cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction or performance.
  3. The terms of the contract are determined by the substantive law applicable to it.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 284. Time and place of sending and receipt.

  1. Unless otherwise agreed between the sender and the recipient, an electronic record is sent when it:
    1. is addressed properly or otherwise directed properly to an information processing system that the recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records or information of the type sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record;
    2. is in a form capable of being processed by that system; and
    3. enters an information processing system outside the control of the sender or of a person that sent the electronic record on behalf of the sender or enters a region of the information processing system designated or used by the recipient that is under the control of the recipient.
  2. Unless otherwise agreed between the sender and the recipient, an electronic record is received when it:
    1. enters an information processing system that the recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records or information of the type sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record; and
    2. is in a form capable of being processed by that system.
  3. Subsection (b) of this section applies even if the place the information processing system is located is different from the place the electronic record is deemed to be received under subsection (d) of this section.
  4. Unless otherwise expressly provided in the electronic record or agreed between the sender and the recipient, an electronic record is deemed to be sent from the sender’s place of business and to be received at the recipient’s place of business. For purposes of this subsection, the following rules apply:
    1. If the sender or recipient has more than one place of business, the place of business of that person is the place having the closest relationship to the underlying transaction.
    2. If the sender or the recipient does not have a place of business, the place of business is the sender’s or recipient’s residence, as the case may be.
  5. An electronic record is received under subsection (b) of this section even if no individual is aware of its receipt.
  6. Receipt of an electronic acknowledgment from an information processing system described in subsection (b) of this section establishes that a record was received but, by itself, does not establish that the content sent corresponds to the content received.
  7. If a person is aware that an electronic record purportedly sent under subsection (a) of this section, or purportedly received under subsection (b) of this section, was not actually sent or received, the legal effect of the sending or receipt is determined by other applicable law. Except to the extent permitted by the other law, the requirements of this subsection may not be varied by agreement.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 285. Transferable records.

  1. In this section, “transferable record” means an electronic record that:
    1. would be a note under 9A V.S.A. § 3—104 or a document under 9A V.S.A. § 7—102 if the electronic record were in writing; and
    2. the issuer of the electronic record expressly has agreed is a transferable record.
  2. A person has control of a transferable record if a system employed for evidencing the transfer of interests in the transferable record reliably establishes that person as the person to which the transferable record was issued or transferred.
  3. A system satisfies subsection (b) of this section, and a person is deemed to have control of a transferable record, if the transferable record is created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that:
    1. a single authoritative copy of the transferable record exists that is unique, identifiable, and, except as otherwise provided in subdivisions (4), (5), and (6) of this subsection, unalterable;
    2. the authoritative copy identifies the person asserting control as:
      1. the person to which the transferable record was issued; or
      2. if the authoritative copy indicates that the transferable record has been transferred, the person to which the transferable record was most recently transferred;
    3. the authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the person asserting control or its designated custodian;
    4. copies or revisions that add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy can be made only with the consent of the person asserting control;
    5. each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily identifiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
    6. any revision of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as authorized or unauthorized.
  4. Except as otherwise agreed, a person having control of a transferable record is the holder, as defined in 9A V.S.A. § 1—201(b)(21), of the transferable record and has the same rights and defenses as a holder of an equivalent record or writing under Title 9A, including, if the applicable statutory requirements under 9A V.S.A. §§ 3—302(a), 7—501, or 9—308 are satisfied, the rights and defenses of a holder in due course, a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated, or a purchaser, respectively. Delivery, possession, and endorsement are not required to obtain or exercise any of the rights under this subsection.
  5. Except as otherwise agreed, an obligor under a transferable record has the same rights and defenses as an equivalent obligor under equivalent records or writings under Title 9A.
  6. If requested by a person against which enforcement is sought, the person seeking to enforce the transferable record shall provide reasonable proof that the person is in control of the transferable record. Proof may include access to the authoritative copy of the transferable record and related business records sufficient to review the terms of the transferable record and to establish the identity of the person having control of the transferable record.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

History

Revision note

—2014. In subsec. (d), substituted “9A V.S.A. § 1—201(b)(21)” for “section 1—201(20) of Title 9A” for purposes of clarity due to the revision of that section.

§ 286. Preservation of rights and obligations.

This chapter does not:

  1. limit, alter, or otherwise affect any requirement imposed by a statute, regulation, or rule of law relating to the rights and obligations of persons under such statute, regulation, or rule of law other than a requirement that contracts or other records be written, signed, or in nonelectronic form; or
  2. require any person to agree to use or accept electronic records or electronic signatures.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 287. Consumer disclosures.

  1. Consent to Electronic Records.   Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, if a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires that information relating to a transaction or transactions be provided or made available to a consumer in writing, the use of an electronic record to provide or make available (whichever is required) such information satisfies the requirement that such information be in writing if:
    1. The consumer has affirmatively consented to such use and has not withdrawn such consent.
    2. The consumer, prior to consenting, is provided with a clear and conspicuous statement:
      1. informing the consumer of:
        1. any right or option of the consumer to have the record provided or made available on paper or in nonelectronic form; and
        2. the right of the consumer to withdraw the consent to have the record provided or made available in an electronic form and of any conditions, consequences (which may include termination of the parties’ relationship), or fees in the event of such withdrawal;
      2. informing the consumer of whether the consent applies only to the particular transaction that gave rise to the obligation to provide the record, or to identified categories of records that may be provided or made available during the course of the parties’ relationship;
      3. describing the procedures the consumer must use to withdraw consent as provided in subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii) of this section and to update information needed to contact the consumer electronically; and
      4. informing the consumer how, after the consent, the consumer may, upon request, obtain a paper copy of an electronic record, and whether any fee will be charged for such copy.
    3. The consumer:
      1. prior to consenting, is provided with a statement of the hardware and software requirements for access to and retention of the electronic records; and
      2. consents electronically, or confirms his or her consent electronically, in a manner that reasonably demonstrates that the consumer can access information in the electronic form that will be used to provide the information that is the subject of the consent.
    4. After the consent of a consumer in accordance with subdivision (a)(1) of this section, if a change in the hardware or software requirements needed to access or retain electronic records creates a material risk that the consumer will not be able to access or retain a subsequent electronic record that was the subject of the consent, the person providing the electronic record shall:
      1. provide the consumer with a statement of:
        1. the revised hardware and software requirements for access to and retention of the electronic records; and
        2. the right to withdraw consent without the imposition of any fees for such withdrawal and without the imposition of any condition or consequence that was not disclosed under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section.
      2. again comply with subdivision (a)(3) of this section.
  2. Other Rights.
    1. Preservation of Consumer Protections.   Nothing in this chapter affects the content or timing of any disclosure or other record required to be provided or made available to any consumer under any statute, regulation, or other rule of law.
    2. Verification or Acknowledgment.   If a law that was enacted prior to July 1, 2003 expressly requires a record to be provided or made available by a specified method that requires verification or acknowledgment of receipt, the record may be provided or made available electronically only if the method used provides verification or acknowledgment of receipt (whichever is required).
  3. Effect of Failure to Obtain Electronic Consent or Confirmation of Consent.   The legal effectiveness, validity, or enforceability of any contract executed by a consumer shall not be denied solely because of the failure to obtain electronic consent or confirmation of consent by that consumer in accordance with subdivision (a)(3)(B) of this section.
  4. Prospective Effect.   Withdrawal of consent by a consumer shall not affect the legal effectiveness, validity, or enforceability of electronic records provided or made available to that consumer in accordance with subsection (a) of this section prior to implementation of the consumer’s withdrawal of consent. A consumer’s withdrawal of consent shall be effective within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the withdrawal by the provider of the record. Failure to comply with subdivision (a)(4) of this section may, at the election of the consumer, be treated as a withdrawal of consent for purposes of this section.
  5. Prior Consent.   This section does not apply to any records that are provided or made available to a consumer who has consented prior to January 1, 2004 to receive such records in electronic form as permitted by any statute, regulation, or other rule of law.
  6. Oral Communications.   An oral communication or a recording of an oral communication shall not qualify as an electronic record for purposes of this section except as otherwise provided under applicable law.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

History

Revision note

—2020. Substituted “January 1, 2004” for “the effective date of this title” in subsec. (e) for purposes of clarity.

—2006. Substituted “subdivision” for “subsection” in subsec. (d) to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

§ 288. Accuracy and ability to retain contracts and other records.

Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, if a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires that a contract or other record relating to a transaction be in writing, the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of an electronic record of such contract or other record may be denied if such electronic record is not in a form that is capable of being retained and accurately reproduced for later reference by all parties or persons who are entitled to retain the contract or other record.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 289. Procedures consistent with federal law.

Consistent with the provisions of Section 7002(a) of the Electronic Signatures in the Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C § 7002(a), this chapter sets forth alternative procedures or requirements for the use of electronic records to establish the legal effect or validity of records in electronic transactions.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 290. Severability clause.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end, the provisions of this chapter are severable.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

Chapter 21. The Negotiable Instruments Act

§§ 301-876. Repealed. 1966, No. 29, § 3, eff. at midnight Dec. 31, 1966.

History

Former §§ 301-876. Former §§ 301-876, relating to negotiable instruments and documents of title, were derived from 1949, No. 133 ; V.S. 1947, §§ 5442-5521, 5523-5531, 5534-5639; 1947, No. 202 , § 5558; P.L. §§ 7134-7213, 7215-7226-7331; 1933, No. 157 , § 6868; 1919, No. 82 ; G.L. §§ 2867-3060; 1917, No. 254 , § 2975; 1912, No. 99 §§ 1-34, 36-54, 56-118, 120-189, 191-196. The subject matter is now covered by 9A V.S.A. § 3—201 et seq.

Chapter 23. Uniform Bills of Lading Act

§§ 931-1073. Repealed. 1966, No. 29, § 3, eff. at midnight Dec. 31, 1966.

History

Former §§ 931-1073. Former §§ 931-1073, relating to bills of lading, were derived from V.S. 1947, §§ 5641-5692; P.L. §§ 7333-7384; G.L. §§ 3061-3113; 1915, No. 149 , §§ 1-53. The subject matter is now covered by 9A V.S.A. § 7—301 et seq.

Chapter 25. Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act

§§ 1131-1293. Repealed. 1966, No. 29, § 3, eff. at midnight Dec. 31, 1966.

History

Former §§ 1131-1293. Former §§ 1131-1293, relating to warehouse receipts, were derived from V.S. 1947, §§ 5694-5752; 1947, No. 202 , § 5820; P.L. §§ 7386-7443; 1923, No. 51 ; G.L. §§ 3114-3169, 3171, 3172; 1917, No. 254 , § 3120; 1912, No. 186 , §§ 1-58; P.S. §§ 4998-5009; R. 1906, §§ 4904, 4907, 4908; 1904, No. 156 , §§ 1-12. The subject matter is now covered by 9A V.S.A. § 7—401 et seq.

Part 3. Sales, Assignments, and Secured Transactions

Chapter 41. Uniform Sales Act

§§ 1501-1577. Repealed. 1966, No. 29, § 3, eff. at midnight Dec. 31, 1966.

History

Former §§ 1501-1577. Former §§ 1501-1577, relating to sales, were derived from V.S. 1947, §§ 7853-7930; 1947, No. 202 , §§ 8039, 8064, 8068; P.L. §§ 7925-8002; 1933, No. 157 , § 1516; 1931, No. 120 ; 1923, No. 107 ; 1921, No. 171 §§ 1-76b. The subject matter is now covered by 9A V.S.A. § 2—101 et seq.

Chapter 43. Bulk Sales

§§ 1631, 1632. Repealed. 1966, No. 29, § 3, eff. at midnight Dec. 31, 1966.

History

Former §§ 1631, 1632. Former §§ 1631 and 1632, relating to bulk sales, were derived from V.S. 1947, §§ 7846, 7847; P.L. §§ 7918, 7919; G.L. §§ 6013, 6014; P.S. §§ 5010, 5011; 1906, No. 140 .

Chapter 45. Conditional Sales

§§ 1691-1700. Repealed. 1966, No. 29, § 3, eff. midnight Dec. 31, 1966.

History

Former §§ 1691-1700. Former §§ 1691-1700, relating to conditional sales, were derived from 1957, No. 80 ; V.S. 1947, §§ 2775-2777, 2779-2785; 1941, No. 39 , § 2; 1937, No. 51 ; P.L. §§ 2705-2714; 1925, No. 48 ; G.L. §§ 2830-2839; P.S. §§ 2663-2672; V.S. §§ 2290-3807; 1896, No. 36 , § 2; 1894, No. 55 ; No. 54, § 2; R.L. § 1992; 1886, No. 95 ; 1884, No. 93 ; 1884, No. 82 ; 1872, No. 51 ; 1870, No. 63 , § 1. The subject matter is now covered by 24 V.S.A. § 1156 .

Chapter 47. Chattel Mortgages

§§ 1751-1797. Repealed. 1966, No. 29, § 3, eff. at midnight Dec. 31, 1966.

History

Former §§ 1751-1797. Former §§ 1751-1797, relating to chattel mortgages, were derived from 1949, No. 62 ; V.S. 1947, §§ 2711-2719, 2721-2723, 2726-2734, 2737; 1941, No. 39 ; 1935, No. 54 ; P.L. §§ 2659-2666, 2668-2679, 2682; 1933, No. 157 , §§ 2450, 2465, 1931, No. 41 ; 1925, No. 47 ; 1919. No. 219, § 3; 1919, No. 81 ; G.L. §§ 2786-2793, 2795-2804; 1917, No. 83 ; 1908, No. 69 ; P.S. §§ 2620-2793, 2795-2805; 1906, No. 219 , § 3; 1902, No. 47 , § 1; 1896, No. 36 § 1; 1894, No. 54 , § 1 V.S. §§ 1345, 1346, 2251-2257, 2259-2268; 1890, No. 38 ; 1886, No. 91 ; 1884, No. 107 ; 1882, No. 70 ; No. 69; 1880, No. 36 ; R.L. §§ 1109, 1110, 1965-1969, 1971-1979; 1878, No. 51 . The subject matter is now covered by 24 V.S.A. § 1156 .

Chapter 49. Factors’ Liens

§§ 1851-1864. Repealed. 1966, No. 29, § 3, eff. at midnight Dec. 31, 1966.

History

Former §§ 1851-1864. Former §§ 1851-1864, relating to factors’ liens, were derived from V.S. 1947, §§ 2738-2751; 1947, No. 37 , §§ 1-11.

Chapter 51. Miscellaneous Liens

CROSS REFERENCES

Income tax liability as property lien, see 32 V.S.A. § 5895 .

Judgment lien, see 12 V.S.A. chapter 113.

Lien for damages caused by aircraft, see 5 V.S.A. § 481 .

Lien for services rendered accident victim, see 18 V.S.A. chapter 51.

Milk producer’s lien, see 6 V.S.A. chapter 159.

Property tax liens, see 32 V.S.A. chapter 133, subchapter 8.

Transferring chattel without notice of lien, see 13 V.S.A. § 2014 .

Transferring realty without notice of encumbrance, see 13 V.S.A. § 2015 .

Subchapter 1. Contractors’ Liens for Labor or Material

CROSS REFERENCES

Construction contracts, see chapter 102 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

Generally.

Contractors’ lien is purely a creature of statute, and, therefore, cases from other jurisdictions, and even Vermont cases decided prior to present statute, have limited application. Newport Sand & Gravel Co. v. Miller Concrete Construction, Inc., 159 Vt. 66, 614 A.2d 395, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1992).

Purpose.

General intent of mechanics’ lien statutes is to provide limited protection for suppliers to construction projects by giving them a tool to secure payment for their products, which is, presumably, part of contract price received by general contractor from owner. Newport Sand & Gravel Co. v. Miller Concrete Construction, Inc., 159 Vt. 66, 614 A.2d 395, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1992).

§ 1921. Extent of lien; notice.

  1. When a contract or agreement is made, whether in writing or not, for erecting, repairing, moving, or altering improvements to real property or for furnishing labor or material therefor, the person proceeding in pursuance of such contract or agreement shall have a lien upon such improvements and the lot of land on which the same stand to secure the payment of the same.
  2. A person who by virtue of a contract or agreement, either in writing or parol, with an agent, contractor, or subcontractor of the owner thereof, performs labor or furnishes materials for erecting, repairing, moving, or altering such improvements shall have a lien, to secure the payment of the same upon such improvements and the lot of land upon which the same stand, by giving notice in writing to such owner or his or her agent having charge of such property that he or she shall claim a lien for labor or material. The notice shall include the date that payment is due, if known. Such lien shall extend to the portions of the contract price remaining unpaid at the time such notice is received.
  3. A lien herein provided for shall not continue in force for more than 180 days from the time when payment became due for the last of such labor performed or materials furnished unless a notice of such lien is filed in the office of the town clerk as hereinafter provided.
  4. A lien under this section shall not take precedence over a deed or other conveyance to the extent that consideration therefor has been paid in good faith before record of such lien.  Such lien shall not take precedence over a mortgage given by the owner thereof upon such building, property, or improvements and the lot of land on which the same stand, as security for the payment of money loaned and to be used by such owner in payment of the expenses of the same, if such mortgage is recorded before such lien is filed in the office of the town clerk as hereinafter provided.  If such mortgagee shall receive written notice that any lien hereunder is to be claimed, such lien shall take precedence over such mortgage as to all advances thereafter made under such mortgage to such mortgagor, except such advances as the mortgagee may show were actually expended in completing such improvements to real property.
  5. The lot of land covered by such lien shall be deemed to be all of the land owned or held by the owner and used or designed for use in connection with such improvements, but such lien shall not extend to other adjacent lands used for purposes of profit.
  6. A lien under this section may not be waived in advance of the time such labor is performed or materials are furnished, and any provision calling for such advance waiver shall not be enforceable.

HISTORY: Amended 1985, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.); 2003, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Source.

1953, No. 35 . V.S. 1947, § 2754. 1935, No. 55 , § 1. P.L. § 2685. G.L. § 2810. P.S. § 2644. 1896, No. 37 , § 1. V.S. § 2273. R.L. § 1983. 1867, No. 7 . 1863, No. 12 , § 1. G.S. 108, § 3. 1856, No. 22 . 1852, No. 30 , § 1. 1849, No. 21 , § 3.

Amendments

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added a comma following “moving” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

—2003. Subsec. (c): Substituted “180 days” for “one hundred and twenty days”.

—1985 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

CROSS REFERENCES

Recording notice of lien, see § 1923 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

Bankruptcy of debtor.

Timely perfection of a contractor’s lien under this section is excepted from the automatic stay under federal bankruptcy law; therefore the lien perfection period is not tolled because of a debtor’s intervening bankruptcy petition. In re APC Constr., Inc., 112 B.R. 89, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1587 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990), aff'd, 132 B.R. 690, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15431 (D. Vt. 1991).

Construction.

Mechanics’ lien statute states that the lien is imposed on “such improvements and the lot of land on which the same stand,” but prevents a lien from extending to “other adjacent lands used for purposes of profit”; the use of the word “other” indicates that the Legislature intended to refer to different land than what was referred to at the beginning of the phrase. Applying the plain language, the Vermont Supreme Court concludes that the phrase simply emphasizes that adjacent land used for profit and not connected to the improvements is exempt from attachment; this phrase is not surplusage, but a clarification to prevent land used for profit but not connected to the improvements from being attached. Birchwood Land Co. v. Ormond Bushey & Sons, Inc., 2013 VT 60, 194 Vt. 478, 82 A.3d 539, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 53 (2013).

With regard to a developer’s slander of title claim, there was no malice in a contractor’s refusal to release certain building lots from a mechanics’ lien so that the developer could complete the sales for those lots. Nothing in the mechanics’ lien statute requires a contractor to reduce the amount of land validly covered by a lien on the theory that the lien can cover only such land as is equal in value to the outstanding claim. Birchwood Land Co. v. Ormond Bushey & Sons, Inc., 2013 VT 60, 194 Vt. 478, 82 A.3d 539, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 53 (2013).

Where a contractor obtained a judgment against a Chapter 13 debtor in part under the Contractor’s Lien Law, 9 V.S.A. § 1921 et seq., the portion of the lien that arose from the Contractor’s Lien Law, including interest, was a statutory lien and, therefore, not avoidable under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f). In re Ahokas, 361 B.R. 54, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 171 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007).

“Contract price” in subsec. (b) of this section refers to the contract between owner and principal contractor. King v. Hoadley, 112 Vt. 394, 26 A.2d 103, 1942 Vt. LEXIS 133 (1942).

Effect.

Prelien notice provided for in subsec. (b) of this section is not such as to give notice to the world of the lien upon the property which the claimant of the lien seeks to establish but to place the owner of the property upon notice that if he seeks to alienate the property upon which the lien may be claimed he may suffer resultant damages. Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

The advantage to the claimant under the prelien notice provision of subsec. (b) of this section is that the property upon which the claim is made cannot be transferred in any manner by the owner without notice to the prospective purchaser or mortgagee without being subject to a tort action. Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

Effect of assignment upon lien.

The lien provided by this section is a direct lien and is not affected by an assignment of the monies due the contractor. Springfield Cooperative Freeze Locker Plant, Inc. v. Wiggins, 115 Vt. 445, 63 A.2d 182, 1949 Vt. LEXIS 80 (1949).

Filing.

The notice to claim a lien as allowed by subsec. (b) of this section is not a prerequisite to filing of a memorandum of lien filed in the land records as is required under subsec. (c). Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

A person who gives the prelien notice provided for in subsec. (b) of this section does not obtain a lien on the property that would take precedence over all other liens unless he follows up his prelien notice with the filing requirements set forth in subsec. (c). Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

Compliance with subsec. (c) of this section does not require a finding that notice was given the owner prior to filing notice in the office of the town clerk. Springfield Cooperative Freeze Locker Plant, Inc. v. Wiggins, 115 Vt. 445, 63 A.2d 182, 1949 Vt. LEXIS 80 (1949).

Interest.

Protection that this section affords to suppliers includes recovery of interest, in court’s discretion, as long as amount owing on general contract when owner receives notice of supplier’s lien is sufficient to cover judgment. Newport Sand & Gravel Co. v. Miller Concrete Construction, Inc., 159 Vt. 66, 614 A.2d 395, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1992).

Owner of property benefited by supplier’s provision of materials to subcontractor was not exempt from interest on supplier’s lien award on ground that it unwisely released balance of contract funds to general contractor after it had notice of supplier’s claim or on ground that supplier failed to give notice of potential for recovery of interest when it gave notice of principal amount of its lien, as owner was charged with knowledge that interest might be awarded and this section requires only that lienor give notice of its claim for labor or material. Newport Sand & Gravel Co. v. Miller Concrete Construction, Inc., 159 Vt. 66, 614 A.2d 395, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1992).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding supplier of construction materials to subcontractor interest from date complaint to enforce lien was filed, where amount owed supplier was undisputed and owner, instead of paying claim, allowed general contractor to post bond in amount of lien and take over litigation so that general contractor could litigate operation of this section. Newport Sand & Gravel Co. v. Miller Concrete Construction, Inc., 159 Vt. 66, 614 A.2d 395, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1992).

Materials and labor covered by lien.

A charge for extra work done and extra materials furnished by claimant during performance of contract was properly included in claim for mechanic’s lien and constituted a valid part of the lien. Baldwin v. Spear Brothers, 79 Vt. 43, 64 A. 235, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1906).

The lien covers only such of material furnished as is so attached to realty as to be a part of it at time memorandum is filed. Hinckley & Egery Iron Co. v. James, 51 Vt. 240, 1878 Vt. LEXIS 151 (1878).

Nature and scope of lien generally.

The reach back of a judgment is not limited by the amount of an attachment, but rather the attached property is encumbered by the full amount of plaintiff’s judgment subject to the priority of a contractor’s lien and the available equity. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Moulton Constr. (In re Rainbow Trust), 216 B.R. 77, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2025 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997).

Mechanic’s lien can exist only when work was done under a contract with one who owned some interest, legal or equitable, in the property, and attaches only to such interest; if the contract was made with an agent, the right to a lien depends upon the scope of the agency. Greene v. McDonald, 70 Vt. 372, 40 A. 1035, 1897 Vt. LEXIS 42 (1897), dismissed, 72 Vt. 258, 47 A. 779, 1900 Vt. LEXIS 127 (1900).

Mechanics’ lien is given only to those who contract with the owner of the building, or have a claim against him for their labor, and not to workmen, employed by contractors, and between whom and the owner there is no privity of contract. Greenough, Cook & Co. v. Nichols, 30 Vt. 768, 1858 Vt. LEXIS 114 (1858).

Precedence of lien over mortgage.

Under subsec. (d) of this section, the only precedence of a mechanic’s lien over a mortgage comes as to funds advanced after written notice shows that the funds were actually used to complete the work. Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

Procedure for establishment of lien generally.

While the right to file a contractor’s lien for labor and materials arises from erecting a building attached to real estate, the right is inchoate until the memorandum required by section 1923 of this title is recorded and then perfected by attachment or judgment within three months. In re Bernstein, 62 B.R. 545, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5785 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

Though person asserting mechanic’s lien should be held to reasonably strict compliance with requirements of this section, reasonable compliance is all that is required, and nicety of form is not essential. Baldwin v. Spear Brothers, 79 Vt. 43, 64 A. 235, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1906).

—Purpose.

The grasp of the prelien notice provided for in subsec. (b) of this section is set forth in section 1922 of this title and is intended to prevent the owner of the property who has received such prelien notice from alienating the property so as to defeat the lien placed upon it through the prelien notice. Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

Set-off for uncompleted or defective work.

A party contracting for construction of a house is entitled to off-set against a subcontractor providing materials to the main contractor the cost of completing the house as specified in the contract between the owner and the main contractor where the main contractor fails to complete the construction. Nadeau Lumber, Inc. v. Benoit, 140 Vt. 298, 437 A.2d 1108, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 609 (1981).

A party contracting for construction of a house is entitled to off-set against a subcontractor providing materials to the main contractor the cost of correcting work defectively done by the main contractor where the main contractor fails to complete the construction. Nadeau Lumber, Inc. v. Benoit, 140 Vt. 298, 437 A.2d 1108, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 609 (1981).

Where main contractor under contract for construction of house failed to complete construction, party contracting for construction of house was entitled to deduct cost of completing construction and cost of correcting work performed by contractor from unpaid contract price, and where those costs exceeded unpaid contract price, against which subcontractor who provided materials to main contractor claimed lien, no lien was obtained, and dismissal of action to recover for materials furnished to main contractor was proper. Nadeau Lumber, Inc. v. Benoit, 140 Vt. 298, 437 A.2d 1108, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 609 (1981).

The obligation of the defendant, under a mechanic’s lien, is only as to the sum of money, if any, which was due under the contract, but where the contractor has left the work uncompleted and the defendant owes him nothing then there is nothing due the person filing the lien. Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

Obligation of homeowner under subcontractor’s lien on house being built for homeowner was only as to the amount of money, if any, due under construction contract between homeowner and general contractor, with homeowner having the right to deduct from the sum due under such contract any set-off he had against general contractor for homeowner’s expenses in completing the building, as specified in the contract between the homeowner and general contractor, upon general contractor’s failure to do so, so that trial court erroneously charged that it was homeowner’s duty to retain the unpaid balance of the contract price regardless of any hardship it might work upon him. Cote v. Bloomfield, 128 Vt. 306, 262 A.2d 467, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 226 (1970).

Suppliers.

Supplier of construction materials to subcontractor could claim protection of this section. Newport Sand & Gravel Co. v. Miller Concrete Construction, Inc., 159 Vt. 66, 614 A.2d 395, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1992).

By giving suppliers and others who benefit construction project an in rem right against owner, this section overcomes lack of privity between suppliers and owner, since suppliers typically deal with general contractor or subcontractors. Newport Sand & Gravel Co. v. Miller Concrete Construction, Inc., 159 Vt. 66, 614 A.2d 395, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1992).

Extent of lien of supplier of construction materials to subcontractor is limited by amount due to general contractor from owner at time supplier’s lien was filed, not by amount general contractor owes subcontractor. Newport Sand & Gravel Co. v. Miller Concrete Construction, Inc., 159 Vt. 66, 614 A.2d 395, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1992).

Cited.

Cited in Goodro v. Tarkey, 112 Vt. 212, 22 A.2d 509, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 155 (1941); Morrisville Lumber Co. v. Okcuoglu, 148 Vt. 180, 531 A.2d 887, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 482 (1987); In re Summit Ventures, Inc., 135 B.R. 483, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1862 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991).

§ 1922. Effect of lien.

Unless a person has satisfied or paid the claim upon which such lien is founded after the person has received written notice of a lien as provided for in subsection 1921(b) of this title, or unless the lien has not been perfected within the time required under section 1924 of this title, such person shall not deed, mortgage, or otherwise convey property that is subject to a lien as provided herein without disclosing such lien to the vendee or mortgagee in writing or stating the existence of the same in the instrument conveying or mortgaging such property. If the person shall fail so to disclose such lien, he or she shall be liable to the person injured in a civil action on this statute for the damages so sustained.

HISTORY: Amended 2003, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2755. 1935, No. 55 , § 2.

Revision note—

In the second sentence, substituted “a civil action” for “an action of tort” pursuant to V.R.C.P. 2 and 81(c) and 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d).

Amendments

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “a person” for “he”, “the person” for “he”, and “subsection 1921(b)” for “section 1921(b)” in the first sentence, inserted “or unless the lien has not been perfected within the time required under section 1924 of this title” in the first sentence, and substituted “the person” for “he” and inserted “or she” preceding “shall be” in the second sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

Effect of recording of notice.

Even though a mechanics’ lien had expired, until it was discharged it was required to be disclosed to potential purchasers; thus, assuming plaintiffs’ allegations that they had suffered actual damages from the cloud on title created by defendant’s lien were true, they met their burden of stating the grounds upon which they were entitled to relief. Wharton v. Tri-State Drilling & Boring, 2003 VT 19, 175 Vt. 494, 824 A.2d 531, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 20 (2003) (mem.).

When recorded in the office of the town clerk of the town where the property is located, pursuant to section 1923 of this title, a memorandum of a contractor’s lien on real property has a practical effect upon alienation, in that under this section disclosure to a vendee or mortgagee is required and a cloud upon title is created. Filter Equipment Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 142 Vt. 499, 458 A.2d 1091, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 434 (1983).

Purpose of notice.

The grasp of the prelien notice provided for in section 1921(b) of this title is set forth in this section and is intended to prevent the owner of the property who has received such prelien notice from alienating the property so as to defeat the lien placed upon it through the prelien notice. Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

Cited.

Cited in In re APC Constr., Inc., 112 B.R. 89, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1587 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990).

§ 1923. Recording notice of lien.

A person claiming a lien under section 1921 of this title shall file for record in the clerk’s office of the town where such real estate is situated a written memorandum, signed by him or her, asserting his or her claim, which shall charge such real estate with such lien as of the visible commencement of work or delivery of material to the extent and subject to the exceptions provided in sections 1921 and 1922 of this title. Several such liens, asserted as aforesaid, shall be paid pro rata, if the sum due or to become due from the owner thereof is not sufficient to pay the same in full.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2756. 1935, No. 55 , § 3. P.L. § 2686. G.L. § 2811. P.S. § 2645. 1896, No. 37 , § 1. V.S. § 2273. R.L. § 1983. 1867, No. 7 . 1863, No. 12 , § 1. G.S. 108, § 3. 1856, No. 22 . 1852, No. 30 , § 1. 1849, No. 21 , § 3.

ANNOTATIONS

Contents of memorandum.

Memorandum required by this section need not recite items of claimant’s account, nor state terms of contract pursuant to which the labor was performed or materials furnished, nor whether it was in writing, nor give date when job was completed or pay became due, nor specify what part for labor. Baldwin v. Spear Brothers, 79 Vt. 43, 64 A. 235, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1906).

Written memorandum, signed by claimant, describing building into which the labor and materials went and which is sought to be charged, and asserting a lien thereon, and which discloses amount claimed and that it is for such indebtedness as section 1921 of this title specifies, person to whom it is due, person from whom it is due, and that latter is owner of building, is sufficient. Baldwin v. Spear Brothers, 79 Vt. 43, 64 A. 235, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1906).

Effect of recording.

While the right to file a contractor’s lien for labor and materials arises from erecting a building attached to real estate, the right is inchoate until the memorandum required by this section is recorded and then perfected by attachment or judgment within three months. In re Bernstein, 62 B.R. 545, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5785 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

When recorded in the office of the town clerk of the town where the property is located, pursuant to this section, a memorandum of a contractor’s lien on real property has a practical effect upon alienation, in that under section 1922 of this title disclosure to a vendee or mortgagee is required and a cloud upon title is created. Filter Equipment Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 142 Vt. 499, 458 A.2d 1091, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 434 (1983).

Nature and scope of lien generally.

The reach back of a judgment is not limited by the amount of an attachment, but rather the attached property is encumbered by the full amount of plaintiff’s judgment subject to the priority of a contractor’s lien and the available equity. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Moulton Constr. (In re Rainbow Trust), 216 B.R. 77, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2025 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997).

Purpose of filing.

The plain purpose of the recording requirement of this section is so that other persons, dealing with the property knowing that a lien has been filed, may also file their own liens if they be so advised and so be entitled to at least a pro rata payment from the property owner if the sum due from the owner to contractor is not sufficient to meet all claims in full. Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

The object of filing a written memorandum pursuant to this section is to give notice to the owner and persons dealing with the property that it stands charged with payment of bills for labor and materials which went into it under such contract as entitles claimant to his lien. Baldwin v. Spear Brothers, 79 Vt. 43, 64 A. 235, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1906); Haigh Lumber Co. v. Drinkwine, 130 Vt. 120, 287 A.2d 560, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1972).

Cited.

Cited in Hinckley & Egery Iron Co. v. James, 51 Vt. 240, 1878 Vt. LEXIS 151 (1878); Goodro v. Tarkey, 112 Vt. 212, 22 A.2d 509, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 155 (1941).

§ 1924. Action to enforce lien.

Within 180 days from the time of filing such memorandum, if such payment is due at the time of such filing and within 180 days from the time such payment becomes due, if not due at the time of such filing, such person may commence his or her action for the same and cause such real estate or other property to be attached thereon. If he or she obtains judgment in the action, the record of such judgment shall contain a brief statement of the contract upon which the same is founded.

HISTORY: Amended 2003, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2757. 1935, No. 55 , § 4. P.L. § 2687. G.L. § 2812. P.S. § 2646. V.S. § 2274. R.L. § 1984. 1869, No. 46 . 1863, No. 12 , § 2. G.S. 108, § 4. 1852, No. 30 , § 2.

Amendments

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “180 days” for “three months” twice and inserted “or her” following “his” in the first sentence, and inserted “or she” following “he” in the second sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

Bankruptcy of debtor.

Although contractor’s liens may be perfected regardless of a debtor’s intervening petition for bankruptcy, judicial enforcement of such perfected liens by post-petition trustee process is subject to automatic stay under federal bankruptcy law, and any payments may be subject to preference avoidance. In re APC Constr., Inc., 112 B.R. 89, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1587 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990), aff'd, 132 B.R. 690, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15431 (D. Vt. 1991).

Nature of action.

Merely filing, but not perfecting, a mechanics’ lien does not involve court process and therefore cannot be the basis for a claim of abuse of process in Vermont. Wharton v. Tri-State Drilling & Boring, 2003 VT 19, 175 Vt. 494, 824 A.2d 531, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 20 (2003) (mem.).

Action under this section is not an ordinary action of creditor against debtor but is action to determine amount due plaintiff which is secured by lien. Goodro v. Tarkey, 112 Vt. 212, 22 A.2d 509, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 155 (1941).

Action under this section brought by person not contracting directly with owner of property is action quasi in rem resulting in judgment affecting only liability of particular property and only particular parties to proceeding. Goodro v. Tarkey, 112 Vt. 212, 22 A.2d 509, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 155 (1941).

Parties.

Contractors with owner of property against whom their subcontractors seek to enforce mechanic’s lien are not necessary or indispensable parties to action under this section and neither their liability to claimant nor their rights as against property owner are fixed thereby. Goodro v. Tarkey, 112 Vt. 212, 22 A.2d 509, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 155 (1941).

Defendant whose equity of redemption is foreclosed by proceedings under this section must be person who owns property sought to be charged. Goodro v. Tarkey, 112 Vt. 212, 22 A.2d 509, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 155 (1941).

Pleading.

The bringing of separate mechanic’s lien and contract actions is not, by itself, vexatious. Woodbury Lumber Co. v. McIntosh, 125 Vt. 154, 211 A.2d 240, 1965 Vt. LEXIS 215 (1965).

Action specifically brought under this section is not defeated by terming the action one in contract. Goodro v. Tarkey, 112 Vt. 212, 22 A.2d 509, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 155 (1941).

Record of judgment.

Where a Chapter 13 debtor claimed that a contractor’s judgment lien was invalid because the judgment did not contain a brief statement of the construction contract upon which the lien was founded, the creditor substantially complied with 9 V.S.A. § 1924 , because the writ, order of approval, and judgment, filed in the land records, provided sufficient notice of the nature and scope of the construction contract to the debtor and any third parties. In re Ahokas, 361 B.R. 54, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 171 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007).

Rights affected by lien.

Mechanic’s lien upon building for labor and materials rests not only upon building itself, but carries with it such right to land on which building stands and which is appurtenant thereto, as is necessary to enable party holding lien to hold, appropriate and use building for all legitimate purposes to which such building might be put, in order to render it available as property in its full value and usefulness. H. Roby & Bros. v. University of Vermont, 36 Vt. 564, 1864 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1864).

Mechanic’s lien stands upon same ground as a mortgage would stand if executed at same time as filing of the claim, and affects existing rights whether legal or equitable, to no greater extent than such mortgage would affect them. Kenny v. Gage, 33 Vt. 302, 1860 Vt. LEXIS 108 (1860).

Time limitations.

When an action to enforce contractor’s lien is not commenced within the three-month period provided by this section, the lien will be lost. Filter Equipment Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 142 Vt. 499, 458 A.2d 1091, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 434 (1983).

Under provisions of this section that if payment is not due at the time of filing a memorandum of lien in the town clerk’s office of the town where the property is located, the action must be commenced within three months from the time payment becomes due, the property involved must be actually attached within the three-month period, and it is not enough that the suit be merely commenced, since the resulting judgment, when obtained, has the force of a mortgage under section 1925 of this title and a right of foreclosure for nonpayment. Filter Equipment Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 142 Vt. 499, 458 A.2d 1091, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 434 (1983).

Where plaintiff filed action under this section to enforce contractor’s lien and asking for attachment of defendant’s property exactly three months after payment became due for materials it had furnished to defendant’s subcontractor for incorporation into a building constructed by defendant, trial court correctly denied the motion for attachment, since the lien had lapsed for lack of perfecting. Filter Equipment Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 142 Vt. 499, 458 A.2d 1091, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 434 (1983).

Attachment of property upon which mechanics’ lien is claimed is necessary incident to action under this section, and time within which action must be commenced is determined by date on which attachment is made. Goodro v. Tarkey, 112 Vt. 212, 22 A.2d 509, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 155 (1941).

In perfecting mechanic’s lien under this section, property must be actually attached within the three months; it is not enough that the suit be begun. Piper v. Hoyt, 61 Vt. 539, 17 A. 798, 1889 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1889).

Cited.

Cited in Hinckley & Egery Iron Co. v. James, 51 Vt. 240, 1878 Vt. LEXIS 151 (1878); Richardson Engineering Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 554 F. Supp. 467, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156 (D. Vt. 1981); In re Summit Ventures, Inc., 135 B.R. 483, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1862 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991).

§ 1925. Foreclosure.

Within five months after the date of such judgment, the plaintiff may cause a certified copy of the record thereof to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the town in which such real estate or other property is situated. Thereupon the same shall be holden for the amount due upon such judgment, with the costs of such copy and recording the same, as if it had been mortgaged for the payment thereof, from the time of the visible commencement of work or delivery of materials, subject, however, to the priorities provided in section 1921 of this title, and the plaintiff may obtain possession and foreclose the defendant’s equity of redemption as in case of a mortgage.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2758. 1935, No. 55 , § 5. P.L. § 2688. G.L. § 2813. P.S. § 2647. V.S. § 2275. R.L. § 1984. 1869, No. 46 . 1863, No. 12 , § 2. G.S. 108, § 4. 1852, No. 30 , § 2.

CROSS REFERENCES

Foreclosure of mortgages, see Rule 80.1, V.R.C.P.

ANNOTATIONS

30 day stay in enforcement.

The act of recording a creditor’s judgment in an action to enforce a contractor’s lien did not violate the provision of V.R.C.P. 62 staying proceedings for enforcement of a judgment for 30 days after entry. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Moulton Constr. (In re Rainbow Trust), 216 B.R. 77, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2025 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997).

Time limitation.

Where a contractor had not perfected his lien by recording his judgment within the five month window of 9 V.S.A. § 1925 , the lien had expired retroactive to the date the debtor property owners had filed their petitions, and the debtors’ homestead exemption was not impaired under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f)(1). Naylor v. Cusson, 412 B.R. 646, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32313 (D. Vt. 2009).

Where a Chapter 13 debtor claimed that a contractor’s recorded judgment was procedurally defective because it did not contain the required statement relating to the construction contract, and it was too late to file a proper judgment containing the proper language because the five month period for recording the judgment had expired, the judgment substantially complied with the statutory requirements, even without explicit reference to the contract, because the writ, order of approval, and judgment, filed in the land records, provided sufficient notice of the nature and scope of the construction contract to the debtor and any third parties. In re Ahokas, 361 B.R. 54, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 171 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007).

Cited.

Cited in Filter Equipment Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 142 Vt. 499, 458 A.2d 1091, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 434 (1983); In re APC Constr., Inc., 112 B.R. 89, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1587 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990), In re Summit Ventures, Inc., 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1862, 135 B.R. 483 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991).

§ 1926. Death of landowner; effect on lien.

When the owner of real estate dies after a lien has been recorded, or dies pending an action brought against him or her to enforce a lien on such real estate, the action or lien shall not abate or be affected by the death of such owner, but the executor or administrator of the deceased shall be cited in and the action shall proceed to final judgment against the representative of the deceased defendant. Such real estate shall be holden for the amount due upon such judgment, with the cost of the copy of the record of the judgment and recording, as if it had been mortgaged for the payment of the same, in like manner as if the deceased defendant were alive. Such lien shall not be enforced to the diminution of a right or interest given by law to the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or to the children of such deceased person.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2759. P.L. § 2689. G.L. § 2814. P.S. § 2648. V.S. § 2276. R.L. § 1985. 1880, No. 38 .

§ 1927. Application to homestead.

The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to property held as a homestead.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2760. P.L. § 2690. G.L. § 2815. P.S. § 2649. V.S. § 2277. R.L. § 1986. G.S. 68, § 18.

CROSS REFERENCES

Homestead generally, see 27 V.S.A. chapter 3.

§ 1928. Married woman’s property.

Under the provisions of this subchapter, the real estate of a married woman may be charged with a mechanic’s lien when she assents to the contract.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2761. P.L. § 2691. G.L. § 2816. P.S. § 2650. V.S. § 2278. R.L. § 1987. 1867, No. 8 .

Subchapter 2. Artisan’s Liens

§ 1951. Artisan’s lien.

A person who makes, alters, launders, dry cleans, or repairs an article of personal property, at the request of the owner, shall have a lien thereon for his or her reasonable charges and may retain possession of the property until the same are paid.

History

Source.

1951, No. 58 . V.S. 1947, § 2762. P.L. § 2692. G.L. § 2817. P.S. § 2651. V.S. § 2279. 1888, No. 133 , § 1.

ANNOTATIONS

Common law.

Lien arises at common law in favor of one who improves by his labor or expense chattel of another at owner’s request, and this section, which purports to give such lien, is merely declaratory of common law. Bergman v. Gay, 79 Vt. 262, 64 A. 1106, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1906).

§ 1952. Enforcement by sale.

When the debt secured thereby remains unpaid for three months after such lien attaches, the person having such lien, except as provided in section 1954 of this title, may sell such property at public auction in the town where such lien accrues. Notice of the time, place, and purpose of such sale shall be posted in two or more public places in such town at least 10 days prior thereto, and he or she may apply the proceeds of such sale to the satisfaction of the debt due him or her and the expenses of such sale. The surplus remaining shall be paid to the proper owner thereof within 10 days thereafter, or deposited for his or her benefit in the treasury of the town where the sale occurs.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2763. P.L. § 2693. G.L. § 2818. 1917, No. 84 , § 1. P.S. § 2652. V.S. § 2280. 1888, No. 133 , § 2.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Bergman v. Gay, 79 Vt. 262, 64 A. 1106, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1906).

§ 1953. Notice of sale.

At least 10 days prior thereto, notice in writing of the time and place of such sale and of the amount claimed to be due shall be given to the owner of such property, either personally, by mail, or by leaving the same at his or her place of abode, if a resident of this State. Otherwise such notice shall be given by publication thereof in some newspaper published in the town or county where such lien accrues, if there is one, and if not, by publication in a newspaper published in an adjoining county.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2764. P.L. § 2694. G.L. § 2819. P.S. § 2653. V.S. § 2281. 1888, No. 133 , § 3.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Bergman v. Gay, 79 Vt. 262, 64 A. 1106, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1906).

§ 1954. Price in dispute; tender by owner.

When the owner of such article of personal property desires to question the reasonableness of such charges, he or she may within such three months make tender therefor, and the person having such lien shall bring a civil action within 30 days after such tender to determine the amount due if he or she does not elect to accept such tender. The defendant may give evidence of the tender under the general denial and, on proof thereof, if the plaintiff does not recover a greater sum than the amount tendered, the defendant shall recover his or her costs. In case tender is made as above provided and an action is not brought by the person having such lien, such lien shall terminate 30 days from the time of such tender. The foregoing provisions shall not be construed as exclusive of any other remedies that the parties now have by law.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2765. P.L. § 2695. G.L. § 2820. 1917, No. 84 , § 2.

Revision note—

In the first sentence, substituted “a civil action” for “an action of contract” pursuant to V.R.C.P. 2 and 81(c) and 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d).

Subchapter 3. Wage Liens

§ 1971. Unpaid wages; statutory lien; priority over subsequent mortgage or lien.

  1. A statutory lien is created on the real and personal property of a corporation for up to 30 days of unpaid wages.
  2. The liability of a corporation to an employee for unpaid wages that were earned for a 30-day period prior to the filing of a new mortgage or other lien upon the property of the corporation, in all cases, shall be a first lien thereon, notwithstanding any mortgage or other lien thereon recorded after such wages were earned. Notice of the lien if on personal property shall be filed with the Secretary of State and, if on real property, in the land records, by the employee or the Department of Labor acting on behalf of one or more employees. An employee who is owed wages or the Department of Labor acting on behalf of one or more employees may file an action to execute on the lien in the Civil Division of the Superior Court in the county in which the corporation has its principal place of business in the State, or in the Civil Division of the Washington County Superior Court.

HISTORY: Amended 2011, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 5857. P.L. § 5881. 1933, No. 111 , § 1. G.L. § 4970. 1915, No. 141 , § 37. 1910, No. 143 , § 9.

Amendments

—2011 (Adj. Sess.) Section heading: Rewrote the section heading.

Subsec. (a): Added.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “an employee” for “wage earners” following “to” and “for a 30-day period” for “in the three months” following “earned”; inserted “new” preceding “mortgage”; substituted “of the corporation” for “and franchise of such corporation” following “property”; deleted the former second sentence and added the present second and third sentences.

§ 1972. Preference for wage liens.

If a person or company is compelled to stop business by reason of an attachment upon mesne process and does not resume business within 30 days thereafter, an employee to whom such person or company is indebted for wages may attach the same property upon his or her debt. Such attachment shall take precedence over such prior attachment to an amount not exceeding $50.00 if made before sale thereof on execution.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2769. P.L. § 2699. G.L. § 2824. P.S. § 2657. V.S. § 2285. R.L. § 1991. 1878, No. 52 , § 2.

Subchapter 4. Liens on Logs for Wages

§ 1991. Nature and extent of lien.

A person cutting or drawing logs and acting under a contract with the owner thereof shall have a lien thereon for his or her wages that shall continue 60 days after the services are performed and have precedence of other claims except public taxes. Such lien shall not attach until the person claiming it files in the office of the clerk of the town where he or she performed the service, or if the town is unorganized, in the county clerk’s office, a brief statement of the contract under which he or she claims a lien and his or her purpose to enforce it against the property for the amount due for such service.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2766. P.L. § 2696. G.L. § 2821. P.S. § 2654. R. 1906, § 2544. V.S. § 2282. R.L. § 1988. 1878, No. 53 , §§ 1, 2.

ANNOTATIONS

Constitutionality.

This section so far as it allowed lien in favor of subcontractor against owner of lumber who was not a party to the contract for cutting or drawing was unconstitutional, on ground that it was really taking one man’s property to pay debts of another, and without notice, hearing, or adjudicating so far as any of proceedings related to such owner. Quimby v. Hazen, 54 Vt. 132, 1881 Vt. LEXIS 82 (1881).

Person entitled to lien.

This section gives lien only to person who actually cuts or hauls the logs. Quimby v. Hazen, 54 Vt. 132, 1881 Vt. LEXIS 82 (1881).

§ 1992. Action to enforce lien.

Such lien shall be void against a subsequent purchaser, unless an action is brought and the logs attached thereon within 30 days from the time the plaintiff’s right of action accrues against the person for whom he or she performed the services, and shall be void as to all persons, unless an action is brought and the logs attached thereon within 60 days from such time.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2767. P.L. § 2697. G.L. § 2822. P.S. § 2655. V.S. § 2283. R.L. § 1989. 1878, No. 53 , §§ 3, 4.

§ 1993. Procedure for attaching logs.

Such attachment shall be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the clerk of the town where the services were performed and also where the logs are located. If either town is unorganized, a copy of such process shall be left in the county clerk’s office.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2768. P.L. § 2698. G.L. § 2823. P.S. § 2656. V.S. § 2284. R.L. § 1990. 1878, No. 53 , §§ 3, 4.

Subchapter 5. Liens on Lumber Products; Registration of Marks

§ 2011. Nature and extent of lien; registered marks.

If a person, firm, or corporation shall, by itself or others, make an advance or series of advances of money to the owner of, or person entitled to the possession of, any logs or pulpwood for the purpose of financing the cutting, hauling, yarding, piling, trucking, rafting, booming, driving, or towing of the same, it shall have a lien for the amount of all such advances, which shall take precedence over all claims, except taxes and liens provided for and enforceable under section 1991 of this title, and except all other liens legally acquired and filed or recorded prior to the placing of the registered mark thereon as herein provided, upon all of such logs or pulpwood on which it has caused its registered mark to be placed, and such lien with respect to such advances shall continue for all advances for two years after the date of making the last advance, and may be enforced by attachment. The term “registered mark” as used in the foregoing sentence means a mark described in a certificate of registration issued by the Secretary of State, pursuant to the provisions of section 2012 of this title, and recorded in the town clerk’s office for the town in which such logs or pulpwood were situated when such registered mark was placed thereon, or if the logs or pulpwood were situated in an unorganized town, gore, or grant, said registered mark must be recorded by the clerk of the county in which such unorganized town, gore, or grant is situated.

History

Source.

1949, No. 63 , § 1.

§ 2012. Registration of marks; regulations.

Any person, firm, or corporation desiring to appropriate for its own exclusive use any distinctive mark to be placed upon logs or pulpwood for identification may file a copy of such mark, accompanied by a statement claiming the exclusive use thereof for such purpose, with the Secretary of State, who, if satisfied that such mark is not the duplicate of, or deceptively similar to, any such mark theretofore registered in his or her office, shall register, and issue to and in the name of such person, firm, or corporation a certificate of registration of such mark. The person, firm, or corporation in whose name such certificate of registration is issued shall be entitled to the exclusive use of the mark therein described for all purposes of this subchapter. The fee for such filing and recording and for a duly attested certificate of the record thereof shall be $10.00. The Secretary may make such rules and regulations and prescribe such forms as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.

History

Source.

1949, No. 63 , § 2.

CROSS REFERENCES

Damages for defacing marks on logs, see 13 V.S.A. § 3606 .

Damages for stopping or conversion of floating marked lumber, see 25 V.S.A. § 207 .

Procedure for adoption of administrative rules, see 3 V.S.A. chapter 25.

§ 2013. Certified copies of certificates; fee.

The town clerk shall receive a fee of $6.00 for recording a certified copy of any such certificate of registration.

HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 84 , § 2; 1979, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1993, No. 170 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2003, No. 70 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 1, 2004.

