Chapter 1. General Provisions

§ 1. Administration and enforcement of title.

The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the Commissioner of Public Safety shall cooperate in carrying out all the statutes and rules adopted to implement the provisions of this title to achieve the most efficient and economical administration. In case of disagreement as to division of work, the Governor shall decide.

HISTORY: Amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 129.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 10,206. 1947, No. 163 , § 16.

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). In the first sentence, substituted “and” for the comma preceding “rules” and “adopted to implement the provisions of” for “, and regulations under” thereafter.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in State v. Brooks, 162 Vt. 26, 643 A.2d 226, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 184 (1993); Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d 757, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1994).

§ 2. Application to trailers, semi-trailers, and trailer coaches.

  1. The provisions of this title in relation to registration, certificates of registration, refund of registration fees, duplicates of certificates of registration and number plates, and times of registration and transfers of registration and the duration thereof, for motor vehicles shall apply also to trailers and semi-trailers.
  2. The provisions of this title applicable to motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers shall be applicable to trailer coaches unless otherwise specifically provided or clearly inapplicable.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, §§ 10,045, 10,242. 1947, No. 202 , § 5261. 1937, No. 125 , § 2. P.L. § 4987. 1933, No. 157 , § 4691.

§ 3. Application to common carriers.

Sections 4(34), 921, 1075, 1281, 1281a, 1282, and 1283 of this title shall not apply to a Type I school bus owned or operated by a common carrier.

HISTORY: Amended 1977, No. 102 , § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1977.

History

Source.

1949, No. 243 , § 6.

Revision note—

At the beginning of the section, substituted “4(34)” for “4, 34” to correct an error in the reference.

Amendments

—1977. Section amended generally.

Notes to Opinions

Private carriers.

Legislature intended exemption to apply only to motor vehicles owned and operated by a common carrier as such and not to an operation classed as that of a private carrier, even though the person performing it happens to be a common carrier with respect to other operations. 1950-52 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 229.

§ 4. Definitions.

Except as may otherwise be provided by law, and unless the context otherwise requires in statutes relating to motor vehicles and enforcement of the law regulating vehicles, as provided in this title and 20 V.S.A. part 5, the following definitions shall apply:

  1. “Authorized emergency vehicle” means a vehicle of a fire department, police vehicle, public and private ambulance, and a vehicle to which a permit has been issued pursuant to subdivision 1252(a)(1) or (2) of this title.
  2. “Button” is a traffic control marking consisting of an object, either permanently attached to the pavement or temporarily placed, and projecting above the surface.
  3. “Carrying capacity of a motor truck” shall be deemed to be the heaviest net load to be carried.
  4. “Commissioner” shall mean in this title only the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
  5. “Construction area” or “work zone” or “work site” means an area of a highway undergoing construction, maintenance, or utility work activities by order or with the permission of the State or a municipality that is designated by and located within properly posted warning devices.
  6. “Contractor’s trailer” means any trailer or semi-trailer towed by a motor truck or truck tractor, both of which have been owned or leased and registered for a period of 30 days or more by the using contract highway builder and used solely for the purpose of transporting road-making appliances or motorized highway building equipment from job to job in connection with his or her business of building, repair, or maintenance of highways.
  7. “Crosswalk” means:
    1. that part of a roadway at an intersection included within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway; or
    2. any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface.
      1. “Dealer” means a person, partnership, corporation, or other entity engaged in the business of selling or exchanging new or used motor vehicles, snowmobiles, motorboats, or all-terrain vehicles. A dealer may, as part of or incidental to such business, repair such vehicles or motorboats, sell parts and accessories, or lease or rent such vehicles or motorboats. “Dealer” shall not include a finance or auction dealer or a transporter.
        1. For a dealer in new or used cars or motor trucks, “engaged in the business” means having sold or exchanged at least 12 cars or motor trucks, or a combination thereof, in the immediately preceding year, or 24 in the two immediately preceding years.

        (II) For a dealer in snowmobiles, motorboats, or all-terrain vehicles, “engaged in the business” means having sold or exchanged at least one snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle, respectively, in the immediately preceding year or two in the two immediately preceding years.

        (III) For a dealer in trailers, semi-trailers, or trailer coaches, “engaged in the business” means having sold or exchanged at least one trailer, semi-trailer, or trailer coach in the immediately preceding year or a combination of two such vehicles in the two immediately preceding years. However, the sale or exchange of a trailer with a gross vehicle weight rating of 3,500 pounds or less shall be excluded under this subdivision (III).

        (IV) For a dealer in motorcycles or motor-driven cycles, “engaged in the business” means having sold or exchanged at least one motorcycle or motor-driven cycle in the immediately preceding year or a combination of two such vehicles in the two immediately preceding years.

        (V) For the purposes of this subdivision (8)(A)(ii), the sale or exchange of vehicles or motorboats owned but not registered by the dealer, or that have been in lease or rental services, shall count as sales or exchanges. Vehicles or motorboats that are to be scrapped, dismantled, or destroyed shall not count as sales or exchanges.

    1. [Repealed.]
    2. “Finance dealer” means a person who is authorized to do business in this State and is actively engaged in and devoting a principal portion of his or her time to the wholesale and retail financing of motor vehicle sales by and through direct wholesale loans to those who are registered motor vehicle dealers under chapter 7 of this title or the purchase of retail conditional sales contracts from the dealers. A person entitled to dealer registration under this subdivision shall be deemed a dealer only to the extent of moving or operating under dealer registration a motor vehicle which he or she is repossessing in the regular course of his or her business. A person entitled to dealer registration under this subdivision shall also be entitled to demonstrate repossessed motor vehicles.
    3. “Auction dealer” means a person who is authorized to do business in this State and is engaged in the sale of motor vehicles at public auction subject to the provisions of sections 451, 458, 459, 463, and 466-468 of this title. A motor vehicle to be sold at public auction by the auction dealer may be transported to the place of auction for a period of up to 30 days prior to the date of auction on auction dealer plates and then only by the dealer or his or her employee. A motor vehicle sold by an auction dealer may only be operated on auction dealer plates on the date of sale and then only by the dealer or his or her employee or by the purchaser when accompanied by the dealer or employee within 10 miles of the place of auction.
    4. As used in this subdivision (8), “person” shall include any individual or, in the case of partnerships, corporations, or other entities, the directors, shareholders, officers, or partners in these entities.
    5. [Repealed.]
  8. “Edge of the roadway” is the extreme right-hand limit of any improved area within the right-of-way of the highway.
  9. “Eight-light system” shall mean four alternately flashing red signal lamps, two at the front and two at the rear, to operate automatically when a school bus is stopped and four alternately flashing amber signal lamps, two at the front and two at the rear, to be operated by the driver at an appropriate distance before stopping the bus.
  10. “Enforcement officers” shall include:
    1. The following persons certified pursuant to 20 V.S.A. § 2358 : sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables whose authority has not been limited under 24 V.S.A. § 1936a , police officers, State’s Attorneys, Capitol Police officers, motor vehicle inspectors, liquor investigators, State game wardens, and State Police.
    2. For enforcement of offenses relating to parking of motor vehicles, meter checkers and other duly authorized employees of a municipality employed to assist in the enforcement of parking regulations.
    3. For enforcement of nonmoving traffic violations enumerated in subdivisions 2302(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of this title, duly authorized employees of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Such employees may issue complaints in accordance with 4 V.S.A. § 1105 .
  11. “Fresh pursuit” includes fresh pursuit as defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a suspected violator of the criminal laws or other laws of this State, for which he or she is, or might be, subject to arrest, by an enforcement officer. Fresh pursuit is not necessarily instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
  12. “Highway,” “road,” “public highway,” or “public road” shall include all parts of any bridge, culvert, roadway, street, square, fairground, or other place open temporarily or permanently to public or general circulation of vehicles, and shall include a way laid out under authority of law.
  13. “Intersecting highway” shall mean any highway that joins another at an angle, whether or not it crosses the other; but a driveway leading to or from private grounds shall not be interpreted to be a highway.
  14. “Jitney” shall include any motor vehicle, not designated for the carrying of merchandise or freight, advertised or regularly used for carrying passengers for hire, but not operating over a fixed route, including motor vehicles operated for hire in connection with a livery business, but shall not include any such vehicle that the owner thereof uses in an emergency for such purpose, nor one that an employer uses to transport his or her employees to and from their work, nor one that is used at least 75 percent of the time in the transportation of schoolchildren or under authority granted to a school board under 16 V.S.A. § 563 to transport other than schoolchildren, nor one that is used in the transfer of U.S. mail on a star route, so-called, nor one that is used to transport elders or persons who have a disability for whom special transportation programs are designed and funded by State and federal authority through public and private nonprofit social service agencies; nor shall it apply to cooperative use transportation.
  15. “Junior operator” shall include only such persons as are 16 and 17 years of age.
  16. “Motor bus” shall include any motor vehicle with a seating capacity of more than seven persons, other than a street car, operated upon the public streets and highways along a regular route, and in such operation receiving, discharging, and transporting passengers for hire. However, “motor bus” shall not be construed to include transportation service the route and destination of which are under the direction and subject to the control of the passengers so transported or to include cooperative-use transportation.
    1. “Motorcycle” means any motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground, and includes autocycles but excludes motor-driven cycles, motor-assisted bicycles, electric bicycles, golf carts, track driven vehicles, tractors, and electric personal assistive mobility devices. (18) (A) “Motorcycle” means any motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground, and includes autocycles but excludes motor-driven cycles, motor-assisted bicycles, electric bicycles, golf carts, track driven vehicles, tractors, and electric personal assistive mobility devices.
    2. “Autocycle” means a three-wheeled motorcycle:
      1. in which the occupants sit with their legs forward;
      2. designed to be controlled with a steering wheel and pedals; and
      3. equipped with safety belts for all occupants.
    3. “Fully enclosed autocycle” means an autocycle equipped with a windshield and that has full top and side enclosures capable of supporting the vehicle’s weight and protecting the occupants when the vehicle is resting on the enclosures.
  17. “Motorized highway building equipment” shall include all bulldozers, rollers, scrapers, graders, spreaders, pavers, bituminous mixers, compressors, power shovels, excavators, dumpsters, concrete mixers, bucket loaders, snow loaders, rooters, and scarifiers, except road oilers and bituminous distributors, which contain as an integral part thereof and within the same unit facilities for generating motor power for propelling the same and while being used exclusively for the building, repair, or maintenance of highways, or being transported or moved from job to job in connection with the building, repair, or maintenance of highways; or, for purposes of registration only, if owned and operated by a municipality, while being used exclusively for municipal purposes; however, the town road commissioner, or comparable municipal officer, shall report annually to the legislative body of the municipality that the equipment is in good repair; tractors used exclusively as a power unit in drawing road making appliances or in the transportation of same or of such tractor from job to job in connection with the building, repair, or maintenance of highways.
  18. “Motor truck” means any motor vehicle designed primarily for the transportation of property and shall be construed to include truck tractor-semitrailer and truck tractor-semitrailer-trailer combinations.
  19. “Motor vehicle” includes all vehicles propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power, except farm tractors, vehicles running only upon stationary rails or tracks, motorized highway building equipment, road making appliances, snowmobiles, tracked vehicles, motor-assisted bicycles, electric bicycles, or electric personal assistive mobility devices.
  20. “Specialized fuel driven motor vehicle” shall include all motor vehicles, the power for which is generated otherwise than by gasoline or by diesel “fuel” as defined in section 3002 of this title, excluding steam road rollers, tractors used entirely for work on the farm, and vehicles running only upon rails or tracks.
  21. “Nonresident” shall include any person who does not come under the definition of a resident.
  22. “Operate,” “operating,” or “operated” as applied to motor vehicles shall include “drive,” “driving,” and “driven” and shall also include an attempt to operate and shall be construed to cover all matters and things connected with the presence and use of motor vehicles on the highway, whether they be in motion or at rest.
  23. “Operator” shall include all persons 18 years of age or over properly licensed to operate motor vehicles.
  24. “Owner” shall include any person, corporation, co-partnership, or association holding legal title to a motor vehicle or having exclusive right to the use or control thereof for a period of 30 days or more.
  25. “Person” includes any natural person, corporation, association, co-partnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals.
  26. “Pleasure car” shall include all motor vehicles not otherwise defined in this title.
  27. [Repealed.]
    1. “Resident,” as used in this title only, means any person living in the State who intends to make the State his or her principal place of domicile either permanently or for an indefinite number of years. Any foreign partnership, firm, association, or corporation having a place of business in this State shall be deemed to be a resident as to all vehicles owned or leased and that are garaged or maintained in this State. (30) (A) “Resident,” as used in this title only, means any person living in the State who intends to make the State his or her principal place of domicile either permanently or for an indefinite number of years. Any foreign partnership, firm, association, or corporation having a place of business in this State shall be deemed to be a resident as to all vehicles owned or leased and that are garaged or maintained in this State.
    2. Without limiting the class of nonresidents under the provisions of this subdivision, persons who live in the State for a particular purpose involving a defined period of time, including students, migrant workers employed in seasonal occupations, and persons employed under a contract with a fixed term, are not residents for purposes of this title only.
  28. “Road making appliances” shall mean all bulldozers, rollers, scrapers, graders, spreaders, pavers, retreading machines, compressors, power shovels, excavators, rock crushers, concrete mixers, snow loaders, bucket loaders, rooters, portable electric generators, pavement heaters, sweepers, steam boilers, traffic control boards, screening plants, asphalt reclaimers, and scarifiers designed to be and while being drawn by a separate motorized power unit and while being used exclusively for building, repair, or maintenance of roads or highways or while being transported from job to job in connection with the building, repair, or maintenance of roads or highways, except contractor’s trailers.
  29. “Roadway” is that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular traffic, exclusive of the shoulder.
  30. “Safety glass” shall mean any product composed of safety glazing materials so manufactured, fabricated, or treated as substantially to prevent shattering and flying when struck or broken.
    1. “School bus” means any motor vehicle used to transport children to or from school or in connection with school activities, except: (34) (A) “School bus” means any motor vehicle used to transport children to or from school or in connection with school activities, except:
      1. Buses operated by common carriers who incidentally accept school children as passengers.
      2. Private motor vehicles used to carry members of the owner’s household. As used in this section, “private motor vehicle” means a vehicle neither owned nor leased by a public school or an approved independent school.
      3. Private motor vehicles used to transport children without compensation. For the purposes of this section, “compensation” means payment in any form except reimbursement for mileage or the normal salary paid to a person otherwise employed by the school.
      4. Motor vehicles with a manufacturer’s rated seating capacity of fewer than 11 persons, including the operator, which are owned, leased, or hired by a school, or for which services are reimbursed by a school. However, if used to transport students, these shall be considered a Type II school bus for purposes of licensure, shall display an identification sign as prescribed in subdivision 1283(a)(1) of this title, and shall be equipped with a simple system of at least two red alternating warning lights unless the driver is a school employee or a volunteer subject to a criminal background check and is transporting no more than five persons excluding the operator, provided that the vehicle has safety belts for all persons being transported.
      5. Motor coaches provided with a driver to a school on a single-trip or multi-trip contract basis to provide transportation to or from, or to and from, athletic or other special events. A motor coach is a vehicle at least 35 feet in length with a manufacturer’s rated seating capacity of more than 30 passengers and is designed for long distance transportation of passengers, characterized by integral construction with an elevated passenger deck located over a baggage compartment. Pursuant to 16 V.S.A. § 255 , a superintendent or headmaster shall request criminal record information for a driver of a motor coach if the driver may be in unsupervised contact with schoolchildren.
      6. Multifunction school activity buses, as defined in section 1287 of this title, provided with a driver to a school on a single-trip or multi-trip contract basis to provide transportation to or from, or to and from, athletic or other special events. Pursuant to 16 V.S.A. § 255 , a superintendent or headmaster shall request criminal record information for a driver of a multifunction school activity bus if the driver may be in unsupervised contact with schoolchildren.
      7. Other multifunction school activity buses as defined in section 1287 of this title.
    2. “Type I school bus” means a school bus with a manufacturer’s rated seating capacity of more than 15 passengers, including the operator.
    3. “Type II school bus” means a school bus with a manufacturer’s rated seating capacity of more than 10 and fewer than 16 passengers, including the operator.
    4. -(F) [Repealed.]
  31. “Sidewalk” is that portion of a street between the curb lines or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines, intended for use by pedestrians.
  32. “Single axle load” is the total load transmitted to the highway by all wheels whose centers may be included within two parallel transverse vertical planes less than 48 inches apart, extending across the full width of the vehicle.
  33. “Standard equipment” and “properly equipped” as applied to a motor vehicle shall include adequate tires, head lamps, tail lamps, lenses, reflectors, brakes, muffler, rear view mirror, windshield wiper, horns, windshield, number plate brackets, and only such motor fuel tank or tanks as are regularly installed by the manufacturer. “Standard equipment” and “properly equipped,” as applied to motor vehicles designated by the manufacturer as 1964 or later models, shall also include safety seat belts or harnesses installed in the left and right front seats of pleasure cars and windshield defroster on pleasure cars, motor trucks, and motor buses, both to be of a type approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
  34. “Tandem axle load” is the total load transmitted to the highway by all wheels whose centers may be included between two parallel transverse vertical planes not less than 48 inches apart and not more than eight feet apart, extending across the full width of the vehicle. A trunnion axle, with eight wheels in line, shall be considered to be a tandem axle, except that when operated upon portions of the highways that are designated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways it shall be considered a single axle.
  35. “Tractor” shall include a motor vehicle designed or used primarily as a traveling power plant or for drawing other vehicles, and not so constructed as to carry any load other than a part of the weight of the vehicles and load so drawn, excepting, however, motorized highway building equipment.
  36. “Trailer” is a vehicle without motive power designed to be drawn by a motor vehicle, and so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle excepting, however, road making appliances and transportation dollies, and “semi-trailer” is a vehicle without motive power, designed to be drawn by a motor vehicle, and so constructed that some part of its weight and that of its load rests upon or is carried by the towing vehicle, excepting, however, pole dinkeys, transportation dollies, and road making appliances.
  37. “Trailer coach” shall mean any trailer or semi-trailer designed to be towed by a motor vehicle and designed, equipped, or used for sleeping, eating, or living quarters.
    1. “Transporter” means: (42) (A) “Transporter” means:
      1. a person engaged in the business of delivering vehicles of a type required to be registered from a manufacturing, assembling, or distributing plant to dealers or sales agents of a manufacturer;
      2. a person regularly engaged in the business of towing trailer coaches, owned by them or temporarily in their custody, on their own wheels over public highways, or towing office trailers owned by them or temporarily in their custody, on their own wheels over public highways;
      3. a person regularly engaged and properly licensed for the short-term rental of “storage trailers” owned by them and who move these storage trailers on their own wheels over public highways;
      4. a person regularly engaged in the business of moving modular homes over public highways;
      5. dealers, owners of motor vehicle auction sites, and automobile repair shop owners when engaged in the transportation of motor vehicles to and from their place of business for repair purposes;
      6. the following, provided that the transportation and delivery of motor vehicles is a common and usual incident to their business:
        1. persons towing overwidth trailers owned by them in connection with their business;
        2. persons whose business is the repossession of motor vehicles; and
        3. persons whose business involves moving vehicles from the place of business of a registered dealer to another registered dealer, or between a motor vehicle auction site and a registered dealer or another motor vehicle auction site, leased vehicles to the lessor at the expiration of the lease, or vehicles purchased at the place of auction of an auction dealer to the purchaser.
    2. As used in this subdivision (42):
      1. “Short-term rental” means a period of less than one year.
      2. “Repossession” includes the transport of a repossessed vehicle to a location specified by the lienholder or owner at whose direction the vehicle was repossessed.
  38. “Truck crane” shall mean a motor truck equipped with a permanently mounted hoisting apparatus, winch, or derrick, designed for the moving of objects, with no provision for carrying a load on the body of such truck crane except equipment used for the operation of a hoisting apparatus, winch, or derrick.
  39. “Moving violation” means any violation of any provision of this title, while the motor vehicle is being operated on a public highway, over which operation the operator has discretion as to commission of the act, except for offenses pertaining to:
    1. a parked vehicle, equipment, size, weight, inspection, or registration of the vehicle;
    2. child restraint or safety belt systems or seat belts as required in section 1258 or 1259 of this title; or
    3. motorcycle headgear under section 1256 of this title.
    1. “Motor-driven cycle” means any vehicle equipped with two or three wheels, a power source providing up to a maximum of two brake horsepower and having a maximum piston or rotor displacement of 50 cubic centimeters if a combustion engine is used, which will propel the vehicle, unassisted, at a speed not to exceed 30 miles per hour on a level road surface, and that is equipped with a power drive system that functions directly or automatically only, not requiring clutching or shifting by the operator after the drive system is engaged. As motor vehicles, motor-driven cycles shall be subject to the purchase and use tax imposed under 32 V.S.A. chapter 219 rather than to a general sales tax. Electric personal assistive mobility devices, motor-assisted bicycles, and electric bicycles are not motor-driven cycles. (45) (A) “Motor-driven cycle” means any vehicle equipped with two or three wheels, a power source providing up to a maximum of two brake horsepower and having a maximum piston or rotor displacement of 50 cubic centimeters if a combustion engine is used, which will propel the vehicle, unassisted, at a speed not to exceed 30 miles per hour on a level road surface, and that is equipped with a power drive system that functions directly or automatically only, not requiring clutching or shifting by the operator after the drive system is engaged. As motor vehicles, motor-driven cycles shall be subject to the purchase and use tax imposed under 32 V.S.A. chapter 219 rather than to a general sales tax. Electric personal assistive mobility devices, motor-assisted bicycles, and electric bicycles are not motor-driven cycles.
      1. “Motor-assisted bicycle” means any bicycle or tricycle with fully operable pedals and equipped with a motor that in itself is capable of producing a top speed of not more than 20 miles per hour on a paved level surface when ridden by an operator who weighs 170 pounds and either: (B) (i) “Motor-assisted bicycle” means any bicycle or tricycle with fully operable pedals and equipped with a motor that in itself is capable of producing a top speed of not more than 20 miles per hour on a paved level surface when ridden by an operator who weighs 170 pounds and either:
        1. has an internal combustion motor with a power output of not more than 1,000 watts or 1.3 horsepower; or
        2. has an electric motor with a power output of not more than 1,000 watts and does not meet the requirements of one of the three classes in subdivisions (46)(A)(i)-(iii) of this section.
      2. Motor-assisted bicycles shall be regulated in accordance with section 1136 of this title.
      3. Electric bicycles, as defined in subdivision (46) of this section, are not motor-assisted bicycles, as defined in subdivision (45) of this section.
    1. “Electric bicycle” means a bicycle equipped with fully operable pedals, a saddle or seat for the rider, and an electric motor of less than 750 watts that meets the requirements of one of the following three classes: (46) (A) “Electric bicycle” means a bicycle equipped with fully operable pedals, a saddle or seat for the rider, and an electric motor of less than 750 watts that meets the requirements of one of the following three classes:
    2. An electric bicycle is not a motor vehicle and is a vehicle to the same extent that a bicycle is a vehicle.
    3. Electric bicycles shall be regulated in accordance with section 1136a of this title.

    (i) “Class 1 electric bicycle” means an electric bicycle equipped with a motor that provides assistance only when the rider is pedaling and that ceases to provide assistance when the bicycle reaches the speed of 20 miles per hour.

  40. “Cooperative use transportation” means the collective nonprofit use by two or more persons of privately owned vehicles when providing transportation is not the primary business of the owner of the vehicle or driver of the vehicle, or both, but is incidental to his or her livelihood. Cooperative use shall include shared driving and shared expense; employer-owned or leased vehicles, including buses, that are operated for employee commuting purposes; and commuter services organized and arranged by employee cooperatives, labor unions, credit unions, and neighborhood groups that are operated for the convenience of their members.
  41. “License to operate a motor vehicle.” Any operator’s license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under, or granted by, the laws of this State, including:
    1. any temporary license or learner’s permit;
    2. the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license;
    3. any nonresident’s operating privilege.
  42. “Revocation of a license” means the termination by formal action of the Commissioner of an individual’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways in which the license or privilege shall not be subject to renewal or restoration except upon an application for a new license presented to and acted upon by the Commissioner after the expiration of the applicable period of time prescribed in this title. The term also includes the refusal of the right of an unlicensed individual to apply for a license.
  43. “Suspension of license” means the withdrawal by formal action of the Commissioner, for a specific period of time and until reinstatement by the Commissioner, of a person’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways.  The term also includes the refusal of the right of an unlicensed person to apply for a license.
  44. “Single-axle tow dolly” is a vehicle towed by a self-propelled motor vehicle and designed and used exclusively to transport another self-propelled motor vehicle that shall not be required to be registered and upon which the front or rear wheels of the towed self-propelled motor vehicle are mounted while the other wheels of the towed self-propelled motor vehicle remain in contact with the ground. These vehicles shall not be subject to registration or titling nor shall they be treated as a separate vehicle when used in combination with another vehicle. They shall be subject to equipment safety requirements.
  45. “Alcohol assessment screening” means an assessment of an individual’s use of alcohol, which includes consideration of the results of any available tests relating to the individual’s blood alcohol content, the individual’s motor vehicle record, responses to an alcohol screening questionnaire approved by the Secretary of Human Services, personal interviews, and any other relevant information that is identified in any subsequent report.
  46. “Truck tractor” shall include a motor vehicle designed and used primarily for drawing other vehicles but so constructed as to carry a load other than a part of the weight of the vehicle and load so drawn.
  47. “Transportation dolly” means a vehicle towed by a motor vehicle and designed and used exclusively in the transport of buildings that are not normally transported over the highway and whose dimensions or weight, or both, would require a permit subject to engineering inspection, which consists of sets of single or double axles with wheels set in such configurations underneath the building to be moved so as to distribute the weight of the load. This vehicle shall not be subject to registration and shall be exempt from titling and so treated whether used singly or in conjunction as one separate vehicle when used in combination with another vehicle. However, all moves shall be governed by the Commissioner’s rules for oversize and overdimension moves.
  48. “Unprocessed milk products” means raw milk transported in bulk when transported in a milk tank truck, semi-trailer, trailer, or combination thereof.
  49. “Full or semi-flotation applicator vehicle” means a vehicle used for the application of lime, fertilizer, or agricultural chemicals.
  50. “Month” means 30 days and “year” means 365 days.
  51. “Privilege to operate” includes the privilege of a nonresident to operate a motor vehicle within the State and includes the privilege of a resident to obtain a license.
  52. “Disqualification” means a withdrawal of the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle.
  53. “Conviction” means an unvacated final adjudication of guilt, or a final determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal, an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person’s appearance in court, the payment of a fine or court cost, or violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated. Conviction shall also mean a plea of guilty or nolo contendere that has been accepted by the court.
  54. “Storage trailer” means any regularly manufactured box type trailer that has been removed from normal over-the-highway service and is used solely for the storage of commodities at a fixed site for extended periods of time. When a storage trailer is moved over the public highways, it shall not contain cargo weighing more than 2,000 pounds and shall be properly equipped, in good mechanical condition, and inspectable under the provisions of section 1222 of this title, except that storage trailers need not display an inspection sticker.
  55. “New motor vehicle” means a vehicle that is being registered or titled for the first time.
  56. “Used motor vehicle” means a vehicle that previously has been registered or titled.
  57. “Commercial fleet inspection station” shall mean a company or business that has been designated by the Commissioner as an official commercial fleet inspection station, provided it has 10 or more motor vehicles registered in the name of the company or business and meets all the requirements for designation as an official inspection station. Commercial fleet inspection stations shall be authorized to inspect only those vehicles registered to the company or business.
  58. “Municipal fleet inspection station” shall mean a municipality that has been designated as an official municipal fleet inspection station, provided it has motor vehicles registered in the name of the municipality and meets all the requirements for designation as an official inspection station. Municipal fleet inspection stations shall be authorized to inspect only those vehicles registered to a municipality.
  59. “Electric personal assistive mobility device” (EPAMD) means a self-balancing, two-nontandem-wheeled device, designed to transport only one person, with an electric propulsion system with average power of 750 watts (1 h.p.).
  60. “Pedestrian” means any person afoot and shall also include any person 16 years of age or older operating an electric personal assistive mobility device. The age restriction of this subdivision shall not apply to a person who has an ambulatory disability as defined in section 304a of this title.
  61. “Farm tractor” means a traveling power plant or a self-propelled device that functions as part of crop production, harvesting, feeding, or livestock management or is used for drawing a farm trailer as defined in subdivision (69) of this section. “Farm tractor” also means a self-propelled vehicle designed to perform single-purpose functions, such as land preparation, crop protection, or harvesting. The term “farm tractor” shall not include a “motor truck” as defined in subdivision (20) of this section.
  62. “Farm trailer” means a vehicle or equipment designed and adapted exclusively for tilling, planting, harvesting, management, or for carrying inputs to or outputs from agricultural, horticultural, or livestock-raising operations, or farm equipment, without motive power, designed to be drawn by a motor vehicle, a farm truck, or a farm tractor, and, in any case, not subject to registration if used upon the highway.
  63. “Agricultural custom service vehicle” means a motor truck used on a farm for planting, harvesting, or transporting crops or waste products produced on the farm that is owned by a person providing custom services who is not a farmer as defined in 32 V.S.A. § 3752(7) . In order to qualify as an “agricultural custom service vehicle,” a motor truck shall be registered under either subsection 367(a) or (f) of this title and shall be exempt from sections 1400 and 1400a of this title if the gross weight does not exceed 60,000 pounds. The operator of an agricultural custom service vehicle shall be exempt from the requirements of chapter 39 of this title, to the extent allowed by federal law.
  64. “Agricultural service vehicle” means a motor truck that shall be registered under subsection 367(a) of this title and is used for the purpose of transporting to or from a farm:
    1. agricultural inputs, including lime, fertilizer, commercial feed, or forages; or
    2. agricultural outputs, including milk, vegetables, fruit, horticultural crops, forages, or livestock.
  65. “Farm truck” means a motor truck that, at the option of the owner, may be registered under the provisions of subsection 367(f) of this title or may be unregistered when used in accordance with subsection 370(b) of this title.
  66. “Neighborhood electric vehicle” means a self-propelled electrically powered motor vehicle that:
    1. is emission free;
    2. is designed to carry four or fewer persons;
    3. is designed to be, and is, operated at speeds of 25 miles per hour or less;
    4. has at least four wheels in contact with the ground;
    5. has a gross vehicle weight rating less than 3,000 pounds; and
    6. conforms to the minimum safety equipment requirements as adopted in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 500, Low Speed Vehicles, 49 C.F.R. § 571.500.
  67. “Category I special purpose vehicle” means a vehicle that is used exclusively as a back hoe, bucket loader, grader, truck shovel (wheeled excavator), street sweeper, or forklift truck.
  68. “Category II special purpose vehicle” means a vehicle that is used exclusively as a truck crane, wrecker, concrete form truck, concrete pumper truck, bituminous distributor, calcium chloride distributor, full or semi-flotation applicator, well driller tender truck (these vehicles may tow a pickup truck), permanently mounted well drilling machine, road oiler, water tanker used for dust control, or a truck used to transport a building by use of a “transportation dolly” as defined in subdivision 4(54) of this title.
  69. “Wrecker” shall mean a motor truck equipped with a permanently mounted hoisting apparatus, winch, or derrick, designed for moving and towing motor vehicles, with no provision for carrying a load on the body of the truck except motor vehicles, parts and equipment used for the repair of motor vehicles, and equipment used for the operation of a hoisting apparatus, winch, or derrick.
  70. “Stiff hitch” shall mean a tow bar used by a self-propelled motor vehicle to tow another self-propelled motor vehicle while all the wheels of the towed vehicle remain in contact with the ground. The towed vehicle shall not be required to be registered.
  71. “Enhanced license” means an operator’s license, commercial driver’s license, junior operator’s license, or nondriver identification card that denotes identity and citizenship and includes facilitative technology identified by the Department of Homeland Security.
  72. “Personal radio frequency identification number chip” shall mean the number assigned to the transmitting chip in an enhanced license.
  73. An “all-surface vehicle” or “ASV” means any non-highway recreational vehicle, except a snowmobile, when used for cross-country travel on trails or on any one of the following or combination of the following: land, water, snow, ice, marsh, swampland, and natural terrain. An all-surface vehicle shall be designed for use both on land and in water, with or without tracks, shall be capable of flotation and shall be equipped with a skid-steering system, a sealed body, a fully contained cooling system, and six or eight tires designed to be inflated with an operating pressure not exceeding 10 pounds per square inch as recommended by the manufacturer. An all-surface vehicle shall have a net weight of 1,500 pounds or less, shall have a width of 75 inches or less, shall be equipped with an engine of not more than 50 horsepower, and shall have a maximum speed of not more than 25 miles per hour. An ASV when operated in water shall be considered to be a motorboat and shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 29, subchapter 2 of this title. An ASV operated anywhere except in water shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 31 of this title.
  74. “Vulnerable user” means a pedestrian; an operator of highway building, repair, or maintenance equipment or of agricultural equipment; a person operating a wheelchair or other personal mobility device, whether motorized or not; a person operating a bicycle or other nonmotorized means of transportation (such as roller skates, rollerblades, or roller skis); a person operating a motor-assisted bicycle or an electric bicycle; or a person riding, driving, or herding an animal.
  75. “Portable electronic device” means a portable electronic or computing device, including a cellular telephone, personal digital assistant (PDA), or laptop computer. “Portable electronic device” does not include a two-way or Citizens Band radio, or equipment used by a licensed Amateur Radio operator in accordance with 47 C.F.R. Part 97.
  76. “Business day” or “working day” means any calendar day except Saturday, Sunday, or any day classified as a holiday under 1 V.S.A. § 371 .
  77. “Serious bodily injury” has the meaning set forth in 13 V.S.A. § 1021 .
  78. “Plug-in electric vehicle” means a motor vehicle that can be powered by an electric motor drawing current from a rechargeable energy storage system, such as from storage batteries or other portable electrical energy storage devices, provided that the vehicle can draw recharge energy from a source off the vehicle such as electric vehicle supply equipment. A “plug-in electric vehicle” includes both a “battery electric vehicle” and a “plug-in hybrid electric vehicle” where:
    1. “battery electric vehicle” means a motor vehicle that can only be powered by an electric motor drawing current from a rechargeable energy storage system; and
    2. “plug-in hybrid electric vehicle” means a motor vehicle that can be powered by an electric motor drawing current from a rechargeable energy storage system but also has an onboard combustion engine.
  79. “On-track equipment” means any car, locomotive, rolling stock, equipment, or other device that, alone or coupled, is operated on stationary rails.
  • “Class 2 electric bicycle” means an electric bicycle equipped with a motor that may be used exclusively to propel the bicycle and that is not capable of providing assistance when the bicycle reaches the speed of 20 miles per hour.

    (iii) “Class 3 electric bicycle” means an electric bicycle equipped with a motor that provides assistance only when the rider is pedaling and that ceases to provide assistance when the bicycle reaches the speed of 28 miles per hour.

  • HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 137 , § 1; 1963, No. 32 ; 1963, No. 54 ; 1963, No. 90 , § 1; 1963, No. 206 , § 1; 1963, No. 223 , § 2; 1964, No. 19 (Sp. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 9, 1964; 1965, No. 91 ; 1965, No. 106 , § 1, eff. Feb. 1, 1966; 1965, No. 119 , eff. Sept. 1, 1965; 1965, No. 120 , § 2; 1965, No. 204 , § 1; 1966, No. 40 (Sp. Sess.), §§ 1-4, eff. March 11, 1966; 1967, No. 252 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1967, No. 341 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 1969, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 1, 1970; 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 12; 1971, No. 14 , § 6, eff. March 11, 1971; 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. March 1, 1973; 1973, No. 25 , § 1, eff. March 15, 1973; 1975, No. 71 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1975; 1975, No. 135 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Feb. 17, 1976; 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1975, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1975, No. 214 (Adj. Sess.); 1975, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1977, No. 20 , §§ 1, 8; 1977, No. 102 , §§ 2, 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1977; 1977, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), eff. April 5, 1978; 1977, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 6, eff. April 19, 1978; 1979, No. 19 , eff. April 6, 1979; 1979, No. 46 , §§ 6, 7, eff. April 26, 1979; 1979, No. 125 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 3, eff. April 15, 1980; 1979, No. 129 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2, eff. April 18, 1980; 1983, No. 6 , eff. Feb. 23, 1983; 1983, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1983, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 4, 5; 1983, No. 108 (Adj. Sess.); 1983, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1985, No. 12 , § 1; 1985, No. 85 , § 1; 1985, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.); 1985, No. 12 4 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 7, 9, eff. April 18, 1986; 1985, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 1987, No. 11 ; 1987, No. 18 ; 1987, No. 62 , § 2; 1987, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 13, 1988; 1987, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1987, No. 209 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1989, No. 51 , § 7; 1989, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 15, 1990; 1989, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. May 14, 1990; 1989, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1991, No. 72 , § 1; 1991, No. 88 , § 1; 1991, 1991, No. 143 (Adj. Sess.); 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1993, No. 18 , § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1994; 1993, No. 64 , §§ 1, 2; 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2, 4; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1997, No. 32 , § 1; 1997, No. 50 , § 44, eff. June 26, 1997; 1997, No. 55 , § 1, eff. June 26, 1997; 1999, No. 18 , § 41i, eff. May 13, 1999; 1999, No. 31 , § 1, eff. May 19, 1999; § 2, eff. July 1, 1999; 1999, No. 34 , § 6; 1999, No. 110 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 1a, 2; 1999, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 49, eff. May 24, 2000; 2001, No. 38 , § 2; 2001, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1-4; 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2003, No. 8 , § 1; 2003, No. 56 , § 69, eff. June 4, 2003; 2003, No. 66 , § 217b; 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2005, No. 29 , § 1; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 40; 2005, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2007, No. 20 , §§ 1, 2; 2007, No. 61 , § 1; 2007, No. 75 , § 32; 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 37; 2007, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 49; 2007, No. 184 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 1, 2010; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19a, eff. Sept. 1, 2010; 2011, No. 17 , § 2, eff. May 11, 2011; 2011, No. 17 , § 4, eff. July 1, 2013; 2013, No. 57 , §§ 1, 2, 3; 2013, No. 57 , § 25, eff. Jan. 1, 2014; 2013, No. 64 , § 7; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 141; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 12, 34; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 39, eff. Oct. 1, 2014; 2015, No. 47 , §§ 1, 2; 2015, No. 50 , § 1; 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2015, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 37; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 54, 56; 2017, No. 113 (Adj. Sess.), § 151; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2019, No. 59 , § 29, eff. June 14, 2019; 2019, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 130, 131, 132, 133; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 37; 2021, No. 20 , §§ 223, 224, 225, 226; 2021, No. 40 , §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 108 , § 1. 1949, No. 243 , § 1. 1949, No. 236 , §§ 1, 2. V.S. 1947, §§ 10,044, 10,241. 1947, No. 202 , §§ 5260, 5407. 1947, No. 88 , § 1. 1945, No. 95 , § 1. 1939, No. 109 , §§ 1-3. 1937, No. 125 , § 1. 1937, No. 116 , § 1. 1937, No. 115 , §§ 1, 2. 1937, No. 114 , § 1. 1937, No. 113 , § 1. 1935, No. 116 , § 1. 1935, No. 115 , § 1. 1935, No. 114 , § 1. 1935, No. 113 , § 1. 1935, No. 112 , § 1. P.L. § 4986. 1933, No. 157 , § 4690. 1933, No. 89 , §§ 1, 2. 1933, No. 84 , § 1. 1931, No. 72 . 1929, No. 73 , § 1. 1927, No. 76 , § 1. 1927, No. 74 , §§ 1, 2. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 73 , §§ 1, 5. 1925, No. 72 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 3. G.L. §§ 4667, 4668, 4678. 1917, No. 254 , § 4578. 1917, No. 132 , §§ 4, 9. 1917, No. 131 , § 1. 1915, No. 135 , §§ 1, 5. 1912, No. 151 . 1910, No. 132 . 1910, No. 129 , § 1. 1908, No. 99 , § 5. P.S. §§ 4075, 4081. 1906, No. 113 , § 5. 1904, No. 86 , §§ 2, 13. 1902, No. 64 , § 4.

    References in text.

    The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, referred to in subdiv. (38), was redesignated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 101-427, and is codified as 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) .

    Revision note

    —2014. In subdiv. (81), deleted “, but not limited to,” preceding “roller skates” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    —2013. In subdiv. (8)(A)(vi), deleted “, but not limited to,” following “including”, and in subdiv. (47), deleted “, but not limited to,” following “include” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    In subdiv. (34)(A)(ii), substituted “As used in” for “For the purposes of” to conform to V.S.A. style.

    —2010. Redesignated subdiv. (81), as added by 2009, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, as subdiv. (82) to avoid conflict with subdiv. (81), as added by 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    —2008. Redesignated subdiv. (78), as added by 2007, No. 184 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, as subdiv. (80) to avoid conflict with subdiv. (78), as added by 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 37 and 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, and subdiv. (79), as added by 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Revision note—. Subdiv. (8)(D): Substituted “466-468” for “466, 467 and 468” preceding “of this title” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    Redesignated subdivs. (66)-(70), as added by 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, as subdivs. (68)-(72) to avoid conflict with subdivs. (66) and (67), as added by 2001, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Redesignated subdivs. (14) and (33), as amended by 1975, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, as subdivs. (15) and (34) to reflect renumbering by 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Redesignated subdiv. (46), as added by 1979, No. 129 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, as subdiv. (47) to avoid conflict with subdiv. (46), as added by 1979, No. 46 , § 7.

    Redesignated subdiv. (49), as added by 1983, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, as subdiv. (52) to avoid conflict with subdivs. (49) and (50), as added by 1983, No. 108 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, and subdiv. (51), as added by 1983, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    Redesignated subdiv. (53), as added by 1985, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, as subdiv. (54) to avoid conflict with subdiv. (53), as added by 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 9.

    Redesignated subdiv. (57), as added by 1989, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, as subdiv. (58) to avoid conflict with subdiv. (57), as added by 1989, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Redesignated subdivs. (61) and (62), as added by 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § § 1 and 2, as subdivs. (62) and (63) to avoid conflict with subdiv. (61), as added by 1993, No. 64 , § 2.

    Editor’s note

    —2013. 2011, No. 17 , § 4, was to strike “liquor investigators” from the definition of “enforcement officers” in subdiv. (11) effective on July 1, 2013. However, this provision was repealed by 2013, No. 64 , § 7(2) effective June 3, 2013 so “liquor investigators” is not deleted from the definition of “enforcement officers” before July 1, 2013. As a result, 2013, No. 57 , § 32(b)(2) applies; 2013, No. 57 , § 2 takes effect on July 1, 2013; and 2013, No. 57, § 1 will not take effect.

    —1997. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 1997 session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 50 and 55, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 1997 session, the text of Act Nos. 50 and 55 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (18)(A): Act No. 40 substituted “means” for “shall mean” preceding “any”, “includes” for “shall include” preceding “autocycles” and “excludes” for “exclude” preceding “motor-driven” and inserted “motor-assisted bicycles, electric bicycles,” preceding “golf carts”.

    Subdiv. (21): Act No. 40 substituted “includes” for “shall include” preceding “all”; deleted “or” preceding “tracked vehicles”; and inserted “, motor-assisted bicycles, electric bicycles,” following “tracked vehicles”.

    Subdiv. (38): Act No. 20 inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding “National System”.

    Subdiv. (45): Amended generally by Act No. 40.

    Subdiv. (46): Added by Act No. 40.

    Subdiv. (61): Act No. 20 substituted “means” for “shall mean” in the first sentence and “and shall” for a comma following “pounds” in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (73)(E): Act No. 20 inserted “and” following “pounds;”.

    Subdiv. (78): Act No. 20 substituted “means” for “shall mean” and “driver’s” for “driver” following “commercial”.

    Subdiv. (81): Act No. 40 inserted “a person operating a motor-assisted bicycle or an electric bicycle;” preceding “or a”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (27): Act No. 131 substituted “includes any natural person,” for “as used in this title, shall include a”.

    Subdiv. (47): Amended generally by Act No. 131.

    Subdiv. (49): Act No. 131 substituted “an individual’s” for “a person’s” and “in which” for “whereby” in the first sentence; and substituted “individual” for “person” in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (54): Act No. 131 substituted “that” for “which” following “buildings”, substituted “or” for “and/or”, and inserted “, or both,” in the first sentence; and deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in the third sentence.

    Subdiv. (85): Act No. 121 inserted “ ‘battery electric vehicle’ and a ‘plug-in hybrid electric vehicle’ where:” following “includes both a” in the second sentence; added subdiv. (85)(A) designation and inserted “ ‘battery electric vehicle’ means a” following the new designation; inserted a semicolon preceding “and” at the end of subdiv. (85)(A), and added subdiv. (85)(B) designation and inserted “‘plug-in hybrid electric vehicle’ means” following the new designation.

    Subdiv. (86): Added by Act No. 149.

    —2019. Subdiv. (85): Added.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Introductory paragraph: Act No. 132 deleted “be” preceding “otherwise”; inserted “be” preceding “provided”; and substituted “by law” for “herein” following “provided”.

    Subdiv. (7): Act No. 113 inserted “means” following “Crosswalk”.

    Subdiv. (7)(A): Act No. 113 inserted “or” following “roadway;”.

    Subdiv. (17): Act No. 132 substituted “. However, ‘motor bus’ ” for “; provided, that nothing herein contained” following “hire”, “include” for “apply to” preceding “transportation”, “or” for “; nor shall it apply” following “transported”, and “include cooperative-use” for “cooperative use” preceding “transportation”, and inserted the word “not” preceding “be construed”.

    Subdiv. (30): Amended generally by Act No. 132.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (8)(A)(ii)(III): Act No. 158 added the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (44): Act No. 147 substituted “means” for “shall mean”, and “except for” for “with exception of”; redesignated exiting text as subdivs. (44)(A) and (44)(B); and added subdiv. (44)(C).

    Subdiv. (45): Act No. 158 added the subdiv. (A) designation, rewrote the last sentence of that subdiv., and added subdiv. (B).

    Subdiv. (84): Added by Act No. 153.

    —2015. Subdivs. (8) and (42): Amended generally by Act No. 50.

    Subdiv. (12): Act No. 47 deleted “as used in this chapter” following “fresh pursuit” once near the beginning of the first sentence and once near the beginning of the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (15): Act No. 47 substituted “ 16 V.S.A. § 563 ” for “ 16 V.S.A. § 562 ” following “granted to a school board under” near the middle of the sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (15): Act No. 96 substituted “schoolchildren” for “school children” twice, “U.S.” for “United States” following “transfer of”, and “elders or persons who have a disability” for “elderly and handicapped persons” following “transport”.

    Subdiv. (18): Act No. 189, § 34 amended generally.

    Subdiv. (82): Act No. 189, § 39 added the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (83): Added by Act No. 189, § 12.

    —2013. Subdiv. (5): Amended generally by Act No. 57, § 25.

    Subdiv. (11): Amended generally by Act No. 57, § 2.

    Subdiv. (42): Amended generally by Act No. 57, § 3.

    —2011. Subdiv. (11): Act No. 17, § 2 inserted “liquor investigators,” following “inspectors,” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (11): Act No. 17, § 4, effective July 1, 2013, deleted “liquor investigators,” following “inspectors,” in the first sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (18): Act No. 152 substituted “motor-driven cycles” for “mopeds”.

    Subdiv. (45): Act No. 152 substituted “motor-driven cycle” for “moped” and “any vehicle” for “a motor-driven cycle”, deleted “foot pedals to permit muscular propulsion” following “three wheels”, and inserted “which” preceding “is equipped” in the first sentence; substituted “motor-driven cycles” for “mopeds” in the second sentence; and substituted “motor-driven cycle” for “moped” in the third sentence.

    Subdiv. (81): Added by Act No. 114.

    Subdiv. (82): Added by Act No. 150.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (34)(A)(iv): Act No. 164 added “unless the driver is a school employee or a volunteer subject to a criminal background check and is transporting no more than five persons excluding the operator; provided that the vehicle has safety belts for all persons being transported” in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (77): Act No. 184 deleted “validly registered” following “tow another” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (78): Added by Act No. 153.

    Subdivs. (79) and (80): Added by Act Nos. 184 and 188, respectively.

    —2007. Subdiv. (22): Act No. 75 substituted “Specialized fuel driven motor vehicle” for “Nongasoline driven motor vehicle” at the beginning of the subdiv., substituted “or by diesel” for “except diesel driven vehicles using” following “than by gasoline”, and added “excluding” preceding “steam road rollers”.

    Subdiv. (43): Act No. 20 deleted “and used” following “designed”, “motor vehicles or other” preceding “objects”, and “an inoperable motor vehicle, parts and equipment used for the operation and for the repair of motor vehicles, and” preceding “equipment”.

    Subdiv. (51): Act No. 20 inserted “which shall not be required to be registered” following “vehicle” and “other” preceding “wheels” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (73)(E): Act No. 61 substituted “a gross vehicle” for “an unladen” preceding “weight”, “rating” for “of” following “weight”, and “3,000” for “1,800” preceding “pounds”.

    Subdivs. (76) and (77): Added by Act No. 20.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (8): Act No. 188 made a minor change in punctuation in the introductory paragraph, and substituted “146” for “104” preceding “days” in subdiv. (A)(v).

    Subdivs. (74) and (75): Added by Act No. 175.

    —2005. Subdiv. (34): Amended generally.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (71): Added.

    —2003. Subdiv. (21): Act No. 66 deleted “all-terrain vehicles” following “snowmobiles”.

    Subdiv. (30): Rewritten by Act No. 56.

    Subdiv. (73): Added by Act No. 8.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (18): Act No. 91 inserted “electric personal assistive mobility devices” following “tractors”.

    Subdiv. (21): Act No. 91 added “or electric personal assistive mobility devices” to the end of the subdiv. and made minor grammatical changes.

    Act No. 139 inserted “farm” preceding “tractors” and deleted “used entirely for work on the farm” thereafter and deleted “or implements of husbandry” following “all-terrain vehicles”.

    Subdiv. (40): Act No. 139 deleted “implements of husbandry” preceding “road making” and following “pole dinkeys”.

    Subdiv. (45): Act No. 91 added the last sentence.

    Subdiv. (46): Deleted by Act No. 139.

    Subdivs. (66) and (67): Added by Act Nos. 91 and 139.

    Subdivs. (68) through (70): Added by Act No. 139.

    —2001. Subdiv. (11): Added the second sentence and made minor changes in punctuation.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (11): Act No. 148 inserted “capitol police officers” preceding “motor vehicle inspectors”.

    Subdiv. (34)(E): Act No. 110 substituted “private motor vehicle designed to transport fewer” for “private vehicle carrying fewer” and inserted “shall be considered a Type II school bus and” following “for compensation”.

    Subdiv. (34)(F): Added by Act No. 110.

    Subdivs. (64), (65): Added by Act No. 110.

    —1999. Subdiv. (8): Amended generally by Act No. 31.

    Subdiv. (18): Act No. 34 added the language beginning “except that a” and ending “such a vehicle”.

    Subdiv. (19): Act No. 18 inserted “or, for purposes of registration only, if owned and operated by a municipality, while being used exclusively for municipal purposes; however, the town road commissioner, or comparable municipal officer, shall report annually to the legislative body of the municipality that the equipment is in good repair” following “maintenance of highways”.

    Subdiv. (42): Act No. 31 substituted “a person” for “every person” in the first sentence and added the last two sentences.

    —1997. Subdiv. (21): Act No. 50 added “or tracked vehicles” following “husbandry” at the end of the subdiv. and Act No. 55 inserted “all-terrain vehicles” following “snowmobiles” and made other minor changes in punctuation.

    Subdiv. (34): Amended generally by Act No. 32.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (34)(B): Substituted “up” for “from seven” following “carrying”, and inserted “or a private motor vehicle leased or otherwise provided to a school for 10 days or less” following “special field trip” in the introductory paragraph.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (22): Inserted “diesel driven vehicles using fuel as defined in section 3002 of this title” following “except”.

    Subdiv. (61): Added.

    Subdiv. (62): Added.

    —1993. Subdiv. (42): Act No. 64 inserted “persons regularly engaged and properly licensed for the short-term rental of ‘storage trailers’ owned by them and who move these storage trailers on their own wheels over public highways” preceding “and persons” in the first sentence and added the third sentence.

    Subdiv. (44): Act No. 18 inserted “or safety belt” preceding “systems” and “or 1259 ” following “section 1258”.

    Subdiv. (61): Added by Act No. 64.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (15): Act No. 143 substituted “at least 75 percent of the time” for “solely” preceding “in the transportation”.

    Subdiv. (60): Added by Act No. 165.

    —1991. Subdiv. (55): Act No. 72 deleted “and shall be considered to be an indivisible load” following “bulk” and “when the vehicle is not equipped with baffles” following “thereof”.

    Subdiv. (59): Added by Act No. 88.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (8)(E): Act No. 204 inserted “or has sold not less than 12 pleasure cars or trucks owned or registered, or both, by him or her which have been used in lease or rental service” following “by him or her” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (34): Act No. 239 deleted “more than 16” preceding “pupils” and inserted “and is designed to carry more than 15 passengers including the operator” following “purposes” in the first sentence of the first paragraph, deleted “16 or less” preceding “pupils” and inserted “and is designed to carry 15 passengers or less including the operator” preceding “except” in the first sentence of the second paragraph, substituted “or” for “of” following “mileage” in subdiv. (A), and substituted “15” for “sixteen” following “seven to” in subdiv. (B).

    Subdiv. (57): Added by Act Nos. 127 and 179.

    —1989. Subdiv. (56): Added.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (8): Amended generally by Act No. 190.

    Subdiv. (34)(A): Amended generally by Act No. 209.

    Subdiv. (34)(B): Act No. 209 rewrote the introductory paragraph.

    Subdiv. (55): Added by Act No. 145.

    —1987. Subdiv. (30): Act No. 62 inserted “except a person who is domiciled in another state and who returns to the state on a regular basis of no less than weekly” preceding “who accepts”.

    Subdiv. (31): Act No. 11 inserted “rock crushers” following “excavators”.

    Subdiv. (42): Act No. 18 inserted “persons towing office trailers owned by them or temporarily in their custody, on their own wheels over public highways” preceding “and persons regularly” in the first sentence.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (31): Act No. 104 substituted “mean” for “include” preceding “all bulldozers” and inserted “portable electric generators, pavement heaters, sweepers, steam boilers, traffic control boards, screening plants, asphalt reclaimers” preceding “and scarifiers”.

    Subdiv. (39): Act No. 124 inserted “primarily” following “used” and substituted “and not so constructed as to carry any load other than a part of the weight of the vehicles and load so drawn” for “but having no provisions for carrying a load” preceding “excepting”.

    Subdiv. (40): Act No. 239 deleted “and” following “however, implements of husbandry” and inserted “and transportation dollies” preceding “and ‘semi-trailer”’ and “transportation dollies” following “pole dinkeys, implements of husbandry”.

    Subdiv. (53): Added by Act Nos. 124 and 239.

    —1985. Subdiv. (8)(B)(ii): Act No. 12 substituted “pleasure cars or motor trucks” for “automobiles” following “selling” in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (42): Act No. 85 inserted “and persons regularly engaged in the business of moving modular homes over public highways” preceding “and shall also” in the first sentence.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (11): Act No. 212 inserted “state game wardens” following “inspectors”.

    Subdiv. (20): Act No. 102 added “and shall be construed to include truck tractor-semitrailer and truck tractor-semitrailer-trailer combinations” following “property”.

    Subdiv. (29): Repealed by Act No. 102.

    Subdiv. (44): Act No. 96 added “and child restraint systems or seat belts required in section 1258” following “registration of the vehicle”.

    Subdiv. (49): Added by Act Nos. 108 and 134.

    Subdiv. (50): Added by Act No. 108.

    Subdiv. (51): Added by Act No. 102.

    —1983. Subdiv. (1): Amended generally.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (8)(D): Added by Act No. 125.

    Subdiv. (15): Act No. 129 added “nor shall it apply to cooperative use transportation” following “service agencies”.

    Subdiv. (17): Act No. 129 added “nor shall it apply to cooperative transportation” following “passengers so transported”.

    Subdiv. (46): Added by Act No. 129.

    Subdiv. (48): Added by Act No. 129.

    —1979. Subdiv. (21): Act No. 46 added “or implements of husbandry” following “snowmobiles”.

    Subdiv. (33): Act No. 19 substituted “safety glazing materials” for “glass” following “composed of”, and deleted “of the glass” following “flying”.

    Subdiv. (46): Added by Act No. 46.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (11): Amended generally by Act No. 249.

    Subdiv. (15): Act No. 249 added “nor one which is used to transport elderly and handicapped persons for whom special transportation programs are designed and funded by state and federal authority through public and private, nonprofit social service agencies” following “so-called”.

    Subdiv. (34): Act No. 193 substituted “motor” for “motive” preceding “power” in the first sentence of the first paragraph and rewrote subdiv. (B) of the second paragraph.

    —1977. Subdiv. (10): Act No. 102 substituted “alternately” for “alternatively” following “four” in two places.

    Subdiv. (18): Act No. 20 inserted “mo-peds” following “excluding”.

    Subdiv. (34): Amended generally by Act No. 102.

    Subdiv. (45): Added by Act No. 20.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.) Act No. 135 added the last sentence of subdiv. (8)(A)(ii) and of subdiv. (8)(B)(ii).

    Act No. 149 amended the section generally.

    Act No. 192 substituted “designated” for “designed” preceding “for the carrying of merchandise” and inserted “or under authority granted to a school board under section 562 of Title 16 to transport other than school children” following “transportation of school children” in former subdiv. (14).

    Act No. 214 added subdiv. (44).

    Act No. 234 substituted “clauses” for “subdivisions” preceding “(A) and (B)” in the first sentence, substituted “clause” for “subdivision” following “under this” in the second sentence and added the third sentence of subdiv. (8)(C).

    —1975. Subdiv. (43): Added.

    —1973. Subdiv. (23): Inserted “ ‘drive’, ‘driving’ and ‘driven’ and shall also include” preceding “an attempt”.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1971. Subdiv. (35): Inserted “shall mean” preceding “every person” and substituted “when engaged” for “for use only” following “shop owners” in the first sentence and substituted “ ‘transporter’ ” shall” for “the provisions of this paragraph may” preceding “include” at the beginning of the second sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (24): Repealed by Act No. 259.

    Subdiv. (35): Amended generally by Act No. 258.

    Subdiv. (36): Added by Act No. 259.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (12): Amended generally by Act No. 252.

    Subdiv. (15): Act No. 341 substituted “on” for “in” preceding “the farm”, deleted “and” preceding “road making appliances” and added “or snowmobiles” thereafter.

    —1966. Subdiv. (5)(A)(i): Substituted “commissioner” for “commission” preceding “finds” and inserted “wilful” preceding “violations” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (5)(A)(ii): Rewrote the first sentence and substituted “building” for “structure” preceding “shall have adequate” in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (5)(B)(i): Added “wilful” preceding “violations” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (5)(B)(ii): Rewrote the former first and second sentences as the present first sentence.

    —1965. Subdiv. (4): Amended generally by Act No. 91.

    Subdiv. (5): Amended generally by Act No. 204.

    Subdiv. (14): Amended generally by Act No. 120.

    Subdiv. (29): Act No. 119 rewrote the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (35): Added by Act No. 106.

    —1964. Subdiv. (15): Substituted “in” for “on” preceding “the farm”, deleted “and” thereafter, and added “motorized highway building equipment and road making appliances” following “tracks”.

    —1963. Subdiv. (6): Act No. 54 inserted “motor vehicle inspectors” following “attorneys”.

    Subdiv. (14): Amended generally by Act No. 90.

    Subdiv. (15): Act 223 inserted “and” following “farm” and deleted “motorized highway building equipment, and road making appliances” following “tracks”.

    Subdiv. (29): Act No. 32 deleted “and” preceding “only such” and added the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (33): Added by Act No. 206.

    Subdiv. (34): Added by Act No. 206.

    —1961. Subdiv. (28): Amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Application.

    Where auto liability policy contained no definition of roads, highways, public roads, and public highways in contravention to the definition contained in this section, the policy’s provisions would be taken to be governed by this section’s definitions. Bourgon v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 128 Vt. 593, 270 A.2d 151, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 280 (1970).

    Construction with other laws.

    The term “operator,” as used in section 1133 of this title, means the person operating the motor vehicle; limiting the term “operator” in section 1133 to the definition supplied in subdiv. (25) of this section would lead to the absurd result that anyone under the age of eighteen, or without a valid driver’s license, could never be convicted of attempting to elude a police officer. State v. Day, 150 Vt. 119, 549 A.2d 1061, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 128 (1988).

    The Legislature intended that all of the definitions in this section apply to all the statutes relating to motor vehicles and to the enforcement of the laws regulating motor vehicles unless the context of the statutes themselves compel otherwise. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 438 A.2d 1135, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 634 (1981).

    Fresh pursuit.

    Police officer had authority to stop and arrest defendant outside of officer’s jurisdiction, based on doctrine of fresh pursuit, where defendant’s erratic driving was first observed in the jurisdiction, although it was not until the officer and defendant left the jurisdiction that defendant accelerated his vehicle and probable cause existed for a stop; it was not required that probable cause exist before the officer left the jurisdiction. State v. Griffin, 152 Vt. 309, 565 A.2d 1340, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 161 (1989).

    In light of the presumption that all language is inserted in a statute advisedly and the Supreme Court’s obligation to give effect to every word, clause ejusdem generis and sentence of a statute if it is possible to do so, the Court would not discard statutory language “as used in this chapter” in the definition of fresh pursuit in subdiv. (12) as inadvertent or as mere surplusage since it is not necessary to do so in order to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 438 A.2d 1135, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 634 (1981).

    Since the definition of fresh pursuit applies to all the statutes relating to motor vehicles and to the enforcement of the laws regulating motor vehicles unless the context of the statutes compel otherwise, trial court properly denied a motion to suppress evidence where the motion was based upon an assumption that a police officer from one town had no authority under the doctrine of fresh pursuit to follow the defendant from that town to a neighboring city and stop him in that jurisdiction. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 438 A.2d 1135, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 634 (1981).

    Jitneys.

    Owner of taxicab which is a jitney, as defined by this section, is common carrier and assumes all obligations incident to that calling; i.e., he is bound to exercise the utmost care that no injury befall his passengers and the law requires of him the highest degree of care respecting his equipment. Ready v. Peters, 119 Vt. 10, 117 A.2d 374, 1955 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1955).

    Motor vehicle.

    Language “propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power,” found in the statute defining a “motor vehicle,” is plain and unambiguous. A boom lift is powered by a motor rather than muscular power; therefore, it falls within this express definition of a motor vehicle. State v. Smith, 2011 VT 83, 190 Vt. 222, 27 A.3d 362, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2011).

    Statutory exceptions in the statute defining a “motor vehicle” are plain and unambiguous. A boom lift is manifestly not a farm tractor, snowmobile, stationary rail vehicle, tracked vehicle, or electric personal assistive mobility device. State v. Smith, 2011 VT 83, 190 Vt. 222, 27 A.3d 362, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2011).

    Statute defining a motor vehicle uses the modifier “all” before “vehicles” indicating that the Legislature intended that the provision encompass all vehicles not specified in the listed exceptions. State v. Smith, 2011 VT 83, 190 Vt. 222, 27 A.3d 362, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2011).

    Automobile temporarily incapable of operating on its own power is a motor vehicle within the meaning of this section. State v. Lansing, 108 Vt. 218, 184 A. 692, 1936 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1936).

    In prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor, automobile which could not be operated on its own power was a “motor vehicle” within meaning of term as defined by this section, since manifestly it was the design, mechanism, and construction of vehicle, and not its temporary condition, that Legislature had in mind in framing definition. State v. Tacey, 102 Vt. 439, 150 A. 68, 1930 Vt. LEXIS 144 (1930).

    Moving violation.

    Violations of municipal ordinances or regulations relating to vehicle speed also constitute violations of the state statutory provisions relating to vehicle speed and, being moving violations, fall within the purview of section 673a of this title, authorizing revocation of the operator’s license of any person convicted of eight or more moving violations within a consecutive period of five years. Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981).

    Operation.

    An attempt to extricate motor vehicle from ditch, when vehicle is partially in road, constitutes operation as defined in this section. State v. Parkhurst, 121 Vt. 210, 154 A.2d 466, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 109 (1959).

    In prosecution for operating unregistered motor vehicle, where automobile descended hill solely by reason of its own weight and the law of gravitation, the automobile then being incapable of operating under its own power, such acts constituted operation of motor vehicle within the meaning of this section. State v. Lansing, 108 Vt. 218, 184 A. 692, 1936 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1936).

    Turning ignition switch which put self-starter of automobile in motion was an operation of a motor vehicle, since it was a matter or thing connected with its use and presence upon the highway. State v. Storrs, 105 Vt. 180, 163 A. 560, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1933).

    Properly equipped.

    Because of his experience with older model Jeeps, which provided him with some knowledge of the way they sounded when running in good condition, a trooper had a reasonable basis for believing that the muffler on defendant’s Jeep was not in working order and his stop of the vehicle was justified. State v. Beauregard, 2003 VT 3, 175 Vt. 472, 820 A.2d 183, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 3 (2003) (mem.).

    Because defendant’s passenger vehicle had only one functioning taillight and thus was not properly equipped under statutes, arresting officer had a reasonable and articulable basis for stopping vehicle. State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 757 A.2d 1017, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 170 (2000).

    Public highway.

    Defendant’s private driveway, which was not restricted in any way, was a public highway under 23 V.S.A. § 4(13) for purposes of Vermont’s DUI statute. State v. Eckhardt, 165 Vt. 606, 686 A.2d 104, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1996) (mem.).

    Defendant was not in control of her vehicle “on a highway” within 23 V.S.A. § 4(13) and § 1201(a)(2) because the taxi cab parking lot where defendant was found was used by employees to leave their cars, the taxicabs used in the business, and persons specifically invited to enter; to the public generally, the message was “no trespassing,” a message enforced by requests for police assistance. State v. McNeil, 164 Vt. 129, 665 A.2d 51, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 71 (1995).

    The trial court’s rationale could have been adopted by the Legislature to prohibit driving or control of a vehicle while intoxicated wherever it occurs, but by including as an element of the offense that the operation or control occur on a “highway” and defining the term as it did, the Legislature opted for a more narrow approach. State v. McNeil, 164 Vt. 129, 665 A.2d 51, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 71 (1995).

    Evidence that road where defendant drove while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was maintained and plowed by town and provided secondary access to store and school supported trial court’s finding that road was open to general circulation of public and, therefore, a highway, even though road was privately owned and “no trespassing” and “private drive” signs indicated exclusion of public. State v. Paquette, 151 Vt. 631, 563 A.2d 632, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 111 (1989).

    The breakdown lane of an interstate highway comes within the meaning of the term “highway.” State v. Bailey, 149 Vt. 528, 546 A.2d 786, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 68 (1988).

    Evidence that road on which defendant was travelling was an interstate highway, and that a number of vehicles were travelling on the same roadway at the time of the offense, was sufficient to allow jury to conclude that road was a highway within the meaning of subdiv. (13) of this section. State v. Jewett, 148 Vt. 324, 532 A.2d 958, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 632 (1986).

    In the case of defendant convicted of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, subdiv. (13) of this section did not require a showing that defendant’s vehicle was on “a way laid out under authority of law.” State v. Trucott, 145 Vt. 274, 487 A.2d 149, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 588 (1984).

    Where police officer testified that the area where the vehicle was parked was on the “side of the highway, approximately 12 to 15 feet wide right along side, parallel to the highway,” that it was immediately adjacent to the highway and “used as a pull-off area” and, in charging the jury on the highway element of the offense, the court pointed out that the key was not ownership of the highway but whether it was open to the general public, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the vehicle was on a public highway and the charge was proper. State v. Trucott, 145 Vt. 274, 487 A.2d 149, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 588 (1984).

    In the case of defendant convicted of operating a motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while his license or right to so operate was under suspension where both offenses were alleged to have occurred in a restaurant parking lot, since there was evidence that the restaurant was located on a highway, that three cars at one time could drive in the wide entrance of its parking lot from the highway, that the driveway entrance was fifteen to twenty feet long before it opened into the parking lot and that the parking lot itself accommodated six or seven rows of cars, the parking lot was open to the general circulation of the public and therefore constituted a public highway under subdiv. (13) of this section. State v. Jarvis, 145 Vt. 8, 482 A.2d 65, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 534 (1984).

    As a place “open temporarily or permanently to public or general circulation of vehicles,” the frozen surface of lake qualified as a public road. Bourgon v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 128 Vt. 593, 270 A.2d 151, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 280 (1970).

    Since the words “or other place” in the definition of public highway are followed by other words clearly indicating the character and extent of the similarity which such place must bear to the places previously enumerated, the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply. State v. Hallock, 114 Vt. 292, 44 A.2d 326, 1945 Vt. LEXIS 82 (1945).

    Frozen surface of Lake Champlain is within the meaning of “or other place” as used in the definition of public highway in this section. State v. Hallock, 114 Vt. 292, 44 A.2d 326, 1945 Vt. LEXIS 82 (1945).

    Cited.

    Cited in 1948-50 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 200; 1950-52 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 219; State v. Parker, 123 Vt. 369, 189 A.2d 540, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 103 (1963); Taylor v. Malloy, 138 Vt. 66, 411 A.2d 1357, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1044 (1980); Leverson v. Conway, 144 Vt. 523, 481 A.2d 1029, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 512 (1984), Pizzagalli Construction Co. v. Town of Whitingham, 146 Vt. 490, 505 A.2d 678, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 317 (1986); State v. Hart, 149 Vt. 104, 539 A.2d 551, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 590 (1987); State v. LeBlanc, 149 Vt. 141, 540 A.2d 1037, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1987); State v. Oliver, 151 Vt. 626, 563 A.2d 1002, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1989); Barringer v. Griffes, 810 F. Supp. 119, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20504 (D. Vt. 1992).

    Notes to Opinions

    Highway building equipment.

    The classification of “highway building equipment” in subdiv. (19) of this section applies only when such equipment is used exclusively for the building, repair, or maintenance of highways. 1966-68 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 132.

    Diesel-powered shovels, scarifiers, gasoline-powered cement mixers, caterpillar tractors, etc., when used within the limits of a highway project, solely in the construction, maintenance, or improvement of a highway, are machines and are not vehicles subject to registration. 1936-38 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 339.

    Jitneys.

    The Legislature intended to limit the definition of a jitney, in regard to carrying school children, to those vehicles which are used for the carrying of other types of passengers, as well as school children. 1962-64 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 259.

    Person transporting co-workers to and from work for nominal fee is not within definition of jitney. 1948-50 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 175.

    Renting of automobile to person to be operated by hirer may be properly construed as meaning that such vehicles are used in connection with livery business, and it follows therefrom that such motor vehicles are included within terms of definition for word “jitney.” 1946-48 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 216.

    Motor vehicle.

    The definition of motor vehicle in this section includes go-carts and any small vehicles driven by motor power. 1962-64 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 184.

    Operation.

    Motor vehicle actually steered or attempted to be steered or its motion controlled or attempted to be controlled by the use of its brakes while being towed by a registered motor vehicle on a public highway would constitute an operation thereof within meaning of this section. 1936-38 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 336.

    Pleasure car.

    A station wagon is a pleasure car rather than a motor truck. 1962-64 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 257.

    A privately owned vehicle used to distribute school children should be registered as a pleasure vehicle where the owner is compensated by the municipality. 1962-64 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 259.

    Public highway.

    Roadways within state forest park fall within definition of “public highways” in this section. 1952-54 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 235.

    § 5. Repealed. 2003, No. 61, § 4.

    History

    Former § 5. Former § 5, relating to payments by credit card to Department of Motor Vehicles, was derived from 1995, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 6. Vehicle registration renewal by municipal clerks.

    By written agreement, the Commissioner may authorize any municipal clerk to renew vehicle, snowmobile, or motorboat registrations upon receipt of a completed application and the required fees which shall be forwarded to the Commissioner immediately. A clerk may assess, collect, and retain an additional $3.00 administration fee for each renewal issued.

    HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 25, 1996; amended 1997, No. 55 , § 2, eff. June 26, 1997; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 2a, eff. May 15, 2002.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$3.00 administration fee” for “$2.00 administration fee” in the second sentence.

    —1997. Inserted “snowmobile or motorboat” preceding “registrations” in the first sentence.

    § 7. Enhanced driver’s license; maintenance of database information; fee.

    1. The face of an enhanced license shall contain the individual’s name, date of birth, gender, a unique identification number, full facial photograph or imaged likeness, address, signature, issuance and expiration dates, citizenship, and, if applicable, a veteran designation. The back of the enhanced license shall have a machine-readable zone. A Gen 2 vicinity Radio Frequency Identification chip shall be embedded in the enhanced license in compliance with the security standards of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Any additional personal identity information not currently required by the Department of Homeland Security shall need the approval of either the General Assembly or the Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules prior to the implementation of the requirements.
    2. In addition to any other requirement of law or rule, before an enhanced license may be issued to a person, the person shall present for inspection and copying satisfactory documentary evidence to determine identity and U.S. citizenship. An application shall be accompanied by: a photo identity document, documentation showing the person’s date and place of birth, proof of the person’s Social Security number, and documentation showing the person’s principal residence address. New and renewal application forms shall include a space for the applicant to request that a “veteran” designation be placed on the enhanced license. If a veteran, as defined in 38 U.S.C. § 101(2), requests a veteran designation and provides a Department of Defense Form 214 or other proof of veteran status specified by the Commissioner, and the Office of Veterans Affairs confirms his or her status as an honorably discharged veteran or a veteran discharged under honorable conditions, the identification card shall include the term “veteran” on its face. To be issued, an enhanced license must meet the same requirements as those for the issuance of a U.S. passport. Before an application may be processed, the documents and information shall be verified as determined by the Commissioner. Any additional personal identity information not currently required by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security shall need the approval of either the General Assembly or the Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules prior to the implementation of the requirements.
    3. No person shall compile or maintain a database of electronically readable information derived from an operator’s license, junior operator’s license, enhanced license, learner permit, or nondriver identification card. This prohibition shall not apply to a person who accesses, uses, compiles, or maintains a database of the information for law enforcement or governmental purposes or for the prevention of fraud or abuse or other criminal conduct.
    4. The fee for an enhanced license shall be $30.00 in addition to the fees otherwise established by this title.
    5. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 39; amended 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2013, No. 57 , § 16; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Substituted “$30.00” for “$25.00”.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Deleted “and” following “dates” and inserted “, and, if applicable, a veteran designation” following “citizenship” and “U.S.” preceding “Department”.

    Subsec. (b): Added the present third and fourth sentences; inserted “U.S.” preceding “Department” in the seventh sentence.

    Effective date of 2007 (Adj. Sess.) enactment. 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 11 provides: “This act shall take effect from passage except for Sec. 3 [which enacted this section] which shall not take effect until the commissioner of motor vehicles determines that the systems necessary to operate the program are available. The provisions of this act are intended to supersede any provisions to the contrary in H. 691 [ 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.)] as passed in the 2008 session of the general assembly.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Commercial license fees, see § 4110 of this title.

    License fees, see § 608 of this title.

    § 8. Personal radio frequency identification chip number protection.

    Personal radio frequency identification chip numbers shall be given protections as codified in the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. chapter 123, as of January 1, 2008, not including any subsequent amendments.

    HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 134.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. chapter 123” for “18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq. (Drivers Privacy Protection Act)”.

    Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Department

    § 101. Commissioner.

    The Department of Motor Vehicles is created and established, and the head of the Department shall be a Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

    HISTORY: Amended 1989, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 15, 1990.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,046. 1947, No. 202 , § 5262. P.L. § 4988. 1933, No. 157 , § 4692. 1927, No. 69 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). In the first sentence, substituted “department of motor vehicles is” for “motor vehicle department is hereby” preceding “created” and “of the department” for “thereof” preceding “shall be a commissioner”, and deleted the second and third sentences.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Commissioner of Motor Vehicles; appointment; duties and powers, see 19 V.S.A. § 8 .

    Notes to Opinions

    Vacancy in office.

    A mere vacancy in the office of Commissioner of Motor Vehicles does not thereby vitiate the appointment of all deputies and inspectors in the Department and they can lawfully carry on their duties during the term of their appointment even though a new Commissioner has not been appointed to fill the vacancy. 1940-42 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 179.

    § 102. Duties of Commissioner.

    1. The Commissioner shall:
      1. register motor vehicles and dealers;
      2. license operators;
      3. file reports received concerning crashes involving motor vehicles;
      4. prepare full statistics from and preserve, properly filed and indexed, such registrations, operator licenses, and crash reports for three years after their dates;
      5. file and record reports received of convictions and adjudications of persons violating motor vehicle laws;
      6. keep a record of the suspension and revocation of licenses and registrations;
      7. prepare full statistics from and preserve, properly filed and indexed, such records of convictions, suspensions, and revocations for at least six years after their dates;
      8. issue certificates of title for motor vehicles;
      9. issue nondriver identification cards; and
      10. maintain commercial driver records and driver identification data in accordance with the provisions of 49 C.F.R § 384.231(d).
    2. The records enumerated in subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed official records.
    3. [Repealed.]
    4. The Commissioner may authorize background investigations for potential employees, which may include criminal, traffic, and financial records checks; provided, however, that the potential employee is notified and has the right to withdraw his or her name from application. Additionally, employees who are involved in the manufacturing or production of operator’s licenses and identification cards, including enhanced licenses, or who have the ability to affect the identity information that appears on a license or identification card, or current employees who will be assigned to such positions, shall be subject to appropriate background checks and shall be provided notice of the background check and the contents of that check. These background checks shall include a name-based and fingerprint-based criminal history records check using at a minimum the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification database and State repository records on each covered employee. Employees may be subject to further appropriate security clearances if required by federal law, including background investigations that may include criminal and traffic records checks and providing proof of U.S. citizenship. The Commissioner may, in connection with a formal disciplinary investigation, authorize a criminal or traffic record background investigation of a current employee; provided, however, that the background review is relevant to the issue under disciplinary investigation. Information acquired through the investigation shall be provided to the Commissioner or designated division director and must be maintained in a secure manner. If the information acquired is used as a basis for any disciplinary action, it must be given to the employee during any pretermination hearing or contractual grievance hearing to allow the employee an opportunity to respond to or dispute the information. If no disciplinary action is taken against the employee, the information acquired through the background check shall be destroyed.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; 1977, No. 174 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 31, 1978; 1979, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1997, No. 55 , § 3, eff. June 26, 1997; 2003, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 37, eff. June 9, 2004; 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2011, No. 46 , § 19; 2013, No. 20 , § 2; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 135.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 39 . V.S. 1947, § 10,047. 1941, No. 90 . P.L. § 4989. 1927, No. 74 , § 3. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 5. G.L. § 4676. P.S. § 4079, 4084. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , §§ 1, 4.

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crashes” for “accidents” in subdiv. (a)(3) and “crash” for “accident” in subdiv. (a)(4) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Substituted “, which,” for “that” in the first sentence, “operator’s” for “operators”’ in the second sentence, “shall” for “will” in the third sentence, and “U.S.” for “United States” in the fourth sentence.

    —2013. Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    —2011. Subsec. (c): Repealed.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(10): Added.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added the present second sentence; substituted “a criminal or traffic record” for “an appropriate” preceding “background” and deleted “necessary and” preceding “relevant” in the third sentence; substituted “the” for “a background” preceding “investigation” and substituted “shall be provided to the commissioner or designated division director, and must be maintained in a secure manner” for “that may be” following “investigation” in the fourth sentence; inserted “If the information acquired is” preceding “used” and “it” following “action” in the fifth sentence; and added the sixth sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Inserted “and adjudications” following “convictions” in subdiv. (5) and added subdiv. (9).

    Subsec. (c): Added “or by electronic imaging” following “microfilm” at the end of the sentence.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), deleted “and” following “registrations” in present subdiv. (a)(6), added “and” following “dates” in present subdiv. (a)(7), and added subsec. (b).

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (1): Act No. 259 inserted “and” preceding “dealers” and deleted “and repairmen” thereafter.

    Subdiv. (8): Added by Act No. 297.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Commissioner of Motor Vehicles; appointment; duties and powers, see 19 V.S.A. § 8 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35, 587 A.2d 405, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 13 (1991).

    § 103. Appointment of officials and inspectors.

    With the approval of the Governor, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may appoint and employ inspectors who shall devote their entire time to the duties of their appointment while so employed. In addition, the Commissioner shall appoint the Deputy Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, the Director of the Gasoline Tax Division, and examiners of new operators, including regular office employees whose duties require such appointment and who shall have the authority of inspectors. With the approval of the Governor, at the expense of the State, the Commissioner may furnish suitable uniforms for a part of or all the inspectors provided for in this section.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,048. 1947, No. 163 , §§ 1, 3. 1946, No. 16 (Sp. Sess.), § 1. 1941, No. 92 . 1937, No. 119 , § 1. 1935, No. 118 , § 1. P.L. § 5011. 1933, No. 157 , § 4715. 1931, No. 73 , § 1. 1927, No. 71 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , §§ 11, 13. G.L. § 4715. 1917, No. 254 , § 4600. 1912, No. 148 . P.S. § 4096. 1906, No. 113 , § 3. 1904, No. 86 , §§ 4, 9.

    Notes to Opinions

    Powers of inspectors.

    State motor vehicle inspector has right to make arrest for violation of village ordinance. 1936-38 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 504.

    § 104. Public records.

    1. Any information contained in Department records is subject to and shall be released pursuant to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. chapter 123 as amended.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, except for requests from government agencies or persons acting on behalf of government agencies, the Commissioner shall not furnish to any person copies of photographs or imaged likenesses of persons to whom licenses, permits, or nondriver identification cards have been issued without the written consent of the person depicted in the photograph or imaged likeness.
    3. If there is a request by any governmental agency for the entire database or the substantial database of any class of documents containing a photograph or imaged likeness of a person or any class of documents containing any other personal information, the Department of Motor Vehicles shall notify the Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the Attorney General.
    4. Any photographs or imaged likenesses furnished to an authorized recipient shall not be made available or redisclosed to any succeeding person or entity, except for use by a law enforcement agency, a court or tribunal, a State’s Attorney, the Office of the Attorney General, or the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Vermont in carrying out its official business or in response to any court order. The Commissioner shall so condition any release of the information and require that the recipient subject itself to the jurisdiction of the Washington Superior Court in the event that the condition is violated.
    5. A person who violates subsection (b), (c), or (d) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00 per occurrence. A civil action to assess a civil penalty may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be commenced by the Attorney General in Washington Superior Court.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1977, No. 174 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 31, 1978; 1979, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1983, No. 252 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1985, No. 85 , § 2; 1987, No. 112 , § 4; 1989, 1987, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 15, 1990; 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2019, No. 60 , § 1; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 136.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,049. P.L. § 4990. 1933, No. 157 , § 4694. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 6. G.L. § 4676. P.S. §§ 4079, 4084. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , §§ 1, 4.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Substituted “U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Vermont” for “office of the United States’ Attorney” in the first sentence and deleted “of Motor Vehicles” following “Commissioner” in the second sentence.

    —2019. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Designated existing provisions of section as subsec. (a), substituted “subdivision” for “section” following “established by” in the second sentence of that subsec., and added subsecs. (b)-(e).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “all-terrain vehicles” following “snowmobiles” and “the records regarding the issuance of nondriver identification cards” following “registrations” in the first sentence.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Added “or electronic imaging” following “microfilm” in the fourth sentence.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). In the second sentence, substituted “the” for “such” preceding “records to any”, inserted “interested” thereafter, deleted “interested therein” preceding “on payment of such fee as”, and substituted “established by section 114(a)(21) of this title” for “he shall deem reasonable but not less than $2.50” thereafter.

    —1987. In the third sentence, inserted “government” preceding “agencies in the manner” and “determined by the Commissioner” thereafter.

    —1985. Inserted “and the records regarding diesel fuel, gasoline and rental vehicle taxes” preceding “shall be deemed” in the first sentence and “but not less than $2.50” following “reasonable” at the end of the second sentence and deleted “state, county and municipal government” preceding “agencies” in the third sentence.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 212 inserted “snowmobiles and motorboats” following “vehicles” in the first sentence.

    Act No. 252 substituted “the records of” for “all matters pertaining to” preceding “the registration” at the beginning of the first sentence, added the third sentence, and rewrote the fourth sentence.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Added the third sentence.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “official and” preceding “public records” in the first sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “and repairmen” preceding “all original” in the first sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Access to public records, see 1 V.S.A. chapter 5, subchapter 3.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction with other laws.

    This section’s provision that Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall furnish certified copies of records for fees, being specific, governed as against 1 V.S.A. § 316 , providing that one requesting a copy of a public record may be charged the cost of providing the copy, so that Commissioner had to provide only certified copies at the statutory fee and did not have to provide uncertified copies at cost; and the fee schedule, having been enacted after 1 V.S.A. § 316 , was the latest expression of the legislative will. Riffon v. Conway, 138 Vt. 344, 415 A.2d 241, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1220 (1980).

    Notes to Opinions

    Examination of records.

    Commissioner has no lawful authority to exclude any interested person from access to and examination and inspection of records during reasonable hours, but may make and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations regarding inspection as may be necessary for their safety, and to prevent disproportionate interference with proper performance of duties of office, and consistent with rights of public. 1940-42 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 280.

    Commissioner has no right to demand any fee or compensation for privilege of access to records, or for any examination thereof, but if an interested person desires assistance in the inspection of records, the Commissioner is authorized to make a reasonable charge for such service, such fees to be transferred to the State Treasury. 1940-42 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 280.

    There is no duty imposed on the Commissioner to furnish finance corporations, collection agencies, insurance companies, and other mailing services with information for the compilation of mailing lists, etc. 1940-42 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 280.

    § 105. Hearing before Commissioner.

    1. In the administration of the laws relating to motor vehicles and to the operators and the operation of motor vehicles, the Commissioner may conduct hearings, subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, and take testimony. He or she may also cause depositions to be taken and order the production of books, papers, and records relating to the matter under investigation. The fees for travel and attendance of witnesses and fees for officers shall be the same as for witnesses and officers before a court and shall be paid by the State upon presentation of proper bills of cost to the Commissioner of Finance and Management. The fees of witnesses summoned or used by the petitioner shall be paid by him or her. The Commissioner may appoint a hearing examiner to conduct hearings. At all hearings, conducted by either the Commissioner or a hearing examiner, an oath shall be administered.
    2. A person aggrieved by the decision of a hearing under subsection (a) of this section may have such decision reviewed by the Superior Court pursuant to Rule 74 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specifically provided by law.
    3. If a presuspension or prerevocation hearing is available by law, the written notice of suspension or revocation shall so state. Unless otherwise specifically provided by statute, a written request for a hearing must be received at the Department of Motor Vehicles within 15 days after the date of the notice or the right to a hearing is deemed to be waived.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 194 , § 10, operative Feb. 1, 1967; 1977, No. 260 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 19, 1978; 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b); 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1999, No. 34 , § 3; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,059. P.L. § 4998. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 118.

    Revision note—

    Reference to “auditor of accounts” at the end of the third sentence changed to “finance director” pursuant to 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(b). See note set out under 32 V.S.A. § 182 .

    Reference to “finance director” at the end of the third sentence changed to “commissioner of finance” to conform reference to new title and reorganization of state government pursuant to 1971, No. 92 .

    Reference to “commissioner of finance and information support” at the end of the third sentence changed to “commissioner of finance and management” in light of Executive Order No. 35-87, which provided for the abolition of the department of finance and information support and the transfer of the duties, responsibilities and authority of the commissioner of that entity to the commissioner of the department of finance and management as established by the order. By its own terms, Executive Order No. 35 shall take effect on July 1, 1987, pursuant to section 2002 of Title 3. For the text of Executive Order No. 35, see chapter 1 of Title 3 Appendix.

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “a court” for “district court” in the third sentence.

    —1999. Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “of motor vehicles” for “thereof” following “operation” in the first sentence and added the sixth sentence.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and inserted “or she” following “he” in the second sentence, substituted “the” for “such” preceding “petitioner” and added “or her” following “him” in the fourth sentence and substituted “examiner” for “officer” preceding “to conduct” in the fifth sentence of that subsec. and added subsec. (b).

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Added “and information support” following “commissioner of finance” at the end of the third sentence.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Added the fifth sentence.

    —1965. Substituted “district” for “municipal” preceding “court” in the third sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Witness fees, see 32 V.S.A. chapter 17, subchapter 5.

    Notes to Opinions

    Witness fees.

    Fees for travel and attendance of witnesses summoned by State and fees for officers used by State in connection with such hearings shall be paid from appropriation to Motor Vehicle Department. 1938-40 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 291.

    § 106. Procedure upon hearings.

    The Commissioner shall determine the rules and procedure under which such hearings shall be held. On request of the Commissioner, the State’s Attorney of the county where such hearing is to be held shall attend and represent the State.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,060. P.L. § 4999. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 118.

    § 107. Notice of hearings.

    Notice of a hearing held by the Commissioner or the hearing officer under the provisions of sections 105 and 106 of this title shall state the place, day, and hour thereof, and warn the petitioner that he or she may then appear through himself, herself, or counsel. Service of such notice shall be sufficient if sent by first-class mail to the address given by the petitioner at least five days before the day set for the hearing.

    HISTORY: Amended 1977, No. 260 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 19, 1978; amended 1997, No. 55 , § 4, eff. June 26, 1997.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,061. P.L. § 5000. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 119.

    Amendments

    —1997. Inserted “or she” preceding “may then appear through himself” and “herself” thereafter in the first sentence, substituted “first class mail” for “registered mail” following “if sent by”, and deleted “provided a return receipt has been received” following “hearing” in the second sentence.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or the hearing officer” following “commissioner” in the first sentence.

    § 108. Application forms.

    The Commissioner shall prepare and furnish all forms for applications, crash reports, conviction reports, a pamphlet containing the full text of the motor vehicle laws of the State, and all other forms needed in the proper conduct of his or her office. He or she shall furnish an adequate supply of such registration forms, license applications, and motor vehicle laws each year to each town clerk, and to such other persons as may so request.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,065. 1945, No. 96 , § 1. P.L. § 5004. 1927, No. 70 . 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 9. G.L. § 4706. 1917, No. 136 , § 3.

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” preceding the first instance of “reports” in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    § 109. Lists of suspensions.

    1. [Repealed.]
    2. Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. chapter 5, subchapter 3, a list of all persons whose operating license, nonresident operating privileges, or privilege of an unlicensed operator to operate a vehicle is suspended or revoked in this State shall be available on request in such form as the Commissioner may determine. The list shall be available in an electronic format for law enforcement officers with computer access through the Department of Public Safety.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 194 , § 10, operative Feb. 1, 1967; 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2015, No. 50 , § 28.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,066. 1941, No. 91 . P.L. § 5006. 1933, No. 157 , § 4710. 1927, No. 70 . 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 9.

    Amendments

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Added “lists of suspensions” in the section heading; designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and, in that subsec., substituted “the commissioner” for “he” in the second sentence, and “The” for “Such” at the beginning of the third sentence; and added subsec. (b).

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “or repairmen’s” following “dealer’s” in the first sentence.

    —1965. Substituted “district” for “municipal” preceding “judge” in the second sentence.

    § 110. Bad checks received for fees.

    1. Whenever any check issued in payment of any fee or for any other purpose is tendered to the Department of Motor Vehicles and payment is not honored by the bank on which the check is drawn, the Commissioner shall send a written notice of its nonpayment to the maker or person presenting the check and if the check is not made good forthwith, he or she shall suspend the license or registration of the person or persons. In no case shall the license or registration be reinstated until settlement has been made in full. Settlement in full shall also include the payment of any penalties assessed by the State Treasurer.
    2. The Commissioner may require payment for any transaction solely by certified check or in cash from persons whose licenses or registrations are under suspension pursuant to subsection (a) of this section or from persons who have repeatedly tendered checks to the Department that have not been honored by the bank on which drawn.
    3. Any refund otherwise due from the Department to a person whose license or registration has been suspended pursuant to this section may be offset against the amount due the Commissioner under this section.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 276 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1971, No. 14 , § 7, eff. March 11, 1971; 1989, No. 84 , § 3; 1993, No. 27 , § 4; 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. June 11, 1994; 2007, No. 19 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 197 .

    Amendments

    —2007. Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “for a period of 15 days for the first offense” following “person or persons” in the first sentence and deleted the former second sentence.

    —1993. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), in that subsec. substituted “department of motor vehicles” for “motor vehicle department” following “tendered to the”, inserted “of its nonpayment” following “written notice” and deleted “of its nonpayment” following “presenting the check” in the first sentence, added the fourth sentence, and added subsec. (b).

    —1989. Inserted “within three years” following “offense occurs” in the second sentence.

    —1971. Inserted “on which the check is drawn” following “honored by the bank” in the first sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Civil remedy for bad checks, see 9 V.S.A. § 2311 .

    Crimes and criminal procedure; bad checks, see 13 V.S.A. § 2022 .

    Operating after suspension or revocation of license, see § 674 of this title.

    Penalty for returned payments, see 32 V.S.A. § 404 .

    Procedure for suspension or revocation of license or registration, see § 204 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    The suspension of an operator’s license for payment of a Motor Vehicle Department fee by a bad check is a civil penalty and as such is regulatory in nature rather than punitive and is constitutionally valid. Bauer v. Malloy, 135 Vt. 175, 376 A.2d 17, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 579 (1977).

    Hearing.

    Where notice of suspension of motor vehicle operator’s license did not give any indication of operator’s right to a hearing, and operator failed to request a hearing, even though the guarantees of hearing apply to suspension of an operator’s license pursuant to this section, operator could not claim that his rights were infringed in view of agreed statement of facts and his admission that he did utter a bad check in payment of license; however, better procedure would be that notice contain reference indicating opportunity for hearing upon request. Bauer v. Malloy, 135 Vt. 175, 376 A.2d 17, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 579 (1977).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35, 587 A.2d 405, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 13 (1991).

    § 111. Emergency extension of time.

    The Commissioner, with the approval of the Governor, may in an emergency extend the period for which any vehicle registration, operator’s license, or vehicle certificate of periodic inspection is valid for periods not to exceed 30 days each.

    HISTORY: Added 1973, No. 11 .

    § 112. Motor vehicle law book.

    The pamphlet of the motor vehicle laws of the State, issued by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, may be furnished to interested parties for a fee of $30.00. The fee for any supplement shall be $15.00. This pamphlet shall be made available to all State law enforcement officers, upon request, at no charge.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 142 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 27, 1978; amended 1989, No. 51 , § 8; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 15, 2002.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$30.00” for “$20.00” in the first sentence and “$15.00” for “$10.00” at the end of the second sentence.

    —1989. Substituted “commissioner of motor vehicles” for “motor vehicle department” following “issued by the” and “$20.00” for “$10.00” following “fee of” in the first sentence and “$10.00” for “$5.00” at the end of the second sentence.

    § 113. Recall of defective vehicles; fee to manufacturers.

    The Commissioner shall charge a fee, to be fixed by him or her at cost, to a person or company requesting listings to be furnished of motor vehicles to be recalled by a manufacturer or company.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 142 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 27, 1978.

    § 114. Fees.

    1. The Commissioner shall be paid the following fees for miscellaneous transactions:
      1. Listings of 1 through 4 registrations  $8.00
      2. Certified copy of registration application  $8.00
      3. Sample plates  $18.00
      4. Lists of registered dealers, transporters,

        periodic inspection stations, fuel dealers,

        and distributors, including gallonage sold

        or delivered and rental vehicle companies $8.00 per page

      5. [Repealed.]
      6. Periodic inspection sticker record  $8.00
      7. Certified copy individual crash report  $12.00
      8. Certified copy police crash report  $18.00
      9. Certified copy suspension notice  $8.00
      10. Certified copy mail receipt  $8.00
      11. Certified copy proof of mailing  $8.00
      12. Certified copy reinstatement notice  $8.00
      13. Certified copy operator’s license application  $8.00
      14. Certified copy three-year operating record  $14.00
      15. [Repealed.]
      16. Government official photo identification card  $6.00
      17. Listing of operator’s licenses of 1 through 4  $8.00
      18. Statistics and research  $42.00 per hour
      19. Insurance information on crash  $8.00
      20. Certified copy complete operating record  $20.00
      21. Records not otherwise specified  $8.00 per page
      22. Public records request for Department  $100.00

        records requiring custom per hour, but not

        computer programming less than $500.00

      23. Public records request for

        Department records requiring custom

        computer programming (updated) $119.00

    2. The Commissioner shall furnish the items listed in subsection (a) of this section upon a request that completely identifies the information sought or pursuant to a contract with an outside entity for purposes permitted under law, including the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. chapter 123 as amended. For purposes of this subsection, a request that completely identifies the information sought for an individual shall mean name and date of birth, and for a vehicle shall mean either the registration number or the vehicle identification number.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 142 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 27, 1978; amended 1979, No. 202 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, Pt. I, eff. Sept. 1, 1980; 1985, No. 85 , § 3; 1989, No. 51 , § 9; 1995, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 12a; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 2009, No. 50 , § 35; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2019, No. 60 , § 2; 2021, No. 76 , § 24.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. In subdivs. (a)(7) and (a)(8), deleted “accident” preceding “crash”.

    —2019. Subdiv. (a)(22): Substituted “Public records request for Department records requiring custom computer programming” for “List of title records and related data elements excluding any personally identifiable information—initial computer programming” and “$100.00 per hour, but not less than $500.00” for “$5,331.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(23): Substituted “Public records request for Department records requiring custom computer programming (updated)” for “List of title records and related data elements excluding any personally identifiable information—record set on electronic media”.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “only” following “of this section”, substituted “that” for “which”, and added “or pursuant to a contract with an outside entity for purposes permitted under law, including the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. chapter 123 as amended” in the first sentence and substituted “For purposes of this subsection, a request that completely identifies” for “Completely identifying”, “an individual” for “individuals”, and “a vehicle” for “vehicles it” in the second sentence.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Raised the fees in subdivs. (1) through (23).

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(14): Substituted “13.00” for “11.00”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(21): Substituted “6.00” for “4.00”.

    —2009. Subdiv. (a)(14) in the table substituted “11.00” for “10.00.”

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(14): Substituted “10.00” for “8.00”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivs. (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), (a)(9), (a)(10), (a)(11), (a)(12), (a)(13), (a)(17), and (a)(19): Substituted “$6.00” for “$4.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(7): Substituted “$10.00” for “$6.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(8): Substituted “$15.00” for “$12.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(14): Substituted “three-year” for “3 year” and “$8.00” for “$4.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(15): Deleted.

    Subdiv. (a)(18): Substituted “$35.00” for “$25.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(20): Substituted “$16.00” for “$8.00”.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added subdivs. (22) and (23).

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(16): Added “government official” preceding “photo”.

    —1989. Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “$4.00” for “$2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “4.00” for “3.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “10.00” for “4.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Substituted “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(6): Substituted “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(7): Substituted “6.00” for “4.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(8): Substituted “12.00” for “8.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(9): Substituted “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(10): Substituted “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(11): Substituted “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(12): Substituted “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(13): Substituted “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(15): Substituted “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(16): Substituted “5.00” for “2.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(17): Substituted “4” for “8” and “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(18): Substituted “25.00” for “10.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(19): Substituted “4.00” for “2.50”.

    Subdiv. (a)(20): Added.

    Subdiv. (a)(21): Added.

    —1985. Section amended generally.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Riffon v. Conway, 138 Vt. 344, 415 A.2d 241, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1220 (1980).

    § 115. Nondriver identification cards.

    1. Any Vermont resident may make application to the Commissioner and be issued an identification card that is attested by the Commissioner as to true name, correct age, residential address unless the listing of another address is requested by the applicant or is otherwise authorized by law, and any other identifying data as the Commissioner may require that shall include, in the case of minor applicants, the written consent of the applicant’s parent, guardian, or other person standing in loco parentis. Every application for an identification card shall be signed by the applicant and shall contain such evidence of age and identity as the Commissioner may require, consistent with subsection (l) of this section. New and renewal application forms shall include a space for the applicant to request that a “veteran” designation be placed on the applicant’s identification card. If a veteran, as defined in 38 U.S.C. § 101(2), requests a veteran designation and provides a Department of Defense Form 214 or other proof of veteran status specified by the Commissioner, and the Office of Veterans Affairs confirms the veteran’s status as an honorably discharged veteran or a veteran discharged under honorable conditions, the identification card shall include the term “veteran” on its face. The Commissioner shall require payment of a fee of $24.00 at the time application for an identification card is made, except that an initial nondriver identification card shall be issued at no charge to an individual who surrenders his or her license in connection with a suspension or revocation under subsection 636(b) of this title due to a physical or mental condition.
    2. Every identification card shall expire, unless earlier canceled, at midnight on the eve of the fourth anniversary of the date of birth of the cardholder following the date of original issue, and may be renewed every four years upon payment of a $24.00 fee. A renewed identification card shall expire, unless earlier canceled, at midnight on the eve of the fourth anniversary of the date of birth of the cardholder following the expiration of the card being renewed. At least 30 days before an identification card will expire, the Commissioner shall mail first-class to the cardholder or send the cardholder electronically an application to renew the identification card; a cardholder shall be sent the renewal notice by mail unless the cardholder opts in to receive electronic notification. An individual born on February 29 shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered as born on March 1.
    3. In the event an identification card is lost, destroyed, mutilated, or a new name is acquired, a replacement may be obtained upon furnishing satisfactory proof to the Commissioner and paying a $20.00 fee.
    4. The identification card shall bear the following notice: “For identification purposes only.”
    5. The holder of an identification card shall notify the Commissioner, in writing, of a change in address within 30 days after the change is made.
    6. The Commissioner shall cancel the identification card if the card is fraudulently obtained, altered, or misused.
    7. An identification card issued to a first-time applicant and any subsequent renewals by that person shall contain a photograph or imaged likeness of the applicant. The photographic identification card shall be available at a location designated by the Commissioner. An individual issued an identification card under this subsection that contains an imaged likeness may renew his or her identification card by mail. Except that a renewal by an individual required to have a photograph or imaged likeness under this subsection must be made in person so that an updated imaged likeness of the individual is obtained not less often than once every nine years.
    8. An identification card issued to an individual who is under 18 years of age shall be distinguishable by color from an identification card issued to an individual who is 18 years of age or older but under 21 years of age, and both cards shall be distinguishable by color from an identification card issued to an individual 21 years of age or older. An identification card issued to an individual under 21 years of age shall clearly indicate, in prominent type, the date on which the individual will become 21. The distinguishing colors shall be the same as those used to distinguish operator’s licenses issued under section 610 of this title.
    9. An identification card issued under this subsection to an initial or renewal applicant shall include data elements as prescribed in 6 C.F.R. § 37.19.
    10. Individuals receiving Supplemental Security Income or Social Security Disability Income and individuals with a disability as defined in 9 V.S.A. § 4501(2) shall be provided with nondriver identification cards for the following fees:
      1. Original issuance: $10.00.
      2. Renewal every four years: $10.00.
      3. Replacement of lost, destroyed, or mutilated card, or a new name is required: $5.00.
    11. At the option of the applicant, his or her valid Vermont license may be surrendered in connection with an application for an identification card. In those instances, the fee due under subsection (a) of this section shall be reduced by:
      1. one-quarter of the four-year fee established by subsection 601(c) of this title for each remaining full year of validity; or
      2. one-half of the two-year fee paid for each remaining full year of validity.
      1. The Commissioner shall issue identification cards to Vermont residents who are not U.S. citizens but are able to establish lawful presence in the United States if an applicant follows the procedures and furnishes documents as required under subsection 603(d) of this title and any applicable policies or adopted rules, and otherwise satisfies the requirements of this section. The identification cards shall expire consistent with subsection 603(d) of this title. (l) (1) The Commissioner shall issue identification cards to Vermont residents who are not U.S. citizens but are able to establish lawful presence in the United States if an applicant follows the procedures and furnishes documents as required under subsection 603(d) of this title and any applicable policies or adopted rules, and otherwise satisfies the requirements of this section. The identification cards shall expire consistent with subsection 603(d) of this title.
      2. The Commissioner shall issue non-REAL ID compliant identification cards to Vermont residents unable to establish lawful presence in the United States if an applicant follows the procedures and furnishes documents as required under subsection 603(e) of this title and any applicable policies or adopted rules, and otherwise satisfies the requirements of this section.
      3. The Commissioner shall issue non-REAL ID compliant identification cards to Vermont residents able to establish lawful presence in the United States but who otherwise fail to comply with the requirements of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 201-202, if the applicant follows the procedures and furnishes documents as required under subsection 603(f) of this title and any applicable policies or adopted rules, and otherwise satisfies the requirements of this section.
      4. A non-REAL ID compliant identification card issued under subdivision (2) or (3) of this subsection shall bear on its face text indicating that it is not valid for federal identification or official purposes.
    12. An individual sentenced to serve a period of imprisonment of six months or more committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections who is eligible for a nondriver identification card under the requirements of this section shall, upon proper application and in advance of release from a correctional facility, be provided with a nondriver identification card for a fee of $0.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 94 , § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1981; amended 1981, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 2, 1982; 1989, No. 51 , § 10; 1995, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1999, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. May 15, 2002; 2003, No. 70 (Adj. Sess.), § 31, eff. March 1, 2004; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2005, 2003, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 26; 2009, No. 50 , § 36; 2011, No. 46 , § 18, eff. July 1, 2012; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2013, No. 57 , § 13; 2013, No. 74 , § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2014; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2015, No. 47 , § 3; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 58; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2019, No. 60 , § 12; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 137; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2021, No. 20 , § 227.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (j), replaced “disabled persons” with ”persons with a disability” in accordance with 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 222.

    Editor’s note

    —2016. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2015 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 158 and 159, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2015 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 158 and 159 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    —2013. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2013 session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 57, effective July 1, 2013, and 74, effective January 1, 2014, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2013 session, the text of Act Nos. 57 and 74 was merged to arrive at the version of the section effective on January 1, 2014. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2021. In subsec. (a), substituted “be” for “by” preceding “placed on” and “the applicant’s” for “his or her” thereafter in the third sentence and “the veteran’s” for “his or her” preceding “status” in the fourth sentence.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 149 substituted “that” for “which” in the first sentence and “an individual” for “a person” in the last sentence

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 149 substituted “an individual” for “a person” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (g): Act No. 149 substituted “An individual” for “A person” in the third sentence and, “an individual” for “a person”, “individual” for “person”, “not” for “no”, and “nine” for “eight” in the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (j): Act No. 149 substituted “Individuals” for “Persons” and “individuals” for “persons”.

    Subsec. ( l )(1): Act No. 131, inserted “applicable” following “and any”, inserted “adopted” following “policies or”, and deleted “adopted thereunder” following “rules”.

    Subsec. ( l )(2): Act No. 131 inserted “applicable” following “and any” and “adopted” following “policies or” and deleted “adopted thereunder” following “rules”.

    Subsec. ( l )(3): Act No. 131 inserted “applicable” following “and any” and “adopted” following “policies or” and deleted “adopted thereunder” following “rules”.

    Subsec. (m): Added by Act No. 149.

    —2019. Subsec. (b): Inserted “at midnight” preceding “on the” and “eve of the” thereafter and substituted “anniversary of the date of birth” for “birthday” and “cardholder” for “applicant” in the first sentence, and added the second and fourth sentences.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 159 substituted “$24.00” for “$20.00” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 158 amended subsec. generally.

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 159 substituted “$24.00” for “$20.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 159 substituted “$20.00” for “$15.00”.

    Subsec. (i): Act No. 158 amended subsec. generally.

    —2015. Subsec. (h): Substituted “under 18 years of age” for “under the age of 18” near the beginning of the first sentence, substituted “18 years of age or older” for “over the age of 18” near the middle of the first sentence, substituted “21 years of age” for “the age of 21” near the middle of the first sentence, substituted “21 years of age or older” for “over the age of 21” at the end of the first sentence, and substituted “21 years of age” for “the age of 21” near the middle of the second sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added “except that an initial nondriver identification card shall be issued at no charge to a person who surrenders his or her license in connection with a suspension or revocation under subsection 636(b) of this title due to a physical or mental condition” to the end.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “Every” for “Except as provided in subsection (1) of this section, every” preceding “identification”.

    Subdivs. ( l )(4)(A) and (B): Deleted the subdiv. (A) designation and deleted subdiv. (B).

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Act No. 57 added “residential address unless the listing of another address is requested by the applicant or is otherwise authorized by the law” and added the third and fourth sentences.

    Subsec. (a): Act No. 74 amended subsec. generally.

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 74 substituted “Except as provided in subsection (1) of this section, every” for “Every” at the beginning of the first sentence.

    Subsec. (i): Act No. 57 rewrote the subsec.

    Subsec. ( l ): Added by Act No. 74.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “$20.00” for “$17.00” in the final sentence.

    —2011. Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Substituted “17.00” for “15.00” in the last sentence.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “$20.00 fee” for “$15.00 fee”.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (j): Added by Act No. 70.

    Act No. 154 amended section generally.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subsec. (g): Substituted “$7.00” for “$5.00”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsecs. (h) and (i): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Deleted “sixteen years of age or older who does not have a valid motor vehicle operator’s license” following “resident” and “of motor vehicles” preceding “and be issued”, and added “which shall include, in the case of minor applicants, the written consent of the applicant’s parent, guardian or other person standing in loco parentis” following “may require” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Deleted “of motor vehicles” following “commissioner” and “whenever the bearer obtains a Vermont motor vehicle operator’s license, or” following “identification card”, and inserted “obtained” following “fraudulently”.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$10.00” for “$8.00” following “fee of” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “a $10.00” for “an $8.00” following “payment of”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$5.00” for “$3.00” following “paying a”.

    Subsec. (g): Substituted “$5.00” for “the same as that determined by the commissioner for licenses pursuant to section 610b of this title” following “shall be” in the third sentence.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (g): Rewrote the last sentence.

    Photographs for renewals. 2019, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 35 provides: “(a) Notwithstanding any provision of 23 V.S.A. § 115(g) , 610(c), or 617(e) to the contrary, a licensee shall be permitted to renew a driver’s license, learner’s permit, privilege to operate, or non-driver identification card with a photograph obtained not more than 16 years earlier that is compliant with the federal REAL ID Act, 6 C.F.R. part 37.

    “(b) Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , subsection (a) of this section shall take effect retroactively on March 20, 2020 and continue in effect until the termination of the state of emergency declared by the Governor as a result of COVID-19.”

    Extensions. 2019, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 36(c) and (e) provide: “(c) Notwithstanding any provision of 23 V.S.A. § 115 , 302, 304a, 305, 601, or 617 to the contrary, the Commissioner shall extend all of the following for an additional 90 days after expiration: driver’s licenses; learner’s permits; privileges to operate; non-driver identification cards; registrations; and registration plates or placards for an individual with a disability.

    “(e) Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , subsection (c) of this section shall take effect retroactively on March 17, 2020 and continue in effect until the termination of the state of emergency declared by the Governor as a result of COVID-19.”

    § 115a. Legislative intent; existing nondriver identification card holders.

    It is the intent of the General Assembly that the provisions of subsection 115(g) of this title not require persons who, prior to July 1, 2004, were issued a nondriver identification card without a photograph or imaged likeness to obtain a photograph or imaged likeness after that date.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Chapter 5. Provisions Common to Registration and Operator’s Licenses

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. 2021, No. 20 , § 228 substituted “Operator’s” for “Operators’ ” preceding “Licenses” in the chapter heading.

    § 201. Applications to be under oath.

    All applications, all proofs that the Commissioner may require, and all requests for personal information shall be under oath or the applications and proofs shall contain and be verified by written declarations that they are made subject to the penalties prescribed in section 202 of this title. Each question and answer and each statement made in any application, or in any proof required, shall be deemed material. When an applicant is a corporation or partnership, the individual signing the application shall be considered the individual under oath or the person subject to the penalties of section 202 of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1997, No. 55 , § 5, eff. June 26, 1997; 2001, No. 69 , § 1; 2007, No. 19 , § 3; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 138.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,058. 1937, No. 118 , § 1. P.L. § 4997. 1929, No. 63 , § 7. 1925, No. 70 , § 117. G.L. § 4669. 1910, No. 134 . 1908, No. 99 , § 1. P.S. §§ 4076, 4087. 1904, No. 86 , §§ 1, 5.

    Editor’s note—

    The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 1969 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 259 and 297, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 1969 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 259 and 297 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). In the last sentence, substituted “individual under oath” for “person making oath thereto” and inserted “of this title” at the end.

    —2007. Section amended generally.

    —2001. Inserted “colored light permits” following “motorboats” in the first sentence.

    —1997. Inserted “and all requests for personal” preceding “information shall be” in the first sentence.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, motorboats, or vessel validation” preceding “for certificate”, substituted “operators’ and junior operators’ licenses, for learner’s permits, for nondriver identification cards” for “licensing operators” preceding “for registration”, and inserted “all-terrain vehicle, snowmobile, or motorboat” preceding “shall be under” in the first sentence and substituted “the” for “such” preceding “application” in the second sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 259 deleted “and repairmen” following “dealers” in the first sentence.

    Act No. 297 inserted “for certificate of title” preceding “for licensing” and “and repairmen” following “dealers” in the first sentence.

    § 202. Impersonating another in an application or aiding an applicant by false representation.

    A person who does any of the following shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both, and shall have his or her privilege to operate suspended for 90 days:

    1. falsely impersonates another in an application for:
      1. an operator’s license;
      2. a learner’s permit;
      3. a nondriver identification card;
      4. a motor vehicle registration or vessel validation; or
      5. an in-transit registration permit;
    2. obtains by false representation:
      1. an operator’s license;
      2. a learner’s permit;
      3. a nondriver identification card;
      4. a motor vehicle registration or vessel validation; or
      5. an in-transit registration permit;
    3. uses an assumed name or name that is not his or her own in an application for:
      1. an operator’s license;
      2. a learner’s permit;
      3. a nondriver identification card;
      4. a motor vehicle registration or vessel validation; or
      5. an in-transit registration permit; or
    4. knowingly aids an applicant in obtaining by false representation as to the age or identity of such applicant:
      1. an operator’s license;
      2. a learner’s permit;
      3. a nondriver identification card;
      4. a motor vehicle registration or vessel validation; or
      5. in-transit registration permit.

    HISTORY: Amended 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2021, No. 20 , § 229.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,307. P.L. § 5171. 1933, No. 92 . 1927, No. 74 , § 3. 1925, No. 70 , § 97.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (3): Deleted “who” preceding “uses”.

    Subdiv. (4): Deleted “who” preceding “knowingly”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Notes to Opinions

    Intent.

    If statement in application is false in sense of being untrue, this section has been violated, even though false representation was not made with any purpose or intent to deceive. 1934-36 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 524.

    § 203. Counterfeiting, fraud, and misuse; penalty.