History

Source.

1949, No. 63 , § 3.

Amendments

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the first sentence.

—1993 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$6.00” for “$5.00” preceding “for recording” in the second sentence.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$5.00” for “$2.00” preceding “for recording” in the second sentence.

—1971. Substituted “$2.00” for “$1.00” preceding “per copy” in the first sentence and “for recording” in the second sentence.

§ 2014. Recording; fees.

No lien as provided for in this subchapter shall be valid, except as against the person to whom such advances were made, until written notice of advances made or to be made is recorded with the town clerk of the town wherein such logs or pulpwood are situated, or if the logs or pulpwood are situated in an unorganized town, gore, or grant, said written notice must be recorded by the clerk of the county in which such unorganized town, gore, or grant is situated. Five dollars shall be paid to the town or county clerk for recording said written notice.

HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 84 , § 3; 1979, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Source.

1949, No. 63 , § 4.

Revision note—

At the beginning of the second sentence, substituted “Five dollars” for “$5.00” to correct a grammatical error.

Amendments

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$5.00” for “$2.00” preceding “shall be” in the second sentence.

Subchapter 6. Liens on Ships for Labor or Material

§ 2031. Lien for labor and materials; enforcement.

A person who performs labor or furnishes materials in building, repairing, fitting, or furnishing a ship, vessel, or steamboat shall have a lien thereon for his or her wages and materials until eight months after it is completed, and may secure the same by attachment thereof. Such attachment shall have precedence of all other attachments and claims.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2752. P.L. § 2683. G.L. § 2808. P.S. § 2642. V.S. § 2271. R.L. § 1981. G.S. 108, § 1. 1858, No. 9 . 1852, No. 30 , § 3. 1849, No. 21 , § 1.

§ 2032. Prerequisites for lien.

Before such lien attaches, such person shall present a claim for his or her services performed or materials furnished and shall demand payment of the same of the owner, agent, contractor, or person in whose care such ship, vessel, or steamboat is. Upon such demand, a payment or tender of the just amount due him or her shall discharge such lien.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2753. P.L. § 2684. G.L. § 2809. P.S. § 2643. V.S. § 2272. R.L. § 1982. G.S. 108, § 2. 1849, No. 21 , § 2.

Subchapter 7. Federal Liens

History

Amendments

—1987 (Adj. Sess.). 1987, No. 226 , (Adj. Sess.), § 4 deleted “Tax” preceding “Liens” in the subchapter heading.

§ 2051. Filing in town clerk’s office.

Notices of liens upon real or personal property for taxes or other obligations payable to the United States of America, certificates and notices affecting the liens, and certificates discharging the liens shall be filed in the office of the town clerk of the town in this State within which the property subject to the lien is situated.

HISTORY: Amended 1987, No. 226 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2787. P.L. § 2716. 1933, No. 42 . § 1.

Amendments

—1987 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “upon real or personal property” preceding “for taxes”, “or other obligations” thereafter and “certificates and notices affecting the liens” following “America”.

§ 2052. Recording of notice of lien.

When a notice of a federal lien is filed, the town clerk shall forthwith record the same in alphabetical order in a book kept for that purpose with the date and hour of filing the lien. A town clerk shall keep on file in the clerk’s office the notices of these liens. Liens filed under this section shall be indexed in accordance with 24 V.S.A. § 1153 or 1161.

HISTORY: Amended 1987, No. 226 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2788. P.L. § 2717. 1933, No. 42 , § 2.

Amendments

—1987 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “a federal lien” for “such tax” following “notice of” in the first sentence; substituted “A” for “Such” preceding “town”, “the clerk’s” for “his” preceding “office”, and “these” for “such tax” preceding “liens” in the second sentence; and added the third sentence.

§ 2053. Discharge of lien.

When a certificate of discharge of a federal lien is filed in the office of the town clerk, the town clerk shall enter the same, with the date of filing, upon the same page of the record where the notice of the lien is filed, and permanently attach the original certificate of discharge to the original notice of the lien.

HISTORY: Amended 1987, No. 227 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2789. P.L. § 2718. 1933, No. 42 , § 3.

Amendments

—1987 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “a federal” for “such tax” preceding “lien is filed in the office” and “the town clerk” for “he” preceding “shall enter”.

Subchapter 8. Liens on Animals

§ 2071. Liens for service of stallions.

Colts foaled in this State and the mare producing the same shall be subject to a lien to secure the payment of the service fee of the stallion. Such lien shall continue in force until the colt is eight months old and may be enforced by attachment of such colt or mare at any time after the colt is four months old. Such lien shall take precedence of any other claim upon such colt, subject to the conditions of sections 2072-2074 of this title.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2771. P.L. § 2701. G.L. § 2826. 1910, No. 95 . P.S. § 2659. V.S. § 2287. 1888, No. 103 , §§ 1, 4, 5.

§ 2072. Filing of statement claiming lien.

On or before April 1, or within 30 days after such stallion is brought into such town, the owner or manager of the stallion shall annually file in the office of the clerk of the town where such stallion is kept a declaration of an intention to claim such lien and a statement containing the name and age of such stallion, his pedigree for two generations, if known, and the terms of service. A copy of such statement shall be furnished the owner of each mare served and all bills or posters advertising such stallion shall contain a copy of such statement.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2772. P.L. § 2702. G.L. § 2827. P.S. § 2660. 1906, No. 81 , § 1. V.S. § 2288. 1890, No. 74 . 1888, No. 103 , § 2.

§ 2073. False statements in claim of lien.

If the owner or manager in such statement makes a false representation regarding the pedigree of such stallion, the lien for such service shall be discharged and the service fee thereon secured shall be forfeited.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2774. P.L. § 2704. G.L. § 2829. P.S. § 2662. V.S. § 2289. 1888, No. 103 , § 3.

§ 2074. Penalty for fraudulent sale of mare.

When the owner or manager of a stallion has complied with the requirements of section 2072 of this title, if the owner or person in whose name a mare has been mated with such stallion for breeding purposes disposes of such mare by sale or otherwise before foaling time without first settling with the owner or manager for the service of the stallion, or within 10 days after the disposal of the mare, he or she shall be subject to the same penalties that he or she would be for disposing of a colt encumbered by a lien. If such mare is returned for trial to the stallion after three weeks from the date of the last service and found not to have become pregnant and is not again served during that breeding season, the provisions of this section shall not apply to the disposal of such mare.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2773. P.L. § 2703. G.L. § 2828. P.S. § 2661. 1906, No. 81 , § 1.

§ 2075. Lien for keeping or pasturing animals.

A person to whom charges are due for pasturing, boarding, or keeping domestic animals placed with the consent of the owner thereof in his or her care, if the charges become due while such animals remain in his or her possession, may retain the same until such charges are paid. After 30 days from the time the charges become due, he or she may sell such animals in the manner provided for the sale of property under a lien for repairs, if such charges remain unpaid.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2770. P.L. § 2700. G.L. § 2825. 1917, No. 85 . P.S. § 2658. V.S. § 2286. 1884, No. 91 .

ANNOTATIONS

Generally.

Agister has no lien at common law except by agreement, and, although a lien is given agisters by section, retention of possession is necessary to such lien. Nemie v. Todd, 89 Vt. 502, 96 A. 14, 1915 Vt. LEXIS 236 (1915).

Agister’s right to proceeds of mortgage sale.

Where livestock, which was encumbered by chattel mortgage and also by agister’s lien subsequent thereto, was taken from possession of agister by process of law and sold upon mortgage, any balance remaining in hands of officer after satisfaction of the mortgage belonged to agister up to amount of his lien. Ingalls v. Green, 62 Vt. 436, 20 A. 196, 1890 Vt. LEXIS 144 (1890).

Keeping and training horses.

Trainer of horses has a common law lien on a horse for its keeping and training during a period for which the horse was committed to him for that purpose with the consent of the owner, and a lien under this section for its keeping without training during a period immediately subsequent. Chase v. Robinson, 86 Vt. 240, 84 A. 867, 1912 Vt. LEXIS 175 (1912).

Waiver of lien.

While waiver of lien rests largely in intention and is ordinarily to be determined by trier of fact, court, where facts are conceded, leaving no inference to be drawn as to the lienor’s intention, may, as matter of law, determine that a lien has been waived. Nemie v. Todd, 89 Vt. 502, 96 A. 14, 1915 Vt. LEXIS 236 (1915).

Subchapter 9. Miscellaneous Provisions

§ 2091. Attachment not waiver of implied lien.

A person holding personal property by a lien implied by law to ensure the payment of the debt secured by such lien, may cause the property to be attached on mesne process and sold on execution and such attachment shall not be a waiver of the lien.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2786. P.L. § 2715. G.L. § 2840. P.S. § 2673. V.S. 2299. R.L. § 1994. 1867, No. 6 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Attachment and sale of property subject to mortgage, pledge or lien, see 12 V.S.A. chapter 123.

ANNOTATIONS

Construction with other laws.

The enactment of section 1951 of this title, giving common law artisan’s lien, and sections 1952 and 1953 of this title, providing for its enforcement by sale of property by lienor at public auction, did not take away benefit conferred by this section. Bergman v. Gay, 79 Vt. 262, 64 A. 1106, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1906).

Chapter 53. Assignment for Benefit of Creditors

§ 2151. Nature and form of assignment.

An assignment of property, including choses in action, by a debtor for the benefit of creditors shall be in writing and signed by the debtor. If real estate is assigned, it shall be by deed, executed and recorded in the same manner as a conveyance of real estate. Such assignment shall be for the benefit of all the creditors of the assignor in proportion to their respective claims. An assignment shall not be valid against a creditor of the assignor if the assignee is a creditor or interested in the provisions of the assignment.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2602. P.L. § 2551. G.L. § 2698. P.S. § 2536. V.S. § 2171. R.L. § 1886. G.S. 67, §§ 1, 10. 1855, No. 12 , § 1. 1852, No. 18 , §§ 1, 8.

Revision note—

Former second sentence divided into present second and third sentences to make it clear that the “assignment” referred to in the present third sentence applied to all property and not merely to real estate.

ANNOTATIONS

Assignment for other than debt.

There may be a transfer to a party to secure a liability incurred by him for assignor or grantor, as well as to secure debt due from latter to former. McGregor v. J. D. Chase & Sons, 37 Vt. 225, 1864 Vt. LEXIS 85 (1864).

Assignment to creditor or interested person.

Assignee was not so interested in provisions of assignment as to invalidate it against creditors, simply because as attorney he had caused attachments to be placed upon property, subject to which assignment was made. Hilliard v. Burlington Shoe Co., 76 Vt. 57, 56 A. 283, 1903 Vt. LEXIS 86 (1903).

Where one of defendants assigned his assets to three other defendants, but the assignees were also creditors, the assignment was void as against other creditors, unless they assented thereto. Farrar, Burt & Co. v. Powell, 71 Vt. 247, 44 A. 344, 1899 Vt. LEXIS 165 (1899).

Evidence.

Party making an assignment for benefit of creditors, under seal, was not concluded by the recitals in instrument of assignment in a subsequent suit between himself and creditor therein named. Reed v. Newcomb, 62 Vt. 75, 19 A. 367, 1889 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1889).

Oral assignment.

Oral assignment of chose in action operates as an equitable transfer, and when followed by notice thereof from assignee to debtor, will be protected and enforced by courts of law against subsequent attachment by trustee process. Noyes v. Brown, 33 Vt. 431, 1860 Vt. LEXIS 118 (1860).

Preferential assignment.

Assignment purporting to be for the benefit of all the creditors of the assignor was not invalid on ground of preference when real estate was conveyed to the assignee subject to attachments, which were prior liens thereon. Hilliard v. Burlington Shoe Co., 76 Vt. 57, 56 A. 283, 1903 Vt. LEXIS 86 (1903).

Assignment of portion of debtor’s property for benefit of part only of his creditors was not assignment “for the benefit of creditors” within the meaning and operation of this section. Passumpsic Bank v. Strong, 42 Vt. 295, 1869 Vt. LEXIS 79 (1869).

§ 2152. Schedule; list of creditors.

Assignments shall be specific and accompanied by a full inventory or schedule of the property assigned, including choses in action, and with a list of the creditors to be benefited by the assignment and the sums due each one as near as may be.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2603. P.L. § 2552. G.L. § 2699. P.S. § 2537. V.S. § 2172. R.L. § 1887. G.S. 67, § 2. 1852, No. 18 , § 2. 1843, No. 6 .

§ 2153. Copy of assignment to be filed.

The assignor and assignee shall file in the clerk’s office in the county where the assignor resides, and also where the property assigned is situated at the time of making such assignment, a copy of the assignment and inventory, including choses in action, and of the list of creditors to be benefited by the assignment, to remain on file for the use and inspection of persons interested.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2604. P.L. § 2553. G.L. § 2700. P.S. § 2538. V.S. § 2173. R.L. § 1888. G.S. 67, § 3. 1857, No. 11 , § 1. 1852, No. 18 , § 3.

§ 2154. Assignee’s bond.

The assignee shall execute to the Superior Court for the unit in which the assignor resides a bond with sureties to the satisfaction of such court and conditioned for the faithful performance of such trust. The assignee shall execute such bond at the time of making such assignment, and the same may be prosecuted by parties aggrieved as provided in 14 V.S.A. chapter 101, relative to bonds governed by that chapter.

HISTORY: Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 60.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2605. P.L. § 2554. G.L. § 2701. P.S. § 2539. V.S. § 2174. R.L. § 1889. G.S. 67, §§ 4, 5. 1857, No. 11 , § 2. 1855, No. 12 , § 2.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “unit” for “county” preceding “in which the assignor” in the first sentence, and substituted “governed by that chapter” for “taken to the probate court” in the second sentence.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior” for “county” preceding “court for” in the first sentence.

§ 2155. Failure to file copy of assignment or to execute bond.

Unless such copies are filed as directed in section 2153 of this title and such bond is executed as directed in section 2154 of this title, the property so assigned shall be liable to trustee process and to attachment and execution at the suit of the creditors of the assignor, as if an assignment had not been made.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2606. P.L. § 2555. G.L. § 2702. P.S. § 2540. V.S. § 2175. R.L. § 1890. G.S. 67, § 6. 1857, No. 11 , § 3. 1852, No. 18 , § 4.

ANNOTATIONS

Effect of filing.

After the copies of the assignment and bond have been filed, as required by this section, the assignee is invested with a valid title, unless the assignment is affected with fraud in fact. Moore v. Smith, 35 Vt. 644 (1863).

An assignment of choses in action to a trustee for benefit of creditors of assignor is at once operative against any subsequent attachments by trustee process if the proper papers are duly filed in the county clerk’s office. Vail v. J. & J. H. Peck & Co., 27 Vt. 764, 1855 Vt. LEXIS 119 (1855).

Cited.

Cited in Kimball v. Evans, 58 Vt. 655, 5 A. 523, 1886 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1886).

§ 2156. Assignee’s duties.

The assignee shall proceed with reasonable dispatch in the discharge of his or her trust to the completion of the same. When completed, he or she shall file with the clerk of such Superior Court a copy of the settlement of his or her trust account showing in detail how he or she has administered the trust, which account shall be verified by the oath of the assignee as a true and just account, and the same shall remain on file in such office for the inspection of the creditors of the assignor.

HISTORY: Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2607. P.L. § 2556. G.L. § 2703. P.S. § 2541. V.S. § 2176. R.L. § 1891. G.S. 67, § 7. 1852, No. 18 , § 5.

Amendments

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior” for “county” preceding “court” in the second sentence.

§ 2157. Application to Superior judge for settlement of account by assignee.

If, in the opinion of a creditor of the assignor named in the assignment, the assignee neglects to settle his or her trust and file a copy of his or her account with the county clerk for an unreasonable length of time, such creditor may apply to a Superior judge for an order upon the assignee to settle the same and file with the clerk of such court a copy of his or her trust account verified by oath within such time as the Superior judge deems proper.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2608. P.L. § 2557. G.L. § 2704. P.S. § 2542. V.S. § 2177. R.L. § 1892. G.S. 67, § 8. 1852, No. 18 , § 6.

Revision note—

References to “chancellor” changed to “superior judge” pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d) and 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3. See notes under §§ 71 and 219 of Title 4.

§ 2158. Powers of Superior judge.

The Superior judge may hear such application upon notice being given to the assignee, make necessary orders in the premises, and allow or refuse costs upon such application and hearing as he or she thinks equitable. He or she shall enforce the orders made by him or her according to the usages of a Superior Court and proceed against the assignee for a disobedience to the order of the Superior judge as for a contempt.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2609. P.L. § 2558. G.L. § 2705. P.S. § 2543. V.S. § 2178. R.L. § 1893. G.S. 67, § 9. 1852, No. 18 , § 7.

Revision note—

References to “chancellor” changed to “superior judge” and reference to “court of chancery” changed to “superior court” pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d) and 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3. See notes under 4 V.S.A. §§ 71 and 219.

Chapter 55. Assignment of Accounts Receivable

§§ 2211-2224. Repealed. 1966, No. 29, § 3, eff. at midnight Dec. 31, 1966.

History

Former §§ 2211-2224. Former §§ 2211-2224, relating to assignment of accounts receivable, were derived from 1957, No. 200 , §§ 1, 2; 1953, No. 164 , §§ 1-6.

Chapter 57. Voidable Transactions and False Checks

History

Amendments

—2017. 2017, No. 20 , § 1, substituted “Voidable Transactions” for “Fraudulent Conveyances” in the chapter heading.

Implementation of provisions. 2017, No. 20 , § 2(b)-(d) provides:

“(b) The provisions of this act apply to a transfer made or obligation incurred on or after July 1, 2017.

“(c) The provisions of this act do not apply:

“(1) to a transfer made or obligation incurred before July 1, 2017; or

“(2) to a right of action that has accrued before July 1, 2017.

“(d) For purposes of this act, a transfer is made and an obligation is incurred at the time provided in 9 V.S.A. § 2290 .”

Subchapter 1. Voidable Transactions

History

Amendments

—2017. 2017, No. 20 , § 1, substituted “Voidable Transactions” for “Fraudulent Transfers” in the subchapter heading.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.) 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 16, substituted “fraudulent transfers” for “fraudulent conveyances” in the subchapter heading.

CROSS REFERENCES

Assignments for benefit of creditors, see chapter 53 of this title.

Recovery of estate fraudulently conveyed by deceased, see 14 V.S.A. §§ 1554 , 1555, 1557, 1558.

§§ 2281-2283. Repealed. 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 15.

History

Former §§ 2281-2283. Former § 2281, relating to fraudulent deeds and transfers, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 8335, P.L. § 8474, G.L. § 6893, P.S. § 5782, V.S. § 4965, R.L. § 4155, G.S. 113, § 32, R.S. 95, § 19, 1821, p. 5, R. 1797, p. 178, § 7, R. 1787, p. 111.

Former § 2282, relating to penalties and forfeitures, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 8336, P.L. § 8475, G.L. § 6894, P.S. § 5783, V.S. § 4966, R.L. § 4156, G.S. 113, § 33, R.S. 95, § 20, 1821, p. 5, R. 1797, p. 178, § 7, R. 1787, p. 111.

Former § 2283, relating to joinder of defendants, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 8337, P.L. § 8476, G.L. § 6895, P.S. § 5784, V.S. § 4967, R.L. § 4157, G.S. 113, § 34.

Annotations From Former § 2281

Ability to pay debts.

Burden of proof.

Consideration.

Effect of invalidation of conveyance.

Evidence.

Exempt property.

Intent.

Null and void.

Payment to avoid attachment by creditors of creditor.

Persons entitled to impeach conveyance.

Possession of property.

Presumptions.

Questions for jury.

Right, debt or duty.

Sale to defraud creditors of partnership.

Secret agreements.

Standard of proof.

Annotations From Former § 2282

Accrual of action.

Applicability.

Construction.

Construction with other laws.

Evidence.

Intent.

Jurisdiction.

Limitation period.

Parties.

Pleading.

Standard of proof.

Annotations From Former § 2281

Ability to pay debts.

Conveyance by debtor of all his property, without reserving adequate assets for his debts, to secure future support of himself and family is fraudulent in law and void as to creditors for whom on provision is made. In re STN Enters., Inc., 73 B.R. 470, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 645 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

Conveyance by debtor of all his property to secure future support of himself and family, without provision for payment of all his debts, is fraudulent in law and void as to creditors for whom no provision is made. Crane v. Stickles, 15 Vt. 252, 1843 Vt. LEXIS 37 (1843); Jones v. Spear, 21 Vt. 426, 1849 Vt. LEXIS 49 (1849).

Where one in prosperous circumstances, and not much embarrassed with debts, in consideration of natural love and affection, made a voluntary conveyance to his daughter of a portion of his estate, leaving property amply sufficient to pay all he owed, such conveyance was good and valid against a subsequent mortgage given to secure a debt existing previous to the voluntary conveyance. Brackett v. Waite, 4 Vt. 389, 1832 Vt. LEXIS 49 (1832).

Burden of proof.

Plaintiff who alleges that transfers of property were made without consideration must establish (1) that there existed a right, debt or duty owed by the defendant; (2) that the defendant conveyed property which was subject to execution in satisfaction of the defendant’s debt; (3) that the conveyance was without adequate consideration; and (4) if the conveyance was without adequate consideration, that the defendant acted fraudulently to the hindrance of the plaintiff’s rights against him. Gore v. Green Mountain Lakes, Inc., 140 Vt. 262, 438 A.2d 373, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 599 (1981).

This section is subject to case law since the enactment of the English statute from which it was drawn, and one claiming fraud must establish (1) that there existed a right, debt or duty owed to claimant by person accused of fraud, (2) that the defrauder conveyed property which was subject to execution in satisfaction of the debt, (3) the nature of any consideration passing to conveyor, and (4) that the defrauder acted fraudulently to the hindrance of claimant’s rights against defrauder. Becker v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 416 A.2d 156, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1249 (1980).

One claiming benefit of this section has, as a prerequisite to avoidance of the conveyance, to show that the property conveyed was subject to execution, and such burden is not met by mere inference from conveyor’s failure to show that the property was exempt from execution. Becker v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 416 A.2d 156, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1249 (1980).

One who alleges that a conveyance, except possibly one from husband to wife, is fraudulent must establish affirmatively all the facts necessary to make out the fraud. Darling v. Ricker, 68 Vt. 471, 35 A. 376, 1896 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1896).

Consideration.

Proof of the nature of any consideration passing to debtor is an element of a fraudulent conveyance, and where the conveyance is for consideration the creditor must show that the grantor-debtor and the grantee knowingly participated in the fraudulent conveyance, whereas if the conveyance is without adequate consideration, only proof of grantor’s fraud is required. Becker v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 416 A.2d 156, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1249 (1980).

Love and affection cannot be a consideration under the law of fraudulent conveyances. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 122 Vt. 338, 173 A.2d 153, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1961).

Where debtor gave an order directing payment to claimant of his wages due and to become due, in consideration of an old debt and a further loan and also for the purpose of preventing other creditors trusteeing, to the extent of the indebtedness the contract of assignment was on a legal consideration, but, beyond that, was in contravention of this section and, being thus based upon a consideration illegal in part, the whole contract was void. Dow v. Taylor, 71 Vt. 337, 45 A. 220, 1899 Vt. LEXIS 187 (1899).

Where services had been rendered to intestate by grantees upon understanding that farm should be conveyed in payment thereof, which services amounted at time of conveyance to more than value of farm, conveyance would not be fraudulent as to creditors. Darling v. Ricker, 68 Vt. 471, 35 A. 376, 1896 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1896).

Conveyance upon inadequate consideration, or upon no consideration, is not void as to creditors, provided the grantor has remaining property sufficient with which to pay his debts. Wilbur v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 432, 18 A. 154, 1889 Vt. LEXIS 62 (1889).

Conveyance by debtor of all his attachable property for not more than half its value was void as to existing creditors, and fact that grantee engaged as additional consideration, to support grantor during life, did not render conveyance valid as to creditors. Church v. Chapin, 35 Vt. 223, 1862 Vt. LEXIS 24 (1862).

Reservation by debtor merely of cash on hand and debts due him from out of state, so that they cannot be attached by trustee process, though amounting in aggregate to sum of his debts, will not render valid a conveyance which, without any reservation of property, would have been invalid as to creditors. Church v. Chapin, 35 Vt. 223, 1862 Vt. LEXIS 24 (1862).

Effect of invalidation of conveyance.

Under this section, which makes a fraudulent conveyance void as to creditors of grantor, when creditors avoid a conveyance, the law remits and restores each party to his previously existing legal rights; thus, the purchaser can hold nothing by his fraudulent contract and the creditors may take all that their debtor fraudulently conveyed and no more. Irish v. Clayes, 10 Vt. 81, 1838 Vt. LEXIS 8 (1838).

Evidence.

Once a creditor shows his debtor made a voluntary conveyance and that the condition of a debtor’s estate was such that creditor could not collect on the debt, the law will impute to the debtor fraud in the conveyance, but one seeking to sustain the conveyance may rebut the imputation by evidence showing that at the time of the transfer the debtor had resources sufficient to answer his debts. Becker v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 416 A.2d 156, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1249 (1980).

When this section is pleaded, and determination is made whether the debtor has other assets sufficient to answer for his debts, sustaining of the conveyance depending upon whether or not he does, court does not have to exclude out-of-state assets unless it is shown that they are not subject to process in the situs state. Becker v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 416 A.2d 156, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1249 (1980).

Where there is written contract it cannot be shown by oral testimony that, at time of its execution, it was agreed that the writing was a sham, designed only to deceive creditors. Connor v. Carpenter, 28 Vt. 237, 1856 Vt. LEXIS 12 (1856).

One who is supposed to have conveyed away his property with a view to defraud his creditors is a competent witness for purchaser to show that the conveyance was not fraudulent. Edgell v. Lowell, 4 Vt. 405, 1832 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1832).

Giving of an absolute deed, without taking back a writing of defeasance, when deed is intended only as security to the grantee is, when grantor is in debt, evidence of fraud, and should be so considered unless it satisfactorily appears that there was some valid reason for transacting the business in that way. Gibson v. Seymour, 3 Vt. 565, 1831 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1831).

Exempt property.

Fraudulent conveyance cannot be predicated on a homestead or other property exempt from attachment. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 122 Vt. 338, 173 A.2d 153, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1961).

Penalty for fraudulent conveyance under section 2282 of this title may be predicated on a conveyance of property in which the grantor has a homestead right, where value of property exceeds homestead exemption. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 122 Vt. 338, 173 A.2d 153, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1961).

Conveyance of property exempt from attachment is not fraudulent as to creditors. Darling v. Ricker, 68 Vt. 471, 35 A. 376, 1896 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1896).

Intent.

The fraud of a voluntary grantor may be an actual fraudulent purpose, or the fraud which the law implicates to him from the condition of his estate and the necessary consequences of his act; when the grantor is found to have conveyed for the express purpose of defrauding his creditors, the condition of his estate is immaterial, and only in cases where the actual fraud appears, can the conveyance be sustained on the ground that the grantor retained sufficient property to satisfy his debts. In re STN Enters., Inc., 73 B.R. 470, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 645 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

In a case involving an alleged fraudulent conveyance where the transfer of property is for consideration, the creditor must show that the grantor-debtor and the grantee knowingly participated in the fraudulent conveyance. Becker v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 416 A.2d 156, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1249 (1980).

Where creditor claimed benefit of this section, and there was no evidence of actual fraudulent purpose, the question was whether on the facts the law would impute fraud to debtor from the condition of his estate and the necessary consequence of his conveyance, regardless of any actual fraudulent intent or purpose on his part, since the law in no case presumes fraud. Becker v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 416 A.2d 156, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1249 (1980).

In suits to set aside fraudulent conveyances, it is only when there is a valuable consideration for the conveyance that fraud on part of grantee is essential. Corey v. Morrill, 71 Vt. 51, 42 A. 976, 1898 Vt. LEXIS 23 (1898).

Deed executed in consideration of marriage will not be set aside as to existing creditors, unless it appears that both parties to deed intended by conveyance to delay creditors of grantor. Pierce v. Harrington, 58 Vt. 649, 7 A. 462, 1886 Vt. LEXIS 137 (1886).

In general, to make conveyance for valuable consideration fraudulent, there must be fraudulent intent both on part of grantor and grantee. Leach v. Francis, 41 Vt. 670, 1869 Vt. LEXIS 21 (1869); Prout v. Vaughn, 52 Vt. 451, 1880 Vt. LEXIS 162 (1880); Cole v. Cole, 117 Vt. 354, 91 A.2d 819, 1952 Vt. LEXIS 146 (1952).

If one honestly supposes it necessary for the preservation of his business interests to purchase and does purchase for a full consideration, with no intent to aid the seller in a fraud upon his creditors, the sale will be valid; it will not be valid if the purchaser, with knowledge of the vendor’s fraudulent intent, is a mere volunteer in the purchase, and buys the property simply to make a good bargain. Root v. Reynolds, 32 Vt. 139, 1859 Vt. LEXIS 76 (1859).

Where one not a creditor to the full value of purchased property, purchases for an adequate consideration, and without any intention to defeat or delay any creditors of vendor, his purchase cannot be impeached by such creditors, even if the vendor were at the time threatened with attachments and this was known to the vendee. Lyon v. Rood, 12 Vt. 233, 1840 Vt. LEXIS 38 (1840).

Null and void.

Under this section “void” means “voidable” and vests legal title in the grantee subject only to divestment by the creditors of the grantor if they choose to avoid it. Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 130 B.R. 170, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1108 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991).

The words “null and void,” as used in this section, are construed to mean voidable only; therefore, such conveyances vest legal title in grantee, subject only to be divested by creditors of grantor, if they choose to impeach it. Tudor v. Tudor, 80 Vt. 220, 67 A. 539, 1907 Vt. LEXIS 94 (1907).

Payment to avoid attachment by creditors of creditor.

Payment by debtor to creditor of his debt before it is due in order to aid creditor in his purpose of preventing his creditors from attaching the debt by means of trustee process is not void as within this section. Fletcher v. Pillsbury, 35 Vt. 16, 1861 Vt. LEXIS 108 (1861).

Persons entitled to impeach conveyance.

Vermont would follow the ‘majority rule‘ to allow a creditors committee acting under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(5) and 1109(b) in a bankruptcy proceeding to bring suit, on behalf of the debtor corporation, for breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent conveyances and director negligence, against officers and directors of the corporation, upon a showing that the debtor in possession unjustifiably failed and refused to bring the action against its directors and officers. In re STN Enters., Inc., 73 B.R. 470, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 645 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

A fraudulent conveyance within the meaning of this section is voidable, not void, and is voidable only as to that creditor; the conveyance is valid as between the parties to it and as to the whole world, other than the creditor, and can even bind the creditor if he affirms it. Becker v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 416 A.2d 156, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1249 (1980).

This section has the effect of making the contracts good and enforceable between the parties and only void as to creditor’s whose right, debt or duty is attempted to be avoided; the parties to a fraudulent contract cannot invoke the section to defeat the other creditors. Still v. Buzzell, 60 Vt. 478, 12 A. 209, 1887 Vt. LEXIS 94 (1887).

A covinous note given to defraud creditors could not be avoided by the maker, but could, notwithstanding the fraud, be enforced against him. Carpenter v. McClure, 39 Vt. 9, 1866 Vt. LEXIS 54 (1866).

Fraudulent and deceitful conveyance of property, without valuable consideration, and with intent to avoid debt, was invalid as to subsequent creditors as well as those who were creditors at the time of conveyance. McLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48, 1870 Vt. LEXIS 46 (1870).

An administrator could maintain a suit in chancery for the recovery of premises fraudulently conveyed. McLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48, 1870 Vt. LEXIS 46 (1870).

If husband, to avoid being compelled to support mother, conveyed land to wife without consideration, conveyance was good between parties, for the law would not permit a party to allege his own fraud to avoid his contracts or legal consequences of his own act. Boutwell v. McClure, 30 Vt. 674, 1858 Vt. LEXIS 95 (1858); Roberts v. Lund, 45 Vt. 82, 1872 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1872).

If conveyance of land is made to one person, and purchase money is paid by another, a resulting trust is thereby created, and person who has legal title will hold the same for the use and benefit of person paying the money, and if transaction was had with fraudulent intent, property will be held subject to be taken by creditors of person who paid money for the land. Dewey v. Long, 25 Vt. 564, 1853 Vt. LEXIS 89 (1853); McLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48, 1870 Vt. LEXIS 46 (1870); Warren v. Ranney, 50 Vt. 653, 1878 Vt. LEXIS 30 (1878).

One cannot set aside a contract because fraudulent on his part, nor can his heir or administrator set aside such contract, even in the case of an insolvent estate; creditors alone have a right to set aside contract under this section. Peaslee v. Barney, 1 D. Chip. 331 (Vt. Dec. 1, 1814); Administrator of Martin v. Martin, 1 Vt. 91, 1828 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1828); Gifford v. Ford, 5 Vt. 532, 1833 Vt. LEXIS 76 (1833); Kinsley v. Scott, 58 Vt. 470, 5 A. 390, 1886 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1886).

Possession of property.

An absolute unconditional sale of goods, under circumstances admitting of immediate delivery of possession, is fraudulent per se and void as to creditors if the possession does not accompany and follow the sale. Fuller v. Sears, 5 Vt. 527, 1833 Vt. LEXIS 75 (1833).

Presumptions.

To constitute a valid sale, as against creditors, it is necessary that there be not only a valuable but an adequate consideration, and also, that there be a change of possession; if the charge, use and possession remain with the vendor, the law presumes the sale to be merely colourable, made to avoid debts of vendor, and not bona fide. Durkee v. Mahoney, 1 Aik. 116 (Vt. Dec. 1, 1825).

Questions for jury.

Jury were proper judges whether sale was made to defeat rights of creditors, or was fair and bona fide. Spaulding v. Austin, 2 Vt. 555, 1829 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1829).

Right, debt or duty.

This section was not designed to protect, alone, creditors in the strict sense of the term, and the words, “right” and “duty,” embrace something more than is covered by the word, “debt.” Corey v. Morrill, 71 Vt. 51, 42 A. 976, 1898 Vt. LEXIS 23 (1898).

Liability upon judgment at law was a “right, debt or duty,” within the meaning of this section. Corey v. Morrill, 71 Vt. 51, 42 A. 976, 1898 Vt. LEXIS 23 (1898).

Wife has tangible and valuable interest in estate of husband, and conveyance made and accepted with intent to defeat this right will be held void as to such right. Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 A. 153, 1889 Vt. LEXIS 61 (1889).

Fact that a consideration passed does not validate a deed executed with fraudulent intent to defeat vested right of wife. Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 A. 153, 1889 Vt. LEXIS 61 (1889).

Claim being founded in tort is not within this section, which relates only to rights and duties arising out of contracts. Green v. Adams, 59 Vt. 602, 10 A. 742, 1887 Vt. LEXIS 164 (1887).

Wife, before divorce was granted, stood in relation of creditor to her husband, having an inchoate right of payment of such alimony as should be granted, and fraudulent conveyance by husband could be impeached under this section. Foster v. Foster, 56 Vt. 540, 1884 Vt. LEXIS 90 (1884); Green v. Adams, 59 Vt. 602, 10 A. 742, 1887 Vt. LEXIS 164 (1887).

Where creditor obtained judgment against debtor and on execution and sale obtained debtor’s property, and debtor subsequently became town ward, debtor was not at time of judgment under any “right, debt or duty” to town and judgment could not be attacked under this section. Fairbanks v. Benjamin, 50 Vt. 99, 1877 Vt. LEXIS 68 (1877).

A contract was not fraudulent as to a debt which did not exist for years subsequent to the contract. Rutland & Burlington R.R. v. Administrator of Powers, 25 Vt. 15, 1852 Vt. LEXIS 106 (1852).

Sale to defraud creditors of partnership.

A man may be guilty of fraud in sale of his own property to defraud creditors of a copartnership of which he is a member. Forbes & Freeman v. Davison, 11 Vt. 660, 1839 Vt. LEXIS 145 (1839).

Secret agreements.

A creditor cannot make use of a confession of judgment by his debtor, and a sale of the debtor’s property on execution, in accordance with a secret agreement between them, to create a lien merely upon such property to secure the debt, and still permit property after sale to remain in hands of debtor. Webster v. Denison, 25 Vt. 493, 1853 Vt. LEXIS 72 (1853).

An absolute conveyance of property, with a secret clause of defeasance, written or verbal, is not a conclusive badge of fraud, but such a conveyance is open to suspicion. Smith v. Onion, 19 Vt. 427, 1847 Vt. LEXIS 50 (1847).

Although person may take security for a debt by an absolute bill of sale of property, when it was intended only as security, yet if he claims that purchase was absolute, and thereby seeks to protect from creditors property of vendor, and endeavors to conceal true nature of transaction, it is evidence of fraud. Barker v. French, 18 Vt. 460, 1846 Vt. LEXIS 73 (1846).

Standard of proof.

All the elements under this section must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 130 B.R. 170, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1108 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991).

Federal law does not preempt the application of a state standard of proof in determining whether a trustee may avoid an interest or obligation under this section. Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 130 B.R. 170, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1108 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991).

Annotations From Former § 2282

Accrual of action.

If conveyance was made to defraud creditor, right to sue under this section for penalty immediately accrues, and a subsequent collection or assignment of debt does not divest the right. Forbes & Freeman v. Davison, 11 Vt. 660, 1839 Vt. LEXIS 145 (1839).

If a man took a conveyance to defraud creditors of grantor and pretended publicly to pay for it with money of his own, which, in fact, the grantor had privately furnished him for that purpose, action under this section accrued, without proving that he afterwards justified the same. Forbes & Freeman v. Davison, 11 Vt. 660, 1839 Vt. LEXIS 145 (1839).

Applicability.

Action to recover under this section cannot be maintained in courts of this state if conveyance was made in another state. Slack v. Gibbs, 14 Vt. 357, 1842 Vt. LEXIS 62 (1842).

Construction.

The penalty attaches to a covinous suit, judgment or execution, although those words are not repeated in the clause of this section giving the penalty. Wright v. Eldred, 2 Aik. 401 (Vt. 1827).

Construction with other laws.

Creditor of person who sold his goods in violation of former section 1631 of this title, which governed fraudulent bulk sales, could hold purchaser as trustee, under section 3143 of Title 12, or proceed under this section, or have his remedy in equity. Newman v. Garfield, 93 Vt. 16, 104 A. 881, 1918 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1918).

Evidence.

In an action brought pursuant to this section, exclusion of evidence of a transaction which, although proper standing alone, might be part of a systematic scheme to defraud, was error. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 122 Vt. 338, 173 A.2d 153, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1961).

Evidence of relations between husband and wife, as bearing on love and affection as consideration for a conveyance from husband to wife, was improper in an action brought pursuant to this section. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 122 Vt. 338, 173 A.2d 153, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1961).

Intent.

In an action under this section it is essential to plaintiff’s case to show that both grantor and grantee had a fraudulent intent and that they were combining and intending to avoid right, debt or duty of another. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 122 Vt. 338, 173 A.2d 153, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1961).

In a qui tam action against creditor in a fraudulent judgment or grantee in a fraudulent conveyance, it is necessary that intent of both parties to the transaction should be ultimately to defraud creditors; a design to hinder or delay them merely for a time is not within this section. Barnum v. Hackett, 35 Vt. 77, 1862 Vt. LEXIS 4 (1862).

If the defendant received deed in good faith for purpose of securing a debt due to him, he would not thereby subject himself to penalty provided in this section. Smith v. Kinne, 19 Vt. 564, 1847 Vt. LEXIS 83 (1847).

Although a party takes conveyance intending to prevent creditors of grantor from attaching, if intent was to secure property conveyed for benefit of creditors ultimately, he may not be liable under this section. Brooks v. Clayes, 10 Vt. 37, 1838 Vt. LEXIS 1 (1838).

Jurisdiction.

County court could take jurisdiction of action under this section, notwithstanding the fact that one-half of penalty, if recovered, would be given to county within which court was held. Colgate v. Hill, 20 Vt. 56, 1847 Vt. LEXIS 109 (1847).

Limitation period.

In action under this section, period of limitation set forth in section 4506 of Title 13, governing actions upon a statute for a penalty or a forfeiture given to the party aggrieved, applies. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 121 Vt. 215, 154 A.2d 483, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1959).

Parties.

Surety for grantor in fraudulent conveyance is the party aggrieved by such conveyance and his right to recover under this section is perfected by paying the debt and dates from the time of his becoming surety. Beach v. Boynton, 26 Vt. 725, 1853 Vt. LEXIS 150 (1853).

Several creditors, having distinct and separate debts due to them severally from the same debtor, cannot join as plaintiffs in an action under this section against such debtor. Carroll v. Aldrich, 17 Vt. 569, 1845 Vt. LEXIS 82 (1845).

Joint action against fraudulent grantor and grantee to recover penalty cannot be maintained under this section, and if both are joined as defendants and a verdict is obtained against them, judgment will be arrested. Slack v. Gibbs, 14 Vt. 357, 1842 Vt. LEXIS 62 (1842).

A conveyance made to defraud all creditors is made to defraud each and entitles them to sue severally under this section. Forbes & Freeman v. Davison, 11 Vt. 660, 1839 Vt. LEXIS 145 (1839).

If two joint creditors commence an action qui tam as being the party aggrieved to recover the penalty, and pending the action one of the plaintiffs dies, the action survives to surviving plaintiff. Wright v. Eldred, 2 D. Chip. 37 (Vt. Feb. 1, 1824).

Pleading.

In qui tam action founded upon this section for being party and privy to execution of fraudulent and deceitful notes, gravamen of the charge consists in justifying the notes to be made bona fide and upon good consideration; a variance between description of notes in declaration, and notes actually made, would not necessarily be fatal, provided such notes were described in the declaration as were actually justified by defendant to have been made. Goodnow v. Houghton, 16 Vt. 404, 1844 Vt. LEXIS 92 (1844).

The declaration need not conclude with the words, “contra forman statuti.” Fuller v. Fuller, 4 Vt. 123, 1832 Vt. LEXIS 11 (1832).

Standard of proof.

In action to recover under this section, the same standard of proof as in criminal actions is required. Brooks v. Clayes, 10 Vt. 37, 1838 Vt. LEXIS 1 (1838).

Cited.

Cited in Coburn v. Drown, 114 Vt. 158, 40 A.2d 528, 1945 Vt. LEXIS 62 (1945); In re Bray Enters., Inc., 38 B.R. 75, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6395 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984); Clayton v. Clayton, 153 Vt. 138, 569 A.2d 1077, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 226 (1989).

§ 2285. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Affiliate” means:
    1. a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
      1. as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
      2. solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;
    2. a corporation, 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote by the debtor, or a person that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person that holds the securities:
      1. as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
      2. solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;
    3. a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
    4. a person who operates the debtor’s business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor’s assets.
  2. “Asset” means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:
    1. property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
    2. property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
    3. an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
  3. “Claim,” except as used in “claim for relief,” means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
  4. “Creditor” means a person who has a claim.
  5. “Debt” means liability on a claim.
  6. “Debtor” means a person who is liable on a claim.
  7. “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
  8. “Insider” includes:
    1. if the debtor is an individual,
      1. a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
      2. a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
      3. a general partner in a partnership described in subdivision (A)(ii) of this subdivision (8);
      4. a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
      5. a member-managed limited liability company in which the debtor is a member, a manager-managed limited liability company in which the debtor is a manager, or any limited liability company in which the debtor is in control; or
      6. a member in a member-managed limited liability company or a manager in a manager-managed limited liability company as described in subdivision (A)(v) of this subdivision (8);
    2. if the debtor is a corporation,
      1. a director of the debtor;
      2. an officer of the debtor;
      3. a person in control of the debtor;
      4. a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
      5. a general partner in a partnership described in subdivision (B)(iv) of this subdivision (8); or
      6. a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
    3. if the debtor is a partnership,
      1. a general partner in the debtor;
      2. a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
      3. another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
      4. a general partner in a partnership described in subdivision (C)(iii) of this subdivision (8); or
      5. a person in control of the debtor;
    4. if the debtor is a limited liability company,
      1. a member of the member-managed limited liability company;
      2. a manager of the manager-managed limited liability company;
      3. a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
      4. a general partner in a partnership described in subdivision (D)(iii) of this subdivision (8); or
      5. a person in control of the debtor;
    5. an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and
    6. a managing agent of the debtor.
  9. “Lien” means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
  10. “Organization” means a person other than an individual.
  11. “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  12. “Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
  13. “Relative” means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
  14. “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
    1. to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
    2. to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.
  15. “Transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
  16. “Valid lien” means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Revision note

—2017. 2017, No. 20 , § 1, which amended this section, inadvertently designated subdivs. (13)-(16) as subdivs. (14)-(17).

Amendments

—2017. Section amended generally.

ANNOTATIONS

Asset.

Though it is true that “asset” is defined to exclude “an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties,” that exclusion applies only to the extent that the property is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant. Here, the claim was against both spouses, rather than against only one tenant. J.A. Morrissey, Inc. v. Smejkal, 2010 VT 66, 188 Vt. 245, 6 A.3d 701, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 60 (2010).

§ 2286. Insolvency.

  1. A debtor is insolvent if, at a fair valuation, the sum of the debtor’s debts is greater than the sum of the debtor’s assets.
  2. A debtor who is generally not paying his or her debts as they become due other than as a result of a bona fide dispute is presumed to be insolvent. The presumption imposes on the party against which the presumption is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of insolvency is more probable than its existence.
  3. Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter.
  4. Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as an asset.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2017, No. 20 , § 1; 2021, No. 20 , § 10.

History

Amendments

—2021. Subsec. (c): Substituted “voidable” for “violable”.

—2017. Section amended generally.

§ 2287. Value.

  1. Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor’s business to furnish support to the debtor or another person.
  2. For the purposes of subdivision 2288(a)(2) and section 2289 of this title, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, nonconclusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
  3. A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

ANNOTATIONS

Foreclosure.

Where a creditor obtained through strict foreclosure property of the debtor valued at $151,200, with a debt underlying the foreclosure of $110,928, the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C.S. § 548 and 9 V.S.A. § 2289(a) because it was made for less than reasonably equivalent value. Sensenich v. Molleur, 328 B.R. 675, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1520 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005).

In the context of a strict foreclosure, if the debt on the date of transfer is not more than 70 percent of the property’s fair market value, then an evidentiary presumption arises that (a) the transfer was for less than reasonably equivalent value and (b) the transfer is presumptively avoidable as a fraudulent conveyance; at the other end, when the debt on the date of transfer is at least 90 percent of the property’s fair market value, the opposite evidentiary presumption is invoked, namely that (a) there was reasonably equivalent value given as consideration for the transfer and (b) the transfer is presumptively not subject to avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance. In all circumstances, the presumption is rebuttable and the debt and value ratio are both computed as of the date of the transfer. Sensenich v. Molleur, 328 B.R. 675, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1520 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005).

§ 2288. Transfer or obligation voidable as to present or future creditor.

  1. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
    1. with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
    2. without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
      1. was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
      2. intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due.
  2. In determining actual intent under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:
    1. the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
    2. the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;
    3. the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
    4. before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
    5. the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets;
    6. the debtor absconded;
    7. the debtor removed or concealed assets;
    8. the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
    9. the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
    10. the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and
    11. the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
  3. A creditor making a claim for relief under subsection (a) of this section has the burden of proving the elements of the claim for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Amendments

—2017. Rewrote the section heading; substituted “voidable” for “fraudulent” in subsec. (a); and added subsec. (c).

ANNOTATIONS

Badges of fraud.

Where a lender asserted that proceeds of a sale of the lender’s collateral were fraudulently transferred to the estranged spouse of the president of the borrower, the lender established badges of fraud with regard to the spouse based on the spouse’s insider status as an officer of the borrower and a relative of the president, and concealment of the sale from the lender, but a statement by the president that claims existed against the lender for mishandling loans was insufficient to constitute a threat of litigation, especially since the statement was not made until after the transfer. Montagne v. Montagne, 417 B.R. 232, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3101 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2009).

Evidence.

Trustee who was appointed to administer the bankruptcy estate of a construction company (“debtor”) that was involuntarily placed into Chapter 7 bankruptcy met his burden of showing that he was entitled under 9 V.S.A. §§ 2288 and 2289 and 11 U.S.C.S. § 548 to recover the value of property the debtor owned which the debtor’s vice president purchased for himself or consigned for sale while the debtor was insolvent; however, the trustee was not entitled to summary judgment on his claim that he was allowed to recover the amount the debtor paid for a wood boiler that was installed in the vice president’s home because he raised that claim for the first time in his motion for summary judgment and not in his complaint. Canney v. Fisher & Strattner, LLC, 507 B.R. 101, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1002 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2014).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that a husband and his company, as potential debtors to plaintiffs, fraudulently transferred assets to his wife and a company with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. Indeed, the record was replete with facts that indicated that the couple purposely funneled funds to the wife or her company in an effort to shield those funds from a judgment in plaintiffs’ favor. J.A. Morrissey, Inc. v. Smejkal, 2010 VT 66, 188 Vt. 245, 6 A.3d 701, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 60 (2010).

Foreclosure.

In the context of a strict foreclosure, if the debt on the date of transfer is not more than 70 percent of the property’s fair market value, then an evidentiary presumption arises that (a) the transfer was for less than reasonably equivalent value and (b) the transfer is presumptively avoidable as a fraudulent conveyance; at the other end, when the debt on the date of transfer is at least 90 percent of the property’s fair market value, the opposite evidentiary presumption is invoked, namely that (a) there was reasonably equivalent value given as consideration for the transfer and (b) the transfer is presumptively not subject to avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance. In all circumstances, the presumption is rebuttable and the debt and value ratio are both computed as of the date of the transfer. Sensenich v. Molleur, 328 B.R. 675, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1520 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005).

Limitations.

Although a creditor’s fraudulent conveyance claims could not be maintained under 9 V.S.A.§ 2289(a) because of the unqualified four-year filing rule, the creditor could sue for fraudulent conveyance under 9 V.S.A. § 2288(a)(1) because the claims were filed within one year of the creditor’s discovery that the property at issue had been transferred; the creditor was reasonably diligent in uncovering the transfer. Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 375 Fed. Appx. 129, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8991 (2d Cir. 2010).

§ 2289. Transfer or obligation voidable as to present creditor.

  1. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
  2. A transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
  3. Subject to subsection 2286(b) of this title, a creditor making a claim for relief under subsection (a) or (b) of this section has the burden of proving the elements of the claim for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Amendments

—2017. Rewrote the section heading; substituted “voidable” for “fraudulent” in subsecs. (a) and (b); and added subsec. (c).

ANNOTATIONS

Bankruptcy.

Trustee who was appointed to administer the bankruptcy estate of a construction company (“debtor”) that was involuntarily placed into Chapter 7 bankruptcy met his burden of showing that he was entitled under 9 V.S.A. §§ 2288 and 2289 and 11 U.S.C. § 548 to recover the value of property the debtor owned that the debtor’s vice president purchased for himself or consigned for sale while the debtor was insolvent; however, the trustee was not entitled to summary judgment on his claim that he was allowed to recover the amount the debtor paid for a wood boiler that was installed in the vice president’s home because he raised that claim for the first time in his motion for summary judgment and not in his complaint. Canney v. Fisher & Strattner, LLC, 507 B.R. 101, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1002 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2014).

Transfer of property effected following the Vermont strict foreclosure law, 12 V.S.A. §§ 4526 et seq., is not entitled to an automatic presumption of reasonably equivalent value and may be avoided as a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1) and 9 V.S.A. § 2289(a) ; the determination of whether transfers pursuant to the strict foreclosure law are avoidable have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account not just the debt-to-value ratio but also all the other facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer. Sensenich v. Molleur, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 196 (Bankr. D. Vt. Jan. 27, 2005).

Foreclosure.

Where a creditor obtained, through strict foreclosure, property of the debtor valued at $151,200, with a debt underlying the foreclosure of $110,928, the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. § 548 and 9 V.S.A. § 2289(a) because it was made for less than reasonably equivalent value. Sensenich v. Molleur, 328 B.R. 675, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1520 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005).

In the context of a strict foreclosure, if the debt on the date of transfer is not more than 70 percent of the property’s fair market value, then an evidentiary presumption arises that (a) the transfer was for less than reasonably equivalent value and (b) the transfer is presumptively avoidable as a fraudulent conveyance; at the other end, when the debt on the date of transfer is at least 90 percent of the property’s fair market value, the opposite evidentiary presumption is invoked, namely that (a) there was reasonably equivalent value given as consideration for the transfer and (b) the transfer is presumptively not subject to avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance. In all circumstances, the presumption is rebuttable and the debt and value ratio are both computed as of the date of the transfer. Sensenich v. Molleur, 328 B.R. 675, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1520 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005).