    1. A person shall not:
      1. counterfeit or cause to be counterfeited or have in his or her possession any counterfeit number plate, validating sticker, marker, inspection sticker, registration certificate, in-transit registration permit, learner’s permit, nondriver identification card, insurance identification card, or operator’s license or alter or have in his or her possession any altered number plate or marker;
      2. display or cause or permit to be displayed, or have in his or her possession, any fictitious or fraudulently altered operator’s license, learner’s permit, nondriver identification card, inspection sticker, registration certificate, or in-transit registration permit, or display for any fraudulent purpose an expired or counterfeit insurance identification card or similar document;
      3. lend his or her operator’s license to any other person or knowingly permit the use thereof by another;
      4. display or represent as his or her own any operator’s license, permit, or nondriver identification card not issued to him or her;
      5. permit any unlawful use of an operator’s license, permit, or nondriver identification card issued to him or her by the Commissioner;
      6. obtain or attempt to obtain a registration plate, validation sticker, registration certificate, in-transit registration permit, operator’s license, learner’s permit, nondriver identification card, or duplicate copy of any of such documents by the use of fraudulently obtained, fictitious, or altered identity documents or by the use of identity documents not his or her own;
      7. obtain or attempt to obtain a registration plate, validation sticker, registration certificate, in-transit registration permit, certificate of title, operator’s license, learner’s permit, nondriver identification card, duplicate copy of any of these documents, or obtain or attempt to obtain any other permit, license, or special privilege from the Department of Motor Vehicles through the submission of an application containing false or fictitious information;
      8. lend his or her identity documents to aid an applicant in his or her attempt to fraudulently obtain or actually obtain a registration plate, validation sticker, registration certificate, in-transit registration permit, operator’s license, learner’s permit, nondriver identification card, or duplicate copy of such documents; or
      9. display on his or her vehicle an inspection sticker not issued to him or her for the vehicle.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, a violation of subsection (a) of this section shall be a traffic violation for which there shall be a penalty of not more than $1,000.00. If a person is found to have committed the violation, the person’s privilege to operate motor vehicles shall be suspended for 60 days. (b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, a violation of subsection (a) of this section shall be a traffic violation for which there shall be a penalty of not more than $1,000.00. If a person is found to have committed the violation, the person’s privilege to operate motor vehicles shall be suspended for 60 days.
      2. If a person may be charged with a violation of subdivision (a)(2) of this section or with a violation of 7 V.S.A. § 656 , the person shall be charged with a violation of 7 V.S.A. § 656 and not with a violation of this section.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 129 , § 1; 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2007, No. 19 , § 4; 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2019, No. 60 , § 14; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. Oct. 7, 2020; 2021, No. 20 , § 230.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 137 . V.S. 1947, § 10,306. P.L. § 5170. 1933, No. 85 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2021. In subdivs. (a)(1)-(a)(5), substituted “operator’s” for “operator” preceding “license”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 149 inserted “in-transit registration permit,” following “registration certificate,” throughout.

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 167 added the designation for subdiv. (1), substituted “Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, a” for “A” preceding “violation of subsection (a)”, and added subdiv. (2).

    —2019. Subsec. (a): Deleted “or” at the end of subdivs. (a)(1) through (a)(7), in subdiv. (a)(4), deleted “inspection sticker,” following “permit,” and “, or, in the case of inspection stickers, not issued to him or her for the vehicle on which the sticker is displayed”, in subdiv. (a)(8), added “; or” at the end, and added subdiv. (a)(9).

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading; added “inspection sticker” in subdivs. (a)(2) and (a)(4); and added “, or, in the case of inspection stickers, not issued to him or her for the vehicle on which the sticker is displayed” in subdiv. (a)(4).

    —2007. Subdivs. (a)(7) and (8): Added new subdiv. (7) and redesignated former subdiv. (7) as subdiv. (8).

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “A” for “Upon conviction for a” preceding “violation” and inserted “shall be a traffic violation for which there shall be a penalty of not more than $1,000.00” following “of this section” in the first sentence and “If a person is found to have committed the violation” preceding “the person’s” at the beginning of the second sentence.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1967. Subdiv. (1): Added “validating sticker” preceding “marker, registration”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Altering, forging, or counterfeiting certificates of title, see § 3829 of this title.

    Forgery and counterfeiting of documents, see 13 V.S.A. § 1801 .

    § 204. Surrender of license or registration.

    1. A person whose license to operate a motor vehicle, nondriver identification card, or motor vehicle registration has been issued in error shall surrender forthwith his or her license or registration upon demand of the Commissioner or his or her authorized inspector or agent. The demand shall be made in person or by notice in writing sent by first-class mail to the last known address of the person.
    2. The Commissioner or his or her authorized inspector or agent and all enforcement officers are authorized to take possession of any certificate of title, nondriver identification card, registration, or license issued by this or any other jurisdiction that has been revoked, canceled, or suspended, or that is fictitious, stolen, or altered.
    3. A suspension or revocation shall be deemed to be in effect upon receipt of the notice, if made in person, or three days after the deposit of the notice in the U.S. mail, if made in writing and sent by first-class mail to the last known address of the person.
    4. If a presuspension or prerevocation hearing is available by law, the written notice of suspension or revocation shall so state. Unless otherwise specifically provided by statute, a written request for a hearing must be received at the Department of Motor Vehicles within 15 days after the date of the notice or the right to a hearing is deemed to be waived.

    HISTORY: Amended 1983, No. 7 ; 1989, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Mar. 15, 1990; 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 22, 1996; 1999, No. 34 , § 4; 2007, No. 61 , § 2; 2011, No. 46 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 264 . V.S. 1947, § 10,055. 1935, No. 128 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2011. Rewrote the section heading and in subsec. (a) deleted “or is suspended or revoked by the commissioner under the provisions of this title” following “error”.

    —2007. Subsec. (a): Deleted “and the suspension shall be deemed to be in effect upon the making of the demand, if made in person, or three days after the deposit of the notice in the United States mails, if made in writing” following “person” at the end of the subsec.

    Subsecs. (c) and (d): Added new subsec. (c) and redesignated former subsec. (c) as subsec. (d).

    —1999. Subsec. (c): Substituted “15 days” for “10 days” in the second sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “nondriver identification card” following “operate a motor vehicle” in the first sentence of subsec. (a), added a new subsec. (b), and redesignated former subsec. (b) as subsec. (c).

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “has been issued in error or” preceding “is suspended” in the first sentence.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or her” preceding “license” and “authorized” in the first sentence and rewrote the second sentence.

    —1983. Inserted “except such notices sent to addresses in foreign countries which may be sent by first class mail” following “address of such person” in the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Penalty for operating after suspension or revocation of license, see § 674 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constructive notice.

    Department of Motor Vehicles properly relied on address listed by purchaser of vehicle who, with plaintiff’s consent, had registered vehicle in plaintiff’s name to notify plaintiff of license suspension, and notice was effective regardless of whether plaintiff actually received notice. Boutin v. Conway, 153 Vt. 558, 572 A.2d 905, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 38 (1990).

    Constructive notice of suspension of driver’s license is sufficient even absent actual notice; as long as notice is sent by registered or certified mail to the last known address, the suspension is in full force and effect three days after the deposit of such notice in the mail. State v. Chicoine, 154 Vt. 653, 580 A.2d 970, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 114 (1990) (mem.).

    Defendant’s alleged failure to receive delivery of notice of suspension of driver’s license, mailed by certified mail, two notices of the arrival of which were placed in defendant’s mailbox, was not sufficient to bar conviction for operating a motor vehicle after suspension of license. State v. Cattanach, 129 Vt. 57, 271 A.2d 828, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1970).

    Compliance by Commissioner of Motor Vehicles with the procedure prescribed by this section for registered mail notice of suspension constitutes constructive notice to the offender that his license has been suspended. State v. Hebert, 124 Vt. 377, 205 A.2d 816, 1964 Vt. LEXIS 117 (1964).

    Last known address.

    Defendant’s “last known address” for purposes of notification of suspension of driver’s license was address defendant filed with Commissioner of Motor Vehicles notwithstanding Department of Motor Vehicles may have had actual notice of a more current address for defendant. State v. Chicoine, 154 Vt. 653, 580 A.2d 970, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 114 (1990) (mem.).

    Cited.

    Cited in Aiken v. Malloy, 132 Vt. 200, 315 A.2d 488, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 324 (1974).

    § 205. Notification of change of name or address.

    The owner of a registered motor vehicle, snowmobile, or motorboat; a person licensed to operate a motor vehicle in this State; and a person licensed under chapter 27 or 28 of this title or 32 V.S.A. chapter 219 shall notify the Commissioner, in writing, of a change in the owner’s or person’s legal name or residence or mailing address within 30 days after the change is made.

    HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 47 ; amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1985, No. 85 , § 4; 2015, No. 47 , § 4.

    History

    Editor’s note—

    This section was originally enacted without a section heading and one was added by the editor for purposes of conformity with general V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2015. Added “or 28” following “under chapter 27” and deleted “32 V.S.A. chapter 217” preceding “or 32 V.S.A. chapter 219”.

    —1985. Section amended generally.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “30” for “thirty” preceding “days” and deleted the former second sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Chicoine, 154 Vt. 653, 580 A.2d 970, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 114 (1990) (mem.).

    § 206. Surcharge.

    A person convicted of violating a provision of this chapter shall be assessed a surcharge of $50.00, which shall be added to any fine or surcharge imposed by the court. The court shall collect and transfer the surcharge assessed under this section to be credited to the DUI Enforcement Fund established and managed pursuant to 32 V.S.A. chapter 7, subchapter 5. The collection procedures described in 13 V.S.A. § 5240 shall be utilized in the collection of this surcharge.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 21.

    § 207. Refund of money erroneously paid.

    Upon application of the Commissioner, the Commissioner of Finance and Management shall issue a warrant in favor of any person equitably entitled to a refund of money erroneously paid into the State Treasury for a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle or for the registration of a motor vehicle, trailer, semi-trailer, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle. A refund shall not be allowed except as provided in this section and sections 325-327 of this title, and shall be paid from the fees remitted to the State Treasury by the Department.

    HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 47 , § 9.

    § 208. Reciprocal recognition of nonresident registrations, licenses, and permits; foreign visitors.

    As determined by the Commissioner, and consistent with section 601 of this title, a motor vehicle owned by a nonresident shall be considered as registered and a nonresident operator shall be considered as licensed or permitted in this State if the nonresident owner or operator has complied with the laws of the foreign country or state of his or her residence relative to the registration of motor vehicles and the granting of operator’s licenses or learner’s permits. However, these exemptions shall be operative only to the extent that under the laws of the foreign country or state of the owner’s or operator’s residence like exemptions and privileges are granted to owners of motor vehicles duly registered and to operators duly licensed or permitted under the laws of this State, except that if the owner or operator is a resident of a country not adjoining the United States, the exemptions shall be operative for a period of not more than one year even if the country does not grant like privileges to residents of this State.

    HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 61; amended 2019, No. 60 , § 7.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019. Substituted “operator’s” for “operators’ ” preceding “licenses” and “one year” for “30 days for vacation purposes” following “more than”.

    Chapter 7. Registration

    Subchapter 1. General Registration

    Article 1. General Provisions

    History

    Extensions. 2019, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 36(a), (c), (d), and (e) provide: “(a) Notwithstanding any provision of 23 V.S.A. § 312 , 457, 458, 3702, or 3703 to the contrary, all International Registration Plan trip permits and temporary authorizations, temporary registration certificates, and temporary number plates shall be valid for 90 days from the date of issuance.

    “(c) Notwithstanding any provision of 23 V.S.A. § 115 , 302, 304a, 305, 601, or 617 to the contrary, the Commissioner shall extend all of the following for an additional 90 days after expiration: driver’s licenses; learner’s permits; privileges to operate; non-driver identification cards; registrations; and registration plates or placards for an individual with a disability.

    “(d) Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall take effect retroactively on March 20, 2020 and continue in effect until the termination of the state of emergency declared by the Governor as a result of COVID-19.

    “(e) Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , subsection (c) of this section shall take effect retroactively on March 17, 2020 and continue in effect until the termination of the state of emergency declared by the Governor as a result of COVID-19.”

    § 301. Persons required to register.

    Residents, except as provided in chapter 35 of this title, shall annually register motor vehicles owned or leased for a period of more than 30 days and operated by them, unless currently registered in Vermont. Notwithstanding this section, a resident who has moved into the State from another jurisdiction shall register his or her motor vehicle within 60 days of moving into the State. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle nor draw a trailer or semi-trailer on any highway unless such vehicle is registered as provided in this chapter. Vehicle owners who have apportioned power units registered in this State under the International Registration Plan are exempt from the requirement to register their trailers in this State.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 97 , § 1, eff. May 3, 1961; 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2003, No. 56 , § 70, eff. June 4, 2003; 2015, No. 47 , § 6; 2019, No. 60 , § 15.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 108 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,069. 1947, No. 202 , § 5290. P.L. § 5018. 1933, No. 157 , § 4722. 1929, No. 64 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 17. G.L. §§ 4669, 4716. 1910, Nos. 133, 134. 1908, No. 99 , § 1. P.S. §§ 4076, 4082, 4087. 1906, No. 113 , § 7. 1904, No. 86 , §§ 1, 3, 5.

    Amendments

    —2019. Added the last sentence.

    —2015. Deleted “section 301a and” preceding “chapter 35 of this title” near the beginning of the first sentence.

    —2003. Deleted “as defined in section 4 of this title” following “Resident” and substituted “30” for “thirty” in the first sentence, and added second sentence.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “sections” for “section” preceding “301a” and inserted “and chapter 35 of this title” thereafter in the first sentence.

    —1961. Inserted “except as provided in section 301a” preceding “shall annually” in the first sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Operation.

    In prosecution for operating unregistered motor vehicle where, according to undisputed evidence, respondent steered, and by applying brakes regulated speed of automobile, descending hill solely by reason of its own weight and the law of gravitation, the automobile then being incapable of operating under its own power, such acts constituted operation of a motor vehicle within the meaning of section 4 of this title, and since the automobile was not registered, such operation was a violation of this section. State v. Lansing, 108 Vt. 218, 184 A. 692, 1936 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1936).

    Violation as negligence.

    Operating an unregistered automobile upon a public highway in violation of this section does not preclude recovery for injuries unless there is a proximate, causal connection between the violation of this section and the injury complained of. Gilman v. Central Vermont Railway, 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122, 1919 Vt. LEXIS 168 (1919).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Santi, 132 Vt. 615, 326 A.2d 149, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 404 (1974); Leverson v. Conway, 144 Vt. 523, 481 A.2d 1029, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 512 (1984), Pizzagalli Construction Co. v. Town of Whitingham, 146 Vt. 490, 505 A.2d 678, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 317 (1986); Barringer v. Griffes, 801 F. Supp. 1282, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14953 (D. Vt. 1992); Barringer v. Griffes, 810 F. Supp. 119, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20504 (D. Vt. 1992).

    Notes to Opinions

    Interstate operators.

    Domestic corporation engaged in the interstate transportation of goods is required to register in Vermont its vehicles which are ordinarily garaged and used by it in connection with branch offices maintained in other states. 1950-52 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 216.

    Operation.

    Motor vehicle actually steered or attempted to be steered or its motion controlled or attempted to be controlled by the use of its brakes while being towed by a registered motor vehicle on a public highway would constitute an operation thereof within meaning of section 4 of this title, and if the towed vehicle was not registered, such operation would be a violation of this section. 1936-38 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 336.

    § 301a. Repealed. 2015, No. 47, § 5.

    History

    Former § 301a. Former § 301a, relating to registration of motor trucks, tractors, trailers, and semi-trailers, was derived from 1961, No. 97 , § 2 and amended by 1963, No. 21 , § 2; 1975, No. 64 , § 1; and 1977, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 9, 10.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Annotations From Former § 301a.

    Cited.

    Cited in 1960-62 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 77, 1962-64 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 264.

    § 302. Period of registration.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in this title, every motor vehicle shall be registered for a period of 12 months from date of issue. Registrations made pursuant to subsections 305(b), 371(b), 376(b), and 376(c) of this title shall expire and the certificate thereof shall become void five years after the date of issue.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, if registered owners so elect, all their registrations may be issued to expire on the same date and the registration fee shall be pro-rated for the amount in excess of the annual 12 months’ fee but not to exceed 24 months.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 54 , § 1, eff. April 1, 1962; 1965, No. 70 , § 1; 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1975, No. 90 , § 1; 1977, No. 85 , § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1977; 1979, No. 34 , § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1979; 1995, No. 49 , § 1, eff. April 20, 1995; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1997, No. 39 , § 1; 2015, No. 47 , § 7.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,070. 1935, No. 123 , § 3. P.L. § 5019. 1933, No. 157 , § 4723. 1929, No. 64 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 17. G.L. § 4670. 1910, No. 131 . 1908, No. 99 , § 2. P.S. § 4077. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , § 1.

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (a), substituted “305(b), 371(b), and 376(e)” for “305(b), 376(e), and 371(b)” for purposes of clarity.

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Substituted “otherwise provided in this title” for “provided in sections 361 and 452 of this title” in the first sentence and “376(b) and 376(c)” for “and 376(e)” preceding “of this title shall expire” in the second sentence.

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Substituted “sections 361 and 452” for “section 361” and “subsections 305(b), 376(e), and 371(b)” for “subsection 371(b)”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “section” for “sections 305 and” following “provided in”, and deleted “except any motor vehicle registered under dealer registration shall expire and the certificate thereof shall become void on the last day of February next following the date of issue” in the first sentence.

    —1995. Subsec. (a): Substituted “sections 305 and 361” for “section 305” in the first sentence.

    —1979. Section amended generally.

    —1977. Section amended generally.

    —1975. Deleted “or municipal” following “dealer” in the first sentence and rewrote the second sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “repairer” following “dealer” in the first sentence.

    —1965. Section amended generally.

    —1961. Added “except as provided in § 305 of this chapter” preceding “every motor”.

    § 303. Application required.

    1. The Commissioner or his or her duly authorized agent shall register a motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer when application therefor, on a form prescribed by the Commissioner, showing such motor vehicle to be properly equipped and in good mechanical condition, is filed with him or her, accompanied by the required registration fee and evidence of the applicant’s ownership of the vehicle in such form as the Commissioner may reasonably require. Except for State or municipal vehicles, registrants and titled owners shall be identical.
    2. An application for registration may be refused by the Commissioner if it is not accompanied by proof of payment of the use tax imposed by Section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury or in another form acceptable to the Commissioner in the case of vehicles that are subject to the tax.

    HISTORY: Amended 1983, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), eff. April 2, 1984; 1995, No. 19 , § 10, eff. April 17, 1995.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,071. P.L. § 5020. 1933, No. 157 , § 4724. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 18. G.L. § 4670. 1910, No. 131 . 1908, No. 99 , § 2. P.S. § 4077. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , § 1.

    References in text.

    Section 4481 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (b), is codified as 26 U.S.C. § 4481.

    Revision note—

    In subsec. (b), substituted “the Internal Revenue Code of 1986” for “the Internal Revenue Code of 1954” to conform reference to redesignation of the Code pursuant to Section 2(a) of Pub. L. No. 99-514.

    Amendments

    —1995. Subsec. (a): Inserted “or her” preceding “duly” and preceding “accompanied” and added “and evidence of the applicant’s ownership of the vehicle in such form as the commissioner may reasonably require” following “registration fee” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Designated existing provisions of section as subsec. (a), deleted “signed and sworn to by the owner of such vehicle described therein and” preceding “showing” in that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Applications to be under oath, see § 201 of this title.

    Impersonating another in an application, or aiding applicant by false representation, see § 202 of this title.

    Motor vehicle purchase and use tax; collection of tax, see 32 V.S.A. § 8905 .

    Vehicle registration renewal by municipal clerks, see § 6 of this title.

    Notes to Opinions

    Acknowledgments.

    Acknowledgment of oath on application may be taken by register of probate. 1934-36 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 579.

    § 304. Registration certificates; number plates; vanity and other special plates.

    1. The Commissioner shall issue to the registrant of a motor vehicle a certificate of registration in the form the Commissioner may prescribe, on which shall appear the name of the registrant, his or her address, a brief description of the vehicle registered, and the date of registration.  The Commissioner shall also assign to each motor vehicle registered a distinctive number and issue a number plate or plates showing the assigned number.  The number plate or plates issued shall be of the material, size, shape, and color, and with the numerals or letters thereon, the Commissioner may determine, and shall be reflectorized in part or in whole.  The certificate and number plates shall be delivered free of charge by the Commissioner to the registrant as soon as may be after receipt and acceptance of application for registration.
    2. The authority to issue vanity motor vehicle number plates or special number plates for safety organizations and service organizations shall reside with the Commissioner. Determination of compliance with the criteria contained in this section shall be within the discretion of the Commissioner. Series of number plates for safety and service organizations that are authorized by the Commissioner shall be issued in order of approval, subject to the operating considerations in the Department as determined by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall issue vanity and special organization number plates in the following manner:
      1. Vanity plates.   Subject to the restrictions of this section, vanity plates shall be issued at the request of the registrant of a motor vehicle unless the vehicle is registered under the International Registration Plan, upon application and upon payment of an annual fee of $48.00 in addition to the annual fee for registration. The Commissioner shall not issue two sets of plates bearing the same initials or letters unless the plates also contain a distinguishing number. Vanity plates are subject to reassignment if not renewed within 60 days of expiration of the registration.
      2. Special organization plates.
        1. For the purposes of this section:
          1. “Safety organizations” are groups that provide police and fire protection, rescue squads, the Vermont National Guard, organizations required to respond to public emergencies, and amateur radio operators licensed by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission. To qualify for a special organization plate, safety organizations must have at least 100 in-state members in good standing.
          2. “Service organization” includes congressionally chartered or noncongressionally chartered U.S. Military Service veterans’ groups and any group that:
            1. has as a primary purpose service to the community through specific programs for the improvement of public health, education, or environmental awareness and conservation and is not limited to social activities;
            2. has nonprofit status under Section 501(c)(3) or (10) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, as amended;
            3. is registered as a nonprofit corporation with the Office of the Secretary of State; and
            4. except for a military veterans group, has at least 100 in-state members in good standing.
        2. The officer of a safety organization or service organization may apply to the Commissioner to approve special plates indicating membership in a qualifying organization to be issued to organization members for a $17.00 special fee for each set of plates in addition to the annual fee for registration. The application shall include designation of an officer or member to serve as the principal contact with the Department and a distinctive name or emblem, or both, for use on the proposed special plate. The name and emblem shall not be objectively obscene or confusing to the general public and shall not promote, advertise, or endorse a product, brand, or service provided for sale. The organization’s name and emblem must not infringe on or violate a trademark, trade name, service mark, copyright, or other proprietary or property right, and the organization must have the right to use the name and emblem. After consulting with the principal contact, the Commissioner shall determine the design of the special plate on the basis that the primary purpose of motor vehicle number plates is vehicle identification. An organization may have only one design, regardless of the number of individual organizational units, squads, or departments within the State that may conduct the same or substantially similar activities.
        3. After the plate design is finalized and an officer or the principal contact provides the Commissioner a written statement authorizing issuance of the plates, the organization shall deposit $2,200.00 with the Commissioner. Of this deposit, $500.00 shall be retained by the Department to recover costs of developing the organization plate. Notwithstanding 32 V.S.A. § 502 , the Commissioner may charge the actual costs of production of the plates against the fees collected and the balance shall be deposited in the Transportation Fund. Upon application, special plates shall be issued to a registrant of a vehicle registered at the pleasure car rate or of a truck registered for less than 26,001 pounds (but excluding trucks registered under the International Registration Plan) who furnishes the Commissioner satisfactory proof that he or she is a member of an organization that has satisfied the requirements of this subdivision (b)(2). For each of the first 100 applicants to whom sets of plates are issued, the $17.00 special plate fee shall not be collected and shall be subtracted from the balance of the deposit. When the $1,700.00 balance of the deposit is depleted, applicants shall be required to pay the $17.00 fee as provided for in subdivision (2)(B) of this subsection. No organization shall charge its members any additional fee or premium charge for the authorization, right, or privilege to display special number plates, but any organization may recover up to $1,700.00 from applicants for the special plates.
        4. When an individual’s membership in a qualifying organization ceases or is terminated, the individual shall surrender any special registration plates issued under this subsection to the Commissioner forthwith. However, a retired member of the Vermont National Guard may renew or, upon payment of a $10.00 fee, acquire, the special guard plates after notification of eligibility for retired pay has been received.
    3. The Commissioner shall issue registration numbers 101 through 9999, which shall be known as reserved registration numbers, for pleasure cars, motor trucks that are registered at the pleasure car rate, and motorcycles in the following manner:
      1. A person holding a reserved registration number may retain the number for the ensuing registration period, provided application is made at least 60 days prior to expiration of the registration.
      2. If the registrant does not renew the registration, the number may be reassigned to a member of the immediate family if application is made at least 60 days prior to expiration of the registration. As used in this subsection, “immediate family” means the spouse, household member, grandparents, parents, siblings, children, or grandchildren of the registrant.
      3. The Commissioner shall restrict the issuance of these registrations to residents of this State and may restrict issuance to applicants who do not already have such a registration issued to them.
      4. A person holding a reserved registration number on a pleasure car, a truck that is registered at the pleasure car rate, or a motorcycle may be issued the same reserved registration number for the other authorized vehicle types, provided that the person receives no more than one such plate or set of plates for each authorized vehicle type.
    4. Vanity or special organization number plates, whether new or renewed, shall be issued in any combination or succession of numerals and letters, provided the total of the numbers and letters on any plate taken together does not exceed seven, and further provided the requested combination of letters and numerals does not duplicate or resemble a regular issue registration plate. The Commissioner may adopt rules for the issuance of vanity or special organization number plates to ensure that all plates serve the primary purpose of vehicle identification. The Commissioner may revoke any plate described in this subsection and shall not issue plates with combinations of letters or numbers that objectively, in any language:
      1. are vulgar, scatological, or obscene, or constitute racial or ethnic epithets;
      2. connote breast, genitalia, pubic area, or buttocks or relate to sexual or eliminatory functions;
      3. refer to any intoxicant or drug; to the use, nonuse, distribution, or sale of an intoxicant or drug; or to a user, nonuser, or purveyor of an intoxicant or drug;
      4. refer to gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability status;
      5. suggest a government or governmental agency;
      6. suggest a privilege not given by law in this State; or
      7. form a slang term, abbreviation, phonetic spelling, or mirror image of a word described in subdivisions (1) through (6) of this subsection.
    5. [Repealed.]
    6. Upon the request of a registrant of a motor vehicle with the previous issue number plates, the Commissioner shall issue current issue number plates bearing the same number as shown on the previous issue plates that are being replaced. The initial one-time fee for the plates shall be $24.00 in addition to the regular registration fee. Official plates and plates with numbers of 9999 or lower are specifically exempted.
    7. Number plates bearing the Vermont Coat of Arms may be issued only to the Governor, members of the Vermont congressional delegation and members of the General Assembly.
    8. The Department, on a quarterly basis, shall provide information to licensed inspection stations for distribution to the owners of motor vehicles during the annual inspection of their motor vehicles. That information shall encourage the proper management of used oil and shall include the telephone number of a recycling hotline that residents may call to determine the availability of a collection service that accepts used oil at the curb or otherwise to find the nearest location to recycle used oil.
    9. The Department and the Agency of Natural Resources shall work cooperatively regarding opportunities to provide information to the public with respect to the proper management of used oil and shall take appropriate steps to implement efficient and effective information distribution measures mutually agreed upon by the Department and the Agency.
    10. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall, upon proper application, issue special plates to Vermont veterans, as defined in 38 U.S.C. § 101(2), and to members of the U.S. Armed Forces, as defined in 38 U.S.C. § 101(10), for use on vehicles registered at the pleasure car rate, on vehicles registered at the motorcycle rate, and on trucks registered for less than 26,001 pounds and excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan. The type and style of the plate shall be determined by the Commissioner, except that an American flag, or a veteran- or military-related emblem selected by the Commissioner and the Vermont Office of Veterans’ Affairs shall appear on one side of the plate. At a minimum, emblems shall be available to recognize recipients of the Purple Heart, Pearl Harbor survivors, former prisoners of war, and disabled veterans. An applicant shall apply on a form prescribed by the Commissioner, and the applicant’s eligibility as a member of one of the groups recognized will be certified by the Office of Veterans’ Affairs. The plates shall be reissued only to the original holder of the plates or the surviving spouse. The Commissioner may adopt rules to implement the provisions of this subsection. Except for new or renewed registrations, applications for the issuance of plates under this subsection shall be processed in the order received by the Department subject to normal workflow considerations. The costs associated with developing new emblems shall be borne by the Department of Motor Vehicles.
      1. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall, upon proper application, issue special gold star and next-of-kin plates for use only on vehicles registered at the pleasure car rate and on trucks registered for less than 26,001 pounds and excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan, as follows: (k) (1) The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall, upon proper application, issue special gold star and next-of-kin plates for use only on vehicles registered at the pleasure car rate and on trucks registered for less than 26,001 pounds and excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan, as follows:
        1. Gold star plates shall be issued to the widow or widower, parents, and next of kin as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 1126(d) of members of the U.S. Armed Forces who lost their lives under the circumstances described in 10 U.S.C. § 1126(a) .
        2. Next-of-kin plates shall be issued to the widow or widower, parents, and next of kin as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 1126(d) of members of the Armed Forces not eligible for gold star plates under subdivision (A) of this subdivision (1) who lost their lives while serving on active duty or on active duty for training, or while assigned in a Reserve or National Guard unit in drill status, or as a result of injury or illness incurred during such service or assignment.
      2. The type and style of the gold star and next-of-kin plates shall be determined by the Commissioner and the Vermont Office of Veterans’ Affairs, except that a gold star shall appear on one side of gold star plates and a distinct emblem shall be approved for next-of-kin plates. An applicant shall apply on a form prescribed by the Commissioner, and the applicant’s eligibility will be certified by the Office of Veterans’ Affairs. A plate shall be reissued only to the original holder of the plate. The Commissioner may adopt rules to implement the provisions of this subsection. Except for new or renewed registrations, applications for the issuance of gold star or next-of-kin plates shall be processed in the order received by the Department subject to normal workflow considerations.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 54 , § 2, eff. April 1, 1962; 1965, No. 154 , § 1; 1967, No. 129 , § 2; 1975, No. 218 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. April 1, 1976; 1977, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2, eff. April 19, 1978; 1979, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1987, No. 112 , § 5; 1987, No. 230 (Adj. Sess.); 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 1989, No. 51 , § 11; 1989, No. 82 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1990; 1991, No. 178 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Dec. 1, 1992; 1993, No. 220 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1993, No. 233 (Adj. Sess.), § 93, eff. June 21, 1994; 1995, No. 49 , § 3, eff. April 20, 1995; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1995, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 1997, No. 85 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 1997, No. 85 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Nov. 11, 1998; 1999, No. 1 , § 77c, eff. March 31, 1999; 1999, No. 1 55 (Adj. Sess.), § 12e; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. May 15, 2002; 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 2003, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 62, eff. June 9, 2004; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 27; 2007, No. 61 , § 3; 2007, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1-3, eff. May 30, 2008; 2009, No. 50 , § 37; 2011, No. 46 , § 3; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 139.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,072. 1947, No. 202 , § 5293. 1945, No. 97 , § 1. P.L. § 5021. 1933, No. 157 , § 4725. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 19. G.L. § 4675. P.S. § 4078. 1906, No. 86 , § 1.

    References in text.

    Section 501(c)(3) and (10) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, referred to in subdiv. (b)(2), is codified as 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) and (10).

    Revision note—

    In subsec. (e), deleted the seventh sentence, which was identical to the sixth sentence, to correct a typographical error.

    Redesignated subsec. (e), as added by 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, as subsec. (f) to avoid conflict with subsec. (e), as added by 1987, No. 230 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Redesignated subsecs. (g) and (h), as added by 1993, No. 220 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, as subsecs. (h) and (i) to avoid conflict with subsec. (g), as added by 1993, No. 233 (Adj. Sess.), § 93.

    Editor’s note—

    The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2003 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 109 and 160, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2003 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 109 and 160 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (c)(2): Substituted “in this subsection” for “herein” in the second sentence.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “$48.00” for “$45.00” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (b)(2)(B): Substituted “$17.00” for “$15.00” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (b)(2)(C): Substituted “$2,200.00” for “$2,000.00” in the first sentence, “$17.00” for “$15.00” in the fifth and sixth sentences, and “$1,700.00” for “$1,500.00” in the sixth and seventh sentences.

    Subsec. (f): Substituted “$24.00” for “$20.00” in the second sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1): Inserted “motor” preceding “vehicle” and substituted “unless the vehicle is” for “registered at the pleasure car rate or of a truck registered for less than 26,001 pounds (but excluding trucks” following “vehicle” and substituted “)” for “,” following “International Registration Plan”.

    Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1): Act No. 128 substituted “$45.00” for “$38.00”.

    Subsec. (k): Amended generally by Act No. 164.

    —2011. Added “vanity and other special plates” in the section heading, and rewrote subsecs. (b), (d) and (j).

    —2009. Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “38.00” for “35.00” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (b)(2)(A): Substituted “15.00” for “10.00” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (b)(2)(B): Substituted “2,000.00” for “1,000.00” in the first sentence; substituted “For the first 100 sets of plates issued, $15.00” for “For each set of plates issued, $10.00” in the third sentence; added the fourth sentence; substituted “$1,500.00” for “$1,000.00” and substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00” in the fifth sentence; and substituted “$1,500.00” for “$1,000.00” in the last sentence.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Deleted.

    Subsec. (j): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (k): Added.

    —2007. Subdiv. (b)(2)(A): Substituted “less than 26,001” for “not more than 8,099” preceding “pounds” and inserted “and excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan” following “pounds”.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “$35.00” for “$30.00” in the first sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 109 added subdiv. (c)(4) and rewrote subsec. (d).

    Act No. 160 inserted “and on trucks registered for less than 26,001 pounds and excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan” following “car rate” in subsec. (e), substituted “less than 26,001” for “not more than 8,099 pounds” and inserted “and excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan” following “pounds” in subsec. (j).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “$30.00” for “$20.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (j): Substituted “Vermont office of veterans’ affairs” for “Veterans’ Administration” in the second sentence and added “$5.00 of the one-time fee shall be transferred to the Vermont office of veterans’ affairs” at the end of the fourth sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (b)(2)(A): Substituted “of a fee” for “of an annual fee” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (b)(2)(B): Substituted “$10.00 fee” for “$10.00 annual fee” in the fourth sentence and substituted “recovering up to $1,000.00 from” for “collecting $10.00 from each of the first 100” and deleted “to recover the cost of the $1,000.00 deposit” following “special plates” in the last sentence.

    Subdiv. (b)(2)(D): Added the second sentence.

    —1999. Subsec. (j): Deleted “for a new or renewed registration” preceding “issue special” in the first sentence, substituted “a one-time” for “an annual” preceding “fee of $10.00” in the fourth sentence, and added the last sentence.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Amended subsec. generally.

    Subsec. (d): Added the last sentence.

    Subsec. (j): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Act No. 112 inserted “or motor trucks that are registered at the pleasure car rate” following “pleasure cars” in the introductory paragraph and added the second sentence in subdiv. (2).

    Subsec. (e): Act No. 189 deleted “and” following “war”, inserted “and recipients of the Purple Heart Medal” following “veterans” in the first sentence, deleted “or” following “(P.O.W.)” and added “or holder of a Purple Heart Medal” following “veteran” in the second sentence, deleted “or” following “(P.O.W)” and inserted “or Purple Heart” following “Harbor” in the third sentence.

    —1995. Subsec. (e): Added “or the surviving spouse” following “plates” in the fifth sentence.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 220 added subsecs. (g) and (h).

    Act No. 233 added subsec. (g).

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Inserted “and Pearl Harbor veterans” following “war” in the first sentence, added the second sentence, inserted “or Pearl Harbor veteran” following “(P.O.W.)” and added “or state veterans’ affairs office, respectively” following “Administration” in the third sentence, inserted “or Pearl Harbor” preceding “number” in the fourth sentence, and substituted “adopt” for “promulgate” preceding “rules” in the sixth sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (b): Act No. 51 substituted “$20.00” for “$15.00” preceding “in addition” in the first sentence and inserted “or she” preceding “may not issue” in the second sentence.

    Amended generally by Act No. 82.

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 82 substituted “seven” for “five” following “exceed” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Act No. 51 substituted “$20.00” for “$15.00” preceding “in addition” in the second sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added by Act Nos. 230 and 241.

    —1987. Subdiv. (c)(3): Added.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): In the first sentence, substituted “any motor vehicle” for “a pleasure car or motor truck with a gross weight of 5,099 pounds or less” following “registrant of” and “$15.00” for “$5.00” following “fee of”.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added the last sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Rewrote the first sentence.

    —1967. Subsec. (b): Inserted “annual” preceding “fee of $5.00” in the first sentence.

    —1965. Subsec. (a): Deleted “together with” following “address” in the first sentence, added “and shall be reflectorized in part or in whole” following “determine” in the third sentence, and rewrote the fourth sentence.

    —1961. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Display of number plates, see chapter 7, subchapter 5 of this title.

    Notification of change of name or address, see § 205 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    Vermont’s ban under 23 V.S.A. § 304(d)(4) , on all vanity license plate combinations that referred, in any language, to a religion or deity, constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The ban on all religious messages in a nonpublic forum served not to restrict content but instead impermissibly restricted expression from a religious viewpoint and thus violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 20825 (2d Cir. 2010).

    Vermont’s ban under 23 V.S.A. § 304(d)(4) , was not reasonable as applied to plaintiff motorist who requested a vanity license plate that referred to a Bible verse because the prohibition on any language that referred to a religion or deity did not further either of the purported state interests in support of the ban which were avoiding disruption and distraction of drivers and avoiding the perception that the government favored certain ideas. Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 20825 (2d Cir. 2010).

    Reserved registration numbers.

    Claim that administrative regulation allowing reservation of low number license plates was invalid under test requiring a regulation to be in harmony with overall statutory scheme, uniform in operation and equal in effect, and claim that the regulation was ultra vires as being beyond the statutory authority of Commissioner promulgating it, were moot and would not be decided, where the regulation had been incorporated into this section. Lague, Inc. v. State, 136 Vt. 413, 392 A.2d 942, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 764 (1978).

    That regulation providing for reservation of low number license plates had been incorporated into this section, governing the field, did not of itself, on ground issue was moot, keep court from deciding constitutional claim of denial of Equal Protection, but where plaintiff attacked the reservation scheme, then obtained a low number within the reserve group of numbers, he was in the favored class of which he complained and the issue was moot and would not be decided. Lague, Inc. v. State, 136 Vt. 413, 392 A.2d 942, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 764 (1978).

    Special number plates; vanity plates.

    Under the provision of subsec. (d) of this section, stating that “[t]he commissioner may refuse to honor any request that might be offensive or confusing to the general public,” the Commissioner may not refuse to honor a request unless she determines that the request might be offensive or confusing. Martin v. State, 2003 VT 14, 175 Vt. 80, 819 A.2d 742, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 9 (2003).

    Administrative regulation promulgated under subsec. (d) of this section extended beyond the statutory language and permitted the Commissioner to reject requests for plates that are themselves inoffensive but belong in one of several designated categories that include words with the potential to offend. Martin v. State, 2003 VT 14, 175 Vt. 80, 819 A.2d 742, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 9 (2003).

    Administrative regulation that permitted the Commissioner to reject requests for vanity plates belonging in designated categories could not support a decision to deny an application for a plate displaying the letters “IRISH” in that it prescribed a standard which the Legislature has not authorized the Commissioner to fix. Martin v. State, 2003 VT 14, 175 Vt. 80, 819 A.2d 742, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 9 (2003).

    The plaintiff did not have a First Amendment right to use vanity plates bearing the letters “SHTHPNS” since (1) vanity plates do not constitute a public forum, and (2) the defendant’s policy of prohibiting vanity plates with offensive scatological terms was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22463 (2d Cir. 2001).

    The defendants did not violate the plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when they revoked vanity plates bearing the letters “SHTHPNS” after issuing them in error, notwithstanding her contention that she was entitled to a prerevocation hearing, where (1) she was given notice that her vanity plates were to be revoked and was afforded a postrevocation hearing at which she prevailed, (2) the defendants attempted to contact her to give her temporary plates so that she could drive pending the result of the hearing, and (3) the defendants even reinstated the SHTHPNS plates pending the result of the hearing because the plaintiff insisted, contrary to the view of the defendants, that she would have waived her right to appeal had she accepted the temporary plates. Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22463 (2d Cir. 2001).

    § 304a. Special registration plates and placards for individuals with disabilities.

    1. As used in this section:
      1. “Ambulatory disability” means an impairment that prevents or impedes walking. An individual shall be considered to have an ambulatory disability if he or she:
        1. cannot walk 200 feet without stopping to rest;
        2. cannot walk without the use of, or assistance from, a brace, cane, crutch, another individual, prosthetic device, wheelchair, or other assistive device;
        3. is restricted by lung disease to such an extent that the individual’s forced (respiratory) expiratory volume for one second, when measured by spirometry, is less than one liter, or the arterial oxygen tension is less than 60 mm/hg on room air at rest;
        4. uses portable oxygen;
        5. has a cardiac condition to the extent that the individual’s functional limitations are classified in severity as Class III or Class IV according to standards set by the American Heart Association; or
        6. is severely limited in his or her ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition.
      2. “Blind” means the visual impairment of an individual whose central visual acuity does not exceed 20/200 in the better eye with corrective lenses or whose visual acuity, if better than 20/200, is accompanied by a limit to the field of vision in the better eye to such a degree that its widest diameter subtends an angle of no greater than 20 degrees.
      3. “Special registration plates” means a registration plate for individuals with disabilities that displays the International Symbol of Access:
        1. in a color that contrasts with the background; and
        2. in the same size as the letters or numbers on the plate.
      4. “Removable windshield placard” means a two-sided, hanger style placard which includes on each side:
        1. the International Symbol of Access, which is at least three inches in height, centered on the placard, and is a color that contrasts with the placard’s background color;
        2. an identification number;
        3. a date of expiration; and
        4. the seal or other identification of the issuing authority.
      5. “Temporary removable windshield placard” means a two-sided hanger style placard which includes on each side:
        1. the International Symbol of Access, which is at least three inches in height, centered on the placard, and is a color that contrasts with the placard’s background color;
        2. an identification number;
        3. a date of expiration; and
        4. the seal or other identification of the issuing authority.
      6. “Eligible person” means:
        1. an individual who is blind or has an ambulatory disability and has been issued a special registration plate or a windshield placard by this State or another state;
        2. a person who is transporting an individual described in subdivision (A) of this subdivision (6); or
        3. an individual transporting an individual who is blind or has an ambulatory disability on behalf of an organization that has been issued a special registration plate or a windshield placard by this State or another state for the purpose of transporting an individual who is blind or has an ambulatory disability.
    2. Special registration plates or removable windshield placards, or both, shall be issued by the Commissioner. The placard shall be issued without a fee to an individual who is blind or has an ambulatory disability. One set of plates shall be issued without additional fees for a vehicle registered or leased to an individual who is blind or has an ambulatory disability or to a parent or guardian of an individual with a permanent disability. The Commissioner shall issue these placards or plates under rules adopted by him or her after proper application has been made to the Commissioner by any person residing within the State. Application forms shall be available on request at the Department of Motor Vehicles.
      1. Upon application for a special registration plate or removable windshield placard, the Commissioner shall send a form prescribed by him or her to the applicant to be signed and returned by a licensed physician, licensed physician assistant, or licensed advanced practice registered nurse. The Commissioner shall file the form for future reference and issue the placard or plate. A new application shall be submitted every four years in the case of placards and at every third registration renewal for plates but in no case greater than every four years. When a licensed physician, licensed physician assistant, or licensed advanced practice registered nurse has previously certified to the Commissioner that an applicant’s condition is both permanent and stable, a special registration plate or placard need not be renewed.
      2. Upon application of an organization, the Commissioner shall issue special registration plates for a vehicle registered in the applicant’s name if the vehicle is primarily used to transport individuals who have an ambulatory disability or are blind. Placards shall also be issued without a fee, upon application in a form prescribed by the Commissioner, to an organization to be used when transporting individuals who have an ambulatory disability or are blind. The plates and placards shall be subject to the restrictions set forth in subdivision (a)(3) of this section.
      3. An individual with a disability who abuses such privileges or allows individuals not disabled to abuse the privileges provided in this section may have this privilege revoked after suitable notice and opportunity for hearing has been given him or her by the Commissioner. Hearings under the provisions of this section shall be held in accordance with sections 105-107 of this title and shall be subject to review by the Civil Division of the Superior Court of the county where the individual with a disability resides.
      4. An applicant for a registration plate or placard for individuals with disabilities may request the Civil Division of the Superior Court in the county in which he or she resides to review a decision by the Commissioner to deny his or her application for a special registration plate or placard.
      5. If the authenticity of the medical need for the special registration is challenged with reasons in writing, the Commissioner may have physicians with the Vermont Department of Health review the medical facts, with the knowledge of the individual with a disability and the licensed physician, licensed physician assistant, or licensed advanced practice registered nurse who filled in the medical form for the special registration, in order to determine eligibility and so notify all concerned of the facts and the recommendations.
      6. On a form prescribed by the Commissioner, a nonprofit organization that provides volunteer drivers to transport individuals who have an ambulatory disability or are blind may apply to the Commissioner for a placard. Placards shall be marked “volunteer driver.” The organization shall ensure proper use of placards and maintain an accurate and complete record of the volunteer drivers to whom the placards are given by the organization. Placards shall be returned to the organization when the volunteer driver is no longer performing that service. Abuse of the privileges provided by the placards may result in the privileges being revoked and the placards repossessed by the Commissioner. Revocation may occur only after suitable notice and opportunity for a hearing. Hearings shall be held in accordance with sections 105-107 of this title.
    3. Eligible persons may park vehicles with special registration plates or removable windshield placards issued by any state in special parking spaces when:
      1. the placard is displayed:
        1. by hanging it from the front windshield rearview mirror in such a manner that it may be viewed from the front and rear of the vehicle; or
        2. if the vehicle has no rearview mirror, on the dashboard;
      2. the plate is mounted as provided in section 511 of this title; or
      3. the plate is mounted or the placard displayed as provided by the law of the jurisdiction where the vehicle is registered.
      1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an eligible person shall be permitted to park, and to park without fee, for at least 10 continuous days in a parking space or area that is restricted as to the length of time parking is permitted or where parking fees are assessed. (d) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an eligible person shall be permitted to park, and to park without fee, for at least 10 continuous days in a parking space or area that is restricted as to the length of time parking is permitted or where parking fees are assessed.
      2. Notwithstanding the 10-day period in subdivision (1) of this subsection, in the case of a State- or municipally operated parking garage, an eligible person shall be permitted to park, and to park without fee, for at least 24 continuous hours.
      3. This subsection shall not apply to spaces or areas in which parking, standing, or stopping of all vehicles is prohibited by law or by any parking ban or that are reserved for special vehicles. As a condition to the privilege conferred by this subsection, the vehicle shall display the registration plate or placard issued by the Commissioner, or a special registration license plate or placard issued by any other jurisdiction, in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.
      1. An individual, other than an eligible person, who for his or her own purposes parks a vehicle in a space for individuals with disabilities shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $200.00 for each violation and shall be liable for towing charges. (e) (1) An individual, other than an eligible person, who for his or her own purposes parks a vehicle in a space for individuals with disabilities shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $200.00 for each violation and shall be liable for towing charges.
      2. An individual, other than an eligible person, who displays a special registration plate or removable windshield placard not issued to him or her under this section and parks a vehicle in a space for individuals with disabilities, shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $400.00 for each violation and shall be liable for towing charges.
      3. A person who violates this section also shall be liable for storage charges not to exceed $12.00 per day, and an artisan’s lien may be imposed against the vehicle for payment of the charges assessed.
      4. The person in charge of the parking space or spaces for individuals with a disability or any duly authorized law enforcement officer shall cause the removal of a vehicle parked in violation of this section.
      5. A violation of this section shall be considered a traffic violation within the meaning of 4 V.S.A. chapter 29.
    4. Individuals who have a temporary ambulatory disability may apply for a temporary removable windshield placard to the Commissioner on a form prescribed by him or her. The placard shall be valid for a period of up to six months and displayed as required under the provisions of subsection (c) of this section. The application shall be signed by a licensed physician, licensed physician assistant, or licensed advanced practice registered nurse. The validation period of the temporary placard shall be established on the basis of the written recommendation from a licensed physician, licensed physician assistant, or licensed advanced practice registered nurse. The Commissioner shall adopt rules to implement the provisions of this subsection.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. June 21, 1988; amended 1989, No. 51 , § 12; 1989, No. 56 ; 1991, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1993; 1999, No. 34 , § 5; 1999, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 29, 2000; 2003, No. 151 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2003, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 60, eff. June 9, 2004; 2005, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2007, No. 61 , § 4; 2009, No. 82 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238; 2011, No. 62 , § 39; 2013, No. 57 , § 4; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 142; 2015, No. 23 , § 121; 2015, No. 50 , § 7; 2017, No. 71 , § 1; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 140.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subdivs. (b)(1) and (5) and in subsec. (f), substituted “licensed” for “certified” preceding “physician assistant” in light of 2011, No. 6 , § 4.

    —2013. Substituted “physician assistant” for “physician’s assistant” in subdivs. (b)(1) and (5), and in subsec. (f), in accordance with 2013, No. 34 , § 30a.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Act 206 inserted “or to a parent or guardian of a person with a permanent disability” following “disability”.

    Subdiv. (b)(3): Act 132 deleted “herein” preceding “provided”; inserted “in this section” following “provided”; and substituted “where” for “wherein” following “county”.

    —2017. Subsec. (e): Amended generally.

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(4)(A): Act No. 50 substituted “a color that contrasts with the placard’s background color” for “white on a blue shield”.

    Subdiv. (a)(5)(A): Act No. 50 substituted “a color that contrasts with the placard’s background color” for “white on a red shield”.

    Subdiv. (a)(6): Added by Act No. 50.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 50 rewrote the introductory paragraph.

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 50 amended generally.

    Subsec. (e): Act No. 50 substituted “an eligible person” for “a person with a disability” and inserted “not less than” preceding “$200.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Act No. 23 substituted “adopt” for “promulgate” preceding “rules” in the last sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(4): Substituted “registration” for “special handicapped” following “applicant for a” and inserted “for persons with disabilities” following “placard”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “registration” for “special handicapped” following “shall display the”.

    Subsec. (f): Substituted “have a temporary” for “are temporarily disabled with an” following “Persons who”.

    —2013. Subsec. (c): Rewritten.

    —2011. Subsec. (d): In the first sentence, deleted “who is blind or” following “person”; substituted “or an individual transporting a person who is blind shall be permitted to” for “may” preceding “park”; inserted “and to park” preceding “without”; substituted “at least” for “not more than” following “fee for”; substituted “space or area” for “zone” following “parking”; and inserted “or where parking fees are assessed, except that this minimum period shall be 24 continuous hours for parking in a state- or municipally operated parking garage” following “permitted”. In the second sentence, substituted “spaces or areas” for “zones” following “apply to”; inserted “by law or by any parking ban, or” following “prohibited,” and deleted “or where parking is prohibited by any parking ban” following “vehicles”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (e): Act No. 82 Substituted “$200.00” for “$100.00” in the first sentence.

    Act No. 154 substituted “civil division of the superior court” for “district court” throughout.

    —2007. Subdiv. (b)(1): In the fourth sentence, substituted “need not” for “may” following “placard” and deleted “by the applicant without submission of a form signed by a licensed physician, certified physician’s assistant, or licensed advanced practice registered nurse”.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “or leased” following “registered” in the third sentence.

    Subdiv. (b)(1), (b)(5): Inserted “certified physician’s assistant, or licensed advanced practice registered nurse” following “physician” throughout.

    Subsec. (f): Substituted “subsection (c) of this section” for “ 23 V.S.A. § 304a(c) ” and inserted “certified physician’s assistant, or licensed advanced practice registered nurse” following “physician” in two places.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 151 in subsec. (e), substituted “$100.00” for “$25.00” following “fined” in the first sentence, substituted “$12.00” for “$2.00” following “exceed” in the second sentence, and substituted “chapter 29 of Title 4” for “chapter 24 of this title” following “meaning of” in the last sentence.

    Act No. 160 substituted “not more than 10 continuous days” for “an unlimited period” in subsec. (d).

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Substituted “issued without a fee” for “issued for a fee of $3.00” in the second sentence of the introductory paragraph and in subdiv. (2) and deleted the former second sentence in subdiv. (6).

    —1999. Subsec. (b): Added subdiv. (6).

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1989. Subsec. (b): Act No. 51 substituted “commissioner” for “department” following “Vermont” in the first sentence and “$3.00” for “$1.00” following “fee of” in the second sentence of the introductory paragraph, “commissioner” for “department” in two places in the fourth sentence of that paragraph and following “plate, the” in the first sentence and preceding “shall file” in the second sentence of subdiv. (1) and “$3.00” for “$1.00” following “fee of” in the first sentence of subdiv. (2), and deleted “of the department” following “commissioner” in the first sentence of subdiv. (3).

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 51 substituted “commissioner” for “department” following “Vermont” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Added by Act No. 56.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Accessibility standards for public buildings and parking, see 20 V.S.A. chapter 174.

    § 304b. Conservation motor vehicle registration plates.

    1. The Commissioner shall, upon application, issue conservation registration plates for use only on vehicles registered at the pleasure car rate, on trucks registered for less than 26,001 pounds, and on vehicles registered to State agencies under section 376 of this title, but excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan. Plates so acquired shall be mounted on the front and rear of the vehicle. The Commissioners of Motor Vehicles and of Fish and Wildlife shall determine the graphic design of the special plates in a manner that serves to enhance the public awareness of the State’s interest in restoring and protecting its wildlife and major watershed areas. The Commissioners of Motor Vehicles and of Fish and Wildlife may alter the graphic design of these special plates, provided that plates in use at the time of a design alteration shall remain valid subject to the operator’s payment of the annual registration fee. Applicants shall apply on forms prescribed by the Commissioner and shall pay an initial fee of $26.00 in addition to the annual fee for registration. In following years, in addition to the annual registration fee, the holder of a conservation plate shall pay a renewal fee of $26.00. The Commissioner may adopt rules under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 to implement the provisions of this subsection.
    2. Initial fees collected under subsection (a) of this section shall be allocated as follows:
      1. 46 percent to the Transportation Fund.
      2. 27 percent to the Department of Fish and Wildlife for deposit into the Nongame Wildlife Account created in 10 V.S.A. § 4048 .
      3. 27 percent to the Department of Fish and Wildlife for deposit into the Watershed Management Account created in 10 V.S.A. § 4050 .
    3. Renewal fees collected under subsection (a) of this section shall be allocated as follows:
      1. 42 percent to the Department of Fish and Wildlife for deposit into the Nongame Wildlife Account created in 10 V.S.A. § 4048 .
      2. 42 percent to the Department of Fish and Wildlife for deposit into the Watershed Management Account created in 10 V.S.A. § 4050 .
      3. 16 percent to the Transportation Fund.
    4. The Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife is authorized to deposit fees collected by the Department of Fish and Wildlife under subsections (b) and (c) of this section into the Conservation Camp Fund when the fees collected exceed the annual funding needs of the Nongame Wildlife Account and the Watershed Management Account.

    HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. May 22, 1996; amended 1997, No. 59 , § 73, eff. June 30, 1997; 1997, No. 85 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2003, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 63, eff. June 9, 2004; 2005, No. 58 , § 1; 2009, No. 50 , § 38; 2011, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 31; 2013, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2017, No. 71 , § 2.

    History

    Editor’s note—

    1997, No. 61 , § 240, provided for the repeal of subdiv. (b)(2) relating to the fee deposited into the Motor Vehicle Registration Plate Revolving Fund. However, the provisions relating to the fee deposited into the Motor Vehicle Registration Plate Revolving Fund were previously deleted by the amendment to this section by 1997, No. 59 , § 73, eff. June 30, 1997.

    Amendments

    —2017. Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “46 percent” for “$12.00”.

    Subdiv. (b)(2) and (3): Substituted “27 percent” for “$7.00”.

    Subdiv. (c)(1) and (2): Substituted “42 percent” for “$11.00”.

    Subdiv. (c)(3): Substituted “16 percent” for “$4.00”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$26.00” for “$23.00” in the fifth and sixth sentences.

    Subsec. (b): Raised the fees in subdivs. (1) through (3).

    Subsec. (c): Adjusted the fee allocations in subdivs. (1) through (3).

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Added “, on vehicles registered to state agencies under section 376 of this title” after “pounds” in the first sentence and substituted “$23.00” for “$20.00” in the fifth and sixth sentences.

    Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “$11.00” for “$10.00.”

    Subdivs. (b)(2) and (b)(3): Substituted “$6.00” for “$5.00.”

    Subdivs. (c)(1) and (c)(2): Substituted “$10.00” for “$9.00.”

    Subdiv. (c)(3): Substituted “$3.00” for “$2.00.”

    —2005. Subsec. (a): Deleted “nongame” preceding “wildlife” in the third sentence, added the fourth and eighth sentences.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “less than 26,001” for “not more than 8,099 pounds” and inserted “and excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan” following “pounds”.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added “and on trucks registered for not more than 8,099 pounds” to the end of the first sentence.

    —1997. Subsec. (b): Rewrote subdiv. (1), deleted former subdiv. (2), and redesignated former subdivs. (3) and (4) as present subdivs. (2) and (3).

    Subsec. (c)(3): Substituted “transportation fund” for “agency of transportation”.

    Repeal of sunset. 1995 No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 16, as amended by 1999, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 244a, and No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 12g, which had provided for the repeal of this section, effective December 31, 2005, was repealed by 2005, No. 58 , § 2.

    § 304c. Motor vehicle registration plates: Building Bright Spaces for Bright Futures Fund.

    1. The Commissioner shall, upon application, issue “Building Bright Spaces for Bright Futures Fund,” referred to as “the Bright Futures Fund,” registration plates for use only on vehicles registered at the pleasure car rate, on trucks registered for less than 26,001 pounds, on vehicles registered to State agencies under section 376 of this title, and excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan. Plates so acquired shall be mounted on the front and rear of the vehicle. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall utilize the graphic design recommended by the Commissioner for Children and Families for the special plates to enhance the public awareness of the State’s interest in supporting children’s services. Applicants shall apply on forms prescribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and shall pay an initial fee of $24.00 in addition to the annual fee for registration. In following years, in addition to the annual registration fee, the holder of a Bright Futures Fund plate shall pay a renewal fee of $24.00. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall adopt rules under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 to implement the provisions of this subsection.
    2. Fees collected under subsection (a) of this section shall be allocated as follows:
      1. 29 percent to the Transportation Fund.
      2. 71 percent to the Department for Children and Families for deposit in the Bright Futures Fund created in 33 V.S.A. § 3531 .
    3. Renewal fees collected under subsection (a) of this section shall be allocated as follows:
      1. 79 percent to the Department for Children and Families for deposit in the Bright Futures Fund in 33 V.S.A. § 3531 .
      2. 21 percent to the Transportation Fund.
    4. The Department of Motor Vehicles shall be charged by the Department of Corrections for the production of the Bright Futures Fund license plates.

    HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 142 (Adj. Sess.), § 140; amended 2003, No. 66 , § 138a; 2003, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 64, eff. June 9, 2004; 2009, No. 50 , § 83; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2017, No. 71 , § 3; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 141.

    History

    Revision note

    —2013. In subsec. (a), substituted “Commissioner for Children and Families” for “commissioner of social and rehabilitation services” to reflect the correct official.

    —2007. In subdivs. (b)(1) and (2) substituted “for children and families” for “of social and rehabilitation services” to reflect the correct recipient of the fee.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “hereinafter” preceding “referred to” in the first sentence and inserted “of Motor Vehicles” following “Commissioner” in the last sentence.

    —2017. Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “29 percent” for “$7.00”.

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Substituted “71 percent” for “$17.00”.

    Subdiv. (c)(1): Substituted “79 percent” for “$19.00”.

    Subdiv. (c)(2): Substituted “21 percent” for “$5.00”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$24.00” for “$20.00” in the fourth and fifth sentences.

    Subsec. (b): Raised the fees in subdivs. (1) and (2).

    Subsec. (c): Adjusted the fee allocations in subdivs. (1) and (2).

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Deleted “and” after “car rate” and inserted “on vehicles registered to state agencies under section 376 of this title,” in the first sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “less than 26,001” for “not more than 8,099 pounds” and inserted “and excluding vehicles registered under the International Registration Plan” following “pounds”.

    —2003. Subsec. (d): Deleted “not” preceding “shall” and “development and” preceding “production”.

    § 305. Registration periods.

    1. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall issue registration certificates, validation stickers, and number plates upon initial registration, and registration certificates and validation stickers for each succeeding renewal period of registration upon payment of the registration fee. Number plates so issued will become void one year from the first day of the month following the month of issue, unless a longer initial registration period is authorized by law or unless this period is extended through renewal. Registrations issued for motor trucks shall become void one year from the first day of the month following the month of issue.
    2. The Commissioner shall issue a registration certificate, validation sticker, and number plates for each motor vehicle owned by the State, which shall be valid for a period of five years. Such motor vehicle shall be considered properly registered while the issued number plates are attached to the motor vehicle. The Commissioner may replace such number plates when in his or her discretion their condition requires.
    3. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, no plate is valid unless the validation sticker is affixed to the rear plate in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner in section 511 of this title.
    4. When a registration for a motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle is processed electronically, a receipt shall be available electronically and for printing. An electronic or printed receipt shall serve as a temporary registration for 10 days after the date of the transaction. An electronic receipt may be shown to an enforcement officer using a portable electronic device. Use of a portable electronic device to display the receipt does not in itself constitute consent for an officer to access other contents of the device.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 54 , § 3, eff. April 1, 1962; 1965, No. 70 , § 2; 1967, No. 129 , § 3; 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1971, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1973; 1977, No. 85 ,§§ 2, 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1977; 1979, No. 34 , § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 1979; 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1987, No. 111 , § 10; 1993, No. 9 , § 1, eff. Feb. 1, 1994; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1997, No. 39 , § 2; 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2009, No. 50 , § 112; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2013, No. 57 , § 5; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2017, No. 71 , § 4; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 142.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 99 . 1957, No. 285 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,073. 1945, No. 98 , § 1. 1935, No. 123 , § 4. P.L. § 5023. 1929, No. 64 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 17.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): In the first sentence, substituted “which” for “that”; and in the second sentence, deleted “as” preceding “properly registered”, inserted “issued number”, preceding “plates” and “so issued” thereafter, and substituted “to the motor vehicle” for “thereto”.

    —2017. Subsec. (a): Deleted the fourth sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “of Motor Vehicles” following “Commissioner”; inserted “, validation sticker,” following “certificate”; and inserted “, that shall be valid” following “State”.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted the former first and second sentences and in the present first sentence deleted “for the second and succeeding years” following “valid” and inserted “validation” preceding “sticker” and “in section 511 of this title” following “Commissioner”.

    Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    —2013. Subsec. (d): Added “for a motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle” in the first sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading and substituted “processed electronically” for “renewed electronically” in subsec. (d).

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Added “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section” preceding “no plate is valid” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    —2009. Subsec. (c): Substituted “One validating sticker” for “Validating stickers” in the second sentence, substituted “sticker is” for “stickers are” and inserted “rear” before “plate” in the last sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “following the month” following “the first day of the month” near the end of the second and third sentences.

    —1997. Subsec. (b): Substituted “a” for “the” preceding “period of” and “five years” for “ownership by the state” thereafter in the first sentence and inserted “or her” preceding “discretion” in the third sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Rewrote the second sentence and inserted “excess weight” following “special”, substituted “section” for “sections” preceding “1392” and deleted “(13) and (14)” following “1392” in the fourth sentence.

    —1993. Subsec. (a): Rewrote the third sentence, deleted the former fourth sentence, and substituted “so as to coincide with registration expiration dates” for “in like manner” following “prorated” in the fourth sentence.

    —1987. Subsec. (a): Deleted “herein” following “provided” in the second sentence and “thereof” following “certificate” in the third sentence, and added the fifth sentence.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added “except as otherwise provided herein” preceding “number plates so issued will become” at the beginning of the second sentence and added the third and fourth sentences.

    —1979. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1977. Subsec. (a): Deleted “each year” following “period of registration” in the first sentence and rewrote the second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “to be used” following “plates” in the first sentence and substituted “validating stickers” for “a validating sticker” preceding “shall be issued” in the second sentence and “stickers are” for “sticker is” preceding “affixed” in the third sentence.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “or municipal” following “dealer” in the second sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “repairer” following “dealer” in the second sentence.

    —1967. Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1965. Subsec. (a): Rewrote the second sentence and added the third sentence.

    —1961. Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    All-terrain vehicle registration, see § 3502 of this title.

    International Registration Plan, see § 3701 of this title.

    Motorboat registration, see § 3305 of this title.

    Snowmobile registration, see § 3202 of this title.

    § 305a. Repealed. 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 31, 2016.

    History

    Former § 305a. Former § 305a, relating to registration not renewed following nonpayment of traffic violation judgment, was derived from 2007, No. 51 , § 6.

    § 306. Title to number plates.

    All number plates shall be the property of the State, and title shall not pass to a person registering a motor vehicle under the provisions of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 143.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,067. P.L. § 5009. 1925, No. 70 , § 110.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “no” following “State, and” and “therein” preceding “shall” and inserted “not” following “shall”.

    § 307. Carrying of registration certificate; replacement and corrected certificates.

    1. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle nor draw a trailer or semi-trailer unless all required registration certificates are carried in some easily accessible place in the motor vehicle.
    2. In case of the loss, mutilation, or destruction of a certificate, the owner of the vehicle described in it shall forthwith notify the Commissioner and remit a fee of $16.00, upon receipt of which the Commissioner shall furnish the owner with a duplicate certificate.
    3. A corrected registration certificate shall be furnished by the Commissioner upon request and receipt of a fee of $16.00.
    4. An operator cited for violating subsection (a) of this section with respect to a pleasure car, motorcycle, or truck that could be registered for less than 26,001 pounds shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $5.00, which penalty shall be exempt from surcharges under 13 V.S.A. § 7282(a) , if he or she is cited within the 14 days following the expiration of the motor vehicle’s registration.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 276 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1989, No. 51 , § 13; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 28; 2009, No. 50 , § 39; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2019, No. 60 , § 31.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,074. P.L. § 5024. 1933, No. 157 , § 4728. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 22. G.L. § 4675. P.S. § 4078. 1906, No. 86 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2019. Subsec. (d): Added.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$16.00” for “$15.00” in the second and third sentences.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$15.00” for “$13.00” in two places.

    —2009. Substituted “$13.00” for “$12.00” in the second and third sentences.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$12.00” for “$7.00” in the second and third sentences.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$7.00” for “$5.00” in two places.

    —1989. Substituted “$5.00” for “$2.00” following “fee of” in the second and third sentences.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “mutilation or destruction” following “the loss” in the second sentence and added the third sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$2.00” for “fifty cents” following “fee of” in the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Obedience to enforcement officers; production of documents, see § 1012 of this title.

    Possession of evidence of financial responsibility, see § 800 of this title.

    Possession of inspection sticker, see § 1222 of this title.

    Possession of operator’s license certificate, see § 611 of this title.

    Possession of registration validation sticker; manner of display, see § 511 of this title.

    § 308. Suspension, revocation, and denial of registration; reinstatement fee.

    1. The Commissioner may suspend or revoke the registration of any motor vehicle registered in this State and repossess the number plates assigned to it, when he or she is satisfied that:
      1. the vehicle has been stolen and that the registrant does not have legal title;
      2. the vehicle is in such poor mechanical condition as to make its operation and use a menace or danger;
      3. the vehicle is operated without proper equipment after the owner has been notified to procure and use such equipment as is required by law or Department rules;
      4. the owner of the motor vehicle has perpetrated some fraud upon the Department of Motor Vehicles;
      5. the owner of the motor vehicle is a habitual user of alcohol to excess;
      6. the number plates were erroneously issued;
      7. suspension or revocation is authorized under any other provision of law; or
      8. the commercial motor carrier responsible for safety of the vehicle has been prohibited from operating by a federal agency.
    2. The Commissioner shall deny registration if the applicant fails to disclose material information required, or if the applicant has made a materially false statement on the application, or if the applicant’s business is operated, managed, or otherwise controlled or affiliated with a person who is ineligible for registration, including the applicant entity, a relative, family member, corporate officer, or shareholder. A person whose privilege to operate has been suspended in accordance with subsection 3009(b) or 3103(b) of this title or section 110 of this title where the payments were due pursuant to section 3015 or 3106 of this title shall be ineligible for registration. The Department shall deny registration for a vehicle that has been assigned for safety to a commercial motor carrier who has been prohibited from operating by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration or a carrier whose business is operated, managed, or otherwise controlled or affiliated with a person who is ineligible for registration, including the owner, a relative, family member, corporate officer, or shareholder.
    3. Prior to terminating the revocation of a registration or reinstating a registration following suspension, the Commissioner shall require payment of a fee equivalent to the fee prescribed in section 675 of this title, except that no such fee shall be imposed if the registration was suspended or revoked following its erroneous issuance by the Commissioner. This fee shall be in addition to any other fee that may be required by law.

    HISTORY: Amended 1997, No. 85 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2009, No. 39 , § 1; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4).

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,053. P.L. § 4994. 1933, No. 157 , § 4698. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 36.

    Amendments

    —2017. Subdiv. (a)(5): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading and added subsec. (c).

    —2009. Redesignated the introductory paragraph and subdivs. (1) through (7) as subsec. (a) and subdivs. (a)(1) through (a)(7) and amended generally; added subdiv. (a)(8); and added subsec. (b).

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “himself of” after “repossess” and added “or she” in the introductory paragraph, and added subdivs. (6) and (7).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Procedure for suspension of license or registration, see § 204 of this title.

    Suspension of registration for nonpayment of motor vehicle fees, see § 110 of this title.

    § 309. Registering motor vehicle of which applicant is not the owner.

    A person who registers or attempts to register a motor vehicle, snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or motorboat of which he or she is not the bona fide owner, as defined in section 4 of this title, shall be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

    HISTORY: Amended 2001, No. 69 , § 2; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 144.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,309. 1947, No. 202 , § 5473. P.L. § 5173. 1925, No. 70 , § 99.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted comma following “$500.00”.

    —2001. Inserted “snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or motorboat” preceding “of which he” and inserted “or she” thereafter.

    § 310. Loaning or permitting the use of number plates.

    A person shall not loan or permit the use of the number plates assigned by the Commissioner to a motor vehicle owned by such person.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,313. P.L. § 5177. 1925, No. 70 , § 102.

    Amendments

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Loaning of number plates by dealers, see § 465 of this title.

    Loaning of number plates by transporters, see § 493 of this title.

    § 311. Permits for nonregisterable vehicles.

    1. The Commissioner, for an annual fee of $2.00 and under such conditions as he or she may prescribe, may permit licensed operators to operate motor vehicles not otherwise registerable across a public highway; however, an unlicensed person may so operate a motorized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device as defined by this title without obtaining a permit.
    2. [Repealed.]
    3. The Commissioner may permit the operation of a specially equipped motor vehicle, not otherwise registerable, by a person with a disability who holds an operator’s license permitting the operation of that vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 46 , §§ 1, 2, eff. April 19, 1963; amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32; 1977, No. 156 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 29, 1978; 1983, No. 5 ; 1989, No. 51 , § 14; 2001, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 143.

    History

    Revision note—

    Designated the language of the section as added by 1963, No. 46 , § 1, as subsec. (a) and codified the provisions of 1963, No. 46 , § 2, as subsec. (b).

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “person with a disability” for “handicapped person” following “by a”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Deleted “Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title,” preceding “the commissioner” and inserted “or an electric personal assistive mobility device as defined by this title” following “wheelchair”.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$2.00” for “$1.00” following “fee of” and inserted “or she” preceding “may prescribe”.

    —1983. Subsec. (a): Substituted “however” for “and may permit” following “highway” and “may” for “to” following “person”, and added “without obtaining a permit” following “wheelchair”.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Repealed.

    § 312. Temporary registration pending issuance of certificate of title.

    1. In his or her discretion, the Commissioner may issue a temporary registration certificate to a person required to obtain a certificate of title in accordance with chapter 21 of this title upon payment of the registration fee provided in subchapter 2 of this chapter and of the title fee. The temporary registration certificate and the number plate shall be valid for 60 days and shall not be renewed. At the expiration of the temporary registration, a permanent registration certificate and a set of number plates shall be issued, provided that all documents and information required by law are filed with the Commissioner.
    2. The registration fee paid in accordance with subsection (a) of this section shall not be refunded, except that the fee shall be deemed the fee for the permanent registration, if one is issued, or shall be deemed the fee for an application to register another vehicle, if the title requirements are met during that registration period. Likewise, the title fee shall be deemed the fee for the title, if one is issued, or shall be deemed the fee for an application to title another vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 49 , eff. April 15, 1975; amended 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2017, No. 71 , § 5.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017. Subsec. (a): Inserted “and of the title fee” following “of this chapter” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “an application to register another vehicle,” for “another application for registration” following “deemed the fee for” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Inserted “or her” preceding “discretion” in the first sentence and substituted “60” for “thirty” preceding “days” in the second sentence.

    § 313. Commercial vehicle operation; denial of registration.

    The Commissioner is authorized to refuse registration if a commercial motor vehicle is being operated by a commercial motor carrier that has been prohibited from operating in interstate commerce by an agency with authority to do so under federal law.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 26 , § 2.

    § 314. Commercial motor vehicles; registration; suspension or revocation.

    The Commissioner is authorized to suspend or revoke the registration of a commercial motor vehicle if the commercial motor carrier responsible for safety has been prohibited from operating in interstate commerce by an agency with authority to do so under federal law.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 26 , § 3.

    Article 2. Transfer of Ownership and Refunds

    § 321. Procedure upon transfer.

    Upon the transfer of ownership of any registered motor vehicle, its registration shall expire. The person in whose name the transferred vehicle was registered shall immediately return to the Commissioner the registration certificate assigned to the transferred vehicle, with the date of transfer and the name and residence of the new owner endorsed on the back. However, the Commissioner may accept any other satisfactory evidence of the date of transfer and new ownership. The transferor shall immediately remove the registration number plates from the transferred vehicle and may attach the registration number plates to another unregistered motor vehicle owned by him or her and the owner or operator shall not, for a period of 60 days, be subject to a civil penalty for the operation of the latter motor vehicle without the proper registration certificate, provided he or she has, within 24 hours of the transfer, made application, as provided in section 323 of this title, for transfer of the registration number plates. If such application for transfer is not so received by the Commissioner, the number plates shall be returned to the Commissioner at the end of five days after the transfer of ownership.

    HISTORY: Amended 1975, No. 68 , § 1, eff. April 18, 1975; 1987, No. 112 , § 8; 2017, No. 71 , § 6; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 145.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,075. P.L. § 5025. 1933, No. 157 , § 4729. 1929, No. 63 , § 1. 1927, No. 69 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 20. G.L. § 4677. 1908, No. 99 , § 2. P.S. § 4080. 1904, No. 86 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2017. In the fifth sentence, substituted “transferor” for “transferer” following “owned by the” and substituted “60 days” for “30 days” following “for a period of”.

    —1987. Added the third sentence and made other minor changes in phraseology throughout the section.

    —1975. Substituted “endorsed” for “indorsed” following “new owner” in the second sentence and “30” for “five” preceding “days, be subject” in the fourth sentence.

    § 322. Failure to return certificate upon sale of vehicle.

    Except as provided in section 321 of this title, a person shall return to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles the registration certificate and number plates of any motor vehicle when the vehicle is sold or exchanged by the person, together with the notice of the sale, when required by this subchapter.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1987, No. 112 , § 9.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,324. P.L. § 5186. 1929, No. 63 , § 5. 1925, No. 70 , § 107.

    Amendments

    —1987. Added “except as provided in section 321 of this title” preceding “a person shall” at the beginning of the section and made other minor changes in phraseology throughout the section.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “shall” for “who fails to” preceding “return” and deleted “shall be fined not more than $25.00” following “subchapter”.

    § 323. Transfer fees.

    A person who transfers the ownership of a registered motor vehicle to another, upon the filing of a new application and upon the payment of a fee of $25.00, may have registered in his or her name another motor vehicle for the remainder of the registration period without payment of any additional registration fee, provided the proper registration fee of the motor vehicle sought to be registered is the same as the registration fee of the transferred motor vehicle. However, if the proper registration fee of the motor vehicle sought to be registered by such person is greater than the registration fee of the transferred motor vehicle, the applicant shall pay, in addition to such fee of $25.00, the difference between the registration fee of the motor vehicle previously registered and the proper fee for the registration of the motor vehicle sought to be registered.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 276 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1975, No. 90 , § 2; 1979, No. 202 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, Pt. IV, eff. Sept. 1, 1980; 1989, No. 51 , § 15; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 29; 2009, No. 50 , § 40; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 13.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,076. 1935, No. 123 , § 5. P.L. § 5026. 1931, No. 74 , § 1. 1929, No. 63 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 21. G.L. § 4674. 1908, No. 99 , § 2. P.S. § 4077. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$25.00” for “$23.00” in the first and second sentences.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$23.00” for “$22.00” in the first and second sentences.

    —2009. Substituted “$22.00” for “$20.00” in the first and second sentences.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$20.00” for “$15.00” in the first and second sentences.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00” in the first and second sentences.

    —1989. Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00” following “payment of a fee of” and inserted “or her” preceding “name” in the first sentence and substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00” preceding “the difference” in the second sentence.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$5.00” for “$2.00” in the first and second sentences.

    —1975. Substituted “period” for “year” preceding “without payment” in the first sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Reenacted section without change.

    Notes to Opinions

    Ownership.

    Where husband and wife own motor vehicle as tenants by entirety, on death of one party other continues to own whole title, and, where vehicle is sold or transferred, may transfer registration to new or additional vehicle on payment of fee provided by this section. 1956-58 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 152.

    § 324. Use of old number plates.

    When ownership of a motor vehicle is transferred, the transferer may attach the registration number plates to another motor vehicle owned by him or her and register the same in accordance with the provisions of sections 321, 323, and 325 of this title only if such transferred vehicle and such other vehicle are both of the pleasure car type, both motor trucks or tractors, both motor buses, or both motorcycles, except that a pleasure car registration and a truck registration shall be mutually transferable on payment of the difference in registration fees.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 120 , § 3; 1975, No. 55 .

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,077. 1935, No. 120 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —1975. Deleted “for less than 5000 pounds” preceding “shall be mutually transferable” and added “on payment of the difference in registration fees” thereafter.

    —1965. Added “except that a pleasure car registration and a truck registration for less than 5000 pounds shall be mutually transferable” following “motorcycles”.

    Notes to Opinions

    Station wagons.

    A station wagon is a pleasure car rather than a motor truck under section 4 of this title and hence a transfer of registration cannot be made from a motor truck to a station wagon. 1962-64 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 257.

    § 325. Refund of part of old registration fee.

    If the registration fee of the motor vehicle sought to be registered is less than the registration fee of the transferred motor vehicle, the Commissioner shall certify to the Commissioner of Finance and Management the facts pertinent to the difference of such registration fees, giving the name of the owner of such motor vehicle, his or her address, the amount of the original registration fee paid, the date of application for transfer, and the correct fee for the motor vehicle sought to be registered. The Commissioner of Finance and Management shall issue his or her warrant in favor of the owner for such percent of the difference in registration fees as the unexpired term bears to the entire registration period, but if a transfer of registration is made before the 15th day of any month, the transfer, for the purpose of the refund, shall be considered as having been made on the first day of such month. If such transfer of registration is made on or after the 15th day of any month, the transfer, for the purpose of the refund, shall be considered as having been made on the first day of the month following such application for transfer.

    HISTORY: Amended 1977, No. 85 , § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1977; 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b).

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,078. 1935, No. 123 , § 6. P.L. § 5027. 1933, No. 157 , § 4731. 1931, No. 74 , § 1. 1927, No. 69 , § 2.

    Revision note—

    References to “commissioner of finance and information support” changed to “commissioner of finance and management” in light of Executive Order No. 35-87, which provided for the abolition of the department of finance and information support and the transfer of the duties, responsibilities and authority of the commissioner of that entity to the commissioner of the department of finance and management as established by the order. By its own terms, Executive Order No. 35-87 took effect on July 1, 1987, pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 2002 . For the text of Executive Order No. 35-87, see 3 App. V.S.A. chapter 1. Executive Order No. 35-87, which this note refers to, was revoked and rescinded by E.O.06-05 (No. 3-46).

    References to “auditor of accounts” changed to “finance director” pursuant to 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(b).

    References to “finance director” changed to “commissioner of finance” to conform references to new title and reorganization of state government pursuant to 1971, No. 92 .

    Amendments

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Added “and information support” following “commissioner of finance” in the first and second sentences.

    —1977. Substituted “period” for “year” following “entire registration”.

    § 326. Refund upon loss of vehicle.

    The Commissioner may cancel the registration of a motor vehicle when the owner thereof proves to his or her satisfaction that it has been totally destroyed by fire or, through crash or wear, has become wholly unfit for use and has been dismantled. After the Commissioner cancels the registration and the owner returns to the Commissioner either the registration certificate, or the number plates and the validation sticker, the Commissioner shall certify to the Commissioner of Finance and Management the fact of the cancellation, giving the name of the owner of the motor vehicle, his or her address, the amount of the registration fee paid, and the date of cancellation. The Commissioner of Finance and Management shall issue his or her warrant in favor of the owner for such percent of the registration fee paid as the unexpired term of the registration bears to the entire registration period, but in no case shall the Commissioner retain less than $5.00 of the fee paid.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 129 , § 4; 1975, No. 90 , § 3; 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b); 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,079. 1935, No. 123 , § 7. P.L. § 5028. 1933, No. 86 , § 1. 1929, No. 72 , § 1. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 111.

    Revision note

    —2021. In the first sentence, substituted “crash” for “accident” preceding “or wear” in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    References to “commissioner of finance and information support” changed to “commissioner of finance and management” in light of Executive Order No. 35-87, which provided for the abolition of the department of finance and information support and the transfer of the duties, responsibilities and authority of the commissioner of that entity to the commissioner of the department of finance and management as established by the order. By its own terms, Executive Order No. 35-87 took effect on July 1, 1987, pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 2002 . For the text of Executive Order No. 35-87, see 3 App. V.S.A. chapter 1. Executive Order No. 35-87, which this note refers to, was revoked and rescinded by E.O.06-05 (No. 3-46).

    References to “auditor of accounts” changed to “finance director” pursuant to 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(b).

    References to “finance director” changed to “commissioner of finance” to conform references to new title and reorganization of state government pursuant to 1971, No. 92 .

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Added “and information support” following “commissioner of finance” in the second and third sentences.

    —1975. Substituted “period” for “year” preceding “but in no case”.

    —1967. Inserted “and validation sticker (if issued for that year)” following “number plates” in the second sentence.

    Notes to Opinions

    Trailers.

    Commissioner has no authority under this section to cancel registration of trailer, since it is not a motor vehicle. 1930-32 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 77.

    § 327. Refund when plates not used.

    Subject to the conditions set forth in subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of this section, the Commissioner may cancel the registration of a motor vehicle, snowmobile, or motorboat when the owner returns to the Commissioner either the number plates, if any, or the registration certificate. Upon cancellation of the registration, the Commissioner shall notify the Commissioner of Finance and Management, who shall issue a refund as follows:

    1. For registrations cancelled prior to the beginning of the registration period, the refund is the full amount of the fee paid, less a charge of $5.00.
    2. For registrations cancelled within 30 days of the date of issue, the refund is the full amount of the fee paid, less a charge of $5.00. The owner of a motor vehicle must prove to the Commissioner’s satisfaction that the number plates have not been used or attached to a motor vehicle.
    3. For registrations cancelled prior to the beginning of the second year of a two-year registration period, the refund is one-half of the full amount of the two-year fee paid, less a charge of $5.00.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 129 , § 5; 1969, No. 276 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1987, No. 112 , § 6; 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 59; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,080. P.L. § 5029. 1933, No. 86 , § 1.

    Revision note—

    References to “auditor of accounts” changed to “finance director” pursuant to 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(b).

    References to “finance director” changed to “commissioner of finance” to conform references to new title and reorganization of state government pursuant to 1971, No. 92 .

    References to “commissioner of finance and information support” changed to “commissioner of finance and management” in light of Executive Order No. 35-87, which provided for the abolition of the department of finance and information support and the transfer of the duties, responsibilities and authority of the commissioner of that entity to the commissioner of the department of finance and management as established by the order. By its own terms, Executive Order No. 35-87 took effect on July 1, 1987, pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 2002 . For the text of Executive Order No. 35-87, see 3 App. V.S.A. chapter 1. Executive Order No. 35-87, which this note refers to, was revoked and rescinded by E.O.06-05 (No. 3-46).

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Introductory language: Rewrote the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (1): Substituted “charge” for “fee” preceding “of $5.00”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Introductory language: Deleted “the validation sticker, if issued for that year,” preceding “and the registration” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (1): Deleted “which are” preceding “cancelled prior” in the first sentence and deleted the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (2): Deleted “which are” preceding “cancelled within” in the first sentence and rewrote the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (3): Deleted “which are” preceding “cancelled prior” in the first sentence and deleted the second sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1987. Section amended generally.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$5.00” for “$2.00” following “charge of” in the second sentence.

    —1967. Inserted “validation sticker (if issued for that year)” preceding “and registration certificate” and “or that the current validation sticker has not been affixed to the plate” following “attached to a motor vehicle” in the first sentence.

    § 328. Repealed. 2015, No. 47, § 8.

    History

    Former § 328. Former § 328, relating to refund of money erroneously paid, was derived from 1933, No. 86 , § 1, and amended by 1987, No. 112 , § 11. For present provisions see § 207 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Annotations From Former § 328

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, 514 F. Supp. 1341, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13845 (D. Vt. 1981); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986).

    § 329. Refunds paid from motor vehicle fees.

    The refunds mentioned in sections 325-327 of this title shall be paid from the fees turned into the State Treasury by the Department of Motor Vehicles.

    HISTORY: Amended 2015, No. 47 , § 10.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,082. P.L. § 5031. 1933, No. 157 , § 4733. 1933, No. 86 , § 1. 1931, No. 74 , § 1. 1929, No. 72 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2015. Substituted “in sections 325-327” for “in the sections 325-328” following “refunds mentioned in” near the beginning of the sentence.

    § 330. Transferring number plates.

    1. Upon the transfer of ownership of a vehicle, the registration number plates may be attached to another vehicle that is being leased by the registrant for a period greater than 30 days. The lessor shall become the registrant.
    2. Upon the termination of a lease of a vehicle, the registration number plates may be attached to another vehicle being leased by the lessee. The lessor of the new vehicle shall become the registrant.
    3. Upon the termination of a lease of a vehicle, the registration number plates may be attached to a vehicle, including the leased vehicle, being purchased or owned by the lessee. The lessor shall be deleted from the registration.
    4. For purposes of calculating fees, transactions pursuant to subsections (a) and (c) of this section shall be considered to be new registrations. Transactions pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall be treated as registration transfers. A lessor shall not gain any rights in or to special number plates or reserved registration numbers through this process nor shall the prohibitions of subdivision 304(c)(3) of this title apply.

    HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 97 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 10, 1996.

    Subchapter 2. Fees and Exemptions

    CROSS REFERENCES

    All-terrain vehicle registration and transfer fees, see §§ 3503 and 3504 of this title.

    Dealer registration fee, see § 453 of this title.

    Dealer registration reinstatement fee, see § 462 of this title.

    Duplicate or corrected registration certificates fees, see § 307 of this title.

    International Registration Plan, see § 3701 of this title.

    In-transit registration permit fees, see §§ 516-518 of this title.

    Motorboat registration fees, see § 3305 of this title.

    Motor vehicle warranty fee, see § 476 of this title.

    Nonregisterable vehicles fee, see § 311 of this title.

    Period of registration; pro-rated fees, see § 302 of this title.

    Refund of registration fee, see §§ 325-329 of this title.

    Registration reinstatement fee, see § 308 of this title.

    Replacement number plate fee, see § 514 of this title.

    Snowmobile registration and transfer fees, see §§ 3203-3204a of this title.

    Special number plates fees, see §§ 304-304c of this title.

    Temporary plate fee; dealers, see § 457 of this title.

    Temporary registration certificate fee, see § 312 of this title.

    Transfer fee, see § 323 of this title.

    Transporter registration fee, see § 494 of this title.

    § 361. Pleasure cars.

    The annual fee for registration of any motor vehicle of the pleasure car type, and all vehicles powered by electricity, shall be $74.00, and the biennial fee shall be $136.00.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 286 , § 1; 1981, No. 87 , § 6; 1989, No. 51 , § 16; 1993, No. 27 , § 8; 1995, No. 49 , § 2, eff. April 20, 1995; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 30; 2009, No. 50 , § 41; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 253 , § 1. 1951, No. 211 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,092. 1947, No. 90 , § 1. 1943, No. 76 , § 1. 1937, No. 122 , § 1. 1935, No. 123 , § 11. P.L. § 5047. 1933, No. 88 , § 1. 1929, No. 65 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 25. G.L. § 4670. 1910, No. 131 . 1908, No. 99 , § 2. P.S. § 4077. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$74.00” for “$69.00” and “$136.00” for “$127.00”.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$69.00” for “$64.00” and “$127.00” for “$120.00”.

    —2009. Substituted “$64.00” for “$59.00” and “$120.00” for “$108.00”.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$59.00” for “$49.00” and “$108.00” for “$90.00”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$49.00” for “$42.00” and “$90.00” for “$78.00”.

    —1995. Added “and the biennial fee shall be “$78.00” following “$42.00”.

    —1993. Inserted “and all vehicles powered by electricity” following “type”.

    —1989. Substituted “$42.00” for “$36.00”.

    —1981. Substituted “$36.00” for “$32.00”.

    —1961. Substituted “$32.00” for “$30.00”.

    § 362. Specialized fuel motor vehicles and motor buses.

    The annual fee for the registration of any “specialized fuel driven motor vehicle” as defined in section 4 of this title and of motor buses as defined in section 3002 of this title shall be one and three-quarters times the amount of the annual fee provided for a motor vehicle of the classification and weight under the terms of this chapter.

    HISTORY: Amended 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2007, No. 75 , § 33.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 253 , § 3. V.S. 1947, § 10,093. 1947, No. 202 , § 5314. 1935, No. 112 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —2007. Section heading: Substituted “Specialized fuel motor” for “Nongasoline and nondiesel” and added “and motor buses”.

    Section text: Amended generally.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “except any diesel-driven vehicle using ‘diesel fuel’ as defined in section 3002 of this title” preceding “but not including” and inserted “as defined in section 3002 of this title and” following “buses”.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “except any diesel-driven vehicle using ‘diesel fuel’ as defined in section 3002 but not including motor buses registered in this state” following “section 4 of this title”.

    § 363. Converted motor vehicle.

    When a motor vehicle of the pleasure car type is built over or converted into a motor vehicle designed for carrying merchandise or freight, such motor vehicle shall be registered at the pleasure car rate or at the truck rate as the Commissioner may, in the Commissioner’s discretion, determine.

    HISTORY: Amended 2021, No. 20 , § 231.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,095. P.L. § 5049. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 26.

    Revision note—

    The former second sentence of this section, which provided “Such converted or built-over motor vehicle shall be weighed on a tested weighing machine and such weight shall be used in determining the registration fee”, was omitted as obsolete in view of 1957, No. 253 , § 1, which amended V.S. 1947, § 10,092, presently codified as section 361 of this title, by deleting the language of that section relating to computation of pleasure car registration fees on a weight basis.

    Amendments

    —2021. Inserted “the” preceding “truck” and substituted “the Commissioner’s” for “his or her” preceding “discretion”.

    § 364. Motorcycles.

    The annual fee for registration of a motorcycle, with or without sidecar, shall be $46.00.

    HISTORY: Amended 1981, No. 87 , § 7; 1989, No. 51 , § 17; 1989, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. June 21, 1990; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 31; 2009, No. 50 , § 42; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 16.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 211 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,096. P.L. § 5050. 1925, No. 70 , § 27. G.L. § 4670. 1910, No. 131 . 1908, No. 99 , § 2. P.S. § 4077. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$46.00” for “$43.00”.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$43.00” for “$40.00”.

    —2009. Substituted “$40.00” for “$36.00.”

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$36.00” for “$30.00”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$30.00” for “$22.50”.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$22.50” for “$20.00”.

    —1989. Substituted “$20.00” for “$11.25”.

    —1981. Substituted “$11.25” for “$10.00”.

    § 364a. Motor-driven cycles: registration; financial responsibility.

    1. The annual fee for registration of a motor-driven cycle shall be $28.00.
    2. Motor-driven cycle operators shall be subject to the provisions of section 801 of this title, which requires, in certain cases, that proof of financial responsibility be filed with the Commissioner after a crash.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 20 , § 9; amended 1981, No. 87 , § 8; 1989, No. 51 , § 18; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. May 15, 2002; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19b, eff. Sept. 1, 2010; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “a crash” for “an accident” at the end of subsec. (b) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$28.00” for “$20.00”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “motor-driven cycles” for “mopeds” and “motor-driven cycle” for “moped” throughout the section.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “$20.00” for “$14.00”.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$14.00” for “$11.25”.

    —1981. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$11.25” for “$10.00”.

    § 364b. All-surface vehicles; registration.

    1. The annual fee for registration of an all-surface vehicle (ASV) shall be the sum of the fees established by sections 3305 and 3504 of this title, plus $26.00.
    2. Evidence of the registration shall be a sticker, as determined by the Commissioner, affixed to the plate issued pursuant to chapter 31 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 184 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 18.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$26.00” for “$25.00”.

    § 365. Hearse or ambulance.

    The annual fee for registration of a hearse or ambulance, except ambulances owned by a municipality and used for police patrol purposes, shall be based on the pleasure car rate.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,097. P.L. § 5051. 1931, No. 75 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 28.

    Revision note—

    Omitted “actual weight thereof, at” preceding “pleasure car” as obsolete in view of 1957, No. 253 , § 1, which amended V.S. 1947, § 10,092, presently codified as section 361 of this title, by deleting the language of that section relating to computation of pleasure car registration fees on a weight basis.

    § 366. Repealed. 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 78(1).

    History

    Former § 366. Former § 366, relating to log-haulers; registration, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,098; P.L. § 5052; 1925, No. 70 , § 29; G.L. § 4671; 1917, No. 131 , § 6; 1910, No. 130 and amended by 1981, No. 87 , § 9 and 1989, No. 51 , § 19.

    § 367. Trucks.

      1. The annual fee for registration of tractors, truck-tractors, or motor trucks except truck cranes, truck shovels, road oilers, bituminous distributors, and farm trucks used as specified in subsection (f) of this section shall be based on the total weight of the truck-tractor or motor truck, including body and cab plus the heaviest load to be carried. In computing the fees for registration of tractors, truck-tractors, or motor trucks with trailers or semi-trailers attached, except trailers or semi-trailers with a gross weight of less than 6,000 pounds, the fee shall be based upon the weight of the tractor, truck-tractor, or motor truck, the weight of the trailer or semi-trailer, and the weight of the heaviest load to be carried by the combined vehicles. In addition to the fee set out in the following schedule, the fee for vehicles weighing between 10,000 and 25,999 pounds inclusive shall be an additional $35.50, the fee for vehicles weighing between 26,000 and 39,999 pounds inclusive shall be an additional $70.98, the fee for vehicles weighing between 40,000 and 59,999 pounds inclusive shall be an additional $248.48, and the fee for vehicles 60,000 pounds and over shall be an additional $390.48. The fee shall be computed at the following rates per 1,000 pounds of weight determined pursuant to this subdivision and rounded up to the nearest whole dollar; the minimum fee for registering a tractor, truck-tractor, or motor truck to 6,000 pounds shall be the same as for the pleasure car type: (a) (1) The annual fee for registration of tractors, truck-tractors, or motor trucks except truck cranes, truck shovels, road oilers, bituminous distributors, and farm trucks used as specified in subsection (f) of this section shall be based on the total weight of the truck-tractor or motor truck, including body and cab plus the heaviest load to be carried. In computing the fees for registration of tractors, truck-tractors, or motor trucks with trailers or semi-trailers attached, except trailers or semi-trailers with a gross weight of less than 6,000 pounds, the fee shall be based upon the weight of the tractor, truck-tractor, or motor truck, the weight of the trailer or semi-trailer, and the weight of the heaviest load to be carried by the combined vehicles. In addition to the fee set out in the following schedule, the fee for vehicles weighing between 10,000 and 25,999 pounds inclusive shall be an additional $35.50, the fee for vehicles weighing between 26,000 and 39,999 pounds inclusive shall be an additional $70.98, the fee for vehicles weighing between 40,000 and 59,999 pounds inclusive shall be an additional $248.48, and the fee for vehicles 60,000 pounds and over shall be an additional $390.48. The fee shall be computed at the following rates per 1,000 pounds of weight determined pursuant to this subdivision and rounded up to the nearest whole dollar; the minimum fee for registering a tractor, truck-tractor, or motor truck to 6,000 pounds shall be the same as for the pleasure car type:
      2. Fractions of 1,000 pounds shall be computed at the next highest 1,000 pounds, excepting, however, fractions of hundredweight shall be disregarded.

      $15.20 when the weight exceeds 6,000 pounds but does not exceed 8,000 pounds.

      $17.39 when the weight exceeds 8,000 pounds but does not exceed 12,000 pounds.

      $19.17 when the weight exceeds 12,000 pounds but does not exceed 16,000 pounds.

      $20.50 when the weight exceeds 16,000 pounds but does not exceed 20,000 pounds.

      $21.46 when the weight exceeds 20,000 pounds but does not exceed 30,000 pounds.

      $21.92 when the weight exceeds 30,000 pounds but does not exceed 40,000 pounds.

      $22.45 when the weight exceeds 40,000 pounds but does not exceed 50,000 pounds.

      $22.65 when the weight exceeds 50,000 pounds but does not exceed 60,000 pounds.

      $23.42 when the weight exceeds 60,000 pounds but does not exceed 70,000 pounds.

      $24.21 when the weight exceeds 70,000 pounds but does not exceed 80,000 pounds.

      $24.99 when the weight exceeds 80,000 pounds but does not exceed 90,000 pounds.

    1. The annual fee for registration of a category I special purpose vehicle shall be $178.00, and the annual fee for a category II special purpose vehicle shall be $415.00.
    2. -(e) [Repealed.]

      (f) (1) The annual fee for registration of a farm truck of a total weight, determined as provided in subsection (a) of this section, used only for the transportation of agricultural products produced on, and material to be used in connection with the operation of, a farm or farms owned, operated, or occupied by the registrant, or motor trucks that are agricultural custom service vehicles as defined in subdivision 4(70) of this title, shall be $40.00 if the total weight is less than 18,000 pounds. If the gross weight is at least 18,000 pounds but is less than 35,000 pounds, the fee shall be $61.00. If the gross weight is at least 35,000 pounds but does not exceed 60,000 pounds, the fee shall be $115.00. If the gross weight exceeds 60,000 pounds but does not exceed 80,000 pounds, the fee shall be $182.50.

      (2) In the event that a farm truck or agricultural custom service vehicle so registered is thereafter registered for general use during the same registration year, the fee or a pro rata portion thereof shall be applied toward the fee for general registration. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to licensed cattle and poultry dealers.

      (g) [Repealed.]

      (h) Loader backhoes used primarily for agricultural related purposes are exempt from the provisions of this section.

      (i) The annual fee for registration of a truck used for logging shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. Trucks used for logging shall be those motor vehicles used exclusively for the transportation of harvested forest products from a forested site.

      (j) [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 286 , § 2, eff. Aug. 1, 1961; 1963, No. 223 , § 3; 1964, No. 19 (Sp. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 9, 1964; 1965, No. 120 , § 1; 1973, No. 156 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 15, 1974; 1977, No. 29 , eff. April 1, 1977; 1979, No. 46 , § 1, eff. April 26, 1979; 1979, No. 196 (Adj. Sess.), eff. May 6, 1980; 1981, No. 87 , § 10; 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1983, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.); 1983, No. 252 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1985, No. 85 , § 10; 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. April 18, 1986; 1987, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. May 13, 1988; 1989, No. 51 , § 20; 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 25, 1996; 2001, No. 69 , § 10, eff. Jan. 1, 2002; 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 32, 41; 2009, No. 50 , § 43; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 146; 2021, No. 20 , § 232.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 103 . 1957, No. 112 . 1957, No. 253 , § 2. 1955, No. 289 , § 3. 1951, No. 212 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,099. 1947, No. 91 , § 1. 1945, No. 99 , § 1. 1941, No. 93 , § 1. 1939, No. 117 , § 1. 1939, No. 109 , § 4. P.L. § 5053. 1933, No. 89 , § 3. 1931, No. 76 . 1929, No. 66 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 30. G.L. § 4671. 1917, No. 131 , § 6. 1910, No. 130 .

    Revision note

    —2004. Inserted “(a)” preceding “(1)” at the beginning of the section to conform to V.S.A. style.

    Revision note—. In subdiv. (f)(1), substituted “4(70)” for “4(68)” to correspond with the redesignation of that subdiv. as originally enacted by 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    In the first sentence of subsec. (f), substituted “subsection (a) of this section” for “the first paragraph of this section” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    In subsec. (h), deleted subdiv. designation preceding the second sentence.

    Editor’s note—

    The text of this section is based on the harmonization of three amendments. During the 2001 Adjourned Session, this section was amended three times, by Act Nos. 75, 102, and 139, resulting in three versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2001 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 75, 102, and 139 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2021. In subsec. (h), substituted “provisions” for “provision” preceding “of this”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): In the first sentence, deleted “hereinafter” preceding “specified” and inserted “in subsection (f) of this section” thereafter; and in the last sentence, substituted “pursuant to this subdivision” for “as above specified”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Changed fee amounts throughout.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$178.00” for “$150.00” and “$415.00” for “$350.00”.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(1): Changed fee amounts throughout.

    —2009. Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “$31.47” for “$29.00”, “$62.93” for “$58.00”, “$220.30” for “$203.04”, and “$346.19” for “$319.07” in the third sentence and amended generally the dollar figures in the paragraphs following subdiv. (a)(1).

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Amended the section generally by increasing the fees throughout.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “category I special purpose vehicle” for “truck crane or truck shovel vehicle”; substituted “$150.00” for “105.00”; and added “and the annual fee for a category II special purpose vehicle shall be $350.00” at the end.

    Subsecs. (c), (d), (e), (g), and (j): Deleted.

    Subsec. (h): Deleted the former first sentence and substituted “section” for “subsection”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 102 added the subdiv. (1) designation, increased the fees throughout the subsec., inserted “and rounded up to the nearest whole dollar” following “determined as above specified” in the fourth sentence, and added the subdiv. (2) designation to the formerly undesignated paragraph at the end of the subsec.

    Subsec. (f): Act No. 75 added subdiv. (1) and (2) designations, added the fourth sentence in subdiv. (1), and substituted “subdivision” for “paragraph” in subdiv. (2).

    Act No. 139 added subdiv. (1) and (2) designations, inserted “or motor trucks which are agricultural custom service vehicles as defined in subdivision 4(68) of this title” following “registrant” in the first sentence, substituted “60,000” for “55,000” in the third and fourth sentences of subdiv. (1), inserted “or agricultural custom service vehicle” in the first sentence and substituted “subdivision” for “paragraph” in the second sentence of subdiv. (2).

    —2001. Subsec. (d): Added “and the annual fee for a well drilling tender truck is $105.00” following “$65.00”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (j): Added.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Added the third sentence and increased fees generally in the first through eleventh items of the first paragraph.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$105.00” for “$95.65”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$65.00” for “$56.25”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “$65.00” for “$56.25”.

    Subsec. (e): Inserted “calcium chloride distributor” following “oiler” and substituted “$105.00” for “$95.65” at the end of the subsec.

    Subsec. (f): In the first paragraph, substituted “$40.00” for “$36.00” in the first sentence, “$61.00” for “$10.00” in the second sentence, and “$115.00” for “$100.00” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (g): Substituted “$105.00” for “$95.65”.

    Subsec. (h): Inserted “full or semi-flotation applicator vehicles” following “sweeper” and substituted “$105.00” for “$95.65” at the end of the subsec.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the first paragraph added “but does not exceed 90,000 pounds” following “80,000 pounds” in the eleventh item of the third sentence.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1985. Subsec. (i): Added.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Act No. 252 added the second sentence to the first paragraph.

    Subsec. (h): Act No. 112 inserted “street sweeper” preceding “grader”.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1981. Subsec. (a): Increased fees generally in the first through ninth items of the fourth sentence in the first paragraph.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$95.65” for “$85.00”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$56.25” for “$50.00”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “$56.25” for “$50.00”.

    Subsec. (e): Substituted “$95.65” for “$85.00”.

    Subsec. (f): In the first paragraph, substituted “$36.00” for “$32.00” in subdiv. (1) and “$45.00” for “$40.00” in subdiv. (2).

    Subsec. (g): Substituted “$95.65” for “$85.00”.

    Subsec. (h): Substituted “$95.65” for “$85.00”.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (h): Added.

    —1979. Subsec. (a): In the first paragraph, substituted “6,000” for “3,000” following “gross weight of less than” in the second sentence and for “5,000” following “motor truck to” at the beginning of the fourth sentence and following “weight exceeds” in the first item of that sentence.

    —1977. Subsec. (g): Added.

    —1973 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Amended generally.

    —1965. Section amended generally.

    —1964. Added the third paragraph, and made minor changes in punctuation in the first sentence of the fourth paragraph.

    —1963. Deleted the former third and fourth paragraphs.

    —1961. Added “lbs. but does not exceed 60,000 lbs.” following “50,000” at the end of the eighth item and added the ninth item of the fourth sentence of the first paragraph, added the second and third sentences of the third paragraph, and substituted “18,000” for “16,000” following “weight does not exceed” and preceding “pounds but does not exceed” and “22,000” for “20,000” thereafter in the first sentence of the fifth paragraph.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Diesel fuel user’s license, see § 3007 of this title.

    Nondiesel fuel user’s license, see § 415 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, 146 Vt. 574, 508 A.2d 405, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 328 (1986); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986).

    § 367a. Special purpose truck plates; penalties.

    The misuse of a vehicle registered under the provisions of a special purpose truck plate under the provisions of section 367 of this title shall be a traffic violation as defined in section 2302 of this title and shall be punishable by a civil penalty of $100.00 for a first offense and by a civil penalty of $200.00 for a second offense occurring within 12 months. Upon a conviction for a second offense, the owner shall be required to register the vehicle at the same rate as provided in subsection 367(a) of this title for other commercial trucks.

    HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 25, 1996; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 147.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “civil penalty” for “fine” twice in the first sentence.

    Prior law.

    Former section 367a, relating to computation of registration fees for special purpose vehicles, was derived from 1963, No. 223 , § 1, and repealed by 1964, No. 19 (Sp. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 9, 1964.

    § 367b. Use of wreckers.

    A motor truck that is registered as a wrecker may tow a motor vehicle on the highway without the towed vehicle being required to be registered.

    HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 20 , § 3.

    § 368. Misuse of farm registration.

    1. A person shall not operate or move upon a highway a motor truck registered as a farm truck:
      1. with a gross weight, including load and vehicle, exceeding the weight for which it is registered under section 367 of this title; or
      2. for any purpose other than the transportation of agricultural products produced on, or materials to be used in connection with the operation of, a farm.
    2. Any truck operated or moved in violation of this statute shall be required to be registered as a commercial truck and any person in violation of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $175.00 for each offense.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 1993, No. 65 , § 2; 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 148.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,100. 1941, No. 93 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted the (a), (a)(1), (a)(2), and (b) designations; in present subdiv. (a)(1), deleted “or for hire” at the end of the subdiv.; and in present subdiv. (a)(2), deleted “or farms owned, operated or occupied by the registrant” following “farm”.

    —1993. Added “and any person in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $175.00 for each offense” following “commercial truck” in the second sentence.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 369. Tractors other than farm tractors.

    The annual fee for registration of a tractor, except farm tractors as otherwise provided in this chapter, shall be based on the actual weight of such tractor at the same rate as that provided for trucks of like weight under the provisions of this chapter. The minimum fee for registering any tractor shall be $20.00.

    HISTORY: Amended 1964, No. 19 (Sp. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 9, 1964; 1975, No. 213 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 1, 1976; 1981, No. 87 , § 11; 1989, No. 51 , § 21; 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 79.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 121 . V.S. 1947, § 10,101. P.L. § 5054. 1925, No. 70 , § 31. G.L. § 4671. 1917, No. 131 , § 6. 1910, No. 130 .

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “log-haulers on snow roads and” preceding “farm tractors” in the first sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Added “other than farm tractors” to the section heading; deleted the subsec. (a) designation at the beginning of the section, and deleted subsec. (b) in its entirety.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$20.00” for “$16.90” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$40.00” for “$36.00” preceding “for registering”.

    —1981. Subsec. (a): At the end of the second sentence, substituted “$16.90” for “$15.00”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$36.00” for “$32.00” preceding “for registering”.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1964. At the end of the second sentence, substituted “$15.00” for “$25.00”.

    1963, No. 223 , § 5, provided for the repeal of this section effective with the 1964 registration year. However, in view of the amendment of the section by 1964, No. 19 , § 3, effective March 9, 1964, the section has been retained.

    § 370. Farm trucks, tractors, and trailers.

    1. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to registration fees for motor vehicles or trailers, farm tractors and farm trailers may be operated on the highway without being subject to a registration fee.
    2. Subsection (a) of this section shall not be construed to prevent unregistered farm trucks that are not “agricultural custom service vehicles” as defined in subdivision 4(70) of this title when being used exclusively for farm work:
      1. from being moved upon a highway within the confines of the farm; or
      2. from being moved upon highways from one farm to another.
    3. Subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall not be construed to prevent the:
      1. operation of an unregistered tractor hired by a municipal corporation in the upkeep and maintenance of the highways; or
      2. operation of a tractor for plowing or removing snow from such highway within such corporation.
    4. All farm trucks, other than those provided for in subsection (b) of this section, shall be subject to the registration requirements of subsection 367(f) of this title and shall be exempt from the permit requirements of sections 1400 and 1400a of this title, provided the gross weight of the farm truck does not exceed 60,000 pounds and the vehicle is in compliance with the provisions of subsection 1391(a) of this title.
    5. A farm tractor or a farm trailer shall be exempt from the permit requirements of sections 1400 and 1400a of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1975, No. 213 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 1, 1976; 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 92 . V.S. 1947, §§ 10,102-10,104. 1947, No. 202 , § 5324. 1943, No. 77 , §§ 1, 2. 1941, No. 95 , § 1. 1935, No. 122 , § 1. P.L. § 5055. 1927, No. 72 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 31.

    Revision note

    —2006. In the introductory paragraph to subsec. (b), substituted “4(70)” for “4(68)” to correct a statutory cross-reference.

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “trucks” following “farm” in the section heading, and amended section generally.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted the former second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted “operated by the owner of such farm truck, trailer or semi-trailer” following “confines of the farm” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Operation of farm tractor on highway without procuring operator’s license, see § 602 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Hajdarevic v. Agway Ins. Co., 2004 VT 28, 176 Vt. 605, 850 A.2d 991, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 34 (2004).

    Notes to Opinions

    Use of vehicle.

    Operator of chicken farms who uses and operates in connection therewith farm type tractor is not required to register tractor because during winter months he uses tractor, with blade attached, to plow private driveways, for which he receives compensation. 1950-52 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 219.

    Tractor which is used primarily for mill purposes but which also does agricultural work is not exempt from registration under this section. 1942-44 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 188.

    § 371. Trailer and semi-trailer.

      1. The one-year and two-year fees for registration of a trailer or semi-trailer, except a contractor’s trailer or farm trailer, shall be as follows: (a) (1) The one-year and two-year fees for registration of a trailer or semi-trailer, except a contractor’s trailer or farm trailer, shall be as follows:
        1. $27.00 and $51.00, respectively, when such trailer or semi-trailer has a gross weight of trailer and load of 1,500 pounds or less;
        2. $52.00 and $102.00, respectively, when such trailer or semi-trailer has a gross weight of trailer and load of more than 1,500 pounds and is drawn by a vehicle of the pleasure car type;
        3. $52.00 and $102.00, respectively, when such trailer or semi-trailer is drawn by a motor truck or tractor, when such trailer or semi-trailer has a gross weight of more than 1,500 pounds but less than 3,000 pounds;
        4. $52.00 and $102.00, respectively, when such trailer or semi-trailer is used in combination with a truck-tractor or motor truck registered at the fee provided for combined vehicles under section 367 of this title. Excepting for the fees, the provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to trailer coaches as defined in section 4 of this title nor to modular homes being transported by trailer or semi-trailer.
      2. The one-year and two-year fees for registration of a contractor’s trailer shall be $197.00 and $394.00, respectively.
      1. A trailer or semi-trailer, except a farm trailer, may be registered for a period of five years for a fee equal to five times the annual fee established by subsection (a) of this section. (b) (1) A trailer or semi-trailer, except a farm trailer, may be registered for a period of five years for a fee equal to five times the annual fee established by subsection (a) of this section.
      2. Any registration made for a period of five years shall cost the full fee regardless of the month in which the registration is made, but a five-year registration may be transferred or cancelled in the same manner as an annual registration.

    HISTORY: Amended 1963, No. 223 , § 4; 1964, No. 19 (Sp. Sess.), § 4, eff. March 9, 1964; 1967, No. 37 , § 1; 1975, No. 90 , § 4; 1981, No. 87 , § 12; 1983, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1989, No. 51 , § 22; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 33; 2009, No. 50 , § 44; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 2013, No. 57 , § 6; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 20.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 212 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,105. 1947, No. 91 , § 2. 1945, No. 100 , § 1. 1939, No. 116 , § 1. P.L. § 5056. 1931, No. 77 . 1925, No. 70 , § 32.

    Revision note

    —2007. Designated the two undesignated paragraphs in subsec. (b) as subdivs. (b)(1) and (b)(2) to conform to V.S.A. style.

    In the second sentence of subdiv. (a)(4), substituted “this subdivision” for “this paragraph” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    In subsec. (b), deleted subdiv. designation preceding the second sentence to conform section to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Changed fee amounts throughout.

    —2013. Added “a” in subdiv. (a)(1) following “except”; deleted “less than” preceding “1,500” and added “or less” following “pounds” in subdiv. (a)(1)(A); added “more than” preceding “1,500” and deleted “or more” following “pounds” in subdiv. (a)(1)(B); and added “more than” preceding “1,500”, deleted “or more” following “pounds”, and substituted “less than” for “not in excess of” in subdiv. (a)(1)(C).

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subdivs. (a)(1)(A) through (a)(1)(D): Changed fee amounts throughout.

    —2009. Substituted “$23.00 and $45.00” for “$20.00 and $40.00” in subdiv. (a)(1)(A) and substituted “$46.00 and $90.00” for “$40.00 and $80.00” in subdivs. (a)(1)(B) through (a)(1)(D).

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1)(A): Substituted “$20.00” for “$15.00” and “$40.00” for “$30.00”.

    Subdivs. (a)(1)(B)-(a)(1)(D): Substituted “$40.00” for “$30.00” and “$80.00” for “$60.00”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): In the first paragraph, substituted “$10.00” for “$8.45” at the beginning of subdiv. (1) and “$20.00” for “$16.90” at the beginning of subdivs. (2), (3) and (4), and in the second paragraph, substituted “$105.00” for “$95.65”.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(4): Added “nor to modular homes being transported by trailer or semi-trailer” following “section 4 of this title” at the end of the second sentence.

    —1981. Subsec. (a): In the first paragraph, substituted “$8.45” for “$7.50” preceding “when such” in subdiv. (1) and “$16.90” for “$15.00” at the beginning of subdivs. (2), (3) and (4) and made other minor stylistic changes in subdiv. (4), and in the second paragraph, substituted “$95.65” for “$85.00”.

    —1975. Section amended generally.

    —1967. Section amended generally.

    —1964. Substituted “3,000” for “three thousand” following “excess of” in the second item of the first paragraph and added the second paragraph.

    —1963. Deleted the former second paragraph.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, 146 Vt. 574, 508 A.2d 405, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 328 (1986).

    § 371a. Exemptions from registration.