Limitations.

Although a creditor’s fraudulent conveyance claims could not be maintained under 9 V.S.A.§ 2289(a) because of the unqualified four-year filing rule, the creditor could sue for fraudulent conveyance under 9 V.S.A. § 2288(a)(1) because the claims were filed within one year of the creditor’s discovery that the property at issue had been transferred; the creditor was reasonably diligent in uncovering the transfer. Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 375 Fed. Appx. 129, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8991 (2d Cir. 2010).

§ 2290. When transfer is made or obligation is incurred.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. a transfer is made:
    1. with respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
    2. with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien otherwise than under this chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee;
  2. if applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in subdivision (1) of this section and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action;
  3. if applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in subdivision (1) of this section, the transfer is made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee;
  4. a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred;
  5. an obligation is incurred:
    1. if oral, when it becomes effective between parties; or
    2. if evidenced by a record, when the record signed by the obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Amendments

—2017. Subdiv. (5)(B): Substituted “record” for “writing” in two places and “signed” for “executed” preceding “by the obligor”.

§ 2291. Remedies of creditor.

  1. In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in section 2292 of this title, may obtain:
    1. avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim;
    2. an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure;
    3. subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable Rules of Civil Procedure:
      1. an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
      2. appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
      3. any other relief the circumstances may require.
  2. If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Amendments

—2017. Section heading: Substituted “creditor” for “creditors”.

§ 2292. Defenses, liability, and protection of transferee or obligee.

  1. A transfer or obligation is not voidable under subdivision 2288(a)(1) of this title against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.
  2. To the extent a transfer is avoidable in an action by a creditor under subdivision 2291(a)(1) of this title, the following rules apply:
    1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under subsection (c) of this section, or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against:
      1. the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or
      2. an immediate or mediate transferee of the first transferee, other than:
        1. a good-faith transferee who took for value; or
        2. an immediate or mediate good-faith transferee of a person described in subdivision (1)(B)(i) of this subsection (b).
    2. Recovery pursuant to subdivision 2291(a)(1) or subsection 2291(b) of this title of or from the asset transferred or its proceeds, by levy or otherwise, is available only against a person described in subdivision (1)(A) or (1)(B) of this subsection.
  3. If the judgment under subsection (b) of this section is based upon the value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the equities may require.
  4. Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to:
    1. a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;
    2. enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
    3. a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
  5. A transfer is not voidable under subdivision 2288(a)(2) or section 2289 of this title if the transfer results from:
    1. termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law;
    2. enforcement of a security interest in compliance with 9A V.S.A. Article 9, other than acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures; or
    3. foreclosure of a mortgage in compliance with 12 V.S.A. chapter 172.
  6. A transfer is not voidable under subsection 2289(b) of this title:
    1. to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made, except to the extent the new value was secured by a valid lien;
    2. if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtors and the insider; or
    3. if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor, and the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor.
  7. The following rules determine the burden of proving matters referred to in this section:
    1. A party that seeks to invoke subsection (a), (d), (e), or (f) of this section has the burden of proving the applicability of that subsection.
    2. Except as otherwise provided in subdivisions (3) and (4) of this subsection, the creditor has the burden of proving each applicable element of subsection (b) or (c) of this section.
    3. The transferee has the burden of proving the applicability to the transferee of subdivision (b)(1)(B)(i) or (ii) of this section.
    4. A party that seeks adjustment under subsection (c) of this section has the burden of proving the adjustment.
  8. The standard of proof required to establish matters referred to in this section is preponderance of the evidence.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2005, No. 133 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 5, 2006; 2013, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. June 17, 2014; 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Amendments

—2017. Added “or obligee” in the section heading; amended generally subsec. (b); added “other than acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures” in subdiv. (e)(2); deleted “chapter 163, subchapter 6 or” preceding “chapter 172” and deleted “subchapter 1” thereafter in subdiv. (e)(3); substituted “except to the extent” for “unless” preceding “the new” in subdiv. (f)(1); and added subsecs. (g) and (h).

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (e)(2): Substituted “9A V.S.A. Article 9” for “Article 9 of Title 9A” following “in compliance with”.

Subdiv. (e)(3): Substituted “12 V.S.A. chapter 163, subchapter 6 or chapter 172, subchapter 1” for “subchapter 6 of chapter 163 of Title 12” at the end.

—2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Substituted “subdivision 2288 (a)(2)” for “subdivision (a)(2) of section 2288” in the introductory paragraph, and added subdiv. (3).

§ 2293. Extinguishment of claim for relief.

A claim for relief with respect to a transfer or obligation under this chapter is extinguished unless action is brought:

  1. under subdivision 2288(a)(1) of this title, not later than four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, not later than one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;
  2. under subdivision 2288(a)(2) or subsection 2289(a) of this title, not later than four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
  3. under subsection 2289(b) of this title, not later than one year after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or
  4. pursuant to the provisions of 32 V.S.A. chapter 133, subchapter 9 for a tax sale, not later than two years after the tax collector’s deed is delivered to the successful bidder at the tax sale.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2017, No. 20 , § 1; 2017, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Amendments

—2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(4): Added.

—2017. Substituted “claim for relief” for “cause of action” in the section heading and in the introductory paragraph, deleted “fraudulent” preceding “transfer” in the introductory paragraph, and substituted “not later than” for “within” throughout subdivs. (1) through (3).

ANNOTATIONS

Limitations.

Although a creditor’s fraudulent conveyance claims could not be maintained under 9 V.S.A.§ 2289(a) because of the unqualified four-year filing rule, the creditor could sue for fraudulent conveyance under 9 V.S.A. § 2288(a)(1) because the claims were filed within one year of the creditor’s discovery that the property at issue had been transferred; the creditor was reasonably diligent in uncovering the transfer. Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 375 Fed. Appx. 129, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8991 (2d Cir. 2010).

§ 2294. Governing law.

  1. In this section, the following rules determine a debtor’s location:
    1. A debtor who is an individual is located at the individual’s principal residence.
    2. A debtor that is an organization and has only one place of business is located at its place of business.
    3. A debtor that is an organization and has more than one place of business is located at its chief executive office.
  2. A claim for relief in the nature of a claim for relief under this chapter is governed by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located when the transfer is made or the obligation is incurred.

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Editor’s note

—2017. Former § 2294, relating to supplementary provisions, was redesignated as § 2296 of this chapter by 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

§ 2295. Application to series organization.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Protected series” means an arrangement, however denominated, created by a series organization that, pursuant to the law under which the series organization is organized, has the characteristics set forth in subdivision (2) of this subsection.
    2. “Series organization” means an organization that, pursuant to the law under which it is organized, has the following characteristics:
      1. The organic record of the organization provides for creation by the organization of one or more protected series, however denominated, with respect to specified property of the organization, and for records to be maintained for each protected series that identify the property of or associated with the protected series.
      2. Debt incurred or existing with respect to the activities of, or property of or associated with, a particular protected series is enforceable against the property of or associated with the protected series only, and not against the property of or associated with the organization or other protected series of the organization.
      3. Debt incurred or existing with respect to the activities or property of the organization is enforceable against the property of the organization only, and not against the property of or associated with a protected series of the organization.
  2. A series organization and each protected series of the organization is a separate person for purposes of this chapter, even if for other purposes a protected series is not a person separate from the organization or other protected series of the organization.

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Editor’s note

—2017. Former § 2295, relating to uniformity of application and construction, was redesignated as § 2297 of this chapter by 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

§ 2296. Supplementary provisions.

Unless displaced by the provisions of this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Amendments

—2017. Redesignated section from former § 2294 of this chapter to present § 2296.

§ 2297. Uniformity of application and construction.

This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; amended 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

History

Amendments

—2017. Redesignated section from former § 2295 of this chapter to present § 2297.

§ 2298. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c) , or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in 15 U.S.C. § 7003(b) .

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

§ 2299. Short title.

This chapter, which was formerly cited as the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, may be cited as the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 20 , § 1.

Subchapter 2. False Checks, Drafts, or Orders

CROSS REFERENCES

Commercial paper generally, see 9A V.S.A. article 3.

§ 2311. Civil remedy for bad checks; damages.

  1. In any action against a person who makes, issues, or draws any check, draft, or order for the payment of money that has been dishonored for lack of funds or credit to pay the same, or because the maker, issuer, or drawer has no account with the drawee, the holder may recover from the maker, issuer, or drawer court costs, costs of service, the amount of the check, draft, or order, bank fees, interest, attorney’s fees, and damages in the amount of $50.00.  A holder may only recover attorney’s fees and damages under this section if the holder gives notice pursuant to this section for payment of the check, draft, or order and the maker, issuer, or drawer fails to tender within 30 days of the date of notice an amount equal to the amount of the check, draft, or order, plus bank fees and mailing costs.
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “Dishonored” includes a stop payment order issued without cause.
    2. “Notice” means notice given to the maker, drawer, or issuer of the check, draft, or order in writing. Notice in writing shall include the date the check was written, the person to whom the check was made payable, bank fees, mailing costs, the amount of the check, and the date by which payment should be made. Notice in writing shall be conclusively presumed to have been given:
      1. when properly mailed by certified mail and by first-class mail, addressed to the maker, drawer, or issuer at the address as it appears on the check, draft, or order or at the last known address; or
      2. if:
        1. the notice has been properly mailed by first-class mail addressed to the maker, drawer, or issuer at the address as it appears on the check, draft, or order or at the last known address;
        2. the notice is supported by an affidavit of service by mailing; and
        3. three days have gone by after the date the affidavit is executed.

HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 23, eff. March 29, 1972; 1971, No. 254 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 11, 1972; 1987, No. 260 (Adj. Sess.); 2005, No. 60 , § 1.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 8329. P.L. 8468. 1925, No. 130 . G.L. § 6888. 1915, No. 206 .

Revision note

—2014. In subdiv. (b)(1), deleted “but is not limited to” following “includes” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

Amendments

—2005. Subdiv. (2): Amended generally.

—1987 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 185 deleted “and for want of property, the body of the person so making, drawing, uttering or delivering such check, draft or order may be attached” following “thereby”.

Act No. 254 substituted “to the holder of the instrument for its face amount together with interest and costs of collection including a reasonable attorney’s fee” for “in an action of tort on this statute, to the person injured thereby” following “liable” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

CROSS REFERENCES

Assessment of returned check charges against depositor of check drafted with insufficient funds, see 8 V.S.A. § 10505 .

Criminal penalties for issuing or passing bad checks, see 13 V.S.A. § 2022 .

Issuing bad check to Department of Motor Vehicles, see 23 V.S.A. § 110 .

ANNOTATIONS

Applicability.

Where an action on a protested check is between the immediate parties and it is shown that the check was taken by the creditor under an agreement of the parties that it should operate as a memorandum of the amount due from the debtor, this section does not apply. Neverett v. Towne, 123 Vt. 45, 179 A.2d 583, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 190 (1962).

An injury under this section is suffered in this State when a check is not paid here. Neverett v. Towne, 121 Vt. 447, 159 A.2d 345, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1960).

This section does not apply to instruments whose conditional delivery did not give them the effect and operation of bank checks. Hooper v. Levin, 112 Vt. 321, 24 A.2d 337, 1942 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1942).

This section has no application to postdated checks. Lovell v. Eaton, 99 Vt. 255, 133 A. 742, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 187 (1925).

This section is limited to checks, drafts, or orders upon a bank or other depository for payment of money, and applies equally to each named; hence it is immaterial how instrument sued upon is classified so long as it is one covered. J.B. LaCroix & Frere v. Eaton, 99 Vt. 262, 133 A. 745, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 190 (1925).

Effect of payee’s knowledge of lack of funds.

Since fraud and deceit are not essential elements of a right of action under this section, it is no defense to the action that the payee had knowledge of such lack of funds at the time of taking the check from the maker. Neverett v. Towne, 123 Vt. 45, 179 A.2d 583, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 190 (1962).

This section applies to presently dated check, although payee was informed at time of delivery that there were no funds to meet check. North Adams Beef & Produce Co. v. Cantor, 103 Vt. 514, 156 A. 879, 1931 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1931).

Elements of right of action.

The essential element of the right of action under this section is the knowledge on the part of the maker that at the time of issuing a check he does not have sufficient funds on deposit in the institution upon which the check is drawn to pay it. Neverett v. Towne, 123 Vt. 45, 179 A.2d 583, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 190 (1962).

This section created a remedy for benefit of holder of presently dated check, and was designed to provide indemnity to him by means of body action against maker of unpaid check falling within its provisions; hence, no injury or damage beyond non-payment need be shown. North Adams Beef & Produce Co. v. Cantor, 103 Vt. 514, 156 A. 879, 1931 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1931).

Neither fraud nor deceit is an essential element of right of action under this section. Lovell v. Eaton, 99 Vt. 259, 133 A. 744, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 189 (1925); North Adams Beef & Produce Co. v. Cantor, 103 Vt. 514, 156 A. 879, 1931 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1931).

Nature of action.

Action under this section is not in contract, nor an action on check for collection of a debt, but is an action of tort and design of this section is to provide indemnity to holder of an unpaid check falling within its provisions by means of a body action against any person liable under its terms. Neverett v. Towne, 121 Vt. 447, 159 A.2d 345, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1960).

Action under this section is neither common law action for fraud and deceit nor action on check for collection of a debt, but is an action to enforce statutory remedy for benefit of payee or holder of check. Lovell v. Eaton, 99 Vt. 259, 133 A. 744, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 189 (1925).

Parties.

Persons who are entitled to take advantage of this section are members of class entitled to be protected by this section, or for the benefit of whom it was intended. Neverett v. Towne, 121 Vt. 447, 159 A.2d 345, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1960).

Pleading.

In an action under this section, no direct reference to this section is necessary if declaration sets up all facts required to make a case hereunder. Neverett v. Towne, 121 Vt. 447, 159 A.2d 345, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1960).

§ 2312. Prima facie evidence of knowledge.

As against the maker or drawer thereof, the making, drawing, uttering, or delivery of such check, draft, or order, the payment of which is refused by the drawee for the reason that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds in or credit with such bank or other depository for the payment of such check, draft, or order in full upon its presentation, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge at the time of such making, drawing, uttering, or delivery that the maker or drawer did not have sufficient funds in or credit with such bank or other depository for the payment of such check, draft, or order in full upon its presentation, unless such maker or drawer shall pay such check, draft, or order, with all costs and protest fees, within eight days after receiving notice that the same has not been paid by the drawee.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 8330. P.L. § 8469. 1925, No. 130 . G.L. § 6888. 1915, No. 206 .

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Neverett v. Towne, 121 Vt. 447, 159 A.2d 345, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1960); Neverett v. Towne, 123 Vt. 45, 179 A.2d 583, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 190 (1962).

Chapter 59. Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Financing

History

1961 amendment. 1961, No. 227 , § 13 provided: “This act [this chapter] shall not apply to retail installment contracts executed before its effective date [Jan. 1, 1962].”

Severability—1961. 1961, No. 227 , § 12 contained a severability provision applicable to this chapter.

Citation. 1961, No. 227 , § 14 provided that this chapter shall be known as the “Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Finance Act.”

CROSS REFERENCES

Financing of mobile homes, see § 2603 of this title.

Motor Vehicle Purchase and Use Tax, see 32 V.S.A. chapter 219.

Retail Installment Sales Act, see chapter 61 of this title.

§ 2351. Definitions.

As used in this chapter only, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Motor vehicle” means and is limited to the following:
    1. all vehicles propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power, except when two or more such vehicles are purchased at the same time;
    2. trailers and semi-trailers, as defined in 23 V.S.A. § 4(40) , except when two or more such trailers or semi-trailers are purchased at the same time; and
    3. mobile home as defined in 10 V.S.A. § 6201 .
  2. “Retail buyer” or “buyer” means a person who agrees to buy or buys a motor vehicle other than principally for the purpose of resale, or other than principally for a commercial purpose, from a retail seller in a retail installment transaction.
  3. “Retail seller” or “seller” means a person engaged in the business of selling motor vehicles to retail buyers in retail installment transactions and includes an owner of a mobile home park who sells mobile homes to residents of the park, whether or not the sales are the principal business of the park owner.
  4. “Retail installment transaction” or “transaction” means any transaction in which a retail buyer purchases a motor vehicle from a retail seller under a retail installment contract for a time sale price consisting of a cash sale price and other amounts as limited by this chapter and agrees to pay part or all of the price in one or more deferred installments.  The term shall include every transaction wherein the promise or agreement to pay the deferred balance of such price is made by the retail buyer to the retail seller notwithstanding the existence or occurrence of any one or more of the following events:
    1. that the retail seller has arranged or arranges to sell, transfer, or assign the retail buyer’s obligation;
    2. that the amount of the finance charge is determined by reference to charts or information furnished by a financing institution;
    3. that the forms of instruments used to evidence the retail installment transaction are furnished by a financing institution; and
    4. that the credit standing of the retail buyer is or has been evaluated by a financing institution.
  5. “Retail installment contract” or “contract” means a contract entered into in this State evidencing a retail installment transaction under which the title to or a lien or security in the motor vehicle, which is the subject matter of the transaction, is retained or taken to secure the retail buyer’s obligations.  The term includes a chattel mortgage, conditional sale contract, and a contract in the form of a bailment or a lease if the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation for use a sum substantially equivalent to or in excess of the value of the motor vehicle sold, and it is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become or, for no further or a merely nominal consideration, has the option of becoming the owner of the motor vehicle upon full compliance with the provisions of the bailment or lease.  The term shall also include any amendment of the retail installment contract in which the parties agree to renew, restate, or reschedule the unpaid balance thereof, or to extend the scheduled due date of all or any part of any installment or installments.
  6. “Cash price” means the minimum price for which the motor vehicle, including accessories, subject to the retail installment contract or another motor vehicle of like kind and quality, including similar accessories, may be purchased for cash from the seller by the buyer.
  7. “Official fees” means the amount of the fees prescribed by law for filing, recording, or otherwise perfecting a retained title, lien, or other security interests created in a retail installment transaction.
  8. “Principal balance” means the cash sale price of the motor vehicle plus the amounts, if any, included in the retail installment contract, if a separate identified charge is stated therein, for insurance and other benefits and official fees, less the amount of the buyer’s down payment, if any, in money or goods, or both.
  9. “Finance charge” means the estimated amount to be added to the principal balance to determine the balance of the buyer’s indebtedness to be paid under a retail installment contract.
  10. “Sales finance company” means a person engaged in the business of purchasing or otherwise acquiring from one or more sellers retail installment contracts.
  11. “Holder” means the retail seller of the motor vehicle or the sales finance company or other assignee if the retail installment contract is purchased or otherwise acquired by a sales finance company or other assignee.
  12. “Administrator” means the Commissioner of Financial Regulation.
  13. “Person” means an individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, banking organization, association, or any other group however organized.
  14. Words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the neuter, and when the sense so indicates, words of the neuter gender may refer to any gender.
  15. “Commercial purpose” means a purpose related to the production, exhibition, marketing, transportation, processing, or manufacture of goods or services by any person, where the cash price of the motor vehicle, exclusive of any finance charges, exceeds the sum of $20,000.00.
  16. “Commercial lease” means a transfer of the right to possession and use of a motor vehicle for a term in return for consideration, including leases intended as security, and where the vehicle is to be used by the lessee primarily for commercial, industrial, or agricultural use and not for personal, family, or household use.

HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 227 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1962; amended 1979, No. 20 , §§ 1, 2, eff. April 10, 1979; 1989, No. 122 , §§ 2, 3, eff. June 30, 1989; 1989, 1989, No. 225 (Adj. Sess.), § 25(b); 1995, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 38(a); 2003, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Revision note

—2013. In introductory language, substituted “As used in” for “For the purposes of ” preceding “this chapter” to conform to V.S.A. style and in subdiv. (5), deleted “, but is not limited to,” following “includes” in the second sentence in accordance with 2013, No. 5 § 4.

Revision note—. Substituted “section 4(40) of Title 23” for “section 4(31) of Title 23” in subdiv. (1)(B) to conform reference to amendment of section.

Amendments

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (1)(C): Added.

Subdiv. (3): Inserted “and includes an owner of a mobile home park who sells mobile homes to residents of the park, whether or not the sales are the principal business of the park owner” at the end.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (12): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities”.

—1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (12): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, and securities” for “commissioner of banking and insurance”.

—1989. Subdiv. (9): Substituted “estimated” for “total” preceding “amount”.

Subdiv. (16): Added.

—1979. Subdiv. (2): Inserted “or other than principally for a commercial purpose” following “resale”.

Subdiv. (15): Added.

ANNOTATIONS

Statute of limitations.

Because there is no inconsistency between the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Finance Act and the statute of limitations of the UCC (9A V.S.A. § 2—275), there is no doubt that applying the latter provision to motor vehicle retail installment sales contracts is consistent with the Legislature’s intent. DaimlerChrysler Services North America v. Ouimette, 2003 VT 47, 175 Vt. 316, 830 A.2d 38, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 88 (2003).

§§ 2352, 2353. Repealed. 1995, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 39(b), eff. Jan. 1, 1997.

History

Former §§ 2352, 2353. Former § 2352, relating to licensing of sales finance companies, was derived from 1961, No. 227 , § 2 and amended by 1987, No. 117 , §§ 7, 8.

Former § 2353, relating to suspension or revocation of licenses, was derived from 1961, No. 227 , § 3.

§ 2354. Investigations and complaints; powers of Administrator.

  1. The Administrator, if he or she has reasonable cause to believe that any licensee or other person has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, may make such investigation as he or she shall deem necessary, and, to the extent necessary for this purpose, the Administrator or his or her authorized representative may examine the licensee or any other person and shall have the power to compel the production of all relevant books, records, and documents.
  2. Any buyer having reason to believe that this chapter has been violated with respect to this retail installment contract may file with the Administrator a written complaint setting forth the details of the alleged violation.
  3. The Administrator may issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, records, documents, and other evidence before him or her in any matter over which he or she has jurisdiction, control, or supervision pertaining to this chapter.  The Administrator shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations to any person whose testimony is required.

HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 227 , § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.

CROSS REFERENCES

Enforcement of administrative subpoenas, see 3 V.S.A. § 809a .

Modification of administrative subpoenas or discovery orders, see 3 V.S.A. § 809b .

§ 2355. Requirements and prohibitions as to retail installment contracts.

  1. Each retail installment contract shall be in writing, dated, signed by both the buyer and the seller, and completed as to all essential provisions before it is signed by the buyer.  A retail installment contract need not be contained in a single document.
  2. The printed portion of the retail installment contract, other than instructions for completion, shall be in a size equal to at least eight-point type. The contract shall contain substantially the following notice in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type and shall appear directly above the buyer’s signature:

    Click to view

  3. A retail installment contract shall also contain, in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type, a specific statement that liability insurance coverage for bodily injury and property damage caused to others is not included, if that is the case.
  4. The seller shall deliver to the buyer at the time of the execution of the contract, and if it contains blank spaces as provided in subsection (j) of this section, mail to him or her at his or her address shown on the retail installment contract a copy of the contract as accepted by the seller. Until the seller does so, a buyer who has not received delivery of the motor vehicle may rescind his or her contract and receive a refund of all payments made and a return of all goods traded in to the seller on account of or in contemplation of the contract or, if the goods traded in cannot be returned, the value thereof.  Any acknowledgment by the buyer of delivery of a copy of the retail installment contract shall be in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type and shall appear directly above the buyer’s signature.
  5. The retail installment contract shall contain the names of the seller and the buyer, the place of business of the seller, the residence or other address of the buyer as specified by the buyer, and a description of the motor vehicle sold or to be sold.
    1. The retail installment contract shall contain the following items: (f) (1) The retail installment contract shall contain the following items:
      1. The cash price of the motor vehicle.
      2. The amount of the buyer’s down payment, if any, specifying the amounts paid in money and in goods traded in.
      3. The difference between items (A) and (B) of this subdivision.
      4. The amount, if any, paid or to be paid by the seller pursuant to an agreement with the buyer to discharge a security interest, lien interest, or lease interest on the traded-in motor vehicle; the amount, if any, for insurance, including the cost of credit life insurance at a rate authorized by rate schedules then in effect and on file with the Commissioner of Financial Regulation; the cost, if any, of physical damage insurance specifying the type or types and the term of coverage; the cost, if any, for service contracts as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 4247 ; and the reasonable cost, if any, for a debt protection agreement as set forth in 8 V.S.A. § 10405 .
      5. The amount of all official fees, and a separate identified charge shall be shown therefor.
      6. The principal balance, which is the sum of items (C), (D), and (E) of this subsection.
      7. The amount of the finance charge.
      8. The sum of items (F) and (G) of this subsection, which is the balance to be paid by the buyer to the seller; the number of installments; the amount of each installment and the due date or period thereof; and notice to the borrower as to the effect of early or late payments.
      9. The total time price, which is the sum of items (A), (D), (E), and (G) of this subsection.
      10. A disclosure form completed by the automobile dealership containing at least the allowance for the trade-in, amount owed on the trade-in or lease, cash price, amount financed on the motor vehicle retail installment contract, the amount financed on the motor vehicle retail installment contract as a percentage of the cash price of the vehicle, and signature blocks for the buyer will be provided to the buyer who finances a motor vehicle utilizing a motor vehicle retail installment sales contract at the dealership. The unexecuted disclosure form will be provided to the buyer prior to consummation of the transaction and will be signed by the buyer at the time the buyer signs the motor vehicle retail installment contract. The disclosure will be on a form prescribed by the Commissioner on or before July 1, 2006 and as thereafter amended by the Commissioner by rule.
    2. The items specified in subdivision (1) of this subsection need not be stated in the sequence or order set forth; additional items may be included but only to explain the calculations involved in determining the balance to be paid by the buyer as set forth in this subsection. No other charges shall be made by the seller.
  6. The amount, if any, stated and included in the retail installment contract for insurance to be purchased by the holder shall not exceed the applicable premiums chargeable in accordance with filings, if any, with the Department of Financial Regulation.  If the insurance for which the stated amount is included insures the life, safety, or health of the buyer, or their interest in or their liability because of the motor vehicle, and is purchased by the holder, the holder shall, within 30 days after the execution of the retail installment contract, send or cause to be sent to the buyer a policy or policies of insurance, written by an insurance company authorized to do business in this State, or a certificate or certificates thereof.  The policy or policies shall set forth all the terms, exceptions, limitations, restrictions, and conditions of the contract or contracts of insurance and the certificates shall set forth a summary thereof.  The insurance may be purchased by the holder. However, the buyer may purchase the insurance from an agent or broker of his or her own selection and select an insurance company acceptable to the holder, which acceptance shall not be arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld, but in that case the inclusion of the insurance premium in the retail installment contract shall be optional with the seller.  If the insurance is cancelled or the premium adjusted, any refund of the premium received by the holder shall be credited to the outstanding principal balance of the contract, except to the extent applied toward payment for similar insurance protecting the interest of the buyer and the holder or either of them.
  7. -(i) [Repealed.]

    (j) A retail installment contract shall not be signed by any party thereto when it contains blank spaces of items that are pertinent to the transaction and that should be completed. However, if delivery of the motor vehicle is not made at the time of the execution of the contract, the identifying numbers or marks or similar information and the due date of the first installment may be inserted in the contract after its execution.

    (k) Upon written request of the buyer, the holder of a retail installment contract shall give or forward to the buyer a written statement of the dates and amounts of installment payments and the total amount unpaid under the contract. A buyer shall be given a written receipt for any payment when made in cash. One statement or receipt shall be given the buyer without charge; if any additional statement or receipt is requested by the buyer, it shall be supplied by the holder at a charge not in excess of $1.00 for each additional statement or receipt so supplied.

    ( l ) A provision in a retail installment contract relieving the seller from liability for any legal remedies that the buyer may have against the seller shall not be enforceable.

    (m) The holder of any retail installment contract may collect a reasonable delinquency charge if provided for in the contract. In addition, where collection is referred for payment to an attorney who is not a salaried employee of the holder of the contract, the contract may provide for the payment of an attorney’s reasonable fee and for court costs and disbursements and also for actual and reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred after referral in connection with the delinquency, repossession, or foreclosure, including storage charges, reconditioning expenses, and collection expenses.

“NOTICE TO RETAIL BUYER Do not sign this contract in blank. You are enti- tled to a copy of the contract at the time you sign. Keep it to protect your legal rights.”

HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 227 , § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 1962; amended 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 1985, No. 59 , § 3; 1989, No. 122 , §§ 4, 5, 6, eff. June 30, 1989; 1989, No. 225 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 1995, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; 1997, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1998; 2005, No. 70 , § 5; 2005, No. 143 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2021, No. 20 , § 11.

History

Revision note

—2013. In subsec. (m), deleted “but not limited to” following “including” in the second sentence in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

—2005. Redesignated the subdivs. included in subdiv. (f)(1)(I) to conform to V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—2021. Subdiv. (f)(2): In the first sentence, deleted “above” preceding “items”, inserted “specified in subdivision (1) of this subsection” preceding “need”, and substituted “in this subsection” for “above” following “set forth”.

—2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (f)(1)(D): Inserted “amount, if any, paid or to be paid by the seller pursuant to an agreement with the buyer to discharge a security interest, lien interest, or lease interest on a traded-in motor vehicle, the” at the beginning.

Subdiv. (f)(1)(J): Added.

—2005. Subdiv. (f)(4): Redesignated as subdiv. (f)(1)(d); deleted “and” following “term of coverage” and added “and the reasonable cost, if any, for a debt protection agreement as set forth in section 10405 of Title 8”.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (f)(4): Substituted “if any, for insurance including the cost” for “if any, including cost” preceding “of credit life”, “the cost, if any, of” for “and” preceding “physical damage” and added “and the cost, if any, for service contracts as defined in section 4247 of Title 8” at the end, and made a minor change in punctuation.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (f)(4): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities”.

Subsec. (g): Substituted “department of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “department of banking, insurance, and securities”.

—1989 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, and securities” for “commissioner of banking and insurance” in subdiv. (f)(4) and “department of banking, insurance, and securities” for “department of banking and insurance” in the first sentence of subsec. (g).

—1989. Subdiv. (f)(8): Amended generally.

Subsec. (g): Substituted “their” for “his” preceding “interest” and preceding “liability” in the second sentence, inserted “or her” following “broker of his” in the fifth sentence, and substituted “outstanding principal balance” for “final maturing installments” preceding “of the contract” in the sixth sentence.

Subsec. (h): Repealed.

—1985. Subsec. (m): Added.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (i): Repealed.

Implementation. For implementation of 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.) provisions, see note set out following heading for subchapter 1 of chapter 4 of this title.

CROSS REFERENCES

Credit life insurance and credit accident and health insurance generally, see 8 V.S.A. chapter 109.

§ 2355a. Repealed. 1969, No. 118, eff. April 22, 1969.

History

Former § 2355a. Former § 2355a, relating to credit cost disclosure, was derived from 1967, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 2356. Repealed. 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. April 30, 1980.

History

Former § 2356. Former § 2356, relating to finance charge limitations, was derived from 1961, No. 227 , § 6. The subject matter is now covered by § 2356a of this title.

§ 2356a. Finance charge limitation and method of calculation.

The interest rates for motor vehicle financing shall be that authorized by subdivision 41a(b)(4) of this title, and the method of interest calculation shall be as specified in subsection 41a(d) of this title.

HISTORY: Added 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 15, eff. April 30, 1980; amended 1989, No. 122 , § 7, eff. June 30, 1989.

History

Revision note

—2006. Substituted “subdivision 41a(b)(4) of this title” and “subsection 41a(d) of this title” for “section 41a(b)(4) of this title” and “section 41a(d) of this title” to conform references to V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—1989. Added “and method calculation” following “limitation” in the section heading and “and the method of interest calculation shall be as specified in section 41a(d) of this title” following “41a(b)(4) of this title” in the text of the section.

Implementation. For implementation of 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.) provisions, see note set out following heading for subchapter 1 of chapter 4 of this title.

§ 2357. Prepayment.

Notwithstanding the provisions of any retail installment contract to the contrary, any buyer may prepay it in full at any time before maturity without penalty.

HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 227 , § 7, eff. Jan. 1, 1962; amended 1967, No. 58 , § 3; 1989, No. 122 , § 8, eff. June 30, 1989.

History

Amendments

—1989. Section amended generally.

—1967. Section amended generally.

§ 2358. Refinancing retail installment contracts.

  1. The holder of a retail installment contract, upon request by the buyer, may agree to an amendment thereto to extend the scheduled due date of all or any part of any installment or installments or to renew, restate, or reschedule the unpaid balance of the contract.
  2. The amendment to the contract must be confirmed in writing signed by the buyer and the holder.  The writing shall set forth the terms of the amendment and shall either be delivered or mailed to the buyer at the address as shown on the contract.  The writing together with the original contract and any previous amendments thereto shall constitute the retail installment contract.

HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 227 , § 8, eff. Jan. 1, 1962; amended 1989, No. 122 , § 9, eff. June 30, 1989.

History

Amendments

—1989. Subsec. (a): Deleted “and may collect for it a refinance charge not to exceed an amount computed as provided in subsection (b) of this section” following “balance of the contract”.

Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

§ 2359. Cases not provided for; scope.

This chapter shall not affect or apply to any loans or to the business of making loans under the laws of this State, nor shall any of the provisions of the loan or interest statutes of this State affect or apply to any retail installment transaction. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair or in any way affect any rule of law applicable to or governing retail installment sales not otherwise subject hereto. This chapter shall apply exclusively to all retail installment transactions as defined in section 2351 of this title. This chapter shall not apply to commercial leases.

HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 227 , § 9, eff. Jan. 1, 1962; amended 1989, No. 122 , § 10, eff. June 30, 1989; 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Amendments

—1989 (Adj. Sess.). In the second paragraph, deleted “neither” preceding “this chapter”, substituted “shall not” for “nor chapter 73 of Title 8 is intended to” thereafter, and deleted “whether entered into prior to or after revision of this chapter” following “leases”.

—1989. Added the second paragraph.

1989 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. June 25, 1990, provided that the amendment to this section by section 2 of the act shall take effect retroactively from June 30, 1989.

Legislative intent. 1989, No. 122 , § 24(b), eff. June 30, 1989, provided that section 10 of the act, which amended this section, was intended to be remedial in nature and to clarify existing law in chapter 73 of Title 8, and elsewhere.

ANNOTATIONS

Construction with other laws.

This section is intended to ensure that the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Financing Act operates independently of loan and loan-related statutes; thus, it operates to exclude application of the License Lenders Act. Green Tree Credit Corp. v. Kenyon, 163 Vt. 631, 660 A.2d 296, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1995) (mem.).

§ 2360. Waiver.

No act or agreement of the retail buyer before or at the time of the making of a retail installment contract shall constitute a valid waiver of any of the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 227 , § 10, eff. Jan. 1, 1962.

§ 2361. Penalties.

  1. In case of failure of any person to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter, such person or any person who acquires a contract or installment account with knowledge of such noncompliance is barred from recovery of any finance charge or of any delinquency, collection, deferral, or refinance charge imposed in connection with such contract or installment account, and the buyer shall have the right to recover from such person an amount equal to any of such charges paid by the buyer with interest thereon from the time of payment and all expenses of collection including reasonable attorney’s fees, in a civil action on this statute.
  2. In any case in which a person willfully violates any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the buyer may recover from such person an amount equal to two times the total of the estimated finance charges and any delinquency, collection, extension, deferral, or refinance charges imposed, contracted for, or received, and the seller shall be barred from the recovery of any such charges.  The buyer shall also recover reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.
  3. A person shall not knowingly or willfully make any retail installment contract under this chapter that directly or indirectly calls for the payment of any finance charges in excess of the legal rate as set forth in this chapter.  A contract violating this section shall be unenforceable, and a person shall have no right to collect any principal, finance, or other charges.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, any failure to comply with any provision of the chapter may be corrected by the holder in accordance with the provisions of this section, provided that a willful violation may not be corrected, and a correction that will increase the amount owed by the owner or the amount of any payment shall not be effective unless the buyer concurs in writing to the correction.  If a violation is corrected by the holder in accordance with the provisions of this section, neither the seller nor the holder shall be subject to any penalty under this section.  The correction shall be made by delivering to the buyer a corrected copy of the contract within 60 days of the execution of the original contract by the buyer.  Any amount improperly collected from the buyer shall be credited against the indebtedness evidenced by the contract.
  5. Any person who shall willfully and intentionally violate any provisions of this chapter shall be fined not more than $100.00 for the first offense.  Upon conviction for violating this section in any transaction entered into or consummated after a first conviction hereunder, the offender shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 227 , § 11, eff. Jan. 1, 1962; amended 1973, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1989, No. 122 , § 11, eff. June 30, 1989.

History

Revision note—

In subsec. (d), substituted “owed” for “owned” following “increase the amount” in the first sentence and deleted “of” following “delivering to the buyer” in the third sentence to correct typographical and grammatical errors.

Amendments

—1989. Subsec. (b): Inserted “estimated” preceding “finance charges” in the first sentence.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

§ 2362. Prohibition on discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, age, or disability.

No seller shall discriminate against any buyer or prospective buyer who desires to establish a retail installment contract because of the sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, age, or disability of the buyer.

HISTORY: Added 1973, No. 130 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 1989, No. 122 , § 12, eff. June 30, 1989; 1991 No. 135 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2007, No. 41 , § 11; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 27.

History

Amendments

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “disability” for “handicapping condition” in the section heading and preceding “of the buyer.”

—2007. Inserted “gender identity” following “sexual orientation” in the section heading and text.

—1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “sexual orientation” following “sex” in the section heading and in the text of the section.

—1989. Deleted “or” preceding “marital status” and added “race, color, religion, national origin, age or handicapping condition” in the section heading and in the text of the section.

Chapter 60. Agricultural Finance Leases

History

Redesignation of chapter. 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 provides: “The office of legislative council shall redesignate 9 V.S.A. chapter 65 as a new 9 V.S.A. chapter 60 and shall redesignate the sections located within the current 9 V.S.A. chapter 65, sections 2481-2492, as new sections 2381-2392 to be located within the new 9 V.S.A. chapter 60. All references in statute and in administrative rules adopted pursuant to authority granted in statute shall be redesignated to reflect the changes in this section.”

§ 2381. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Agricultural finance lease” or “lease” means a lease of property to a farmer under which:
    1. the lease transfers ownership of the leased property to the lessee by the end of the lease term;
    2. the lease contains an option for the lessee to purchase the leased property at the end of the lease term;
    3. the lease term is equal to or greater than 75 percent of the estimated economic life of the leased property; or
    4. when the lease is executed, the present value of the rental and other minimum lease payments equals or exceeds 90 percent of the fair market value of the leased property less any investment tax credit retained by the lessor.
  2. “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Financial Regulation.
  3. “Fair market value” means the price the leased property would be sold for in a transaction between willing and informed parties in an arms-length transaction.
  4. “Farmer” means any person engaged in farming.
  5. “Farming” means those activities described in 10 V.S.A. § 6001(22) .
  6. “Leased property” or “property” means personal property leased by a lessor to a farmer lessee for use in farming, including goods, livestock, equipment and machinery, bulk milk tanks, silos, manure storage systems, tools, fixtures that were personal property at the time the lease was entered into, and accessories.  The term also includes the cost of installation, if any.
  7. “Lessee” means a person who acquires the right to possession and use of leased property under an agricultural finance lease.
  8. “Lessor” means a person who transfers the right to possession and use of leased property under an agricultural finance lease, and agents, successors, and assigns of the lessor.  The term also includes a person who is the manufacturer, seller, supplier, or dealer of the leased property if the lessor is wholly owned as a subsidiary corporation by, or wholly owns as a subsidiary corporation, such a person, or if there is common ownership or management in any other form between the lessor and that person.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1995, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Revision note—

In subdiv. (2), substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, and securities” for “commissioner of banking and insurance” pursuant to 1989, No. 225 (Adj. Sess.), § 25(b).

Amendments

—1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (2): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities”.

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2481 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

ANNOTATIONS

Particular Cases.

Motion to dismiss failed because complaint contained plausible allegations that defendant developed online lender, which charged rates in excess of Vermont’s usury limit, negotiated term sheet which governed business arrangements with Indian tribe, and enabled alleged violations of Vermont law to occur. Gingras v. Rosette, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66833 (D. Vt. May 18, 2016), aff'd, 922 F.3d 112, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 12104 (2d Cir. 2019).

§ 2382. Agricultural finance leases.

  1. An agricultural finance lease, including any lease amendments, shall be in writing, dated, and signed by the lessee and the lessor.  The lease shall be completed before being signed by the lessee.  The lease need not be contained in a single document.  A copy of the lease shall be provided to the lessee at the time of execution.
  2. The printed portion of an agricultural finance lease, and the accompanying disclosure sheet if not incorporated into the lease, other than instructions for completion, shall be in a size equal to at least eight-point type.  The contract shall be designated in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type as an “agricultural finance lease ” and shall contain the following notice in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type.

    “NOTICE TO THE LESSEE—DO NOT SIGN THIS LEASE IN BLANK. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO A COPY OF THE LEASE AT THE TIME YOU SIGN. KEEP IT TO PROTECT YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS.”

  3. The provisions of section 2454 of this title, requiring a lessor to disclose a lessee’s right to cancel a lease, shall apply to an agricultural finance lease that is a “home solicitation sale,” as that term is defined by section 2451a of this title.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2482 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2383. Disclosure sheet.

The agricultural finance lease shall contain, or be accompanied by, a disclosure sheet that contains the following information in easily readable form:

  1. The names and addresses of the lessor and lessee.  If the seller of the leased property is an entity different than the lessor, the name and address of the seller shall also be included.
  2. A brief description of each item of the leased property.
  3. The purchase price of leased property purchased by the lessor contemporaneously with the execution of the agricultural finance lease, evidenced by a copy of the sales invoice or, for other leased property, identification of the leased property’s fair market value at the time of execution of the lease.
  4. The total amount of any advance payment, down payment, security deposit, together with the rate of interest, if any, or trade-in allowance.
  5. The number, amount, and due dates or periods of payments scheduled under the lease, and the total amount of the periodic payments.
  6. The total amount paid or payable by the lessee during the lease term for official fees, registration, certificate of title, license fees, and taxes.  If these amounts are not known, a good faith estimate shall be included.
  7. The total amount of all other charges payable by the lessee to the lessor, individually itemized, that are not included in the periodic payments, except for costs of collection upon default.
  8. A brief identification of any insurance required by the lease, including:
    1. if provided or paid for by the lessor, the types and amounts of coverages and the cost to the lessee; or
    2. if not provided or paid for by the lessor, the types and amounts of coverages required of the lessee.
  9. A statement identifying any express warranties or guarantees available to the lessee made by the lessor or manufacturer with respect to the leased property.
  10. Identification of any person responsible for maintaining or servicing the leased property, a brief description of any maintenance responsibility, and a statement of reasonable standards for wear and use, if the lessor sets such standards.
  11. A description of the terms and conditions of any security interest held or to be retained by the lessor, including any mortgage connected with the lease, and a clear identification of the property to which the security interest applies.
  12. The amount or method of determining the amount of any penalty or other charge for delinquency, default, or late payments.
  13. A statement of the conditions under which the lessee or lessor may terminate the lease before the end of the lease term, and the amount, or method of determining the amount, of any penalty or other charge for early termination.
  14. Identification of the amount, and the method of calculating the amount, of any penalty or other charge for which the lessee is liable at the end of the lease term, if a liability exists.
  15. A statement of whether the lessee may purchase the leased property before or at the end of the lease term, and identification of the exact time when the option may be exercised.  The statement shall also disclose the purchase price or declare that the price will be based on the property’s fair market value at the time the property may be purchased by the lessee.  If the price will be based on fair market value, the historical experience, if any, of the lessor in calculating the purchase price of similar equipment under similar leases shall also be disclosed.
  16. If the lessee has an option to purchase the leased property before or at the end of the lease term based on the property’s fair market value, a statement that the lessee may obtain a professional appraisal of the fair market value by an independent third party agreed to by the lessee and lessor. The appraised price shall be final and binding upon the lessor and lessee.  The cost of the appraisal shall be shared equally by the lessor and lessee.  The lessee shall not be obliged to exercise the option to purchase the property even though an appraisal has been obtained.
  17. A declaration that comparison of the total amount of payments that would be due under an agricultural finance lease with the total amount of payment that would be due under a loan to purchase the property does not account for the relative tax advantages to the lessee of lease and loan transactions.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2483 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2384. Warranties.

  1. A lessee may enforce all express or implied warranties available to the lessor directly against the manufacturer, seller, supplier, or dealer of the leased property, during the term of the lease.
  2. A lessor shall impliedly warrant that the leased property is fit for a particular purpose if the lessor, when the lease is executed, has reason to know of any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the lessee is relying on the lessor’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.
  3. A lessor shall impliedly warrant that the leased property is merchantable, if the lessor is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
  4. A lessor shall impliedly warrant that no person holds a claim to or interest in the leased property arising from an act or omission of the lessor, for the lease term, that will interfere with the lessee’s enjoyment of the leasehold interest.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2484 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2385. Unconscionability.

  1. If a court finds an agricultural finance lease, or any clause of a lease, to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the entire lease or enforce the remainder of the agricultural finance lease without the unconscionable clause, or it may limit the application of any unconscionable clause to avoid an unconscionable result.
  2. If a court finds that an agricultural finance lease or any clause of a lease has been induced by unconscionable conduct, or that unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a lease contract, the court may grant appropriate relief.
  3. Before making a finding on unconscionability under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the court, on its own motion or that of a party, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the lease contract or clause, or of the conduct.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2485 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2386. Option to accelerate at will.

Any term of an agricultural finance lease providing that a party or a successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance, or require collateral or additional collateral “at will” or “when he or she deems himself or herself insecure,” or in words of similar import, shall be construed to mean that the party may do so only if he or she in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing good faith shall be on the party who exercised the power.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2486 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2387. Waiver.

No act or agreement of the lessee shall be deemed a waiver of any of the provisions of this chapter, except for a waiver made in settlement of a claim asserted under this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2487 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2388. Prohibition on discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, age, or disability.

No person shall discriminate against any lessee or prospective lessee who has entered into an agricultural finance lease, or who desires to enter into an agricultural finance lease, because of the sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, age, or disability of the lessee.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 135 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2007, No. 41 , § 13; 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 28.

History

Amendments

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “disability” for “handicapping condition” in the section heading and preceding “of the lessee.”

—2007. Inserted “gender identity” following “sexual orientation” in the section heading and text.

—1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “sexual orientation” following “sex” in the section heading and in the text of the section.

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2488 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2389. Limitation on power to choose applicable law and judicial forum.

  1. If the parties to an agricultural finance lease choose the law of a jurisdiction other than that in which the goods are to be used, or that in which the lessee resides or has his or her principal place of business, when the lease agreement becomes enforceable or within 30 days thereafter, the choice is not enforceable.
  2. If the parties to an agricultural finance lease choose a judicial forum that would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the lessee, the choice is not enforceable.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2489 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2390. Remedies and penalties.

All remedies and penalties available to a consumer and the Attorney General under chapter 63 of this title shall apply to violations of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 79 , § 6; 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Amendments

—1991. Substituted “consumer” for “person” following “available to a”.

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2490 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2391. Construction.

In the event of a conflict between this chapter and Title 9A, the Uniform Commercial Code, the provisions of this chapter shall control.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2491 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

§ 2392. Rules.

The Commissioner may adopt rules, including incorporation of the applicable provisions of 12 C.F.R. Part 213, deemed necessary to promote the purposes of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Prior law.

9 V.S.A. § 2492 .

Redesignation of section. See note set out under chapter heading.

CROSS REFERENCES

Procedure for adoption of administrative rules, see 3 V.S.A. chapter 25.

Chapter 61. Retail Installment Sales

History

1963 amendment. 1963, No. 221 , § 11, provided that this chapter would not apply to retail installment contracts or retail charge agreements executed before Jan. 1, 1964.

1963, No. 221 , § 10, contained a severability provision applicable to this chapter.

Citation. 1963, No. 221 , § 12, provided that this chapter shall be known as the “Retail Installment Sales Act.”

Construction of chapter with Uniform Commercial Code. 1966, No. 29 , § 5(b) provided that in the event of an inconsistency between Title 9A, the Uniform Commercial Code, and this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall control.

CROSS REFERENCES

Licensed lenders, see 8 V.S.A. chapter 73.

Motor vehicle retail installment sales financing, see chapter 59 of this title.

§ 2401. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Goods” means all tangible personal chattels when purchased primarily for personal, family, or household use and not for commercial, industrial, or agricultural use, but not including money, motor vehicles, things in action, or intangible personal property other than merchandise certificates or coupons as described in this subdivision. The term includes chattels that are furnished or used at the time of sale or subsequently in the modernization, rehabilitation, repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property as to become a part of the real property whether or not it is severable from it. The term also includes merchandise certificates or coupons, issued by a retailer seller, not redeemable in cash, and to be used in their face amount in lieu of cash.
  2. “Services” means:
    1. With respect to retail installment contracts, work, labor, and services furnished for personal, family, or household use, and not for commercial, industrial, or agricultural use, in connection with the delivery, installation, servicing, repair, or improvement of goods sold under such contract; and
    2. With respect to retail charge agreements, work, labor, and services of any kind rented or furnished by a person engaged in the business of retail seller that are for personal, family, or household use and not for commercial, industrial, or agricultural use.  The term does not include services for which the cost is by law fixed or approved by, or filed subject to approval or disapproval with, the United States or any state or any agency of either, such as in the case of transportation services.
  3. “Motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means and is limited to any automobile, mobile home, motorcycle, truck, truck-tractor, trailer, semi-trailer, and bus designed and used primarily to transport persons or property on a public highway, excepting, however, any boat trailer and any vehicle propelled or drawn exclusively by muscular power or that is designed to run only on rails or tracks.
  4. “Retail buyer” or “buyer” means a person who buys or agrees to buy goods from a retail seller in a retail installment transaction, or who obtains services or agrees to have services furnished or rendered from a retail seller in a retail installment transaction.
  5. “Retail seller” or “seller” means a person regularly and principally engaged in a business of selling goods to retail buyers.
  6. “Retail installment transaction” or “transaction” means any transaction in which a retail buyer purchases goods or services for a price consisting of the cash price and other amounts as limited by this chapter and agrees under a retail installment contract or retail charge agreement to pay a part or all of the price in one or more deferred installments. The term shall include every transaction in which the promise or agreement to pay the deferred balance of the price is made by the retail buyer to the retail seller, notwithstanding the existence or occurrence of any one or more of the following events:
    1. that the retail seller has arranged or arranges to sell, transfer, or assign the retail buyer’s obligation;
    2. that the amount of the finance charge is determined by reference to charts or information furnished by a financing institution;
    3. that the forms of instruments used to evidence the retail installment and transaction are furnished by a financing institution; and
    4. that the credit standing of the retail buyer is or has been evaluated by a financing institution.
  7. “Retail installment contract” or “contract” means a contract entered into in this State and designated as a retail installment transaction, but not a retail charge agreement, or a document reflecting a sale under it, evidencing an agreement to pay the retail purchase price of goods or any part thereof in two or more installments over a period of time, and pursuant to which title to, or a lien upon, or a security interest in, the goods is retained or taken by the retail seller to secure the payment of a price that includes the charge as limited by section 2405 of this title.  The term includes a chattel mortgage, a conditional sales contract, and a contract in the form of a bailment or lease if the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation for use a sum substantially equivalent to or in excess of the value of the goods sold, and it is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or, for no further or a merely nominal consideration, has the option of becoming, the owner of the goods upon full compliance with the provisions of the bailment or lease.  The term shall also include any amendment of the retail installment contract in which the parties agree to renew, restate, or reschedule the unpaid balance thereof, or to extend the scheduled due date of all or any part of any installment or installments.
  8. “Retail charge agreement” means an agreement other than a retail installment contract that prescribed the terms of retail installment transactions that may be made thereafter from time to time under it, under which the buyer’s total unpaid balance under the agreement, whenever incurred, is payable in one or more deferred installments and under the terms of which the retail buyer pays a price that includes a charge as limited by section 2406 of this title, which charge is to be computed in relation to the buyer’s unpaid balance from time to time.
  9. “Cash price” means the minimum price for which the goods and services subject to the retail installment contract or the retail charge agreement, or for which other goods and services of like kind and quality, may be purchased for cash from the seller by the buyer, as stated in the retail installment contract or the retail charge agreement.
  10. “Recording fees” means the amount of the fees prescribed by law for filing, recording, or otherwise perfecting and, in addition, releasing or satisfying a retained title, lien, or other security interest created by a retail installment transaction.
  11. “Principal balance” means the cash price of the goods and services that are the subject matter of a retail installment contract plus the amount, if any, included therein, if a separate identified charge is made therefor and stated in the contract, for insurance and official fees, less the amount of the buyer’s down payment in money or goods, or both.
  12. “Holder” means the retail seller of the goods or services, or the assignee if the retail installment contract or the retail charge agreement or any indebtedness thereunder has been sold or otherwise transferred.
  13. “Finance charge” means that part of the time sales price as determined under subsection 2405(g) of this title by which the time sales price exceeds the aggregate of the cash price and the amount included in a retail installment contract, if a separate charge is made therefor, for insurance and official fees.
  14. “Times sales price” means the total of the cash price of the goods or services and the amounts, if any, included for insurance, official fees, and finance charges.
  15. “Official fees” means the filing or other fees required by law to be paid to a public officer to perfect the interest or lien on the goods retained or taken by a retail seller under a retail installment contract.
  16. “Sales finance company” means a person engaged in the business of purchasing or otherwise acquiring from one or more sellers retail installment contracts.
  17. “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Financial Regulation of Vermont.
  18. “Person” means an individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, banking organization, association, or any other group however organized.
  19. [Repealed.]
  20. “Commercial lease” means a transfer of the right to possession and use of personal property or fixtures for a term in return for consideration, including leases intended as security, and where the property is to be used by the lessee primarily for commercial, industrial or agricultural use and not for personal, family, or household use.

HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 221 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1964; amended 1989, No. 122 , § 13, eff. June 30, 1989; 1989, No. 225 (Adj. Sess.), § 25(b); 1993, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 6, 1994; 1995, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 38(a); 2003, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2021, No. 20 , § 12.

History

Revision note

—2020. In subdiv. (7), in the second sentence following “The term includes”, deleted “, but is not limited to,” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4 and in subdiv. (17), substituted “Commissioner of Financial Regulation” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” in accordance with 2011, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

Amendments

—2021. Intro. para.: Substituted “As used in this chapter” for “For the purposes of this chapter only, unless the context otherwise requires”.

Subdiv. (1): In the first sentence, deleted “as herein defined” following “motor vehicles” and “herein” preceding “described”, and inserted “in this subdivision” following “described”.

Subdiv. (6): Deleted “as defined herein” following “services” and following “agreement” in the first sentence; and substituted “in which” for “wherein” following “transaction” in the second sentence.

Subdiv. (8): Substituted “that” for “, which” following “contract” and “under the agreement” for “thereunder” following “balance”.

Subdiv. (19): Repealed.

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (1): Substituted “that” for “which”, “of the real property” for “thereof”; inserted “it is” preceding “severable” and substituted “from it” for “therefrom. The term includes a mobile home as defined in 10 V.S.A. § 6201 ”.

Subdiv. (5): Deleted the second sentence.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (17): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities”.

—1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (1): Added the third sentence.

Subdiv. (5): Added the second sentence.

—1989 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (17): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, and securities” for “commissioner of banking and insurance”.

—1989. Subdiv. (20): Added.

ANNOTATIONS

Retail charge agreement.

“Searscharge” credit agreement between consumer and national retailer, Sears, was a retail charge agreement because of its revolving nature. Oszajca v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 199 B.R. 103, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 969 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1996), rev'd, 207 B.R. 41, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 652 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997).

§§ 2402, 2403. Repealed. 1995, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 39(c), eff. Jan. 1, 1997.

History

Former §§ 2402, 2403. Former § 2402, relating to licensing of sales finance companies, was derived from 1963, No. 221 , § 2 and amended by 1987, No. 117 , §§ 9, 10.

Former § 2403, relating to suspension or revocation of licenses, was derived from 1963, No. 221 , § 3.

§ 2404. Investigations and complaints; powers of Commissioner.

  1. The Commissioner, if he or she has reasonable cause to believe that any licensee or other person has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, may make such investigation as he or she shall deem necessary, and, to the extent necessary for this purpose, the Commissioner or his or her authorized representative may examine the licensee or any other person and shall have the power to compel the production of all relevant books, records, and documents.
  2. Any buyer having reason to believe that this chapter has been violated with respect to this retail installment contract may file with the Commissioner a written complaint setting forth the details of the alleged violation.
  3. The Commissioner may issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, records, documents, and other evidence before him or her in any matter over which he or she has jurisdiction, control, or supervision pertaining to this chapter.  The Commissioner shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations to any person whose testimony is required.

HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 221 , § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 1964.

CROSS REFERENCES

Enforcement of administrative subpoenas, see 3 V.S.A. § 809a .

Modification of administrative subpoenas or discovery orders, see 3 V.S.A. § 809b .

§ 2405. Retail installment contracts.

  1. Each retail installment contract shall be in writing, dated, signed by both the buyer and the seller, and completed as to essential provisions before being signed by the buyer.  A retail installment contract need not be contained in a single document.
  2. The printed portion of the retail installment contract, other than instructions for completion, shall be in a size equal to at least eight-point type. The contract shall be designated in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type as a “Retail Installment Contract” and shall contain the following notice in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type.

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  3. A retail installment contract may be evidenced by an original document stated to be applicable to purchase of goods or services to be made by the retail buyer from time to time.  In that case, the original document, together with the sales slip, account book, or other written statement relating to each purchase, shall set forth all of the information required by this section and shall constitute the retail installment contract for each purchase.  On each succeeding purchase under the original document, the sales slip, account book, or other written statement may, at the option of the seller, constitute the memorandum required by subsection (h) of this section. The seller shall deliver to the buyer a copy of the contract as accepted by the seller.
  4. The seller shall deliver to the buyer at the time of the execution of the contract a copy of the contract as accepted by the seller, except that where the sale is less than $ 5.00, the seller may mail a copy of such contract to the buyer at his or her address as shown on the retail installment contract.  Any acknowledgement by the buyer of delivery of a copy of the contract shall be in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type and shall appear directly above the buyer’s signature. In any transaction involving the modernization, rehabilitation, repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property, the seller shall not request or accept a certificate of completion signed by the buyer before the actual delivery of the goods and completion of the work to be performed under the contract.
  5. Retail installment contracts negotiated and entered into by mail without personal solicitation by salespersons or other representatives of the seller and based upon a catalogue of the seller or other printed solicitation of the business, if the catalogue or other printed solicitation clearly sets forth the cash price and other terms of sales to be made through the medium, may be made as provided in this section. All provisions of this chapter applicable to retail installment contracts shall apply to those sales, except that the retail installment contract when completed by the buyer need not contain the items required in subsection (g) of this section. When the contract is received from the retail buyer, the seller shall forthwith prepare a written memorandum containing all the information required by subsection (g) of this section to be included in a retail installment contract. In lieu of delivering a copy of the contract to the buyer as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the seller shall deliver to the buyer a copy of such memorandum prior to the due date of the first installment under the contract.
  6. The retail installment contract shall contain the names of the seller and the buyer, the place of business of the seller, the residence or other address of the buyer as specified by the buyer, and a description of the goods sold or to be sold, which shall be sufficient for identification, and of the services furnished or to be furnished.
    1. The retail installment contract shall contain the following items: (g) (1) The retail installment contract shall contain the following items:
      1. the cash price of the goods or services;
      2. the amount of the buyer’s down payment, if any, specifying the amount paid in money and in goods traded in;
      3. the difference between subdivisions (A) and (B) of this subsection (g);
      4. the amount, if any, included for insurance, if a separate identified charge is made therefor, specifying the coverage and cost of each type of insurance at rates authorized by rate schedules then in effect and on file with the Commissioner of Financial Regulation; the cost, if any, for service contracts as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 4247 ; and the reasonable cost, if any, for a debt protection agreement as set forth in 8 V.S.A. § 10405 ;
      5. the amount of all official fees and a separate identified charge shall be shown therefor;
      6. the principal balance, which is the sum of subdivisions (C) and (D) and (E) of this subsection;
      7. the amount of the estimated finance charge as limited by subsection (k) of this section;
      8. the sum of subdivisions (F) and (G) of this subsection (g), which is the balance to be paid by the buyer to the seller; the number of installments thereof, the amount of each installment, and the due date or period thereof; and notice to the borrower as to the effect of early or late payments; and
      9. the total time price, which is the sum of subdivisions (A), (D), (E), and (G) of this subdivision (1).
    2. The items specified in subdivision (1) of this subsection need not be stated in the sequence or order set forth; additional items may be included, but only to explain the calculations involved in determining the balance to be paid by the buyer as set forth. No other charges shall be made by the seller.
    1. Whenever a retail installment contract by its terms permits inclusion of additional goods purchased after the original agreement, and such goods are so purchased and the amount due on the new purchase is combined with an unpaid balance on any prior purchase so as to permit the retail seller to retain title to or reserve a lien upon all goods under the combined agreement, the retail seller shall, at the time of the additional purchase, deliver to the retail buyer and attach to the original agreement: (h) (1) Whenever a retail installment contract by its terms permits inclusion of additional goods purchased after the original agreement, and such goods are so purchased and the amount due on the new purchase is combined with an unpaid balance on any prior purchase so as to permit the retail seller to retain title to or reserve a lien upon all goods under the combined agreement, the retail seller shall, at the time of the additional purchase, deliver to the retail buyer and attach to the original agreement:
      1. a statement containing all the information with respect to the additional purchase required to be included in a retail installment contract; and
      2. a statement showing the amount due on the agreement immediately previous to the new purchase, the amount due after the purchase, the payments agreed to be made thereafter, and the number of additional months required to complete the payments.
    2. Whenever a payment is made on such a continuing agreement after additional purchases have been added, the payment shall be considered as allocated among each of the separate purchases included, in the same proportions that the original cash price of each bears to the total cash price of all goods to which the retail seller has retained title, and the retail seller before repossessing or attempting to repossess any goods under any such agreement shall actually allocate in such manner all such payments made to him or her by the retail buyer. When the amount owing on any such purchase has been fully paid, the goods so paid for shall become the absolute property of the retail buyer and shall not be subject to possession for any subsequent default on the agreement.  The retail buyer under any such agreement may at any time prepay the amount due on any of the separate purchases and in case of repossession may redeem any of such separate purchases by payment of the amount due on such purchase alone.
      1. (1) The amount, if any, stated and included in the retail installment contract for insurance to be purchased by the holder shall not exceed the applicable premiums chargeable in accordance with filings, if any, with the Department of Financial Regulation.  If the insurance for which the stated amount is included insures the life, safety, or health of the buyer, or his or her interest in or his or her liability because of the goods or services and is purchased by the holder, the holder shall, within 30 days after execution of the retail installment contract, send or cause to be sent to the buyer a policy or policies of insurance, written by an insurance company authorized to do business in this State, or a certificate or certificates thereof.  The policy or policies shall set forth all the terms, exceptions, limitations, restrictions, and conditions of the contract or contracts of insurance and the certificates shall set forth a summary thereof.  The insurance may be purchased by the holder. The buyer shall have the privilege of purchasing the insurance from an agent or broker of his or her own selection and of selecting an insurance company acceptable to the holder, which acceptance shall not be arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld, but in that case the inclusion of the insurance premium in the retail installment contract shall be optional with the seller.

        (2) If the insurance is cancelled, or the premium adjusted, any refund of the premium received by the holder shall be credited to the outstanding principal balance of the contract, except to the extent applied towards payment for similar insurance protecting the interest of the buyer and the holder or either of them.

        (j) A retail installment contract shall not be signed by any party thereto when it contains blank spaces of items that are pertinent to the transaction and should be completed. However, if delivery of the goods is not made at the time of the execution of the contract, the identifying numbers or marks of the goods or similar information and the due date of the first installment may be inserted in the contract after its execution.

        (k) The interest rates for retail installment sales shall be that authorized by subdivision 41a(b)(2) of this title, and the method of interest calculation shall be as specified in subsection 41a(d) of this title.

        ( l ) [Repealed.]

        (m) The holder of any retail installment contract may collect a reasonable delinquency charge if provided for in the contract. In addition, where collection is referred for payment to an attorney who is not a salaried employee of the holder of the contract, the contract may provide for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees and for court costs and disbursements and also for actual and reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred after referral in connection with the delinquency, repossession, or foreclosure, including storage charges, reconditioning expenses, and collection expenses.

        (n) Upon written request of the buyer, the holder of a retail installment contract shall give or forward to the buyer a written statement of the dates and amounts of installment payments and the total amount unpaid under the contract. The buyer shall be given a written receipt for any payment when made in cash. One statement or receipt shall be given the buyer without charge, and if any additional statement or receipt is requested by the buyer, it shall be supplied by the holder at a charge not in excess of $1.00 for each additional statement or receipt so supplied.

        (o) A provision in a retail installment contract relieving the seller from liability for any legal remedies that the buyer may have against the seller shall not be enforceable.

        (p) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any retail installment contract to the contrary, any buyer may prepay the contract in full at any time before maturity without penalty.

        (2) [Repealed.]

        (q) (1) The holder of a retail installment contract upon request by the buyer may agree to an amendment thereto to extend the scheduled due date of all or any part of any installment or installments or to renew, restate, or reschedule the unpaid balance of the contract.

        (2) The amendment to the contract must be confirmed in a writing signed by the buyer and the holder. The writing shall set forth the terms of the amendment and shall either be delivered to the buyer or mailed to him or her at the address as shown on the contract. That writing together with the original contract and any previous amendments thereto shall constitute the retail installment contract.

“NOTICE TO THE BUYER—DO NOT SIGN THIS CONTRACT IN BLANK. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO A COPY OF THE CONTRACT AT THE TIME YOU SIGN. KEEP IT TO PROTECT YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS.”

HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 221 , § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 1964; amended 1967, No. 58 , § 2; 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 16, 17, eff. April 30, 1980; 1985, No. 59 , § 2; 1989, No. 122 , §§ 14-21, eff. June 30, 1989; 1989, No. 225 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 1995, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 38(a); 1997, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1998; 2005, No. 70 , § 6; 2013, No. 29 , § 9, eff. May 13, 2013; 2021, No. 20 , §§ 13, 14.

History

Revision note

—2013. In subsec. (m), deleted “but not limited to” following “including” in the second sentence in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

Amendments

—2021. Subsec. (e): Substituted “salespersons” for “salesmen” in the first sentence.

Subdiv. (g)(2): In the first sentence, deleted “above” preceding “items”, inserted “specified in subdivision (1) of this subsection” preceding “need”, and deleted “above” following “set forth”.

—2013. Subdiv. (f)(1)(I): Substituted “(G) of this subdivision (1)” for “(F)”.

—2005. Subdiv. (g)(4): Deleted “and” following “health care administration” and added “and the reasonable cost, if any, for a debt protection agreement as set forth in section 10405 of Title 8”.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (g)(4): Added “, and the cost, if any, for service contracts as defined in section 4247 of Title 8” following “health care administration”.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (g)(4): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities”.

Subsec. (i): Substituted “department of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “department of banking, insurance, and securities” in the first paragraph.

—1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (g)(4): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, and securities” for “commissioner of banking and insurance”.

Subsec. (i): Substituted “department of banking, insurance, and securities” for “department of banking and insurance” in the first sentence of the first paragraph.

—1989. Subdiv. (g)(7): Inserted “estimated” preceding “finance”.

Subdiv. (g)(8): Amended generally.

Subsec. (i): Substituted “outstanding principal balance” for “final maturing installments” preceding “of the contract” in the second paragraph.

Subsec. (k): Amended generally.

Subsec. ( l ): Repealed.

Subdiv. (p)(1): Amended generally.

Subdiv. (p)(2): Repealed.

Subdiv. (q)(1): Deleted “and may collect for it a refinance charge not to exceed an amount computed as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection” following “balance of the contract”.

Subdiv. (q)(2): Amended generally.

—1985. Subsec. (m): Amended generally.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (k): Amended subdiv. (1) generally, deleted former subdivs. (3) and (5), and redesignated former subdiv. (4) as subdiv. (3).

Subsec. (m): Amended generally.

—1967. Subdiv. (p)(1): Amended generally.

Implementation. For implementation of 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.) provisions, see note set out following heading for subchapter 1 of chapter 4 of this title.

CROSS REFERENCES

Credit life insurance and credit accident and health insurance generally, see 8 V.S.A. chapter 109.

§ 2406. Retail charge agreements.

  1. PARASTAT=“s” DESISTAT=“”>PARASTAT=“s” DESISTAT=“”>Each retail charge agreement shall be in writing and signed by the buyer. A copy of any agreement executed on or after January 1, 1964 shall be delivered or mailed to the buyer by the seller before the date on which the first payment is due under the agreement. Any acknowledgment by the buyer of delivery of a copy of the agreement contained in the body thereof shall be in a size equal to at least 10-point boldface type and shall appear directly above the buyer’s signature. No agreement executed on or after January 1, 1964 shall be signed by the buyer when it contains blank spaces to be filled in after it has been signed. The buyer’s acknowledgment, conforming to the requirements of this subsection, of delivery of a copy of an agreement shall be presumptive proof in any action or proceeding of the delivery and that the agreement, when signed, did not contain any blank spaces. All retail charge agreements executed on or after January 1, 1964 shall state the maximum amount or rate of any charge referred to in subsection (c) of this section to be charged and paid under the agreement. Any such agreement shall contain the following notice printed or typed in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type, which shall appear directly above the space provided for the buyer’s signature:

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    1. The seller shall promptly supply the buyer under the retail charge agreement with a statement as of the end of each monthly period, which need not be a calendar month, or other regular period agreed upon in writing by the seller and buyer, in which there is any unpaid balance under the agreement, which statement shall recite the following: (b) (1) The seller shall promptly supply the buyer under the retail charge agreement with a statement as of the end of each monthly period, which need not be a calendar month, or other regular period agreed upon in writing by the seller and buyer, in which there is any unpaid balance under the agreement, which statement shall recite the following:
      1. the unpaid balance under the retail charge agreement at the beginning and at the end of the period;
      2. unless otherwise furnished by the seller to the buyer by sales slip, memorandum, or otherwise, a description of the goods or services purchased during the period, the cash price, and the date of each purchase;
      3. the payments made by the buyer to the seller and other credits to the buyer during the period;
      4. the amount, if any, of any charge for the period made under subsection (c) of this section; and
      5. that the buyer may at any time pay the total balance or any part of the total balance.
    2. The items specified in subdivision (1) of this subsection need not be stated in the sequence or order set forth in subdivision (1) of this subsection; additional items may be included, but only to explain the computations made in determining the amount to be paid by the buyer.
  2. A retail charge agreement may provide for, and the seller or holder may then, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, charge, collect, and receive, in addition to the cash price, a charge for the privilege of making deferred payments under the agreement, which charge shall not exceed the rates authorized by subdivision 41a(b)(9) of this title. If the amount of the finance charge otherwise permitted shall be less than 50 cents for any month or longer regular period, 50 cents may nevertheless be charged, received, and collected. In addition, a retail charge agreement may provide for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees where it is referred for collection to an attorney who is not a salaried employee of the holder of the retail charge agreement or any indebtedness under the agreement and of court costs and disbursements and also of actual and reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with the collection.

“NOTICE TO THE BUYER—DO NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT IN BLANK. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO A COPY OF THE AGREEMENT AT THE TIME YOU SIGN. KEEP IT TO PROTECT YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS.”

HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 221 , § 6, eff. Jan. 1, 1964; amended 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. April 30, 1980; 1983, No. 214 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2021, No. 20 , § 15.

History

Revision note

—2006. Substituted “subdivision” for “section” preceding “41a(b)(9)” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

Revision note—. Substituted “January 1, 1964” for “the effective date of this chapter” in three places in subsec. (a) for purposes of clarity.

Added “of this section” following “subsection (c)” in subsec. (a) to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—2021. Section amended generally.

—1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “(9)” for “(2)” following “section 41a(b)” in the first sentence.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

Implementation. For implementation of 1979, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.) provisions, see note set out following heading for subchapter 1 of chapter 4 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

Application.

“Searscharge” credit agreement between consumer and national retailer, Sears, was a retail charge agreement because of its revolving nature. Oszajca v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 199 B.R. 103, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 969 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1996), rev'd, 207 B.R. 41, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 652 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997).

§ 2406a. Repealed. 1969, No. 118, eff. April 22, 1969.

History

Former § 2406a. Former § 2406a, relating to credit cost disclosure, was derived from 1967, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

§ 2407. Scope.

  1. This chapter shall not affect or apply to any loans or to the business of making loans under or in accordance with the laws of this State, nor shall any of the provisions of the loan or interest statutes of this State affect or apply to any retail installment transaction regulated hereunder.  Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair or in any way affect any rule of law applicable to or governing retail installment sales not otherwise subject hereto.  This chapter shall apply exclusively to all retail installment transactions as defined in section 2401 of this title.
  2. This chapter shall not apply to commercial leases.

HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 221 , § 7, eff. Jan. 1, 1964; amended 1989, No. 122 , § 22, eff. June 30, 1989; 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Revision note

—2006. Designated the first and second paragraphs as subsecs. (a) and (b) to conform to V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—1989 (Adj. Sess.). In the second paragraph, deleted “neither” preceding “this chapter”, substituted “shall not” for “nor chapter 73 of Title 8 is intended to”, and deleted “whether entered into prior to or after revision of this chapter” following “leases”.

—1989. Added the second paragraph.

1989 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 1989, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. June 25, 1990, provided that the amendment to this section by section 3 of the act shall take effect retroactively from June 30, 1989.

Legislative intent. 1989, No. 122 , § 24(b), eff. June 30, 1989, provided that section 22 of the act, which amended this section, was intended to be remedial in nature and to clarify existing law in chapter 73 of Title 8, and elsewhere.

§ 2408. Waiver.

No act or agreement of the retail buyer before or at the time of the making of the retail installment contract, retail charge agreement, or purchase thereunder shall constitute a valid waiver of any of the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 221 , § 8, eff. Jan. 1, 1964.

§ 2409. Penalties.

  1. In case of failure of any person to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter, such person or any person who acquires a contract or installment account with knowledge of such noncompliance is barred from recovery of any finance charge or of any delinquency, collection, deferral, or refinance charge imposed in connection with such contract or installment account, and the buyer shall have the right to recover from such person an amount equal to any of such charges paid by the buyer with interest thereon from the time of payment and all expenses of collection, including reasonable attorney’s fees, in a civil action on this statute.
  2. In any case in which a person willfully violates any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the buyer may recover from such person an amount equal to two times the total of the finance charges and any delinquency, collection, extension, deferral, or refinance charges imposed, contracted for, or received, and the seller shall be barred from the recovery of any such charges.  The buyer shall also recover reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.
  3. A person shall not knowingly or willfully make any retail installment contract under this chapter that directly or indirectly calls for the payment of any finance charges in excess of the legal rate as set forth in this chapter.  A contract violating this section shall be unenforceable, and a person shall have no right to collect any principal, finance, or other charges.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, any failure to comply with any provision of the chapter may be corrected by the holder in accordance with the provisions of this section, provided that a willful violation may not be corrected, and a correction that will increase the amount owed by the owner or the amount of any payment shall not be effective unless the buyer concurs in writing to the correction.  If a violation is corrected by the holder in accordance with the provisions of this section, neither the seller nor the holder shall be subject to any penalty under this section.  The correction shall be made by delivering to the buyer a corrected copy of the contract within 60 days of the execution of the original contract by the buyer.  Any amount improperly collected from the buyer shall be credited against the indebtedness evidenced by the contract.
  5. Any person who shall willfully and intentionally violate any provisions of this chapter shall be fined not more than $100.00 for the first offense.  Upon conviction for violating this section in any transaction entered into or consummated after a first conviction hereunder, the offender shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 221 , § 9, eff. Jan. 1, 1964; amended 1973, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Revision note—

In the third sentence of subsec. (d), deleted “of” preceding “a corrected copy” to correct a grammatical error.

Amendments

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

§ 2410. Prohibition on discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, age, or disability.

No seller shall discriminate against any buyer or prospective buyer who desires to establish a retail installment contract or retail charge agreement because of the sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, age, or disability of the buyer.

HISTORY: Added 1973, No. 130 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1989, No. 122 , § 23, eff. June 30, 1989; 1991, No. 135 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2007, No. 41 , § 12; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 29.

History

Amendments

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “disability” for “handicapping condition” in the section heading and preceding “of the buyer.”

—2007. Inserted “gender identity” following “sexual orientation” in the section heading and text.

—1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “sexual orientation” following “sex” in the section heading and in the text of the section.

—1989. Deleted “or” following “sex” and added “marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, age or handicapping condition” in the section heading and in the text of the section.

Chapter 62. Protection of Personal Information

Subchapter 1. General Provisions

§ 2430. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

    1. “Brokered personal information” means one or more of the following computerized data elements about a consumer, if categorized or organized for dissemination to third parties: (1) (A) “Brokered personal information” means one or more of the following computerized data elements about a consumer, if categorized or organized for dissemination to third parties:
      1. name;
      2. address;
      3. date of birth;
      4. place of birth;
      5. mother’s maiden name;
      6. unique biometric data generated from measurements or technical analysis of human body characteristics used by the owner or licensee of the data to identify or authenticate the consumer, such as a fingerprint, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation or digital representation of biometric data;
      7. name or address of a member of the consumer’s immediate family or household;
      8. Social Security number or other government-issued identification number; or
      9. other information that, alone or in combination with the other information sold or licensed, would allow a reasonable person to identify the consumer with reasonable certainty.
    2. “Brokered personal information” does not include publicly available information to the extent that it is related to a consumer’s business or profession.
  1. “Business” means a commercial entity, including a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, limited liability company, or other group, however organized and whether or not organized to operate at a profit, including a financial institution organized, chartered, or holding a license or authorization certificate under the laws of this State, any other state, the United States, or any other country, or the parent, affiliate, or subsidiary of a financial institution, but does not include the State, a State agency, any political subdivision of the State, or a vendor acting solely on behalf of, and at the direction of, the State.
  2. “Consumer” means an individual residing in this State.
    1. “Data broker” means a business, or unit or units of a business, separately or together, that knowingly collects and sells or licenses to third parties the brokered personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship. (4) (A) “Data broker” means a business, or unit or units of a business, separately or together, that knowingly collects and sells or licenses to third parties the brokered personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship.
    2. Examples of a direct relationship with a business include if the consumer is a past or present:
      1. customer, client, subscriber, user, or registered user of the business’s goods or services;
      2. employee, contractor, or agent of the business;
      3. investor in the business; or
      4. donor to the business.
    3. The following activities conducted by a business, and the collection and sale or licensing of brokered personal information incidental to conducting these activities, do not qualify the business as a data broker:
      1. developing or maintaining third-party e-commerce or application platforms;
      2. providing 411 directory assistance or directory information services, including name, address, and telephone number, on behalf of or as a function of a telecommunications carrier;
      3. providing publicly available information related to a consumer’s business or profession; or
      4. providing publicly available information via real-time or near-real-time alert services for health or safety purposes.
    4. The phrase “sells or licenses” does not include:
      1. a one-time or occasional sale of assets of a business as part of a transfer of control of those assets that is not part of the ordinary conduct of the business; or
      2. a sale or license of data that is merely incidental to the business.
    1. “Data broker security breach” means an unauthorized acquisition or a reasonable belief of an unauthorized acquisition of more than one element of brokered personal information maintained by a data broker when the brokered personal information is not encrypted, redacted, or protected by another method that renders the information unreadable or unusable by an unauthorized person. (5) (A) “Data broker security breach” means an unauthorized acquisition or a reasonable belief of an unauthorized acquisition of more than one element of brokered personal information maintained by a data broker when the brokered personal information is not encrypted, redacted, or protected by another method that renders the information unreadable or unusable by an unauthorized person.
    2. “Data broker security breach” does not include good faith but unauthorized acquisition of brokered personal information by an employee or agent of the data broker for a legitimate purpose of the data broker, provided that the brokered personal information is not used for a purpose unrelated to the data broker’s business or subject to further unauthorized disclosure.
    3. In determining whether brokered personal information has been acquired or is reasonably believed to have been acquired by a person without valid authorization, a data broker may consider the following factors, among others:
      1. indications that the brokered personal information is in the physical possession and control of a person without valid authorization, such as a lost or stolen computer or other device containing brokered personal information;
      2. indications that the brokered personal information has been downloaded or copied;
      3. indications that the brokered personal information was used by an unauthorized person, such as fraudulent accounts opened or instances of identity theft reported; or
      4. that the brokered personal information has been made public.
  3. “Data collector” means a person who, for any purpose, whether by automated collection or otherwise, handles, collects, disseminates, or otherwise deals with personally identifiable information, and includes the State, State agencies, political subdivisions of the State, public and private universities, privately and publicly held corporations, limited liability companies, financial institutions, and retail operators.
  4. “Encryption” means use of an algorithmic process to transform data into a form in which the data is rendered unreadable or unusable without use of a confidential process or key.
  5. “License” means a grant of access to, or distribution of, data by one person to another in exchange for consideration. A use of data for the sole benefit of the data provider, where the data provider maintains control over the use of the data, is not a license.
  6. “Login credentials” means a consumer’s user name or e-mail address, in combination with a password or an answer to a security question, that together permit access to an online account.
    1. “Personally identifiable information” means a consumer’s first name or first initial and last name in combination with one or more of the following digital data elements, when the data elements are not encrypted, redacted, or protected by another method that renders them unreadable or unusable by unauthorized persons: (10) (A) “Personally identifiable information” means a consumer’s first name or first initial and last name in combination with one or more of the following digital data elements, when the data elements are not encrypted, redacted, or protected by another method that renders them unreadable or unusable by unauthorized persons:
      1. a Social Security number;
      2. a driver license or nondriver State identification card number, individual taxpayer identification number, passport number, military identification card number, or other identification number that originates from a government identification document that is commonly used to verify identity for a commercial transaction;
      3. a financial account number or credit or debit card number, if the number could be used without additional identifying information, access codes, or passwords;
      4. a password, personal identification number, or other access code for a financial account;
      5. unique biometric data generated from measurements or technical analysis of human body characteristics used by the owner or licensee of the data to identify or authenticate the consumer, such as a fingerprint, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation or digital representation of biometric data;
      6. genetic information; and
        1. health records or records of a wellness program or similar program of health promotion or disease prevention;
        2. a health care professional’s medical diagnosis or treatment of the consumer; or
        3. a health insurance policy number.
    2. “Personally identifiable information” does not mean publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, State, or local government records.
  7. “Record” means any material on which written, drawn, spoken, visual, or electromagnetic information is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics.
  8. “Redaction” means the rendering of data so that the data are unreadable or are truncated so that no more than the last four digits of the identification number are accessible as part of the data.
    1. “Security breach” means unauthorized acquisition of electronic data, or a reasonable belief of an unauthorized acquisition of electronic data, that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of a consumer’s personally identifiable information or login credentials maintained by a data collector. (13) (A) “Security breach” means unauthorized acquisition of electronic data, or a reasonable belief of an unauthorized acquisition of electronic data, that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of a consumer’s personally identifiable information or login credentials maintained by a data collector.
    2. “Security breach” does not include good faith but unauthorized acquisition of personally identifiable information or login credentials by an employee or agent of the data collector for a legitimate purpose of the data collector, provided that the personally identifiable information or login credentials are not used for a purpose unrelated to the data collector’s business or subject to further unauthorized disclosure.
    3. In determining whether personally identifiable information or login credentials have been acquired or is reasonably believed to have been acquired by a person without valid authorization, a data collector may consider the following factors, among others:
      1. indications that the information is in the physical possession and control of a person without valid authorization, such as a lost or stolen computer or other device containing information;
      2. indications that the information has been downloaded or copied;
      3. indications that the information was used by an unauthorized person, such as fraudulent accounts opened or instances of identity theft reported; or
      4. that the information has been made public.

HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2007; amended 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 8, 2012; 2017, No. 171 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2019; 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Revision note

—2013. In subdiv. (3), deleted “, but is not limited to” following “include” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (9): Added.

Subdivs. (9) through (12): Redesignated as subdivs. (10) through (13).

Subdiv. (10)(A): Rewrote subdiv.

Subdiv. (13)(A): Inserted “or login credentials” following “identifiable information”.

Subdiv. (13)(B): Inserted “or login credentials” following “identifiable information” and substituted “or login credentials are” for “is”.

Subdiv. (13)(C): Substituted “or login credentials have” for “has” in the introductory language.

—2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (5): Substituted “personally identifiable information” for “personal information” throughout.

Subdiv. (8)(A): Deleted “or access” following “acquisition”; substituted “electronic” for “computerized” preceding “data”; inserted “or a reasonable belief of an unauthorized acquisition of electronic data” following “data” and substituted “a consumer’s personally identifiable” for “personal” preceding “information”.

Subdiv. (8)(B): Substituted “personally identifiable” for “personal” preceding “information” in two places.

Subdiv. (8)(C): Added.

§ 2431. Acquisition of brokered personal information; prohibitions.

  1. Prohibited acquisition and use.
    1. A person shall not acquire brokered personal information through fraudulent means.
    2. A person shall not acquire or use brokered personal information for the purpose of:
      1. stalking or harassing another person;
      2. committing a fraud, including identity theft, financial fraud, or e-mail fraud; or
      3. engaging in unlawful discrimination, including employment discrimination and housing discrimination.
  2. Enforcement.
    1. A person who violates a provision of this section commits an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title.
    2. The Attorney General has the same authority to adopt rules to implement the provisions of this section and to conduct civil investigations, enter into assurances of discontinuance, bring civil actions, and take other enforcement actions as provided under chapter 63, subchapter 1 of this title.

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 171 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.

History

Revision note

—2018. This section was enacted as 9 V.S.A. § 2433 , but was redesignated as 9 V.S.A. § 2431 to conform to V.S.A. classification and style.

Subchapter 2. Security Breach Notice Act

§ 2435. Notice of security breaches.

  1. This section shall be known as the Security Breach Notice Act.
  2. Notice of breach.
    1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, any data collector that owns or licenses computerized personally identifiable information or login credentials shall notify the consumer that there has been a security breach following discovery or notification to the data collector of the breach. Notice of the security breach shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, but not later than 45 days after the discovery or notification, consistent with the legitimate needs of the law enforcement agency, as provided in subdivisions (3) and (4) of this subsection, or with any measures necessary to determine the scope of the security breach and restore the reasonable integrity, security, and confidentiality of the data system.
    2. Any data collector that maintains or possesses computerized data containing personally identifiable information or login credentials that the data collector does not own or license or any data collector that acts or conducts business in Vermont that maintains or possesses records or data containing personally identifiable information or login credentials that the data collector does not own or license shall notify the owner or licensee of the information of any security breach immediately following discovery of the breach, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement as provided in subdivisions (3) and (4) of this subsection.
    3. A data collector or other entity subject to this subchapter shall provide notice of a breach to the Attorney General or to the Department of Financial Regulation, as applicable, as follows:
      1. A data collector or other entity regulated by the Department of Financial Regulation under Title 8 or this title shall provide notice of a breach to the Department. All other data collectors or other entities subject to this subchapter shall provide notice of a breach to the Attorney General.
        1. The data collector shall notify the Attorney General or the Department, as applicable, of the date of the security breach and the date of discovery of the breach and shall provide a preliminary description of the breach within 14 business days, consistent with the legitimate needs of the law enforcement agency as provided in this subdivision (3) and subdivision (4) of this subsection (b), of the data collector’s discovery of the security breach or when the data collector provides notice to consumers pursuant to this section, whichever is sooner. (B) (i) The data collector shall notify the Attorney General or the Department, as applicable, of the date of the security breach and the date of discovery of the breach and shall provide a preliminary description of the breach within 14 business days, consistent with the legitimate needs of the law enforcement agency as provided in this subdivision (3) and subdivision (4) of this subsection (b), of the data collector’s discovery of the security breach or when the data collector provides notice to consumers pursuant to this section, whichever is sooner.
        2. Notwithstanding subdivision (B)(i) of this subdivision (b)(3), a data collector who, prior to the date of the breach, on a form and in a manner prescribed by the Attorney General, had sworn in writing to the Attorney General that it maintains written policies and procedures to maintain the security of personally identifiable information or login credentials and respond to a breach in a manner consistent with Vermont law shall notify the Attorney General of the date of the security breach and the date of discovery of the breach and shall provide a description of the breach prior to providing notice of the breach to consumers pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection (b).
        3. If the date of the breach is unknown at the time notice is sent to the Attorney General or to the Department, the data collector shall send the Attorney General or the Department the date of the breach as soon as it is known.
        4. Unless otherwise ordered by a court of this State for good cause shown, a notice provided under this subdivision (3)(B) shall not be disclosed to any person other than the Department, the authorized agent or representative of the Attorney General, a State’s Attorney, or another law enforcement officer engaged in legitimate law enforcement activities without the consent of the data collector.
        1. When the data collector provides notice of the breach pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection (b), the data collector shall notify the Attorney General or the Department, as applicable, of the number of Vermont consumers affected, if known to the data collector, and shall provide a copy of the notice provided to consumers under subdivision (1) of this subsection (b). (C) (i) When the data collector provides notice of the breach pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection (b), the data collector shall notify the Attorney General or the Department, as applicable, of the number of Vermont consumers affected, if known to the data collector, and shall provide a copy of the notice provided to consumers under subdivision (1) of this subsection (b).
        2. The data collector may send to the Attorney General or the Department, as applicable, a second copy of the consumer notice, from which is redacted the type of personally identifiable information or login credentials that was subject to the breach, and which the Attorney General or the Department shall use for any public disclosure of the breach.
      2. If a security breach is limited to an unauthorized acquisition of login credentials, a data collector is only required to provide notice of the security breach to the Attorney General or Department of Financial Regulation, as applicable, if the login credentials were acquired directly from the data collector or its agent.
      1. The notice to a consumer required by this subsection shall be delayed upon request of a law enforcement agency. A law enforcement agency may request the delay if it believes that notification may impede a law enforcement investigation, or a national or Homeland Security investigation, or jeopardize public safety or national or Homeland Security interests. In the event law enforcement makes the request for a delay in a manner other than in writing, the data collector shall document such request contemporaneously in writing, including the name of the law enforcement officer making the request and the officer’s law enforcement agency engaged in the investigation. A law enforcement agency shall promptly notify the data collector in writing when the law enforcement agency no longer believes that notification may impede a law enforcement investigation, or a national or Homeland Security investigation, or jeopardize public safety or national or Homeland Security interests. The data collector shall provide notice required by this section without unreasonable delay upon receipt of a written communication, which includes facsimile or electronic communication, from the law enforcement agency withdrawing its request for delay. (4) (A) The notice to a consumer required by this subsection shall be delayed upon request of a law enforcement agency. A law enforcement agency may request the delay if it believes that notification may impede a law enforcement investigation, or a national or Homeland Security investigation, or jeopardize public safety or national or Homeland Security interests. In the event law enforcement makes the request for a delay in a manner other than in writing, the data collector shall document such request contemporaneously in writing, including the name of the law enforcement officer making the request and the officer’s law enforcement agency engaged in the investigation. A law enforcement agency shall promptly notify the data collector in writing when the law enforcement agency no longer believes that notification may impede a law enforcement investigation, or a national or Homeland Security investigation, or jeopardize public safety or national or Homeland Security interests. The data collector shall provide notice required by this section without unreasonable delay upon receipt of a written communication, which includes facsimile or electronic communication, from the law enforcement agency withdrawing its request for delay.
      2. A Vermont law enforcement agency with a reasonable belief that a security breach has or may have occurred at a specific business shall notify the business in writing of its belief. The agency shall also notify the business that additional information on the security breach may need to be furnished to the Office of the Attorney General or the Department of Financial Regulation and shall include the website and telephone number for the Office and the Department in the notice required by this subdivision (4)(B). Nothing in this subdivision (4)(B) shall alter the responsibilities of a data collector under this section or provide a cause of action against a law enforcement agency that fails, without bad faith, to provide the notice required by this subdivision (4)(B).
    4. The notice to a consumer required in subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be clear and conspicuous. A notice to a consumer of a security breach involving personally identifiable information shall include a description of each of the following, if known to the data collector:
      1. the incident in general terms;
      2. the type of personally identifiable information that was subject to the security breach;
      3. the general acts of the data collector to protect the personally identifiable information from further security breach;
      4. a telephone number, toll-free if available, that the consumer may call for further information and assistance;
      5. advice that directs the consumer to remain vigilant by reviewing account statements and monitoring free credit reports; and
      6. the approximate date of the security breach.
    5. A data collector may provide notice of a security breach involving personally identifiable information to a consumer by one or more of the following methods:
      1. Direct notice, which may be by one of the following methods:
        1. written notice mailed to the consumer’s residence;
        2. electronic notice, for those consumers for whom the data collector has a valid e-mail address, if:
          1. the data collector’s primary method of communication with the consumer is by electronic means, the electronic notice does not request or contain a hypertext link to a request that the consumer provide personal information, and the electronic notice conspicuously warns consumers not to provide personal information in response to electronic communications regarding security breaches; or
          2. the notice is consistent with the provisions regarding electronic records and signatures for notices in 15 U.S.C. § 7001; or
        3. telephonic notice, provided that telephonic contact is made directly with each affected consumer and not through a prerecorded message.
        1. Substitute notice, if: (B) (i) Substitute notice, if:
          1. the data collector demonstrates that the lowest cost of providing notice to affected consumers pursuant to subdivision (6)(A) of this subsection among written, e-mail, or telephonic notice would exceed $10,000.00; or
          2. the data collector does not have sufficient contact information.
        2. A data collector shall provide substitute notice by:
          1. conspicuously posting the notice on the data collector’s website if the data collector maintains one; and
          2. notifying major statewide and regional media.
  3. In the event a data collector provides notice to more than 1,000 consumers at one time pursuant to this section, the data collector shall notify, without unreasonable delay, all consumer reporting agencies that compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (p), of the timing, distribution, and content of the notice. This subsection shall not apply to a person who is licensed or registered under Title 8 by the Department of Financial Regulation.
    1. Notice of a security breach pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is not required if the data collector establishes that misuse of personally identifiable information or login credentials is not reasonably possible and the data collector provides notice of the determination that the misuse of the personally identifiable information or login credentials is not reasonably possible pursuant to the requirements of this subsection. If the data collector establishes that misuse of the personally identifiable information or login credentials is not reasonably possible, the data collector shall provide notice of its determination that misuse of the personally identifiable information or login credentials is not reasonably possible and a detailed explanation for said determination to the Vermont Attorney General or to the Department of Financial Regulation in the event that the data collector is a person or entity licensed or registered with the Department under Title 8 or this title. The data collector may designate its notice and detailed explanation to the Vermont Attorney General or the Department of Financial Regulation as “trade secret” if the notice and detailed explanation meet the definition of trade secret contained in 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(9) . (d) (1) Notice of a security breach pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is not required if the data collector establishes that misuse of personally identifiable information or login credentials is not reasonably possible and the data collector provides notice of the determination that the misuse of the personally identifiable information or login credentials is not reasonably possible pursuant to the requirements of this subsection. If the data collector establishes that misuse of the personally identifiable information or login credentials is not reasonably possible, the data collector shall provide notice of its determination that misuse of the personally identifiable information or login credentials is not reasonably possible and a detailed explanation for said determination to the Vermont Attorney General or to the Department of Financial Regulation in the event that the data collector is a person or entity licensed or registered with the Department under Title 8 or this title. The data collector may designate its notice and detailed explanation to the Vermont Attorney General or the Department of Financial Regulation as “trade secret” if the notice and detailed explanation meet the definition of trade secret contained in 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(9) .
    2. If a data collector established that misuse of personally identifiable information or login credentials was not reasonably possible under subdivision (1) of this subsection, and subsequently obtains facts indicating that misuse of the personally identifiable information or login credentials has occurred or is occurring, the data collector shall provide notice of the security breach pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
    3. If a security breach is limited to an unauthorized acquisition of login credentials for an online account other than an e-mail account the data collector shall provide notice of the security breach to the consumer electronically or through one or more of the methods specified in subdivision (b)(6) of this section and shall advise the consumer to take steps necessary to protect the online account, including to change his or her login credentials for the account and for any other account for which the consumer uses the same login credentials.
    4. If a security breach is limited to an unauthorized acquisition of login credentials for an email account:
      1. the data collector shall not provide notice of the security breach through the email account; and
      2. the data collector shall provide notice of the security breach through one or more of the methods specified in subdivision (b)(6) of this section or by clear and conspicuous notice delivered to the consumer online when the consumer is connected to the online account from an Internet protocol address or online location from which the data collector knows the consumer customarily accesses the account.
  4. A data collector that is subject to the privacy, security, and breach notification rules adopted in 45 C.F.R. Part 164 pursuant to the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, P.L. 104-191 (1996) is deemed to be in compliance with this subchapter if:
    1. the data collector experiences a security breach that is limited to personally identifiable information specified in 2430(10)(A)(vii); and
    2. the data collector provides notice to affected consumers pursuant to the requirements of the breach notification rule in 45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subpart D.
  5. Any waiver of the provisions of this subchapter is contrary to public policy and is void and unenforceable.
  6. Except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, a financial institution that is subject to the following guidances, and any revisions, additions, or substitutions relating to an interagency guidance, shall be exempt from this section:
    1. The Federal Interagency Guidance Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Consumer Information and Customer Notice, issued on March 7, 2005, by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
    2. Final Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Member Information and Member Notice, issued on April 14, 2005, by the National Credit Union Administration.
    3. A financial institution regulated by the Department of Financial Regulation that is subject to subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection shall notify the Department as soon as possible after it becomes aware of an incident involving unauthorized access to or use of personally identifiable information.
  7. Enforcement.
    1. With respect to all data collectors and other entities subject to this subchapter, other than a person or entity licensed or registered with the Department of Financial Regulation under Title 8 or this title, the Attorney General and State’s Attorney shall have sole and full authority to investigate potential violations of this subchapter and to enforce, prosecute, obtain, and impose remedies for a violation of this subchapter or any rules or regulations made pursuant to this chapter as the Attorney General and State’s Attorney have under chapter 63 of this title. The Attorney General may refer the matter to the State’s Attorney in an appropriate case. The Superior Courts shall have jurisdiction over any enforcement matter brought by the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney under this subsection.
    2. With respect to a data collector that is a person or entity licensed or registered with the Department of Financial Regulation under Title 8 or this title, the Department of Financial Regulation shall have the full authority to investigate potential violations of this subchapter and to prosecute, obtain, and impose remedies for a violation of this subchapter or any rules or regulations adopted pursuant to this subchapter, as the Department has under Title 8 or this title or any other applicable law or regulation.
  8. [Repealed.]

HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2007; amended 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 8, 2012; 2013, No. 29 , §§ 10, 11, eff. May 13, 2013; 2013, No. 199 (Adj. Sess.), § 67; 2015, No. 55 , § 8; 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

References in text.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, referred to in subdiv. (f)(1), is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1811.

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, referred to in subdiv. (f)(1), is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 221 et seq.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, referred to in subdiv. (f)(1), is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

The Office of Thrift Supervision, referred to in subdiv. (f)(1), is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1462.

The National Credit Union Administration, referred to in subdiv. (f)(2), is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1752a .

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote section.

—2015. Subdiv. (b)(6): Amended generally.

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(4)(A): Inserted “for a delay” following “law enforcement makes the request” and “in writing” following “notify the data collector”.

Subdiv. (b)(4)(B): Added.

—2013. Subdiv. (b)(3): Amended generally.

Subsec. (f): Inserted “Except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection (f)” preceding “a financial” in the introductory paragraph, and added subdiv. (3).

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

Extension of sunset of law enforcement exemption to security breach notice act. 2005, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 5 as amended by 2007, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, provided that: “ 9 V.S.A. § 2435(h) (exemption for law enforcement agencies from security breach notice act) shall be repealed June 30, 2012.”

Subchapter 3. Social Security Number Protection Act

§ 2440. Social Security number protection.