    1. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to registration fees for trailers, the following shall be exempt from registration:
      1. wood splitters; and
      2. pole dinkeys.
    2. When any such trailer is used upon a public highway it shall have attached a red reflector that shall be so displayed as to be clearly visible from the rear, under normal atmospheric conditions, or a reflectorized slow moving vehicle symbol of a standard type approved by the Commissioner.
    3. A person in violation of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $25.00 for each offense.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 72 ; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 149.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined”.

    § 372. Motor bus.

    The annual fee for registration of a motor bus shall be based on the actual weight of such bus, plus passenger carrying capacity at 150 pounds per person, and shall be $2.00 per 100 pounds of such weight, except for motor buses registered under section 372a or 376 of this title. Fractions of a hundred-weight shall be disregarded. The minimum fee for the registration of any motor bus shall be $43.00.

    HISTORY: Amended 1981, No. 87 , § 13; 1989, No. 51 , § 23; 2009, No. 50 , § 74; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 21.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 212 , § 3. V.S. 1947, § 10,106. P.L. § 5057. 1925, No. 70 , § 33. G.L. § 4671. 1917, No. 131 , § 6. 1910, No. 130 .

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$2.00” for “$1.40” in the first sentence.

    —2009. Inserted “, except for motor buses registered under section 372a or 376 of this title” after the second reference of “weight” at the end of the first sentence.

    —1989. Substituted “$1.40” for “$1.25” preceding “per hundred” in the first sentence and “$43.00” for “$39.40” at the end of the third sentence.

    —1981. Substituted “$1.25” for “$1.10” preceding “per hundred pounds” in the first sentence and “’$39.40” for “’$35.00” in the third sentence.

    § 372a. Local transit public transportation service.

    1. The annual registration fee for any motor bus used in local transit or public transportation service shall be $62.00, except for those vehicles owned by a municipality for such service that are subject to the provisions of section 376 of this title. In the event a bus registered for local transit or public transportation service is subsequently registered for general use during the same registration year, such fee shall be applied toward the fee for general registration.
    2. As used in this section, a motor bus used in public transportation service is a motor bus used by a nonprofit public transit system as defined in 24 V.S.A. § 5088(3) , and a motor bus used in local transit is a motor bus used entirely within or not more than 100 miles beyond the boundaries of a city or town.

    HISTORY: Amended 1989, No. 51 , § 24; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. May 15, 2002; 2009, No. 50 , § 75; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 22; 2017, No. 71 , § 7; 2017, No. 113 (Adj. Sess.), § 152; 2021, No. 20 , § 233.

    History

    Editor’s note—

    This section was derived from 1957, No. 124 , § 1, eff. July 1, 1957, as amended by 1959, No. 30 , § 1, eff. March 11, 1959.

    Amendments

    —2021. In subsec. (a), substituted “subsequently” for “thereafter” preceding “registered for general use” and “toward” for “towards” following “applied” in the second sentence.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Inserted “motor” following “transportation service is a”.

    —2017. Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$62.00” for “$45.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “As used in” for “For the purposes of” preceding “this section”.

    —2009. Designated the undesignated paragraph as subsec. (a) and amended generally; and added subsec. (b).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$45.00” for “$33.00”.

    —1989. Substituted “$33.00” for “$30.00” at the end of the first sentence.

    § 373. Exhibition vehicles; year of manufacture plates.

    1. The annual fee for the registration of a motor vehicle that is maintained for use in exhibitions, club activities, parades, and other functions of public interest and that is not used for general daily transportation of passengers or property on any highway shall be $21.00, in lieu of fees otherwise provided by law. Permitted use shall include:
      1. use in exhibitions, club activities, parades, and other functions of public interest; and
      2. occasional transportation of passengers or property not more than one day per week.
    2. Pursuant to the provisions of section 304 of this title, one registration plate shall be issued to those vehicles registered under subsection (a) of this section.
    3. Vermont registration plates issued prior to 1968 may be displayed on a motor vehicle registered under this section instead of the plate issued under this section, if the issued plate is maintained within the vehicle and produced upon request of any enforcement officer as defined in subdivision 4(11) of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1981, No. 87 , § 14; 1989, No. 51 , § 25; 1989, No. 82 , § 2; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 15, eff. May 15, 2002; 2009, No. 50 , § 96; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 60; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 23; 2017, No. 71 , § 8.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 201 .

    Amendments

    —2017. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Acts No. 158 and 159 substituted “$21.00” for “$15.00”.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 158 amended generally.

    —2009. Added “; year of manufacture plates” at the end of section heading; made a minor punctuation change in subsec. (a); and added subsec. (c).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00”.

    —1989. Act No. 51 substituted “$10.00” for “$7.90” preceding “in lieu of”.

    Act No. 82 designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1981. Substituted “$7.90” for “$7.00” preceding “in lieu of”.

    § 374. Jitney.

    The annual fee for registration of a jitney designed to carry not more than seven persons, including the operator, shall be the same as is required for the registration of a motor vehicle of the pleasure car type. When a jitney is designed to carry more than seven passengers, including the operator, the fee shall be the same as is required for the registration of a motor bus of like passenger carrying capacity.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,108. P.L. § 5058. 1925, No. 70 , § 34. G.L. § 4670. 1910, No. 131 . 1908, No. 99 , § 2. P.S. § 4077. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , § 1.

    § 375. Repealed. 1971, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1973.

    History

    Former § 375. Former § 375, relating to registration fees for motor trucks or trailers owned by fire departments, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,107; 1941, No. 94 , § 1 and was amended by 1967, No. 129 , § 9. The subject matter is now covered by § 376 of this title.

    § 376. State, municipal, fire department, and rescue organization motor vehicles.

    1. A fee shall not be charged for registration of motor vehicles owned by the State.
    2. The fee for registration of a motor vehicle owned by any municipality in this State and used entirely by it or any other municipality for municipal purposes shall be $12.00 in lieu of fees otherwise specified in this chapter. As used in this subsection, the term municipality shall include county-owned vehicles. The Commissioner shall issue specially designed registration plates for county-owned sheriffs’ departments’ vehicles.
    3. The registration fee for registration of a motor truck, trailer, ambulance, or other motor vehicle, owned by a volunteer fire department or other volunteer fire fighting organization or other organization conducting rescue operations and used solely for fire fighting or rescue purposes shall be $12.00 in lieu of fees otherwise specified in this chapter. A motor vehicle or trailer registered under this section shall be plainly marked on both sides of the body or cab to indicate its ownership.
    4. The use of a school bus owned by a municipality in this State, whether or not that use is compensated, shall be considered a municipal purpose within the meaning of this section.
    5. [Repealed.]
    6. A replacement registration plate shall be provided by the Commissioner upon the payment of a fee of $9.00.
      1. The fee for registration of a motor vehicle obtained from the government as excess government property, or a vehicle purchased with 100 percent federal funds and used for federally supported local programs, shall be $14.00, in lieu of fees otherwise specified in this chapter.  The Commissioner shall determine the eligibility as to whether or not the motor vehicle qualifies for this registration and ownership of the vehicle shall be plainly marked on both sides of the body or cab. (g) (1) The fee for registration of a motor vehicle obtained from the government as excess government property, or a vehicle purchased with 100 percent federal funds and used for federally supported local programs, shall be $14.00, in lieu of fees otherwise specified in this chapter.  The Commissioner shall determine the eligibility as to whether or not the motor vehicle qualifies for this registration and ownership of the vehicle shall be plainly marked on both sides of the body or cab.
      2. The registration of a vehicle used for other than federally supported local programs shall be revoked.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 50 , eff. April 1, 1962; 1963, No. 190 ; 1967, No. 129 , § 10; 1971, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1973; 1975, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1977, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 19, 1978; 1979, No. 42 ; 1979, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1981, No. 87 , § 15; 1989, No. 51 , § 26; 1989, No. 82 , § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1990; 1997, No. 39 , § 6; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 24.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 146 , § 1. 1953, No. 157 . 1951, No. 212 , § 4. V.S. 1947, § 10,109. P.L. § 5059. 1925, No. 70 , § 35.

    Revision note

    —2007. In subsec. (g), designated the two included paragraphs as subdivs. (1) and (2).

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “$12.00” for “$10.00” in the first sentence, and “As used in” for “For the purposes of” preceding “this subsection” and “county-owned” for “county owned” following “shall include” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$12.00” for “$10.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Substituted “$9.00” for “$7.00”.

    —1997. Subsec. (e): Repealed.

    —1989. Subsec. (b): Act No. 51 substituted “$10.00” for “$6.75” preceding “in lieu”.

    Act No. 82 added the second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 51 substituted “$10.00” for “$6.75” preceding “in lieu” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Act No. 51 substituted “$7.00” for “$3.40”.

    Subsec. (g): Act No. 51 substituted “$14.00” for “$11.25” preceding “in lieu” in the first sentence of the first paragraph.

    —1981. Subsec. (b): Substituted “$6.75” for “$6.00” preceding “in lieu” and deleted the former second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$6.75” for “$6.00” preceding “in lieu” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Substituted “$3.40” for “$3.00”.

    Subsec. (g): Substituted “$11.25” for “$10.00” preceding “in lieu” in the first sentence.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (g): Deleted the former third sentence.

    —1979. Subsec. (g): Substituted “1980” for “1979” following “July 1” in the third sentence and added subdiv. (1).

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (g): Added.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading, amended subsecs. (b) and (c) generally, substituted “use” for “used” following “transportation, is” in subsec. (d), and added subsecs. (e) and (f).

    —1967. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —1963. Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —1961. Section amended generally.

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 375.

    Municipal purpose.

    The Legislature intended by 1957, No. 146 , § 1, to change the conclusion reached in 1956-58 Op. Atty. Gen. 160, at least as it affected vehicles transporting children from one district to another, and a school bus owned by a municipality could register under the lower rate while transporting children from one district to another, even though the municipality might receive compensation for such transportation. 1962-64 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 259.

    Term “municipal purpose” as used in this section meant any use to which municipality legally could put its vehicles. 1956-58 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 160.

    Transportation of pupils to other activities on a fare-paying basis was not permissible as municipal purpose under this section. 1956-58 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 160.

    § 377. Government-owned vehicles.

    The Commissioner shall have authority to issue registration certificates and registration number plates without charge to passenger car vehicles, not otherwise required to be registered under the provisions of this title, owned by the U.S. government, other states, or provinces.

    HISTORY: Amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 150.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 69 .

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “of Motor Vehicles” following “Commissioner” and substituted “U.S.” for “United States”.

    § 378. Veterans’ exemptions.

    No fees shall be charged an honorably discharged veteran of the U.S. Armed Forces who is a resident of the State of Vermont for the registration of a motor vehicle that the veteran has acquired with financial assistance from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, or for the registration of a motor vehicle owned by him or her during his or her lifetime obtained as a replacement thereof, when his or her application is accompanied by a copy of an approved VA Form 21-4502 issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs certifying him or her to be entitled to the financial assistance.

    HISTORY: Amended 1975, No. 38 , § 1; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 208 .

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1975. Deleted “on or after January 1 of each year” following “issued”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Veteran’s exemption from certificate of title fee, see § 2002 of this title.

    Veteran’s exemption from motor vehicle purchase and use tax, see 32 V.S.A. § 8911 .

    Veteran’s exemption from operator’s license fee, see § 609 of this title.

    §§ 379, 380. Repealed. 1979, No. 34, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 1979.

    History

    Former §§ 379, 380. Former § 379, relating to motor vehicles permitted to be registered for one half of the annual registration fee, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,083; 1935, No. 123 , § 9; P.L. § 5033; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 70 , § 23; G.L. § 4673; 1917, No. 132 , §§ 5, 9; 1917, No. 254 , § 4573; 1915, No. 135 , § 3; 1908, No. 99 , § 2; P.S. § 4077; 1906, No. 113 , § 4; 1904, No. 86 , § 1 and amended by 1965, No. 70 , § 3; 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 1977, No. 85 , § 5.

    Former § 380, relating to motor vehicles permitted to be registered for one fourth of the annual registration fee, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,084; 1935, No. 123 , § 10; P.L. § 5034; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 70 , § 24 and amended by 1965, No. 70 , § 4; 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1977, No. 85 , § 6.

    § 381. Fees turned over to State Treasurer.

    1. Except as otherwise provided, all fees for registering motor vehicles, licensing operators, and all other motor vehicle fees shall be collected by the Commissioner and forthwith paid into the State Treasury or deposited to such bank to the credit of the State Treasurer as he or she may direct.
    2. -(d) [Repealed.]

      (e) Whenever a payment is received that is less than, but within $0.99 of, the required fee, the transaction shall be processed. The Commissioner may determine that action will not be taken to collect the missing portion of the fee. When a payment up to $1.00 greater than the required fee is received, the excess shall not be refunded.

    HISTORY: Amended 1987, No. 89 , § 309; 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 1991, No. 89 ; 1997, No. 61 , § 240; 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,068. P.L. § 5010. 1927, No. 74 , § 3. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 10.

    Amendments

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Amended generally.

    —1997. Subsecs. (b)-(d): Repealed.

    —1991. Subsec. (e): Added.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1987. Section amended generally.

    § 382. Diesel-powered pleasure cars.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the annual registration fee for a pleasure car or tractor, truck-tractor, or motor truck up to 6,000 pounds powered by fuel as defined in section 3002 of this title shall be $74.00, and the biennial fee shall be $136.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; amended 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 25.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$74.00” for “$26.00” and “$136.00” for “$48.00”.

    Subchapter 3. Nonresident and Zone Registration

    § 411. Repealed. 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 62.

    History

    Former § 411. Former § 411, relating to reciprocal provisions, was derived from 1904, No. 86 , § 6; 1906, No. 113 , § 6; P.S. § 4089; 1908, No. 100 , §§ 1, 2; 1910, No. 136 ; 1917, No. 254 , § 4588; G.L. § 4682; 1925, No. 70 , § 64; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1927, No. 74 , § 3; 1927, No. 75 ; 1931, No. 78 , § 1; 1933, No. 87 , § 1; P.L. § 5035; 1935, No. 121 , § 1; 1939, No. 113 , § 1; 1947, No. 89 , § 1; V.S. 1947, § 10,085; 1957, No. 115 , and amended by 1963, No. 163 and 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, 146 Vt. 574, 508 A.2d 405, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 328 (1986); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986).

    § 412. Repealed. 1975, No. 218 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. Oct. 1, 1976.

    History

    Former § 412. Former § 412, relating to registration of motor vehicles in the State of Vermont by nonresidents residing within fifteen miles of Vermont boundary lines, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,091; 1937, No. 121 ; P.L. § 5045; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 70 , § 66 and amended by 1963, No. 109 .

    § 412a. Repealed. 2011, No. 46, § 17.

    History

    Former § 412a. Former § 412a, relating to zone registration, was derived from 1977, No. 108 , § 1.

    § 413. Repealed. 2015, No. 50, § 29.

    History

    Former § 413. Former § 413, relating to nonresident motor truck registration, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,086; 1947, No. 89 , § 2; 1935, No. 121 , § 2; 1934, No. 5 (Sp. Sess.), § 1; P.L. § 5036; 1933, No. 87 , § 1; 1931, No. 78 , § 1; 1925, No. 70 , § 64 and amended by 1975, No. 64 , § 2.

    § 414. Special permits for foreign public utilities.

    The Commissioner may issue to public utilities operating in this State, for a nominal fee, a special permit for vehicles engaged in emergency repair work in this State, provided such vehicles are registered in some other state, have registration plates attached, and are driven by an individual licensed to operate motor vehicles in this or some other state.

    HISTORY: Amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 151.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,087. P.L. § 5037. 1933, No. 87 , § 1. 1931, No. 78 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted a comma for “and” following “other state”, deleted “attached thereto” preceding “registration plates”, and inserted “attached,” thereafter, and substituted “an individual” for “persons” preceding “licensed to operate” and inserted “motor vehicles” thereafter.

    § 415. Nondiesel fuel user’s license.

    1. In addition to any other provision of law relating to registration of motor trucks with a gross weight of 18,000 pounds or over and powered by gasoline or any other nondiesel fuel, or fees paid therefor, a person owning or operating a motor truck upon the highways of the State, registered in this State, shall apply to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for a nondiesel fuel user’s license for each such motor truck to be so operated. Application shall be made upon a form prescribed by such Commissioner and shall set forth such information as the Commissioner may require. The application shall be accompanied by a license fee of $6.50 for each motor truck listed in the application. However, any license issued under this section prior to July 1, 1990 shall remain in effect for the term of the issuance. The Commissioner shall issue a license and an identification tag, plate, or sticker for each such motor truck, which tag, plate, or sticker shall be of such size and design and contain such information as the Commissioner shall prescribe. Except as otherwise provided, any such license and tag, plate, or sticker shall become void on January 1 next following the date of issue. Such licenses shall be carried in the motor truck, and the tag, plate, or sticker shall be affixed to said motor truck and at all times be visible and legible. This section shall not apply to motor trucks owned by federal, State, provincial, or municipal governments nor to motor trucks, otherwise required to be licensed under this section, that are being operated under the provisions of sections 463 or 516 of this title.
    2. A person owning or operating a motor truck as defined in subsection (a) of this section that is registered in this State and for which the fees required under section 367 of this title have been paid shall not be required to obtain the license or pay the fee as required in subsection 367(a) of this title until his or her next registration renewal and annually thereafter.
    3. [Repealed.]
    4. Upon approval of the Commissioner, one-way rental vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 26,000 pounds or less are exempt from carrying the nondiesel fuel user’s license in the motor vehicle and are exempt from displaying the identification tag, plate, or sticker on or in the motor vehicle.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 214 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 25, 1970; 1971, No. 226 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1975, No. 218 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1976; 1977, No. 12 , § 1, eff. March 14, 1977; 1981, No. 87 , § 18, eff. June 1, 1981; 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1985, No. 58 , § 10; 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. April 18, 1986; 1987, No. 109 , § 1; 1987, No. 283 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1989, No. 46 , § 1, eff. May 5, 1989; 1989, No. 51 , § 27; 1989, No. 51 , § 27a, eff. July 1, 1990; 1991, No. 137 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1993, No. 210 (Adj. Sess.), § 256a; 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 15.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 210 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Repealed.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 210 substituted “$6.50” for “$6.00” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 210 substituted “$6.50” for “$6.00” in the third sentence; and Act No. 212 substituted “for registration” for “therefor” following “fees paid” and inserted “base” preceding “registered” in the first sentence.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Rewrote the first sentence, substituted “he or she” for “the commissioner” following “information as” in the second sentence, added “or, when determined by the commissioner, 12 months from the first day of the month of issue” following “date of issue” in the fifth sentence, and made other minor changes in phraseology.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Act No. 51, § 27 substituted “$5.50” for “$50.00” following “fee of” in the third sentence and added the fourth sentence.

    Act No. 51, § 27a substituted “$6.00” for “$5.50” following “fee of” in the third sentence and substituted “1990” for “1989” following “July 1” in the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Added by Act No. 46.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “whether or not” following “highways of the state” in the first sentence and deleted the former seventh and eighth sentences.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1987. Subsec. (a): Rewrote the ninth sentence.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted former subsec. (c).

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Substituted “January 1” for “October 1” in the fifth sentence.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1981. Substituted “$40.00” for “$20.00” following “fee of” in the third sentence.

    —1977. Rewrote the section heading, and deleted “or a motor bus as defined in division (16) of section 4 of this title” following “section 420 of this title” in the first sentence and “or motor bus” preceding “to be so operated” in that sentence and following “truck” throughout the third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth sentences.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading, and inserted “or a motor bus as defined in division (16) of section 4 of this title” following “section 420 of this title” in the first sentence and “or motor bus” preceding “to be so operated” in that sentence and following “truck” throughout the third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth sentences.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$20.00” for “$10.00” following “fee of” in the third sentence and “become void on October 1 next following the date of issue” for “be valid until October 1 of the following year” following “sticker shall” in the fifth sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Added the seventh and eighth sentences.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Waiver of requirements for emergency response units, see § 3021(f) of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    Where this section imposed fees upon truck owners or operators whose trucks were not registered in Vermont, it discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, 146 Vt. 574, 508 A.2d 405, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 328 (1986).

    Fee system imposed under 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), requiring owners or operators of trucks weighing 18,000 pounds or more, whether registered in Vermont or not, to either pay a $50.00 annual fuel user’s license fee under this section and section 3007 of this title or acquire a $50.00 single trip permit or temporary authorization under section 3010 of this title, was unconstitutional and unenforceable as violative of the Commerce Clause, since Act 172 also reduced by $50.00 the registration fee owed by owners of Vermont-registered trucks weighing 18,000 pounds or more. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019, 107 S. Ct. 3262, 97 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2939 (1987).

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, 514 F. Supp. 1341, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13845 (D. Vt. 1981); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 142 Vt. 17, 451 A.2d 42, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 575 (1982); American Trucking Ass'n v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 566 A.2d 1323, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 189 (1989).

    § 415a. Repealed. 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. Dec. 1, 1982.

    History

    Former § 415a. Former § 415a, relating to single trip permits, was derived from 1971, No. 226 (Adj. Sess.), § 2 and amended by 1975, No. 218 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1977, No. 12 , § 2; 1981, No. 87 , § 18a.

    § 416. Suspension and revocation.

    The Commissioner, for cause, may deny a permit or suspend or revoke any permit issued by him or her. Hearings on any action by the Commissioner under this section may be had pursuant to the provisions of sections 105-107 of this title.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 210 , § 2.

    Revision note—

    Deleted “—” from the beginning of the section heading in light of the repeal of § 415a of this title.

    §§ 417-419. Repealed. 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 27.

    History

    Former §§ 417-419. Former § 417, relating to motor truck trip permits, was derived from 1951, No. 210 , § 3 and amended by 1961, No. 286 , § 3; 1971, No. 226 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1975, No. 218 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1977, No. 12 , § 3; 1977, No. 261 (Adj. Sess.); 1981, No. 87 , § 19 and 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    Former § 418, relating to collection of tax; regulations, was derived from 1951, No. 210 , § 4.

    Former § 419, relating to reciprocal agreements for waiver of truck permit fees, was derived from 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    Annotations From Former § 417

    Constitutionality.

    Assessment of fees.

    Audit of records.

    Annotations From Former § 417

    Constitutionality.

    This section, as amended in 1981, which imposes a trip tax on trucks which were registered in any of nine states which imposed third-tier taxes on foreign trucks, and not affecting Vermont trucks, is unconstitutional as offensive to the Commerce Clause, because the tax discriminates against out-of-state trucks on its face. American Trucking Ass'n v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 566 A.2d 1323, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 189 (1989).

    Where this section imposed fees upon truck owners or operators whose trucks were not registered in Vermont, it discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, 146 Vt. 574, 508 A.2d 405, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 328 (1986).

    Assessment of fees.

    Petitioner challenging assessment of unreported entry fees by the Department of Motor Vehicles had the burden of showing that the assessment was erroneous. In re DeCato Brothers, Inc., 149 Vt. 493, 546 A.2d 1354, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1988).

    Where petitioner’s records did not distinguish between trucks entering Vermont as tractors only, which were thus under the minimum weight to qualify as a motor truck subject to the entry fees, and those trucks comprised of a tractor and one or two trailers subject to the fees, assessment of fees for all of petitioner’s entries was not clearly erroneous. In re DeCato Brothers, Inc., 149 Vt. 493, 546 A.2d 1354, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1988).

    Audit of records.

    By granting the Department of Motor Vehicles the right to collect the fees set out in this section, the Legislature implicitly granted it the power to audit the records of those within the scope of this section. In re DeCato Brothers, Inc., 149 Vt. 493, 546 A.2d 1354, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1988).

    Where the Department of Motor Vehicles audited petitioner’s records to test compliance with this section and at the time of the audit petitioner had lost its records for 1982, the Department’s decision to use information from a prior audit, in which it had audited petitioner’s records for May 1982 and November 1982, in order to estimate the number of petitioner’s unreported entries for July through November 1982 was reasonable, even though May 1982 was outside the audit period. In re DeCato Brothers, Inc., 149 Vt. 493, 546 A.2d 1354, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1988).

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, 514 F. Supp. 1341, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13845 (D. Vt. 1981); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 142 Vt. 17, 451 A.2d 42, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 575 (1982); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986), American Trucking Ass’ns v. Conway, 152 Vt. 383, 566 A.2d 1335, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 176 (1989).

    § 420. Motor truck defined.

    As used in sections 415, 416, 420, and 421 of this title, the words “motor truck” shall include any motor vehicle having a gross weight of 18,000 pounds or over, designed and used for the transportation of merchandise or freight.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 210 , § 6.

    Revision note

    —2014. Substituted “sections 415, 416, 420, and 421” for “sections 415 and 416-421” in light of the repeal of sections 417-419 by 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 27.

    —2007. Substituted “sections 415, and 416-421” for “sections 415-421” in light of the repeal of section 415a by 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in In re DeCato Brothers, Inc., 149 Vt. 493, 546 A.2d 1354, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1988); 1950-52 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 215.

    § 421. Penalties.

    1. It shall be unlawful for any person:
      1. to operate a motor truck subject to the provisions of this chapter upon any public highway in the State without first obtaining the license and tag, plate, or marker required under section 415 of this title or to so operate without carrying the license and displaying the tag, plate, or marker if issued;
      2. [Repealed.]
      3. to fail to file any return or report required by the Commissioner; or
      4. to make a false return or fail to keep records of operations as may be required by the Commissioner.
    2. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section, upon first conviction, shall be punishable by a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 or more than $250.00; and upon a second or subsequent conviction of a violation occurring within one year after a previous conviction of any provision of subsection (a), by a fine of not less than $250.00 or more than $500.00 or by imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both.

    HISTORY: Amended 1975, No. 218 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. Oct. 1, 1976; 1977, No. 12 , § 4, eff. March 14, 1977; 1979, No. 34 , § 5, eff. Nov. 1, 1979; 1981 (Adj. Sess.), No. 172, § 8, eff. March 1, 1983; 1985, No. 58 , § 8; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 28; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 152.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 210 , § 7.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “civil penalty” for “fine”.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Deleted “, emergency telegram, or single trip license” following “license” in two places.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Repealed.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “the Commissioner; or” for “said commissioner;”.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Substituted “Commissioner” for “commissioner; or”.

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Deleted.

    —1985. Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “license, emergency telegram or single trip license and tag, plate or marker” for “permit” preceding “required under section 415 of this title” and added “or to so operate without carrying the license, emergency telegram or single trip license and displaying the tag, plate or marker if issued” thereafter.

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Inserted “marker or single trip” preceding “permit required under section 422 of this title” and added “or to so operate without displaying said marker or without the single trip permit with the vehicle” thereafter.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “chapter” for “act” preceding “upon any” in subdiv. (1), deleted “or” following “commissioner” in subdiv. (3), added “or” following “commissioner” in subdiv. (4), and added subdiv. (5).

    —1979. Subsec. (b): Inserted “of a violation occurring within one year after a previous conviction of any provision of subsection (a)” following “subsequent conviction”.

    —1977. Subdiv. (a)(1): Deleted “or motor bus” preceding “subject”.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Inserted “or motor bus” preceding “subject”.

    § 422. Repealed. 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 27.

    History

    Former § 422. Former § 422, relating to motor bus identification marker, was derived from 1981, No. 87 , § 20 and amended by 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1983, No. 44 , § 11; 1987, No. 98 , § 3; 1987, No. 157 (Adj. Sess.), § 2 and 1989, No. 51 , § 28.

    § 423. Repealed. 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 78(2).

    History

    Former § 423. Former § 423, relating to negotiating and entering into an interstate compact regarding truck license fees, was derived from 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 7a.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 142 Vt. 17, 451 A.2d 42, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 575 (1982).

    Subchapter 4. Registration of Dealers and Transporters

    History

    Revision note—

    Deleted “Repairmen” following “Dealers” in the subchapter heading in view of the repeal of §§ 481-485 of this title, which related to registration of motor vehicles used or owned by repairmen in motor vehicle repair businesses, by 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.,) § 12.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, and dealers franchising, see 9 V.S.A. chapter 108.

    Article 1. Dealers

    History

    Extensions. 2019, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 36(a) and (d) provide: “(a) Notwithstanding any provision of 23 V.S.A. § 312 , 457, 458, 3702, or 3703 to the contrary, all International Registration Plan trip permits and temporary authorizations, temporary registration certificates, and temporary number plates shall be valid for 90 days from the date of issuance.

    “(d) Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall take effect retroactively on March 20, 2020 and continue in effect until the termination of the state of emergency declared by the Governor as a result of COVID-19.”

    § 450. Definition.

    As used in this subchapter, “vehicle or motorboat” means a motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    § 450a. Dealer registration; eligibility.

    1. A person shall not be eligible to register as a dealer unless the person:
      1. Has no previous record of willful violations of dealer laws or regulations in this or any other jurisdiction.
      2. For initial and renewal applicants, has not had a conviction or been incarcerated for a conviction for extortion, forgery, fraud, larceny, or embezzlement in this or any other jurisdiction within the 10 years prior to the application.
      3. Has no unsatisfied judgments against the person arising out of violations of consumer protection laws in Vermont or any other jurisdiction.
      4. Owns real estate (as defined in 1 V.S.A. § 132 ) as his or her place of business or has a lease with an expiration date not earlier than the last day of the registration year for which registration is sought under the provisions of this subchapter, which includes a building of at least 1,200 square feet in size used primarily for the business of the dealership. The building shall have adequate facilities for the maintenance of the records required by law to be kept including those required by section 466 of this title.
    2. In addition to the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, a person shall not be eligible to register as a dealer in cars, motor trucks, motorcycles, or motor-driven cycles unless the person presents proof of compliance with the provisions of section 800 of this title at the time application for registration is made.
    3. In addition to the requirements of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, a person shall not be eligible to register as a dealer in cars or motor trucks unless the person is open for business at least 146 days during the calendar year. The applicant shall provide the Commissioner with the hours of operation of the business that the person shall maintain during the registration period at the time of the application.

    HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    § 451. Dealer’s certificate.

    1. Instead of registering each motor vehicle owned by him or her, a dealer may apply under oath to the Commissioner, upon forms prescribed and furnished by the Commissioner for that purpose, and accompanied by such additional information and certifications as the Commissioner may reasonably require, for a general distinguishing number for such motor vehicles. If the Commissioner is satisfied that the applicant meets all the requirements of section 4 and chapter 7 of this title and is qualified to engage in such business, the Commissioner may issue to the applicant a certificate of registration containing the name, place of residence, and address of such applicant, the general distinguishing number assigned, and such additional information as the Commissioner may determine. If a dealer has a place of business or agency in more than one city or town, he or she shall file an application and secure a certificate of registration for each place of business or agency. The place of business or agency shall mean a place in any town where motor vehicles owned by a dealer are regularly kept or exposed for sale in the custody or control of the dealer or a salesman, employee, or agent of such dealer. In his or her discretion, the Commissioner may assign the same distinguishing number with more than one certificate to any dealer who has separate places of business within the same or an adjacent city or town within Vermont. The Commissioner may allow a dealer having one distinguishing number with more than one certificate to maintain only one central area for the maintenance of records required by law to be kept, including those required by section 466 of this title and for the transfer of motor vehicles. This location must be in Vermont and must be disclosed on the application prior to approval and may be changed only with the approval of the Commissioner or his or her agent. Dealer registration plates shall contain letters indicating the type of dealer certificate issued before the distinguishing number.
    2. With the prior approval of the Commissioner, a Vermont dealer may display vehicles on a temporary basis, but in no instance for more than 14 consecutive days, at a fair, show, exhibition, or other off-site location. New vehicles may only be displayed off-site within the manufacturer’s stated area of responsibility in the franchise agreement. No sales may be transacted at these off-site locations. A dealer desiring to display vehicles temporarily at an off-site location shall notify the Commissioner in a manner prescribed by the Commissioner no less than two days prior to the first day for which approval is requested.
    3. A dealer in new or used motor vehicles may temporarily transfer possession of a vehicle owned by the dealer on consignment to a registered auction dealer or Vermont licensed auctioneer to be sold at public or private wholesale auction by the auction dealer or Vermont licensed auctioneer.
    4. The issuance of snowmobile, motorboat, and all-terrain vehicle dealer registrations are governed by this chapter and sections 3204, 3305, and 3504 of this title, respectively.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 204 , § 2; 1995, No. 19 , § 11, eff. April 17, 1995; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. April 22, 1996; 1999, No. 31 , § 3; 2013, No. 57 , § 8; 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,110. P.L. § 5060. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 50. G.L. § 4678. 1917, No. 132 , §§ 4, 9. 1917, No. 254 , § 4578. 1915, No. 135 , §§ 1, 5. 1912, No. 151 . 1910, No. 132 . 1908, No. 99 , § 5. P.S. § 4081. 1906, No. 113 , § 5. 1904, No. 86 , § 2.

    Revision note

    —2013. In subsec. (a), in the fifth sentence, deleted “, but not limited to” following “including” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —2013. Subsec. (b): Substituted “14 days” for “10 days” in the first sentence.

    —1999. Section amended generally.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Inserted “new or used car” preceding “dealer” and substituted “manufacturer’s stated area of responsibility in the franchise agreement, or in the event there is no manufacturer’s stated area of responsibility, within 25 air miles of the exact location” for “county of the location” preceding “of the dealership” in the first sentence.

    —1995. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), added “within the same or an adjacent city or town within Vermont” following “business” in the fifth sentence, rewrote the sixth sentence, and deleted the former seventh sentence; and added subsec. (b).

    —1965. Section amended generally.

    § 452. Expiration.

    Unless otherwise specifically provided or unless canceled, revoked, or suspended, dealers’ registrations and certificates shall become void one year from the first day of the month of issue. The Commissioner may renew dealer registrations for two years and may stagger expiration dates.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 70 , § 5; 1999, No. 31 , § 4.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,111. 1935, No. 123 , § 12. P.L. § 5061. 1925, No. 70 , § 50. G.L. § 4678. 1917, No. 132 , §§ 4, 9. 1917, No. 254 , § 4578. 1915, No. 135 , §§ 1, 5. 1912, No. 151 . 1910, No. 132 . 1908, No. 99 , § 5. P.S. § 4081. 1906, No. 113 , § 5. 1904, No. 86 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —1999. Section amended generally.

    —1965. Substituted “the last day of February” for “March 1” following “expire on”.

    § 453. Fees and number plates.

      1. An application for registration as a dealer in new or used cars or motor trucks shall be accompanied by a fee of $503.00 for each certificate issued in such dealer’s name. The Commissioner shall furnish free of charge with each dealer’s registration certificate three number plates showing the distinguishing number assigned such dealer. The Commissioner may furnish additional plates according to the volume of the dealer’s sales in the prior year or, in the case of an initial registration, according to the dealer’s reasonable estimate of expected sales, as follows: (a) (1) An application for registration as a dealer in new or used cars or motor trucks shall be accompanied by a fee of $503.00 for each certificate issued in such dealer’s name. The Commissioner shall furnish free of charge with each dealer’s registration certificate three number plates showing the distinguishing number assigned such dealer. The Commissioner may furnish additional plates according to the volume of the dealer’s sales in the prior year or, in the case of an initial registration, according to the dealer’s reasonable estimate of expected sales, as follows:
        1. under 20 sales: 0 additional plates;
        2. 20-49 sales: 1 additional plate;
        3. 50-99 sales: up to 5 additional plates;
        4. 100-249 sales: up to 12 additional plates;
        5. 250-499 sales: up to 17 additional plates;
        6. 500-749 sales: up to 27 additional plates;
        7. 750-999 sales: up to 37 additional plates;
        8. 1,000-1,499 sales: up to 47 additional plates;
        9. 1,500 or more: up to 57 additional plates.
      2. If the issuance of additional plates is authorized under subdivision (1) of this subsection, up to two plates shall be provided free of charge, and the Commissioner shall collect $55.00 for each additional plate thereafter.
    1. Application by a “dealer in farm tractors or other self-propelled farm implements,” which shall mean a person actively engaged in the business of selling or exchanging new or used farm tractors or other self-propelled farm implements, for such dealer registration shall annually be accompanied by a fee of $78.00. The Commissioner shall furnish free of charge with each such dealer registration certificate two sets of number plates showing the distinguishing number assigned such dealer and in his or her discretion may furnish further sets of plates at a fee of $12.00 per set; such number plates may, however, be displayed only upon a farm tractor or other self-propelled farm implement.
    2. Application by a “dealer in motorized highway building equipment and road making appliances,” which shall mean a person actively engaged in the business of selling or exchanging new or used motorized highway building equipment or road making appliances, for such dealer registration shall annually be accompanied by a fee of $123.00. The Commissioner shall furnish free of charge with each such dealer registration certificate two sets of number plates showing the distinguishing number assigned such dealer and in his or her discretion may furnish further sets of plates at a fee of $30.00 per set; such number plates may, however, be displayed only upon motorized highway building equipment or road making appliances.
    3. If a dealer is engaged only in the business of selling or exchanging motorcycles or motor-driven cycles, the registration fee shall be $62.00, which shall include three number plates. The Commissioner may, in his or her discretion, furnish further sets of plates at a fee of $10.00 for each set.
    4. If a dealer is engaged only in the business of selling or exchanging trailers, semi-trailers, or trailer coaches, the registration fee shall be $123.00, which shall include three number plates; such number plates may, however, be displayed only upon a trailer, semi-trailer, or trailer coach. The Commissioner may, in his or her discretion, furnish further plates at a fee of $10.00 for each such plate.
    5. In any year that number plates are reused and validation stickers are issued, the Commissioner shall not be required to issue new number plates to persons renewing registrations under this section.
    6. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall not issue a dealer’s certificate of registration to a dealer in new or used motor vehicles, unless the dealer has provided the Commissioner with a surety bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit issued by an entity authorized to transact business in the same state. The amount of such surety bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit shall be between $20,000.00 and $35,000.00, based on the number of new or used units sold in the previous year; such schedule is to be determined by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. In the case of a certificate of deposit, it shall be issued in the name of the dealer and assigned to the Commissioner or his or her designee. The bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit shall serve as indemnification for any monetary loss suffered by the State or by a purchaser of a motor vehicle by reason of the dealer’s failure to remit to the Commissioner any fees collected by the dealer under the provisions of chapters 7 and 21 of this title or by a dealer’s failure to remit to the Commissioner any tax collected by the dealer under 32 V.S.A. chapter 219. This State or the motor vehicle owner who suffers such loss or damage shall have the right to claim against the surety upon the bond or against the letter of credit or certificate of deposit. The bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit shall remain in effect for the pending registration year and one year thereafter. The liability of any such surety or claim against the letter of credit or certificate of deposit shall be limited to the amount of the fees or tax collected by the dealer under chapters 7 and 21 of this title or 32 V.S.A. chapter 219 and not remitted to the Commissioner.
    7. Applications by a snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle dealer shall be accompanied by the fees prescribed in sections 3204, 3305, and 3504 of this title, respectively.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 286 , § 4; 1967, No. 129 , § 6; 1977, No. 81 , § 3, eff. April 27, 1977; 1981, No. 87 , § 16; 1987, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1989, No. 51 , § 29; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 16, eff. May 15, 2002; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19c, eff. Sept. 1, 2010; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 29; 2015, No. 50 , § 2; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 26.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 226 , § 1. 1951, No. 213 , §§ 1, 7(a), (b). 1949, No. 236 , § 3. V.S. 1947, §§ 10,112, 10,113. P.L. §§ 5062, 5063. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 51. G.L. § 4678. 1917, No. 132 , §§ 4, 9. 1917, No. 254 , § 4578. 1915, No. 135 , §§ 1, 5. 1912, No. 151 . 1910, No. 132 . 1908, No. 99 , § 5. P.S. § 4081. 1906, No. 113 , § 5. 1904, No. 86 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “$503.00” for “$370.00” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “$55.00” for “$40.00”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$78.00” for “$40.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$123.00” for “$90.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “$62.00” for “$45.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Substituted “$123.00” for “$90.00” in the first sentence.

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(1): In the first sentence, deleted “dealer’s” preceding “registration” and inserted “as a dealer in new or used cars or motor trucks” thereafter.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “manufacturing, buying” preceding “selling” and substituted “used” for “secondhand” preceding “farm tractors” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted “manufacturing, buying” preceding “selling” and substituted “used” for “secondhand” preceding “motorized highway” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “business of” for “manufacturing, buying” preceding “selling” and deleted “sets of” preceding “number plates” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Substituted “business of” for “manufacturing, buying” preceding “selling” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (g): In the first sentence, deleted “new or used car” preceding “dealer” and inserted “in new or used motor vehicles” thereafter.

    Subsec. (h): Added.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (d): Substituted “motor-driven cycles” for “mopeds” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (g): Substituted “between $20,000.00 and $35,000.00” for “between $5,000.00 and $15,000.00”, and inserted “is” preceding “to be determined” in the second sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “$370.00” for “$270.00” in the first sentence and “$40.00” for “$30.00” at the end of the third sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$90.00” for “$65.00” in the first sentence and “$30.00” for “$20.00” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “$45.00” for “$32.00” in the first sentence and “$10.00” for “$7.00” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Substituted “$90.00” for “$65.00” in the first sentence and “$10.00” for “$7.00” in the second sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$270.00” for “$236.25” following “fee of” in the first sentence and inserted “or her” preceding “discretion, he”, inserted “or she” thereafter and substituted “$30.00” for “$24.75” following “fee of” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$40.00” for “$33.75” at the end of the first sentence and inserted “or her” preceding “discretion” and substituted “$12.00” for “$11.25” following “fee of” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$65.00” for “$56.25” at the end of the first sentence, and inserted “or her” preceding “discretion” and substituted “$20.00” for “$16.90” following “fee of” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “$32.00” for “$28.15” following “fee shall be” in the first sentence and inserted “or her” preceding “discretion” and substituted “$7.00” for “$5.65” following “fee of” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Substituted “$65.00” for “$56.25” following “fee shall be” in the first sentence and inserted “or her” preceding “discretion” and substituted “$7.00” for “$5.65” following “fee of” in the second sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (g): Added.

    —1981. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$236.25” for “$210.00” preceding “for each” in the first sentence and “$24.75” for “$22.00” preceding “per set” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$33.75” for “$30.00” following “fee of” in the first sentence and “$11.25” for “$10.00” preceding “per set” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$56.25” for “$50.00” following “fee of” in the first sentence and “$16.90” for “$15.00” preceding “per set” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “$28.15” for “$25.00” following “fee shall be” in the first sentence and “$5.65” for “$5.00” following “fee of” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Substituted “$56.25” for “$50.00” following “fee shall be” in the first sentence and “$5.65” for “$5.00” following “fee of” in the second sentence.

    —1977. Subsec. (d): Inserted “or mo-peds” following “motorcycles” in the first sentence and deleted “such” following “each” in the second sentence.

    —1967. Subsec. (f): Added.

    —1961. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$210.00” for “$200.00” preceding “for each” in the first sentence and “$22.00” for “$20.00” preceding “per set” in the third sentence.

    § 454. Dealer’s use of vehicles or motorboats.

    1. A motor vehicle owned by a dealer may be operated, while so owned, under the distinguishing number assigned to him or her as provided in this subchapter, for the following purposes and uses:
      1. For the purpose of testing or adjusting the vehicle in the immediate vicinity of his or her place of business.
      2. For some purpose directly connected with the dealer business, purchasing, selling, or exchanging motor vehicles by the dealer. The words “directly connected” for the purposes of this subdivision shall not be construed to include towing service unless the disabled vehicle is being towed to or from the dealer’s place of business for repair purposes, nor shall it include the transport of crushed vehicles unless all of the vehicles being so transported are properly recorded in the records of the dealer as required by section 466 of this title.
      3. For a demonstration when the prospective purchaser is operating the vehicle, and then only for a period not to exceed three days.
      4. For the temporary accommodation of a customer of the dealer when a motor vehicle properly registered under the law of the state of residence of the customer, because of crash or wear, is disabled and is left with the dealer for repairs and then only for a period not exceeding seven days.
      5. For the private pleasure use of the dealer and members of his or her immediate family residing in the same household.
      6. For the use of the vehicles at funerals or in public parades when no charge or rental is made for the use.
    2. The word “dealer” for the purposes of subdivision (a)(5) of this section shall include such of the principal officers of a corporation registered as dealer and such of the partners in a co-partnership registered as dealer as are actively and principally engaged in the motor vehicle business and in any event shall include only those persons listed on the application for a registered dealer submitted to the Department, but shall not include directors and stockholders nor inactive and silent partners.
    3. A snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle dealer may only use a dealer’s number plate or dealer registration number in accordance with sections 3204, 3305, and 3504 of this title, respectively.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 204 , § 9; 1975, No. 218 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 7a, 7b, eff. April 1, 1976; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. April 22, 1996; 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 213 , §§ 2, 3. V.S. 1947, §§ 10,114, 10,116. P.L. §§ 5064, 5066. 1925, No. 70 , §§ 52, 53.

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” preceding “or wear” in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23

    Amendments

    —2015. Section heading: Deleted “motor” preceding “vehicles” and added “or motorboats” thereafter.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Added the second sentence in subdiv. (2), deleted “and is not accompanied by the dealer or his employee” following “vehicle” in subdiv. (3), inserted “residence of” preceding “the customer” in subdiv. (4), deleted “or business” following “pleasure” in subdiv. (5), and made other minor changes in phraseology throughout the subsec.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “and in any event shall include only those persons listed on the application for a registered dealer submitted to the department” following “business”.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(5): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (a)(6): Added.

    —1965. Subdiv. (a)(4): Substituted “a” for “the” preceding “motor vehicle”, inserted “properly registered under the law of this state” thereafter, and substituted “seven” for “three” preceding “days”.

    Notes to Opinions

    Immediate family.

    Term “immediate family” means household of dealer and those bearing relation to him of dependents for support and excludes any member of family who has become separated from group. 1942-44 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 182 (Decided under P.L. § 5065.).

    § 455. Use by others than dealer.

    A person, other than a dealer, shall not operate a motor vehicle under the provisions of section 454 of this title unless such person carries a written authority so to do signed by the dealer whose motor vehicle such person is operating.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 213 , § 4. V.S. 1947, § 10,118. P.L. § 5068. 1925, No. 70 , § 53.

    § 456. Employees’ use of vehicles, motorboats restricted.

    Employees of a dealer shall not operate, and a dealer shall not permit them to operate, vehicles or motorboats with dealer’s registration number plates or registration numbers displayed thereon, except for business purposes of the dealer, or in traveling directly between their homes and the place of their employer’s business.

    HISTORY: Amended 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. April 22, 1996; 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 213 , § 5. V.S. 1947, § 10,120. P.L. § 5070. 1933, No. 157 , § 4769. 1925, No. 70 , § 54.

    Revision note—

    For purposes of clarity, deleted “are using such vehicle” preceding “in traveling”.

    Amendments

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Added “motorboats, snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles” following “motor vehicles”.

    § 457. Temporary plates.

    At the time of the issuance of a registration certificate to a dealer as provided in this chapter, the Commissioner shall furnish the dealer with a sufficient number of number plates and temporary validation stickers, temporary number plates, or temporary decals for use during the 60-day period immediately following sale of a vehicle or motorboat by the dealer. The plates and decals shall have the same general design as the plates or decals furnished individual owners, but the plates and decals may be of a material and color as the Commissioner may determine. The Commissioner shall collect a fee of $5.00 for each temporary plate issued.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 356 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1969, No. 276 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1975, No. 68 , § 2, eff. April 18, 1975; 1985, No. 30 , § 1; 1989, No. 51 , § 30; 1997, No. 39 , § 3; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. May 15, 2002; 2015, No. 47 , § 11; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 27.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 213 , § 6. V.S. 1947, § 10,122. P.L. § 5072. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 56. G.L. § 4680. 1917, No. 254 , § 4580. 1915, No. 135 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$5.00” for “$3.00” in the last sentence.

    —2015. Added “temporary” preceding “decals for use” near the middle of the first sentence, substituted “vehicle or motorboat” for “motor vehicle” preceding “by the dealer” near the end of the first sentence, deleted “as hereafter provided in” at the end of the first sentence, added “The plates and decals shall have the same” preceding “general design” at the beginning of the second sentence, and substituted “as the plates” for “the same as the number plates” preceding “or decals furnished individual owners” near the middle of the second sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$3.00” for “$2.00” in the second sentence.

    —1997. Inserted “number plates and temporary validation stickers” following “sufficient number of”, “or decals” preceding “for use during” and “furnished”, substituted “60-day” for “thirty-day”, and inserted “and decals” following “but the plates” in the first sentence.

    —1989. Substituted “$2.00” for “one dollar” following “fee of” in the second sentence.

    —1985. Substituted “the” for “such” preceding “plates may be of” in the first sentence and “a” for “such” thereafter and “one dollar” for “twenty-five cents” preceding “for each temporary plate” in the second sentence and deleted “so” thereafter.

    —1975. Substituted “thirty-day” for “fifteen-day” preceding “period immediately” in the first sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “twenty-five cents” for “ten cents” following “fee of” in the second sentence.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading and the first sentence of the section.

    § 458. Temporary plate on sold or exchanged vehicles.

    On the day of the sale or exchange of a motor vehicle, motorboat, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle to be registered in this State, a dealer may issue to the purchaser, for attachment to the motor vehicle, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, or to be carried in or on the motorboat, a number plate with temporary validation stickers, a temporary number plate, or a temporary decal, provided that the purchaser deposits with such dealer, for transmission to the Commissioner, a properly executed application for the registration of such motor vehicle, motorboat, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle and the required fee. If a properly licensed purchaser either attaches to the motor vehicle, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle or carries in the motorboat such number plate or decal, he or she may operate the same for a period not to exceed 60 consecutive days immediately following the purchase. An individual shall not operate a motor vehicle, motorboat, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle with a number plate with temporary validation stickers, a temporary number plate, or a temporary decal attached to the motor vehicle or carried in the motorboat except as provided in this section.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 356 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1975, No. 68 , § 3, eff. April 18, 1975; 1997, No. 39 , § 4; 2015, No. 47 , § 12; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 153.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 94 . V.S. 1947, § 10,123. 1937, No. 123 , § 1. P.L. § 5073. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 56. G.L. § 4680. 1917, No. 254 , § 4580. 1915, No. 135 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). In the first sentence, deleted “which is” following “all-terrain vehicle”; and in the last sentence, substituted “An individual” for “A person” and “to the motor vehicle” for “thereto” and inserted “in the motorboat” following “or carried”.

    —2015. Inserted “a” preceding “temporary number plate” and “a temporary” preceding “decal” in the first sentence, rewrote the second sentence, and inserted “a” preceding “temporary number plate” and “a temporary” preceding “decal attached” in the last sentence.

    —1997. Section amended generally.

    —1975. Substituted “30” for “fifteen” preceding “consecutive” in the second sentence.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “set of” preceding “temporary number” in the first sentence, substituted “fifteen” for “ten” preceding “consecutive” in the second sentence, inserted “a” preceding “temporary number” in the third sentence, and substituted “plate” for “plates” in the section heading and throughout the text of the section.

    § 459. Notice, application, and fees to Commissioner.

    1. Upon issuing a number plate with temporary validation stickers, a temporary number plate, or a temporary decal to a purchaser, a dealer shall have 15 calendar days, or up to 30 calendar days as applicable pursuant to subsection 2015(b) of this title, to forward to the Commissioner the application and fee, deposited with him or her by the purchaser, together with notice of such issue and such other information as the Commissioner may require.
    2. If a number plate with temporary validation stickers, a temporary registration plate, or a temporary decal is not issued by a dealer in connection with the sale or exchange of a vehicle or motorboat, the dealer may accept from the purchaser a properly executed registration, tax, and title application and the required fees for transmission to the Commissioner. The dealer shall have 15 calendar days, or up to 30 calendar days as applicable pursuant to subsection 2015(b) of this title, to forward to the Commissioner the application and fee together with such other information as the Commissioner may require.

    HISTORY: Amended 1987, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1999, No. 31 , § 5; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2015, No. 47 , § 13; 2019, No. 60 , § 21.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,124. 1937, No. 123 , § 2. P.L. § 5074. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 56. G.L. § 4680. 1917, No. 254 , § 4580. 1915, No. 135 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —2019. Subsecs. (a) and (b): Substituted “shall have” for “shall, within” preceding “15 calendar days” and inserted “or up to 30 calendar days as applicable pursuant to subsection 2015(b) of this title, to” preceding “forward to the Commissioner”.

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Substituted “a temporary number plate, or a temporary decal” for “temporary number plate, or decal” preceding “to a purchaser” near the beginning of the sentence and deleted “for attachment to a motor vehicle” preceding “, a dealer shall” near the middle of the sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “a temporary registration plate, or a temporary decal” for “temporary registration plate, or decal” preceding “is not issued by a dealer” near the beginning of the first sentence and substituted “exchange of a vehicle or motorboat” for “exchange of a motor vehicle” following “with the sale or” near the middle of the first sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “15 calendar days” for “three business days” in subsecs. (a) and (b).

    —1999. Subsec. (a): Substituted “number plate with temporary validation stickers” for “set of” preceding “, temporary number” and “plate or decal” for “plates” thereafter and “within three business days” for “immediately” following “dealer shall”.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “number plate with temporary validation stickers” preceding “, temporary registration plate” and “or decal” thereafter in the first sentence and substituted “within three business days” for “immediately” in the second sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.) Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), inserted “or her” following “deposited with him” in that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    § 460. Dealer’s use of temporary plates restricted.

    A dealer shall not use, attach, or issue temporary number plates except as provided in sections 458, 459, and 463 of this title.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,125. P.L. § 5075. 1925, No. 70 , § 56. G.L. § 4680. 1917, No. 254 , § 4580. 1915, No. 135 , § 3.

    § 461. Destruction of temporary plates.

    Unless otherwise directed by the Commissioner, at the expiration of the period of 60 days, the purchaser shall destroy the temporary number plates.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 356 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1975, No. 68 , § 4, eff. April 18, 1975; 1997, No. 39 , § 5.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,126. P.L. § 5076. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 56. G.L. § 4680. 1917, No. 254 , § 4580. 1915, No. 135 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —1997. Substituted “60” for “30” preceding “days”.

    —1975. Substituted “30” for “fifteen” preceding “days”.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “fifteen” for “ten” preceding “days”.

    § 462. Cancellation, revocation, or suspension of dealer’s registration.

    1. The Commissioner may cancel, revoke, or suspend the registration of a dealer under the provisions of this chapter or section 3204, 3305, or 3504 of this title whenever, after the dealer has been afforded the opportunity of a hearing before the Commissioner or upon conviction in any court in any jurisdiction, it appears that the dealer has willfully violated any vehicle or motorboat law of this State or any lawful regulation of the Commissioner applying to dealers, or when it appears that the dealer has engaged in fraudulent or unlawful practices related to the purchase, sale, or exchange of vehicles or motorboats. A dealer whose registration has been canceled, revoked, or suspended shall forthwith return to the Commissioner the registration certificate and any and all number plates or numbers or decals furnished him or her by the Commissioner, and the privilege to operate, purchase, sell, or exchange vehicles or motorboats under his or her dealer’s number shall cease. An application for a new dealer’s registration for that dealer will not be considered until a revocation period has been served.
    2. A fee of $30.00 shall be paid to the Commissioner prior to the reinstatement of any dealer’s registration that has been suspended for cause.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 204 , § 4; 1987, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1997, No. 59 , § 74, eff. June 30, 1997; 1999, No. 31 , § 6; 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,127. P.L. § 5077. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 57. G.L. § 4681. 1915, No. 135 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —1999. Subsec. (a): Substituted “any jurisdiction” for “this state” following “in any court in”, “willfully” for “wilfully” preceding “violated”, and “related to” for “in” following “unlawful practices” in the first sentence; substituted “any and all” for “the” preceding “number plates” and inserted “, or numbers or decals” thereafter, substituted “privilege” for “right” preceding “to operate”, and inserted “, purchase, sell or exchange” thereafter in the second sentence; and added the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “canceled” for “cancelled” following “registration certificate”.

    —1997. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “the dealer has been afforded the opportunity of a” preceding “hearing before the commissioner” in the first sentence and “or her” following “furnished him” and preceding “dealer’s number” in the second sentence.

    —1965. Inserted “revoke or suspend” following “cancel” and made other minor changes in punctuation in the first sentence.

    § 463. Sale of vehicle to go out of State.

    A registered motor vehicle dealer is authorized to issue an in-transit registration permit for the purpose of movement over the highways of certain motor vehicles otherwise required to be registered when these vehicles are sold in this State to be transported to and registered in another state or province. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall, upon request, provide registered motor vehicle dealers with such numbers of applications and special in-transit number plates for vehicles sold in this State to be transported to and registered in another state or province as shall be necessary. The Commissioner is authorized to charge a fee of $6.00 for the processing of the plate application and the issuance of the plate. The dealer, upon the sale of a motor vehicle to be transported to and registered in another state or province, shall cause the application to be filled out and transmitted to the Commissioner and shall attach to the vehicle the in-transit number plate corresponding to the application. No registered motor vehicle dealer shall sell, exchange, give, or transfer any application or in-transit plate to any person other than the person to whom the dealer sells or exchanges a motor vehicle to be registered in another state or province. The application shall be in a form prescribed and furnished by the Commissioner. The special in-transit number plate to be attached to the vehicle will be issued in the form and design as prescribed by the Commissioner and shall be valid for a period of 30 days from the date of issue.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 356 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1975, No. 68 , § 5, eff. April 18, 1975; 1977, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1979, No. 30 , § 1, eff. April 17, 1979; 1985, No. 30 , § 2; 1989, No. 51 , § 31; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. May 15, 2002; 2003, No. 35 , § 1; 2009, No. 50 , § 45; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 28.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,128. P.L. § 5078. 1929, No. 63 , § 3. 1925, No. 70 , § 58.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$6.00” for “$5.00” following “charge a fee of” in the third sentence.

    —2009. Substituted “$5.00” for “$3.00” following “charge a fee of” in the third sentence.

    —2003. Substituted “30” for “ten” in the last sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$3.00” for “$2.00” following “charge a fee of” in the third sentence.

    —1989. Substituted “$2.00” for “one dollar” following “charge a fee of” in the third sentence.

    —1985. Substituted “these” for “such” preceding “vehicles are sold” in the first sentence, “one dollar” for “twenty-five cents” following “charge a fee of” in the third sentence, and “the” for “such” preceding “vehicle” in the seventh sentence.

    —1979. Section amended generally.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1975. Substituted “ten” for “fifteen” preceding “consecutive”.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “a nonresident to be registered in another state or province” for “go out of the state” preceding “the dealer shall” and “fifteen” for “ten” preceding “consecutive”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    In-transit registration permit fees, see §§ 516-518 of this title.

    § 464. Return of number plates by dealer.

    If a dealer comes into possession of a motor vehicle the registration of which has expired by reason of the provisions of section 321 of this title, and that has number plates attached, he or she shall immediately return such number plates to the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 154.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,129. P.L. § 5079. 1929, No. 63 , § 3. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 58.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “that” for “which” and deleted “thereto” following “attached”.

    § 465. Loaning of plates, vehicles, or motorboats prohibited.

    A dealer shall not lend or lease registration certificates, validation stickers, numbers, decals, or number plates that have been assigned to him or her under the provisions of this chapter, nor shall he or she lend or lease a vehicle or motorboat to which his or her dealer’s decals, numbers, or number plates have been attached, nor lend or lease his or her dealer’s decals, numbers, or number plates to a subagent.

    HISTORY: Amended 1999, No. 31 , § 7; 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,131. P.L. § 5081. 1925, No. 70 , § 60. G.L. § 4678. 1917, No. 132 , §§ 4, 9. 1917, No. 254 , § 4578. 1915, No. 135 , §§ 1, 5. 1912, No. 151 . 1910, No. 132 . 1908, No. 99 , § 5. P.S. § 4081. 1906, No. 113 , § 5. 1904, No. 86 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —2015. Inserted “or motorboats” following “vehicles” in the section heading, deleted “or” preceding “decals” and “motor” preceding “vehicle”, and inserted “or motorboat” preceding “to which his or her”.

    —1999. Inserted “or lease registration certificates, validation stickers, numbers, or decals or” preceding “number plates”, “or lease” following “loan” and “decals, numbers or” following “dealer’s” in two places and made gender neutral changes throughout the section.

    § 466. Records; custodian.

    1. On a form prescribed or approved by the Commissioner, every licensed dealer shall maintain and retain for six years a record containing the following information, which shall be open to inspection by any law enforcement officer or motor vehicle inspector or other agent of the Commissioner during reasonable business hours:
      1. Every vehicle or motorboat that is bought, sold, or exchanged by the licensee or received or accepted by the licensee for sale or exchange.
      2. Every vehicle or motorboat that is bought or otherwise acquired and dismantled by the licensee.
      3. The name and address of the person from whom such vehicle or motorboat was purchased or acquired, the date thereof, the name and address of the person to whom any such vehicle or motorboat was sold or otherwise disposed of and the date thereof, and a sufficient description of every such vehicle or motorboat by name and identifying numbers thereon to identify the same.
      4. [Repealed.]
    2. Every licensed dealer shall designate a custodian of documents who shall have primary responsibility for administration of documents required to be maintained under this title. In the absence of the designated custodian, the dealer shall have an ongoing duty to make such records available for inspection by any law enforcement officer or motor vehicle inspector or other agent of the Commissioner during reasonable business hours.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 1999, No. 31 , § 8; 2005, No. 143 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2011, No. 46 , § 1; 2015, No. 50 , § 2; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. May 30, 2018.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,132. 1939, No. 114 .

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivs. (a)(1), (a)(2): Substituted “that” for “which” following “motorboat”.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Repealed.

    —2015. Substituted “vehicle or motorboat” for “motor vehicle” throughout the section and “as used in” for “for purposes of” in the second sentence of subdiv. (a)(4).

    —2011. Added “custodian” following “Records” in the section heading; added the subsec. (a) designation; substituted “ 9 V.S.A. § 2451a(a) ” for “subsection 2451a(a) of Title 9” and “ 9 V.S.A. § 2351(6) ” for “subdivision 2351(6) of Title 9” in subdiv. (a)(4); and added subsec. (b).

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Made a minor change in punctuation in subdiv. (3) and added subdiv. (4).

    —1999. Inserted “or approved” following “prescribed”, deleted “motor vehicle” preceding “dealer shall maintain” and inserted “and retain for six years” thereafter, substituted “law enforcement” for “peace” preceding “officer”, and inserted “or other agent of the commissioner” following “inspector” in the introductory paragraph.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “and repairmen” following “dealer” in the introductory paragraph.

    § 467. Dealer duty to report sales, return expired plates.

    On a form prescribed by the Commissioner, a dealer shall send the reports of sale to the Commissioner upon the sale and relative to his or her sale or exchange of new or used vehicles or motorboats, and return to the Commissioner number plates coming into his or her possession through the sale or exchange of a motor vehicle, the registration of which has expired under the provisions of section 321 of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1999, No. 31 , § 9; 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,325. 1947, No. 202 , § 5489. P.L. § 5187. 1929, No. 63 , § 6. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 108.

    Amendments

    —2015. Rewrote the section heading and substituted “new or used vehicles or motorboats” for “new or secondhand motor vehicles” following “exchange of”.

    —1999. Substituted “On a form prescribed by the commissioner, a” for “A” in the beginning of the section, substituted “shall” for “who fails to” following “dealer”, inserted “of sale” following “reports”, substituted “upon the sale and” for “of motor vehicles required by this title” preceding “relative”, deleted “or who fails to” following “secondhand motor vehicles”, substituted “the” for “such” preceding “commissioner number plates”, deleted “shall be fined not more than $25.00” following “321 of this title”, and inserted “or her” after “his” in two instances.

    § 468. General prohibition.

    A dealer shall not operate a vehicle or motorboat nor permit the same to be operated under dealer’s registration numbers, except as specifically permitted in this chapter or under section 3204, 3305, or 3504 of this title. No charge shall be made for any permitted use.

    HISTORY: Amended 1999, No. 31 , § 10; 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,138. P.L. § 5087. 1925, No. 70 , § 63.

    Amendments

    —2015. Substituted “a vehicle or motorboat” for “a motor vehicle” following “not operate”, and added “or under section 3204, 3305, or 3504 of this title” in the first sentence.

    —1999. Added the second sentence.

    §§ 469-471. Repealed. 1995, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    History

    Former §§ 469-471. Former § 469 relating to the advisory registration board, was derived from 1965, No. 204 , § 3 and amended by 1977, No. 81 , § 6.

    Former § 470, relating to a review before the advisory registration board, was derived from 1965, No. 204 , § 5.

    Former § 471, relating to the advisory opinion, was derived from 1965, No. 204 , § 6 and amended by 1987, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    § 472. Evidence of authorization.

    The Commissioner shall issue suitable documents of authorization of dealership that shall be displayed at the dealer’s place of business.

    HISTORY: Added 1965, No. 204 , § 8.

    § 473. When registration is allowed, required; penalties.

    1. A person shall not engage in the business of selling or exchanging vehicles or motorboats, as defined in subdivision 4(8) of this title, without a dealer registration and obtaining dealer plates or motorboat registrations in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter and, if applicable, section 3204, 3305, or 3504 of this title. A person may register as a dealer only if he or she is engaged in the business of selling or exchanging vehicles or motorboats as defined in subdivision 4(8) of this title or, in the case of an initial registration, if the person’s reasonable estimate of expected sales or exchanges satisfies the minimum thresholds under subdivision 4(8) of this title. A person who violates this section shall be subject to the penalties established pursuant to section 475 of this title.
    2. A person who misrepresents himself or herself as a dealer in the purchase, sale, or exchange of a vehicle or motorboat without registering as a dealer, or after the cancellation, suspension, or revocation of the dealer’s registration, or who makes misrepresentations to the Department in order to qualify for registration, shall be subject to the penalties established pursuant to section 475 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1965, No. 204 , § 7; 1985, No. 12 , § 2; amended 1987, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1989, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1999, No. 31 , § 11; 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —1999. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and rewrote the first through third sentences of that subsec. and added subsec. (b).

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Added the fourth sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “12” for “six” preceding “pleasure cars” in the third sentence.

    —1985. Substituted “pleasure cars or motor trucks” for “vehicles” following “six” in the third sentence.

    § 474. Repealed. 1979, No. 30, § 3, eff. April 17, 1979.

    History

    Former § 474. Former § 474, relating to in-transit motor vehicle registration and number plates, was derived from 1977, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    The subject matter is now covered by § 463 of this title.

    § 475. Administrative penalties.

    1. The Commissioner may impose an administrative penalty of not more than $500.00 for each violation against a dealer or a transporter who violates the provisions of this subchapter.
    2. Each violation is a separate and distinct offense, and, in the case of a continuing violation, each day’s continuance may be deemed a separate and distinct offense. In no event shall the maximum amount imposed for a continuing offense exceed $1,000.00.
    3. The Commissioner shall adopt rules establishing a schedule of administrative penalties to be imposed under this section. Penalties shall be based on the severity and frequency of the violation.
    4. The alleged violator shall be given notice and opportunity for a hearing. Service of the notice shall be sufficient if sent by first-class mail to the address stated on the dealer’s certificate of registration. The notice shall include the following:
      1. a factual description of the alleged violation;
      2. a reference to the particular statute allegedly violated;
      3. the amount of the proposed administrative penalty; and
      4. a warning that the person will be deemed to have waived his or her right to a hearing, that the penalty will be imposed if no hearing is requested within 15 days from date of notice, and that failure to pay a penalty may result in suspension of his or her license.
    5. A person who receives notice under subsection (d) of this section shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing unless, within 15 days from the date of the notice, the person requests a hearing in writing. If the person waives the right to a hearing, the Commissioner shall issue a final order finding the person in default and imposing the penalty.
    6. The provisions of sections 105, 106, and 107 of this title shall apply to hearings conducted under this section.
    7. The Commissioner may collect an unpaid administrative penalty by filing a civil action in Superior Court or through any other means available to State agencies.
    8. If a penalty is not paid within 60 days after it is imposed, the Commissioner may suspend any license, certificate, registration, or permit issued under this subchapter.
    9. The remedies authorized by this section shall be in addition to any other civil or criminal remedies provided by law for violation of this subchapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 31 , § 12.

    § 476. Motor vehicle warranty fee.

    A motor vehicle warranty fee of $6.00 is imposed on the registration of each new motor vehicle in this State, not including trailers, tractors, motorized highway building equipment, road-making appliances, snowmobiles, motorcycles, motor-driven cycles, or trucks with a gross vehicle weight over 12,000 pounds.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 50 , § 56; amended 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19d, eff. Sept. 1, 2010; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 29.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$6.00” for “$5.00”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “motor-driven cycles” for “mopeds”.

    Article 2. Repairmen

    §§ 481-485. Repealed. 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 12.

    History

    Former §§ 481-485. Former § 481, relating to application by motor vehicle repairmen for assignments of numbers to unregistered motor vehicles used in their businesses, was derived from 1957, No. 226 , § 2; V.S. 1947, § 10,133; P.L. § 5082; 1929, No. 67 ; 1925, No. 70 , § 61.

    Former § 482, relating to issuance of certificates of registration to motor vehicle repairmen, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,134; P.L. § 5083; 1933, No. 157 , § 4782; 1929, No. 67 ; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 70 , § 61 and amended by 1967, No. 129 , § 7.

    Former § 483, relating to the expiration date of motor vehicle repairmen’s registrations and certificates, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,111 and amended by 1965, No. 70 , § 6.

    Former § 484, relating to the prohibition against motor vehicle repairmen loaning number plates or loaning or renting motor vehicles to which number plates were assigned, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,136; P.L. § 5058; 1929, No. 67 ; 1925, No. 70 , § 61.

    Former § 485, relating to the prohibition against operation of motor vehicles having repairer registration numbers, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,138; P.L. § 5087; 1925, No. 70 , § 63.

    Article 3. Transporters

    § 491. Transporter application; eligibility; use of transporter plates.

    1. A transporter may apply for and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, in his or her discretion, may issue a certificate of registration and a general distinguishing number plate. Before a person may be registered as a transporter, he or she shall present proof:
      1. of compliance with section 800 of this title; and
      2. that he or she either owns or leases a permanent place of business located in this State where business will be conducted during regularly established business hours and the required records stored and maintained.
    2. When he or she displays thereon his or her transporter’s registration plate, a transporter or his or her employee or contractor may transport a motor vehicle owned by the transporter, repossessed, or temporarily in the transporter’s custody, and it shall be considered to be properly registered under this title. Transporter’s registration plates shall not be used for any other purposes and shall not be used by the holder of such number plates for personal purposes.

    HISTORY: Added 1965, No. 106 , § 2(a), eff. Feb. 1, 1966; amended 1969, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. May 1, 1970; 2015, No. 50 , § 2.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 492. Certificate; expiration.

    A transporter’s registration certificate shall contain the name, place of residence, and address of the applicant; the distinguishing number assigned; and such further information as the Commissioner may determine. It shall expire on the last day of February next following the date of issue.

    HISTORY: Added 1965, No. 106 , § 2(b), eff. Feb. 1, 1966.

    § 493. Loan of plates prohibited.

    A transporter shall not loan a number plate issued to him or her under this article.

    HISTORY: Added 1965, No. 106 , § 3, eff. Feb. 1, 1966.

    § 494. Fees.

    The annual fee for a transporter’s registration certificate, number plate, or validation sticker is $123.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1965, No. 106 , § 4, eff. Feb. 1, 1966; amended 1967, No. 129 , § 8; 1981, No. 87 , § 17; 1989, No. 51 , § 32; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. May 15, 2002; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 30.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$123.00” for “$90.00” following “sticker is”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$90.00” for “$65.00” following “sticker is”.

    —1989. Substituted “$65.00” for “$56.25” following “sticker is”.

    —1981. Substituted “$56.25” for “$50.00” following “sticker is”.

    —1967. Deleted “and” preceding “number plate” and inserted “or validation sticker” thereafter.

    § 495. Suspension of registration.

    The Commissioner may cancel a registration certificate issued to a transporter whenever, after hearing before the Commissioner or upon conviction in any court in this State, the Commissioner finds that the transporter has violated any motor vehicle law in this State or any lawful regulation of the Commissioner applying to transporters. A transporter whose certificate has been cancelled shall forthwith return to the Commissioner the registration certificate and the number plates furnished him or her by the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1965, No. 106 , § 5, eff. Feb. 1, 1966.

    § 496. Written records.

    Every transporter shall keep a written record, upon forms prescribed and furnished by the Commissioner for that purpose, of the motor vehicles upon which such transporter plate is used and the date and time during which each plate is used on a particular motor vehicle, which record shall be open to inspection by any law enforcement officer.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 1, 1970.

    § 497. Rulemaking.

    The Commissioner may adopt rules pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 consistent with this chapter as may be necessary to carry their provisions into effect. The rules may prescribe what shall be requisite to obtaining or retaining a dealer registration and may, by way of illustration and not limitation, include requirements regarding maintenance of knowledge of regulatory criteria, training standards, convictions, ownership or leasehold interests in real estate, facilities, hours and days of operation, proof of compliance with any other applicable laws or rules, and any other matter or thing that, in the Commissioner’s judgment, will contribute to the registration and reasonable regulation of dealers in order to promote business, prevent fraud, and encourage fair and honest competition.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 31 , § 13.

    Subchapter 5. Display of Number Plates

    § 511. Manner of display.

    1. Number plates.   A motor vehicle operated on any highway shall have displayed in a conspicuous place either one or two number plates as the Commissioner may require. Such number plates shall be furnished by the Commissioner and shall show the number assigned to such vehicle by the Commissioner. If only one number plate is furnished, the same shall be securely attached to the rear of the vehicle. If two are furnished, one shall be securely attached to the rear and one to the front of the vehicle. The number plates shall be kept entirely unobscured, and the numerals and letters thereon shall be plainly legible at all times. They shall be kept horizontal, shall be so fastened as not to swing, excepting, however, there may be installed on a motor truck or truck tractor a device that would, upon contact with a substantial object, permit the rear number plate to swing toward the front of the vehicle, provided such device automatically returns the number plate to its original rigid position after contact is released, and the ground clearance of the lower edges thereof shall be established by the Commissioner pursuant to the provisions of 3 V.S.A. chapter 25.
    2. Validation sticker.   A registration validation sticker shall be unobstructed and shall be affixed as follows:
      1. for vehicles issued registration plates with dimensions of approximately 12 x 6 inches, in the lower right corner of the rear registration plate; and
      2. for vehicles issued a registration plate with a dimension of approximately 7 x 4 inches, in the upper right corner of the rear registration plate.
    3. Violation.   A person shall not operate a motor vehicle unless number plates and a validation sticker are displayed as provided in this section.
    4. Failure to display a validation sticker.   An operator cited for violating subsection (c) of this section with respect to failure to display a validation sticker on a pleasure car, motorcycle, or truck that could be registered for less than 26,001 pounds shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $5.00, which penalty shall be exempt from surcharges under 13 V.S.A. § 7282(a) , if he or she is cited within the 14 days following the expiration of the motor vehicle’s registration.
    5. Temporary and in-transit registration plates.   A motor vehicle issued a temporary or in-transit registration plate under sections 312, 458, 463, and 516-518 of this title operated on any highway shall have the temporary or in-transit registration plate displayed horizontally in a conspicuous place on the rear of the vehicle, including in the rear window. The temporary or in-transit registration plate shall be kept entirely unobscured, and the numerals and letters thereon shall be plainly legible at all times.

    HISTORY: Amended 1979, No. 125 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 15, 1980; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2019, No. 60 , § 32; 2021, No. 76 , § 1, eff. Sept. 8, 2020.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 217 . V.S. 1947, § 10,237. 1945, No. 97 , § 2. P.L. § 5123. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 70. G.L. § 4707. 1915, No. 234 . 1912, No. 146 , § 1. 1910, No. 138 . 1908, No. 99 , § 6. P.S. § 4093. 1906, No. 113 , § 7. 1904, No. 86 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (a): Added the subsection heading and deleted “the” preceding “letters” in the fifth sentence.

    Subsecs. (b)-(d): Added the subsection headings.

    Subsec. (e): Added.

    —2019. Subsec. (d): Added.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Added the subsec. designations throughout the section.

    Subsec. (a): Substituted “Commissioner” for “commissioner of motor vehicles” preceding “may require” and “Commissioner and shall show” for “commissioner of motor vehicles, showing”; inserted “and” preceding “the numerals”; and substituted “3 V.S.A. chapter 25” for “chapter 25 of Title 3”.

    Subsec. (b): Added.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “and a validation sticker” following “number plates”.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “and” following “unobscured” in the fifth sentence, inserted “ground clearance of the” preceding “lower edges thereof shall be” in the sixth sentence, and substituted “established by the commissioner pursuant to the provisions of chapter 25 of Title 3” for “at least fifteen inches from the ground” thereafter.

    Retroactive effective date of 2021 amendment. 2021, No. 76 , § 38(c) provides: “Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , Secs. 1 (display of number plates; 23 V.S.A. § 511 ) and 2 (temporary plate; 23 V.S.A. § 518 ) shall take effect retroactively on September 8, 2020.”

    ANNOTATIONS

    Horizontal position.

    Court finds a proper reading of the statute regarding display of license plates to be that a license plate ceases to be horizontal when the angle of the license makes it difficult for a person with normal vision to read it; the Court declines at this point to define what that angle is. Of course, evidence of an observer’s ability to read a license plate may inform an interpretation in a specific case. State v. Tuma, 2013 VT 70, 194 Vt. 345, 79 A.3d 883, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 65 (2013).

    Proper reading of the statute regarding display of license plates was that a license plate ceased to be “horizontal” when its angle made it difficult for a person with normal vision to read it. Thus, when one side of defendant’s front license plate was about one to two inches lower than the other side, an officer lacked reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop based on the plate’s not being horizontal. State v. Tuma, 2013 VT 70, 194 Vt. 345, 79 A.3d 883, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 65 (2013).

    Operation.

    In prosecution for operating motor vehicle on public highway with number plates attached that were not lawfully assigned to such vehicle, criminal responsibility of respondent was not lessened by cooperation with him of another person in operating automobile in violation of statutes on which prosecution was based. State v. Dugee, 101 Vt. 491, 144 A. 689, 1929 Vt. LEXIS 196 (1929).

    Registration sticker.

    Stop of plaintiff’s vehicle violated Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution because at the time of the stop an obscured registration sticker did not violate the statute dealing with the manner of display of a license plate. Zullo v. State, 2019 VT 1, 209 Vt. 298, 205 A.3d 466, 2019 Vt. LEXIS 1 (2019).

    Notes to Opinions

    Operation.

    Motor vehicle actually steered or attempted to be steered, or its motion controlled or attempted to be controlled by the use of its brakes, while being towed by registered vehicle on public highway, is being operated, and if such vehicle is not registered, there would be violation of this section. 1936-38 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 336.

    § 512. Trailer or semi-trailer.

    When a trailer or semi-trailer is being drawn by a registered motor vehicle, the rear number plate assigned to such trailer or semi-trailer shall be displayed on the rear of such trailer or semi-trailer and shall be illuminated at night as provided in section 1248 of this title for the lighting of rear number plates on motor vehicles.

    HISTORY: Amended 2015, No. 47 , § 14.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 29 . V.S. 1947, § 10,238. P.L. § 5124. 1931, No. 77 . 1925, No. 70 , § 32.

    Amendments

    —2015. Substituted “section 1248 of this title” for “this chapter” preceding “for the lighting of rear number plates” near the end of the sentence.

    § 513. Misuse of plates.

    Except as provided in section 321 of this title, an owner of a motor vehicle shall not attach or cause to be attached to the vehicle number plates that were not assigned by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle, except as provided in section 321 of this title, to which number plates are attached that were not assigned to the vehicle by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. An inspector of motor vehicles and any enforcement officer shall have authority to remove from a motor vehicle any plates that have been attached in violation of the provisions of this section.

    HISTORY: Amended 2005, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 20, 2006.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,239. P.L. § 5125. 1929, No. 63 , § 4. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 72. G.L. § 4708. 1915, No. 134 . 1912, No. 146 , § 1. 1912, No. 149 . P.S. § 4093. 1906, No. 113 , § 7. 1904, No. 86 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “to the vehicle” for “thereto” preceding “number plates” and deleted “to such owner to be attached to such motor vehicle” following “motor vehicles” in the first sentence; inserted “of this title” following “section 321” and substituted “the vehicle” for “such vehicle” in the second sentence; and inserted “and any enforcement officer” preceding “shall have authority” in the third sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Operation.

    In prosecution for operating motor vehicle on public highway with number plates attached that were not lawfully assigned to such vehicle, criminal responsibility of respondent was not lessened by cooperation with him of another person in operating automobile in violation of statutes on which prosecution was based. State v. Dugee, 101 Vt. 491, 144 A. 689, 1929 Vt. LEXIS 196 (1929).

    § 514. Replacement number plates.

    1. In case of the loss of a number plate, the owner of the motor vehicle to which it was assigned shall immediately notify the Commissioner of such loss, and the Commissioner shall furnish such owner with a new plate. The fee charged shall be $12.00 for each plate. The owner of a motor vehicle who has lost one number plate may operate his or her vehicle with only one number plate attached, until a new plate is furnished him or her, provided he or she notified the Commissioner as required under this section.
    2. Any replacement number plate shall be issued at a fee of $12.00. However, if the Commissioner, in his or her discretion, determines that a plate has become illegible as a result of deficiencies in the manufacturing process or by use of faulty materials, the replacement fee shall be waived.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 276 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1981, No. 81 , § 1, eff. May 5, 1981; 1989, No. 51 , § 33; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 20, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 72 , § 12; 2011, No. 46 , § 4; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 31; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 155.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,240. P.L. § 5126. 1929, No. 63 , § 4. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 72. G.L. § 4708. 1915, No. 134 . 1912, No. 146 , § 1. 1912, No. 149 . P.S. § 4093. 1906, No. 113 , § 7. 1904, No. 86 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$12.00” for “$10.00” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$12.00” for “$10.00” in the first sentence.

    —2011. Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence.

    —2005. Subsec. (b): Substituted “$10.00” for “$7.00” in the first sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$10.00” for “$7.00” in the second sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$7.00” for “$5.00” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$7.00” for “$5.00” in the first sentence.

    —1981. Substituted “Replacement” for “Loss of” at the beginning of the section heading, designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), substituted “$5.00” for “$3.00” in the second sentence of that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$3.00” for “$1.00” in the second sentence.

    § 515. Repealed. 1989, No. 137 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    §§ 515a-515c. Repealed. 2015, No. 47, § 15.

    History

    Former §§ 515a-515c. Former § 515a, relating to Bicentennial 1791-1991 plates, was derived from 1989, No. 137 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Former § 515b, relating to 1794-1994 Masonic Bicentennial plates, was derived from 1993, No. 211 (Adj. Sess.), § 33.

    Former § 515c, relating to Lake Champlain quadricentennial plates, was derived from 2007, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 516. Sale of vehicle to go out of State by a person other than dealer.

    The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is authorized to issue an in-transit registration permit for the purpose of movement over the highways of certain motor vehicles otherwise required to be registered when the vehicles are sold in this State by a person, other than a registered motor vehicle dealer, to be transported to and registered in another state or province. The registration may be obtained by submitting an application on a form prescribed and furnished by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The Commissioner is authorized to charge a fee of $6.00 for the processing of the application and the issuance of the plate. The in-transit registration plate pursuant to this section shall be valid for a period of 30 days from issuance and shall be in the form and design prescribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. Issuance of an in-transit plate for vehicles sold by a registered motor vehicle dealer to a person to be transported to and registered in another state or province shall be governed by the provisions of section 463 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1979, No. 30 , § 2, eff. April 17, 1979; amended 1985, No. 30 , § 3; 1995, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2003, No. 35 , § 2; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 32.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$6.00” for “$3.00” in the third sentence.

    —2003. Substituted “three” for “two” preceding “dollars” in the third sentence and “30” for “ten” preceding “days” in the fourth sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “two dollars” for “one dollar” in the third sentence.

    —1985. Inserted “an” preceding “application” in the second sentence and deleted “therefor” thereafter and substituted “one dollar” for “twenty-five cents” in the third sentence.

    § 517. Intrastate in-transit permit.

    The Commissioner may issue an intrastate in-transit registration permit to authorize the movement within Vermont of a motor vehicle otherwise required to be registered, if the vehicle is sold in this State by a person other than a registered motor vehicle dealer. The permit may be obtained after submission of an application on a form prescribed and furnished by the Commissioner and payment of a $6.00 fee. The permit shall be valid for a period of 10 days from the date of issuance and shall be in the form and design prescribed by the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 33.

    § 518. Electronic issuance of temporary plate and temporary registration.

    1. Issuance of plate and registration; length.   The Commissioner is authorized to electronically issue a temporary plate and temporary registration to be printed by the owner of a motor vehicle for the purpose of movement over the highways of certain motor vehicles otherwise required to be registered when the vehicles are sold by a person other than a registered motor vehicle dealer. The temporary plate and temporary registration issued pursuant to this section shall be valid for a period of 60 days from issuance and shall be in the form and design prescribed by the Commissioner.
    2. Form of application; fee.   The temporary plate and temporary registration may be obtained by submitting an application under oath on a form prescribed and furnished by the Commissioner, which shall require the applicant to attest to compliance with the provisions of section 800 of this title and provide any other proof of the identity of the vehicle the Commissioner reasonably requires. The Commissioner is authorized to charge a fee of $6.00 for the processing of the application and the issuance of the temporary plate and temporary registration.
    3. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 2021, No. 76 , § 2, eff. Sept. 8, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    Retroactive effective date of 2021 amendment. 2021, No. 76 , § 38(c) provides: “Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , Secs. 1 (display of number plates; 23 V.S.A. § 511 ) and 2 (temporary plate; 23 V.S.A. § 518 ) shall take effect retroactively on September 8, 2020.”

    Chapter 8. Bus Taxation Proration Agreement

    Subchapter 1. Agreement

    §§ 561-567. Repealed. 2007, No. 75, § 35(c).

    History

    Former §§ 561-567. Former §§ 561-567, relating to bus taxation proration agreement, were derived from 1965, No. 117 , § 1.

    Statement of legislative intent. 2007, No. 75 , § 35(b) provides: “This repeal does not absolve the agency of transportation from its existing public involvement responsibilities under 23 C.F.R. § 450.212(f), as certified to the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Transit Administration. This annual certification outlines the agency’s public involvement responsibilities in three areas: the transportation planning initiative (TPI); development and adoption of the long-range transportation plan; and development and adoption of the state transportation improvement plan (STIP).”

    Subchapter 2. Provisions Relating to Agreement

    §§ 581-584. Repealed. 2007, No. 75, § 35(c).

    History

    Former §§ 581-584. Former §§ 581-584, relating to bus taxation proration agreement, were derived from 1965, No. 117 , § 1.

    Statement of legislative intent. 2007, No. 75 , § 35(b) provides: “This repeal does not absolve the agency of transportation from its existing public involvement responsibilities under 23 C.F.R. § 450.212(f), as certified to the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Transit Administration. This annual certification outlines the agency’s public involvement responsibilities in three areas: the transportation planning initiative (TPI); development and adoption of the long-range transportation plan; and development and adoption of the state transportation improvement plan (STIP).”

    Chapter 9. Operator’s Licenses

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. 2021, No. 20 , § 234 substituted “Operator’s” for “Operators’ ” in the chapter heading.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Commercial Driver’s License Act, see chapter 39 of this title.

    Driver License Compact, see chapter 37 of this title.

    Subchapter 1. General Provisions

    History

    Photographs for renewals. 2019, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 35 provides: “(a) Notwithstanding any provision of 23 V.S.A. § 115(g) , 610(c), or 617(e) to the contrary, a licensee shall be permitted to renew a driver’s license, learner’s permit, privilege to operate, or non-driver identification card with a photograph obtained not more than 16 years earlier that is compliant with the federal REAL ID Act, 6 C.F.R. part 37.

    “(b) Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , subsection (a) of this section shall take effect retroactively on March 20, 2020 and continue in effect until the termination of the state of emergency declared by the Governor as a result of COVID-19.”

    Extensions. 2019, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 36(c) and (e) provide: “(c) Notwithstanding any provision of 23 V.S.A. § 115 , 302, 304a, 305, 601, or 617 to the contrary, the Commissioner shall extend all of the following for an additional 90 days after expiration: driver’s licenses; learner’s permits; privileges to operate; non-driver identification cards; registrations; and registration plates or placards for an individual with a disability.

    “(e) Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , subsection (c) of this section shall take effect retroactively on March 17, 2020 and continue in effect until the termination of the state of emergency declared by the Governor as a result of COVID-19.”

    § 601. License required.

      1. Except as otherwise provided by law, a resident shall not operate a motor vehicle on a highway in Vermont unless he or she holds a valid license issued by the State of Vermont. A new resident who has moved into the State from another jurisdiction and who holds a valid license to operate motor vehicles under section 208 of this title shall procure a Vermont license within 60 days of moving to the State. Except as provided in subsection 603(d) of this title, licenses shall not be issued to nonresidents. (a) (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a resident shall not operate a motor vehicle on a highway in Vermont unless he or she holds a valid license issued by the State of Vermont. A new resident who has moved into the State from another jurisdiction and who holds a valid license to operate motor vehicles under section 208 of this title shall procure a Vermont license within 60 days of moving to the State. Except as provided in subsection 603(d) of this title, licenses shall not be issued to nonresidents.
      2. In addition to any other requirement of law, a nonresident as defined in section 4 of this title shall not operate a motor vehicle on a Vermont highway unless:
        1. he or she holds a valid license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued by another U.S. jurisdiction; or
        2. he or she holds a valid license or permit to operate a motor vehicle from a jurisdiction outside the United States and:
          1. is at least 18 years of age, is lawfully present in the United States, and has been in the United States for not more than one year; and
          2. he or she possesses an international driving permit.
    1. All operator’s licenses issued under this chapter shall expire, unless earlier cancelled, at midnight on the eve of the second or fourth anniversary of the date of birth of the license holder following the date of issue. Renewed licenses shall expire at midnight on the eve of the second or fourth anniversary of the date of birth of the license holder following the date the renewed license expired. All junior operator’s licenses shall expire, unless earlier cancelled, at midnight on the eve of the second anniversary of the date of birth of the license holder following the date of issue. A person born on February 29 shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered as born on March 1.
    2. At least 30 days before a license is scheduled to expire, the Commissioner shall mail first class to the licensee or send the licensee electronically an application for renewal of the license; a cardholder shall be sent the renewal notice by mail unless the cardholder opts in to receive electronic notification. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle unless properly licensed.
    3. The Commissioner may, in his or her discretion, determine that certain types of motor vehicles require that an operator possess specialized skill or knowledge to operate those vehicles so that the public safety may not be endangered. If the Commissioner so determines, he or she may prescribe different classes of licenses for the operation of particular types of vehicles. The Commissioner is authorized to make rules prescribing forms and procedures for applications, license classifications, restrictions, endorsements, examinations, driver training requirements, and disqualifications consistent with this title as necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
    4. A motor-driven cycle may be operated only by a licensed driver at least 16 years of age.
    5. Operators of autocycles shall be exempt from the requirements to obtain a motorcycle learner’s permit or a motorcycle endorsement. The Commissioner shall offer operators of three-wheeled motorcycles that are not autocycles the opportunity to obtain a motorcycle endorsement that authorizes the operation of three-wheeled motorcycles only.
    6. A person who violates this section commits a traffic violation, except that a person who violates this section after a previous conviction under this section within the prior two years shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than 60 days or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both. An unsworn printout of the person’s Vermont motor vehicle conviction history may be admitted into evidence to prove a prior conviction under this section.

    HISTORY: Amended 1966, No. 38 (Sp. Sess.), § 1; 1967, No. 86 , § 1; 1977, No. 20 , § 10; 1981, No. 130 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1989, No. 51 , § 34; 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1991, No. 88 , § 2; 2003, No. 56 , § 71, eff. June 4, 2003; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2005, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 40; 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19e, eff. Sept. 1, 2010; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 33, 35; 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 63; 2017, No. 71 , § 10, eff. June 8, 2017; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 2019, No. 60 , §§ 8, 13.

    History

    Source.

    1949, No. 237 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,139. 1947, No. 202 , § 5360. 1941, No. 96 , § 2. 1935, No. 123 , § 13. P.L. § 5088. 1927, No. 74 , § 3. 1925, No. 70 , § 37. G.L. §§ 4685, 4693. 1917, No. 132 , § 1. 1910, No. 134 . 1908, No. 99 , § 7. P.S. §§ 4084, 4087. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , §§ 4, 5.

    Amendments

    —2019. Subdiv. (a)(2): In subdiv. (A), added “or” following the semicolon; deleted former subdiv. (B) and redesignated former subdiv. (C) as present subdiv. (B); in present subdiv. (B)(i), inserted “at least” preceding “18”, deleted “or more” thereafter, and added “and” following the semicolon; and deleted former subdiv. (B)(ii) and redesignated former subdiv. (B)(iii) as present subdiv. (B)(ii).

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Added the second sentence.

    —2017. Subsec. (b): Substituted “operator’s licenses” for “operator licenses” in the first and second sentences.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Act No. 158 substituted “section 208” for “section 411” in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Act No. 158 added new subdiv. (B) and redesignated former subdiv. (B) as subdiv. (C).

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 158 amended subsec. generally.

    Subsec. (g): Added by Act No. 147.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsecs. (a)-(c): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (f): Added.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (e): Substituted “motor-driven cycle” for “moped”.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added the present second sentence.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Rewrote the second sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “so to do” following “license” in the first sentence of subsec. (a), deleted “every two years” following “expire” and added “at the end of the term or which they were issued” following “applicant” in the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “so to do, except as provided in this chapter” in the second sentence of subsec. (b), substituted “two-year” for “biennial” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted the former second and third sentences.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “the commissioner” for “he or she” following “If” in the second sentence.

    —2003. Subsec. (a): Deleted “proper” preceding “license” and “so to do” thereafter at the end of the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

    —1991. Subsec. (d): Deleted “and” preceding “driver training requirements”, inserted “and disqualifications” thereafter, and made a minor change in punctuation in the third sentence.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Inserted “or her” preceding “discretion” in the first sentence, “or she” preceding “so determines” and “may prescribe” in the second sentence, and added the third sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (c): Substituted “$12.00” for “$10.00” at the end of the third sentence.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “biennially” preceding “procure” in the first sentence, inserted “operator” preceding “licenses” and substituted “four” for “two” preceding “years” in the third sentence, and added the fourth sentence of subsec. (a); substituted “quadrennial” for “biennial” preceding “birth” and inserted “and biennially for each junior operator licenseholder” preceding “mail” in the first sentence of subsec. (b); added present subsec. (c); and redesignated former subsecs. (c) and (d) as present subsecs. (d) and (e), respectively.

    —1977. Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1967. Subsec. (a): Substituted “biennially” for “annually” preceding “procure” in the first sentence and deleted “such” preceding “nonresidents” in the second sentence and “the provisions of” preceding “this chapter shall” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “before the biennial” for “prior to the” preceding “birth” and deleted “such” preceding “licensee” in the first sentence.

    —1966. Subsec. (c): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Certificate of all-terrain vehicle education, see § 3515 of this title.

    Certificate of boating education, see § 3305b of this title.

    Certificate of snowmobile education, see § 3206 of this title.

    Commercial Driver’s License Act, see chapter 39 of this title.

    Motorcycle rider training program, see § 733 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Violation as negligence.

    Fact that defendant had not obtained a license to operate an automobile, as required by this section, was condition only and not cause of injuries sustained by plaintiff run into by automobile driven by defendant. Dervin v. Frenier, 91 Vt. 398, 100 A. 760, 1917 Vt. LEXIS 262 (1917).

    Cited.

    Cited in Century Arms, Inc. v. Kennedy, 323 F. Supp. 1002, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14429 (D. Vt. 1971); Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Cady, 136 Vt. 29, 383 A.2d 607, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 680 (1978).

    Notes to Opinions

    Revoked foreign license.

    Operator of vehicle in Vermont, whose license has been revoked in another state and who has no Vermont license, should be prosecuted under this section and not section 674 of this title. 1930-32 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 195.

    § 602. Exceptions for farm tractors and highway equipment.

    1. No person may operate a farm tractor or motorized highway building equipment upon a public highway without first procuring from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles a license to operate motor vehicles, except that a person may operate a farm tractor upon a public highway in going to and from different parts of the farm of the owner of the farm tractor without obtaining a license.
    2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a person operating a farm tractor upon the public highways in going to and from different parts of the farm of the owner of the farm tractor or a person operating motorized highway building equipment upon the public highways within a construction area under the provisions of this section is subject to sections 602, 602a, 674, 1007, 1071, 1091, 1094, 1095, 1125, 1126, 1127, and 1201-1210 of this title.
    3. A person operating a farm tractor upon the public highways, except when going to and from different parts of the farm of the owner of the farm tractor, or a person operating motorized highway building equipment upon the public highways outside a construction area, is, while so operating, subject to all of the provisions of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 361 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 1, 1973; 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    History

    Source.

    1949, No. 249 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,318. 1947, No. 99 , § 1. 1939, No. 109 , § 6.

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted the subsec. (a) through (c) designations; in subsec. (a), inserted “farm” preceding “tractor”; in subsec. (b), added “Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section”, inserted “of the farm tractor” following “the owner”, and deleted a reference to section 1707; in subsec. (c), inserted “of the farm tractor” following “the owner” and deleted “of” following “outside”.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the first sentence, substituted “is” for “shall be” preceding “subject to”, deleted “all of the provisions of” thereafter and substituted “1007, 1071, 1091, 1094, 1095, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1201-1210 and 1707” for “1004-1006, 1091, 1096, 1142, 1181-1183, 1187 and 1709” preceding “of this title” in the second sentence, and substituted “is” for “under the provisions of this section shall” following “area” in the third sentence.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “and for repair purposes to any repair shop” preceding “without” in the first sentence, deleted “or for repairs to a repair shop” following “owner” and inserted “602, 602a” preceding “674” in the second sentence, and deleted “or to a repair shop” following “owner” in the third sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 602a. Age requirement.

    A person 12 years of age or older may operate a farm tractor under the provisions of section 602 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 361 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    § 603. Application for and issuance of license.

      1. The Commissioner or his or her authorized agent may license operators and junior operators when an application, on a form prescribed by the Commissioner, signed and sworn to by the applicant for the license, is filed with him or her, accompanied by the required license fee and any valid license from another state or Canadian jurisdiction is surrendered. (a) (1) The Commissioner or his or her authorized agent may license operators and junior operators when an application, on a form prescribed by the Commissioner, signed and sworn to by the applicant for the license, is filed with him or her, accompanied by the required license fee and any valid license from another state or Canadian jurisdiction is surrendered.
      2. The Commissioner may, however, in his or her discretion, refuse to issue a license to any person whenever he or she is satisfied from information given him or her by credible persons, and upon investigation, that the person is mentally or physically unfit or, because of his or her habits or record as to crashes or convictions, is unsafe to be trusted with the operation of motor vehicles. A person refused a license under the provisions of this subsection shall be entitled to hearing as provided in sections 105-107 of this title.
      3. Any new or renewal application form shall include a space for the applicant to request that a “veteran” designation be placed on his or her license certificate. An applicant who requests the designation shall provide a Department of Defense Form 214 or other proof of veteran status specified by the Commissioner.
      4. Any new or renewal application form shall provide for and request the information required in 17 V.S.A. § 2145a .
    1. Before issuing an operator’s license, junior operator’s license, or learner’s permit to an applicant, the Commissioner shall obtain driving record information through the National Driver Register and from each state in which the person has been licensed or has been issued a learner’s permit.
    2. An operator’s license, junior operator’s license, or learner’s permit shall not be issued to an applicant whose license, learner’s permit, or privilege to operate is suspended, revoked, or canceled in any jurisdiction.
    3. Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section:
      1. A citizen of a foreign country shall produce his or her passport and visa, alien registration receipt card (green card), or other proof of legal presence for inspection and copying as a part of the application process for an operator’s license, junior operator’s license, or learner’s permit.
      2. An operator’s license, junior operator’s license, or learner’s permit issued to a citizen of a foreign country shall expire coincidentally with his or her authorized duration of stay.
      1. A citizen of a foreign country unable to establish legal presence in the United States who furnishes reliable proof of Vermont residence and of name, date of birth, and place of birth, and who satisfies all other requirements of this chapter for obtaining a license or permit, shall be eligible to obtain an operator’s privilege card, a junior operator’s privilege card, or a learner’s privilege card. (e) (1) A citizen of a foreign country unable to establish legal presence in the United States who furnishes reliable proof of Vermont residence and of name, date of birth, and place of birth, and who satisfies all other requirements of this chapter for obtaining a license or permit, shall be eligible to obtain an operator’s privilege card, a junior operator’s privilege card, or a learner’s privilege card.
      2. The Commissioner shall require applicants under this subsection to furnish a document or a combination of documents that reliably proves the applicant’s name, date of birth, and place of birth. The Commissioner may prescribe the documents or combination of documents that meets these criteria. However, the Commissioner shall accept a combination of two or more of the following documents to establish the name, date of birth, and place of birth of an applicant:
        1. a valid foreign passport, with or without a U.S. Customs and Border Protection entry form or stamp;
        2. a valid consular identification document issued by the government of Mexico or of Guatemala or by any other government with comparable security standards and protocols, as determined by the Commissioner;
        3. a certified record of the applicant’s birth, marriage, adoption, or divorce, including a translation if necessary.
      3. The Commissioner shall require applicants under this subsection to furnish a document or a combination of documents that reliably proves the applicant’s Vermont residence. The Commissioner may prescribe the documents or combination of documents that meets these criteria. However, the Commissioner shall accept the following combinations of documents as proof of Vermont residence:
          1. two pieces of mail received by the applicant within the prior 30 days with the applicant’s current name and residential Vermont address; and (A) (i) two pieces of mail received by the applicant within the prior 30 days with the applicant’s current name and residential Vermont address; and
          2. at least one of the documents specified in subdivision (B) of this subdivision (3); or
        1. two of the following that show name and residential Vermont address:
          1. a vehicle title or registration;
          2. a document issued by a financial institution, such as a bank statement;
          3. a document issued by an insurance company or agent, such as an insurance card, binder, or bill;
          4. a document issued by an educational institution, such as a transcript, report card, or enrollment confirmation;
          5. federal tax documents, such as W-2 or 1099 forms;
          6. State tax documents, such as an IN-111; and
          7. medical health records, receipts, or bills.
    4. Persons able to establish lawful presence in the United States but who otherwise fail to comply with the requirements of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 201-202, shall be eligible for an operator’s privilege card, a junior operator’s privilege card, or a learner’s privilege card, provided the applicant furnishes reliable proof of Vermont residence and of name, date of birth, and place of birth, and satisfies all other requirements of this chapter for obtaining a license or permit. The Commissioner shall require applicants under this subsection to furnish a document or a combination of documents that reliably proves the applicant’s Vermont residence and his or her name, date of birth, and place of birth.
    5. The Commissioner may adopt policies or rules related to the issuance of privilege cards under this section that balance accessibility with mechanisms to prevent fraud. The Commissioner shall consider adopting the appointment system procedures used in other states to prevent and deter fraud with regard to proof of residency.
    6. A privilege card issued under this section shall:
      1. on its face bear the phrase “privilege card” and text indicating that it is not valid for federal identification or official purposes; and
      2. expire at midnight on the eve of the second birthday of the applicant following the date of issuance or, at the option of an applicant for an operator’s privilege card and upon payment of the required four-year fee, at midnight on the eve of the fourth birthday of the applicant following the date of issuance.
    7. Every applicant for or holder of a privilege card under this section shall be subject to all of the provisions of this title that apply to applicants and holders of operator’s licenses, junior operator’s licenses, and learner permits, except where the context clearly requires otherwise.

    HISTORY: Amended 1987, No. 62 , § 3; 1989, No. 84 , § 4; 1995, No. 70 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Feb. 14, 1996; 1997, No. 55 , § 6, eff. June 26, 1997; 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2007, No. 61 , § 5; 2011, No. 46 , § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2012; 2013, No. 57 , § 14; 2013, No. 74 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2014; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2015, No. 80 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. July 1, 2017; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 80; 2017, No. 71 , § 9, eff. June 8, 2017; 2017, No. 71 , § 10.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,140. P.L. § 5089. 1929, No. 76 , § 2. 1927, No. 74 , §§ 3, 4. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 38. G.L. §§ 4684, 4685. 1917, No. 132 , § 1. 1915, No. 136 . P.S. §§ 4083, 4084. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , § 4.

    Revision note

    —2021. In subdiv. (a)(2), substituted “crashes” for “accidents” preceding “or convictions” in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2017. Substituted “operator’s license” for “operator licenses”, “junior operator’s license” for “junior operator license”, and “learner’s permit” for “learner permit” wherever they appeared in subsecs. (b)-(d) and in subsec. (c), substituted “, learner’s permit, or privilege to operate” for “or learner permit”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(2): Act No. 158 deleted “or section 605 of this title,” following “subsection” in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Added by Act No. 80.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (h)(2): Inserted “or, at the option of an applicant for an operator’s privilege card and upon payment of the required four-year fee, at midnight on the eve of the fourth birthday of the applicant following the date of issuance” following “issuance”.

    —2013. Act No. 57 added the subdivs. (a)(1) through (a)(3) designations and added subdiv. (a)(3).

    Act No. 74 rewrote subsec. (d) and added subsecs. (e) through (i).

    —2011. Subsec. (d): Deleted the former third sentence.

    —2007. Subsec. (d): Inserted “or” preceding ”learner permit” and deleted “or nondriver identification card” following “ learner permit” in the first and second sentences.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 109 substituted “an” for “a first-time” preceding “applicant” in subsecs. (b) and (c).

    Act No. 154 added subsec. (d).

    —1997. Subsec. (b): Inserted “to a first-time applicant” following “learner permit”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “first-time applicant” for “person” preceding “whose license” and “canceled” for “cancelled” preceding “in any jurisdiction”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and deleted “is” following “application” in the first sentence and substituted “subsection” for “section” preceding “or section 605” in the third sentence of that subsec., and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

    —1989. In the first sentence, substituted “or her” for “duly” preceding “authorized”, and inserted “state or Canadian” preceding “jurisdiction”.

    —1987. Added “and any valid license from another jurisdiction is surrendered” following “license fee” at the end of the first sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Applications to be under oath, see § 201 of this title.

    Impersonating another in an application or aiding applicant by false representation, see § 202 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Right to license.

    Where Governor granted full and unconditional pardon, covering three convictions for driving while intoxicated, to person whose license had been revoked for life, all legal punishment and disqualifications resulting from the convictions were removed and Commissioner of Motor Vehicles properly issued him a license. Brown v. Tatro, 134 Vt. 248, 356 A.2d 512, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 643 (1976).

    Notes to Opinions

    Inmates.

    The fact that a person is an institutional inmate does not alone, under any statute, prohibit the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles from issuing a driver’s license to that person, or require the Commissioner to suspend or revoke a license. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 93.

    § 604. Repealed. 1977, No. 118 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. Feb. 3, 1978.

    History

    Former § 604. Former § 604, relating to suspension of license for nonpayment of poll tax, was derived from 1955, No. 269 ; V.S. 1947, § 10,141; 1947, No. 92 ; 1945, No. 101 , § 1; 1943, No. 78 , § 1; 1939, No. 115 , § 1; 1937, No. 124 , § 1; 1935, No. 30 , § 4; P.L. § 5090; 1933, No. 90 , § 1.

    § 605. Repealed. 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 78(3).

    History

    Former § 605. Former § 605, relating to unsatisfied judgment; suspension, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,142; 1947, No. 202 , § 5363; P.L. § 5091; 1929, No. 76 , § 2; 1927, No. 74 , § 4; 1925, No. 70 , § 38 and amended by 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 605.

    Right to license.

    Until a judgment is satisfied in some manner or it has been shown to Commissioner that judgment is not based upon any violation of motor vehicle laws, person against whom such judgment is outstanding has no legal right to procure operator’s license. 1940-42 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 418.

    § 606. Age limit.

    An operator’s license shall not be issued to any person under 18 years of age. Any person who has previously held a junior operator’s license in Vermont prior to application for a license under this section shall have held that license for a minimum of six months or until age 18 and maintained a record without any suspensions, revocations, or recalls for the six-month period preceding licensure under this section.

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 195 , § 1; 1999, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,143. P.L. § 5092. 1929, No. 76 , § 2. 1927, No. 74 , §§ 3, 4. 1925, No. 70 , § 38. G.L. § 4684. 1915, No. 136 . P.S. § 4083. 1904, No. 86 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “under 18 years” for “under eighteen years” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1959. Reenacted the section without change.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Shulins v. New England Insurance Co., 360 F.2d 781, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 6153 (2d Cir. 1966).

    § 607. Junior operator’s license.

    1. A junior operator’s license may be issued initially only to persons who:
      1. are 16 and 17 years of age;
      2. have passed the driver examination required in subchapter 2 of this chapter and a driver education and training course approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the Secretary of Education;
      3. have:
        1. possessed a learner’s permit for not less than one year;
        2. submitted on a form provided by the Department of Motor Vehicles that is approved by the Commissioner, and certified by the operator’s licensed parent or guardian, licensed or certified driver education instructor, or licensed person at least 25 years of age that there was at least 40 hours of practice behind the wheel, at least 10 of which was nighttime driving and that the operator was accompanied by his or her licensed parent or guardian, a licensed or certified driver education instructor, or another licensed individual at least 25 years of age, riding in the front passenger seat; and
        3. maintained a driving record without a learner’s permit suspension, revocation, or recall for six consecutive months prior to licensure.
    2. An applicant for a junior operator’s license shall not be given a license unless his or her parent, guardian, or a person standing in loco parentis to him or her files a written consent with the Commissioner.
    3. Any junior operator’s license may be renewed. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, a renewed junior operator’s license shall not be required to meet the requirements of subsection 610(b) of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 195 , § 1; 1966, No. 65 (Sp. Sess.), § 6; 1999, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2005, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Feb. 24, 2006; 2013, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), § 268, eff. Feb. 14, 2014; 2019, No. 60 , § 3.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, §§ 10,143, 10,144. P.L. §§ 5092, 5093. 1929, No. 76 , § 2. 1927, No. 74 , §§ 3, 4, 12. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , §§ 38, 48. G.L. § 4684. 1915, No. 136 . P.S. § 4083. 1904, No. 86 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2019. Subdiv. (a)(3): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “Secretary of Education” for “commissioner of education”.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “initially” following “issued” in the introductory paragraph and made minor changes in punctuation in subdivs. (3)(B) and (3)(B)(i).

    Subsec. (b): Made a minor change in punctuation.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1966. Section amended generally.

    —1959. Reenacted the section without change.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driver education and training course for high school pupils, see 16 V.S.A. chapter 23, subchapter 5.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Imputed negligence.

    In tort action against driver of automobile to recover for injuries received in automobile accident through his alleged negligence, where driver was boy under sixteen years of age, his negligence was not as matter of law imputable to licensed driver riding on front seat with him, by which means, under section 615 of this title, operation of automobile by unlicensed driver was made lawful. Round v. Pike, 102 Vt. 324, 148 A. 283, 1930 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1930).

    Cited.

    Cited in Shulins v. New England Insurance Co., 360 F.2d 781, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 6153 (2d Cir. 1966).

    § 607a. Recall of learner’s permit or junior operator’s license.

    1. A learner’s permit or junior operator’s license shall contain an admonition that it is recallable and that the later procurement of an operator’s license is conditional on the establishment of a record that is satisfactory to the Commissioner and showing compliance with the motor vehicle laws of this and other states. The Commissioner may recall any permit or license issued to a minor whenever he or she is satisfied, from information provided by a credible person and upon investigation, that the operator is mentally or physically unfit or, because of his or her habits or record as to crashes or convictions, is unsafe to be trusted with the operation of motor vehicles. On recommendation of a diversion or reparative board, the Commissioner may recall the learner’s permit or junior operator’s license of a person in a diversion or reparative program for up to 30 days. The Commissioner shall also recall any learner’s permit or junior operator’s license for 30 days when an operator is adjudicated of a single texting violation under section 1099 of this title, 90 days following adjudication of a single speeding violation resulting in a three-point assessment, 90 days when a total of six points has been accumulated, or 90 days when an operator is adjudicated of a violation of subsection 614(c) or 615(a) of this title. When a learner’s permit or junior operator’s license is so recalled, it shall be reinstated upon expiration of a specific term and, if required by the Commissioner, when the person has passed a reexamination approved by the Commissioner.
    2. When a license or permit is recalled under the provisions of this section, the person whose license or permit is so recalled shall have the same right of hearing before the Commissioner as is provided in subsection 671(a) of this title.
    3. Except for a recall based solely upon the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, any recall of a license or permit may extend past the operator’s 18th birthday. While the recall is still in effect, that operator shall be ineligible for any operator’s license.
    4. The Commissioner shall recall a learner’s permit or junior operator’s license upon written request of the individual’s custodial parent or guardian.
    5. Any recall period under this section shall run concurrently with any suspension period imposed under chapter 13 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 195 , §§ 1, 2; amended 1971, No. 184 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. March 29, 1972; 1999, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2009, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. June 1, 2010; 2013, No. 57 , § 9.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. In the second sentence, substituted “crashes” for “accidents” preceding “or convictions” in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Inserted “permit or” preceding “license” in the second sentence and substituted “subsection 614(c) or 615(a)” for “section 678” in the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “or permit” following “license” in two places.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “or permit” following “license” in the first sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Inserted “30 days when an operator is adjudicated of a single texting violation under section 1099 of this title” preceding “90 days”, “adjudication of”’ preceding “a single speeding”, “90 days” preceding “when” in two places, and substituted “adjudicated of” for “convicted for” in the fourth sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Rewrote the first sentence and substituted “minor” for “person under twenty-one years of age” preceding “whenever” in the third sentence.

    § 608. Fees.

    1. The four-year fee required to be paid the Commissioner for licensing an operator of motor vehicles or for issuing an operator’s privilege card shall be $51.00. The two-year fee required to be paid the Commissioner for licensing an operator or for issuing an operator’s privilege card shall be $32.00, and the two-year fee for licensing a junior operator or for issuing a junior operator’s privilege card shall be $32.00.
    2. An additional fee of $3.00 per year shall be paid for a motorcycle endorsement. The endorsement may be obtained for either a two-year or four-year period, to be coincidental with the length of the operator’s license.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 154 , § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1965; 1967, No. 86 , § 2; 1975, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1981, No. 130 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1989, No. 51 , § 35; 1989, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. June 21, 1990; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 21, eff. May 15, 2002; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 34; 2009, No. 50 , § 46; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 34.

    History

    Source.

    1949, No. 237 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,153. 1941, No. 96 , § 3. 1935, No. 123 , § 14. P.L. § 5102. 1927, No. 74 , § 5. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 39. G.L. § 4685. 1917, No. 132 , § 1. P.S. § 4084. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$51.00” for “$48.00” in the first sentence, and “$32.00” for “$30.00” in two places in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$3.00” for “$2.00” in the first sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “or for issuing an operator’s privilege card” following “vehicles” and “operator” and inserted “or for issuing a junior operator’s privilege card” following “junior operator”.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “$48.00” for “$45.00” in the first sentence and “$30.00” for “$28.00” twice in the second sentence.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$45.00” for “$40.00” in the first sentence; substituted “$28.00” for “$25.00” and “$28.00” for “$27.00” in the second sentence.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$40.00” for “$35.00” in the first sentence; deleted “or junior operator” following “operator”, added “shall be $25.00 and the two-year fee for licensing a” and substituted “$27.00” for “$23.00” in the second sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “four-year” for “quadrennial” preceding “fee” and “$35.00” for “30.00” following “shall be” in the first sentence, and substituted “two-year” for “biennial” preceding “fee” and “or junior operator shall be $23.00” for “shall be $18.00 and for licensing a junior shall be $15.00” in the second sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$30.00” for “$20.00” in the first sentence, substituted “shall be $18.00 and for licensing” for “or” and “$15.00” for “$12.00” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$2.00” for “$1.00” in the first sentence.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1989. Substituted “$20.00” for “$16.00” in the first sentence and “$12.00” for “$10.00” in the second sentence.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “quadrennial” for “biennial” preceding “fee” and “$16.00” for “$8.00” following “vehicles shall be” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$8.00” for “$6.00” following “vehicles shall be”.