  1. This section shall be known as the Social Security Number Protection Act.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a business may not do any of the following:
    1. intentionally communicate or otherwise make available to the general public an individual’s Social Security number;
    2. intentionally print or imbed an individual’s Social Security number on any card required for the individual to access products or services provided by the person or entity;
    3. require an individual to transmit his or her Social Security number over the Internet unless the connection is secure or the Social Security number is encrypted;
    4. require an individual to use his or her Social Security number to access an Internet website, unless a password or unique personal identification number or other authentication device is also required to access the internet website;
    5. print an individual’s Social Security number on any materials that are mailed to the individual, unless State or federal law requires the Social Security number to be on the document to be mailed;
    6. sell, lease, lend, trade, rent, or otherwise intentionally disclose an individual’s Social Security number to a third party without written consent to the disclosure from the individual, when the party making the disclosure knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence would have reason to believe that the third party lacks a legitimate purpose for obtaining the individual’s Social Security number.
  3. Subsection (b) of this section shall not apply:
    1. When a Social Security number is included in an application or in documents related to an enrollment process, or to establish, amend, or terminate an account, contract, or policy; or to confirm the accuracy of the Social Security number for the purpose of obtaining a credit report pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2). A Social Security number that is permitted to be mailed under this section may not be printed, in whole or in part, on a postcard or other mailer not requiring an envelope, or visible on an envelope without the envelope having been opened.
    2. To the collection, use, or release of a Social Security number reasonably necessary for administrative purposes or internal verification.
    3. To the opening of an account or the provision of or payment for a product or service authorized by an individual.
    4. To the collection, use, or release of a Social Security number to investigate or prevent fraud; conduct background checks; conduct social or scientific research; collect a debt; obtain a credit report from or furnish data to a consumer reporting agency pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.; undertake a permissible purpose enumerated under Gramm Leach Bliley, 12 C.F.R. § 216.13-15; or locate an individual who is missing, is a lost relative, or is due a benefit, such as a pension, insurance, or unclaimed property benefit.
    5. To a business acting pursuant to a court order, warrant, subpoena, or when otherwise required by law, or in response to a facially valid discovery request pursuant to rules applicable to a court or administrative body that has jurisdiction over the disclosing entity.
    6. To a business providing the Social Security number to a federal, State, or local government entity, including a law enforcement agency, the Department of Public Safety, and a court, or their agents or assigns.
    7. To a Social Security number that has been redacted.
      1. To a business that has used, prior to January 1, 2007, an individual’s Social Security number in a manner inconsistent with subsection (b) of this section, which may continue using that individual’s Social Security number in that manner on or after January 1, 2007, if all of the following conditions are met: (8) (A) To a business that has used, prior to January 1, 2007, an individual’s Social Security number in a manner inconsistent with subsection (b) of this section, which may continue using that individual’s Social Security number in that manner on or after January 1, 2007, if all of the following conditions are met:
        1. The use of the Social Security number is continuous. If the use is stopped for any reason, subsection (b) of this section shall apply.
        2. The individual is provided an annual disclosure that informs the individual that he or she has the right to stop the use of his or her Social Security number in a manner prohibited by subsection (b) of this section.
        3. A written request by an individual to stop the use of his or her Social Security number in a manner prohibited by subsection (b) of this section is implemented within 30 days of the receipt of the request. There shall not be a fee or charge for implementing the request.
        4. The person or entity does not deny services to an individual because the individual makes a written request pursuant to this subsection.
      2. Nothing in this subdivision (8) is intended to apply to the collection, use, or dissemination of Social Security numbers collected prior to January 1, 2007 and exempted from the provisions of subsection (b) of this section pursuant to subdivisions (1) through (7) or (9) and (10) of this subsection.
    8. To information obtained from a recorded document in the official records of the town clerk or municipality.
    9. To information obtained from a document filed in the official records of the courts.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, the State and any State agency, political subdivision of the State, or an agent or employee of the State, may not do any of the following:
    1. Collect a Social Security number from an individual unless authorized or required by law, State or federal regulation, or grant agreement to do so or unless the collection of the Social Security number or records containing the Social Security number is related to the performance of that agency’s duties and responsibilities as prescribed by law.
    2. Fail, when collecting a Social Security number from an individual in a hard copy format, to segregate that number on a separate page from the rest of the record, or as otherwise appropriate, in order that the Social Security number can be more easily redacted pursuant to a valid public records request.
    3. Fail, when collecting a Social Security number from an individual, to provide, at the time of or prior to the actual collection of the Social Security number by that agency, that individual, upon request, with a statement of the purpose or purposes for which the Social Security number is being collected and used.
    4. Use the Social Security number for any purpose other than the purpose set forth in the statement required under subdivision (3) of this subsection.
    5. Intentionally communicate or otherwise make available to the general public a person’s Social Security number.
    6. Intentionally print or imbed an individual’s Social Security number on any card required for the individual to access government services.
    7. Require an individual to transmit the individual’s Social Security number over the Internet, unless the connection is secure or the Social Security number is encrypted.
    8. Require an individual to use the individual’s Social Security number to access an Internet website, unless a password or unique personal identification number or other authentication device is also required to access the Internet website.
    9. Print an individual’s Social Security number on any materials that are mailed to the individual, unless a State or federal law, regulation, or grant agreement requires that the Social Security number be on the document to be mailed. A Social Security number that is permitted to be mailed under this subdivision may not be printed, in whole or in part, on a postcard or other mailer not requiring an envelope, or visible on an envelope, without the envelope having been opened.
  5. Subsection (d) of this section does not apply to:
    1. Social Security numbers disclosed to another governmental entity or its agents, employees, contractors, grantees, or grantors of a governmental entity if disclosure is necessary for the receiving entity to perform its duties and responsibilities. The receiving governmental entity and its agents, employees, and contractors shall maintain the confidential and exempt status of such numbers. As used in this subsection, “necessary” means reasonably needed to promote the efficient, accurate, or economical conduct of an entity’s duties and responsibilities.
    2. Social Security numbers disclosed pursuant to a court order, warrant, or subpoena, or in response to a facially valid discovery request pursuant to rules applicable to a court or administrative body that has jurisdiction over the disclosing entity.
    3. Social Security numbers disclosed for public health purposes pursuant to and in compliance with requirements of the Department of Health under Title 18.
    4. The collection, use, or release of a Social Security number reasonably necessary for administrative purposes or internal verification. Internal verification includes the sharing of information for internal verification between and among governmental entities and their agents, employees, contractors, grantees, and grantors.
    5. Social Security numbers that have been redacted.
      1. A State agency or State political subdivision that has used, prior to January 1, 2007, an individual’s Social Security number in a manner inconsistent with subsection (d) of this section, which may continue using that individual’s Social Security number in that manner on or after January 1, 2007, if all of the following conditions are met: (6) (A) A State agency or State political subdivision that has used, prior to January 1, 2007, an individual’s Social Security number in a manner inconsistent with subsection (d) of this section, which may continue using that individual’s Social Security number in that manner on or after January 1, 2007, if all of the following conditions are met:
        1. The use of the Social Security number is continuous. If the use is stopped for any reason, subsection (d) of this section shall apply.
        2. The individual is provided an annual disclosure that informs the individual that he or she has the right to stop the use of his or her Social Security number in a manner prohibited by subsection (d) of this section.
        3. A written request by an individual to stop the use of his or her Social Security number in a manner prohibited by subsection (d) of this section is implemented within 30 days of the receipt of the request. There shall not be a fee or charge for implementing the request.
        4. The State agency or State political subdivision does not deny services to an individual because the individual makes a written request pursuant to this subdivision.
      2. Nothing in this subdivision (e)(6) is intended to apply to the collection, use, or dissemination of Social Security numbers collected prior to January 1, 2007 and exempted from the provisions of subsection (d) of this section pursuant to subdivisions (1) through (5) or (7) through (11) of this subsection.
    6. Certified copies of vital records issued by the Department of Health and other authorized officials pursuant to 18 V.S.A. part 6.
    7. A recorded document in the official records of the town clerk or municipality.
    8. A document filed in the official records of the courts.
    9. The collection, use, or dissemination of Social Security numbers by law enforcement agencies and the Department of Public Safety in the execution of their duties and responsibilities.
    10. The collection, use, or release of a Social Security number to investigate or prevent fraud; conduct background checks; conduct social or scientific research; collect a debt; obtain a credit report from or furnish data to a consumer reporting agency pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; undertake a permissible purpose enumerated under Gramm Leach Bliley, 12 C.F.R. § 216.13-15; or locate an individual who is missing, is a lost relative, or is due a benefit, such as a pension, insurance, or unclaimed property benefit.
  6. Any person has the right to request that a town clerk or clerk of court remove from an image or copy of an official record placed on a town’s or court’s Internet website available to the general public or an Internet website available to the general public to display public records by the town clerk or clerk of court, the person’s Social Security number, employer taxpayer identification number, driver’s license number, State identification number, passport number, checking account number, savings account number, credit card or debit card number, or personal identification number (PIN) code or passwords contained in that official record. A town clerk or clerk of court is authorized to redact the personal information identified in a request submitted under this section. The request must be made in writing, legibly signed by the requester, and delivered by mail, facsimile, or electronic transmission, or delivered in person to the town clerk or clerk of court. The request must specify the personal information to be redacted, information that identifies the document that contains the personal information and unique information that identifies the location within the document that contains the Social Security number, employer taxpayer identification number, driver’s license number, State identification number, passport number, checking account number, savings account number, credit card number, or debit card number, or personal identification number (PIN) code or passwords to be redacted. The request for redaction shall be considered a public record with access restricted to the town clerk, the clerk of court, their staff, or upon order of the court. The town clerk or clerk of court shall have no duty to inquire beyond the written request to verify the identity of a person requesting redaction and shall have no duty to remove redaction for any reason upon subsequent request by an individual or by order of the court, if impossible to do so. No fee will be charged for the redaction pursuant to such request. Any person who requests a redaction without proper authority to do so shall be guilty of an infraction, punishable by a fine not to exceed $500.00 for each violation.
  7. Enforcement.
    1. With respect to businesses, the State, State agencies, political subdivisions of the State, and agents or employees of the State, a State agency, or a political subdivision of the State, subject to this subchapter, other than a person or entity licensed or registered with the Department of Financial Regulation under Title 8 or this title, the Attorney General and State’s Attorney shall have sole and full authority to investigate potential violations of this subchapter, to enforce, prosecute, obtain, and impose remedies for a violation of this subchapter, or any rules made pursuant to this subchapter, and to adopt rules under this subchapter, as the Attorney General and State’s Attorney have under chapter 63 of this title. The Attorney General may refer the matter to the State’s Attorney in an appropriate case. The Superior Courts shall have jurisdiction over any enforcement matter brought by the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney under this subsection.
    2. With respect to a person or entity licensed or registered with the Department of Financial Regulation under Title 8 or this title, the Department shall have full authority to investigate potential violations of this subchapter, and to prosecute, obtain, and impose remedies for a violation of this subchapter or any rules adopted pursuant to this subchapter as the Department has under Title 8 or this title, or any other applicable law or regulation.
    3. With respect to the information provided by the Vermont Department of Public Safety and law enforcement agencies, and any agent or employee thereof, to the Vermont Attorney General or State’s Attorney pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection, the information provided or made available by the agency or Department to the Attorney General may be designated by the agency or Department as confidential, and shall not be released under the provisions of 1 V.S.A. § 317 .

HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 1, 2007.

History

References in text.

12 C.F.R. §§ 216.13-15, referred to in subdivs. (c)(4) and (e)(11), respectively, were removed and reserved as part of the removal and reservation of 12 C.F.R. Part 216 by 79 F.R. §§ 30708, 30709, eff. May 29, 2014.

In subdiv. (c)(1), the reference to 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2) should probably be to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2) as 15 U.S.C. 1681 does not contain a subdiv. (b)(2).

Subchapter 3A. Student Privacy

§ 2443. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Covered information” means personal information or material, or information that is linked to personal information or material, in any media or format that is:
      1. not publicly available; or (A) (i) not publicly available; or
      2. made publicly available pursuant to the federal Family Educational and Rights and Privacy Act; and
      1. created by or provided to an operator by a student or the student’s parent or legal guardian in the course of the student’s, parent’s, or legal guardian’s use of the operator’s site, service, or application for PreK-12 school purposes; (B) (i) created by or provided to an operator by a student or the student’s parent or legal guardian in the course of the student’s, parent’s, or legal guardian’s use of the operator’s site, service, or application for PreK-12 school purposes;
      2. created by or provided to an operator by an employee or agent of a school or school district for PreK-12 school purposes; or
      3. gathered by an operator through the operation of its site, service, or application for PreK-12 school purposes and personally identifies a student, including information in the student’s education record or electronic mail, first and last name, home address, telephone number, electronic mail address or other information that allows physical or online contact, discipline records, test results, special education data, juvenile dependency records, grades, evaluations, criminal records, medical records, health records, Social Security number, biometric information, disability status, socioeconomic information, food purchases, political affiliations, religious information, text messages, documents, student identifiers, search activity, photos, voice recordings, or geolocation information.
  2. “Operator” means, to the extent that an entity is operating in this capacity, the operator of an Internet website, online service, online application, or mobile application with actual knowledge that the site, service, or application is used primarily for PreK-12 school purposes and was designed and marketed for PreK-12 school purposes.
  3. “PreK-12 school purposes” means purposes that are directed by or that customarily take place at the direction of a school, teacher, or school district; aid in the administration of school activities, including instruction in the classroom or at home, administrative activities, and collaboration between students, school personnel, or parents; or are otherwise for the use and benefit of the school.
  4. “School” means:
    1. a public or private preschool, kindergarten, elementary or secondary educational institution, vocational school, special educational agency or institution; and
    2. a person, agency, or institution that maintains school student records from more than one of the entities described in subdivision (6)(A) of this section.
  5. “Targeted advertising” means presenting advertisements to a student where the advertisement is selected based on information obtained or inferred over time from that student’s online behavior, usage of applications, or covered information. The term does not include advertising to a student at an online location based upon that student’s current visit to that location or in response to that student’s request for information or feedback, without the retention of that student’s online activities or requests over time for the purpose in whole or in part of targeting subsequent ads.

HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

§ 2443a. Operator prohibitions.

  1. An operator shall not knowingly do any of the following with respect to its site, service, or application:
    1. Engage in targeted advertising on the operator’s site, service, or application or target advertising on any other site, service, or application if the targeting of the advertising is based on any information, including covered information and persistent unique identifiers, that the operator has acquired because of the use of that operator’s site, service, or application for PreK-12 school purposes.
    2. Use information, including a persistent unique identifier, that is created or gathered by the operator’s site, service, or application to amass a profile about a student, except in furtherance of PreK-12 school purposes. “Amass a profile” does not include the collection and retention of account information that remains under the control of the student, the student’s parent or legal guardian, or the school.
    3. Sell, barter, or rent a student’s information, including covered information. This subdivision (3) does not apply to the purchase, merger, or other type of acquisition of an operator by another entity if the operator or successor entity complies with this subchapter regarding previously acquired student information.
    4. Except as otherwise provided in section 2443c of this title, disclose covered information, unless the disclosure is made for one or more of the following purposes and is proportionate to the identifiable information necessary to accomplish the purpose:
      1. to further the PreK-12 school purposes of the site, service, or application, provided:
        1. the recipient of the covered information does not further disclose the information except to allow or improve operability and functionality of the operator’s site, service, or application; and
        2. the covered information is not used for a purpose inconsistent with this subchapter;
      2. to ensure legal and regulatory compliance or take precautions against liability;
      3. to respond to judicial process;
      4. to protect the safety or integrity of users of the site or others or the security of the site, service, or application;
      5. for a school, educational, or employment purpose requested by the student or the student’s parent or legal guardian, provided that the information is not used or further disclosed for any other purpose; or
      6. to a third party if the operator contractually prohibits the third party from using any covered information for any purpose other than providing the contracted service to or on behalf of the operator, prohibits the third party from disclosing any covered information provided by the operator to subsequent third parties, and requires the third party to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices.
  2. This section does not prohibit an operator’s use of information for maintaining, developing, supporting, improving, or diagnosing the operator’s site, service, or application.

HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

§ 2443b. Operator duties.

An operator shall:

  1. implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the covered information and designed to protect that covered information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure;
  2. delete, within a reasonable time period and to the extent practicable, a student’s covered information if the school or school district requests deletion of covered information under the control of the school or school district, unless a student or his or her parent or legal guardian consents to the maintenance of the covered information; and
  3. publicly disclose and provide the school with material information about its collection, use, and disclosure of covered information, including publishing a term of service agreement, privacy policy, or similar document.

HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

§ 2443c. Permissive use or disclosure.

An operator may use or disclose covered information of a student under the following circumstances:

  1. if other provisions of federal or State law require the operator to disclose the information and the operator complies with the requirements of federal and State law in protecting and disclosing that information;
  2. for legitimate research purposes as required by State or federal law and subject to the restrictions under applicable State and federal law or as allowed by State or federal law and under the direction of a school, school district, or the State Board of Education if the covered information is not used for advertising or to amass a profile on the student for purposes other than for PreK-12 school purposes; and
  3. disclosure to a State or local educational agency, including schools and school districts, for PreK-12 school purposes as permitted by State or federal law.

HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

§ 2443d. Operator actions that are not prohibited.

This subchapter does not prohibit an operator from doing any of the following:

  1. using covered information to improve educational products if that information is not associated with an identified student within the operator’s site, service, or application or other sites, services, or applications owned by the operator;
  2. using covered information that is not associated with an identified student to demonstrate the effectiveness of the operator’s products or services, including in their marketing;
  3. sharing covered information that is not associated with an identified student for the development and improvement of educational sites, services, or applications;
  4. using recommendation engines to recommend to a student either of the following:
    1. additional content relating to an educational, other learning, or employment opportunity purpose within an online site, service, or application if the recommendation is not determined in whole or in part by payment or other consideration from a third party; or
    2. additional services relating to an educational, other learning, or employment opportunity purpose within an online site, service, or application if the recommendation is not determined in whole or in part by payment or other consideration from a third party; and
  5. responding to a student’s request for information or for feedback without the information or response being determined in whole or in part by payment or other consideration from a third party.

HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

§ 2443e. Applicability.

This subchapter does not:

  1. limit the authority of a law enforcement agency to obtain any content or information from an operator as authorized by law or under a court order;
  2. limit the ability of an operator to use student data, including covered information, for adaptive learning or customized student learning purposes;
  3. apply to general audience Internet websites, general audience online services, general audience online applications, or general audience mobile applications, even if login credentials created for an operator’s site, service, or application may be used to access those general audience sites, services, or applications;
  4. limit service providers from providing Internet connectivity to schools or students and their families;
  5. prohibit an operator of an Internet website, online service, online application, or mobile application from marketing educational products directly to parents if the marketing did not result from the use of covered information obtained by the operator through the provision of services covered under this subchapter;
  6. impose a duty upon a provider of an electronic store, gateway, marketplace, or other means of purchasing or downloading software or applications to review or enforce compliance with this subchapter on those applications or software;
  7. impose a duty upon a provider of an interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230, to review or enforce compliance with this subchapter by third-party content providers;
  8. prohibit students from downloading, exporting, transferring, saving, or maintaining their own student-created data or documents; or
  9. supersede the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act or rules adopted pursuant to that Act.

HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

§ 2443f. Enforcement.

A person who violates a provision of this chapter commits an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title.

HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

Subchapter 4. Document Safe Destruction Act

§ 2445. Safe destruction of documents containing personal information.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Business” means sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, limited liability company, or other group, however organized and whether or not organized to operate at a profit, including a financial institution organized, chartered, or holding a license or authorization certificate under the laws of this State, any other state, the United States, or any other country, or the parent, affiliate, or subsidiary of a financial institution, but in no case shall it include the State, a State agency, or any political subdivision of the State. The term includes an entity that destroys records.
    2. “Customer” means an individual who provides personal information to a business for the purpose of purchasing or leasing a product or obtaining a service from the business.
    3. “Personal information” means the following information that identifies, relates to, describes, or is capable of being associated with a particular individual: his or her signature, Social Security number, physical characteristics or description, passport number, driver’s license or State identification card number, insurance policy number, bank account number, credit card number, debit card number, or any other financial information.
      1. “Record” means any material, regardless of the physical form, on which information is recorded or preserved by any means, including in written or spoken words, graphically depicted, printed, or electromagnetically transmitted. (4) (A) “Record” means any material, regardless of the physical form, on which information is recorded or preserved by any means, including in written or spoken words, graphically depicted, printed, or electromagnetically transmitted.
      2. “Record” does not include publicly available directories containing information an individual has voluntarily consented to have publicly disseminated or listed, such as name, address, or telephone number.
  2. A business shall take all reasonable steps to destroy or arrange for the destruction of a customer’s records within its custody or control containing personal information that is no longer to be retained by the business by shredding, erasing, or otherwise modifying the personal information in those records to make it unreadable or indecipherable through any means for the purpose of:
    1. ensuring the security and confidentiality of customer personal information;
    2. protecting against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of customer personal information; and
    3. protecting against unauthorized access to or use of customer personal information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.
  3. An entity that is in the business of disposing of personal financial information that conducts business in Vermont or disposes of personal information of residents of Vermont must take all reasonable measures to dispose of records containing personal information by implementing and monitoring compliance with policies and procedures that protect against unauthorized access to or use of personal information during or after the collection and transportation and disposing of such information.
  4. This section does not apply to any of the following:
    1. any bank, credit union, or financial institution as defined under the federal Gramm Leach Bliley law that is subject to the regulation of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, the National Credit Union Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, or the Department of Financial Regulation and is subject to the privacy and security provisions of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq.;
    2. any health insurer or health care facility that is subject to and in compliance with the standards for privacy of individually identifiable health information and the security standards for the protection of electronic health information of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996; or
    3. any consumer reporting agency that is subject to and in compliance with the Federal Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., as amended.
  5. Enforcement.
    1. With respect to all businesses subject to this section, other than a person or entity licensed or registered with the Department of Financial Regulation under Title 8 or this title, the Attorney General and State’s Attorney shall have sole and full authority to investigate potential violations of this section, and to prosecute, obtain, and impose remedies for a violation of this section, or any rules adopted pursuant to this section, and to adopt rules under this chapter, as the Attorney General and State’s Attorney have under chapter 63 of this title. The Superior Courts shall have jurisdiction over any enforcement matter brought by the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney under this subsection.
    2. With respect to a person or entity licensed or registered with the Department of Financial Regulation under Title 8 or this title to do business in this State, the Department of Financial Regulation shall have full authority to investigate potential violations of this chapter, and to prosecute, obtain, and impose remedies for a violation of this chapter, or any rules or regulations made pursuant to this chapter, as the Department has under Title 8 and this title, or any other applicable law or regulation.

HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2007.

History

References in text.

In subdiv. (d)(1), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; the Federal Reserve is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 221 et seq.; the National Credit Union Administration is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1752a ; the Securities and Exchange Commission is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78d ; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1811; and the Office of Thrift Supervision is codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1462.

The reference to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, referred to in subdiv. (d)(2), is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 300g g-44 et seq.

Revision note

—2020. In subdivs. (e)(1) and (2), substituted “this chapter” for “this act” in four places to conform to V.S.A. style.

Subchapter 5. Data Brokers

§ 2446. Annual registration.

  1. Annually, on or before January 31 following a year in which a person meets the definition of data broker as provided in section 2430 of this title, a data broker shall:
    1. register with the Secretary of State;
    2. pay a registration fee of $100.00; and
    3. provide the following information:
      1. the name and primary physical, e-mail, and Internet addresses of the data broker;
      2. if the data broker permits a consumer to opt out of the data broker’s collection of brokered personal information, opt out of its databases, or opt out of certain sales of data:
        1. the method for requesting an opt-out;
        2. if the opt-out applies to only certain activities or sales, which ones; and
        3. whether the data broker permits a consumer to authorize a third party to perform the opt-out on the consumer’s behalf;
      3. a statement specifying the data collection, databases, or sales activities from which a consumer may not opt out;
      4. a statement whether the data broker implements a purchaser credentialing process;
      5. the number of data broker security breaches that the data broker has experienced during the prior year, and if known, the total number of consumers affected by the breaches;
      6. where the data broker has actual knowledge that it possesses the brokered personal information of minors, a separate statement detailing the data collection practices, databases, sales activities, and opt-out policies that are applicable to the brokered personal information of minors; and
      7. any additional information or explanation the data broker chooses to provide concerning its data collection practices.
  2. A data broker that fails to register pursuant to subsection (a) of this section is liable to the State for:
    1. a civil penalty of $50.00 for each day, not to exceed a total of $10,000.00 for each year, it fails to register pursuant to this section;
    2. an amount equal to the fees due under this section during the period it failed to register pursuant to this section; and
    3. other penalties imposed by law.
  3. The Attorney General may maintain an action in the Civil Division of the Superior Court to collect the penalties imposed in this section and to seek appropriate injunctive relief.

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 171 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.

§ 2447. Data broker duty to protect information; standards; technical requirements.

  1. Duty to protect personally identifiable information.
    1. A data broker shall develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive information security program that is written in one or more readily accessible parts and contains administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that are appropriate to:
      1. the size, scope, and type of business of the data broker obligated to safeguard the personally identifiable information under such comprehensive information security program;
      2. the amount of resources available to the data broker;
      3. the amount of stored data; and
      4. the need for security and confidentiality of personally identifiable information.
    2. A data broker subject to this subsection shall adopt safeguards in the comprehensive security program that are consistent with the safeguards for protection of personally identifiable information and information of a similar character set forth in other State rules or federal regulations applicable to the data broker.
  2. Information security program; minimum features.   A comprehensive information security program shall at minimum have the following features:
    1. designation of one or more employees to maintain the program;
    2. identification and assessment of reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of any electronic, paper, or other records containing personally identifiable information, and a process for evaluating and improving, where necessary, the effectiveness of the current safeguards for limiting such risks, including:
      1. ongoing employee training, including training for temporary and contract employees;
      2. employee compliance with policies and procedures; and
      3. means for detecting and preventing security system failures;
    3. security policies for employees relating to the storage, access, and transportation of records containing personally identifiable information outside business premises;
    4. disciplinary measures for violations of the comprehensive information security program rules;
    5. measures that prevent terminated employees from accessing records containing personally identifiable information;
    6. supervision of service providers, by:
      1. taking reasonable steps to select and retain third-party service providers that are capable of maintaining appropriate security measures to protect personally identifiable information consistent with applicable law; and
      2. requiring third-party service providers by contract to implement and maintain appropriate security measures for personally identifiable information;
    7. reasonable restrictions upon physical access to records containing personally identifiable information and storage of the records and data in locked facilities, storage areas, or containers;
      1. regular monitoring to ensure that the comprehensive information security program is operating in a manner reasonably calculated to prevent unauthorized access to or unauthorized use of personally identifiable information; and (8) (A) regular monitoring to ensure that the comprehensive information security program is operating in a manner reasonably calculated to prevent unauthorized access to or unauthorized use of personally identifiable information; and
      2. upgrading information safeguards as necessary to limit risks;
    8. regular review of the scope of the security measures:
      1. at least annually; or
      2. whenever there is a material change in business practices that may reasonably implicate the security or integrity of records containing personally identifiable information; and
      1. documentation of responsive actions taken in connection with any incident involving a breach of security; and (10) (A) documentation of responsive actions taken in connection with any incident involving a breach of security; and
      2. mandatory post-incident review of events and actions taken, if any, to make changes in business practices relating to protection of personally identifiable information.
  3. Information security program; computer system security requirements.   A comprehensive information security program required by this section shall at minimum, and to the extent technically feasible, have the following elements:
    1. secure user authentication protocols, as follows:
      1. an authentication protocol that has the following features:
        1. control of user IDs and other identifiers;
        2. a reasonably secure method of assigning and selecting passwords or use of unique identifier technologies, such as biometrics or token devices;
        3. control of data security passwords to ensure that such passwords are kept in a location and format that do not compromise the security of the data they protect;
        4. restricting access to only active users and active user accounts; and
        5. blocking access to user identification after multiple unsuccessful attempts to gain access; or
      2. an authentication protocol that provides a higher level of security than the features specified in subdivision (A) of this subdivision (c)(1);
    2. secure access control measures that:
      1. restrict access to records and files containing personally identifiable information to those who need such information to perform their job duties; and
      2. assign to each person with computer access unique identifications plus passwords, which are not vendor-supplied default passwords, that are reasonably designed to maintain the integrity of the security of the access controls or a protocol that provides a higher degree of security;
    3. encryption of all transmitted records and files containing personally identifiable information that will travel across public networks and encryption of all data containing personally identifiable information to be transmitted wirelessly or a protocol that provides a higher degree of security;
    4. reasonable monitoring of systems for unauthorized use of or access to personally identifiable information;
    5. encryption of all personally identifiable information stored on laptops or other portable devices or a protocol that provides a higher degree of security;
    6. for files containing personally identifiable information on a system that is connected to the Internet, reasonably up-to-date firewall protection and operating system security patches that are reasonably designed to maintain the integrity of the personally identifiable information or a protocol that provides a higher degree of security;
    7. reasonably up-to-date versions of system security agent software that must include malware protection and reasonably up-to-date patches and virus definitions, or a version of such software that can still be supported with up-to-date patches and virus definitions and is set to receive the most current security updates on a regular basis or a protocol that provides a higher degree of security; and
    8. education and training of employees on the proper use of the computer security system and the importance of personally identifiable information security.
  4. Enforcement.
    1. A person who violates a provision of this section commits an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title.
    2. The Attorney General has the same authority to adopt rules to implement the provisions of this chapter and to conduct civil investigations, enter into assurances of discontinuance, and bring civil actions as provided under chapter 63, subchapter 1 of this title.

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 171 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.

Chapter 63. Consumer Protection

History

Amendments

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Acts 109 and 136 substituted “Protection” for “Fraud” in the chapter heading.

Educational program. 1967, No. 32 , § 2, eff. April 17, 1967, provided: “Sec. 2. The consumer information clearinghouse of the extension service at the university of Vermont shall carry out a consumer education program designed to complement the investigative and enforcement duties of the attorney general provided for in this act. It shall advise the people of the state, through the public media and other methods, of fraudulent and deceptive business practices, and shall provide an educational service in matters affecting their rights as consumers. It shall refer consumer problems to the office of the attorney general of this state and shall cooperate with consumer welfare bodies of agencies, of both state and federal governments and of the business community, where such exist.”

CROSS REFERENCES

Application of chapter to agricultural finance leases, see chapter 60 of this title.

Application of chapter to weights and measures, see chapter 73 of this title.

Criminal frauds, see 13 V.S.A. chapter 47.

Insurance trade practices, see 8 V.S.A. chapter 129.

Rights of recipients of unsolicited merchandise or services, see § 4401 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

Business victim.

Nothing in the wording of this chapter limits the types of victims who may be protected by the Attorney General so as to exclude victims that are businesses. State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 594 A.2d 426, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1991).

Trial court’s dismissal of State’s consumer fraud action was erroneous, where State’s argument that this chapter allowed it to protect businesses, as well as individual consumers, victimized by unfair or deceptive acts was supported by plain meaning of this chapter as well as precedents from Federal Trade Commission, federal courts, and other states with similar acts. State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 594 A.2d 426, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1991).

Construction.

This chapter is remedial in nature and must be construed liberally so as to furnish all the remedy and accomplish the purposes intended. State v. Custom Pools, 150 Vt. 533, 556 A.2d 72, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 232 (1988).

Intentional misrepresentation or bad faith is not required for liability under this chapter. Winton v. Johnson & Dix Fuel Corp., 147 Vt. 236, 515 A.2d 371, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 389 (1986).

While this chapter must be construed liberally in order to serve its remedial purpose, the Court cannot so freely stretch its meaning as to evade the Legislature’s intent: therefore, this chapter will not be interpreted to apply to transaction involving insurance and involving no buyer and seller. Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 550 (1981).

Evidence.

Seller of horse with heart condition would not be entitled to directed verdict on action brought under this chapter on the basis that buyer did not immediately return horse upon learning of the condition; the evidence raised jury question as to reasonableness of buyer’s reliance on representations of seller. Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 580 A.2d 51, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1990).

Particular cases.

There was sufficient evidence to support a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in a suit under the Consumer Protection Act based on a misrepresentation or omission of material fact, as a fact-finder could reasonably infer that defendant agreed to the sale of a demonstrator modular home while harboring an unstated intention not to consummate it, but rather to persuade plaintiffs later to take a different, newly manufactured model. McKinstry v. Fecteau Residential Homes, 2015 VT 125, 200 Vt. 392, 131 A.3d 1123, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 101 (2015).

In an action under the Consumer Protection Act, the trial court did not err in awarding an attorney’s fee less than sought by plaintiffs, as it considered the result obtained by plaintiffs versus the recovery they sought, and did not err in finding that plaintiffs had not shown a pattern of socially irresponsible behavior on the part of defendant. McKinstry v. Fecteau Residential Homes, 2015 VT 125, 200 Vt. 392, 131 A.3d 1123, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 101 (2015).

Trial court erred by offsetting the deposit refunded by defendant against the attorney’s fees awarded to plaintiffs, as the return of the deposit had nothing to do with plaintiffs’ claim that defendant violated the Consumer Protection Act. McKinstry v. Fecteau Residential Homes, 2015 VT 125, 200 Vt. 392, 131 A.3d 1123, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 101 (2015).

Purpose.

Where plaintiff State brought consumer enforcement action under Vermont’s Consumer Protection Act (CPA), 9 V.S.A. § 2451 et seq., the case was properly filed in state court, and claims asserting defendant’s constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 impacted important state interests. Myinfoguard, LLC v. Sorrell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161070 (D. Vt. Nov. 9, 2012).

The purpose of this chapter is to protect the public and is remedial in nature. Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 580 A.2d 51, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1990).

This chapter was passed to protect citizens from unfair and deceptive business practices and to encourage a commercial environment highlighted by integrity and fairness. Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, 143 Vt. 527, 470 A.2d 1157, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 582 (1983).

This chapter was created to protect citizens from unfair and deceptive acts in consumer transactions. Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 550 (1981).

Survival of claims.

In order to effectuate purposes of remedial legislation, claims under Act 250 and the Consumer Fraud Act of not abate on death of seller of lots subject to permit. State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26, 633 A.2d 272, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1993).

Cited.

Cited in Shop & Save Food Markets, Inc. v. Pneumo Corp., 683 F.2d 27, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 22490 (2d Cir. 1982), Gerrish Corp. v. Dworkin, 145 Vt. 107, 483 A.2d 261, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 551 (1984); Vermont Development Credit Corp. v. Kitchel, 149 Vt. 421, 544 A.2d 1165, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 44 (1988); Wenzel v. Brault's Mobile Homes, Inc., 152 Vt. 457, 566 A.2d 993, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 183 (1989).

Subchapter 1. General Provisions

History

Amendments

—1989 (Adj. Sess.). 1989, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, designated the existing provisions of this chapter, comprised of sections 2451-2462, as subchapter 1 and added the heading for that subchapter.

ANNOTATIONS

Construction with other laws.

Consumer Fraud Act applies to real estate leases, which includes residential rental agreements. Bisson v. Ward, 160 Vt. 343, 628 A.2d 1256, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 56 (1993).

There is no indication that by enacting Residential Rental Agreement Act, the Legislature intended to deny tenants additional protections provided by Consumer Fraud Act. Bisson v. Ward, 160 Vt. 343, 628 A.2d 1256, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 56 (1993).

§ 2451. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to complement the enforcement of federal statutes and decisions governing unfair methods of competition, unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and anti-competitive practices in order to protect the public and to encourage fair and honest competition.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 2011, No. 168 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Amendments

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “and” following “competition,” and inserted “and anti-competitive practices” following “practices”.

ANNOTATIONS

Particular cases.

As to homeowners’ Consumer Fraud Act claim, the trial court made precise findings concerning the parties’ knowledge of a defective carpet, its location, and the carpet company’s willingness to replace it. There was no reason to disturb the trial court’s determination that the company made no misleading statements to the homeowners regarding the carpeting. First Quality Carpets, Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 2012 VT 41, 191 Vt. 28, 54 A.3d 465, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 35 (2012).

Car buyer satisfied the elements for a claim under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act. The dealer represented that the title was clear and erroneously certified an odometer reading; the buyer reasonably relied on the misrepresentations since nothing suggested he had reason to question the car’s title or the odometer’s accuracy; and the misrepresentations were material as they were closely linked to the vehicle’s longevity and value. Gregory v. Poulin Auto Sales, Inc., 2012 VT 28, 191 Vt. 611, 44 A.3d 788, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 28 (2012) (mem.).

Preemption.

Regardless of whether a lending bank acted willfully or with intent to injure, it was entitled to summary judgment in that federal Fair Credit Reporting Act preempted State law on issues of false credit reporting, precluding the borrower from asserting any such State law claim. Sprayregen v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101910 (D. Vt. July 23, 2012).

Cited.

Cited in Randolph National Bank v. Vail, 131 Vt. 390, 308 A.2d 588, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1973); Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, 143 Vt. 527, 470 A.2d 1157, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 582 (1983); Barrett v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp., 145 Vt. 287, 487 A.2d 1074, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 592 (1984); Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 515 A.2d 123, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 392 (1986); State v. Custom Pools, 150 Vt. 533, 556 A.2d 72, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 232 (1988); Peabody v. P.J.'s Auto Village, Inc., 153 Vt. 55, 569 A.2d 460, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 232 (1989); Bridge v. Corning Life Sciences, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 551, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3354 (D. Vt. 1998); Goldman v. Town of Plainfield, 171 Vt. 575, 762 A.2d 854, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 307 (2000) (mem.).

§ 2451a. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Consumer” means any person who purchases, leases, contracts for, or otherwise agrees to pay consideration for goods or services not for resale in the ordinary course of the person’s trade or business but for the person’s use or benefit or the use or benefit of a member of the person’s household, or in connection with the operation of the person’s household or a farm whether or not the farm is conducted as a trade or business, or a person who purchases, leases, contracts for, or otherwise agrees to pay consideration for goods or services not for resale in the ordinary course of the person’s trade or business but for the use or benefit of the person’s business or in connection with the operation of the person’s business.
  2. “Goods” or “services” shall include any objects, wares, goods, commodities, work, labor, intangibles, courses of instruction or training, securities, bonds, debentures, stocks, real estate, or other property or services of any kind. The term also includes bottled liquified petroleum (LP or propane) gas.
  3. “Seller” means a person regularly and principally engaged in a business of selling goods or services to consumers.
  4. “Home solicitation sale” means the sale or lease, or the offer for sale or lease, of goods or services with a purchase price of $5.00 or more, whether under single or multiple contracts, where the sale, lease, or offer thereof is either personally solicited or consummated by a seller at the residence or place of business or employment of the consumer, or at a seller’s transient quarters, or solicited or consummated by a seller wholly or in part by telephone with a consumer at the residence or place of business or employment of the consumer. Transient quarters includes hotel or motel rooms, or any other place utilized as a temporary business location. The term “home solicitation sale” does not include a transaction:
    1. Made pursuant to prior negotiations in the course of a visit by the consumer to a retail business establishment having a fixed permanent location where the goods are exhibited or the services are offered for sale on a continuing basis.
    2. In which the consumer has initiated the contact and specifically requested the seller to visit the consumer’s home for the purpose of repairing or performing maintenance upon the consumer’s personal property. If, in the course of such a visit, the seller sells the consumer the right to receive additional services or goods other than replacement parts necessarily used in performing the maintenance or in making the repairs, the sale of those additional goods or services would not fall within this exclusion.
    3. Conducted and consummated entirely by mail and without any other contact between the consumer and the seller prior to delivery of the goods or performance of the services.
    4. With a purchase price of under $25.00 where the consumer is not required to sign any contract, receipt, sales ticket, evidence of indebtedness, or other writing, and the goods, services, or merchandise purchased are capable of delivery or performance at one time.
    5. Pertaining to the sale or rental of real property, to the sale of insurance, to the sale of securities by a broker dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or to the sale of commodities by any person registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
    6. Where, in the case of goods, the buyer may at any time:
        1. cancel the order prior to delivery of the goods and receive a full refund for any monies paid;
        2. refuse to accept the goods when delivered, without incurring any obligation to pay for them and receive a full refund for any monies paid; or
        3. return the goods to the seller and receive a full refund for any monies paid;
      1. the buyer’s right to cancel the order or return the goods without obligation or charge at any time and receive a full refund for any monies paid is clearly and unmistakably set forth on the face or reverse side of the sales ticket; and
      2. the goods or merchandise purchased under an agreement meeting the requirements specified in subdivisions (i) and (ii) of this subdivision (F) are capable of delivery at one time.
    7. Solicited or consummated wholly or in part by telephone where the seller offers a full refund and right of cancellation for at least ten days after receipt of the goods or services, and a full refund within 30 days of return of the goods or cancellation of the services or under terms no more restrictive than those set forth in subsections 2454(a), (c), and (d) of this title, and the right of refund and cancellation is conspicuously disclosed with the goods or services.
    8. Solicited or consummated wholly or in part by a federally insured depository institution or its subsidiary, affiliate, or parent organizations, or by a public utility regulated by the Federal Communications Commission or the Vermont Public Utility Commission.
    9. In response to an order placed by a farmer for farm-related goods or services, whether in person, by telephone, or otherwise, and the farmer has a preexisting open end credit plan with the seller.
  5. “Business day” means any calendar day except Saturday, Sunday, or any day classified as a holiday under 1 V.S.A. § 371 .
  6. “Purchase price” means the total price paid or to be paid for the consumer goods or services, including all interest and service charges.
  7. “Lessor” means a person engaged in a business of leasing goods to consumers.
  8. “Collusion” means an agreement, contract, combination in the form of trusts or otherwise, or conspiracy to engage in price fixing, bid rigging, or market division or allocation of goods or services between or among persons.

HISTORY: Added 1973, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. June 7, 1974; amended 1985, No. 34 , § 1; 1985, No. 61 ; 1993, No. 99 , § 3; 1995, No. 23 , § 1; 1997, No. 42 , § 1; 2001, No. 42 , § 2; 2011, No. 168 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 18, 2012; 2021, No. 20 , § 16.

History

References in text.

The reference to the Securities and Exchange Commission, referred to in subdiv. (d)(5), is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78d .

The reference to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, referred to in subdiv. (d)(5), is codified as 17 C.F.R. Part 30, Rule 30.10.

The reference to the Federal Communications Commission, referred to in subdiv. (d)(8), is codified as 47 U.S.C. § 11.

Revision note

—2017. In subdiv. (d)(8), substituted “Public Utility Commission” for “Public Service Board” in accordance with 2017, No. 53 , § 12.

—2013. In the introductory language, substituted “As used in” for “For the purposes of ” preceding “this chapter” to conform to V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—2021. Section amended generally.

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (h): Added.

—2001. Subsec. (g): Added.

—1997. Subsec. (a): Added “or a person who purchases, leases, contracts for, or otherwise agrees to pay consideration for goods or services not for resale in the ordinary course of his or her trade or business but for the use or benefit of his or her business or in connection with the operation of his or her business” at the end of the sentence.

—1995. Subdiv. (d)(9): Added.

—1993. Subsec. (d): Added “or solicited or consummated by a seller wholly or in part by telephone with a consumer at the residence or place of business or employment of the consumer” following “transient quarters” in the first sentence of the introductory paragraph, deleted “or telephone” preceding “and without” in subdiv. (3), “or” following “insurance” and “or commodities” following “sale of securities” in subdiv. (5), and added subdivs. (7) and (8).

—1985. Act No. 34 amended subsec. (b) generally.

Act No. 61 deleted former subsec. (c) and redesignated former subsecs. (d)-(g) as present subsecs. (c)-(f), amended subsec. (a) generally, and inserted “work, labor” preceding “intangibles” in subsec. (b).

ANNOTATIONS

Consumer.

Assuming misrepresentation on the part of the defendant, it remains incumbent on a plaintiff to prove itself a “consumer” under the Consumer Fraud Act. Rathe Salvage, Inc. v. R. Brown & Sons, Inc., 2012 VT 18, 191 Vt. 284, 46 A.3d 891, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 19 (2012).

When the evidence proved only that defendants bought scrap from plaintiff’s salvage yard at an agreed-upon price per ton, and that the salvage yard purchased no goods or services from defendants, the trial court properly held that plaintiff was no “consumer” under the Consumer Fraud Act. Rathe Salvage, Inc. v. R. Brown & Sons, Inc., 2012 VT 18, 191 Vt. 284, 46 A.3d 891, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 19 (2012).

Business entities are entitled to the same rights under the Consumer Fraud Act as other consumers. Rathe Salvage, Inc. v. R. Brown & Sons, Inc., 2008 VT 99, 184 Vt. 355, 965 A.2d 460, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 93 (2008).

Claims by a corporate investor under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (VCFA) survived dismissal because the VCFA allowed suits by corporations that had purchased goods or services for the use or benefit of the business as long as the goods or services were not purchased for resale; “consumer” as defined in 9 V.S.A. § 2451a(a) includes corporations by virtue of 1 V.S.A. § 128 . Ascension Tech. Corp. v. McDonald Invs., Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 271, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25876 (D. Vt. 2003).

Language in 9 V.S.A. § 2461(b) , stating that “any consumer,” reinforced by the definition of consumer in subsec. (a) of this section as “any person”, who suffers injury may bring an action against a “seller, solicitor or other violator”, does not support the imposition of a privity requirement. Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 174 Vt. 328, 817 A.2d 9, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 314 (2002).

This section identifies a farmer as an ordinary consumer, regardless of whether his farm is conducted as a business. Mainline Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13871 (D. Vt. 1996).

Where buyer, who purchased automobile with the expectation that it would increase in value, testified that he bought it for his personal benefit and that although he had sold automobiles bought as investments, he was not a used car dealer, jury could conclude that buyer was a consumer within the meaning of this section. Poulin v. Ford Motor Co., 147 Vt. 120, 513 A.2d 1168, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 381 (1986).

Buyers who purchased a tractor for use in a logging business and therefore used goods for a commercial purpose were not “consumers” within the meaning of this section. Corey v. Furgat Tractor & Equipment, Inc., 147 Vt. 477, 520 A.2d 600, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 451 (1986).

Consumer goods.

In an action that arose out of consequences of a patient’s spinal surgery, in which the treating surgeon utilized a product to augment bone fusion, the patient’s claims under the Vermont Consumer Protection Act were dismissed because the patient did not constitute a “consumer” under the statute since the patient did not, for the patient’s personal use, purchase the product, which in any event was not available for consumer purchase, but rather was prescribed the medical device by the patient’s doctor. Otis-Wisher v. Medtronic, Inc., 616 Fed. Appx. 433, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9565 (2d Cir. 2015).

Pursuant to this section and 9A V.S.A. § 2—316, farmers were consumers and herbicides that they purchased from defendant were consumer goods so that defendant could not limit farmers’ remedies in breach of express warranty action. Mainline Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13871 (D. Vt. 1996).

Truck purchased primarily for use in plaintiff’s logging business could not be classified as consumer goods. Murray v. J & B International Trucks, Inc., 146 Vt. 458, 508 A.2d 1351, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 330 (1986).

Home solicitation sale.

In determining whether a sale is a home solicitation sale as defined by this section, it is the location of the sale and not whether the merchant maintains a regular business address which is controlling. Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 515 A.2d 123, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 392 (1986).

Horses.

Horses are included within the definition of “goods.” Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 580 A.2d 51, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1990).

Insurance.

The sale of an insurance policy is not a contract for “goods or services” within the meaning of section 2461 of this title, allowing civil penalties for false or fraudulent representations or practices, since insurance cannot legitimately be labelled either goods or services as the Legislature has defined those terms in this section. Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 550 (1981).

Real estate transactions.

Court in action for misrepresentation in connection with house purchase correctly ruled that real estate brokerage engaged in residential real estate transactions was a “seller” involved “in commerce” within the meaning of the Consumer Fraud Act. Carter v. Gugliuzzi, 168 Vt. 48, 716 A.2d 17, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 142 (1998).

Cited.

Cited in State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 594 A.2d 426, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1991); Bisson v. Ward, 160 Vt. 343, 628 A.2d 1256, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 56 (1993).

§ 2452. Limitation.

  1. Nothing in this chapter shall apply to the owner or publisher of a newspaper, magazine, publication, or printed matter, or to a provider of an interactive computer service, wherein an advertisement or offer to sell appears, or to the owner or operator of a radio or television station that disseminates an advertisement or offer to sell, when the owner, publisher, operator, or provider has no knowledge of the fraudulent intent, design, or purpose of the advertiser or offeror, and is not responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of the advertisement or offer to sell.
  2. In this section, “interactive computer service” has the same meaning as in 47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (2).

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 2015, No. 55 , § 9.

History

Amendments

—2015. Section amended generally.

ANNOTATIONS

Applicability.

Under 9 V.S.A. § 2452 , the publishers of a campground directory were exempt from a wife’s claim brought pursuant to the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act where the wife failed to allege that they were aware of the poorly maintained trees at the campground where the husband was killed by a falling tree or that the publishers were the agents of, or had some other kind of direct relationship with, the campground and its owners. Repucci v. Lake Champagne Campground, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25888 (D. Vt. 2002).

§ 2453. Practices prohibited; antitrust and consumer protection.

  1. Unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
  2. It is the intent of the Legislature that in construing subsection (a) of this section, the courts of this State will be guided by the construction of similar terms contained in Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act as from time to time amended by the Federal Trade Commission and the courts of the United States.
  3. The Attorney General shall adopt rules, when necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of this chapter, relating to unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. The rules shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations, and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts interpreting the Federal Trade Commission Act.
  4. Violation of a rule adopted by the Attorney General is prima facie proof of the commission of an unfair or deceptive act in commerce.
  5. The provisions of subsections (a), (c), and (d) of this section shall also be applicable to real estate transactions.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 1969, No. 45 , § 8, eff. April 4, 1969; 1969, No. 278 (Adj. Sess.); 1973, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 7, 1974; 1999, No. 65 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. May 8, 2012; 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1a, eff. May 18, 2012; 2017, No. 74 , § 13.

History

References in text.

The Federal Trade Commission Act, referred to in subsec. (c), is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. Section 5(a)(1) of the Act, referred to in subsec. (b), is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1).

Amendments

—2017. Subsec. (c): In the first sentence, substituted “adopt rules” for “make rules and regulations” following “General shall”; in the second sentence, deleted “and regulations” following “rules”.

Subsec. (d): Substituted “adopted” for “or regulation as made” following “rule”.

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “protection” for “fraud” in the section heading.

—1999 (Adj. Sess.) Added “antitrust and consumer fraud” in the section heading.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added “when necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of this chapter” following “regulations” in the first sentence.

—1969 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added.

—1969. Subsec. (c): Added.

Subsec. (d): Added.

CROSS REFERENCES

Applicability of section to charitable solicitations, see § 2479 of this title.

Applicability of section to credit reporting agencies, see § 2480f of this title.

Applicability of section to pay-per-call services, see § 2516 of this title.

Applicability of section to rent-to-own agreements, see § 41b of this title.

Failure to comply with decision of Vermont motor vehicle arbitration board as unfair or deceptive practice, see § 4177 of this title.

Procedure for adoption of administrative rules, see 3 V.S.A. chapter 25.

Unauthorized use of market Vermont logo as unfair or deceptive practice, see 3 V.S.A. § 2506 .

ANNOTATIONS

Class actions.

Although trial courts must assure that questions common to the putative class predominate and that a class action would be superior to independent actions, they must not rigidly apply the class certification rule so as to prematurely determine the merits of the case and deny a class of indirect consumers, who as a practical matter cannot obtain relief for alleged antitrust violations in separate proceedings, the opportunity to present their case to a jury. Otherwise, legitimate plaintiffs may be left without a remedy, and defendants may secure unlawful gains without the risk of being sued or prosecuted. Wright v. Honeywell International, Inc., 2009 VT 123, 187 Vt. 123, 989 A.2d 539, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 146 (2009).

False representations.

Trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ consumer fraud claim premised on defendants’ representation that they “take pride in offering cost efficient, quality construction with exceptional value;” defendants’ representations fell within the category of opinion as subjective evaluations of workmanship rather than objectively verifiable statements of fact. Heath v. Palmer, 2006 VT 125, 181 Vt. 545, 915 A.2d 1290, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 328 (2006) (mem.).

Campground directory publishers’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a claim brought pursuant to the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act was granted where the statements describing a campground as premier and well maintained were opinions, rather than statements of fact, and were not actionable under subsec. (a). Repucci v. Lake Champagne Campground, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25888 (D. Vt. 2002).

Subsec. (a) of this section was violated where purchaser of ski area who sold time-share interests in its lodging facilities actively misrepresented his ownership of the ski area and failed to inform prospective buyers of the speculative nature of the time-sharing scheme. State v. Stedman, 149 Vt. 594, 547 A.2d 1333, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 93 (1988).

Finding that seller’s advertisement falsely represented the availability of a tax credit for the product supported conclusion that seller violated this section. Winton v. Johnson & Dix Fuel Corp., 147 Vt. 236, 515 A.2d 371, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 389 (1986).

Indirect purchasers.

Subsec. (b) of this section does not require that the State must follow the “indirect-purchaser” rule, set forth in a federal decision, which states that a party who does not purchase a product directly from an antitrust violator is barred from bringing a cause of action for overcharge against that violator. Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 174 Vt. 328, 817 A.2d 9, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 314 (2002).

Intent.

Deceptions does not require intent. Poulin v. Ford Motor Co., 147 Vt. 120, 513 A.2d 1168, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 381 (1986).

Landlord-tenant cases.

In cases where tenants are basing a Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim upon the failure of landlords to disclose code violations related to the habitability of residential premises, the tenants must show that the landlords knew or should have known of the alleged defect in the premises. Nothing in the CPA evinces a legislative intent to make landlords strictly liable under the act for having failed to reveal every potential latent defect in residential premises; moreover, requiring knowledge on the part of landlords for their failures to disclose defects or code violations in residential housing is more consistent with the actual notice requirement of the Residential Rental Agreements Act’s habitability provision, which often forms the basis for claims under the CPA. Terry v. O'Brien, 2015 VT 132, 200 Vt. 511, 134 A.3d 203, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 113 (2015).

Landlords may be held liable under the Consumer Protection Act for not revealing material defects or code violations of which they should have been aware; they may not avoid liability by intentionally remaining ignorant of information that they have a duty to disclose, particularly if they fail to inform tenants of the limits of their knowledge with respect to that information. Tenants can establish through circumstantial evidence alone that landlords knew or should have known of a code violation or other defect impacting habitability. Terry v. O'Brien, 2015 VT 132, 200 Vt. 511, 134 A.3d 203, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 113 (2015).

Liability.

Vermont Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA) did not provide for derivative liability and thus, an assignee of a mortgagee could not be liable for the previous lender’s actions. Scafuro v. PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3658 (Bankr. D. Vt. Sept. 4, 2013).

Derivative liability for a violation of subsec. (a) of this section would not be imposed absent direct participation in the unfair or deceptive acts, direct aid to the actor, or a principal/agent relationship. State v. Stedman, 149 Vt. 594, 547 A.2d 1333, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 93 (1988).

Nondisclosure.

Statements by a prior-prospective purchaser to a realtor regarding alleged defects on the property were not sufficiently specific to impute knowledge of those defects to the realtor or to require disclosure of material information for purposes of the consumer fraud context. PH West Dover Prop. v. Lalancette Eng'rs, 2015 VT 48, 199 Vt. 1, 120 A.3d 1135, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 28 (2015).

In a consumer fraud action, where the sellers of property knew about an underground gasoline spill, knew that there was ongoing monitoring of the well on the property in connection with the spill, and failed to disclose these facts to plaintiff buyers, the omission was objectively and plainly material; thus, plaintiffs were entitled to judgment in their favor. Vastano v. Killington Valley Real Estate, 2007 VT 33, 182 Vt. 550, 929 A.2d 720, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 63 (2007) (mem.).

Where court in action for misrepresentation in connection with house purchase did not expressly consider fact, known to agents of defendant real estate brokerage, that plaintiff was moving from California and may not have been as familiar with Vermont housing conditions as typical in-state purchaser, damage award was required to be reversed and case remanded for trial court to make additional findings and conclusions. Carter v. Gugliuzzi, 168 Vt. 48, 716 A.2d 17, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 142 (1998).

Landlords who knew that apartment was in violation of health and safety codes and did not have a certificate of occupancy committed a deceptive act by renting the apartment. Bisson v. Ward, 160 Vt. 343, 628 A.2d 1256, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 56 (1993).

In order to establish consumer fraud under this section, actual damage is not necessary; all plaintiff must show is that a deceptive omission is likely to influence a consumer’s conduct by distorting the buyer’s ultimate exercise of choice. Peabody v. P.J.'s Auto Village, Inc., 153 Vt. 55, 569 A.2d 460, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 232 (1989).