    —1967. Substituted “biennial” for “annual” preceding “fee” and “$6.00” for “$3.00” following “vehicles shall be”.

    —1965. Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Examination fees, see § 634 of this title.

    Fee for commercial driver’s license, see §§ 4108 and 4110 of this title.

    Fee for enhanced driver’s license, see § 7 of this title.

    Fee for nondriver identification card, see § 115 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Bieling v. Malloy, 133 Vt. 522, 346 A.2d 204, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 444 (1975).

    § 609. Veterans’ exemption.

    No fees shall be charged an honorably discharged veteran of the U.S. Armed Forces who is a resident of the State of Vermont for a license to operate a motor vehicle, when the veteran has acquired a motor vehicle with financial assistance from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and he or she is otherwise eligible to be granted the license, and when his or her application is accompanied by a copy of an approved VA Form 21-4502 issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs certifying him or her to be entitled to the financial assistance.

    HISTORY: Amended 1975, No. 38 , § 2; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 208 .

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1975. Deleted the former second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Veteran’s exemption from certificate of title fee, see § 2002 of this title.

    Veteran’s exemption from motor vehicle purchase and use tax, see 32 V.S.A. § 8911 .

    Veteran’s exemption from registration fee, see § 378 of this title.

    § 610. License certificates.

    1. The Commissioner shall assign a distinguishing number to each licensee and shall furnish the licensee with a license certificate that shows the number and the licensee’s full name, date of birth, and residential address, except that at the request of the licensee, the licensee’s mailing address may be listed, or an alternative address may be listed if otherwise authorized by law. The certificate also shall include a brief physical description and a space for the signature of the licensee. The license shall be void until signed by the licensee. If a veteran, as defined in 38 U.S.C. § 101(2), requests a veteran designation and provides proof of veteran status as specified in subdivision 603(a)(3) of this title, and the Office of Veterans Affairs confirms his or her status as an honorably discharged veteran or a veteran discharged under honorable conditions, the license certificate shall include the term “veteran” on its face.
    2. A motor vehicle operator’s license issued to an individual who is under the age of 18 shall be distinguishable by color from a motor vehicle operator’s license issued to an individual who is over the age of 18 but under the age of 21, and both cards shall be distinguishable by color from a motor vehicle operator’s license issued to an individual 21 or older. A motor vehicle operator’s license issued to an individual under the age of 21 shall clearly indicate, in prominent type, the date on which the individual will become 21. The distinguishing colors shall be the same as those used to distinguish identification cards issued under section 115 of this title.
    3. Each license certificate issued to a first-time applicant and each subsequent renewal by that individual shall be issued with the photograph or imaged likeness of the licensee included on the certificate. The Commissioner shall determine the locations where photographic licenses may be issued. An individual issued a license containing an imaged likeness under this subsection may renew by mail, except that a renewal by a licensee required to have a photograph or imaged likeness must be made in person so that an updated imaged likeness of the individual is obtained not less often than once every nine years.
    4. Each license certificate issued to an initial or renewal applicant shall include a bar code with minimum data elements as prescribed in 6 C.F.R. § 37.19.

    HISTORY: Amended 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1999, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2013, No. 57 , § 15; 2019, No. 60 , § 4; 2021, No. 20 , § 235.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,154. 1955, No. 124 , § 1. P.L. § 5103. 1927, No. 74 , § 6. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 40.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —2019. Subsec. (c): Substituted “nine” for “eight” preceding “years” at the end of the fourth sentence.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Rewrote.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted the former third sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “name, date of birth, a brief description, and” preceding “mailing address” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “Each license” for “Upon request, a license” preceding “certificate”, inserted “issued to a first-time applicant and each subsequent” preceding “renewal”, inserted “by that person” preceding “shall be”, and inserted “or imaged likeness” following “photograph” in the first sentence, deleted “fee for the photographic license and” preceding “locations” in the second sentence, and added the fourth and fifth sentences.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or her” following “him”, substituted “the” for “such” preceding “number, his”, substituted “or her mailing address” for “place of residence” thereafter, deleted “thereon” following “space” and substituted “the” for “such” following “signature of” in the first sentence, and substituted “the” for “such” preceding “license shall” and “to it” for “thereto” following “affixed” in the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Notification of change of name or address, see § 205 of this title.

    §§ 610a, 610b. Repealed. 1999, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    History

    Former §§ 610a, 610b. Former § 610a, relating to color of license certificates, was derived from 1961, No. 41 , §§ 1, 2; and amended by 1971, No. 184 (Adj. Sess.), § 9.

    Former § 610b, relating to photograph on license, was derived from 1967, No. 356 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. March 27, 1968; and amended by 1989, No. 51 , § 36.

    § 610c. Legislative intent; existing driver’s licenses without photograph or imaged likeness.

    It is the intent of the General Assembly that the provisions of subsection 610(c) of this title not require individuals who, prior to July 1, 2004, were issued a driver’s license without a photograph or imaged likeness to obtain a photograph or imaged likeness after that date.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; amended 2021, No. 20 , § 236.

    History

    Revision note

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.) This section was enacted as section 610a of this title, but was redesignated as section 610c to avoid conflict with section 610a which was repealed by 1999, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, as was 610b.

    Amendments

    —2021. Substituted “driver’s” for “driver” in the section heading and in the section text and “individuals” for “persons” in the section text.

    § 611. Possession of license certificate.

    Every licensee shall have his or her operator’s license certificate in his or her immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle. However, a person cited with violating this section or section 610 of this title shall not be convicted if he or she sends a copy of or produces to the issuing enforcement agency within seven business days of the traffic stop an operator’s license certificate that was valid or had expired within 14 days prior to the traffic stop.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 356 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 27, 1968; 2011, No. 62 , § 37; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,155. 1947, No. 202 , § 5376. 1939, No. 116 , § 2. 1935, No. 124 , § 1. P.L. § 5103. 1927, No. 74 , § 6. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 40.

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    —2011. Inserted “or her” preceding “immediate” in the first sentence; substituted “enforcement” for “arresting” preceding “officer”, “which” for “and valid” following “her”, and “citation, was valid or had expired within the prior 14 days” for “arrest or within 14 days following its expiration” following “her” in the second sentence.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Added “or within fourteen days following its expiration” following “his arrest or” in the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Possession of inspection sticker, see § 1222 of this title.

    Possession of proof of financial responsibility, see § 800 of this title.

    Possession of registration certificate, see § 307 of this title.

    Possession of registration validation sticker; manner of display, see § 511 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 612. Restricted license.

    When issuing or reinstating the license of an operator, the Commissioner may restrict the privileges granted by such license to the operating of one or more specified motor vehicles or in such other manner as the Commissioner may deem best, and such restriction shall be endorsed on the license certificate. A person holding a restricted license shall not operate a motor vehicle except as permitted in such restriction.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,156. P.L. § 5014. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 41. G.L. § 4685. 1917, No. 132 , § 1. P.S. § 4084. 1906, No. 113 , § 4. 1904, No. 86 , § 4.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Notes to Opinions

    Endorsement.

    Provision that “such restriction shall be endorsed on the license certificate” is sufficient authority for holding that any restrictions applicable thereto must be endorsed on the certificate in the form in which the same are made and not made a general provision which is endorsed upon all license certificates. 1940-42 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 289.

    § 613. Replacement license.

    1. In case of the loss, mutilation, or destruction of a license or error in a license, the licensee shall forthwith notify the Commissioner who shall furnish such licensee with a replacement on receipt of $20.00.
    2. A replacement license shall not be issued to any person who has surrendered his or her license to another jurisdiction in connection with obtaining a license in that jurisdiction.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 276 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1987, No. 62 , § 4; 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1989, No. 51 , § 37; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 22, eff. May 15, 2002; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 35; 2019, No. 60 , § 10.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,157. P.L. § 5105. 1927, No. 74 , § 7. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 42.

    Amendments

    —2019. Section heading: Substituted “Replacement” for “Duplicate”.

    Subsec. (a): Inserted “or error in a license” following “destruction of a license”, substituted “replacement” for “duplicate” preceding “on receipt” in the first sentence and deleted the former second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “replacement” for “duplicate” preceding “license shall”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$20.00” for “$15.00” in the first and second sentences.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “certificate” following “license” and substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00” in the first and second sentences of subsec. (a), deleted “certificate” following “duplicate” in the first sentence of subsec. (a), and deleted “certificate” following “license” in subsec. (b).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00” in the first and second sentences.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$5.00” for “$2.00” in the first and second sentences.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “mutilation or destruction” following “case of the loss” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1987. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$2.00” for “fifty cents” following “receipt of”.

    § 614. Rights under license.

    1. An operator’s license shall entitle the holder to operate a registered motor vehicle with the consent of the owner whether employed to do so or not.
    2. A junior operator’s license shall entitle the holder to operate a registered motor vehicle with the consent of the owner, but shall not entitle him or her to operate a motor vehicle in the course of his or her employment or for direct or indirect compensation for one year following issuance of the license, except that the holder may operate a farm tractor with or without compensation upon a public highway in going to and from different parts of a farm of the tractor’s owner or to go to any repair shop for repair purposes. A junior operator’s license shall not entitle the holder to carry passengers for hire.
    3. During the first three months of operation, the holder of a junior operator’s license is restricted to driving alone or with a licensed parent or guardian, licensed or certified driver education instructor, or licensed person at least 25 years of age. During the following three months, a junior operator may additionally transport family members. No person operating with a junior operator’s license shall transport more passengers than there are safety belts unless he or she is operating a vehicle that has not been manufactured with a federally approved safety belt system. A person convicted of operating a motor vehicle in violation of this subsection shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $50.00, and his or her license shall be recalled for a period of 90 days. The provisions of this subsection may be enforced only if a law enforcement officer has detained the operator for another suspected traffic violation.
    4. A nonresident under 18 years of age who is privileged to operate on Vermont highways under section 208 of this title shall be subject to the restrictions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 361 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1999, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2013, No. 57 , § 10; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2015, No. 47 , § 40; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 64.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,158. 1947, No. 202 , § 5379. 1945, No. 102 , § 1. 1943, No. 79 , § 1. P.L. § 5106. 1933, No. 157 , § 4804. 1927, No. 74 , §§ 3, 8. 1925, No. 70 , § 43. G.L. § 4693. 1910, No. 134 . 1908, No. 99 , § 7. P.S. § 4087. 1904, No. 86 , § 5.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Substituted “208” for “411” following “section”.

    —2015. Subsec. (c): Substituted “another suspected traffic violation” for “a suspected violation of another traffic offense” at the end of the last sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —2013. Section amended generally.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); Wisell v. Jorgensen, 136 Vt. 604, 398 A.2d 283, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 918 (1979).

    Notes to Opinions

    Compensation.

    In order to make out a prima facie case of violation of this section by junior operators for accepting tips from riders, it is necessary to show that not only were tips received, but that the giving of the rides was motivated by an understanding expressed or implied, that a tip would be given. 1962-64 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 266.

    Special privileges.

    Commissioner of Motor Vehicles has no right to grant special privileges to holder of junior license. 1926-28 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 57.

    § 615. Unlicensed operators.

        1. An unlicensed person 15 years of age or older may operate a motor vehicle if he or she possesses a valid learner’s permit issued to him or her by the Commissioner, or by another jurisdiction in accordance with section 208 of this title, and if one of the following persons who is not under the influence of alcohol or drugs rides beside him or her: (a) (1) (A) An unlicensed person 15 years of age or older may operate a motor vehicle if he or she possesses a valid learner’s permit issued to him or her by the Commissioner, or by another jurisdiction in accordance with section 208 of this title, and if one of the following persons who is not under the influence of alcohol or drugs rides beside him or her:
          1. his or her licensed parent or guardian;
          2. a licensed or certified driver education instructor;
          3. a licensed examiner of the Department; or
          4. a licensed person at least 25 years of age.
        2. A person described under subdivisions (A)(i)-(iv) of this subdivision (1) who, while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, rides beside an individual whom the person knows to be unlicensed shall be subject to the same penalties as for a violation of subsection 1130(b) of this title. A holder of a learner’s permit shall not be deemed to have violated this section if a person described under subdivisions (A)(i)-(iv) of this subdivision (1) rides beside him or her while the person is under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
        3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a person against whom a revocation or suspension of license is in force, or a person younger than 15 years of age, or a person who has been refused a license by the Commissioner to operate a motor vehicle.
      1. A licensed person who does not possess a valid motorcycle endorsement may operate a motorcycle, with no passengers, only during daylight hours and then only if he or she has upon his or her person a valid motorcycle learner’s permit issued to him or her by the Commissioner.
    1. A person convicted of operating a motor vehicle in violation of this section shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $50.00, and his or her learner’s permit shall be recalled for a period of 90 days. No person may be issued traffic complaints alleging a violation of this section and a violation of section 676 of this title from the same incident. The provisions of this section may be enforced only if a law enforcement officer has detained the operator for another suspected traffic violation.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 133 ; 1963, No. 139 , eff. Aug. 1, 1963; 1983, No. 42 , § 1; 1999, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2013, No. 57 , § 11; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2015, No. 47 , § 41; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 64; 2017, No. 71 , § 11.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,159. P.L. § 5017. 1927, No. 74 , § 9. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 44. G.L. § 4693. 1910, No. 134 . 1908, No. 99 , § 7. P.S. § 4087. 1904, No. 86 , § 5.

    Amendments

    —2017. Subdiv. (a)(1): Amended generally.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “208” for “411” following “section”.

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Substituted “another suspected traffic violation” for “a suspected violation of another traffic offense” at the end of the last sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Inserted “, or by another jurisdiction in accordance with section 411 of this title,” following “Commissioner”.

    —2013. Section amended generally.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “or her” following “in his” and “or she” following “as he”.

    —1983. Subdiv. (a)(1): Added.

    —1963. Section amended generally.

    —1961. Added the second sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Imputed negligence.

    In tort action against driver of automobile, to recover for injuries received in automobile accident through his alleged negligence, where driver was boy under sixteen years of age, his negligence was not as matter of law imputable to licensed driver riding on front seat with him, by which means, under this section, operation of automobile by unlicensed driver was made lawful. Round v. Pike, 102 Vt. 324, 148 A. 283, 1930 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1930).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 616. Extension of license for members of U.S. Armed Forces and immediate family members.

    1. Definition.   As used in this section, “immediate family member” means a child; stepchild; foster child; spouse; domestic partner, as defined in 17 V.S.A. § 2414 ; civil union partner; parent; or parent of a spouse, domestic partner, or civil union partner.
    2. Members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
      1. A resident of Vermont who is a member of the U.S. Armed Forces and who at the time of his or her induction or enlistment into the U.S. Armed Forces, or who during his or her term of service with the U.S. Armed Forces was the holder of a valid Vermont license to operate motor vehicles issued by the Commissioner, shall, notwithstanding the expiration of the license, be entitled to operate a motor vehicle with that expired license during his or her term of service and until 30 days after receiving a discharge from the U.S. Armed Forces, but not to exceed four years from the date of expiration of his or her license.
      2. A resident of Vermont who is a member of the Reserve Component of the U.S. Armed Forces and who at the time he or she is called to active duty was the holder of a valid Vermont license to operate motor vehicles issued by the Commissioner shall, notwithstanding the expiration of such license, be entitled to operate a motor vehicle with that expired license during his or her term of active duty and until 30 days after being released from active duty, but not to exceed four years from the date of expiration of his or her license.
    3. Immediate family members of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
      1. A resident of Vermont who is absent from the State because his or her immediate family member is serving with the U.S. Armed Forces and who had a valid Vermont license to operate motor vehicles issued by the Commissioner at the time of the immediate family member’s induction or enlistment into the U.S. Armed Forces shall, notwithstanding the expiration of the license, be entitled to operate a motor vehicle with that expired license during the immediate family member’s term of service and until 30 days after his or her immediate family member is discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces, but not to exceed four years from the date of expiration of his or her license.
      2. A resident of Vermont who is absent from the State because his or her immediate family member is a member of the Reserve Component of the U.S. Armed Forces who had a valid Vermont license to operate motor vehicles issued by the Commissioner at the time of the immediate family member’s call to active duty shall, notwithstanding the expiration of such license, be entitled to operate a motor vehicle with that expired license during his or her immediate family member’s term of active duty and until 30 days after his or her immediate family is released from active duty, but not to exceed four years from the date of expiration of his or her license.
    4. Proof required.   Any member of the U.S. Armed Forces or immediate family member of a member of the U.S. Armed Forces operating a motor vehicle with an expired license pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) shall, while operating a motor vehicle, carry the last license issued to him or her and conclusive evidence that he or she is a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or the immediate family member of a member of the U.S. Armed Forces and, if the member of the U.S. Armed Forces is discharged or released from active duty, a copy of the applicable DD-214 or similar document of discharge or release from active duty.
    5. Effect of revocation, suspension, or refusal.   Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit an individual against whom a revocation or suspension of license has been issued or is in force, or an individual who has been refused a license by the Commissioner, to operate a motor vehicle.

    HISTORY: Amended 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 33 . 1951, No. 214 .

    Revision note—

    Undesignated paragraphs were designated as subsecs. (a)-(c) to conform section to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 617. Learner’s permit.

    1. Any Vermont resident 15 years of age or over, but under 18 years of age, who has no convictions under section 601, 674, 676, 1091, 1094, 1128, 1133, or 1201 of this title, suspensions under section 1205 of this title, or civil traffic violations under section 1216 of this title in the previous two years, or any Vermont resident 18 years of age or over, may apply to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for a learner’s permit in the form prescribed by the Commissioner. A nonresident may be issued a learner’s permit if the permit is required for purposes of participation in a driver education and training course. After the applicant has successfully passed all parts of the driver’s license examination other than the driving test, the Commissioner may issue to the applicant a learner’s permit that entitles the applicant, subject to section 615 of this title, to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways for a period of two years from the date of issuance. Any learner’s permit may be renewed. This section shall not affect section 602 of this title.
      1. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any licensed person may apply to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for a learner’s permit for the operation of a motorcycle in the form prescribed by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall offer both a motorcycle learner’s permit that authorizes the operation of three-wheeled motorcycles only and a motorcycle learner’s permit that authorizes the operation of any motorcycle. The Commissioner shall require payment of a fee of $20.00 at the time application is made. (b) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any licensed person may apply to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for a learner’s permit for the operation of a motorcycle in the form prescribed by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall offer both a motorcycle learner’s permit that authorizes the operation of three-wheeled motorcycles only and a motorcycle learner’s permit that authorizes the operation of any motorcycle. The Commissioner shall require payment of a fee of $20.00 at the time application is made.
      2. After the applicant has successfully passed all parts of the applicable motorcycle endorsement examination, other than a skill test, the Commissioner may issue to the applicant a learner’s permit that entitles the applicant, subject to subsection 615(a) of this title, to operate a three-wheeled motorcycle only, or to operate any motorcycle, upon the public highways for a period of 120 days from the date of issuance. The fee for the examination shall be $9.00.
      3. A motorcycle learner’s permit may be renewed only twice upon payment of a $20.00 fee. If, during the original permit period and two renewals the permittee has not successfully passed the applicable skill test or motorcycle rider training course, he or she may not obtain another motorcycle learner’s permit for a period of 12 months from the expiration of the permit unless:
        1. he or she has successfully completed the applicable motorcycle rider training course; or
        2. the learner’s permit and renewals thereof authorized the operation of any motorcycle and the permittee is seeking a learner’s permit for the operation of three-wheeled motorcycles only.
      4. This section shall not affect section 602 of this title.
    2. No learner’s permit may be issued to any person under 18 years of age unless the parent or guardian of, or a person standing in loco parentis to, the applicant files his or her written consent to the issuance with the Commissioner.
    3. An applicant shall pay $20.00 to the Commissioner for each learner’s permit or a duplicate or renewal thereof.
      1. A learner’s permit, which is not a learner’s permit for the operation of a motorcycle, shall contain a photograph or imaged likeness of the individual if the permit is obtained in person. The photographic learner’s permit shall be available at locations designated by the Commissioner. (e) (1) A learner’s permit, which is not a learner’s permit for the operation of a motorcycle, shall contain a photograph or imaged likeness of the individual if the permit is obtained in person. The photographic learner’s permit shall be available at locations designated by the Commissioner.
      2. An individual issued a permit under this subsection may renew his or her permit by mail or online, but a permit holder who chooses to have a photograph or imaged likeness under this subsection must renew in person so that an updated imaged likeness of the individual is obtained not less often than once every nine years.
      1. The Commissioner may authorize motorcycle rider training instructors to administer a motorcycle endorsement examination for three-wheeled motorcycles only or for any motorcycle, or a motorcycle skill test for three-wheeled motorcycles only or for any motorcycle, or any of these. Upon successful completion of the applicable examination or test, the instructor shall issue to the applicant either a temporary motorcycle learner’s permit or notice of motorcycle endorsement, as appropriate. The instructor shall immediately forward to the Commissioner the application and fee together with such additional information as the Commissioner may require. (f) (1) The Commissioner may authorize motorcycle rider training instructors to administer a motorcycle endorsement examination for three-wheeled motorcycles only or for any motorcycle, or a motorcycle skill test for three-wheeled motorcycles only or for any motorcycle, or any of these. Upon successful completion of the applicable examination or test, the instructor shall issue to the applicant either a temporary motorcycle learner’s permit or notice of motorcycle endorsement, as appropriate. The instructor shall immediately forward to the Commissioner the application and fee together with such additional information as the Commissioner may require.
      2. The Commissioner shall maintain a list of approved in-state and out-of-state motorcycle rider training courses, successful completion of which the Commissioner shall deem to satisfy the skill test requirement. This list shall include courses that provide training on three-wheeled motorcycles.

    HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 107 ; amended 1965, No. 177 ; 1981, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 2, 1982; 1983, No. 8 ; 1983, No. 42 , § 2; 1989, No. 51 , § 38; 1989, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. June 21, 1990; 1995, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1997, No. 9 , § 1, eff. July 1, 1996; 1997, No. 9 , § 1, eff. July 1, 1996; 1997, No. 9, § 2, eff. May 6, 1997; 1999, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 23, eff. May 15, 2002; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 35; 2005, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2009, No. 50 , § 47; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 36; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 43, eff. June 1, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Amended generally.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsecs. (b) and (f): Amended generally.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “$20.00” for “$17.00” in the second and fourth sentences and “$9.00” for “$7.00” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted “the age of” following “person under” and inserted “of age” following “18 years”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “$20.00” for “$17.00” and deleted “that is not a motorcycle learner’s permit” following “learner’s permit”

    —2009. Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence and added “upon payment of a $17.00 fee” after “twice” at the end of the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “$17.00” for “$15.00.”

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 188 substituted “Vermont resident” for “person” in two places in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 175 substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00”.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Inserted “that is not a motorcycle learner’s permit”.

    Subsec. (e): Substituted “shall contain a photograph or imaged likeness of the person” for “may, if requested contain a photograph” in the first sentence, deleted the former third sentence, and added the present third and fourth sentences.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 75 inserted “but under 18 years of age” following “15 years of age or over” and “or any person over 18 years of age or over” following “previous two years” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 102 substituted “$10.00” for “$7.00”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “15 years” for “fifteen years” and inserted “who has no convictions under sections 601, 674, 676, 1091, 1094, 1128, 1133 or 1201 of this title, suspensions under section 1205 of this title, or civil traffic violations under section 1216 of this title in the previous two years” preceding “may apply” in the first sentence.

    —1997. Subsec. (b): Substituted “120 days” for “60 days” in the second sentence, “twice” for “once” at the end of the third sentence, and “two renewals” for “one renewal” preceding “, the permittee has not” and “successfully passed” for “taken” thereafter and added “unless he or she has successfully completed the motorcycle rider training course” at the end of the fourth sentence and made a minor change in phraseology.

    Subsec. (f): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Substituted “a motorcycle” for “any” preceding “learner’s permit may be reviewed” and added “only once” thereafter in the third sentence, and added the fourth and sixth sentences.

    Subsec. (d): Deleted the former second sentence.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Substituted “$7.00” for “$5.00” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (d): Substituted “$5.00” for “two dollars”.

    Subsec. (e): Substituted “$5.00” for “the same as that determined by the commissioner for licenses pursuant to section 610b of this title” at the end of the third sentence.

    —1983. Act No. 8 substituted “two years” for “one year” following “period of” in the second sentence of subsec. (a) and “two dollars” for “one dollar” following “pay” in subsec. (c).

    Act No. 42 added present subsec. (b), redesignated former subsecs. (b)-(d) as present subsecs. (c)-(e), respectively, and inserted “which is not a learner’s permit for the operation of a motorcycle” preceding “may, if” in the first sentence of present subsec. (e).

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1965. Added present subsec. (b) and redesignated former subsec. (b) as present subsec. (c).

    Retroactive effective date of subsec. (e). 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 44(c) provides: “Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , Sec. 43 (learner’s permits; 23 V.S.A. § 617(e) ) shall take effect retroactively on June 1, 2020.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Motorcycle rider training program, see § 733 of this title.

    § 618. Repealed. 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 41.

    History

    Former § 618. Former § 618, relating to anatomical gifts, was derived from 1975, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 2 and amended by 1977, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.); 1989, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; and 1993, No. 122 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    2008 Repeal. Section repealed in accordance with 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 41 and 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    § 618a. Anatomical Gift Act; donor; form.

    The Commissioner shall provide a form that, upon the licensee’s execution, shall serve as a document of an anatomical gift under 18 V.S.A. chapter 110. An indicator shall be placed on the license of any person who has executed an anatomical gift form in accordance with this section.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 39 , § 14; amended 2009, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “chapter 110” for “chapter 109” in the first sentence.

    Subchapter 2. Examinations

    § 631. Requirements; rules.

    1. The Commissioner may adopt rules pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 governing the examination of new applicants for operator’s licenses and may prescribe requirements to obtain or hold a license or learner’s permit, by either a new or renewal applicant, as to driving experience, mental and physical qualifications, and any other matter or thing that, in his or her judgment, will contribute to the selection of safe and efficient operators.
    2. Any written forms, applications, or tests used by the Department of Motor Vehicles for operator licensing shall be translated into primary languages of nations from which individuals assisted by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants Vermont in the prior 10 years hail, as determined on an annual basis by the Department in consultation with the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants Vermont, and available at all Department locations and on the Department’s website if the English version is available. Nothing in this subsection is intended to require the Department to translate any educational manuals.

    HISTORY: Amended 1999, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 2019, No. 60 , § 23, eff. Oct. 1, 2020.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,052. P.L. § 4993. 1927, No. 74 , § 3. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 8.

    Amendments

    —2019. Subsec. (a): Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and substituted “operator’s” for “operators”’, “requirements” for “what shall be requisite”, and “that” for “which”.

    Subsec. (b): Added.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “either a new or renewal” for “either an old or a new” preceding “applicant” and inserted “or her” preceding “judgment”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “rules” for “regulations” in the section heading, and “may adopt rules pursuant to chapter 25 of Title 3 governing” for “may make regulations governing”, inserted “or learner’s permits” following “operator’s licenses”, and substituted “requisite to obtain or hold a license or learner’s permit” for “requisite to obtaining or holding a license”.

    Notes to Opinions

    Inmates.

    The fact that a person is an institutional inmate does not alone, under any statute, prohibit the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles from issuing a driver’s license to that person, or require the Commissioner to suspend or revoke a license. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 93.

    § 632. Examination required; waiver.

    1. Before an operator’s or a junior operator’s license is issued to an applicant for the first time in this State, or before a renewal license is issued to an applicant whose previous Vermont license had expired more than three years prior to the application for renewal, the applicant shall pass a satisfactory examination, except that the Commissioner may, in his or her discretion, waive the examination when the applicant holds a chauffeur’s or operator’s license in force at the time of application or within three years prior to the application in some other jurisdiction where an examination is required similar to the examination required in this State.
    2. The examination shall consist of:
      1. an oral or written examination;
      2. a thorough road test; and
      3. at the discretion of the Commissioner, such other examination or demonstration as he or she may prescribe, including an oral eye examination.
    3. An applicant may have an individual of his or her choosing at the oral examination or road test to serve as an interpreter, including to translate any oral commands given as part of the road test.

    HISTORY: Amended 1985, No. 118 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2015, No. 47 , § 16; 2019, No. 60 , § 9; 2019, No. 60 , § 24, eff. Oct. 1, 2020; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 89 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,145. P.L. § 5094. 1927, No. 74 , § 10. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 45. G.L. § 4692. P.S. § 4086. 1904, No. 86 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “three years” for “one year”.

    —2019. Subsec. (a): Substituted “prior to” for “of” following “one year” and “jurisdiction” for “state” following “some other”.

    Subdiv. (b)(3): Added “, including an oral eye examination”.

    Subdiv. (c): Added.

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or her” preceding “discretion” and “at the time of application or within one year of the application” preceding “in some other state” and substituted “where” for “wherein” thereafter in the first sentence and inserted “or she” following “he” in the second sentence.

    § 633. Examiners.

    Inspectors appointed under the provisions of section 103 of this title shall also be examiners of new applicants for operators’ licenses.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,146. 1947, No. 202 , § 5367. P.L. § 5095. 1927, No. 74 , § 3. 1925, No. 70 , § 13.

    § 634. Fee for examination.

    1. The fee for an examination for a learner’s permit shall be $32.00. The fee for an examination to obtain an operator’s license when the applicant is required to pass an examination pursuant to section 632 of this title shall be $19.00. The fee for a motorcycle skill test to obtain a motorcycle endorsement shall be $19.00.
    2. A scheduling fee of $24.00 shall be paid by the applicant before he or she may schedule the road test required under section 632 of this title. Unless an applicant gives the Department at least 48 hours’ notice of cancellation, if the applicant does not appear as scheduled, the $24.00 scheduling fee is forfeited. If the applicant appears for the scheduled road test, the fee shall be applied toward the license examination fee. The Commissioner may waive the scheduling fee until the Department is capable of administering the fee electronically.
    3. The Department of Motor Vehicles shall not implement any procedures or processes for identifying applicants for licenses, learner permits, or nondriver identification cards that involve the use of biometric identifiers. Pursuant to the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 31308, this subsection shall not apply to applicants for commercial driver licenses or endorsements on these licenses.

    HISTORY: Amended 1975, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1989, No. 51 , § 39; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 24, eff. May 15, 2002; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 36; 2009, No. 50 , § 48; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 37.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,147. P.L. § 5096. 1927, No. 74 , § 10. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 45.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$32.00” for “$30.00” in the first sentence and “$19.00” for “$18.00” in the second and third sentences of subsec. (a); added new subsec. (b); and redesignated former subsec. (b) as subsec. (c).

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “$30.00” for “$28.00” in the first sentence, “$18.00” for “$17.00” in the second sentence, and added the third sentence.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$28.00” for “$25.00” in the first sentence and substituted “$17.00” for “$15.00” in the last sentence.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$25.00” for “$20.00” in the first sentence, and “$15.00” for “$5.00” in the second sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Designated existing provisions of section as subsec. (a), amended subsec. (a) generally, and added subsec. (b).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$20.00” for “$15.00” and “$15.00” for “$10.00” in the first sentence.

    —1989. Substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00” preceding “for the first examination, and” and “$10.00” for “$5.00” thereafter.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$10.00 for the first examination, and $5.00 for any additional examination” for “$2.00” preceding “and shall be paid” in the first sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Commercial driver’s license test and endorsement fees, see § 4108 of this title.

    License fees, see § 608 of this title.

    § 635. Place of examinations.

    The Commissioner shall cause examinations of operators to be held at such convenient times and places throughout the State as he or she may determine.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 74 , § 2.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,149. P.L. § 5098. 1927, No. 74 , § 3. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 47.

    Amendments

    —1971. Deleted the second sentence.

    § 636. Special examinations.

      1. Whenever the Commissioner has good cause to believe that any holder of an operator’s license, or any applicant for renewal of an operator’s license, is incompetent or otherwise not qualified to be licensed, he or she may require such person to submit to a special examination to determine his or her capabilities or mental or physical fitness. A person shall not be required to pay to the State a fee for such special examination, except for a component of an examination conducted by an authorized medical professional. (a) (1) Whenever the Commissioner has good cause to believe that any holder of an operator’s license, or any applicant for renewal of an operator’s license, is incompetent or otherwise not qualified to be licensed, he or she may require such person to submit to a special examination to determine his or her capabilities or mental or physical fitness. A person shall not be required to pay to the State a fee for such special examination, except for a component of an examination conducted by an authorized medical professional.
      2. If the Commissioner determines that a special examination is warranted, then a driving examination shall be administered. If, under the Commissioner’s discretion, extenuating circumstances exist, the Commissioner may also administer a written or oral examination or require an examination by a medical professional under section 637 of this title. A driving, written, or oral examination shall be given at a time and place as the Commissioner may determine.
    1. Upon the conclusion of such examination, the Commissioner shall take action as may be appropriate and may suspend or revoke the license or right of such person to operate a motor vehicle or may issue a license subject to restrictions as permitted under section 612 of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 2009, No. 50 , § 101; 2015, No. 47 , § 17.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 89 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,148. P.L. § 5097. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 46.

    Revision note—

    Undesignated paragraphs were designated as subsecs. (a) and (b) to conform section to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Added the third and fourth sentences.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Nondriver identification card, issued at no charge in certain instances, see § 115 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Bradley, 145 Vt. 492, 494 A.2d 129, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 319 (1985).

    § 637. Examiners of physical and mental conditions.

    The Commissioner may designate physicians, licensed physician assistants, licensed advanced practice registered nurses, ophthalmologists, oculists, and optometrists properly registered and authorized to practice in this State or in an adjoining state as examiners of operators. The Commissioner may refer any matter relative to the issuing, suspending, or reinstating of licenses that concerns the physical or mental condition or eyesight of any applicant for or holder of a license or any petitioner for reinstatement to, and require the applicant or other person to be examined by, such examiner in the vicinity of the person’s residence as he or she determines to be qualified to examine and report. Such examiner shall report to the Commissioner the true and actual result of examinations made by him or her together with his or her decision as to whether the person examined should be granted or allowed to retain an operator’s license or permitted to operate a motor vehicle.

    HISTORY: Amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 65.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 122 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,150. P.L. § 5099. 1927, No. 74 , § 3. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 49.

    Revision note

    —2020. In the first sentence, substituted “licensed” for “certified” preceding “physician assistants” in light of 2011, No. 6 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 638. Repealed. 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 66.

    History

    Former § 638. Former § 638, relating to dissatisfaction with physical and mental examination, was derived from 1955, No. 122 , § 2; V.S. 1947, § 10,151; 1947, No. 202 , § 5372; P.L. § 5100; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 70 , § 49 and amended by 1969, No. 50 .

    § 639. Fees for physical and mental examinations.

    The compensation of the examiners provided in section 637 of this title shall be paid by the person examined.

    HISTORY: Amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 67.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 122 , § 3. V.S. 1947, § 10,152. P.L. § 5101. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 49.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “section 637” for “sections 637 and 638”.

    Subchapter 3. Suspension and Revocation

    History

    Diversion program for driving with a suspended license. 2011, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 2 as amended by 2013, No. 18 , § 1a, provides: “(a) The court administrator, the court diversion program, and the department of motor vehicles shall work cooperatively in an effort to assist Vermonters who have a suspended motor vehicle operator’s license to regain their license through participation in the DLS diversion program, as provided in this section.

    “(b)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, the court administrator shall notify a person who has had his or her operator’s license suspended that he or she is eligible to participate in the DLS diversion program, which is intended to assist people in regaining their operator’s license. A person shall be eligible to participate in the DLS diversion program if the person completes all the requirements of the underlying violation and the suspension and if, as a result, the person would otherwise be eligible to regain his or her license if not for unmet financial obligations.

    “(2) A person whose operator’s license is suspended for a violation of 23 V.S.A. §§ 1091(b) , 1094(b), 1128(b) or (c), or 1201 or 1205 shall not be eligible to participate in the DLS diversion program with respect to the suspension for such violation.

    “(3) The notice shall provide that:

    “(A) The program is designed to assist the person to get his or her driver’s license reinstated prior to completion of payment of any debt related to the suspension.

    “(B) The person may be eligible for a reduction in the amount of the person’s financial obligation to the state or may be permitted to establish a reasonable payment plan to discharge the debt.

    “(C) The program is voluntary but agreeing to participate would include certain requirements including:

    “(i) meeting with diversion staff to assess the person’s risks and to identify factors that contributed to previous violations leading to license suspension.

    “(ii) completing all conditions related to the offense and indicated by the screening process that are imposed by the diversion program.

    “(4) The court administrator may charge the cost of preparing and sending the notice against revenues collected pursuant to this subsection.

    “(c) Upon receiving a request from a person who has been issued a notice pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the diversion program shall register the person in the DLS diversion program. The program staff shall meet with the person to assess the person’s risks and to identify factors that contributed to previous violations leading to license suspension. Based upon the assessment, the program shall develop a contract with the person that may include:

    “(1) Adherence to a plan to pay fines and fees required to reinstate a driver’s license.

    “(2) Acquiring and showing proof of auto insurance.

    “(3) Performance of community service.

    “(4) Completion of a driving education program.

    “(5) Any other conditions related to the reasons for the violation that led to license suspension.

    “(d) A person with violations of 23 V.S.A. § 676 may apply to the DLS Diversion Program. Upon receipt of an application and determination of eligibility, the Diversion Program shall send the person a notice to report to the Diversion Program. The notice to report shall provide that the person is required to meet with diversion staff for the purposes of assessment and to complete all conditions of the diversion contract as provided in subsection (c) of this section.

    “(e) The diversion program shall notify the judicial bureau of acceptance of a person into the DLS diversion program and that a contract has been agreed to by the parties. Upon approval of the contract and any related payment plan, the judicial bureau shall notify the department of motor vehicles of compliance with the contract and the person shall be eligible to have his or her license reinstated, provided the person remains in compliance with the diversion contract. The department of motor vehicles may suspend a person’s license for failure to comply with the diversion contract.

    “(f) The DLS diversion program shall work cooperatively with the judicial bureau to establish a reasonable payment plan for fines and fees owed by a person enrolled in the program. In addition to any remedies already provided, the judicial bureau may do the following in cases involving a person enrolled in the DLS diversion program:

    “(1) Reduce the amount of fines or fees owed in exchange for community service or education, or both, as provided in a diversion contract.

    “(2) Withdraw any debt placed for collection with a collection agency or the department of taxes.

    “(g) The court diversion program, in cooperation with the judiciary, shall adopt standards for operating the DLS diversion program, including determining whether a person is in compliance with conditions as set forth in this section. The standards shall specifically identify circumstances, such as additional violations or accumulation of points, which shall require additional contract conditions and circumstances that will result in dismissal from the program. Such standards shall be applicable in all county diversion programs.

    “(h) Each participant shall pay a fee to the local adult court diversion project. The amount of the fee shall be determined by the program using a sliding-scale fee based on financial means of the participant. The fee shall not exceed $300.00. Notwithstanding 32 V.S.A. § 502(a) , fees collected under this subsection shall be retained and used solely for the purpose of the DLS diversion program.

    “(i) The court administrator shall begin notification as provided in subsection (b) of this section by January 15, 2013, at which time the DLS diversion program shall be operational. Priority shall be given to persons determined to be at highest risk of acquiring a criminal DLS pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 674 due to an accumulation of civil suspension violations pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 676 .

    “(j) The department of motor vehicles and the court administrator shall coordinate a method for determining the appropriate mechanism to inform people about the DLS diversion program.

    “(k) The court administrator, the director of the court diversion program, and the commissioner of motor vehicles shall jointly report to the general assembly on or before December 15, 2014 on the following:

    “(1) implementation of the DLS diversion program;

    “(2) the number of people enrolled in the program;

    “(3) the number of people who have successfully completed the program;

    “(4) the number of licenses reinstated;

    “(5) the number of fines and amounts modified;

    “(6) additional money collected by the state as a result of the program;

    “(7) the advisability of implementing the program through roadside stops for driving without a license; and

    “(8) extending the program to persons who are currently prohibited from participation pursuant to subdivision (b)(2) of this section.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Anatomical gift indications not invalidated because of revocation or suspension, see 18 V.S.A. § 5250e .

    List of suspended licenses, see § 109 of this title.

    Recall of learner’s permit or junior operator’s license, see § 607a of this title.

    Surrender of license following revocation or suspension, see § 204 of this title.

    Suspension of license for failure to furnish evidence of financial responsibility, see § 802 of this title.

    Suspension of license for impersonation, false representation, counterfeit, fraud, or misuse, see §§ 202 and 203 of this title.

    Suspension of license for issuing bad check, see § 110 of this title.

    Suspension of license for noncompliance with child support orders, see 15 V.S.A. § 798 .

    Suspension of license for nonpayment of traffic violation judgments, see 4 V.S.A. § 1109 .

    Suspension of license for possession of cannabis by an individual under 21 years of age, see 18 V.S.A. § 4230b .

    Suspension of license pursuant to point assessment system, see chapter 25 of this title.

    Suspension of license related to alcohol; individuals under 21 years of age, see 7 V.S.A. § 656 .

    Suspension and disqualification of a commercial driver’s license; diesel fuel and gasoline taxes, see §§ 3009, 3103, 3706, and 4116-4119 of this title.

    Suspension and revocation of license for driving while under the influence of alcohol or other substance; refusing to submit to a blood alcohol content test, see chapter 13, subchapter 13 of this title.

    Suspension or revocation of license following special examination, see § 636 of this title.

    § 671. Procedure.

    1. In his or her discretion, the Commissioner may suspend indefinitely or for a definite time the license of an operator, or the right of an unlicensed individual to operate a motor vehicle, after opportunity for a hearing upon not less than 15 days’ notice, if the Commissioner has reason to believe that the holder thereof is an individual who is incompetent to operate a motor vehicle or is operating improperly so as to endanger the public. If, upon receipt of such notice, the individual requests a hearing, such suspension shall not take effect unless the Commissioner, after hearing, determines that the suspension is justified. If the Commissioner imposes a suspension, he or she may order the license delivered to him or her. Not less than six months from the date of suspension and each six months thereafter, an individual upon whom such suspension has been imposed may apply for reinstatement of his or her license or right to operate or for a new license. Upon receipt of such application, the Commissioner shall thereupon cause an investigation to be made and, if so requested, conduct a hearing to determine whether such suspension should be continued in effect.
    2. In his or her discretion, the Commissioner may suspend for a period not exceeding 15 days the license of an operator, or the right of an unlicensed individual to operate a motor vehicle, without hearing, whenever he or she finds upon full reports submitted by an enforcement officer or motor vehicle inspector that the safety of the public has been or will be imperiled as a result of the operation of a motor vehicle by such operator or unlicensed individual.
    3. The Commissioner may suspend the license of an operator, or the right of an unlicensed individual to operate a motor vehicle, while a prosecution for an offense under this title is pending against such individual if:
      1. the Commissioner finds upon full reports submitted to him or her by an enforcement officer or motor vehicle inspector that the safety of the public will be imperiled by permitting such operator or such unlicensed individual to operate a motor vehicle; or
      2. the Commissioner finds that such operator is seeking to delay the prosecution.
    4. The Commissioner shall not suspend the license of an operator, or the right of an unlicensed individual to operate a motor vehicle, for any cause that has constituted the subject matter of a prosecution in which the conviction of such individual has not been obtained.
    5. The Commissioner shall revoke licenses obtained fraudulently. The Commissioner shall also revoke licenses when required by law, and such revocation shall not entitle the holder of such license to hearing.
    6. If a hearing is required under the provisions of this section, it shall be held in accordance with the provisions of sections 105-107 of this title and at such time and place as the Commissioner may determine. It shall be in the discretion of the Commissioner to determine the granting of a hearing and subsequent hearing in response to a petition for a hearing in connection with suspension orders issued under the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
    7. Notwithstanding subsection (d) of this section, if the Commissioner receives official notice, in any form he or she deems appropriate, that an individual’s right to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked in another jurisdiction, the Commissioner may suspend the individual’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this State after the opportunity for a hearing upon not less than 15 days’ notice. If the individual’s license or right to operate is subsequently reinstated by the other jurisdiction, the individual may apply to the Commissioner for reinstatement of his or her license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this State.

    HISTORY: Amended 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. July 1, 1979; 1979, No. 79 , § 1, eff. May 10, 1979; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 144; 2015, No. 47 , § 18; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 156; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 9.

    History

    Editor’s note

    —2020. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2019 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 131 and 149, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2019 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 131 and 149 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. Subsecs. (a) and (c) were each amended in one conflicting way by these two acts. In those instances, only the amendments from Act No. 149 are reflected in the text, however, and not the amendments from Act No. 131, as the stated purpose of Act No. 131 was to make only technical amendments and § 303 of the act specified that, to the extent that Act No. 131 may conflict with other acts of the same biennium, “the substantive changes in other acts shall take precedence over the technical changes of this act.” The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act Nos. 131 and 149 substituted “individual” for “person” and “an individual” for “a person” three times, and “Not” for “No” in the beginning of the fourth sentence; and Act No. 149 substituted “individual requests” for “person so notified shall request” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 131 substituted “individual” for ”person” twice.

    Subsec. (c): Amended generally by Act No. 149; and Act No. 131 substituted “individual” for “person” three times.

    Subsec. (d): Act Nos. 131 and 149 substituted “individual” for “person” twice and “that” for “which has” preceding “constituted the subject matter”.

    Subsec. (f): Act No. 131 substituted “for a hearing” for “therefor” following “in response to a petition”.

    Subsec. (g): Added by Act No. 149.

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “a person who is incompetent” for “an improper or incompetent person” following “thereof is”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added the first sentence and inserted “also” preceding “revoke” in the second sentence.

    —1979. Subsec. (g): Added.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “no” for “not” preceding “less” in the fourth sentence of subsec. (a), deleted former subsec. (c), redesignated former subsecs. (d)-(g) as present subsecs. (c)-(f), respectively, and substituted “(b) and (c)” for “(b)-(d)” following “subsections” in the second sentence of present subsec. (f).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Request for presuspension or prerevocation hearing, see § 204(d) of this title.

    Notes to Opinions

    Inmates.

    The fact that a person is an institutional inmate does not alone, under any statute, prohibit the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles from issuing a driver’s license to that person, or require the Commissioner to suspend or revoke a license. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 93.

    Period of time.

    The period of time for which Commissioner may suspend or revoke the license of persons convicted of driving while under suspension under section 674 of this title is graduated depending on the terms of imprisonment provided therein. 1958-60 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 235.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    This section is not constitutionally infirm because of its failure to require a hearing prior to suspension of motor vehicle operator’s license, since Due Process Clause does not require that Vermont provide a separate pre-suspension hearing determining degree of hardship suspension will cause to motorists who face possible suspension of their operator’s licenses; opportunity to contest the actual traffic offense in court provides the motorist with a hearing which is sufficient to meet due process standards. Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977), amended, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    This section does not violate Equal Protection Clause since rational basis exists for providing pre-suspension hearing for Vermont licensees who have been convicted of motor vehicle offenses in other states and who are deemed improper or incompetent to operate motor vehicles, while denying pre-suspension hearings for Vermont licensees convicted of traffic offense in Vermont; those convicted of traffic offenses outside Vermont who are provided with pre-suspension hearings would otherwise have no opportunity to be heard in Vermont, while those traffic offenders inside Vermont who are denied pre-suspension hearings retain the right to a full judicial hearing in Vermont on the facts underlying the charges against them. Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977), amended, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Since Commissioner’s procedural guidelines administered in suspending motor vehicle operator’s licenses are reasonably specific and ascertainable and prescribe suspensions which are both within the statutory maximum and within normally acceptable limits, the scheme of this section does not unconstitutionally fail to provide standards for the exercise of administrative discretion. Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977), amended, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Hearing.

    Where notice of suspension of motor vehicle operator’s license did not give any indication of operator’s right to a hearing, and operator failed to request a hearing, even though the guarantees of hearing pursuant to this section apply to suspension of an operator’s license, operator could not claim that his rights were infringed in view of agreed statement of facts and his admission that he did utter a bad check in payment of license; however, better procedure would be that notice contain reference to provisions of this section, indicating opportunity for hearing upon request. Bauer v. Malloy, 135 Vt. 175, 376 A.2d 17, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 579 (1977).

    Suspension criteria.

    Suspension under subsec. (c) of this section must follow prescribed administrative criteria. Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Cady, 136 Vt. 29, 383 A.2d 607, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 680 (1978).

    Law Reviews —

    For note, “Two for the Road: Administrative License Revocations and Multiple Punishments Under the Double Jeopardy Clause,” see 21 Vt. L. Rev. 1259 (1997).

    For note relating to proposed administrative license suspension procedures, see 11 Vt. L. Rev. 75 (1986).

    § 671a. Repealed. 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 12.

    History

    Former § 671a. Former § 671a, relating to suspension or revocation of operator’s license for out-of-state conviction, was derived from 1959, No. 234 , §§ 1-3 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10 and 1985, No. 84 , § 2.

    § 672. Suspending or revoking right of nonresident operator.

    1. The Commissioner may suspend or revoke the right of any nonresident operator to operate a motor vehicle in this State for the same causes and under the same conditions and in the same manner that he or she could suspend or revoke the license of any resident operator.  Thereupon the right of such nonresident operator to operate any motor vehicle in this State shall terminate, and he or she shall be subject to the same penalties as a resident operator who operates after the suspension or revocation of his or her license.
    2. Whenever a nonresident operator has his or her right to operate a motor vehicle in this State suspended or revoked, the Commissioner shall mail a copy of the notice of suspension or revocation as well as a copy of the court document resulting in the suspension or revocation to the state or province of residence or licensing.

    HISTORY: Amended 1985, No. 85 , § 5.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,161. P.L. § 5109. 1927, No. 74 , § 3. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 84.

    Amendments

    —1985. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    § 673. Repealed. 1967, No. 147, § 53(b), eff. Oct. 1, 1968.

    History

    Former § 673. Former § 673, relating to suspension of licenses of persons who received town assistance, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,162; 1939, No. 119 , § 1; 1937, No. 120 , § 1.

    § 673a. Habitual offenders.

    1. The Commissioner shall revoke the license of an operator or the right of an unlicensed individual to operate a motor vehicle for a period of two years when the individual is a habitual violator of the motor vehicle laws.
    2. As used in this section, “habitual violator” means any person who has been convicted in any court in this State of eight or more moving violations each of which would result in point assessments of six or more points, including violations of section 1201 of this title, arising out of different incidents within a consecutive period of five years.
    3. The individual may within 15 days after the notice of revocation request a hearing solely for the purpose of verifying the conviction record, and the revocation shall not take effect until the hearing has been held in accordance with the provisions of sections 105-107 of this title and the record has been verified.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 231 (Adj. Sess.); amended 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. July 1, 1979; 1981, No. 229 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 157.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “individual” for “person” twice and substituted “a” for “an” preceding “habitual”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “As used in this section,” for “The term” and substituted “means” for “as used herein, shall mean”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “individual” for “person” preceding “may within 15 days” and “after” for “of” thereafter.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “six” for “6” preceding “or more points”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “The” for “Upon receipt of the notice of revocation, the”, “15” for “ten”; and inserted “of the notice of revocation” following “days”.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “each of which would result in point assessments of 6 or more points including violations of section 1201 of this title” preceding “arising” and made other minor changes in punctuation.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “ten” for “five” preceding “days request”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Point assessments for moving violations, see § 2502 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Notice.

    Where driver had pleaded guilty to his seventh, eighth, and ninth traffic violations, but later moved to withdraw guilty pleas as being involuntary because of his unawareness of the full consequence of his pleas, a two year license suspension for anyone having eight or more violations within a five year period, and evidence showed that in at least two of the violations driver was given ticket containing prominent notice of possible liabilities if guilty, motion to withdraw guilty plea was correctly refused, for driver had received adequate notice as to the consequences of such a plea. State v. Rich, 132 Vt. 277, 316 A.2d 523, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 333 (1974).

    Ordinance violations.

    Violations of municipal ordinances or regulations relating to vehicle speed also constitute violations of the State statutory provisions relating to vehicle speed and, being moving violations, fall within the purview of this section. Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981).

    Where traffic citation indicated that a violation of both ordinance and State statute was charged, Supreme Court found that citation charged a State statute and that the reference to the ordinance was mere surplusage, so that argument license to drive could not be revoked under this section, allowing revocation after eight state law moving violations in five consecutive years, because one of driver’s violations was of an ordinance, was of no avail. Taylor v. Malloy, 138 Vt. 66, 411 A.2d 1357, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1044 (1980).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Bradley, 145 Vt. 492, 494 A.2d 129, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 319 (1985).

    § 674. Operating after suspension or revocation of license; penalty; removal of registration plates; towing.

      1. Except as provided in section 676 of this title, a person whose license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked for a violation of this section or subsection 1091(b), 1094(b), or 1128(b) or (c) of this title and who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway before the suspension period imposed for the violation has expired shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $5,000.00, or both. (a) (1) Except as provided in section 676 of this title, a person whose license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked for a violation of this section or subsection 1091(b), 1094(b), or 1128(b) or (c) of this title and who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway before the suspension period imposed for the violation has expired shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $5,000.00, or both.
      2. A person who violates section 676 of this title for the third or subsequent time shall, if the two prior offenses occurred within two years of the third offense and on or after December 1, 2016, be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $5,000.00, or both.
      3. Violations of section 676 of this title that occurred prior to the date a person successfully completes the DLS Diversion Program shall not be counted as prior offenses under subdivision (2) of this subsection.
    1. Except as authorized in section 1213 of this title, a person whose license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked for a violation of section 1201 of this title or has been suspended under section 1205 of this title and who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway before reinstatement of the license shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $5,000.00, or both. The sentence shall be subject to the following mandatory minimum terms:
      1. For the first offense, the defendant shall pay a mandatory minimum fine of $300.00 or complete 40 hours of community service. In the event that no term of imprisonment, suspended or to serve, is imposed, the community service shall be performed within 120 days. Failure to submit proof of completion of the 40 hours within 120 days shall constitute civil contempt unless the defendant requests an extension for good cause shown prior to expiration of the 120 days.
      2. For a second offense occurring within five years, the defendant shall pay a mandatory minimum fine of $750.00 or complete 80 hours of community service. In the event that no term of imprisonment, suspended or to serve, is imposed, the community service shall be performed within 120 days. Failure to submit proof of completion of the 80 hours within 120 days shall constitute civil contempt unless the defendant requests an extension for good cause shown prior to expiration of the 120 days.
      3. For the third offense occurring within five years, the defendant shall serve at least 12 days of preapproved furlough with community restitution.
      4. For the fourth offense occurring within five years, the defendant shall serve at least 18 days of preapproved furlough with community restitution.
      5. For the fifth and subsequent offenses occurring within five years, the defendant shall be imprisoned at least 16 consecutive days in a correctional facility. The sentence may not be suspended or deferred.
    2. An enforcement officer shall have the authority to remove any number plates from a motor vehicle that is being operated by a person in violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section. The Commissioner shall be notified in writing and may, in his or her sole discretion, cause the plates to be returned to the registered owner or lessee for good cause shown.
    3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, when a conviction for a violation of this section and a conviction for a violation of section 1201 of this title result from the same incident, any penalty or suspension or revocation of a person’s license or privilege to operate shall be imposed to be consecutive and not concurrent.
    4. In determining appropriate fines under this section, the court may take into account the income of the defendant.
    5. For purposes of this section and section 676 of this title, the suspension period for a violation of section 1201 or 1205 of this title shall not be deemed to expire until the person has complied with section 1209a of this title and the person’s license has been reinstated.
    6. In establishing a prima facie case against a person accused of violating this section, the court shall accept as evidence a printout attested to by the law enforcement officer as the person’s motor vehicle record showing convictions and resulting license suspensions. The admitted motor vehicle record shall establish a permissive inference that the person was under suspension on the dates and time periods set forth in the record. No certified copy shall be required from the Department of Motor Vehicles to establish the permissive inference.
    7. At the time of sentencing after a second or subsequent conviction under subsection (b) of this section, the court may, in addition to any penalty imposed by law, order that the motor vehicle operated by the person at the time of the offense be immobilized. At the time of sentencing after a third or subsequent conviction under subsection (b) of this section, the court may, in addition to any penalty imposed by law, order that the motor vehicle operated by the person at the time of the offense be forfeited and sold. Immobilization and forfeiture procedures under this section shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures in section 1213c of this title.
    8. A person convicted of violating this section shall be assessed a surcharge of $50.00, which shall be added to any fine or surcharge imposed by the court. The court shall collect and transfer the surcharge assessed under this subsection to be credited to the DUI Enforcement Fund. The collection procedures described in 13 V.S.A. § 5240 shall be utilized in the collection of this surcharge.

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 205 , §§ 1, 2, eff. May 29, 1959; 1975, No. 25 ; 1981, No. 103 , § 1; 1981, No. 229 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1989, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 14, 1989; 1991, No. 55 , § 11; 1995, No. 21 , § 1; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 8, 22; 2003, No. 54 , § 12; 2005, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. May 20, 2006; 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 1, 2011; 2011, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2013, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 16.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,295. P.L. § 5160. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 91. G.L. § 4719. 1917, No. 132 , §§ 8, 9.

    Revision note—

    Redesignated subsec. (g), as added by 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 22, as subsec. (i) to avoid conflict with subsecs. (g) and (h), as added by 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivs. (a)(2) and (3): Amended generally.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “subsection” for “subsections” following “of this section”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Inserted “or prior to the date that a person pays the amount due to the Judicial Bureau in accordance with subsection 2307(b) of this chapter” following “diversion program”.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(3): Added.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Substituted “Except as authorized in section 1213 of this title, a” for “A” in the beginning of the first sentence.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Added “Removal of Registration Plates; Towing” in the section heading; designated the existing provisions of subsec. (a) as subdiv. (a)(1) and added subdiv. (a)(2); added new subsec. (c); and redesignated former subsecs. (c) through (h) as present subsecs. (d) through (i).