In action for damages under this section, judgment for defendant used car dealer based on lack of actual damage was reversed; consumer who bought vehicle was entitled to relief based on dealer’s failure to disclose “clipped” nature of vehicle. Peabody v. P.J.'s Auto Village, Inc., 153 Vt. 55, 569 A.2d 460, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 232 (1989).

Particular cases.

In a suit brought by a student forced to attend college classes on-line due to the college’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the college’s motion to dismiss was denied in part because the student’s claims did not challenge the quality of education he received, but rather alleged that he was deprived of certain educational services for which he contracted for and paid. Mooers v. Middlebury Coll., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176354 (D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2021).

While defendant’s marketing brochure advertised its flooring as a “spectacular, lifelike wood,” and natural wood floors did not develop blue-green spots all over them, as did the flooring here, this alone was not sufficient to demonstrate that the marketing brochure would mislead a reasonable consumer. The trial court ruled that the blue spots in the flooring were not the result of a manufacturing defect, and there was accordingly no evidence that defendant misrepresented its product in violation of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act. The Lofts Essex, LLC v. Strategis Floor and Decor Inc., 2019 VT 82, 211 Vt. 204, 224 A.3d 116, 2019 Vt. LEXIS 152 (2019).

Plaintiff had not stated a claim against defendant insurer under the Consumer Protection Act, as plaintiff was not a consumer with respect to the policy the insurer issued to defendant driver. Messier v. Bushman, 2018 VT 93, 208 Vt. 261, 197 A.3d 882, 2018 Vt. LEXIS 128 (2018).

In a landlord-tenant case, the trial court’s instructions as to the Consumer Protection Act were overbroad in not including the element of materiality in defining a deceptive act and in not requiring that the landlords knew or should have known of the alleged defect that they failed to disclose and that led to a fire. Terry v. O'Brien, 2015 VT 132, 200 Vt. 511, 134 A.3d 203, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 113 (2015).

As inn buyers clearly knew the information about the need to replace the roof, the realtor’s failure to provide the seller’s estimate of repair costs to them could not satisfy the requirements for liability under the Consumer Protection Act for purposes of a private cause of action. PH West Dover Prop. v. Lalancette Eng'rs, 2015 VT 48, 199 Vt. 1, 120 A.3d 1135, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 28 (2015).

Sale of a business did not constitute a transaction “in commerce” for purposes of the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act because it did not occur in the consumer marketplace. First, plaintiff held his offer out to defendant only, not to the public at large; second, the transaction did not involve products, goods, or services purchased or sold for general consumption; third, the transaction’s high level of customization did not typically occur in the consumer marketplace. Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corp., 2013 VT 111, 195 Vt. 524, 90 A.3d 885, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 117 (2013).

Sheriff’s office lacked constitutional standing to assert a predatory pricing claim against a police department that bid to provide police services to a town, as no commerce existed so as to provide the sheriff’s office with a legally protected interest. The provision of police services in Vermont occurred outside the realm of commerce because it involved no interchange of goods or commodities on the open market; it was a governmental function provided only by governmental entities for the benefit of the public. Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. St. Albans City Police Dep't, 2012 VT 62, 192 Vt. 188, 58 A.3d 207, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 61 (2012).

Real estate sellers’ Consumer Fraud Act claim failed because they failed to show that any alleged “misrepresentation” was material to the reasonable consumer or that there was any damage or injury attributable to the representation that a real estate commission would be split equally. There was no evidence that a reasonable seller of a small business would conclude that the greater incentive for the buyer broker was more important than a greater incentive for a seller broker or that the commission split affected the price for which the business was sold. Lang McLaughry Spera Real Estate, LLC v. Hinsdale, 2011 VT 29, 190 Vt. 1, 35 A.3d 100, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2011).

Real estate sellers’ Consumer Fraud Act claim failed when the parties’ listing agreement stated that the broker “recommended” mediation. Such a recommendation was not likely to mislead a reasonable consumer into believing that mediation was guaranteed, and the sellers’ interpretation that they had a right to mediation was unreasonable as a matter of law. Lang McLaughry Spera Real Estate, LLC v. Hinsdale, 2011 VT 29, 190 Vt. 1, 35 A.3d 100, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2011).

Court rejected real estate sellers’ assertion that a broker had a “practice” of claiming a commission on property not included in a listing agreement, and that this practice violated the Consumer Fraud Act. The sellers’ citation of a conditional statement made by the broker’s president did not suffice; the fact that the listing agreement was not as specific as it should have been did not alone demonstrate consumer fraud. Lang McLaughry Spera Real Estate, LLC v. Hinsdale, 2011 VT 29, 190 Vt. 1, 35 A.3d 100, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2011).

Even if a statement that any shortfall in a real estate broker’s commission would come out of the share of an employee who was the sellers’ friend violated the Consumer Fraud Act as an unfair debt collection practice, the sellers had not shown that they sustained damages or injury as a result. Lang McLaughry Spera Real Estate, LLC v. Hinsdale, 2011 VT 29, 190 Vt. 1, 35 A.3d 100, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2011).

Bankruptcy court denied a Chapter 12 trustee’s claims that a claim in the amount of $1,024,436 which a creditor filed against a debtor’s Chapter 12 bankruptcy estate should have been disallowed because the creditor violated the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act, 9 V.S.A. § 2453 , or, in the alternative, subordinated to other claims under 11 U.S.C.S. § 510(c). Evidence the trustee offered did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the creditor engaged in inequitable conduct and exercised an unfair advantage in business relations with the debtor, to the detriment of the debtor and unsecured creditors by: (1) extending a commercially unreasonable amount of credit to the debtor; (2) receiving confidential information from a lender regarding proposed refinancing with the debtor; (3) obtaining an ex parte attachment by providing false, incomplete, and misleading information to a state court; and (4) improperly seeking payment on several open accounts, including improper payment of attorney’s fees and interest. Bourdeau Bros. v. Montagne, 431 B.R. 94, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1665 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2010).

Bank was properly granted summary judgment on a customer’s claim under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act. The bank had not led the customer to believe that a debt could be settled by payment of $150, but indicated only that it agreed to contact the collection agency to which the debt had been sold and repurchase it; moreover, there were no damages. Ianelli v. U.S. Bank, 2010 VT 34, 187 Vt. 644, 996 A.2d 722, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 34 (2010) (mem.).

Because deception can be found where there is no breach of contract or warranty, contract and common law defenses generally do not foreclose consumer-fraud claims. Thus, notwithstanding a provision in an automobile purchase agreement reading, “In the event the amount quoted by me or the holder of any lien covering the trade-in is not correct and the amount necessary to satisfy any such lien exceeds the amount taken into account in the obverse side of this Motor Vehicle Purchase Contract, I agree to pay such deficiency immediately upon demand thereof,” summary judgment for a truck dealership in an action by the truck buyers was inappropriate. Inkel v. Pride Chevrolet-Pontiac, Inc., 2008 VT 6, 183 Vt. 144, 945 A.2d 855, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 4 (2008).

Subsec. (b) of this section does not require that the State must follow the “indirect-purchaser” rule, set forth in a federal decision, which states that a party who does not purchase a product directly from an antitrust violator is barred from bringing a cause of action for overcharge against that violator. Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 174 Vt. 328, 817 A.2d 9, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 314 (2002).

Practice and procedure.

Given the lack of clarity as to what transpired, summary judgment was inappropriate in a suit under the Consumer Fraud Act brought by truck buyers. The evidentiary record did not make it clear how a “mistake” in a bank’s giving the truck dealership the wrong payoff amount occurred or even whether there was a mistake; further, the principal facts that the trial court apparently relied on in ruling in favor of the dealership—that the truck buyers knew they had substantial negative equity in their vehicle and that another dealership had recently declined to negotiate with them because of the substantial negative equity in the vehicle—did not necessarily undercut the buyers’ allegation that the dealer made, even if good-faith, false and misleading representations actionable under the Act by telling them that their lien holder would not seek over-mileage payments on their trade-in. Inkel v. Pride Chevrolet-Pontiac, Inc., 2008 VT 6, 183 Vt. 144, 945 A.2d 855, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 4 (2008).

In a dispute arising from construction by defendant of a creamery for plaintiff, summary judgment for defendant in regard to plaintiff’s claim under Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act was proper where the trial court found no evidence that defendant’s statements were false or misleading in any material way. EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., 2007 VT 37, 181 Vt. 513, 928 A.2d 497, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 69 (2007).

In an action brought under the Consumer Fraud Act, the trial court’s instructions as a whole reflected the proper legal standard on how to assess whether a representation is deceptive because they required the jury to consider the overall impression left by defendants’ communications. Jordan v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2004 VT 27, 176 Vt. 465, 853 A.2d 40, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 31 (2004).

Whether mobile home owners invested in park development to their disadvantage, or in a way that rendered park operator’s profit-making strategies “unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce,” was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Vermont Mobile Home Owners' Ass'n v. LaPierre, 94 F. Supp. 2d 519, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5336 (D. Vt. 2000).

Professional services.

Plaintiff’s Consumer Protection Act claim against defendant attorney was properly dismissed because the underlying conduct, defendant’s advice to sign a settlement agreement that contained general-release language, involved the provision of legal advice rather than entrepreneurial conduct. Rodrigue v. Illuzzi, 2022 VT 9, 2022 Vt. LEXIS 10 (Vt. 2022).

Claims of client in a divorce proceeding that her attorney’s representations falsely and fraudulently led her to believe that she had adequate security for a debt and that he had represented her competently did not state a claim against the attorney under the Consumer Fraud Act. Kessler v. Loftus, 994 F. Supp. 240, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21928 (D. Vt. 1997).

Attorney’s misrepresentations affecting entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law, such as advertising, billing and collection practices, fee arrangements, and methods of obtaining and dismissing clients, may be actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act. Kessler v. Loftus, 994 F. Supp. 240, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21928 (D. Vt. 1997).

The Consumer Fraud Act applies to the provision of professional services. Bridge v. Corning Life Sciences, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 551, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3354 (D. Vt. 1998).

Issue of fact as to whether a laboratory technician read a slide for purposes of a Pap smear examination precluded summary judgment for the laboratory on plaintiff’s claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Bridge v. Corning Life Sciences, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 551, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3354 (D. Vt. 1998).

Scope.

“In commerce” requirement narrows the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act’s application to prohibit only unfair or deceptive acts or practices that occur in the consumer marketplace. To be considered “in commerce,” the transaction must take place in the context of an ongoing business in which the defendant holds himself out to the public; further, the practice must have a potential harmful effect on the consuming public, and thus constitute a breach of a duty owed to consumers in general. Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corp., 2013 VT 111, 195 Vt. 524, 90 A.3d 885, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 117 (2013).

Transactions resulting not from the conduct of any trade or business but rather from private negotiations between two individual parties who have countervailing rights and liabilities established under common law principles of contract, tort, and property law remain beyond the purview of the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act. Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corp., 2013 VT 111, 195 Vt. 524, 90 A.3d 885, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 117 (2013).

Vermont case law does not appear to establish a common law cause of action for predatory lending. Regarding 9 V.S.A. § 2453 , assuming arguendo that such a claim could be brought under Vermont’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 9 V.S.A. § 2451 et seq., it would be governed by Vermont’s general six-year statute of limitations on civil claims, 12 V.S.A. § 511 , 9 V.S.A. § 2451 et seq. Monty v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2355 (Bankr. D. Vt. June 10, 2013).

Although certain representations may give rise to a malpractice claim, they are generally not actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act if they are the product of the defendant’s professional judgment based upon his legal knowledge and skill. Moreover, for purposes of this rule, there is no meaningful distinction between lawyers and other professionals hired to give a specialized or expert interpretation of a matter. Webb v. Leclair, 2007 VT 65, 182 Vt. 559, 933 A.2d 177, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 163 (2007) (mem.).

Court in action for misrepresentation in connection with house purchase correctly ruled that real estate brokerage engaged in residential real estate transactions was a “seller” involved “in commerce” within the meaning of the Consumer Fraud Act. Carter v. Gugliuzzi, 168 Vt. 48, 716 A.2d 17, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 142 (1998).

Under subsec. (a) of this section, alleged unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices must occur in commerce to fall within the scope of this chapter. Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 550 (1981).

Tests and standards.

In regard to plaintiff’s claim under Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act, to survive summary judgment, plaintiff was required to demonstrate: (1) that defendant made a representation or omission that was likely to mislead; (2) that plaintiff interpreted the message reasonably under the circumstances; and (3) that the misleading effects were material. EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., 2007 VT 37, 181 Vt. 513, 928 A.2d 497, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 69 (2007).

Under the Consumer Fraud Act, complainant must establish proof of three elements: (1) the representation or omission at issue was likely to mislead consumers; (2) the consumer’s interpretation of the representation was reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the misleading representation was material in that it affected the consumer’s purchasing decision. Jordan v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2004 VT 27, 176 Vt. 465, 853 A.2d 40, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 31 (2004).

Under the Consumer Fraud Act, a consumer establishes the element that the representation or omission at issue was likely to mislead if she proves that it had the tendency or capacity to deceive a reasonable consumer; messages susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations may violate the Act if just one of those interpretations is false and, notably, no intent to deceive or mislead need be proven because the statute requires only proof of an intent to publish. Jordan v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2004 VT 27, 176 Vt. 465, 853 A.2d 40, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 31 (2004).

Deception under this section is measured by an objective standard focusing on risk of consumer harm in a particular case; actual injury need not be shown, because representations made with the capacity or tendency to deceive satisfy the standard. Peabody v. P.J.'s Auto Village, Inc., 153 Vt. 55, 569 A.2d 460, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 232 (1989).

Unfair acts and practices.

Practices such as hiding the negative equity in a trade-in, failing to pay off the lien on the trade-in, lowering the agreed price of the trade-in, or otherwise effectively raising the cost of a vehicle after a deal has been consummated are widely recognized as deceptive practices. Inkel v. Pride Chevrolet-Pontiac, Inc., 2008 VT 6, 183 Vt. 144, 945 A.2d 855, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 4 (2008).

Claim that landlord had improperly attempted — by sending demand letters and ultimately filing a civil action — to collect monthly rent in excess of a ruling of Commissioner of Housing and Community Affairs did not describe actions that could be construed as so oppressive or unscrupulous as to constitute an unfair practice. Lalande Air & Water Corp. v. Pratt, 173 Vt. 602, 795 A.2d 1233, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 53 (2002).

A claim that defendant-mobile park owners violated the Consumer Fraud Act by conditioning the lease of a mobile home site on the purchase of a mobile home was actionable, despite the fact that the statute is silent on the tying issue, neither expressly allowing nor forbidding it. Under § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1), which is identical to this section, the FTC has declared that it is illegal to tie or condition the leasing of lots in mobile home parks to the purchase of homes from the park owner. Russell v. Atkins, 165 Vt. 176, 679 A.2d 333, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 39 (1996).

Where, pursuant to subsec. (c) of this section, Attorney General promulgated regulation providing that failure of seller to honor his express and implied warranties regarding goods sold constituted an unfair and deceptive act and practice, since the regulation could not be inconsistent with rules and regulations of the Federal Trade Commission and decisions of federal courts interpreting the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the U.S. Supreme Court had noted that factors the Federal Trade Commission considered regarding unfairness were: (1) offensive to public policy, (2) immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous, and (3) caused substantial injury to consumers, the Attorney General’s regulation was too broad and was invalid. Christie v. Dalmig, Inc., 136 Vt. 597, 396 A.2d 1385, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 914 (1979).

Cited.

Cited in Diamond v. Vickrey, 134 Vt. 585, 367 A.2d 668, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 734 (1976); Hershenson v. Lake Champlain Motors, Inc., 139 Vt. 219, 424 A.2d 1075, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 430 (1981); Vermont National Bank v. Chittenden Trust Co., 143 Vt. 257, 465 A.2d 284, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 509 (1983); Prouty v. Manchester Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 449, 470 A.2d 1152, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 581 (1983); Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 515 A.2d 123, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 392 (1986); State v. Custom Pools, 150 Vt. 533, 556 A.2d 72, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 232 (1988); In re S.A., 155 Vt. 112, 582 A.2d 137, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 177 (1990); State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 594 A.2d 426, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1991); Committee v. Dennis Reimer Co., L.P.A., 150 F.R.D. 495, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13384 (D. Vt. 1993); Winey v. William E. Dailey, Inc., 161 Vt. 129, 636 A.2d 744, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 106 (1993); Alpine Haven Property Owners Association v. Deptula, 2003 VT 51, 175 Vt. 559, 830 A.2d 78, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 126 (2003); State v. Lee, 2007 VT 7, 181 Vt. 605, 924 A.2d 81, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 8 (2007) (mem.).

Notes to Opinions

Unfair acts and practices.

In view of serious energy crisis causing gasoline shortages, and public policy of equal distribution of energy, refusal of gasoline station operators to sell gasoline to out-of-state motorists would amount to unfair acts within the meaning of this section. 1972-74 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 111.

§ 2453a. Practices prohibited; criminal antitrust violations.

  1. Collusion is hereby declared to be a crime.
  2. Subsection (a) of this section shall not be construed to apply to activities of or arrangements between or among persons that are permitted, authorized, approved, or required by federal or state statutes or regulations.
  3. It is the intent of the General Assembly that in construing this section and subdivision 2451a(8) of this title, the courts of this State shall be guided by the construction of federal antitrust law and the Sherman Act, as amended, as interpreted by the courts of the United States.
  4. Nothing in this section limits the power of the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney to bring civil actions for antitrust violations under section 2453 of this title.
  5. A violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100,000.00 for an individual or $1,000,000.00 for any other person or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or both.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 168 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 18, 2012; amended 2021, No. 20 , § 17.

History

Amendments

—2021. Subsec. (c): Substituted “subdivision 2451a(8)” for “subsection 2451a(h)”.

ANNOTATIONS

Insufficient evidence.

Former employee failed to proffer admissible evidence to support the essential elements of his antitrust and consumer protection claims, under Vermont’s Consumer Protection Act, 9 V.S.A. § 2451 , and the Sherman Act, because the employee failed to produce any evidence establishing the existence of an agreement to suppress certified registered nurse anesthetist wages, and the employee identified neither the participants to the alleged conspiracy, nor how and why it carried out its alleged restraints of trade. Green v. Springfield Med. Care Sys., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87911 (D. Vt. June 24, 2014).

§ 2453b. Retaliation prohibited.

No person shall retaliate against, coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any other person who:

  1. has opposed any act or practice of the person that is collusive or in restraint of trade;
  2. has lodged a complaint or has testified, assisted, or participated in any manner with the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney in an investigation of acts or practices that are collusive or in restraint of trade;
  3. is known by the person to be about to lodge a complaint or testify, assist, or participate in any manner in an investigation of acts or practices that are collusive or in restraint of trade; or
  4. is believed by the person to have acted as described in subdivision (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 168 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. May 18, 2012.

ANNOTATIONS

Insufficient evidence.

Former employee failed to proffer admissible evidence to support the essential elements of his antitrust and consumer protection claims, under Vermont’s Consumer Protection Act, 9 V.S.A. § 2451 , and the Sherman Act, because the employee failed to produce any evidence establishing the existence of an agreement to suppress certified registered nurse anesthetist wages, and the employee identified neither the participants to the alleged conspiracy, nor how and why it carried out its alleged restraints of trade. Green v. Springfield Med. Care Sys., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87911 (D. Vt. June 24, 2014).

§ 2454. Purchase contracts; rescission.

  1. Consumer’s or other obligor’s right to cancel.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (5) of this subsection, in addition to any right otherwise to revoke an offer, the consumer or any other person obligated for any part of the purchase price may cancel a home solicitation sale until midnight of the third business day after the day on which the consumer has signed an agreement or offer to purchase relating to such sale, or has otherwise agreed to buy consumer goods or services from the seller.
    2. Cancellation occurs when notice of cancellation is given to the seller.
    3. Notice of cancellation, if given by mail, shall be deemed given when deposited in a mailbox properly addressed and postage prepaid.
    4. Notice of cancellation need not take the form prescribed and shall be sufficient if it indicates the intention of the consumer not to be bound.
    5. A home solicitation sale may not be cancelled if the consumer has requested the seller to provide goods or services without delay because of an emergency, and:
      1. the seller in good faith has begun substantial performance of the contract before the notice of cancellation has been given;
      2. in the case of goods, the goods cannot be returned to the seller in substantially the same condition as when received by the consumer; and
      3. the consumer’s request is both handwritten and signed by the consumer.
  2. Disclosure obligations.
    1. In every home solicitation sale, the seller shall furnish the consumer with a fully completed receipt or copy of any contract pertaining to such sale at the time the consumer signs an agreement or offer to purchase relating to such sale, or otherwise agrees to buy consumer goods or services from the seller. Such receipt or contract copy shall show the date of the transaction and shall contain the name and address of the seller, and in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract for the signature of the consumer or on the front page of the receipt if a contract is not used and in boldface type of a minimum size of 10 points, a statement in substantially the following form:

      You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any time prior to midnight of the third business day after the date of this transaction. See the attached notice of cancellation for an explanation of this right.

    2. In a home solicitation sale, unless a consumer requests the seller to provide goods or services without delay in an emergency, the seller shall furnish a notice of cancellation to the consumer at the time he or she signs an agreement or offer to purchase relating to such sale or otherwise agrees to buy consumer goods or services from the seller, which notice shall be attached to the contract or receipt and easily detachable.
      1. The notice of cancellation shall contain the following information and statements, printed in not less than 10-point boldface type:

        Click to view

      2. Before furnishing copies of the “Notice of Cancellation” to the buyer, the seller shall complete both copies by entering the name of the seller, the address of the seller’s place of business, the date of the transaction, and the date, not earlier than the third business day following the date of the transaction, by which the buyer may give notice of cancellation.
      3. The seller shall leave the “Notice of Cancellation” with the consumer.
      4. In addition to the written notice of cancellation the seller shall orally inform the buyer of his or her right to cancel at the time of the transaction.
    3. Until the seller has complied with this subsection, the consumer or any other person obligated for any part of the purchase price may cancel the home solicitation sale by notifying the seller in any manner and by any means of his or her intention to cancel.  The cancellation period of three business days shall begin to run from the time the seller complies with this subsection.
  3. Restoration of payments.
    1. Within 10 days after a home solicitation sale has been cancelled or an offer to purchase revoked, the seller shall tender to the consumer any payments made by the consumer and any note or other evidence of indebtedness, and take any action necessary or appropriate to terminate promptly any security interest in the transaction, except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection.
    2. If payment includes goods traded in, the goods shall be tendered in substantially as good condition as when received by the seller. If the seller fails to tender the goods as provided by this subsection, the consumer may elect to recover an amount equal to the trade-in allowance stated in the agreement.
    3. Until the seller has complied with this subsection, the consumer may retain possession of goods delivered to him or her by the seller and shall have a lien on the goods in his or her possession or control for any recovery to which he or she may be entitled.
  4. Duties of seller and consumer.
    1. Within 10 days after a home solicitation sale has been cancelled or an offer to purchase revoked, the seller shall either demand possession of any goods delivered by the seller pursuant to the sale or instruct the consumer regarding the return shipment of the goods at the seller’s expense and risk.
    2. If the seller does not give instructions regarding the return shipment of the goods, or if the consumer does not comply with any such instructions given, the seller must pick up such goods within 20 days after a home solicitation sale has been cancelled.
    3. If the seller does not act within the time periods established in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, the goods shall become the property of the consumer without obligation to pay for them.
    4. Upon demand, the consumer shall tender to the seller any goods delivered by the seller pursuant to the sale but need not tender at any place other than his or her residence.
    5. If the consumer agrees to return the goods to the seller and fails to do so, then he or she shall remain liable for performance of all obligations under the contract.
    6. The consumer shall take reasonable care of the goods in his or her possession both before cancellation or revocation and for a reasonable time thereafter, during which time the goods are otherwise at the seller’s risk.
    7. If the seller has performed any services pursuant to a home solicitation sale prior to its cancellation, the seller shall be entitled to no compensation therefor.
  5. If the home solicitation sale is principally negotiated in a language other than English, then all of the disclosures required by this section shall be given in that language.
  6. If the consumer is unable to write in his or her own handwriting, then any of the statements required to be written by him or her under this section shall be handwritten by a member of the consumer’s household at the request of the consumer. If there is no other member of the consumer’s household, then such statements must be written by the seller, at the request of the consumer, and the effect of such statements shall be orally explained to the consumer by the seller.
  7. Use of the cancellation provision provided for in this section shall not prevent any other action being taken under this chapter or otherwise against such seller.
  8. A violation of any of the provisions of this section shall be considered an unfair act in commerce within the meaning of subsection 2453(a) of this title.

NOTICE OF CANCELLATION =font8 (enter date of transaction) (date) You may cancel this transaction, without any penalty or obligation, within three business days from the above date. If you cancel, any property traded in, any payments made by you under the contract or sale, and any negotiable instrument executed by you will be returned within 10 business days following receipt by the seller of your cancellation notice, and any security interest arising out of the transaction will be canceled. If you cancel, you must make available to the seller at your residence, in substantially as good condition as when received, any goods delivered to you under this contract or sale; or you may, if you wish, comply with the instructions of the seller regarding the return shipment of the goods at the seller’s expense and risk. If you do make the goods available to the seller and the seller does not pick them up within 20 days of the date of your notice of cancellation, you may retain or dispose of the goods without any further obligation. If you fail to make the goods available to the seller, or if you agree to return the goods to the seller and fail to do so, then you remain liable for performance of all obligations under the contract. To cancel this transaction, mail or deliver a signed and dated copy of this cancellation notice or any other written notice, or send a telegram, to at =font8 (name of seller) (address of seller’s place of business) not later than midnight of =font8 (date) I hereby cancel this transaction. =font8 (date) =font8 (buyer’s signature)

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 1969, No. 45 , § 1, eff. April 4, 1969; 1973, No. 110 , § 1; 1973, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. June 7, 1974.

History

Revision note—

In subdiv. (b)(1), deleted subdiv. (A) designation preceding language of disclosure clause for purposes of conformity with V.S.A. style in light of absence of subdiv. (B).

Amendments

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1973. Subdiv. (c)(1): Reenacted without change.

—1969. Section amended generally.

ANNOTATIONS

Notice of right to cancellation.

This section requires the seller in a home solicitation sale to furnish a notice of cancellation at the time of a credit transaction, and the consumer’s right to cancel continues until the seller is in compliance with the notice requirement. Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, 143 Vt. 527, 470 A.2d 1157, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 582 (1983).

Where the assignor of promissory notes held by plaintiffs and executed by defendants during home solicitation sales never furnished defendants with notices of their right to cancel the credit transactions, defendants’ notices of rescission, given at the time of the institution of the action to enforce the notes, were timely. Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, 143 Vt. 527, 470 A.2d 1157, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 582 (1983).

Cited.

Cited in Randolph National Bank v. Vail, 131 Vt. 390, 308 A.2d 588, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1973); Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 515 A.2d 123, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 392 (1986); State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 594 A.2d 426, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1991).

§ 2454a. Consumer contracts; automatic renewal.

  1. A contract between a consumer and a seller or a lessor with an initial term of one year or longer that renews for a subsequent term that is longer than one month shall not renew automatically unless:
    1. the contract states clearly and conspicuously the terms of the automatic renewal provision in plain, unambiguous language in bold-face type;
    2. in addition to accepting the contract, the consumer takes an affirmative action to opt in to the automatic renewal provision; and
    3. if the consumer opts in to the automatic renewal provision, the seller or lessor provides a written or electronic notice to the consumer:
      1. not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days before the earliest of:
        1. the automatic renewal date;
        2. the termination date; or
        3. the date by which the consumer must provide notice to cancel the contract; and
      2. that includes:
        1. the date the contract will terminate and a clear statement that the contract will renew automatically unless the consumer cancels the contract on or before the termination date; and
        2. the length and any additional terms of the renewal period.
  2. A seller or lessor under a contract subject to subsection (a) of this section shall:
    1. provide to the consumer a toll-free telephone number, e-mail address, a postal address if the seller or lessor directly bills the consumer, or another cost-effective, timely, and easy-to-use mechanism for canceling the contract; and
    2. if the consumer accepted the contract online, permit the consumer to terminate the contract exclusively online, which may include a termination e-mail formatted and provided by the seller or lessor that the consumer can send without additional information.
  3. A person who violates a provision of this section commits an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title.
  4. The provisions of this section do not apply to:
    1. a contract between a consumer and a financial institution, as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 11101 , or between a consumer and a credit union, as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 30101 ; or
    2. a contract for insurance, as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 3301a .

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 1, 2019; amended 2019, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

History

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(3)(B)(i): Added “and” at the end.

Subdivs. (a)(3)(B)(iii) and (a)(3)(B)(iv): Deleted.

Subsec. (b): Added.

Subsecs. (b) and (c): Redesignated as subsecs. (c) and (d) and deleted “of subsection (a)” following “provision” in subsec. (c).

Automatic renewal of contracts; applicability to existing contracts. 2017, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 2 provides: “(a) A contract between a consumer and a seller or lessor in effect on July 1, 2019 with an initial term of one year or longer that renews for a subsequent term that is longer than one month shall not renew automatically unless the seller or lessor sends written or electronic notice to the consumer with the information required in 9 V.S.A. § 2454a(a)(3)(B) :

“(1) not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days before the earliest of:

“(A) the automatic renewal date;

“(B) the termination date; or

“(C) the date by which the consumer must provide notice to cancel the contract; or

“(2) if the contract will automatically renew on or before July 31, 2019, then as soon as is commercially reasonable after this section takes effect.

“(b) The Attorney General shall have the same authority to enforce this section as set forth in 9 V.S.A. § 2454a .

“(c) The provisions of this section do not apply to:

“(1) a contract between a consumer and a financial institution, as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 11101 , or between a consumer and a credit union, as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 30101 ; or

“(2) a contract for insurance, as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 3301a .”

§ 2455. Defenses.

The holder of a promissory note or instrument, or other evidence of indebtedness of a consumer delivered in connection with a contract shall take or hold that note, instrument, or evidence subject to all defenses of such consumer that would be available to the consumer in an action on a simple contract, and all rights available to him or her under this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 1969, No. 45 , § 2, eff. April 4, 1969.

History

Amendments

—1969. Substituted “consumer” for “buyer” preceding “delivered” “which would be available”, and “in an action on a simple contract” and “contract” for “retail installment transaction” preceding “shall take”.

ANNOTATIONS

Construction.

Promissory note that owner gave to home builders over a year after agreement to construct home was entered into and after work had been completed, except for improperly constructed items that owner assumed would be corrected, and that was signed over to bank by builders as collateral for a loan to pay their building suppliers was security for a pre-existing obligation and, therefore, not delivered in connection with a contract so as to come within the scope of the protection afforded by this section. Randolph National Bank v. Vail, 131 Vt. 390, 308 A.2d 588, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1973).

Construction with other laws.

Purchasers of consumer paper executed in connection with a consumer contract hold the promissory notes subject to all defenses that would be available to the consumer in an action on a simple contract, irrespective of their status as holders in due course under section 3-305 of Title 9A. Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, 143 Vt. 527, 470 A.2d 1157, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 582 (1983).

This section cuts off the rights of a holder in due course under section 3-305 of Title 9A. Randolph National Bank v. Vail, 131 Vt. 390, 308 A.2d 588, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1973).

Legislative intent.

This section is an attempt by the Legislature to equalize the substantial bargaining power differential between consumers on one side and sellers and financiers on the other, by transferring the risk of loss from the maker to the holder of the instrument. Randolph National Bank v. Vail, 131 Vt. 390, 308 A.2d 588, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1973).

Cited.

Cited in State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 594 A.2d 426, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1991).

§ 2456. Confession of judgment.

Any agreement of a consumer in a contract that a power of attorney is given to confess judgment, or an assignment of wages is given, or any agreement of similar effect, is void and of no force and effect on any party.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 1969, No. 45 , § 3, eff. April 4, 1969.

History

Amendments

—1969. Substituted “consumer” for “buyer” following “agreement of a” and “contract” for “retail installment transaction” preceding “that a power of attorney”.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 594 A.2d 426, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1991).

§ 2457. Evidence of fraud.

The failure to sell any goods or services in the manner and of the nature advertised or offered, or the refusal or inability to sell any goods or services at the price advertised or offered or in accordance with other terms or conditions of the advertisement or offer, creates a rebuttable presumption of an intent to violate the provisions of this chapter. No actual damage to any person need be alleged or proven for an action to lie under this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967.

ANNOTATIONS

Application.

Statutory presumption of consumer fraud did not apply to defendant’s billing practices in an ongoing contract even if he over billed, or billed for improper work. Winey v. William E. Dailey, Inc., 161 Vt. 129, 636 A.2d 744, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 106 (1993).

§ 2458. Restraining prohibited acts.

  1. Whenever the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney has reason to believe that any person is using or is about to use any method, act, or practice declared by section 2453 of this title to be unlawful, or has reason to believe that any person has violated any assurance of discontinuance entered into pursuant to section 2459 of this title, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, the Attorney General, or a State’s Attorney if authorized to proceed by the Attorney General, may bring an action in the name of the State against such person to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of such method, act, or practice or to dissolve a domestic corporation or revoke the certificate of authority granted a foreign corporation.  The action may be brought in the Superior Court of the county in which such person resides, has a place of business, or is doing business. The courts are authorized to issue temporary or permanent injunctions to restrain and prevent violations of this chapter, such injunctions to be issued without bonds, and so to dissolve, or revoke the certificate of authority of, a corporation.
  2. In addition to the foregoing, the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney may request and the court is authorized to render any other temporary or permanent relief, or both, as may be in the public interest, including:
    1. the imposition of a civil penalty of not more than $10,000.00 for each unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce and of not more than $100,000.00 for an individual or $1,000,000.00 for any other person for each unfair method of competition in commerce;
    2. an order for restitution of cash or goods on behalf of a consumer or a class of consumers similarly situated;
    3. an order requiring reimbursement to the State of Vermont for the reasonable value of its services and its expenses in investigating and prosecuting the action;
    4. amounts other than consumer restitution recovered by the Attorney General or Department of State’s Attorneys and Sheriffs under this chapter, but not to exceed amounts annually appropriated, or authorized pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 511 , shall be deposited into special funds that shall be available to the Attorney General or Department of State’s Attorneys and Sheriffs, respectively, to offset the costs of providing legal services.
  3. Whenever a State’s Attorney brings an action pursuant to this section, a copy of any pleadings shall be served on the Attorney General pursuant to Rule 5 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.  Failure to comply with this provision shall not affect the validity of the proceedings commenced under this section.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 1969, No. 45 , § 4, eff. April 4, 1969; 1971, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1973, No. 110 , § 2; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 1999, No. 49 , § 213; 2009, No. 67 (Adj. Sess.), § 88, eff. Feb. 25, 2010; 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § D.1; 2019, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § E.200.2, eff. Oct. 2, 2020.

History

Revision note

—2013. In subsec. (b), deleted “, but not limited to” following “including” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(4): Deleted “ 3 V.S.A. § 167 or” following “pursuant to”.

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce, and of not more than $100,000.00 for an individual or $1,000,000.00 for any other person for each unfair method of competition in commerce” for “violation”.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(4): Substituted “but not to exceed amounts annually appropriated, or authorized pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 167 or 32 V.S.A. § 511 , shall be deposited into special funds which” for “subject to appropriation each fiscal year” preceding “shall”.

—1999. Subdiv. (b)(4): Added.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “superior” for “county” preceding “court” in the second sentence.

—1973. Subsec. (a): Rewrote the first and second sentences.

Subsec. (b): Inserted “or a state’s attorney” following “attorney general” in the introductory clause.

Subsec. (c): Added.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1969. Substituted “2453” for “2451” following “declared by section” in the first sentence.

CROSS REFERENCES

Application of section to actions for discrimination against applicant for employment asserting workers’ compensation claim, see 21 V.S.A. § 710 .

ANNOTATIONS

Attorney’s fees for prevailing defendant.

Neither this section nor section 2461 of this title, which provides for recovery of attorney’s fees by consumers, and which are incorporated by reference in section 495b(a) of Title 21, governing civil penalties for unlawful employment practices, authorize attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant. State v. Whitingham School Board, 140 Vt. 405, 438 A.2d 394, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 617 (1981).

Investigation costs.

This section authorizes, but does not mandate, an award of investigation costs to the state. State v. Champlain Cable Corp., 147 Vt. 436, 520 A.2d 596, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 437 (1986).

Power of court.

Trial court did not err in ordering wells brought into compliance with modern health standards, even though conditions of 1974 Act 250 permit did not require defendant’s decedent to warrant quality of water, and deeds given by him specifically disclaimed any such guarantee; court’s order had no direct effect on deed obligations and did not rewrite them, and court was within its remedial powers in making the order. State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26, 633 A.2d 272, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1993).

Use of prohibited act.

The verb “using” in subsec. (a) of this section is not synonymous with “doing” or “committing.” State v. Custom Pools, 150 Vt. 533, 556 A.2d 72, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 232 (1988).

Subsec. (a) of this section authorized Attorney General to bring an action against financing company and bank that made use of notes and mortgages obtained by their assignor in violation of this chapter. State v. Custom Pools, 150 Vt. 533, 556 A.2d 72, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 232 (1988).

Cited.

Cited in Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, 143 Vt. 527, 470 A.2d 1157, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 582 (1983); State v. Severance, 150 Vt. 597, 554 A.2d 684, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 207 (1988); State v. DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237, 577 A.2d 254, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 74 (1990); State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 594 A.2d 426, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1991).

§ 2459. Assurance of discontinuance.

  1. In any case where the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney has authority to institute an action or proceeding under section 2458 of this title, in lieu thereof he or she may accept an assurance of discontinuance of any method, act, or practice in violation of this chapter from any person alleged to be engaged or to have been engaged in such method, act, or practice.  Such assurance may include a stipulation for affirmative action by such person, payment of a civil forfeiture and the costs of investigation, or of an amount to be held in escrow pending the outcome of an action or as restitution to aggrieved consumers, or any of the above.  Any such assurance of discontinuance shall be in writing and be filed with the Washington Superior Court.  Evidence of a violation of such assurance shall be prima facie proof of violation of section 2453 of this title, or of any rule of regulation made pursuant to section 2453 of this title in any action or proceeding thereafter brought by the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney.
  2. No assurance of discontinuance may be accepted by a State’s Attorney without the approval of the Attorney General, who shall indicate his or her approval by countersigning any assurance before it may become effective.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 1969, No. 45 , § 5, eff. April 4, 1969; 1973, No. 110 , § 3; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Amendments

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “superior” for “county” preceding “court” at the end of the third sentence.

—1973. Section amended generally.

—1969. Substituted “consumers” for “buyers” following “aggrieved” and “2453” for “2451” following “violation of section” and inserted “or of any rule or regulation made pursuant to section 2453 of this chapter” preceding “in any action” in the second sentence.

CROSS REFERENCES

Application of section to actions for discrimination against applicant for employment asserting workers’ compensation claim, see 21 V.S.A. § 710 .

§ 2460. Civil investigation.

    1. The Attorney General or a State’s Attorney, whenever he or she has reason to believe any person to be or to have been in violation of section 2453 of this title, or of any rule or regulation made pursuant to section 2453 of this title, may examine or cause to be examined by any agent or representative designated by him or her for that purpose, any books, records, papers, memoranda, and physical objects of whatever nature bearing upon each alleged violation, and may demand written responses under oath to questions bearing upon each alleged violation. (a) (1) The Attorney General or a State’s Attorney, whenever he or she has reason to believe any person to be or to have been in violation of section 2453 of this title, or of any rule or regulation made pursuant to section 2453 of this title, may examine or cause to be examined by any agent or representative designated by him or her for that purpose, any books, records, papers, memoranda, and physical objects of whatever nature bearing upon each alleged violation, and may demand written responses under oath to questions bearing upon each alleged violation.
    2. The Attorney General or a State’s Attorney may require the attendance of such person or of any other person having knowledge in the premises in the county where the person resides or has a place of business, or in Washington County if the person is a nonresident or has no place of business, within the State, may take testimony and require proof material for his or her information, and may administer oaths or take acknowledgment in respect of any book, record, paper, or memorandum.
    3. The Attorney General or a State’s Attorney shall serve notice of the time, place, and cause of the examination or attendance, or notice of the cause of the demand for written responses, at least 10 days prior to the date of the examination, personally or by certified mail, upon the person at his or her principal place of business, or, if the place is not known, to his or her last known address.
    4. Any book, record, paper, memorandum, or other information produced by any person pursuant to this section shall not, unless otherwise ordered by a court of this State for good cause shown, be disclosed to any person other than the authorized agent or representative of the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney or another law enforcement officer engaged in legitimate law enforcement activities, unless with the consent of the person producing the same.
    5. This subsection shall not be applicable to any criminal investigation or prosecution brought under the laws of this or any state.
    1. A person upon whom a notice is served pursuant to the provisions of this section shall comply with the terms thereof unless otherwise provided by the order of a court of this State. (b) (1) A person upon whom a notice is served pursuant to the provisions of this section shall comply with the terms thereof unless otherwise provided by the order of a court of this State.
    2. Any person who, with intent to avoid, evade, or prevent compliance, in whole or in part, with any civil investigation under this section, removes from any place, conceals, withholds, or destroys, mutilates, alters, or by any other means falsifies any documentary material in the possession, custody, or control of any person subject of any such notice, or mistakes or conceals any information, shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000.00 and to recovery by the Attorney General’s or State’s Attorney’s office the reasonable value of its services and expenses in enforcing compliance with this section.
    1. Whenever any person fails to comply with any notice served upon him or her under this section or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of material pursuant to this section cannot be done and the person refuses to surrender the material, the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney may file, in the Superior Court in which the person resides or has his or her principal place of business, or in Washington County if the person is a nonresident or has no principal place of business in this State, and serve upon the person, a petition for an order of the court for the enforcement of this section. (c) (1) Whenever any person fails to comply with any notice served upon him or her under this section or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of material pursuant to this section cannot be done and the person refuses to surrender the material, the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney may file, in the Superior Court in which the person resides or has his or her principal place of business, or in Washington County if the person is a nonresident or has no principal place of business in this State, and serve upon the person, a petition for an order of the court for the enforcement of this section.
    2. Whenever a petition is filed under this section, the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter presented and to enter one or more orders as may be required to carry into effect the provisions of this section.
    3. A person who violates an order entered under this section by a court shall be punished for contempt of court and shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000.00 and to recovery by the Attorney General’s or State’s Attorney’s office of the reasonable value of its services and expenses in enforcing compliance with this section.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 1969, No. 45 , § 6, eff. April 4, 1969; 1973, No. 110 , § 4; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 1997, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 25, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; 2013, No. 44 , § 5.

History

Amendments

—2013. Section amended generally.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the first sentence, substituted “reason” for “probable cause” and “may examine” for “may upon probable cause examine” and added the phrase beginning with “and may demand” at the end; added “or notice of the cause of the demand for written responses” in the third sentence; added “or another law enforcement officer engaged in legitimate law enforcement activities” in the fourth sentence; added “investigation or” and “or any” in the last sentence; and made the text gender-neutral.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “superior” for “county” preceding “court” in the first sentence.

—1973. Subsec. (a): Rewrote the first sentence, inserted “or a state’s attorney” following “attorney general” and deleted “at any place” following “in the premises” in the second sentence and inserted “or a state’s attorney” following “attorney general” in the third sentence.

Subsec. (c): In the first sentence, inserted “or a state’s attorney” preceding “may file” and “county” preceding “court” and deleted “of chancery of the county” thereafter.

—1969. Subsec. (a): Substituted “2453” for “2451” following “violation of section” and inserted “or of any rule or regulation made pursuant to section 2453 of this chapter” preceding “may examine” in the first sentence.

1997 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 1997, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 26, eff. April 29, 1998, provided in part that the amendment to subsec. (a) shall be retroactive to January 1, 1998.

CROSS REFERENCES

Application of section to actions for discrimination against applicant for employment asserting workers’ compensation claim, see 21 V.S.A. § 710 .

ANNOTATIONS

Probable cause.

The term “probable cause to believe,” in subsec. (a) of this section, refers to a state of facts and circumstances as would lead a careful and conscientious man to believe that a violation had taken place, and is the standard imposed as a limitation upon the authority conducting civil investigations under this section. Diamond v. Vickrey, 134 Vt. 585, 367 A.2d 668, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 734 (1976).

By replacing the phrase “whenever he believes” with “whenever he has probable cause to believe” in subsec. (a) of this section, the Legislature intended to change the previous standard, allowing civil investigations upon the Attorney General’s personal belief that a violation had taken place, to an objective probable cause standard. Diamond v. Vickrey, 134 Vt. 585, 367 A.2d 668, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 734 (1976).

Information in subpoena and supporting affidavit, disclosing only that State’s investigator spoke to former nurse employee of nursing home, who stated that Medicaid patients were charged for pharmaceutical items previously covered by the nursing home, and telephone call to nursing home’s bookkeeper who stated that in her opinion a legal action could be brought against the home if she gave the investigator certain information, was insufficient to demonstrate the probable cause required by subsec. (a) of this section. Diamond v. Vickrey, 134 Vt. 585, 367 A.2d 668, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 734 (1976).

Cited.

Cited in Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 559 A.2d 1073, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 34 (1989).

§ 2461. Civil penalty.

  1. Any person who violates the terms of an injunction issued under section 2458 of this title shall forfeit and pay to the State a civil penalty of not more than $10,000.00 for each violation.  For the purposes of this section, the court issuing such injunction shall retain jurisdiction, and the cause shall be continued, and in such cases the Attorney General or a State’s Attorney acting in the name of the State may petition for recovery of such civil penalty.
  2. Any consumer who contracts for goods or services in reliance upon false or fraudulent representations or practices prohibited by section 2453 of this title, or who sustains damages or injury as a result of any false or fraudulent representations or practices prohibited by section 2453 of this title, or prohibited by any rule or regulation made pursuant to section 2453 of this title, may sue for appropriate equitable relief and may sue and recover from the seller, solicitor, or other violator the amount of his or her damages, or the consideration or the value of the consideration given by the consumer, reasonable attorney’s fees, and exemplary damages not exceeding three times the value of the consideration given by the consumer.  Any language, written or oral, used by a seller or solicitor, that attempts to exclude or modify recovery of the penalty or reasonable attorney’s fees shall be unenforceable.
  3. Any person alleged to have violated the terms of subsection (b) of this section shall be entitled to a trial by jury, unless waived according to law.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 1969, No. 45 , § 7, eff. April 4, 1969; 1971, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1973, No. 110 , § 5.

History

Amendments

—1973. Subsec. (a): Substituted “title” for “chapter” following “section 2458 of this” in the first sentence and inserted “or a state’s attorney” following “attorney general” in the second sentence.

Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

Subsec. (c): Added.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “is induced to contract” for “contracts” following “any consumer who” and “reasonable attorney’s fees, and exemplary damages not exceeding three times the value of the consideration given by the consumer” for “and a penalty of not more than $1,000.00” following “by the consumer” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

—1969. Designated existing provisions of section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

CROSS REFERENCES

Application of section to actions for discrimination against applicant for employment asserting workers’ compensation claim, see 21 V.S.A. § 710 .

Waiver of jury trial in civil action, see Rule 38(d), V.R.C.P.

ANNOTATIONS

Appeals.

“Reasonable attorney’s fees” as used in subsec. (b) of this section includes the cost of attorney’s fees on appeal to the prevailing consumer. Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 515 A.2d 123, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 392 (1986).

Business victim.

It is clear that there is no private right of action under the State Consumer Fraud Act for business victims of deceptive or unfair acts or practices. State v. International Collection Service, Inc., 156 Vt. 540, 594 A.2d 426, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1991).

—Mandatory.

Home buyers were not entitled to attorney’s fees. Their suit under the Consumer Fraud Act, which was based on a mistake by a realtor that was later corrected and resulted in no harm to them, yielded no relief to the buyers, vindicated no significant legal rights, and advanced no broader public goals. Anderson v. Johnson, 2011 VT 17, 189 Vt. 603, 19 A.3d 86, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 16 (2011).

Tenant who prevailed on consumer fraud claim was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under Consumer Fraud Act. Bisson v. Ward, 160 Vt. 343, 628 A.2d 1256, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 56 (1993).

Once a violation of this chapter has been established, the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to subsec. (b) of this section is a statutory element of damages and not within the discretion of the trial court. Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 515 A.2d 123, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 392 (1986).

Attorney’s fees must be awarded under subsec. (b) of this section once the trial court has found that this chapter has been violated; their award is not within the trial court’s discretion. Winton v. Johnson & Dix Fuel Corp., 147 Vt. 236, 515 A.2d 371, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 389 (1986).

Construction.

Condominium owners’ complaint sufficiently alleged a claim under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (VCFA), because 9 V.S.A. § 2461(b) did not impose a citizenship requirement in order to invoke its protections, but its plain language extended the remedy to consumers. Bergman v. Spruce Peak Realty, LLC, 847 F. Supp. 2d 653, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37229 (D. Vt. 2012).

The plain meaning of “other violator” in the civil penalty provision of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) is anyone engaged in an unfair or deceptive commercial practice in violation of the CFA’s prohibition on such activity. Stated another way, the focus in determining applicability of the CFA is the nature of the alleged violator’s activities, not whether the violator falls into a defined statutory category. Sawyer v. Robson, 2006 VT 136, 181 Vt. 216, 915 A.2d 1298, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 362 (2006).

There was no basis for categorically excluding landlords from the range of potential defendants under the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), given the court’s conclusion that there was evidence that landlords had engaged in unfair and deceptive commercial practices. The Superior Court should have permitted tenant’s claim asserted under the CFA to proceed. Sawyer v. Robson, 2006 VT 136, 181 Vt. 216, 915 A.2d 1298, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 362 (2006).

Claims by a corporate investor under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (VCFA) survived dismissal because the VCFA allowed suits by corporations that had purchased goods or services for the use or benefit of the business as long as the goods or services were not purchased for resale; “consumer” as defined in 9 V.S.A. § 2451a(a) includes corporations by virtue of 1 V.S.A. § 128 . Ascension Tech. Corp. v. McDonald Invs., Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 271, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25876 (D. Vt. 2003).

Language in subsec. (b) of this section stating that “any consumer,” reinforced by the definition in 9 V.S.A. § 2451a of consumer as “any person”, who suffers injury may bring an action against a “seller, solicitor or other violator” does not support the imposition of a privity requirement. Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 174 Vt. 328, 817 A.2d 9, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 314 (2002).

Coverage.

There is no indication that the Legislature intended that a private action be available where the Attorney General cannot pursue a public action; the private right of action was intended to supplement the public right of action, not to replace it. For this reason, the Stedman holding that derivative liability for consumer fraud cannot be imposed absent direct participation in the unfair or deceptive acts, direct aid to the actor, or a principal/agent relationship applies both to public Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) suits and to private CFA suits. Knutsen v. Dion, 2013 VT 106, 195 Vt. 512, 90 A.3d 866, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2013).

Defendant cannot be found liable under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) absent direct participation in the unfair or deceptive acts, direct aid to the actor, or a principal/agent relationship. The application of this test in private CFA cases is appropriate because it looks to the nature of the alleged violator’s activities, not whether the violator falls into a defined statutory category. Knutsen v. Dion, 2013 VT 106, 195 Vt. 512, 90 A.3d 866, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2013).

Evidence.

In plaintiff insured’s action against defendant insurer claiming consumer fraud under the Consumer Fraud Act, even if the Act applied, plaintiff failed to make out a case of consumer fraud sufficient to withstand summary judgment because he never demonstrated a compensable loss to defendant, and because there was no evidence to support his position that defendant acted in bad faith in hiring the persons who evaluated his alleged damages, in relying upon their report, and in claiming that a policy exclusion applied to the circumstances that created plaintiff’s damages. Greene v. Stevens Gas Service, 2004 VT 67, 177 Vt. 90, 858 A.2d 238, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 243 (2004).

In transaction for sale of a horse with defective heart covered by Consumer Fraud Act, trial court did not err in denying seller’s motion for a directed verdict on basis that disclosure of the defect was made to buyer’s agent; the jury could have found fraudulent inducement of agent to keep silent about the condition. Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 580 A.2d 51, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1990).

Exemplary damages.

Because the owners of a mobile home park proposed both a condominium conversion and a sale of the park, they properly included both notice of their intention to sell the park pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 6242(a) , and “written notice to vacate or purchase” pursuant to 27 V.S.A. § 1333(a) . Plaintiffs-tenants claimed that defendants-owners threatened to evict tenants who failed to arrange for the purchase of their lots, but because plaintiffs did not rely on, or sustain damages as a result of, the eviction notice, as required under 9 V.S.A. § 2461(b) , they did not have an actionable claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Russell v. Atkins, 165 Vt. 176, 679 A.2d 333, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 39 (1996).

In action brought under this chapter concerning sale of horse with heart condition, trial court properly submitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury, where jury could reasonably have inferred malice, ill will, or wanton conduct from the evidence adduced at trial. Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 580 A.2d 51, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1990).

Where trial court found that defendant did not obtain cable television service it had promised to prospective condominium purchasers because of an unwillingness to make the necessary expenditures, defendant’s conduct did not evince the degree of malice required for an award of punitive damages under subsec. (b) of this section. Meadowbrook Condominium Ass'n v. South Burlington Realty Corp., 152 Vt. 16, 565 A.2d 238, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 140 (1989).

Under subsec. (b) of this section, exemplary damages are automatically awarded when found, but their existence depends on a showing of malicious conduct warranting their imposition. Winton v. Johnson & Dix Fuel Corp., 147 Vt. 236, 515 A.2d 371, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 389 (1986).

Subsec. (b) of this section requires an award of exemplary damages only where malice, ill will, or wanton conduct is demonstrated. Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 515 A.2d 123, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 392 (1986).

Trial court is required, under subsec. (b) of this section, to consider whether a plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages, and must award them upon a showing of actual malice. Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 515 A.2d 123, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 392 (1986).

Indirect purchasers.

Since consumers can generally sue under this section even though they are indirect purchasers of a good or service from defendant, they also can bring an antitrust case under the section. Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 174 Vt. 328, 817 A.2d 9, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 314 (2002).

Injured consumer.

In contradistinction to the civil remedy available to the State as a plaintiff in a consumer fraud case, this section provides for an award of equitable relief and damages or restitution, attorney’s fees, and exemplary damages to an injured consumer who is the plaintiff in a consumer fraud action. Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, 143 Vt. 527, 470 A.2d 1157, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 582 (1983).

Insurance.

The sale of an insurance policy is not a contract for “goods or services” within the meaning of subsec. (b) of this section, since insurance cannot legitimately be labelled either goods or services as the Legislature has defined those terms in section 2451a of this title. Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 550 (1981).

Particular cases.

For-sale-by-owner publication had not plausibly alleged a Vermont Consumer Protection Act claim based on unfair or deceptive practices as it was a competitor to the realty website owner, not a consumer. Picket Fence Preview, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156854 (D. Vt. Aug. 19, 2021).

Plaintiffs’ claim under the Consumer Protection Act with regard to defendant’s certification of a wastewater disposal system failed because defendant was not directly involved in the sales transaction, but simply sent the certification to the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources. Glassford v. Dufresne & Assocs., P.C., 2015 VT 77, 199 Vt. 422, 124 A.3d 822, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 57 (2015).

As inn buyers clearly knew the information about the need to replace the roof, the realtor’s failure to provide the seller’s estimate of repair costs to them could not satisfy the requirements for liability under the Consumer Protection Act for purposes of a private cause of action. PH West Dover Prop. v. Lalancette Eng'rs, 2015 VT 48, 199 Vt. 1, 120 A.3d 1135, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 28 (2015).

Home buyer’s private consumer fraud claim against a realtors’ association failed when the association’s only act was to draft the template clauses that the buyer and her broker used in the purchase and sales contract. Knutsen v. Dion, 2013 VT 106, 195 Vt. 512, 90 A.3d 866, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2013).

Borrowers’ private consumer fraud claim against a bank failed because the borrowers had not established an injury for the purposes of standing. Even if the bank could not enforce either the note or the mortgage, the borrowers were still liable on the note and mortgage, either to another or to the bank after it had cured any deficiency that stood in the way of its enforcement. Dernier v. Mortgage Network, Inc., 2013 VT 96, 195 Vt. 113, 87 A.3d 465, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 99 (2013).

Even if a statement that any shortfall in a real estate broker’s commission would come out of the share of an employee who was the sellers’ friend violated the Consumer Fraud Act as an unfair debt collection practice, the sellers had not shown that they sustained damages or injury as a result. Lang McLaughry Spera Real Estate, LLC v. Hinsdale, 2011 VT 29, 190 Vt. 1, 35 A.3d 100, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2011).

Prevailing defendant.

Neither this section nor section 2458 of this title, which provides for recovery of litigation expenses by the State, and which are incorporated by reference in section 495(b) of Title 21, governing civil penalties for unlawful employment practices, authorize attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant. State v. Whitingham School Board, 140 Vt. 405, 438 A.2d 394, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 617 (1981).

Professional services.

Claims of client in a divorce proceeding that her attorney’s representations falsely and fraudulently led her to believe that she had adequate security for a debt and that he had represented her competently did not state a claim against the attorney under the Consumer Fraud Act. Kessler v. Loftus, 994 F. Supp. 240, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21928 (D. Vt. 1997).

Attorney’s misrepresentations affecting entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law, such as advertising, billing and collection practices, fee arrangements, and methods of obtaining and dismissing clients, may be actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act. Kessler v. Loftus, 994 F. Supp. 240, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21928 (D. Vt. 1997).

The Consumer Fraud Act applies to the provision of professional services. Bridge v. Corning Life Sciences, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 551, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3354 (D. Vt. 1998).

Issue of fact as to whether a laboratory technician read a slide for purposes of a Pap smear examination precluded summary judgment for the laboratory on plaintiff’s claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Bridge v. Corning Life Sciences, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 551, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3354 (D. Vt. 1998).

Purpose.

Subsec. (b) of this section, providing for treble damages, was added to the original enactment to encourage prosecution of individual consumer fraud claims. Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 550 (1981).

Violation of injunction.

Subsec. (a) of this section provides for the recovery of a civil penalty, payable to the State, upon petition of the Attorney General, against any person who violates the terms of an injunction issued pursuant to section 2458 of this title in an action brought by the Attorney General to restrain any person from using an unfair or deceptive commercial practice or act. Gramatan Home investors Corp. v. Starling, 143 Vt. 527, 470 A.2d 1157, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 582 (1983).

Cited.

Cited in Prouty v. Manchester Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 449, 470 A.2d 1152, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 581 (1983); Poulin v. Ford Motor Co., 147 Vt. 120, 513 A.2d 1168, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 381 (1986); State v. Champlain Cable Corp., 147 Vt. 436, 520 A.2d 596, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 437 (1986); State v. DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237, 577 A.2d 254, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 74 (1990); Committee v. Dennis Reimer Co., L.P.A., 150 F.R.D. 495, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13384 (D. Vt. 1993); Winey v. William E. Dailey, Inc., 161 Vt. 129, 636 A.2d 744, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 106 (1993); Carter v. Gugliuzzi, 168 Vt. 48, 716 A.2d 17, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 142 (1998); Lalande Air & Water Corp. v. Pratt, 173 Vt. 602, 795 A.2d 1233, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 53 (2002); Heath v. Palmer, 2006 VT 125, 181 Vt. 545, 915 A.2d 1290, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 328 (2006) (mem.).

§ 2461a. Hearing aid violations.

The Attorney General shall investigate alleged irregularities and complaints relating to the fitting and selling of hearing aids, in violation of 18 V.S.A. chapter 90, and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.

HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 95 , § 2.

History

References in text.

Chapter 90 of Title 18, referred to in this section, was repealed by 1989, No. 60 , § 4. The subject matter is now covered by 26 V.S.A. § 3281 et seq.

§ 2461b. Regulation of propane.

    1. In this section: (a) (1) In this section:
      1. “Consumer” means any person who, for consumption and not for resale, purchases propane through a meter or has propane delivered to one or more storage tanks of 2,000 gallons or less.
      2. “Seller” means a person who sells or offers to sell propane to a consumer.
      3. “Terminates service” means that a seller:
        1. disconnects, removes, or locks off that seller’s propane tank;
        2. reads a meter with the purpose of terminating service; or
        3. takes other action that evidences an intent to terminate a service relationship with a consumer or evidences knowledge that the consumer requested termination of service.
    2. The Attorney General shall investigate irregularities, complaints, and unfair or deceptive acts in commerce by sellers.
  1. For the purpose of promoting business practices that are uniformly fair to sellers and that protect consumers, the Attorney General shall adopt necessary rules, including notice prior to disconnection, repayment agreements, minimum delivery, discrimination, security deposits, and the assessment of fees and charges.
    1. A violation of this section, or a rule adopted under this section not inconsistent with this section, shall constitute an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title. (c) (1) A violation of this section, or a rule adopted under this section not inconsistent with this section, shall constitute an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title.
    2. No contract for propane services shall contain any provision that conflicts with the obligations and remedies established by this section or by any rule adopted under this section, and any conflicting provision shall be unenforceable and void.
  2. A seller shall not:
    1. assess a minimum usage fee;
    2. assess a fee for propane that is not actually delivered to a consumer; or
    3. require a consumer to purchase a minimum number of gallons of propane per year, except as part of a guaranteed price plan that meets the requirements of section 2461e of this title.
  3. When terminating service to a consumer, a seller shall comply with the following requirements:
      1. If the propane storage tank has been located on the consumer’s premises, regardless of ownership of the premises, for 12 months or more, the seller may not assess a fee related to termination of propane service, including a fee: (1) (A) If the propane storage tank has been located on the consumer’s premises, regardless of ownership of the premises, for 12 months or more, the seller may not assess a fee related to termination of propane service, including a fee:
        1. to remove the seller’s storage tank from the premises;
        2. to pump out or restock propane; or
        3. to terminate service.
      2. If a consumer has received propane service from the seller for less than 12 months, any fee related to termination of service may not exceed the disclosed price of labor and materials.
    1. Subject to subdivision (h)(5) of this section:
      1. Within 20 days of the date when the seller terminates service or is notified by the consumer in writing that service has been disconnected, whichever is earlier, the seller shall refund to the consumer the amount paid by the consumer for any propane remaining in the storage tank, less any payments due the seller from the consumer.
      2. If the quantity of propane remaining in the storage tank cannot be determined with certainty, the seller shall, within the 20 days described in subdivision (2)(A) of this subsection, refund to the consumer the amount paid by the consumer for 80 percent of the seller’s best reasonable estimate of the quantity of propane remaining in the tank, less any payments due from the consumer. The seller shall refund the remainder of the amount due as soon as the quantity of propane left in the tank can be determined with certainty, but no later than 14 days after the removal of the tank or restocking of the tank at the time of reconnection.
      1. Any refund to the consumer shall be by cash, check, direct deposit, credit to a credit card account, or in the same method or manner of payment that the consumer, or a third party on the consumer’s behalf, used to make payments to the seller. (3) (A) Any refund to the consumer shall be by cash, check, direct deposit, credit to a credit card account, or in the same method or manner of payment that the consumer, or a third party on the consumer’s behalf, used to make payments to the seller.
      2. Unless requested by the consumer, a seller shall not provide a refund in the form of a reimbursement or credit to any account with the seller.
    2. If the seller fails to mail or deliver a refund to the consumer in accordance with this subsection, the seller shall within one business day make a penalty payment to the consumer, in addition to the refund, of:
      1. $250.00 on the first day after the refund was due; and
      2. $75.00 per day for each day thereafter until the refund and penalty payment have been mailed or delivered, provided that the total amount that accrues under this subdivision (B) shall not exceed 10 times the amount of the refund.
    3. Termination of service does not void any guaranteed price plan that meets the requirements of section 2461e of this title that has not expired by its own terms.
    1. A seller of propane shall not refuse to deliver propane to a storage tank owned by a consumer if the consumer provides proof of ownership of the tank and the seller has conducted a safety check of the tank in accordance with NFPA 54 (National Fuel Gas Code) and NFPA 58 (Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code) of the National Fire Protection Association and complies with rules adopted by the Attorney General governing propane. (f) (1) A seller of propane shall not refuse to deliver propane to a storage tank owned by a consumer if the consumer provides proof of ownership of the tank and the seller has conducted a safety check of the tank in accordance with NFPA 54 (National Fuel Gas Code) and NFPA 58 (Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code) of the National Fire Protection Association and complies with rules adopted by the Attorney General governing propane.
    2. If a seller of propane chooses to finance a consumer’s purchase of a storage tank, the financing shall be a retail installment sale as provided in chapter 61 of this title.
  4. Nonpayment of the following charges may be the only basis for an interruption or disconnection of service: propane, leak or pressure test, safety check, restart of equipment, after-hours delivery, special trip for delivery, and meter read.
    1. A seller who has a duty to remove a propane storage tank from a consumer’s premises shall remove the tank within 20 days or, in the case of an underground storage tank, within 30 days of the earliest of the following dates: (h) (1) A seller who has a duty to remove a propane storage tank from a consumer’s premises shall remove the tank within 20 days or, in the case of an underground storage tank, within 30 days of the earliest of the following dates:
      1. the date on which the consumer requests termination of service;
      2. the date the seller disconnects propane service; or
      3. the date on which the seller is notified by the consumer in writing that service has been disconnected.
    2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection, if a consumer requests that a tank be removed on a specific day, the seller shall remove the tank no more than 10 days after the date requested, or within the period required by subdivision (1) of this subsection, whichever is later.
    3. A seller who fails to remove a propane storage tank in accordance with this subsection shall make a penalty payment to the consumer of:
      1. $250.00 on the first day after the tank should have been removed; and
      2. $75.00 per day for each day thereafter until the tank has been removed and the penalty payments have been mailed or delivered, provided that the total amount that accrues under this subdivision (B) shall not exceed $2,000.00.
      1. Notwithstanding subdivision (3) of this subsection, no penalty shall be due for the time a seller is unable to remove a tank due to weather or other conditions not caused by the seller that bar access to the tank, if the seller provides within five days of the latest date the tank was otherwise required to be removed: (4) (A) Notwithstanding subdivision (3) of this subsection, no penalty shall be due for the time a seller is unable to remove a tank due to weather or other conditions not caused by the seller that bar access to the tank, if the seller provides within five days of the latest date the tank was otherwise required to be removed:
        1. a written explanation for the delay;
        2. what reasonable steps the consumer must take to provide access to the tank; and
        3. a telephone number, a mailing address, and an e-mail address the consumer can use to notify the seller that the steps have been taken.
      2. The seller shall have 20 days from the date he or she receives the notice from the consumer required in subdivision (4)(A)(iii) of this subsection to remove the tank.
    4. A consumer who prevents access to a propane storage tank, such that a seller is unable to timely remove the tank from the property or determine the amount of propane remaining in the tank in compliance with this section, shall not be entitled to a refund for propane remaining in the storage tank pursuant to subsection (e) of this section until the consumer takes the reasonable steps identified by the seller that are necessary to allow access to the tank and provides notice to the seller that he or she has taken those steps, in compliance with the process established in subdivision (4) of this subsection.

HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 34 , § 2; amended 2011, No. 47 , § 19a, eff. May 25, 2011; 2013, No. 44 , § 1; 2013, No. 111 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 24, 2014; 2015, No. 23 , § 90.

History

Amendments

—2015. Subsec. (b): Substituted “adopt” for “promulgate” preceding “necessary” and deleted “and regulations” following “rules”.

Subsec. (c): Substituted “adopted” for “or regulation promulgated” following “rule” in subdivs. (1) and (2).

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1)(A): Substituted “, for consumption and not for resale, purchases propane” for “purchases propane for consumption and not for resale” following “person who”.

Subdiv. (a)(1)(C): Added.

Subdiv. (e)(2)(A): Substituted “terminates” for “disconnects propane” following “when the seller”.

—2013. Subsec. (e): Inserted “When terminating service to a consumer, a seller shall comply with the following requirements.”

—2013. Subdiv. (e)(2): Inserted “Subject to subdivision (h)(5) of this section”.

Subdiv. (e)(4): Added subdiv. (A) and (B) designations, and added “provided that the total amount that accrues under this subdivision (B) shall not exceed 10 times the amount of the refund” at the end of subdiv. (B).

Subsec. (h): Added.

—2011. Rewrote the section.

Implementation. 2013, No. 44 , § 2 provides: “The penalties created in 9 V.S.A. § 2461b(h)(3) shall not accrue prior to July 20, 2013.”

§ 2461c. Predatory pricing.

  1. No person, with the intent to harm competition, shall price goods or services in a manner that tends to create or maintain a monopoly or otherwise harms competition. A violation of this subsection is deemed to be an unfair method of competition in commerce and a violation of section 2453 of this title.
  2. It is the intent of the General Assembly that in construing subsection (a) of this section, the courts of the State will be guided by similar terms contained in federal anti-trust law as construed by the courts of the United States and as amended by Congress.
  3. The Attorney General shall adopt rules when necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of this section. The rules shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations, and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission or with the decisions of the courts of the United States construing federal anti-trust law.
  4. The Attorney General has the same authority to conduct civil investigations and enter into assurances of discontinuance as provided under subchapter 1 of this chapter.
  5. A person aggrieved by a violation of this section or a violation of rules adopted under this section may bring an action in Superior Court for appropriate relief under subsection 2461(b) of this title.
  6. This section shall not be construed to limit rights or remedies available to a person under any other law.

HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 35 , § 1; amended 2017, No. 74 , § 14.

History

References in text.

The reference to the Federal Trade Commission, referred to in subsec. (c), is codified as 47 U.S.C. § 11.

Amendments

—2017. Subsec. (c): In the first sentence, substituted “adopt rules” for “make rules and regulations” following “General shall”; in the second sentence, deleted “and regulations” following “rules”.

ANNOTATIONS

Scope.

For-sale-by-owner publication had not plausibly pled a Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 9, § 2461c(a) claim based on predatory pricing where it conceded that the website’s revenue was derived from real estate agents who paid to advertise on the website. Picket Fence Preview, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156854 (D. Vt. Aug. 19, 2021).

There is simply no unrestrained interaction of competitive forces in the Vermont law enforcement market that would require regulation by the predatory pricing statute. It is the protection of competition, rather than the protection of competitors, that antitrust laws are designed to protect, and the statutory scheme relating to law enforcement embraces no element of competition in an open marketplace: this is because the universe of entities that can provide police services is narrowly limited to State actors, and the “market” in which the services are contracted for is wholly restricted. Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. St. Albans City Police Dep't, 2012 VT 62, 192 Vt. 188, 58 A.3d 207, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 61 (2012).

Standing.

Sheriff’s office lacked constitutional standing to assert a predatory pricing claim against a police department in part because it had no legally protected right to “fair competition” with other statutorily created government entities to provide police services to a town. The town was under no obligation to entertain bids for police services in the first instance, or to award the contract to the lowest bidder. Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. St. Albans City Police Dep't, 2012 VT 62, 192 Vt. 188, 58 A.3d 207, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 61 (2012).

Sheriff’s office lacked constitutional standing to assert a predatory pricing claim against a police department that bid to provide police services to a town, as no commerce existed so as to provide the sheriff’s office with a legally protected interest. The provision of police services in Vermont occurred outside the realm of commerce because it involved no interchange of goods or commodities on the open market; it was a governmental function provided only by governmental entities for the benefit of the public. Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. St. Albans City Police Dep't, 2012 VT 62, 192 Vt. 188, 58 A.3d 207, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 61 (2012).

Sheriff’s office lacked prudential standing to assert a predatory pricing claim against a police department that bid to provide police services to a town, as its alleged injuries did not fall within the zone of interests to be protected by the predatory pricing statute. The “competitors” were all statutorily created entities, meaning that one entity could not lower its prices so as to put another out of business, nor could potential entrants be deterred from entering the “market” because the statutory scheme allowed no new entrants. Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. St. Albans City Police Dep't, 2012 VT 62, 192 Vt. 188, 58 A.3d 207, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 61 (2012).

§ 2461d. Price gouging of petroleum products and heating fuel products.

  1. Definitions  For the purposes of this section:
    1. A “market emergency” shall be declared by the Governor. The market emergency shall continue for 30 days or until terminated by the Governor. The Governor may extend the market emergency for additional 30-day periods. “Market emergency” means any abnormal disruption of any market for petroleum products or heating fuel products, including any actual or threatened shortage in the supply of petroleum products or heating fuel products or any actual or threatened increase in the price of petroleum products or heating fuel products resulting from severe weather, convulsion of nature, supply manipulation, failure or shortage of electric power or other source of energy, strike, civil disorder, act of war, terrorist attack, national or local emergency, or other extraordinary adverse circumstances.
    2. “Petroleum or heating fuel product” means motor fuels, liquefied petroleum gas, fuel oil, kerosene, and wood pellets used for heating or cooking purposes.
    3. “Petroleum or heating fuel-related business” means any producer, supplier, wholesaler, distributor, or retail seller of any petroleum or heating fuel product.
  2. It is an unfair and deceptive act and practice in commerce and a violation of section 2453 of this title for any petroleum or heating fuel-related business during a market emergency or seven days prior thereto to sell or offer to sell any petroleum product or heating fuel product for an amount that represents an unconscionably high price.
  3. A price is unconscionably high if:
    1. the amount charged during the market emergency or seven days prior thereto represents a gross disparity between the price of the petroleum product or heating fuel product charged by the petroleum or heating fuel related business and:
      1. the price at which the same product was sold or offered for sale by that business in the usual course of business immediately prior to the date of the declaration of the market emergency; or
      2. the price at which the same or similar petroleum product or heating fuel product is readily obtainable by the buyer and other buyers in the trade area in which the petroleum- or heating-fuel-related business markets the product; and
    2. the disparity is not substantially attributable to increased prices charged by the petroleum product or heating fuel product suppliers or increased costs due to a market emergency.

HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 210 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

2005, No. 210 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 provides: “The purpose of 9 V.S.A. § 2461d of this act is to ensure that those entities involved in the sale or transfer of designated petroleum products do not take advantage of a purchaser during a market emergency.”

§ 2461e. Requirements for guaranteed price plans and prepaid contracts.

  1. Contract and solicitation requirements.
    1. A contract for the retail sale of home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas that offers a guaranteed price plan, including a fixed price contract, a prepaid contract, a cost-plus contract, and any other similar terms, shall be in writing, and the terms and conditions of such price plans shall be disclosed. Such disclosure shall be in plain language and shall immediately follow the language concerning the price or service that could be affected and shall be printed in no less than 12-point boldface type of uniform font. A solicitation for the retail sale of home heating oil or liquefied petroleum gas that offers a guaranteed price plan that could become a contract upon a response from a consumer, including a fixed price contract, a prepaid contract, a cost-plus contract, and any other similar terms, shall be in writing, and the terms and conditions of such offer shall be disclosed in plain language.
    2. Subdivision (1) of this subsection does not preclude a first come, first served offering.
  2. Security for prepaid contracts.
    1. No home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas dealer shall enter into a prepaid contract to provide home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas to a consumer unless that dealer has, within seven days of the acceptance of the contract, obtained and maintained any one of the following:
      1. Futures contract.   Heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas contracts or other similar commitments that allow the dealer to purchase, at a fixed price, heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas in an amount not less than 75 percent of the maximum number of gallons that the dealer is committed to deliver pursuant to all prepaid contracts entered into by the dealer.
      2. Surety bond.   A surety bond in an amount not less than 50 percent of the total amount of funds paid to the dealer by consumers pursuant to prepaid heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas contracts.
      3. Line of credit, letter of credit, cash.   A line of credit from an FDIC-insured institution, letter of credit from an FDIC-insured institution, cash in an FDIC-insured account or a functionally equivalent account, or combination thereof in an amount that represents 100 percent of the cost to the dealer of the maximum number of gallons that the dealer is committed to deliver pursuant to all prepaid contracts entered into by the dealer. The cost shall be calculated at the time the contracts are entered into.
    2. A dealer shall maintain the amount of futures contracts required by this subsection for the period of time for which the prepaid home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas contracts are effective, except that the amount of the futures contracts may be reduced during such period of time to reflect any amount of home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas already delivered to and paid for by the consumer.
    3. Subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not apply to budget plans under which consumers pay 1/12th of their yearly heating fuel cost each month.
    1. Disclosure; additional contract requirements.   A prepaid home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas contract shall indicate: (c) (1) Disclosure; additional contract requirements.   A prepaid home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas contract shall indicate:
      1. the amount of funds paid by the consumer to the dealer under the contract;
      2. the maximum number of gallons of home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas committed by the dealer for delivery to the consumer pursuant to the contract; and
      3. that the performance of the prepaid contract is secured by one of the three options described in subsection (b) of this section.
    2. Reimbursement default provision.   Any contract described in this subsection shall provide that the contract price of any undelivered home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas owed to the consumer under the contract at the end date of the contract shall be reimbursed to the consumer not later than 30 days after the end date of the contract, unless the parties to the contract agree otherwise.
  3. Private right of action under Consumer Protection Act.   In addition to the remedies set forth in sections 2458 and 2461 of this title, a home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas dealer may bring an action against its heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas suppliers for failing to honor its contract with the home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas dealer. The home heating oil, kerosene, or liquefied petroleum gas dealer bringing the action may recover all remedies available to consumers under subsection 2461(b) of this title.

HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 210 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. May 8, 2012; 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1a, eff. May 18, 2012; 2013, No. 44 , § 3.

History

Amendments

—2013. Subdiv. (a)(1): Inserted “a cost-plus contract” following “a prepaid contract” in two places.

—2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (d): Acts 109 and 136 substituted “consumer protection” for “consumer fraud” in the first sentence.

§ 2462. Action by State’s Attorney.

Any State’s Attorney receiving notice of any alleged violation of this chapter shall immediately forward written notice of the same with any other information he or she may have to the “Office of the Attorney General, Attention Consumer Protection Division.”

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 132 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1967; amended 1973, No. 110 , § 6.

History

Amendments

—1973. Added “attention consumer protection division” following “attorney general”.

§ 2463. Credit billing for certain home solicitation sales.

In the case of any home solicitation sale solicited or consummated by a seller in whole or in part by telephone that is paid for by means of an open-end consumer credit plan within the meaning of the federal Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., the issuer of the credit card on which the consumer has charged the purchase shall, for one year from the date of the sale, or within any other time period available under applicable network operating rules in effect at the time of the sale, whichever is greater, and for the purpose of a disputed charge and reimbursement to the consumer, be subject to the claim or defense that the seller failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of subsection 2454(b) of this chapter and engaged in a related unfair or deceptive act or practice under subsection 2453(a) of this title, regardless of the amount of the purchase, the location of the seller, or the amount, if any, already paid by the consumer. Where a consumer has raised such a claim or defense, the issuer shall not report any negative information on the purchase to any consumer reporting agency as defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (f), unless there is a judicial determination that the consumer’s defense or claim is without merit, except that the issuer may report that there is a dispute with respect to the charge.

HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 99 , § 4; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 18, 2013.

History

Amendments

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

§ 2463a. Choice of law in computer information agreement.

A choice of law provision in a computer information agreement that provides that the contract is to be interpreted pursuant to the laws of a state that has enacted the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, as proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or any substantially similar law, is voidable, and the agreement shall be interpreted pursuant to the laws of this State if the party against whom enforcement of the choice of law provisions is sought is a resident of this State or has its principal place of business located in this State. For purposes of this section, a “computer information agreement” means an agreement that would be governed by the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act or substantially similar law as enacted in the state specified in the choice of law provisions if that state’s law were applied to the agreement. This section may not be varied by agreement of the parties. This section shall remain in force until such time as the General Assembly enacts the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act or any substantially similar law and that law becomes effective.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 44 , § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

§ 2464. Telemarketing transactions.

  1. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Express oral authorization” means that a consumer has explicitly authorized an electronic funds transfer from his or her financial account for goods or services offered by a telemarketer:
      1. during a telephone call in which the telemarketer has clearly stated that the consumer is authorizing the transfer from his or her account and has further stated the consumer’s name, a description of the specific goods or services offered, any material terms of the transaction, the date on or after which the account will be debited, the amount of the transfer, a telephone number for consumer inquiries that is answered during normal business hours, and the date of the authorization; and
      2. where the telemarketer has either tape-recorded the entire telemarketing call on which the consumer has authorized the transaction and not disposed of the recording until at least four years after the authorization or has provided written notice to the consumer, prior to the settlement date of the transfer, confirming the terms of the authorization as described in subdivision (A) of this subdivision (1) and has not disposed of the written notice until at least four years after the notice was created. Isolated and inadvertent failure to comply with this record-keeping requirement shall not give rise to liability under this subsection, provided that the telemarketer has in place reasonable procedures designed to comply with this requirement.
    2. “Financial account” means a checking, savings, share, or other depository account.
    3. “Process” includes printing a check, draft, or other form of negotiable instrument drawn on or debited against a consumer’s financial account, formatting or transferring data for use in connection with the debiting of a consumer’s account by means of such an instrument or an electronic funds transfer, or arranging for such services to be provided to a telemarketer.
    4. “Telemarketer” means any person who initiates telephone calls to, or who receives telephone calls from, a consumer in connection with a plan, program, or campaign to market goods or services. The term “telemarketer” does not include:
      1. a federally insured depository institution or its subsidiary when it obtains or submits for payment a check, draft, or other form of negotiable instrument drawn on or debited against a person’s checking, savings, share, or other depository account at that institution;
      2. any person that submits a payment when the consumer authorizing the submission has, prior to July 1, 1997, entered into a written contract with the person for the issuance of a charge or credit card;
      3. any person who initiates telephone calls to or who receives telephone calls from a consumer in connection with collection of an amount due for goods or services previously provided to the consumer;
      4. any company registered with and regulated by the Public Utility Commission;
      5. any other category of persons that the Attorney General may exempt by rule consistent with the purposes of this section.
  2. It is an unfair and deceptive act and practice in commerce for any telemarketer directly or through an agent:
    1. to procure the services of any third-party delivery, courier, or other pickup service to obtain a consumer’s payment for goods, unless the goods are delivered at the time that the consumer’s payment is obtained by the courier;
    2. to obtain or submit for payment a check, draft, or other form of negotiable instrument drawn on a person’s financial account without the consumer’s prior written authorization or to dispose of the written authorization until at least four years after the authorization; or
    3. to obtain funds from a person’s financial account by means of an electronic funds transfer unless:
        1. the consumer has initiated the telephone call to the telemarketer; or (A) (i) the consumer has initiated the telephone call to the telemarketer; or
        2. the telemarketer and the consumer have a current written agreement for the provision of goods or services or the consumer has purchased goods or services from the telemarketer within the previous two years; and
      1. the telemarketer has obtained the consumer’s express oral authorization to the transfer prior to initiating the debit.
  3. It is an unfair and deceptive act and practice in commerce for a party other than a federally insured depository institution to process for payment from a consumer’s financial account, in connection with a telemarketer’s transaction with the consumer:
    1. a check, draft, or other form of negotiable instrument drawn on or debited against such account without the consumer’s prior written authorization; or
    2. an electronic funds transfer from such account for goods or services offered by a telemarketer, unless:
        1. the consumer has initiated the telephone call to the telemarketer; or (A) (i) the consumer has initiated the telephone call to the telemarketer; or
        2. the telemarketer and the consumer have a current written agreement for the provision of goods or services or the consumer has purchased goods or services from the telemarketer within the previous two years; and
      1. the telemarketer has obtained the consumer’s express oral authorization to the transfer prior to initiating the debit.
  4. In addition to the legal liability described in subsection (c) of this section, it is an unfair and deceptive act and practice in commerce for any person, including a third-party delivery, courier, or other pickup service, or the telemarketer’s financial institution as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 10202(5) , but not including the consumer’s financial institution as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 10202(5) , to provide substantial assistance to a telemarketer in violation of subsection (b) of this section when the person or the person’s authorized agent knows or consciously avoids knowing that the telemarketer is engaging in an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce.
  5. It is an unfair and deceptive act and practice in commerce for a party other than a federally insured depository institution who processes a telemarketing transaction for payment from a consumer’s financial account to:
    1. fail to obtain, before processing the transaction, any prior written authorization required by subdivision (b)(2) of this section or any tape recording or copy of a written confirmation required by subdivision (b)(3) of this section as part of the consumer’s express oral authorization; or
    2. dispose of a document required by subdivision (1) of this subsection, or of telemarketer applications or agreements, records of payments processed or returned, electronic communications relating to telemarketers, consumer complaints, or any other category of record that the Attorney General may prescribe by rule, until at least four years after the records were created.

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 42 , § 2; amended 2005, No. 5 , § 1; 2007, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 2-5.

History

Revision note

—2017. In subdiv. (a)(4)(D), substituted “Public Utility Commission” for “Public Service Board” in accordance with 2017, No. 53 , § 12.

Revision note—. In subdiv. (a)(2), substituted “July 1, 1997” for “the effective date of this section” for purposes of clarity.

Amendments

—2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1)(A): Inserted “a description of the specific goods or services offered, any material terms of the transaction,”.

Subdiv. (a)(1)(B): Amended generally.

Subdiv. (a)(4): Redesignated former subdiv. (C) as present subdiv. (E) and added subdivs. (C) and (D).

Subdiv. (b)(2): Added “or to dispose of the written authorization until at least four years after the authorization” at the end.

Subsec. (e): Added.

—2005. Section amended generally.

§ 2464a. Prohibited telephone solicitations.

  1. Definitions.   As used in this section, section 2464b, and section 2464c of this title:
    1. “Customer” means a customer, residing or located in Vermont, of a company providing telecommunications service as defined in 30 V.S.A. § 203(5) .
    2. “Caller identification information” means information a caller identification service provides regarding the name and number of the person calling.
    3. “Caller identification service” means a service that allows a subscriber of the service to have the telephone number and, where available, the name of the calling party transmitted contemporaneously with the telephone call and displayed on a device in or connected to the subscriber’s telephone.
    4. “Federal functional regulator” means a federal functional regulator as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 6809(2).
    5. “Financial institution” means a financial institution as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3).
    6. “Tax-exempt organization” means an organization described in Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Service Code ( 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)) .
    7. “Telemarketer” means any telephone solicitor. However, “telemarketer” does not include any telephone solicitor who is otherwise registered or licensed with, or regulated or chartered by, the Secretary of State, the Public Utility Commission, the Department of Financial Regulation, or the Department of Taxes or is a financial institution subject to regulations adopted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a) by a federal functional regulator. Telephone solicitors registered with the Department of Taxes to collect Vermont income withholding, sales and use, or meals and rooms tax, but not registered with any other agency listed in this subdivision, shall provide to the Secretary of State an address and agent for the purpose of submitting to the jurisdiction of the Vermont courts in any action brought for violations of this section.
    8. “Telephone solicitation”:
      1. means the solicitation by telephone of a customer for the purpose of encouraging the customer to contribute to an organization that is not a tax-exempt organization, or to purchase, lease, or otherwise agree to pay consideration for money, goods, or services; and
      2. does not include:
        1. telephone calls made in response to a request or inquiry by the called customer;
        2. telephone calls made by or on behalf of a tax-exempt organization, an organization incorporated as a nonprofit organization with the State of Vermont, or an organization in the process of applying for tax-exempt status or nonprofit status;
        3. telephone calls made by a person not regularly engaged in the activities listed in subdivision (A) of this subdivision (8); or
        4. telephone calls made to a person with whom the telephone solicitor has an established business relationship.
    9. “Telephone solicitor” means any person placing telephone solicitations, or hiring others, on an hourly, commission, or independent contractor basis to conduct telephone solicitations.
  2. Prohibition; Caller Identification Information.
    1. No telemarketer shall make a telephone solicitation to a telephone number in Vermont without having first registered in accordance with section 2464b of this title.
    2. No person shall make any telephone call to a telephone number in Vermont that violates the Federal Trade Commission’s Do Not Call Rule, 16 C.F.R. subdivision 310.4(b)(1)(iii), or the Federal Communication Commission’s Do Not Call Rule, 47 C.F.R. subdivision 64.1200(c)(2) and subsection (d), as amended from time to time.
      1. A person who places a telephone call to make a telephone solicitation or to induce a charitable contribution, donation, or gift of money or other thing of value shall transmit or cause to be transmitted to a caller identification service in use by the recipient of the call: (3) (A) A person who places a telephone call to make a telephone solicitation or to induce a charitable contribution, donation, or gift of money or other thing of value shall transmit or cause to be transmitted to a caller identification service in use by the recipient of the call:
        1. the caller’s telephone number; and
        2. if made available by the caller’s carrier, the caller’s name.
      2. Notwithstanding subdivision (A) of this subdivision (3), a caller may substitute for its own name and number the name and the number, which is answered during regular business hours, of the person on whose behalf the caller places the call.
  3. Violation.   A violation of this section shall constitute a violation of section 2453 of this title. Each prohibited telephone call shall constitute a separate violation. In considering a civil penalty for violations of subdivision (b)(2) of this section, the court may consider, among other relevant factors, the extent to which a telephone solicitor maintained and complied with procedures designed to ensure compliance with the rules of the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.
  4. Criminal Penalties.   A telemarketer who makes a telephone solicitation in violation of subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be imprisoned for not more than 18 months or fined not more than $10,000.00, or both. It shall be an affirmative defense, for a telemarketer with five or fewer employees, that the telemarketer did not know and did not consciously avoid knowing that Vermont has a requirement of registration of telemarketers. Each telephone call shall constitute a separate solicitation under this section. This section shall not be construed to limit a person’s liability under any other civil or criminal law.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2003, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 7, 2004; 2017, No. 66 , § 1, eff. June 8, 2017.

History

Revision note

—2017. In subdiv. (a)(7), substituted “Public Utility Commission” for “Public Service Board” in accordance with 2017, No. 53 , § 12.

Amendments

—2017. Subsec. (a): Added “section 2464b, and section 2464c of this title” in the introductory language, added new subdivs. (2) and (3) and redesignated former subdivs. (2) through (7) as present subdivs. (4) through (9), and substituted “that” for “which” following “organization” in subdiv. (8)(A), and “subdivision (8)” for “subdivision (6)” in subdiv. (8)(B)(iii).

Subsec. (b): Added “Caller Identification Information” and substituted “that” for “which” preceding “violates” in subdiv. (2) and added subdiv. (3).

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted former subdiv. (6) and redesignated former subdivs. (7) and (8) as present subdivs. (6) and (7).

Subsec. (b): Substituted “Prohibition” for “Prohibitions”.

Subdiv. (b)(2): Rewrote the subdiv.

Subdiv. (b)(3): Deleted.

Subsec. (c): Substituted “call” for “solicitation” and “(b)(2)” for “(b)(3)”.

Repeal of expiration date. 2001, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. July 1, 2002, provided: “This act [which enacted this section] shall take effect on July 1, 2002, and shall be repealed effective July 1, 2004.” However, pursuant to 2003, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, this section does not expire and remains in effect.

§ 2464b. Registration of telemarketers.

  1. Every telemarketer shall register with the Secretary of State, on a form approved by the Secretary. In the case of a telemarketer who hires, whether on an hourly, commission, or independent contractor basis, one or more persons to conduct telephone solicitations, only the person who causes others to conduct telephone solicitations need register. The Secretary of State may adopt rules prescribing the manner in which registration under this section shall be conducted, including a requirement of notice to the Secretary by the telemarketer when the telemarketer ceases to do business in Vermont.
  2. The Secretary of State shall require that each telemarketer designate an agent for the purpose of submitting to the jurisdiction of the Vermont courts in any action brought for violations of section 2464a of this title.
  3. The Secretary of State shall collect the following fees when a document described in this section is delivered to the Office of the Secretary of State for filing:
    1. Registration: $125.00.
    2. Statement of change of designated agent or designated office, or both: $25.00, not to exceed $1,000.00 per filer per calendar year.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2013, No. 72 , § 2.

History

Amendments

—2013. Subsec. (c): Added.

Repeal of expiration date. 2001, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. July 1, 2002, provided: “This act [which enacted this section] shall take effect on July 1, 2002, and shall be repealed effective July 1, 2004.” However, pursuant to 2003, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, this section does not expire and remains in effect.

§ 2464c. Private cause of action.

Any person who receives a telephone call in violation of subsection 2464a(b) of this title may bring an action in Superior Court for damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages in the case of a willful violation, and reasonable costs and attorney’s fees. The court may issue an award for the person’s actual damages or $500.00 for a first violation, or $1,000.00 for each subsequent violation, whichever is greater. In considering the amount of punitive damages, the court may consider, among other relevant factors, the extent to which a telephone solicitor maintained and complied with procedures designed to ensure compliance with the requirements of sections 2464a and 2464b of this title. This section shall not limit any other claims the person may have under applicable law.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 2003, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 7, 2004; 2017, No. 66 , § 1, eff. June 8, 2017.

History

Amendments

—2017. Made minor capitalization changes.

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “call” for “solicitation” following “telephone” in the first sentence and “under applicable law” for “against the telephone solicitor” at the end of the fourth sentence.

Repeal of expiration date. 2001, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. July 1, 2002, provided: “This act [which enacted this section] shall take effect on July 1, 2002, and shall be repealed effective July 1, 2004.” However, pursuant to 2003, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, this section does not expire and remains in effect.

§ 2464d. Telephone preference service.

Local exchange carriers shall provide notices at least annually to residential customers of the availability of telephone callers’ do not call lists under federal law and of the federal Do Not Call Registry, and a description of how to register.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 2003, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 7, 2004.

History

Amendments

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “a” preceding “telephone” and substituted “callers’ do not call lists under federal law” for “solicitor’s do not call list” and “federal do not call registry” for “telephone preference service”.

Repeal of expiration date. 2001, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. July 1, 2002, provided: “This act [which enacted this section] shall take effect on July 1, 2002, and shall be repealed effective July 1, 2004.” However, pursuant to 2003, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, this section does not expire and remains in effect.

§ 2465. Antitrust remedies.

  1. Any person who sustains damages or injury as a result of any violation of State antitrust laws, including section 2453 of this title, may sue and recover from the violator the amount of his or her damages, or the consideration or the value of the consideration given by the aggrieved person, reasonable attorney’s fees, and exemplary damages, not exceeding three times the value of the consideration given or damages sustained by the aggrieved person.
  2. In any action for damages or injury sustained as a result of any violation of State antitrust laws, pursuant to section 2453 of this title, the fact that the State, any public agency, political subdivision, or any other person has not dealt directly with a defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery. The court shall take all necessary steps to avoid duplicate liability, including the transfer or consolidation of all related actions.

HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 65 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Revision note

—2014. In subsec. (b), deleted “but not limited to” following “including” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

ANNOTATIONS

Construction.

Allowing plaintiff’s class action suit under the Consumer Protection Act would not be an impermissible retroactive application of this section because its enactment did not effectuate a change in State law and an indirect purchaser was entitled to bring a cause of action under the Act prior thereto. 9 V.S.A. § 2465(b) . Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 174 Vt. 328, 817 A.2d 9, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 314 (2002).

§ 2465a. Definition of local, local to Vermont, and locally grown or made in Vermont.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Eggs” means eggs that are the product of laying birds, including chickens, turkeys, ducks, geese, or quail, and that are in the shell.
    2. “Majority of ingredients” means more than 50 percent of all product ingredients by volume, excluding water.
    3. “Processed food” means any food other than a raw agricultural product and includes a raw agricultural product that has been subject to processing, such as canning, cooking, dehydrating, milling, or the addition of other ingredients. Processed food includes dairy, meat, maple products, beverages, fruit, or vegetables that have been subject to processing, baked, or modified into a value-added or unique food product.
    4. “Raw agricultural product” means any food in its raw or natural state without added ingredients, including pasteurized or homogenized milk, maple sap or syrup, honey, meat, eggs, apple cider, and fruits or vegetables that may be washed, colored, or otherwise treated in their unpeeled natural form prior to marketing.
    5. “Substantial period of its life” means an animal that was harvested in Vermont and lived in Vermont for at least one third of its life or one year.
    6. “Unique food product” means food processed in Vermont from ingredients that are not regularly produced in Vermont or not available in sufficient quantities to meet production requirements.
  2. For the purposes of this chapter and rules adopted pursuant to subsection 2453(c) of this chapter, “local,” “local to Vermont,” “locally grown or made in Vermont,” and any substantially similar term shall have the following meaning based on the type of food or food product:
    1. For products that are raw agricultural products, “local to Vermont” means the product:
      1. was exclusively grown or tapped in Vermont;
      2. is not milk and was derived from an animal that was raised for a substantial period of its lifetime in Vermont;
      3. is milk where a majority of the milk was produced from Vermont animals; or
      4. is honey produced by Vermont colonies located exclusively in Vermont when all nectar was collected.
    2. Except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, for products that are processed foods, “local to Vermont” means:
      1. the majority of the ingredients are raw agricultural products that are local to Vermont; and
      2. the product meets one or both or the following criteria:
        1. the product was processed in Vermont; or
        2. the headquarters of the company that manufactures the product is located in Vermont.
    3. For bakery products, beverages, or unique food products, the product meets two or more of the following criteria:
      1. the majority of the ingredients are raw agricultural products that are local to Vermont;
      2. substantial transformation of the ingredients in the product occurred in Vermont; or
      3. the headquarters of the company that manufactures the product is located in Vermont.
  3. For the purposes of this chapter and rules adopted pursuant to subsection 2453(c) of this chapter, when referring to products other than food, “local” and any substantially similar term shall mean that the goods being advertised originated within Vermont.
  4. For the purposes of this chapter and rules adopted under subsection 2453(c) of this title, “local,” “locally grown or made,” and substantially similar terms may be used in conjunction with a specific geographic location provided that the specific geographic location appears as prominently as the term “local” and the representation of origin is accurate. If a local representation refers to a specific city or town, the product shall have been grown or made in that city or town. If a local representation refers to a region with precisely defined political boundaries, the product shall have been grown or made within those boundaries. If a local representation refers to a region that is not precisely defined by political boundaries, then the region shall be prominently described when the representation is made, or the product shall have been grown or made within 30 miles of the point of sale, measured directly point to point.
  5. A person or company who sells or markets food or goods impacted by a change in this section shall have until January 1, 2021 to utilize existing product labels or packaging materials and to come into compliance with the requirements of this section.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. June 11, 2008; amended 2019, No. 129 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

History

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section.

§ 2465b. Misrepresentation of a floral business as local.

  1. In connection with the sale of floral products, it shall be an unlawful and deceptive act and practice in commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title for a floral business to misrepresent in an advertisement, on the Internet, on a website, or in a listing of the floral business in a telephone directory or other directory assistance database the geographic location of the floral business as “local,” “locally owned,” or physically located within Vermont.
  2. A floral business is considered to misrepresent its geographic location that it is “local,” “locally owned,” or located within Vermont in violation of subsection (a) of this section if the floral business is not physically located in Vermont and:
    1. the advertisement, Internet, website, or directory listing would lead a reasonable consumer to conclude that the floral business is physically located in Vermont; or
    2. the advertisement, Internet, website, or directory listing uses the name of a floral business that is physically located in Vermont, with geographic terms that would lead a reasonable consumer to understand the advertised floral business to be physically located in Vermont.
  3. A retail floral business physically located in Vermont shall be deemed a consumer for the purposes of enforcing this section under subsection 2461(b) of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 52 , § 45, eff. May 27, 2011.

§ 2466. Goods and services appearing on telephone bill.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, a seller shall not bill a consumer for goods or services that will appear as a charge on the person’s bill for telephone service provided by any local exchange carrier.
  2. No person shall arrange on behalf of a seller of goods or services, directly or through an intermediary, with a local exchange carrier, to bill a consumer for goods or services other than as permitted by this section. This prohibition applies, but is not limited, to persons who aggregate consumer billings for a seller and to persons who serve as a clearinghouse for aggregated billings.
  3. Failure to comply with this section is an unfair and deceptive act and practice in commerce under this chapter.
  4. The Attorney General may make rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this section.
  5. Nothing in this section limits the liability of any person under existing statutory or common law.
    1. This section shall apply to billing aggregators described in 30 V.S.A. § 231a , but shall not apply to: (f) (1) This section shall apply to billing aggregators described in 30 V.S.A. § 231a , but shall not apply to:
      1. billing for goods or services marketed or sold by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Vermont Public Utility Commission under 30 V.S.A. § 203 ;
      2. billing for direct dial or dial around services initiated from the consumer’s telephone; or
      3. operator-assisted telephone calls, collect calls, or telephone services provided to facilitate communication to or from correctional center inmates.
    2. Nothing in this section affects any rule issued by the Vermont Public Utility Commission.

HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 67 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; amended 2011, No. 52 , § 78, eff. May 27, 2011.

History

Revision note—

2017.

In subdivs. (f)(1)(A) and (f)(2), substituted “Public Utility Commission” for “Public Service Board” in accordance with 2017, No. 53 , § 12.

Amendments

—2011. Section amended generally.

ANNOTATIONS

Constitutionality.

Regulation of the collection and use of prescriber-identifiable data for commercial uses such as marketing under 9 V.S.A. § 2466(c)(1) by creating a cause of action under a state consumer fraud act for prescription drug advertisements that violated federal law was upheld because it did not violate the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and it was not preempted by federal law. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35594 (D. Vt. 2009), rev'd, 630 F.3d 263, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24053 (2d Cir. 2010).

§ 2466a. Consumer protections; prescription drugs.

  1. A violation of 18 V.S.A. § 4631 shall be considered a prohibited practice under section 2453 of this title.
  2. As provided in 18 V.S.A. § 9474 , a violation of 18 V.S.A. § 9472 or 9473 shall be considered a prohibited practice under section 2453 of this title.
    1. It shall be a prohibited practice under section 2453 of this title for a manufacturer of prescription drugs to present or cause to be presented in the State a regulated advertisement if that advertisement does not comply with the requirements concerning drugs and devices and prescription drug advertising in federal law and regulations under 21 U.S.C. §§ 331 and 352(n) and 21 C.F.R. Part 202. (c) (1) It shall be a prohibited practice under section 2453 of this title for a manufacturer of prescription drugs to present or cause to be presented in the State a regulated advertisement if that advertisement does not comply with the requirements concerning drugs and devices and prescription drug advertising in federal law and regulations under 21 U.S.C. §§ 331 and 352(n) and 21 C.F.R. Part 202.
    2. For purposes of this section:
      1. “Manufacturer of prescription drugs” means a person authorized by law to manufacture, bottle, or pack drugs or biological products; a licensee or affiliate of that person; or a labeler that receives drugs or biological products from a manufacturer or wholesaler and repackages them for later retail sale and has a labeler code from the federal Food and Drug Administration under 21 C.F.R. § 202.20.
      2. “Regulated advertisement” means:
        1. the presentation to the general public of a commercial message regarding a prescription drug or biological product by a manufacturer of prescription drugs that is broadcast on television, cable, or radio from a station or cable company that is physically located in the State, broadcast over the Internet from a location in the State, or printed in magazines or newspapers that are printed, distributed, or sold in the State; or
        2. a commercial message regarding a prescription drug or biological product by a manufacturer of prescription drugs or its representative that is conveyed:
          1. to the office of a health care professional doing business in Vermont, including statements by representatives or employees of the manufacturer and materials mailed or delivered to the office; or
          2. at a conference or other professional meeting occurring in Vermont.
  3. No person shall sell, offer for sale, or distribute electronic prescribing software that advertises, uses instant messaging and pop-up advertisements, or uses other means to influence or attempt to influence the prescribing decision of a health care professional through economic incentives or otherwise and that is triggered or in specific response to the input, selection, or act of a health care professional or agent in prescribing a specific prescription drug or directing a patient to a certain pharmacy. This subsection shall not apply to information provided to the health care professional about pharmacy reimbursement, prescription drug formulary compliance, and patient care management.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 80 , § 21; amended 2007, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 5, 2008; 2013, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; 2015, No. 23 , § 42.

History

References in text.

21 C.F.R. § 202.20, referred to in subdiv. (c)(2)(A), no longer exists. For present provisions, see 21 C.F.R. § 201.25.

Amendments

—2015. Subdiv. (c)(2)(A): Substituted “21 C.F.R. § 202.20” for “21 C.F.R. 2027.20 (1999)”.

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “ 18 V.S.A. § 9474 ” for “ 18 V.S.A. § 9473 ” following “As provided in”, and inserted “or 9473” following “ 18 V.S.A. § 9472 ”.

—2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “prohibited practice under section 2453 of this title” for “violation under this chapter”.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “prohibited practice under section 2453 of this title” for “violation under this chapter”.

Subdiv. (c)(1): Substituted “prohibited practice under section 2453 of this title” for “violation under this chapter”, deleted “and state rules” following “Part 202” and deleted the second sentence.

Effective dates; Prescription drug pricing and information. 2007, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 7(b) provides: “Notwithstanding the effective dates of this section and of No. 80 of the Acts of 2007, the provisions of Sec. 17 of No. 80 of the Acts of 2007 (adding 18 V.S.A. chapter 91, subchapter 3; prescription drug data confidentiality) and Sec. 21 of No. 80 of the Acts of 2007 (adding 9 V.S.A. § 2466a ; consumer protection; prescription drugs) shall not be effective until July 1, 2009; except that the department of health and the office of professional regulation may, immediately upon passage, begin any necessary rulemaking, revision of forms, or other administrative actions necessary to implement the program established in 18 V.S.A. chapter 91, subchapter 3 on July 1, 2009.

§ 2466b. Disclosure of fee for automatic dialing service.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Automatic dialing service” means a service of a home or business security, monitoring, alarm, or similar system, by which the system automatically initiates a call or connection to an emergency service provider, either directly or through a third person, upon the occurrence of an action specified within the system to initiate a call or connection.
    2. “Emergency functions” include services provided by the Department of Public Safety, firefighting services, police services, sheriff’s department services, medical and health services, rescue, engineering, emergency warning services, communications, evacuation of persons, emergency welfare services, protection of critical infrastructure, emergency transportation, temporary restoration of public utility services, other functions related to civilian protection, and all other activities necessary or incidental to the preparation for and carrying out of these functions.
    3. “Emergency service provider” means a person that performs emergency functions.
  2. Before executing a contract for the sale or lease of a security, monitoring, alarm, or similar system that includes an automatic dialing service, the seller or lessor of the system shall disclose in writing:
    1. any fee or charge the seller or lessor charges to the buyer or lessee for the service; and
    2. that the buyer or lessor may be subject to additional fees or charges imposed by another person for use of the service.
  3. A person who fails to provide the disclosure required by subsection (b) of this section commits an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title.

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 55 , § 4.

§ 2466c. Internet service; network management; Attorney General review and disclosure.

  1. The Attorney General shall review the network management practices of Internet service providers in Vermont and, to the extent possible, make a determination as to whether the provider’s broadband Internet access service complies with the open Internet rules contained in the Federal Communications Commission’s 2015 Open Internet Order, “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,” WC Docket No. 14-28, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 5601.
  2. The Attorney General shall disclose his or her findings under this section on a publicly available, easily accessible website maintained by his or her office.

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

Subchapter 1A. Assistive Technology

History

Revision note—

Sections 2465-2468 of this title, comprising this subchapter, were redesignated as sections 2467-2470 and internal references were revised in order to avoid conflict with 9 V.S.A. sections 2465 and 2466 as added by 1999, Nos. 65 and 67 (Adj. Sess.), respectively.

Applicability of enactment.

1999, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, provided: “This act [which enacted this subchapter and § 41c of this title], shall apply to assistive technology devices purchased by, or leased or transferred to a consumer after July 1, 2000.”

§ 2467. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Assistive device” means an item, piece of equipment, or product system, whether acquired commercially off-the-shelf, modified, or customized, that is used or designed to be used to increase, maintain, or improve any functional capability of an individual with disabilities. An assistive device system, that as a whole is within the definition of this term, is itself an assistive device, and, in such cases, this term also applies to each component product of the assistive device system that is itself ordinarily an assistive device. For this section only and no other purposes, this term is limited to:
    1. wheelchairs and scooters of any kind, including all their assistive devices and components that enhance the mobility or positioning of an individual, such as motorization, motorized positioning features, and the switches and controls for any motorized features; and
    2. computer equipment with voice output, artificial larynges, voice amplification devices, and other alternative and augmentative communication devices or any devices used for the purpose of communication.
  2. “Assistive device dealer” means a person who is in the business of selling assistive devices to consumers.
  3. “Assistive device lessor” means a person who leases an assistive device to a consumer, or who holds the lessor’s rights, under a written lease.
  4. “Collateral costs” means expenses incurred by a consumer in connection with the repair of a nonconformity, including the costs of obtaining an alternative assistive device.
  5. “Consumer” means any of the following:
    1. the purchaser of an assistive device, if the assistive device was purchased from an assistive device dealer or manufacturer for purposes other than resale;
    2. a person to whom the assistive device is transferred for purposes other than resale, if the transfer occurs before the expiration of an express warranty applicable to the assistive device;
    3. a person who may enforce the warranty; and
    4. a person who leases an assistive device from an assistive device lessor under a written lease.
  6. “Demonstrator” means an assistive device used primarily for the purpose of demonstration and tryout to the public.
  7. “Early termination cost” means any expense or obligation that an assistive device lessor incurs as a result of both the termination of a written lease before the termination date set forth in that lease and the return of an assistive device to a manufacturer pursuant to this section. Early termination cost includes a penalty for prepayment under a finance arrangement.
  8. “Early termination saving” means any expense or obligation that an assistive device lessor avoids as a result of both the termination of a written lease before that termination date set forth in that lease and the return of an assistive device to a manufacturer pursuant to this section. Early termination saving includes an interest charge that the assistive device lessor would have paid to finance the assistive device or, if the assistive device lessor does not finance the assistive device, the difference between the total amount for which the lease obligates the consumer during the period of the lease term remaining after the early termination and the present value of that amount at the date of the early termination.
  9. “Loaner” means an assistive technology device that is loaned to the user without charge while repairs are made to the user’s assistive technology device.
  10. “Manufacturer” means a person who manufactures or assembles assistive devices and agents of that person, including an importer, a distributor, factory branch, distributor branch, and any warrantors of the manufacturer’s assistive device, but does not include an assistive device dealer.
  11. “Nonconformity” means a condition or defect that substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of an assistive device and that is covered by an express warranty applicable to the assistive device or to a component of the assistive device, but does not include a condition or defect that is the result of abuse, use that exceeds the manufacturer’s recommendations, neglect, or unauthorized modification or alteration of the assistive device by a consumer.
  12. “Reasonable attempt to repair” means, within the terms of an express warranty applicable to a new assistive device:
    1. any nonconformity within the warranty that is either subject to repair by the manufacturer, assistive device lessor, or any of the manufacturer’s authorized assistive device dealers, for at least three times and a nonconformity continues; or
    2. the assistive device is out of service for an aggregate of at least 30 cumulative days because of warranty nonconformity.

HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Revision note

—2014. Substituted “As used in this subchapter” for “These definitions are for use in this subchapter only” in the introductory paragraph to conform to V.S.A. style.

Revision note—. This section was originally enacted as section 2465 of this title and was redesignated to avoid conflict with section 2465 as previously enacted by 1999, No. 65 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

Applicability of enactment.

See note set out preceding this section.

§ 2468. Warranty.

  1. A manufacturer who sells or leases an assistive device, only of the types listed in subdivisions 2467(1)(A) and (B) of this title, to a consumer, either directly or through an assistive device dealer, shall furnish the consumer with an express warranty for the assistive device. By the terms of or in the absence of an express warranty from the manufacturer, the manufacturer shall be deemed to have expressly warranted to the consumer of an assistive device, only as defined in subdivisions 2467(1)(A) and (B) of this title, that, for a period of at least one year from the date of first delivery to the consumer, the assistive device:
    1. has no defects in parts or performance; and
    2. is free from any condition and defect that would substantially impair the device’s use, value, or safety to the consumer.
  2. The manufacturer, through the assistive device lessor or assistive device dealer, shall provide the consumer with a loaner if the assistive device, listed in subdivisions 2467(1)(A) and (B) of this title, has any condition or defect that would substantially impair the device’s use, value, or safety to the consumer and that cannot be remedied within one business day.
  3. If a new assistive device listed in subdivisions 2467(1)(A) and (B) of this title does not conform to an applicable express warranty and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, the assistive device lessor, or any of the manufacturer’s authorized assistive device dealers, and makes the assistive device available for repair before one year after return delivery of the assistive device to the consumer, the nonconformity shall be repaired at no charge to the consumer, including parts, labor, shipping, delivery, and all other costs.
  4. If, after a reasonable attempt to repair, the nonconformity is not repaired, then at the direction of a consumer described in subdivisions 2467(5)(A), (B) or (C) of this title, the manufacturer shall do one of the following:
    1. Accept return of the assistive device and replace the assistive device with a comparable new assistive device and refund any collateral costs.
    2. Accept return of the assistive device and refund to the consumer and to any holder of a perfected security interest in the consumer’s assistive device, as their interest may appear, the full purchase price plus any finance charge amount paid by the consumer at the point of sale and collateral costs, less a reasonable allowance for use. A reasonable allowance for use may not exceed the amount obtained by multiplying the full purchase price of the assistive device by a fraction, the denominator of which is 1,825 and the numerator of which is the number of days that the assistive device was used before the consumer first reported the nonconformity to the assistive device dealer.
    3. With respect to a consumer described in subdivision 2467(5)(D) of this title, accept return of the assistive device, refund to the assistive device lessor and to any holder of a perfected security interest in the assistive device, as their interest may appear, the current value of the written lease and refund to the consumer the amount that the consumer paid under the written lease, plus any collateral costs, less a reasonable allowance for use.
  5. The current value of the written lease equals the total amount for which that lease obligates the consumer during the period of the lease remaining after its early termination, plus the assistive device dealer’s early termination costs and the value of the assistive device at the lease expiration date if the lease sets forth that value, less the assistive device lessor’s early termination savings.
  6. A reasonable allowance for use may not exceed the amount obtained by multiplying the total amount for which the written lease obligates the consumer by a fraction, the denominator of which is 1,825 and the numerator of which is a number of days that the consumer used the assistive device before first reporting the nonconformity to the manufacturer, assistive device lessor or assistive device dealer.
  7. None of the requirements of this subchapter shall be construed to diminish existing assistive device warranties.

HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2021, No. 20 , § 18.

History

Revision note—

This section was originally enacted as section 2466 of this title and was redesignated to avoid conflict with section 2466 as previously enacted by 1999, No. 67 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

Substituted “subdivisions 2467(1)(A) and (B)” for “subdivisions 2465(1)(A) and (B)” in subsecs. (a)-(c) to conform reference to the redesignation of that section.

Substituted “subdivisions 2467(5)(A), (B) or (C)” for “subdivisions 2465(5)(A), (B) or (C)” in the introductory paragraph of subsec. (d) to conform reference to the redesignation of that section.

Substituted “subdivision 2467(5)(D)” for “subdivision 2465(5)(D)” in subsec. (d)(3) to conform reference to the redesignation of that section.

Amendments

—2021. Subsec. (b): Substituted “cannot” for “can not” preceding “be remedied”.

Applicability of enactment.

See note set out preceding § 2467 of this title.

§ 2469. Loaners.

A loaner must:

  1. be in good working order;
  2. perform the essential functions of the assistive technology device that is being repaired, considering the needs of the user;
  3. not create a threat to the safety of the user; and
  4. be provided to the consumer by the manufacturer through the assistive device dealer within two business days after notice from the consumer of the nonconformity, except in the case of an assistive device that requires extensive custom retrofit in order to perform the essential functions. Such a custom device shall be provided as soon as reasonably possible, but in no case later than 10 business days after notice.

HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Revision note—

This section was enacted as § 2467 but was redesignated as § 2469 to conform classification to V.S.A. style.

Applicability of enactment.

See note set out preceding § 2467 of this title.

§ 2470. Remedies.

  1. To receive a comparable new assistive device or a refund due under subsection 2468(d) of this title, a consumer shall offer to the manufacturer of the assistive device having the nonconformity to transfer possession of that assistive device to that manufacturer. No later than 30 days after that offer, the manufacturer shall provide the consumer with the comparable assistive device or refund. When the manufacturer provides the new assistive device or refund, the consumer shall return the assistive device having the nonconformity to the manufacturer, along with any endorsements necessary to transfer real possession to the manufacturer.
  2. To receive a refund due under subsection 2468(d) of this title, a consumer described in subdivision 2467(5)(D) of this title shall offer to return the assistive device having the nonconformity to its manufacturer. No later than 30 days after that offer, the manufacturer shall provide the refund to the consumer. When the manufacturer provides the refund, the consumer shall return to the manufacturer the assistive device having the nonconformity.
  3. To receive a refund due under subsection 2468(d) of this title, an assistive device lessor shall offer to transfer possession of the assistive device having the nonconformity to its manufacturer. No later than 30 days after that offer, the manufacturer shall provide the refund to the assistive device lessor. When the manufacturer provides the refund, the assistive device lessor shall provide to the manufacturer any endorsements necessary to transfer legal possession to the manufacturer.
  4. If the assistive device was a covered benefit under a health insurance policy or health benefit plan, then the health insurer or other entity providing the benefit shall be subrogated to the consumer’s right of recovery to the extent of the benefit provided.
  5. No person shall enforce the lease against the consumer after the consumer offers to return the assistive device having the non-conformity pursuant to this section or returns the assistive device to the vendor pursuant to this section.
  6. No assistive device returned by a consumer or assistive device lessor in this State, or by a consumer or assistive device lessor in another state under a similar law of that state, may be sold or leased again in this State, unless full written disclosure of the reasons for return is made to any prospective buyer or lessee.
  7. This subchapter shall not be construed to limit rights or remedies available to a consumer under any other law.
  8. Any waiver by a consumer of rights under this subchapter is void.
  9. A violation of this subchapter or rules adopted under this subchapter is deemed to be an unfair or deceptive practice in commerce and a violation of section 2453 of this title. The Attorney General has the same authority to make rules, conduct civil investigations, and enter into assurances of discontinuance as provided under subchapter 1 of this chapter.
  10. A consumer aggrieved by a violation of this subchapter or a violation of rules adopted under this subchapter may bring an action in Superior Court for appropriate equitable relief, the amount of the consumer’s damages, punitive damages in the case of a willful violation, the consideration or the value of the consideration given by the consumer, and reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.

HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Revision note—

This section was enacted as § 2468 but was redesignated as § 2470 to conform classification to V.S.A. style.

Substituted “subsection 2468(d)” for “subsection 2466(d)” in subsecs. (a)-(c) to conform reference to the redesignation of that section.

Substituted “subdivision 2467(5)(D)” for “subdivision 2465(5)(D)” in subsec. (b) to conform reference to the redesignation of that section.

Applicability of enactment.

See note set out preceding § 2467 of this title.

Subchapter 1B. Children’s Product Safety

§ 2470a. Definition.

As used in this subchapter, “children’s product” means a product that is designed or intended for the care of or use by children under six years of age, whether or not it is also designed or intended for the care of or use by children six years of age or older, and the product is designed or intended to come into contact with the child while the product is used. A product is not a “children’s product” for purposes of this subchapter if:

  1. it may be used by or for the care of a child under six years of age, but is designed or intended for use by the general population and not solely or primarily for use by or the care of a child; or
  2. it is a medication, drug, or food or is intended to be ingested.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 42 , § 3.

§ 2470b. Unsafe children’s products; prohibition.

  1. A children’s product is deemed to be unsafe for purposes of this subchapter if it meets any of the following criteria:
    1. It does not conform to all federal laws and regulations setting forth standards for the children’s product, including standards endorsed or established by the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission and the American Society for Testing and Materials.
    2. It has been recalled for any reason by an agency of the federal government or the product’s manufacturer, distributor, or importer, and the recall has not been rescinded.
    3. An agency of the federal government has issued a warning that a specific product’s intended use constitutes a safety hazard, and the warning has not been rescinded.
  2. The Department of Health shall create or adopt by reference and shall maintain and update a comprehensive list of children’s products that it has identified as meeting any of the criteria set forth in subdivisions (a)(1) through (3) of this section. The Department of Health shall make the comprehensive list available to the public at no cost and shall post it on its Internet website. The Department shall also encourage links to and from state, federal, and private Internet websites that describe children’s product standards, provide information on children or children’s products, or advertise or sell children’s products.
  3. It shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce and a violation of section 2453 of this title, subject to enforcement and subject to the rights and remedies provided by subchapter 1 of this chapter, for a seller or lessor to remanufacture or retrofit, unless in compliance with the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, or for a seller or lessor to sell, contract to sell, or resell, lease, sublet, or otherwise place in the stream of commerce, on or after January 1, 2002, a children’s product that appears on the list of children’s products created and maintained under subsection (b) of this section.
    1. A listed children’s product may be retrofitted if the retrofit has been approved or sanctioned by the agency of the federal government issuing the recall or warning or the agency responsible for approving the retrofit, if different from the agency issuing the recall or warning. A retrofitted children’s product may be sold or leased if it is accompanied at the time of sale or lease by a notice containing: (d) (1) A listed children’s product may be retrofitted if the retrofit has been approved or sanctioned by the agency of the federal government issuing the recall or warning or the agency responsible for approving the retrofit, if different from the agency issuing the recall or warning. A retrofitted children’s product may be sold or leased if it is accompanied at the time of sale or lease by a notice containing:
      1. a description of the original problem that made the recalled product unsafe;
      2. a description of the retrofit that explains how the original problem was eliminated and declaring that it is now safe to use for a child under six years of age; and
      3. the name and address of the person who accomplished the retrofit.
    2. The seller or lessor is responsible for ensuring that the notice is present with the retrofitted product at the time of sale or lease. A retrofit is exempt from the provisions of this subchapter if:
      1. the retrofit is for a children’s product that requires assembly by the consumer, the approved retrofit is provided with the product by the seller or lessor, and the retrofit is accompanied at the time of sale or lease by instructions explaining how to apply the retrofit; or
      2. the seller or lessor of a previously unsold or unleased product accomplishes the repair, approved or recommended by an agency of the federal government, prior to sale or lease.
  4. It shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce and a violation of section 2453 of this title, subject to enforcement and subject to the rights and remedies provided by subchapter 1 of this chapter, for a person to manufacture and to sell, contract to sell, resell, lease, sublet, or otherwise place in the stream of commerce, on or after January 1, 2002, a children’s product that does not conform to all federal laws and regulations setting forth standards for the children’s product, including standards endorsed or established by the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission and the American Society for Testing and Materials.
  5. At least annually, the Department of Health shall notify day care facilities and family child care homes licensed or registered under 33 V.S.A. chapter 35 of the list of children’s products created and maintained under subsection (b) of this section.
  6. At least annually, the Department of Health shall notify pediatricians licensed under 26 V.S.A. chapter 23 of the list of children’s products created and maintained under subsection (b) of this section.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 42 , § 3; amended 2005, No. 174 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

History

References in text.

The federal Consumer Product Safety Commission, referred to in subdiv. (a)(1), and subsec. (e), is codified as 16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(b)(14)(i).

Amendments

—2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Substituted “family child care homes” for “family day care homes”.

§ 2470c. Exception.

A seller or lessor shall not be held in violation of any provision of this subchapter if the specific children’s product sold or leased is not deemed unsafe under subsection 2470b(a) of this title or was not included on the Department of Health’s list 14 days before the sale or commencement of the lease.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 42 , § 3.

§ 2470d. Penalty; remedies.

  1. A seller or lessor who willfully and knowingly violates any provision of this subchapter shall be imprisoned not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both.
  2. The rights and remedies available under this subchapter are in addition to any other rights and remedies that may exist in law or in equity for an aggrieved party, or for the Attorney General.

HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 42 , § 3.

Subchapter 1C. Lead in Consumer Products

History

Legislative findings—Regulation of lead in food and in vitamins and other supplements. 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 4 provides: “The general assembly finds:

“(1) Lead is highly toxic to humans, particularly to young children.

“(2) Ingesting lead can cause irreversible damage that results in long-lasting, permanent neurological damage, such as a decrease in I.Q.

“(3) The effects of lead exposure are cumulative, and a child may be harmed by ingesting very small amounts of lead.

“(4) Over the years there have been public reports of lead in certain food products, including fruit juices, honey, candy, chocolate, and eggs.

“(5) The current statutory definition of ‘children’s products’ includes food, vitamins, and supplements.

“(6) Although there is no single governmental limit on lead in food, such limits as do exist are much lower than the 100 parts per million (ppm) limit on lead in ‘children’s products’ under Vermont law. For example, the federal Food and Drug Administration has set a 0.005 ppm limit on lead in bottled water and has recommended a 0.1 ppm limit on lead in candy.”

§ 2470e. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Children’s product” means any consumer product marketed for use by children under the age of 12 or whose substantial use or handling by children under 12 years of age is reasonably foreseeable, including toys, furniture, jewelry, personal care products, clothing, and food containers and packaging.
    1. “Contain or containing lead,” unaccompanied by a specific standard, means containing or having a surface coating containing the following amount of lead by weight of lead or lead compound, unless the Commissioner of Health, in consultation with the Attorney General by rule, reduces this percentage generally or with respect to specific products: (2) (A) “Contain or containing lead,” unaccompanied by a specific standard, means containing or having a surface coating containing the following amount of lead by weight of lead or lead compound, unless the Commissioner of Health, in consultation with the Attorney General by rule, reduces this percentage generally or with respect to specific products:
      1. 0.06 percent as of October 1, 2008;
      2. 0.03 percent as of July 1, 2009; and
      3. 0.01 percent as of January 1, 2010.
    2. If the standard set under this subdivision (2) is preempted by a federal standard as to any class of products, then “contain or containing lead,” unaccompanied by a specific standard, means the lowest such federal standards and federal effective dates applicable to such a class of products.
  2. “Nonresidential paints and primers” does not mean artists’ supplies.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2011, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. May 18, 2012.

History

Amendments

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (1): Deleted “vitamins and other supplements” preceding “personal care products, clothing” and deleted “food,” preceding “and food containers”.

§ 2470f. Prohibition of lead in children’s products.

Except to the extent specifically preempted by federal law, no person shall manufacture, regardless of location, for sale in, offer for sale, sell in or into the stream of commerce, or otherwise introduce into the stream of commerce in Vermont any children’s product any component part of which contains lead. This prohibition shall not apply to:

  1. Any part of a children’s product that is not accessible to a child through normal and reasonably foreseeable use and abuse of such product. A component part is not accessible under this section if such component part is not physically exposed by reason of a sealed covering or casing and does not become physically exposed through reasonably foreseeable use and abuse of the product, except that paint, coatings, and electroplating shall not be considered barriers that would render lead in the substrate inaccessible to a child under this subdivision.
  2. Any component of a children’s product that is intended for children age eight or under, that complies with any more stringent federal or European Union standard for lead in consumer products or with a similar standard applicable in states with a total population of 25 million, and that is contained within a battery compartment that cannot be opened without a coin, screwdriver, or other common household tool.
  3. Any power cord, USB cable, audio-visual cable, jack, connector, or similar device or component used in connection with or attached to a children’s product that:
    1. conducts electric current;
    2. is not a small part, as defined by the Consumer Product Safety Commission in 16 C.F.R. part 1501;
    3. does not have a casing or coating that contains lead; and
    4. complies with the most stringent standard for lead in consumer products adopted by federal law, by states with a total population of at least 25 million, or by the European Union.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 2470g. Prohibition of lead in jewelry.

Except to the extent specifically preempted by federal law and in addition to the prohibition in section 2470f of this subchapter, no person shall manufacture, regardless of location, for sale in, offer for sale, or sell in or into the stream of commerce, or otherwise introduce into the stream of commerce in Vermont any article of jewelry or other metal decorative item containing lead that is not a children’s product as defined in section 2470e of this title, where the article, or any detachable part of the article, is the size of a small part as defined by the Consumer Product Safety Commission in 16 C.F.R. part 1501, unless the article is:

  1. expressly and prominently advertised as adult jewelry;
  2. not commonly understood to be an article for use by a child under age 12; and
  3. accompanied by a point-of-sale disclosure prescribed by the Attorney General to the effect that the article may contain lead at or above the prevailing legal limit for lead in children’s products, if that is true.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 2470h. Consumer warnings; notification; phase-outs.

Except to the extent specifically preempted by federal law:

  1. Wheel weights.   Beginning January 1, 2010, the State of Vermont shall not use wheel weights containing lead in vehicles owned by the State or vehicles operated by the State under a long-term lease. Beginning September 1, 2011, no person shall sell or offer for sale in or into the State of Vermont a new motor vehicle with wheel weights containing lead.
    1. Plumbing fixtures and related supplies.   As prescribed by the Attorney General, beginning January 1, 2009, and ending December 31, 2009, any person who sells or offers for sale in or into the State of Vermont plumbing fixtures whose wetted surfaces contain more than a weighted average of 0.25 percent lead shall clearly and conspicuously post a warning at the point of sale stating that these products contain lead and shall also provide to each buyer prior to sale information on the risks of lead exposure. (2) (A) Plumbing fixtures and related supplies.   As prescribed by the Attorney General, beginning January 1, 2009, and ending December 31, 2009, any person who sells or offers for sale in or into the State of Vermont plumbing fixtures whose wetted surfaces contain more than a weighted average of 0.25 percent lead shall clearly and conspicuously post a warning at the point of sale stating that these products contain lead and shall also provide to each buyer prior to sale information on the risks of lead exposure.
    2. Beginning January 1, 2010, no person shall sell or offer for sale in or into the State of Vermont, or use in the State of Vermont, solder or flux for plumbing containing more than 0.2 percent lead, or plumbing fixtures whose wetted surfaces contain more than a weighted average of 0.25 percent lead.
    3. As prescribed by the Attorney General, beginning January 1, 2009, any person who sells or offers for sale in or into the State of Vermont solder or flux containing more than 0.2 percent lead shall clearly and conspicuously post a warning at the point of sale stating that these products contain lead and shall also provide to each buyer prior to sale information on the risks of lead exposure.
    4. For the purpose of this subdivision (2) of this section:
      1. the term “plumbing fixtures” means pipes, pipe and plumbing fittings, and fixtures used to convey or dispense water for human consumption;
      2. the “weighted average” lead content shall be calculated by using the following formula: the percentage of lead content within each component that comes into contact with water shall be multiplied by the percent of the total wetted surface of the entire pipe and pipe fitting, plumbing fitting, or fixture represented in each component containing lead; these percentages shall be added; and the sum shall constitute the weighted average lead content of the pipe and pipe fitting, plumbing fitting, or fixture.
  2. Nonresidential paints and primers.   As prescribed by the Attorney General, beginning January 1, 2009, and ending December 31, 2010, any person who sells or offers for sale in or into the State of Vermont nonresidential paints and primers containing lead shall clearly and conspicuously post a warning at the point of sale stating that these products contain lead and shall also provide to each buyer prior to sale information on the risks of lead exposure. Beginning January 1, 2011, no person shall sell or offer for sale in or into the State of Vermont nonresidential paints or primers containing lead. Beginning January 1, 2012, no person shall use nonresidential paints or primers containing lead in the State of Vermont.
  3. Salvage building materials.   As prescribed by the Attorney General, beginning January 1, 2009, any person in commerce who sells or offers for sale in or into the State of Vermont salvage building materials made prior to 1978 shall clearly and conspicuously post a warning at the point of sale stating that these products may contain lead and shall also provide to each buyer prior to sale information on the risks of lead exposure.
  4. Other.   The Attorney General, in consultation with the Commissioner of Health, may by rule require warnings, notifications, or a combination of these relating to other products containing lead.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 2470i. Prohibition on removal of labels.

No person in commerce shall remove from a consumer product any warning label affixed to it that relates in whole or in part to lead or lead hazards and which label is required by this State, the federal government, or any other state or country.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 2470j. Prohibition on providing substantial assistance.

No person shall provide substantial assistance to a person in violation of section 2470f, 2470g, 2470h, or 2470i of this title with knowledge or reason to know of the violation.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 2470k. Violations.

  1. A violation of this subchapter is deemed to be a violation of section 2453 of this title.
  2. The Attorney General has the same authority to make rules, conduct civil investigations, enter into assurances of discontinuance, and bring civil actions, and private parties have the same rights and remedies, as provided under subchapter 1 of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 2470l. Scope.

  1. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to regulate firearms, ammunition, or components thereof, hunting or fishing equipment or components thereof, lead pellets from air rifles, shooting ranges, or circumstances resulting from shooting, handling, storing, casting, or reloading ammunition.
  2. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter the existing authority of the Agency of Natural Resources to regulate the lead content of products used in connection with fishing and hunting.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

Subchapter 1D. Third-Party Discount Membership Programs

History

Revision note

—2012. This subchapter was originally enacted as Subchapter 1C but was renumbered as Subchapter 1D to avoid a conflict with the existing Subchapter 1C consisting of §§ 2470e-2470l.

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.1 inserted “Third-Party” preceding “Discount Membership” in the subchapter heading.

§ 2470aa. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Billing information” means any data that enables a seller of a third-party discount membership program to access a consumer’s credit or debit card, bank, or other account, but does not include the consumer’s name, e-mail address, telephone number, or mailing address. For credit card and debit card accounts, billing information includes the full account number, card type, and expiration date, and, if necessary, the security code. For accounts at a financial institution, “billing information” includes the full account number and routing number and, if necessary, the name of the financial institution holding the account.
  2. A “third-party discount membership program” is a program that entitles consumers to receive discounts, rebates, rewards, or similar incentives on the purchase of goods or services or both, in whole or in part, from any third party.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; amended 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.1.

History

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Introductory paragraph: Substituted “As used in” for “In”.

Subdivs. (1) and (2): Inserted “third-party” preceding “discount membership”.

§ 2470bb. Applicability.

  1. A third-party discount membership program is a good or service within the meaning of subdivision 2451a(2) of this chapter.
  2. This subchapter applies only to persons who are regularly and primarily engaged in trade or commerce in this State in connection with offering or selling third-party discount membership programs.
  3. This subchapter shall not apply to an electronic payment system, as defined in section 2480o of this title, or to a financial institution, as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 11101(32) .

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; amended 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.1; 2021, No. 20 , § 19.

History

Amendments

—2021. Subsec. (a): Substituted “subdivision 2451a(2)” for “subsection 2451a(b)”.

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Added the subsec. designations and in subsecs. (a) and (b) inserted “third-party” preceding “discount membership”.

§ 2470cc. Required disclosures; consent.

  1. No person shall charge or attempt to charge a consumer for a third-party discount membership program, or to renew a third-party discount membership program beyond the term expressly agreed to by the consumer or the term permitted under section 2470ff of this title, whichever is shorter, unless:
    1. before obtaining the consumer’s billing information, the person has clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer all material terms of the transaction, including:
      1. a description of the types of goods and services on which a discount is available;
      2. the name of the third-party discount membership program, the name and address of the seller of the program, and a telephone number, e-mail address, or other contact information the consumer may use to contact the seller with questions concerning the operation of the program;
      3. the amount or a good faith estimate of the typical discount on each category of goods and services;
      4. the cost of the program, including the amount of any periodic charges, how often such charges are imposed, and the method of payment;
      5. the right to cancel and to terminate the program, which shall be no more restrictive than as required by section 2470ee of this subchapter, and a toll-free telephone number and e-mail address that can be used to cancel the membership;
      6. the maximum length of membership, as described in section 2470ff of this subchapter;
      7. in the event that the program is offered on the Internet through a link or referral from another business’s website, the fact that the seller is not affiliated with that business; and
      8. the fact that periodic notices of the program billings will be e-mailed or mailed to the consumer, as the case may be, consistent with section 2470dd of this title; and
    2. the person has received express informed consent for the charge from the consumer whose credit or debit card, bank, or other account will be charged, by:
      1. obtaining from the consumer:
        1. the consumer’s billing information; and
        2. the consumer’s name and address and a means to contact the consumer; and
      2. requiring the consumer to perform an additional affirmative action, such as clicking on an online confirmation button, checking an online box that indicates the consumer’s consent to be charged the amount disclosed, or expressly giving consent over the telephone.
  2. A person who sells third-party discount membership programs shall retain evidence of a consumer’s express informed consent for at least three years after the consent is given.
  3. A person who sells a third-party discount membership program shall provide to a consumer on the receipt for the underlying good or service:
    1. confirmation that the consumer has signed up for a discount membership program;
    2. the price the consumer will be charged for the program;
    3. the date on which the consumer will first be charged for the program;
    4. the frequency of charges for the program; and
    5. information concerning the consumer’s right to cancel the program and a toll-free telephone number, address, and e-mail address a consumer may use to cancel the program.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; amended 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.1.

History

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsecs. (a), (b): Inserted “third-party” preceding “discount membership”.

Subdiv. (a)(1)(B): Added “, and a telephone number, e-mail address, or other contact information the consumer may use to contact the seller with questions concerning the operation of the program” following “seller of the program”.

Subsec. (c): Added.

§ 2470dd. Periodic notices.

  1. A person who periodically charges a consumer for a third-party discount membership program shall send the consumer a notice of the charge no less frequently than every three months from the date of initial enrollment that clearly and conspicuously discloses:
    1. a description of the program;
    2. the name of the third-party discount membership program and the name and address of the seller of the program;
    3. the cost of the program, including the amount of any periodic charges, how often such charges are imposed, and the method of payment;
    4. the right to cancel and to terminate the program, which shall be no more restrictive than as required by section 2470ee of this subchapter, and a toll-free number and e-mail address that can be used to cancel the membership; and
    5. the maximum length of membership, as described in section 2470ff of this subchapter.
  2. The notice specified in subsection (a) of this section:
    1. shall be sent:
      1. to the consumer’s last known e-mail address, if the consumer enrolled in the third-party discount membership program online or by e-mail, with the subject line, “IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR DISCOUNT PROGRAM BILLING,” or substantially similar words, provided that the sender takes reasonable steps to verify that the e-mail has been opened; or
      2. otherwise by first-class mail to the consumer’s last known mailing address, with the heading on the enclosure and outside envelope, “IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR DISCOUNT PROGRAM BILLING,” or substantially similar words; and
    2. shall not include any solicitation or advertising.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; amended 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.1.

History

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “third-party” preceding “discount membership” wherever it appeared throughout the section.

§ 2470ee. Cancellation and termination.

  1. In addition to any other right to revoke an offer, a consumer may cancel the purchase of a third-party discount membership program until midnight on the 30th day after the date the consumer has given express informed consent to be charged for the program. If the consumer cancels within the 30-day period, the seller of the third-party discount membership program shall, within 10 days of receiving the notice of cancellation, provide a full refund to the consumer.
    1. Notice of cancellation shall be deemed given when deposited in a mailbox properly addressed and postage prepaid or when e-mailed to the e-mail address of the seller of the third-party discount membership program. (b) (1) Notice of cancellation shall be deemed given when deposited in a mailbox properly addressed and postage prepaid or when e-mailed to the e-mail address of the seller of the third-party discount membership program.
    2. A consumer may cancel a third-party discount membership program verbally by contacting the seller at a toll-free telephone number that the seller provides for that purpose.
  2. In addition to the right to cancel described in this subchapter, a consumer may terminate a third-party discount membership program at any time by providing notice to the seller by one of the methods described in this section. In that case, the consumer shall not be obligated to make any further payments under the program and shall not be entitled to any discounts under the program for any period of time after the last month for which payment has been made.
  3. If the seller of a third-party discount membership program cancels the program for any reason other than nonpayment by the consumer, the seller shall make pro rata reimbursement to the consumer of all periodic charges paid by the consumer for periods of time after cancellation. Prior to such cancellation, the seller shall first provide reasonable notice and an explanation of the cancellation in writing to the consumer.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; amended 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.1.

History

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “third-party” preceding “discount membership” wherever it appeared throughout the section, and in subsec. (b), added the subdiv. (1) designation and added subdiv. (2).

§ 2470ff. Maximum length of plan.

No person shall sell, or offer for sale, a third-party discount membership program lasting longer than 18 months.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; amended 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.1.

History

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “third-party” preceding “discount membership”.

§ 2470gg. Billing information.

No person who offers or sells third-party discount membership programs shall obtain billing information relating to a consumer except directly from the consumer.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; amended 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.1.

History

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “third-party” preceding “discount membership”.

§ 2470hh. Violations.

  1. A person who violates this subchapter commits an unfair and deceptive act in trade and commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title.
  2. The Attorney General has the same authority to make rules, conduct civil investigations, enter into assurances of discontinuance, and bring civil actions as is provided under subchapter 1 of this chapter.
  3. It is an unfair and deceptive act and practice in commerce for any person to provide substantial assistance to the seller of a third-party discount membership program that has engaged or is engaging in an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce when the person or the person’s authorized agent:
    1. receives notice from a regulatory, law enforcement, or similar governmental authority that the seller of the third-party discount membership program is in violation of this subchapter;
    2. knows from information received or in its possession that the seller of the third-party discount membership program is in violation of this subchapter; or
    3. consciously avoids knowing that the seller of the third-party discount membership program is in violation of this subchapter.
  4. Subject to section 2452 of this title, a person who provides only incidental assistance, which does not further the sale of a third-party discount membership program, to the seller of the program, or who does not receive a benefit from providing assistance to the seller of a discount membership, shall not be liable under this section unless the person receives notice, knows, or consciously avoids knowing, pursuant to subdivision (c)(1), (2), or (3) of this section, that a third-party discount membership program is in violation of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; amended 2015, No. 55 , § 7; 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.1.

History

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “third-party” preceding “discount membership” throughout the section.

—2015. Section amended generally.

Subchapter 1E. Add-on Discount Membership Programs

§ 2470ii. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. An “add-on discount membership program” is a program that entitles consumers to receive discounts, rebates, rewards, or similar incentives on the purchase of goods or services or both, sold to a consumer during the purchase of a different good or service using the same billing information.
  2. “Billing information” means any data that enables a seller of an add-on discount membership program to access a consumer’s credit or debit card, bank, or other account, but does not include the consumer’s name, e-mail address, telephone number, or mailing address. For credit card and debit card accounts, billing information includes the full account number, card type, and expiration date and, if necessary, the security code. For accounts at a financial institution, “billing information” includes the full account number and routing number and, if necessary, the name of the financial institution holding the account.

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.2.

§ 2470jj. Applicability.

  1. An add-on discount membership program is a good or service within the meaning of subdivision 2451a(2) of this title.
  2. This subchapter applies only to persons who are regularly engaged in offering or selling add-on discount membership programs.
  3. This subchapter shall not apply to an electronic payment system, as defined in section 2480o of this title, or to a financial institution, as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 11101(32) .

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.2; amended 2021, No. 20 , § 20.

History

Amendments

—2021. Subsec. (a): Substituted “subdivision 2451a(2)” for “subsection 2451a(b)”.

§ 2470kk. Required disclosures; consent.

  1. No person shall charge or attempt to charge a consumer for an add-on discount membership program or to renew an add-on discount membership program beyond the term expressly agreed to by the consumer, unless:
    1. before obtaining the consumer’s billing information, the person has clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer all material terms of the transaction, including:
      1. a description of the types of goods and services on which a discount is available;
      2. the name of the add-on discount membership program, the name and address of the seller of the program, and a telephone number, e-mail address, or other contact information the consumer may use to contact the seller with questions concerning the operation of the program;
      3. the cost of the program, including the amount of any periodic charges, how often such charges are imposed, and the method of payment; and
      4. the right to cancel and to terminate the program, which shall be no more restrictive than as required by section 2470ll of this title, and a toll-free telephone number and e-mail address that can be used to cancel the membership;
    2. before obtaining the consumer’s billing information, the person has received express informed consent for the add-on membership program from the consumer whose credit or debit card, bank, or other account will be charged, by requiring the consumer to perform an additional affirmative action, such as clicking on an online confirmation button, checking an online box that indicates the consumer’s consent to be charged the amount disclosed, or expressly giving consent over the telephone; and
    3. after providing the disclosures and obtaining the consent required by subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, obtaining from the consumer:
      1. the consumer’s billing information; and
      2. the consumer’s name and address and a means to contact the consumer.
  2. A person who sells an add-on discount membership program shall retain evidence of a consumer’s express informed consent for at least three years after the consent is given.
  3. A person who sells an add-on discount membership program shall provide to a consumer on the receipt for the underlying good or service:
    1. confirmation that the consumer has signed up for a discount membership program;
    2. the price the consumer will be charged for the program;
    3. the date on which the consumer will first be charged for the program;
    4. the frequency of charges for the program; and
    5. information concerning the consumer’s right to cancel the program and a toll-free telephone number, address, and e-mail address a consumer may use to cancel the program.

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.2.

§ 2470ll. Cancellation and termination.

  1. In addition to any other right to revoke an offer, a consumer may cancel the purchase of an add-on discount membership program until midnight on the 30th day after the date the consumer has given express informed consent to be charged for the program. If the consumer cancels within the 30-day period, the seller of the add-on discount membership program shall, within 10 days of receiving the notice of cancellation, provide a full refund to the consumer less the value of any discount the consumer has received by using the add-on discount membership program.
    1. Notice of cancellation shall be deemed given when deposited in a mailbox properly addressed and postage prepaid or when e-mailed to the e-mail address of the seller of the add-on discount membership program. (b) (1) Notice of cancellation shall be deemed given when deposited in a mailbox properly addressed and postage prepaid or when e-mailed to the e-mail address of the seller of the add-on discount membership program.
    2. A consumer may cancel an add-on discount membership program verbally by contacting the seller at a toll-free telephone number that the seller provides for that purpose.
  2. In addition to the right to cancel described in this subchapter, a consumer may terminate an add-on discount membership program at any time by providing notice to the seller by one of the methods described in this section. In that case, the consumer shall not be obligated to make any further payments under the program and shall not be entitled to any discounts under the program for any period of time after the last month for which payment has been made.
  3. If the seller of an add-on discount membership program cancels the program for any reason other than nonpayment by the consumer, the seller shall make pro rata reimbursement to the consumer of all periodic charges paid by the consumer for periods of time after cancellation. Prior to such cancellation, the seller shall first provide reasonable notice and an explanation of the cancellation in writing to the consumer.

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.2.

§ 2470mm. Billing information.

A person who offers or sells a discount membership program may not obtain billing information relating to a consumer except directly from the consumer.

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.2.

§ 2470nn. Violations.

  1. A person who violates this subchapter commits an unfair and deceptive act in trade and commerce in violation of section 2453 of this title.
  2. The Attorney General has the same authority to make rules, conduct civil investigations, enter into assurances of discontinuance, and bring civil actions as is provided under subchapter 1 of this chapter.
  3. It is an unfair and deceptive act and practice in commerce for any person to provide substantial assistance to the seller of an add-on discount membership program that has engaged or is engaging in an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce, when the person or the person’s authorized agent:
    1. receives notice from a regulatory, law enforcement, or similar governmental authority that the seller of the add-on discount membership program is in violation of this subchapter;
    2. knows from information received or in its possession that the seller of the add-on discount membership program is in violation of this subchapter; or
    3. consciously avoids knowing that the seller of the add-on discount membership program is in violation of this subchapter.
  4. Subject to section 2452 of this title, a person who provides only incidental assistance, which does not further the sale of an add-on discount membership program, to the seller of the program, or who does not receive a benefit from providing assistance to the seller of an add-on discount membership, shall not be liable under this section unless the person receives notice, knows, or consciously avoids knowing, pursuant to subdivision (c)(1), (2), or (3) of this section, that an add-on discount membership program is in violation of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § E.2.

Subchapter 2. Charitable Solicitations

CROSS REFERENCES

Regulation of charitable fundraising relative to pay-per-call services, see § 2509 of this title.

Taxation of paid fundraisers, see 32 V.S.A. § 9710 .

§ 2471. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Charitable” means related to a charitable purpose.
  2. “Charitable organization” means any organization that is or holds itself out to be furthering any charitable purpose.
  3. “Charitable purpose” means any benevolent, educational, philanthropic, humane, patriotic, social welfare, advocacy, public health, environmental conservation, or civic objective or any objective of law enforcement officers, firefighters, or other persons who protect the public safety.
  4. “Contribution” means the grant, promise, or pledge of money, credit, financial assistance, or other goods or services in part or in whole for a charitable purpose.
  5. “Contributor” means a person who makes a contribution.
  6. “Fundraising campaign” means an effort undertaken during a specific time period by a paid fundraiser to solicit contributions on behalf of a charitable organization.
  7. “Gross receipts” mean all receipts before deduction of any administrative or operating expenses.
  8. “Paid fundraiser” means a person who, for financial consideration, solicits contributions from persons in this State, either directly or through employees, agents, or those with whom the paid fundraiser is in privity.  A paid fundraiser does not include:
    1. Any person who, for compensation, plans, manages, advises, or consults in connection with the solicitation of contributions in this State, but does not solicit contributions; except that if the compensation is in whole or in part dependent on the number or value of contributions received, the person shall be considered a paid fundraiser.
    2. Any person who for profit is regularly and primarily engaged in trade or commerce in this State other than in connection with the raising of funds for charitable purposes and who represents to the public that an amount per unit of goods or services purchased by the public will benefit a charitable purpose.
    3. A bona fide officer or employee of a charitable organization.
    4. A person who solicits for an educational institution at which he or she is a bona fide student, unless the person is paid compensation that is in whole or in part dependent upon the number or value of contributions received.
  9. “Solicit” and “solicitation” mean the direct or indirect request for a contribution, including the solicitor’s offer or attempt to sell any property, rights, services, or other thing, in connection with which:
    1. The name of any charitable organization or name similar to any charitable organization is used as an inducement for making the contribution or consummating the sale.
    2. Any statement is made that implies that the whole or any part of the contribution will be donated to any charitable organization or will go to any charitable purpose.  A solicitation shall be deemed to have taken place when the request for a contribution is made and at the place where the request is received, whether or not the person making the solicitation receives a contribution.  A request or appeal on behalf of a candidate for office or a political committee is not a solicitation.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1991, No. 102 .

History

Amendments

—1991. Subdiv. (8)(C): Deleted “nontemporary” preceding “officer”.

§ 2472. Contracts between paid fundraisers and charitable organizations.

  1. Prior to soliciting in this State, a paid fundraiser shall enter into a written contract with the charitable organization on whose behalf solicitations are to be made.  The contract shall contain the following:
    1. A minimum percentage of the gross receipts of the fundraising campaign to be paid to the charitable organization.
    2. An itemized description of all expenses, commissions, and other amounts that are to be deducted from the receipts of the fundraising campaign, how they are to be calculated, and to whom they are to be paid.
    3. An authorized signature of the charitable organization indicating approval of the terms of the contract.
    4. The following statement in immediate proximity to the signature of the charitable organization, in a minimum size of 10 points:

      Chapter 63 of Title 9 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated requires a paid fundraiser to provide the fundraiser’s charitable sponsor, within 60 days after the end of a solicitation campaign, with a statement setting out the name and address of each contributor and the amount of the contribution; the amount of the gross receipts; and an itemized list of all expenses, commissions, and other costs incurred in the campaign. The law also gives charities other rights, including the right to cancel this contract or to recover damages, or both, in certain circumstances. Contact the Vermont Attorney General for further information.

    5. A provision that prohibits the paid fundraiser from restricting in any way the use by the charitable organization of the list of donors to the campaign.
  2. Prior to commencing a solicitation, a paid fundraiser shall:
    1. Provide to the charitable organization on whose behalf solicitations are to be made, the wording to be used by the paid fundraiser when conducting written solicitations and a copy of any script to be used in conducting telephone or in-person solicitation.
    2. Obtain written approval from the charitable organization for the use of such wording and script.
  3. A charitable organization may rescind any contract with a paid fundraiser and have all contributions in the possession of the paid fundraiser returned to the contributors if the contract or the paid fundraiser does not comply with this subchapter.
  4. Upon application for State funds received through a grant or contract, a charitable organization shall disclose:
    1. the actual percentage of gross receipts of any fundraising campaign paid to the charitable organization within the two previous fiscal years; and
    2. the minimum contracted percentage of gross receipts to be paid by a paid fundraiser to the charitable organization in any current or known future fundraising campaign.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2003, No. 51 , § 2.

History

Amendments

—2003. Subdiv. (a)(5): Added.

Subsec. (d): Added.

§ 2473. Notice of solicitation.

  1. At least 10 days prior to the commencement of a fundraising campaign, a paid fundraiser shall file with the Attorney General a notice of solicitation on a form prescribed by the Attorney General.  The notice of solicitation shall contain the following:
    1. the name, permanent address, and permanent telephone number of the paid fundraiser and, if the paid fundraiser is a business entity, of each of its principal officers and directors;
    2. the name, address, and telephone number of the charitable organization on behalf of which solicitations are to be made;
    3. the nature, location, dates, parties, and outcome of any litigation or investigation concerning the fundraiser’s solicitation activity in any jurisdiction occurring within six years prior to the commencement of the fundraising campaign in this State;
    4. the nature and anticipated starting and ending dates of the solicitation campaign;
    5. the address and telephone number from which the solicitation will be conducted;
    6. the names and addresses of all employees and agents of, and individuals in privity with, the paid fundraiser who will solicit during the campaign, and whether any of these persons have been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving dishonesty arising from a charitable solicitation;
    7. the name and address of any member of the immediate family of an officer, director, or owner of the paid fundraiser and the name and address of any entity owned in whole or in part by an officer, director, or owner of the paid fundraiser with whom the paid fundraiser will incur expenses in connection with the solicitation campaign;
    8. a copy of the contract between the paid fundraiser and the charitable organization;
    9. such other information as the Attorney General may by rule require.
  2. The notice of solicitation shall be accompanied by a bond approved by the Attorney General in the amount of $20,000.00. The bond shall run to the State and to any person who may have a cause of action against the paid fundraiser for any liability arising under this subchapter, as long as the action on the bond is brought within two years after accrual of the cause of action.
  3. A separate notice of solicitation shall be required to be filed for each separate solicitation campaign to be undertaken on behalf of a charitable organization.  However, only one bond shall be required to be in effect at the same time for any one fundraiser, regardless of the number of notices of solicitation filed.
  4. Any material change in any information contained in a notice of solicitation shall be reported to the Attorney General in writing not more than seven days after the change occurs.
  5. The Attorney General may adopt rules to require that:
    1. the notice of solicitation be filed electronically, with proper verification;
    2. the paid fundraiser provide an electronic copy of the contract with the notice of solicitation or provide a copy of the contract upon request of the Attorney General; and
    3. the paid fundraiser provide an electronic copy of the bond with the notice of solicitation or provide a copy of the bond upon request of the Attorney General.
    1. For each calendar year in which a paid fundraiser solicits in this State on behalf of a charitable organization, the paid fundraiser shall pay a registration fee of $500.00 to the Attorney General no later than ten days prior to its first solicitation in this State. (f) (1) For each calendar year in which a paid fundraiser solicits in this State on behalf of a charitable organization, the paid fundraiser shall pay a registration fee of $500.00 to the Attorney General no later than ten days prior to its first solicitation in this State.
    2. Each notice of solicitation filed in accordance with this section shall be accompanied by a fee of $200.00. In the case of a campaign lasting more than 12 months, an additional $200.00 fee shall be paid annually on or before the date of the anniversary of the commencement of the campaign.
    3. Fees paid under this subsection shall be deposited in a special fund managed pursuant to 32 V.S.A. chapter 7, subchapter 5, and shall be available to the Attorney General for the costs of administering sections 2471-2479 of this title.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2003, No. 110 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 11, 2004; 2013, No. 72 , § 32; 2015, No. 57 , § 29, eff. June 11, 2015.

History

Amendments

—2015. Subdiv. (f): Rewrote subdiv. (1) and added the second sentence in subdiv. (2).

—2013. Subsec. (f): Added.

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added.

§ 2474. Notice not to be used as an endorsement.

A paid fundraiser shall not use or exploit the fact of filing a notice of solicitation to create the impression that the State has in any way endorsed or approved a solicitation or solicitation campaign.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 2475. Solicitations.

  1. No paid fundraiser shall misrepresent, directly or indirectly, his or her relationship to a charitable organization.
  2. No paid fundraiser or charitable organization shall misrepresent, directly or indirectly, to a contributor or potential contributor any fact relating to the solicitation, including the percentage of the contribution that will be paid over to the charitable organization or the purpose for which the contribution will be used.
  3. No paid fundraiser shall represent, directly or indirectly, that any part of the contributions received will be given or donated to any charitable organization unless the organization has previously consented in writing to the use of its name.
  4. The provisions of this section shall also apply to any person that a paid fundraiser employs or engages, directly or indirectly, to solicit contributions.
  5. No paid fundraiser shall solicit a contribution from any person in this State without clearly and conspicuously disclosing to the person, both orally, if the paid fundraiser is soliciting in whole or in part by telephone, and in writing, if the paid fundraiser is soliciting in whole or in part by means of writing:
    1. that the solicitor is being paid by the charitable organization on whose behalf the solicitation is being made; and
    2. how the potential contributor may obtain information from the State on the respective percentages of contributions that will be paid to the charitable organization and to the paid fundraiser.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1997, No. 42 , §§ 3, 4; 2003, No. 51 , § 3.

History

Revision note

—2014. In subsec. (b), deleted “, but not limited to,” following “including” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

Amendments

—2003. Subsec. (e): Amended generally.

—1997. Subsec. (b): Inserted “or charitable organization” following “fundraiser”.

Subsec. (e): Added.

§ 2476. Bank accounts.

  1. All checks and money orders contributed in response to a solicitation shall be made out to the name of the charitable organization.