    —2003. Section amended generally.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (f): Inserted “or 1205” following “section 1201” and added “and the person’s license has been reinstated” at the end of the paragraph.

    Subsecs. (g)-(h): Added.

    —1995. Section amended generally.

    —1991. Section amended generally.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the first sentence of the introductory paragraph, substituted “privilege” for “right” following “whose”, “license or privilege” for “right” following “until the”, and “the commissioner” for “such commissioner by subsequent license or otherwise” following “reinstated by”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “privilege” for “right” following “license or”.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Made minor changes in punctuation in subdivs. (a)(1) and (3), deleted former subsec. (b), redesignated former subsec. (c) as present subsec. (b), and added present subsecs. (c) and (d).

    —1981. Rewrote subsec. (a), added present subsec. (b), and redesignated former subsec. (b) as present subsec. (c).

    —1975. Subsec. (a): In the second sentence, inserted “shall be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned” following “first offense”, “fined not more than $500.00 or” following “second offense, and shall be”, and “fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned” following “third offense and shall be”.

    —1959. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), rewrote the second sentence of that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    For the DLS Diversion Program, see the note at the beginning of this subchapter 3.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    Recidivism statute imposing criminal sanctions for driving with a suspended license (DLS) after two prior uncounseled DLS civil violations does not violate a defendant’s right to counsel and due process. State v. Lafountain, 160 Vt. 313, 628 A.2d 1243, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1993).

    Application.

    Defendant’s conviction for driving with a suspended license was reversed, where information failed to apprise defendant of fact that, under amended statute, the reason for suspension was an element of the crime. State v. Williams, 160 Vt. 615, 627 A.2d 1254, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 39 (1993) (mem.).

    Change in law that reclassified as a civil violation, rather than a criminal offense, the operation of a motor vehicle with a suspended license after suspension period had expired and prior to reinstatement was applied retroactively since the change did not remove all liability for violative conduct. State v. Flagg, 160 Vt. 141, 624 A.2d 864, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 34 (1993).

    When a license to operate a motor vehicle is suspended for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of section 1201 of this title, subsec. (c) of this section would apply during the definite term of the suspension, but subsec. (a) would apply after the definite term had expired but prior to reinstatement of the license. State v. Potier, 150 Vt. 15, 547 A.2d 1359, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1988).

    Charges.

    If prosecution intends to ask that greater punishment be imposed because of prior convictions under this section, allegation of prior convictions is necessary in order that accused be clearly informed of charge he is called to meet and complaint must allege every fact affecting degree of punishment. State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 227 A.2d 276, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1967).

    Notice of intention by prosecution to ask that greater punishment be imposed because of prior convictions under this section must be given before arraignment or trial to provide accused with opportunity to resolve propriety of insisting on constitutional and statutory rights and this must be done by charging principal offense and prior convictions in two parts in complaint. State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 227 A.2d 276, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1967).

    Defendant convicted under this section could not be sentenced as recidivist where information did not charge him with prior convictions. State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 227 A.2d 276, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1967).

    Evidence.

    In a trial for driving with a suspended license, the evidence did not require the trial court to grant acquittal by its own motion. Although defendant argued that no one actually saw him drive into the store, one witness testified that defendant’s van hit the store and that he saw defendant exit the van; another witness saw defendant behind the wheel moments after the accident; when the store owner arrived, defendant apologized for the damage; police testified that the van was registered to defendant; when police spoke with defendant the day after the accident, he asserted that he had been drinking the previous day and did not remember the accident; and police also testified that when they asked defendant if anybody was exiting the store at the time of the crash, defendant responded that no one had been leaving at the time. State v. LaFlam, 2008 VT 108, 184 Vt. 629, 965 A.2d 519, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 136 (2008) (mem.).

    In order to convict defendant of driving with license suspended, State was not required to prove that his license was suspended for violating DUI statute, since evidence of defendant’s failure to satisfy statute conditioning license reinstatement on his successful completion of alcohol and driving education program was sufficient for jury to find fact of the qualifying underlying suspension. State v. Longe, 170 Vt. 35, 743 A.2d 569, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 310 (1999).

    State does not have to prove each prior civil violation of driving with a suspended license (DLS) to convict a third time DLS violater on misdemeanor charge. State v. Lafountain, 160 Vt. 313, 628 A.2d 1243, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1993).

    In prosecution for violating this section, evidence that driver’s insurance had in fact never terminated was admissible to prove that the Department of Motor Vehicles was without authority to suspend driver’s license pursuant to section 803 of this title for failure to show proof of financial responsibility. State v. Mohr, 146 Vt. 193, 499 A.2d 769, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 362 (1985).

    Knowledge of suspension.

    Information that cited the recidivism statute defendant was accused of violating, dates of two previous civil violations, and penalty for present offense was sufficient to apprise defendant that criminal charge stemmed from prior civil violations. State v. Lafountain, 160 Vt. 313, 628 A.2d 1243, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1993).

    Constructive notice of suspension of driver’s license is sufficient even absent actual notice; as long as notice is sent by registered or certified mail to the last known address, the suspension is in full force and effect three days after the deposit of such notice in the mail. State v. Chicoine, 154 Vt. 653, 580 A.2d 970, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 114 (1990) (mem.).

    Defendant’s “last known address” for purposes of notification of suspension of driver’s license was address defendant filed with Commissioner of Motor Vehicles notwithstanding Department of Motor Vehicles may have had actual notice of a more current address for defendant. State v. Chicoine, 154 Vt. 653, 580 A.2d 970, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 114 (1990) (mem.).

    Defendant’s alleged failure to receive delivery of notice of suspension of driver’s license, mailed by certified mail, two notices of the arrival of which were placed in defendant’s mailbox, was not sufficient to bar conviction for operating a motor vehicle after suspension of license. State v. Cattanach, 129 Vt. 57, 271 A.2d 828, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1970).

    Where the evidence supports a finding that the offender had knowledge that his license had been suspended, actual delivery and receipt of the registered mail is not essential to a conviction under this section for driving under suspension. State v. Hebert, 124 Vt. 377, 205 A.2d 816, 1964 Vt. LEXIS 117 (1964).

    —Generally.

    This section does not provide the procedure to be followed in a case involving a prior conviction or convictions, however it is clear that the penalty is to be graduated according to the status of the respondent as to prior similar convictions and the procedure to be followed in such cases is discretionary with the trial court. State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 227 A.2d 276, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1967).

    Fact of prior convictions does not become material until after conviction of accused on substantive offense on trial and then only for purpose of enabling trial judge to impose proper sentence. State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 227 A.2d 276, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1967).

    License or right to operate.

    Where the Legislature expanded the definition of “license to operate” in section 4(48) of this title to include “privilege to operate,” it overruled Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Cady, 136 Vt. 29, 383 A.2d 607 (1978), wherein it held that a person who had never possessed a driver’s license could not be prosecuted for driving with license suspended, because there was nothing for anyone to suspend. State v. Jarvis, 145 Vt. 8, 482 A.2d 65, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 534 (1984).

    Where person charged with operating a motor vehicle after his right or license to operate had been suspended and before reinstatement had never had a license or right to operate, there was nothing for anyone to suspend or reinstate, the obvious charge was operating without a license, and judgment of acquittal would be ordered. State v. Cady, 136 Vt. 29, 383 A.2d 607, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 680 (1978). But see State v. Jarvis, 145 Vt. 8, 482 A.2d 65, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 534 (1984).

    Sentence.

    It was error to order defendant, who was convicted of driving with a suspended license, to pay restitution for damage to a store that he drove into. Vermont law required there to be a direct link between the loss for which restitution was ordered and the conduct for which a defendant had been convicted, and there was not such a link here. State v. LaFlam, 2008 VT 108, 184 Vt. 629, 965 A.2d 519, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 136 (2008) (mem.).

    Under subsec. (c) of this section, trial court was without authority to substitute community service for jail time, even though such alternative was available to defendants convicted of DUI. State v. Baker, 154 Vt. 411, 579 A.2d 479, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1990).

    Mandatory minimum sentence under this section does not violate defendants’ right to allocution. State v. Saari, 152 Vt. 510, 568 A.2d 344, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1989).

    Mandatory minimum sentence under this section does not violate separation of powers doctrine by limiting discretion of sentencing court. State v. Saari, 152 Vt. 510, 568 A.2d 344, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1989).

    Where defendant’s license to operate a motor vehicle was suspended for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of section 1201 of this title and defendant operated a motor vehicle on a highway after the term of the license suspension had expired, but prior to reinstatement of the license, as of the date of the violation of this section, the absence of defendant’s right to operate was based on his failure to have been reinstated, not the previous conviction, and the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of subsec. (c) of this section did not apply. State v. Potier, 150 Vt. 15, 547 A.2d 1359, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1988).

    For the mandatory minimum sentence provision of subsec. (c) of this section to apply, the facts that invoke that provision must themselves be alleged in the information. State v. Bradley, 145 Vt. 492, 494 A.2d 129, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 319 (1985).

    Where information alleged that defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public highway while her license to operate was suspended, and that defendant had previously been convicted of the same offense, but did not allege that the present violation occurred while defendant was under suspension as a result of a prior conviction for a violation of one of the six sections enumerated in subsec. (c) of this section, failure to allege the basis of the suspension in the information rendered the mandatory minimum sentence provisions of subsec. (c) inapplicable to defendant’s case. State v. Bradley, 145 Vt. 492, 494 A.2d 129, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 319 (1985).

    Separate proceedings.

    Where accused denies prior convictions, question is to be withheld from jury trying principal charge. State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 227 A.2d 276, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1967).

    Separate proceeding to determine liability of accused to punishment as subsequent offender is criminal rather than civil one and procedure in such case is in general same as in trials of criminal offenses with accused having rights granted on trial for criminal offense. State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 227 A.2d 276, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1967).

    If accused denies sufficiency of record alleged as to prior convictions or his identity with person so convicted and waives jury trial, question of prior convictions is to be resolved by trial court after hearing and findings of fact. State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 227 A.2d 276, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1967).

    Vacation of prior convictions.

    In a repeat-offender prosecution for driving with a suspended license (DLS) in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 674(c) , the third DLS adjudication does not allow criminal penalties if one or both of the earlier adjudications are vacated. Section 674(c) is a penalty-enhancement provision, and not a status offense. The Legislature’s scheme, in decriminalizing first- and second-offense driving with a suspended license, was to reduce penalties, not to create new offenses. State v. LeClair, 167 Vt. 32, 702 A.2d 628, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 185 (1997).

    Validity of suspension, revocation or refusal.

    In trial for operating a motor vehicle after license suspension, defendant’s claim that first suspension was illegal because the notice did not advise him of his statutory right to hearing and an attorney and incorrectly advised him of the period within which he must file proof of financial responsibility should have been heard and determined. State v. Putnam, 137 Vt. 410, 407 A.2d 161, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1007 (1979).

    In trial for operating a motor vehicle after license suspension, defendant’s claim that suspension was illegal because of illegal delegation to a subordinate officer of discretion to suspend contested only method and not the underlying authority of the department to order suspension, and was not a jurisdictional claim and thus could not be collaterally attacked in the instant trial. State v. Putnam, 137 Vt. 410, 407 A.2d 161, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1007 (1979).

    In a prosecution for driving while under license suspension, claim that underlying suspension was illegal because of illegal delegation of authority to impose suspension within the Department of Motor Vehicles does not reach jurisdiction of person or subject matter in the suspension proceeding and is not appropriate for collateral attack in the criminal prosecution. State v. Bacon, 137 Vt. 414, 406 A.2d 382, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 988 (1979).

    Cited.

    Cited in Bolio v. Malloy, 126 Vt. 424, 234 A.2d 336, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 213 (1967); Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Brown, 136 Vt. 561, 396 A.2d 134, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 666 (1978); State v. Covell, 142 Vt. 197, 453 A.2d 1118, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 628 (1982); State v. Poirier, 142 Vt. 595, 458 A.2d 1109, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 437 (1983); State v. Hewey, 144 Vt. 10, 471 A.2d 236, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 595 (1983); State v. Livi, 146 Vt. 641, 508 A.2d 715, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 343 (1986); State v. Bessette, 148 Vt. 17, 530 A.2d 549, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 471 (1987); State v. Hemingway, 148 Vt. 90, 528 A.2d 746, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 458 (1987); State v. Byrne, 149 Vt. 257, 542 A.2d 667, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 8 (1988); State v. Bushey, 149 Vt. 378, 543 A.2d 1327, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 25 (1988); State v. Muir, 150 Vt. 549, 554 A.2d 671, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 193 (1988); State v. Nichols, 150 Vt. 563, 556 A.2d 75, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 224 (1988); State v. Thompson, 150 Vt. 640, 556 A.2d 95, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1989); State v. Daudelin, 151 Vt. 214, 559 A.2d 668, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 27 (1989); State v. St. Francis, 151 Vt. 384, 563 A.2d 249, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 90 (1989); State v. Conn, 152 Vt. 99, 565 A.2d 246, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 134 (1989); State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 582 A.2d 119, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 169 (1990); State v. Roberge, 155 Vt. 121, 582 A.2d 142, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 172 (1990); United States v. Whitcomb, 767 F. Supp. 79, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9576 (D. Vt. 1991); State v. Callahan, 155 Vt. 571, 587 A.2d 970, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 7 (1991); State v. Barber, 157 Vt. 228, 596 A.2d 337, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 269 (1990); State v. Hollis, 161 Vt. 87, 633 A.2d 1362, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 98 (1993).

    Notes to Opinions

    History.

    The 1959 amendment was clearly intended to graduate the penalty, making it increasingly severe as to maximum imprisonment for each subsequent violation, but maintaining the same maximum fine. 1958-60 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 235.

    License or right to operate.

    Operator of vehicle in Vermont, whose license has been revoked in another state and who has no Vermont license, should be prosecuted under section 601 of this title for operating without a license, rather than under this section. 1930-32 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 195.

    Nonpayment of taxes.

    A person convicted for a third, or subsequent, time of driving under suspension, when the initial suspension arose out of nonpayment of poll taxes, could not be penalized, at least not under this section. 1953-60 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 235.

    Sentence.

    Court has power to suspend sentence imposed under this section. 1958-60 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 235.

    § 675. Fee prior to termination or reinstatement of suspension or revocation of license.

    1. Before a suspension or revocation issued by the Commissioner of a person’s operator’s license or privilege of operating a motor vehicle may be terminated or before a person’s operator’s license or privilege of operating a motor vehicle may be reinstated, there shall be paid to the Commissioner a fee of $80.00 in addition to any other fee required by statute. This section shall not apply to suspensions issued under the provisions of chapter 11 of this title nor suspensions issued for physical disabilities or failing to pass reexamination. The Commissioner shall not reinstate the license of a driver whose license was suspended pursuant to section 1205 of this title until the Commissioner receives certification from the court that the costs due the State have been paid.
    2. Any suspension issued as a result of improper information received from the criminal justice system shall be canceled and removed from the record without payment of any fee upon receipt of proper information that the suspension should not have been requested.

    HISTORY: Added 1979, No. 202 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, Pt. II, eff. Sept. 1, 1980; amended 1981, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 22, 1982; 1989, No. 51 , § 40; 1995, No. 77 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. March 21, 1996; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 25, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 37; 2009, No. 50 , § 49; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 38.

    History

    Revision note—

    This section was enacted without a section heading, which was added for purposes of conformity with general V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$80.00” for “$71.00” in the first sentence.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$71.00” for “$65.00” in the first sentence.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$65.00” for “$50.00” in the first sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$50.00” for “$30.00” in the first sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Added the third sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$30.00” for “$20.00” in the first sentence.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), added “nor suspensions issued for physical disabilities or failing to pass a re-examination” following “title” in the second sentence of that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    Termination of suspensions repealed in act. 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 provides: “Notwithstanding 23 V.S.A. § 675 (fee prior to termination of suspension), as soon as possible after this act takes effect, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall, without requiring an application or payment of a fee, terminate pending suspensions of a person’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle and refusals of a person’s license or privilege to operate that were imposed pursuant to the following provisions:

    “(1) 7 V.S.A. § 656(g) (underage alcohol violation; failure to pay civil penalty);

    “(2) 7 V.S.A. § 1005 (underage tobacco violation);

    “(3) 13 V.S.A. § 1753 (false public alarm; students and minors);

    “(4) 18 V.S.A. § 4230b(g) (underage marijuana violation; failure to pay civil penalty); and

    “(5) 32 V.S.A. § 8909 (driver’s license suspensions for nonpayment of purchase and use tax).”

    Persons with suspended driver’s licenses; reinstatement fee waiver program. 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 25, provides: “(a) There is established the Reinstatement Fee Waiver Program to permit the Department of Motor Vehicles to waive all license reinstatement fees for motor vehicle operators whose licenses have been suspended under certain circumstances. The Reinstatement Fee Waiver Program shall comply with the guidelines set forth in this section.

    “(b) On or before April 30, 2021, the Department of Motor Vehicles shall:

    “(1) waive all license reinstatement fees for any person whose operator’s license has been:

    “(A) suspended for noncriminal reasons for one year or longer and who has satisfied all other reinstatement conditions and requirements; or

    “(B) suspended prior to July 1, 2014 for failure to pay the amount due in a Judicial Bureau judgment and who has satisfied all other reinstatement conditions and requirements;

    “(2) reinstate the operator’s licenses of each person whose reinstatement fees are waived pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) of this section; and

    “(3) notify each person whose reinstatement fees are waived pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) of this section that the person’s license has been reinstated or that the person’s license is ineligible for reinstatement and the reason for ineligibility.

    “(c) As used in this section:

    “(1) “Amount due” means the same as in 4 V.S.A. § 1109(a) .

    “(2) “Reinstatement conditions and requirements” shall not include the amount due in a Judicial Bureau judgment.

    “(3) “Suspended for noncriminal reasons” shall not include a license that is under suspension on April 30, 2021 for the accumulation of 10 or more points.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Fee for reinstatement of license revoked or suspended for driving under the influence, see § 1209a of this title.

    Power of Judicial Bureau hearing officer to waive reinstatement fee, see 4 V.S.A. § 1109 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    Application of this section to suspension which was in effect at time section was enacted did not violate ex post facto provision of the United States Constitution. Boutin v. Conway, 153 Vt. 558, 572 A.2d 905, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 38 (1990).

    § 676. Operation after suspension, revocation, or refusal — civil violation.

    1. A person whose license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been revoked, suspended, or refused by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for any reason other than a violation of subsection 1091(b), 1094(b), 1128(b) or (c) of this title, or section 1201 of this title or a suspension under section 1205 of this title and who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway before the license or privilege of the person to operate a motor vehicle has been reinstated by the Commissioner commits a civil traffic violation.
    2. In establishing a prima facie case against a person accused of violating this section, the Judicial Bureau shall accept as evidence a printout attested to by the law enforcement officer as the person’s motor vehicle record showing convictions and resulting license suspensions. The admitted motor vehicle record shall establish a permissive inference that the person was under suspension or had his or her license revoked on the dates and time periods set forth in the record. The Judicial Bureau shall not require a certified copy of the person’s motor vehicle record from the Department of Motor Vehicles to establish the permissive inference.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 55 , § 12; amended 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 8a; 1999, No. 110 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. May 15, 2002; 2003, No. 54 , § 13.

    History

    Amendments

    —2003. Subsec. (a): Substituted “1091(b), 1094(b), 1128(b) or (c),” for “674, 1091, 1094, 1128, 1133”.

    Deleted former subsec. (b) and redesignated former subsec. (c) as subsec. (b).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Rewrote the first sentence and substituted “motor vehicle record” for “affidavit” and “record” for “affidavit” in the second sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added by Act No. 110. Amended by Act No. 160.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “or a suspension under section 1205” preceding “of this title”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “674(a)” for “674” and “1128 or 1133” for “1128, 1133 or 1201”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Application.

    Change in law that reclassified as a civil violation, rather than a criminal offense, the operation of a motor vehicle with a suspended license after suspension period had expired and prior to reinstatement was applied retroactively since the change did not remove all liability for violative conduct. State v. Flagg, 160 Vt. 141, 624 A.2d 864, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 34 (1993).

    Criminal charges.

    In a repeat-offender prosecution for driving with a suspended license (DLS) in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 674(c) , the third DLS adjudication does not allow criminal penalties if one or both of the earlier adjudications are vacated. Section 674(c) is a penalty-enhancement provision, and not a status offense. The Legislature’s scheme, in decriminalizing first- and second-offense DLS, was to reduce penalties, not to create new offenses. State v. LeClair, 167 Vt. 32, 702 A.2d 628, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 185 (1997).

    Information that cited the recidivism statute defendant was accused of violating, dates of two previous civil violations, and penalty for present offense was sufficient to apprise defendant that criminal charge stemmed from prior civil violations. State v. Lafountain, 160 Vt. 313, 628 A.2d 1243, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1993).

    State does not have to prove each prior civil violation of driving with a suspended license (DLS) to convict a third time DLS violator on misdemeanor charge. State v. Lafountain, 160 Vt. 313, 628 A.2d 1243, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1993).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Williams, 160 Vt. 615, 627 A.2d 1254, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 39 (1993) (mem.).

    § 677. Operating commercial motor vehicle after disqualification.

    1. A person who has been disqualified from holding a commercial driver’s license under subsection 4116(d) of this title and who operates or attempts to operate a commercial motor vehicle upon a public highway before the commercial driver’s license has been reinstated commits a civil traffic violation.  A person who has been disqualified from holding a commercial driver’s license under subsection 4116(a), (b), (c), or (e) of this title and who operates or attempts to operate a commercial motor vehicle on a public highway after the disqualification period has expired but prior to reinstatement commits a civil traffic violation.
    2. A person who has been disqualified from holding a commercial driver’s license under subsection 4116(a), (b), (c), or (e) of this title and who operates or attempts to operate a commercial motor vehicle upon a public highway before the disqualification period has expired shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsection 674(a) of this title.
    3. A person who violates subsection (a) of this section for the third or subsequent time shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsection 674(a) of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 55 , § 13.

    § 678. Repealed. 2013, No. 57, § 12.

    History

    Former § 678. Former § 678, relating to penalties for unauthorized operation, was derived from 1999, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    § 679. Operating commercial motor vehicle after privilege suspended.

    A person whose privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle has been suspended under section 4116a of this title and who operates or attempts to operate a commercial motor vehicle upon a public highway before the suspension period has expired shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsection 674(a) of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 24.

    History

    Revision note—

    Redesignated section 678, as enacted by 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 24, as section 679 to avoid conflict with section 678, as enacted by 1999, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    Subchapter 4. Driver Training School Licenses

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Exemption of all-terrain vehicle instructors from driver training laws, see § 3515 of this title.

    Instructor requirements and training for the motorcycle rider training program, see § 734 of this title.

    § 701. Definitions.

    The following terms when used in this subchapter shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this section unless the context clearly indicates a different meaning:

    1. “Commissioner” means the Vermont Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
    2. “Department” means the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles.
    3. “Driver training” means the instruction for hire in the driving of motor vehicles or in the preparation of an applicant for examination given by the Department for a driver’s license, but not including instruction given by employers to their employees.
    4. “Driver training school” means any person engaged in providing driver training through one or more instructors, but not including a public or private school conducting a course in driver training approved by the Secretary of Education and the Commissioner.
    5. “Established place of business” means a location approved by the Commissioner at which the business of a driver’s training school is transacted and at which its records are kept.
    6. “Instructor” means any person engaged in giving driver training.
    7. The terms “licensee” and “applicant” as applied to a firm, partnership, or association include the members thereof and as applied to a corporation include the officers and directors thereof.
    8. “Person” means any individual, combination of individuals, firm, partnership, or corporation; whenever used in any provision of this subchapter which prescribes or imposes a fine or imprisonment, or both, the term “person,” as applied to a firm, partnership, or association, shall include the members thereof and, as applied to a corporation, the officers thereof; a firm, partnership, association, or corporation may be subjected as an entity to the payment of a fine.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1960; amended 1999, No. 110 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2015, No. 47 , § 19.

    History

    Revision note—

    Subdiv. designations added to conform section to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2015. Subdiv. (4): Substituted “Secretary of Education and the Commissioner” for “Board of Education”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (3): Substituted “for a driver’s license” for “for an operator’s or junior operator’s license” and deleted “automobile dealers or their salesmen to purchasers of motor vehicles or instructions given by” preceding “employers”.

    § 702. Training school and instructor’s licenses.

    A person shall not operate a driver training school or act as an instructor unless the person has secured a license from the Commissioner. Applications for such licenses may be filed with the Commissioner and shall contain the information and shall be on the forms the Commissioner may prescribe. Each application for a driver’s training school license shall be accompanied by an application fee of $150.00, which shall not be refunded. If the application is approved by the Commissioner, the applicant upon payment of an additional fee of $225.00 shall be granted a license, which shall become void two years after the first day of the month of issue unless sooner revoked as provided in this subchapter. The renewal fee shall be $225.00. Each application for an instructor’s license shall be accompanied by an application fee of $105.00, which shall not be refunded. If the application is approved by the Commissioner, the applicant upon payment of an additional fee of $75.00 shall be granted a license, which shall become void two years after the first day of the month of issue unless sooner revoked as provided in this subchapter. The renewal fee shall be $75.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1960; amended 1989, No. 51 , § 41; 1997, No. 59 , § 75, eff. June 30, 1997; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 39; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 9.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Raised the fees throughout the section.

    —1997. Section amended generally.

    —1989. Substituted “commissioner” for “department” at the end of the first sentence and following “filed with the” in the second sentence, “$35.00” for “$10.00” in the third sentence, “$50.00” for “$15.00” in the fourth and fifth sentences, and “$20.00” for “$ 5.00” in the sixth, seventh, and eighth sentences.

    § 703. Possession of license.

    Each person granted a driver’s training school license shall display the same conspicuously on the school premises. Each person granted an instructor’s license shall carry the same in his or her possession while engaged in giving driver training. In case of loss, mutilation, or destruction of a license certificate, the Commissioner shall issue a duplicate certificate upon payment of a fee of $8.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1960; amended 1989, No. 51 , § 42; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 40.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$8.00” for “$5.00” in the last sentence.

    —1989. Inserted “or her” preceding “possession” in the second sentence and substituted “$5.00” for “$1.50” at the end of the third sentence.

    § 704. Qualifications for training school license.

    To qualify for a driver’s training school license, each new and renewal applicant shall:

    1. not have been convicted of a felony nor incarcerated for a felony within the 10 years prior to the date of application;
    2. maintain an established place of business open to the public;
    3. maintain bodily injury and property damage liability insurance on each motor vehicle being used in driver training, insuring the liability of the driver training school and the operator of each motor vehicle for each instructor and of any person while using any such motor vehicle with the permission of the named insured in at least the following amount: $300,000.00 for bodily injury or death of one person in any one crash and, subject to said limit for one person, $500,000.00 for bodily injury or death of two or more persons in any one crash, and $100,000.00 for damage to property of others in any one crash;
    4. have the equipment necessary to the giving of proper instruction in the operation of motor vehicles;
    5. pay the application and license fees prescribed in section 702 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 1960; amended 1981, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983; 1999, No. 110 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. In subdiv. (3), substituted “crash” for “accident” three times in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Introductory paragraph: Substituted “To” for “Each applicant in order to” preceding “qualify”; inserted “, each new and renewal applicant” following “license”; and deleted “meet the following requirements” following “shall”.

    Subdiv. (3): Substituted “maintain” for “provide evidence that he or she maintains” preceding “bodily” and deleted the former second sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (1): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (2): Deleted “without respect to race, creed or color” following “the public”.

    Subdiv. (3): Amended generally.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (3): Substituted “$ 50,000.00” for “$ 20,000.00” following “amount”, “$ 100,000.00” for “$ 40,000” preceding “for bodily injury or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and” and “$ 50,000.00” for “$ 10,000.00” thereafter.

    § 705. Qualifications for instructor’s license.

    In order to qualify for an instructor’s license, each applicant shall:

    1. not have been convicted of:
      1. a felony nor incarcerated for a felony within the 10 years prior to the date of application;
      2. a violation of section 1201 of this title or a like offense in another jurisdiction reported to the Commissioner pursuant to subdivision 3905(a)(2) of this title within the three years prior to the date of application;
      3. a subsequent violation of an offense listed in subdivision 2502(a)(5) of this title or of section 674 of this title; or
      4. a sex offense that requires registration pursuant to 13 V.S.A. chapter 167, subchapter 3;
    2. pass such examination as the Commissioner shall require on:
      1. traffic laws;
      2. safe driving practices;
      3. operation of motor vehicles; and
      4. qualifications as a teacher;
    3. be physically able to operate a motor vehicle and to train others in such operation;
    4. have five years’ experience as a licensed operator and be at least 21 years of age on date of application;
    5. pay the application and license fees prescribed in section 702 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 1960; amended 1999, No. 110 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2013, No. 57 , § 17.

    History

    Amendments

    —2013. Deleted “or” following “application” in subdivs. (1)(A) and (1)(B); substituted “like offense in another jurisdiction” for “conviction” in subdiv. (1)(B); substituted “violation of an” for “conviction for an” and added “or of section 674 of this title; or” in subdiv. (1)(C); and added subdiv. (1)(D).

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the introductory paragraph and subdiv. (1).

    § 706. Powers of Commissioner.

    The Commissioner may by rule prescribe requirements and standards for driver training, operation of driver training schools, and conduct of instructors. The charges for such driver training shall be subject to the approval of the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 6, eff. Jan. 1, 1960.

    § 707. Records required; maintenance of vehicles.

    Every driver’s training school licensee shall keep a record on such forms as the Commissioner may prescribe showing the name and address of each instructor, the instruction license number of such instructor, the particular type of instruction given and how much time was given to each type of instruction, and such other information as the Commissioner may require. Such record shall be open to the inspection of the Department at all reasonable times. Individually identifying information about students that is exempt from public inspection and copying under 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(7) shall be kept confidential. Every driver’s training school licensee shall maintain all vehicles used in driver training in safe mechanical condition at all times.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 7, eff. Jan. 1, 1960; amended 2015, No. 29 , § 13.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Deleted “but shall be for the confidential use of the department” following “reasonable times” in the second sentence, and added the third sentence.

    § 708. Refusal to issue license.

    The Commissioner may refuse to issue a license to any applicant for a driver’s training school license or instructor’s license when he or she is satisfied that:

    1. the applicant has not met the applicable requirements of sections 704 and 705 of this title;
    2. the applicant has made a material false statement or concealed a material fact in connection with the application;
    3. the applicant was previously the holder of a driver’s training school or instructor’s license that was revoked, suspended, or refused renewal;
    4. the applicant has been convicted of a felony or any crime involving violence, dishonesty, or deceit;
    5. the applicant is not the true owner of the driver training school.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 8, eff. Jan. 1, 1960; amended 1999, No. 110 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    History

    Amendments

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or she” following “when he” in the introductory paragraph and substituted “dishonesty or deceit” for “dishonesty, deceit, indecency, degeneracy or moral turpitude” in subdiv. (4).

    § 709. Suspension and revocation.

    1. The Commissioner may at any time cancel, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew any driver’s training school or instructor’s license when he or she is satisfied that:
      1. the licensee fails to meet the applicable requirements for a license under sections 704 and 705 of this title;
      2. under the circumstances the Commissioner would have the right under the provisions of section 708 of this title to refuse to issue a license if the licensee were then making application therefor;
      3. the licensee represents himself or herself as an agent or employee of the Department or uses advertising designed to lead persons, or that would reasonably have the effect of leading persons, to believe that such licensee is an employee or representative of the Department;
      4. the licensee has willfully violated the provisions of section 705 of this title;
      5. the licensee has failed to comply with the rules of the Commissioner made pursuant to this subchapter.
    2. Notwithstanding the renewal of a license, the Commissioner may revoke or suspend such license for causes prescribed in this section although such causes occurred during license periods prior to the renewal.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No, 153, § 9, eff. Jan. 1, 1960.

    § 710. Hearing and appeal.

    Each holder of a driver’s training school or instructor’s license under this section shall be entitled to notice and hearing prior to cancellation, suspension, revocation, or failure by the Department to renew the license of such licensee. Hearings under the provisions of this section shall be held in accordance with the provisions of sections 105-107 of this title, and at such time and place as the Commissioner may determine.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 10, eff. Jan. 1, 1960.

    § 711. Penalties.

    Any person who operates a driver training school or acts as an instructor without a license shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $500.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1959, No. 153 , § 11, eff. Jan. 1, 1960; amended 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 158.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined”.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “therefor” preceding “shall be fined” and substituted “$500.00” for “$50.00 or imprisoned for a term not exceeding 5 days, or both”.

    Subchapter 5. Driver Retraining Program

    § 721. Authority to require driver retraining.

    The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, either in his or her discretionary authority under this chapter or upon the recommendation of a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction, may require a motor vehicle operator to attend at his or her own expense a driver retraining course as defined and established by the Department of Motor Vehicles under section 723 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 201 , § 1.

    § 722. Recommendation of a court.

    When a motor vehicle operator is convicted of a violation of subchapters 1 through 5 of chapter 13 of this title involving the operation of a motor vehicle in motion, the judge of the court in which the conviction was obtained may recommend, in writing, to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles that the operator be required to attend a driver retraining course. The judge may delay sentencing the operator until he or she has had an answer to his or her recommendation from the Commissioner. If advised by the Commissioner that the operator has been ordered to take a driver retraining program, the judge may further delay sentencing the operator for a period not to exceed 90 days. If the judge receives evidence that the operator has satisfactorily completed a driver retraining course, he or she may then consider all the facts and circumstances of the case and either impose a penalty and costs or waive all or any part of the penalty and costs making a note of the action on the original warrant. In such cases the court shall in no way be relieved of the duty of filing forthwith upon conviction the report required under section 1709 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 201 , § 2.

    History

    References in text.

    The reference to subchapters 1 through 5 of chapter 13 of this title in the first sentence of this section is to the provisions of the chapter prior to its revision by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1-3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    The subject matter of former subchapter 1, consisting of §§ 1001-1011, containing general provisions relating to operation of vehicles, is now covered principally by subchapter 1 of the revised chapter.

    The subject matter of former subchapter 2, consisting of §§ 1031-1054, containing the general rules of the road, is now covered principally by subchapters 2 through 7, 9 and 10 of the revised chapter.

    The subject matter of former subchapter 3, consisting of §§ 1091-1106, containing miscellaneous rules governing operation of vehicles, is now covered principally by subchapters 9 and 11 of the revised chapter.

    The subject matter of former subchapter 4, consisting of §§ 1141-1147, containing restrictions relating to the speed of vehicles, is now covered principally by subchapter 8 of the revised chapter.

    The subject matter of former subchapter 5, consisting of §§ 1181-1195, containing provisions regarding negligent and drunken driving, is now covered principally by subchapter 13 of the revised chapter.

    The subject matter of former subchapters 6 through 8 appears in subchapters 14 through 16 of the revised chapter.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Report of convictions to Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, see § 1709 of this title.

    § 723. Supervision.

    1. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may by rule prescribe requirements and standards for driver retraining, operation of a driver retraining program, and qualifications and conduct of the instructors.
    2. Upon application of a person as defined by section 701 of this title, the Commissioner may authorize the establishment and operation of a driver retraining program.
    3. The Commissioner may at any time cancel or revoke a person’s authorization to establish and operate a driver retraining program when he or she is satisfied that the person has failed to comply with the rules of the Commissioner made under subsection (a) of this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 201 , § 3.

    § 723a. Operation of course by Department of Motor Vehicles.

    1. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may also cause a driver retraining course to be operated by the Department of Motor Vehicles at the times and places and in the manner he or she may determine by rule from time to time.
    2. When an operator required to attend a driver retraining course under this subchapter applies to attend a course operated by the Department, he or she shall pay to the Department a fee set by the Commissioner, but not to exceed $25.00, that shall not be refunded.

    HISTORY: Added 1966, No. 38 (Sp. Sess.), § 2.

    § 724. Repealed. 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32.

    History

    Former § 724. Former § 724, relating to the penalty for unauthorized operation of a driver retraining program, was derived from 1961, No. 201 , § 4.

    Subchapter 6. Motorcycle Rider Training Program

    § 731. Legislative intent.

    1. The General Assembly finds that a comprehensive training program for motorcycle operators would enhance operator safety and reduce the number of injuries that occur as a result of motorcycle crashes. Since the great majority of motorcycle crashes involve inexperienced operators, a training program focused on inexperienced operators is the primary purpose of this legislation. The training program established shall be operated pursuant to nationally recognized safety and training standards and shall be funded from registration and license fees paid by Vermont motorcycle operators.
    2. It is the intent of the General Assembly that revenue from fee increases specified in this act shall be used for administration of the motorcycle rider training program and expenses relating to the program, including instructor training, licensing improvement, alcohol and drug education, public awareness, a driver improvement program for motorcyclists, technical assistance, program promotion, and other motorcycle safety programs. Funds may also be used for reimbursement of persons with course sites.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 21, 1990; amended 1997, No. 9 , § 3, eff. May 6, 1997; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 159.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. In subsec. (a), substituted “crashes” for “accidents” following “motorcycle” two times in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    —2014. In subsec. (b), deleted “but not limited to” following “including” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “that” for “which” in the first sentence and “shall” for “would” twice in the last sentence.

    —1997. Subsec. (b): Substituted “persons” for “organizations” following “reimbursement of” in the second sentence.

    § 732. Definitions.

    As used in this subchapter:

    1. “Chief instructor” means a licensed motorcycle operator who meets the standards established by the Department to qualify to train and oversee instructors for the motorcycle rider education program.
    2. “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
    3. “Department” means the Department of Motor Vehicles.
    4. “Motorcycle rider training program” means the Motorcycle Training and Information Disbursement Plan created in section 733 of this title.
    5. “Program coordinator” means the person designated by the Commissioner to plan, organize, and administer the motorcycle rider training program as provided in subsection 733(b) of this title.
    6. “Rider training course” means a motorcycle rider education curriculum and delivery system approved by the Department as meeting standards designed to develop and instill the knowledge, attitudes, habits, and skills necessary for the safe operation of a motorcycle.
    7. “Training specialist” means the person designated by the Commissioner to fulfill the obligations stated in subsection 733(c) of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 21, 1990.

    History

    Revision note—

    In the introductory clause, substituted “this subchapter” for “this act” to conform language to V.S.A. style.

    § 733. Motorcycle rider training program.

    1. The Department shall establish standards for and shall administer the motorcycle rider training program.  The program shall include rider training courses and instructor training. The Department may expand the program to include public awareness, alcohol and drug effects, driver improvement for motorcyclists, licensing improvement, program promotion, or other motorcycle safety programs.
    2. The Commissioner shall appoint a program coordinator who shall oversee and direct the program by setting program and funding guidelines, and conduct an annual evaluation.
    3. The Commissioner shall also appoint one or more training specialists who shall assist in establishing rider training courses throughout the State, support and implement program and funding guidelines and supervise instructors and other personnel as necessary.  The training specialist may be a trained chief instructor.
    4. An adequate number of rider training courses shall be provided to meet the reasonably anticipated needs of all persons in the State who desire to participate in the program.  The Department shall issue certificates of completion in the manner and form prescribed by the Commissioner to persons who satisfactorily complete the requirements of the course.
    5. The Department may enter into contracts with either public or private institutions or organizations for technical assistance in conducting rider training courses, if the course is administered and taught according to standards established by the Department pursuant to this section for the motorcycle rider training program. If necessary, an organization conducting a rider training course shall charge a reasonable tuition fee which shall be determined by and paid to the Commissioner.
    6. The Commissioner shall adopt rules that are necessary to carry out the provisions of the motorcycle rider training program.
    7. In establishing standards for the motorcycle rider training program, the Department shall be guided by any existing national standards for such programs, including standards of the motorcycle safety foundation.
    8. Any person, agencies, institutions, or organizations offering motorcycle safety instruction under the auspices of this subchapter, with respect to such instruction activities, are exempt from the requirements of subchapter 4 of this chapter relating to driver training school licenses.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 21, 1990; amended 1997, No. 59 , § 76, eff. June 30, 1997.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (a), deleted “, but is not limited to,” following “shall include” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Revision note—. In subsec. (h), substituted “subchapter 4 of this chapter” for “subchapter 4 of this title” to correct an error in the reference.

    Amendments

    —1997. Subsec. (e): Inserted “and paid to” preceding “the commissioner” at the end of the second sentence.

    § 734. Instructor requirements and training.

    1. The Department shall establish standards for an approved motorcycle rider training instructor preparation course. Successful completion of the course shall require the participant to demonstrate knowledge of the course material, knowledge of safe motorcycle operating practices, riding proficiency, and the necessary aptitude for instructing students.
    2. The Department shall establish minimum requirements for the qualifications of a rider training instructor.  The minimum requirements shall include the following:
      1. the instructor shall have a high school diploma or its equivalent;
      2. the instructor shall be at least 21 years of age and must hold a valid motorcycle endorsement;
      3. the instructor shall have at least four years of motorcycle riding experience during the last five years;
      4. the instructor’s driver’s license shall not have been suspended or revoked at any time during the preceding two years;
      5. the instructor shall not have any convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs during the preceding five years;
      6. instructors who are licensed in other states shall furnish certified copies of their driving records to the Department;
      7. an applicant shall not be eligible for instructor status until his or her driving record for the preceding five years, or the maximum number of years less than five for which a state retains driving records, is furnished; and
      8. the instructor shall have an approved instructor certificate that may be a state or Motorcycle Safety Foundation certificate, and the instructor must be registered as a currently active instructor.
    3. Temporary, seasonal employees of the Department of Motor Vehicles hired to provide motorcycle safety instruction, as well as any assistant instructors or range aides hired on a temporary, seasonal basis to provide or assist in the provision of motorcycle safety instruction, shall be exempt from the classified service created in 3 V.S.A. chapter 13.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 21, 1990; amended 2001, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. May 28, 2002.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (b), deleted “, but not limited to,” following “including” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

    § 735. Repealed. 2009, No. 135 (Adj. Sess.), § 26(10) and 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

    History

    Former § 735. Former § 735, relating to motorcycle rider training program advisory committee, was derived from 1989, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and was amended by 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    § 736. Implementation.

    After a date to be established by the Commissioner in rules, any applicant for a permit or an operator’s license valid for operating a motorcycle, except a renewal applicant or an applicant who surrenders a valid motorcycle license issued by another state, shall successfully complete the rider training course established under this subchapter before taking the on-motorcycle portion of the license examination or, in his or her discretion, the Commissioner may require any applicant to successfully complete an approved classroom training curriculum before a motorcycle learner’s permit or motorcycle endorsement may be issued. The Department shall also exempt applicants who have successfully completed equivalent training courses in other states or provinces. The Commissioner shall not implement the rider training course until the Commissioner determines that the program can be operated effectively, and that there are adequate training vehicles, instructors, curriculum materials, training sites, and program funding to provide the training throughout the State to all those individuals who desire or would be required to complete the course.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 21, 1990; amended 1997, No. 9 , § 4, eff. May 6, 1997; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 160.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “rules” for “regulations” and “learner’s” for “learner” in the first sentence, and substituted “individuals” for “persons” in the last sentence.

    —1997. Added “or, in his or her discretion, the commissioner may require any applicant to successfully complete an approved classroom training curriculum before a motorcycle learner permit or motorcycle endorsement may be issued” at the end of the first sentence and substituted “the rider training course” for “this section” following “implement” in the third sentence.

    Chapter 10. Transportation Network Companies

    History

    Legislative intent. 2018, No. 3 (Sp. Sess.), § 1 provides: “It is the intent of the General Assembly that this act be a step toward uniform regulation of all vehicle for hire companies and vehicle for hire drivers in Vermont.”

    § 750. Definitions; insurance requirements.

    1. Definitions.   As used in this chapter:
      1. “Digital network” or “network” means any online-enabled application, software, website, or system offered or used by a transportation network company that enables the prearrangement of rides with transportation network company drivers.
      2. “Personal vehicle” means a vehicle that is:
        1. used by a driver to provide a prearranged ride;
        2. owned, leased, or otherwise authorized for use by the driver; and
        3. not a taxicab, limousine, or other for-hire vehicle.
      3. “Prearranged ride” or “ride” means the transportation provided by a driver to a transportation network company rider, beginning when a driver accepts the rider’s request for a ride through a digital network controlled by a company; continuing while the driver transports the rider; and ending when the last rider departs from the vehicle. The term does not include:
        1. shared-expense carpool or vanpool arrangements;
        2. use of a taxicab, limousine, or other for-hire vehicle;
        3. use of a public or private regional transportation company that operates along a fixed route; or
        4. a ride furnished through a broker using a publicly funded network to connect riders to drivers through the Elders and Persons with Disabilities Program, Medicaid Non-Emergency Medical Transportation Program, or other similar governmental transportation program.
      4. “Transportation network company” or “company” means a person that uses a digital network to connect riders to drivers who provide prearranged rides.
      5. “Transportation network company driver” or “driver” means an individual who:
        1. receives connections to potential riders and related services from a transportation network company in exchange for payment of a fee to the company; and
        2. uses a personal vehicle to offer or provide a prearranged ride to riders upon connection through a digital network controlled by a transportation network company in exchange for compensation or payment of a fee.
      6. “Transportation network company rider” or “rider” means an individual who uses a company’s digital network to connect with a driver who provides rides in his or her personal vehicle between points chosen by the rider.
    2. Company’s financial responsibility.
      1. Beginning on July 1, 2018, a driver, or a company on the driver’s behalf, shall maintain primary automobile insurance that recognizes that the driver is a company driver or otherwise uses a vehicle to transport passengers for compensation and covers the driver while the driver is logged on to the company’s digital network or while the driver is engaged in a prearranged ride.
        1. The following automobile insurance requirements shall apply while a participating driver is logged on to the transportation network company’s digital network and is available to receive transportation requests but is not engaged in a prearranged ride: (2) (A) The following automobile insurance requirements shall apply while a participating driver is logged on to the transportation network company’s digital network and is available to receive transportation requests but is not engaged in a prearranged ride:
          1. primary automobile liability insurance in the amount of at least $50,000.00 for death and bodily injury per person, $100,000.00 for death and bodily injury per incident, and $25,000.00 for property damage; and
          2. any other State-mandated coverage under section 941 of this title.
        2. The coverage requirements of this subdivision (2) may be satisfied by any of the following:
          1. automobile insurance maintained by the driver;
          2. automobile insurance maintained by the company; or
          3. any combination of subdivisions (i) and (ii) of this subdivision (2)(B).
        1. The following automobile insurance requirements shall apply while a driver is engaged in a prearranged ride: (3) (A) The following automobile insurance requirements shall apply while a driver is engaged in a prearranged ride:
        2. The coverage requirements of this subdivision (3) may be satisfied by any of the following:
          1. automobile insurance maintained by the driver;
          2. automobile insurance maintained by the company; or
          3. any combination of subdivisions (i) and (ii) of this subdivision (3)(B).

        (i) primary automobile liability insurance that provides at least $1,000,000.00 for death, bodily injury, and property damage;

        (ii) uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that provides at least $1,000,000.00 for death, bodily injury, and property damage; and

        (iii) $5,000.00 in medical payments coverage (Med Pay).

      2. If insurance maintained by a driver under subdivision (2) or (3) of this subsection has lapsed or does not provide the required coverage, insurance maintained by the company shall provide such coverage beginning with the first dollar of a claim and shall have the duty to defend such claim.
      3. Coverage under an automobile insurance policy maintained by the company shall not be dependent on a personal automobile insurer’s first denying a claim nor shall a personal automobile insurance policy be required to first deny a claim.
      4. Insurance required by this subsection may be placed with an insurer licensed under 8 V.S.A. chapter 101 (insurance companies generally) or 138 (surplus lines insurance).
      5. Insurance satisfying the requirements of this subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the financial responsibility requirement for a motor vehicle under section 800 of this title.
      6. A driver shall carry proof of coverage satisfying this section at all times during use of a vehicle in connection with a company’s digital network. In the event of a crash or a traffic violation, a driver shall provide this insurance coverage information to the directly interested parties, automobile insurers, and law enforcement, upon request. Upon such request, a driver shall also disclose whether he or she was logged on to the network or was on a prearranged ride at the time of a crash or traffic violation.
      7. A person who fails to maintain primary automobile insurance as required in subdivisions (2) and (3) of this subsection (b) shall be assessed a civil penalty consistent with subsection 800(b) of this title, and such violation shall be a traffic violation within the meaning of chapter 24 of this title. A person who fails to carry proof of insurance as required under subdivision (8) of this subsection (b) shall be subject to a civil penalty consistent with subsection 800(d) of this title. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a person who operates a vehicle without financial responsibility as required by this subsection (b) is subject to administrative action as set forth in chapter 11 of this title.
    3. Disclosures.   A transportation network company shall disclose in writing to its drivers the following before they are allowed to accept a request for a prearranged ride on the company’s digital network:
      1. the insurance coverage, including the types of coverage and the limits for each coverage, that the company provides while the driver uses a personal vehicle in connection with the company’s network; and
      2. that the driver’s own automobile insurance policy, depending on its terms, might not provide any coverage while the driver is logged on to the company’s network and available to receive transportation requests or engaged in a prearranged ride.
    4. Automobile insurers.
      1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, insurers that write automobile insurance in Vermont may exclude any and all coverage afforded under a policy issued to an owner or operator of a personal vehicle for any loss or injury that occurs while a driver is logged on to a transportation network company’s digital network or while a driver provides a prearranged ride. This right to exclude all coverage may apply to any coverage in an automobile insurance policy, including:
        1. liability coverage for bodily injury and property damage;
        2. personal injury protection coverage;
        3. uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage;
        4. medical payments coverage;
        5. comprehensive physical damage coverage; and
        6. collision physical damage coverage.
      2. Nothing in this subsection implies or requires that a personal automobile insurance policy provide coverage while the driver is logged on to a company’s digital network, while the driver is engaged in a prearranged ride, or while the driver otherwise uses a vehicle to transport passengers for compensation.
      3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require an insurer to use any particular policy language or reference to this section in order to exclude any and all coverage for any loss or injury that occurs while a driver is logged on to a company’s digital network or while a driver provides a prearranged ride.
      4. Nothing in this subsection is deemed to preclude an insurer from providing primary or excess coverage for the driver’s vehicle, if it chooses to do so by contract or endorsement.
      5. Insurers that exclude the coverage described under subsection (b) of this section shall have no duty to defend or indemnify any claim expressly excluded.
      6. Nothing in this section is deemed to invalidate or limit an exclusion contained in a policy, including any policy in use or approved for use in Vermont prior to the enactment of this section, that excludes coverage for vehicles used to carry persons or property for a charge or available for hire by the public.
      7. An insurer that defends or indemnifies a claim against a driver that is excluded under the terms of its policy shall have a right of contribution against other insurers that provide automobile insurance to the same driver in satisfaction of the coverage requirements of subsection (b) of this section at the time of loss.
      8. In a claims coverage investigation, transportation network companies shall immediately provide, upon request by directly involved parties or any insurer of the transportation network company driver, if applicable, the precise times that a transportation network company driver logged on and off the transportation network company’s digital network in the 12-hour period immediately preceding and in the 12-hour period immediately following the crash. Insurers providing coverage under subsection (b) of this section shall disclose, upon request by any other insurer involved in the particular claim, the applicable charges, exclusions, and limits provided under any automobile insurance maintained in order to satisfy the requirements of subsection (b) of this section.

    HISTORY: Added 2018, No. 3 (Sp. Sess.), § 2; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 161, 162; 2021, No. 20 , § 237.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “a crash” for “an accident” two times in subdiv. (b)(8) and “crash” for “accident” once in subdiv. (d)(8) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    References in text.

    In subdiv. (b)(6), the reference to chapters 101 and 138 is to chapters that do not exist in this title. The correct reference is likely to chapters 101 and 138 of Title 8.

    Amendments

    —2021. In subdiv. (b)(6), inserted “8 V.S.A” preceding “chapter” and deleted “of this title” following “(surplus lines insurance)”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Made the heading for subdiv. (b)(1) the heading for subsec. (b) instead.

    Subsec. (d): Made the heading for subdiv. (d)(1) the heading for subsec. (d) instead and deleted “thereunder” at the end of subdiv. (d)(5).

    § 751. Driver requirements; background checks.

    1. A company shall not allow an individual to act as a driver on the company’s network without requiring the individual to submit to the company an application that includes:
      1. the individual’s name, address, and date of birth;
      2. a copy of the individual’s driver’s license;
      3. a copy of the registration for the personal vehicle that the individual will use to provide prearranged rides; and
      4. proof of financial responsibility for the personal vehicle described in subdivision (3) of this subsection of a type and in the amounts required by the company.
      1. A company shall not allow an individual to act as a driver on the company’s network unless, with respect to the driver, the company: (b) (1) A company shall not allow an individual to act as a driver on the company’s network unless, with respect to the driver, the company:
        1. contracts with an accredited entity to conduct a local, State, and national background check of the individual, including the multistate-multijurisdiction criminal records locator or other similar national database, the U.S. Department of Justice national sex offender public website, and the Vermont sex offender public website;
        2. confirms that the individual is at least 18 years of age and, if the individual is 18 years of age, that he or she has at least one year of driving experience or has been issued a commercial driver license; and
        3. confirms that the individual possesses proof of registration, automobile liability insurance, and proof of inspection if required by the state of vehicle registration for the vehicle to be used to provide prearranged rides.
      2. The background checks required by this subsection shall be conducted annually by the company.
      3. With respect to an individual who is a driver as of July 1, 2018, the requirements of subdivision (1)(A) of this subsection (b) shall be deemed satisfied if the background check is completed within 30 days of July 1, 2018 or if a background check that satisfies the requirements of subdivision (1)(A) of this subsection (b) was conducted by the company on or after July 1, 2017. This subdivision shall not be construed to exempt drivers from undergoing an annual background check as required under subdivision (2) of this subsection (b).
    2. A company shall not allow an individual to act as a driver on the company’s network if the company knows or should know that the individual:
      1. has been convicted within the last seven years of:
        1. a listed crime as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 5301(7) ;
        2. a felony level violation of 18 V.S.A. chapter 84 for selling, dispensing, or trafficking a regulated drug;
        3. a violation of section 1201 (operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs) of this title;
        4. a felony violation of 13 V.S.A. chapter 47 (frauds) or 57 (larceny and embezzlement); or
        5. a comparable offense in another jurisdiction;
      2. has been convicted within the last three years of:
        1. more than three moving violations as defined in subdivision 4(44) of this title;
        2. grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle in violation of section 1091 of this title or operating with a suspended or revoked license in violation of section 674 of this title; or
        3. a comparable offense in another jurisdiction;
      3. has been subject to a civil suspension within the last five years under section 1205 (operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs) of this title; or
      4. is listed on the U.S. Department of Justice national sex offender public website or the Vermont sex offender public website or has been convicted of homicide, manslaughter, kidnapping, or an offense involving sexual exploitation of children in violation of 13 V.S.A. chapter 64.
    3. A company shall establish and enforce a zero tolerance policy for drug and alcohol use by drivers during any period when a driver is engaged in, or is logged on to the company’s network but is not engaged in, a prearranged ride. The policy shall include provisions for investigations of alleged policy violations and the suspension of drivers under investigation.
    4. A company shall require that a personal vehicle used to provide prearranged rides comply with all applicable laws and regulations concerning vehicle equipment.

    HISTORY: Added 2018, No. 3 (Sp. Sess.), § 2; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 163.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(3): In the first sentence, substituted “an individual” for “a person” and “July 1, 2018” for “the effective date of this act” twice.

    § 752. Records; inspection.

    1. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or designee, not more frequently than once per year, shall visually inspect a random sample of up to 25 drivers’ records per company demonstrating compliance with the requirements of this chapter. The records inspected pursuant to this section shall pertain to drivers operating in Vermont. A company shall have an ongoing duty to make such records available for inspection under this section during reasonable business hours and in a manner approved by the Commissioner.
    2. The Commissioner or designee may visually inspect additional random samples of drivers’ records if there is a reasonable basis to suspect that a company is not in compliance with this chapter. The records inspected pursuant to this section shall pertain to drivers operating in Vermont.
    3. If the Commissioner receives notice of a complaint against a company or a driver, the company shall cooperate in investigating the complaint, including producing any necessary records.
    4. Any records, data, or information disclosed to the Commissioner by a company, including the names, addresses, and any other personally identifiable information regarding drivers, are exempt from inspection and copying under the Public Records Act and shall not be released.

    HISTORY: Added 2018, No. 3 (Sp. Sess.), § 2.

    § 753. Enforcement; administrative penalties.

    1. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may impose an administrative penalty pursuant to this section if a company violates a provision of this chapter.
    2. A violation may be subject to an administrative penalty of not more than $500.00. Each violation is a separate and distinct offense and, in the case of a continuing violation, each day’s continuance may be deemed a separate and distinct offense.
    3. The company shall be given notice and opportunity for a hearing for alleged violations under this section. Service of the notice shall be sufficient if sent by first-class mail to the applicable address on file with the Secretary of State. The notice shall include the following:
      1. a factual description of the alleged violation;
      2. a reference to the particular statute allegedly violated;
      3. the amount of the proposed administrative penalty; and
      4. a warning that the company will be deemed to have waived its right to a hearing and that the penalty will be imposed if no hearing is requested within 15 days from the date of the notice.
    4. A company that receives notice under subsection (c) of this section shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing unless, within 15 days from the date of the notice, the company requests a hearing in writing. If the company waives the right to a hearing, the Commissioner shall issue a final order finding the company in default and imposing the penalty.
    5. The provisions of sections 105, 106, and 107 of this title shall apply to hearings conducted under this section.
    6. The Commissioner may collect an unpaid administrative penalty by filing a civil action in Superior Court or through any other means available to State agencies.
    7. The remedies authorized by this section shall be in addition to any other civil or criminal remedies provided by law for violation of this chapter.

    HISTORY: Added 2018, No. 3 (Sp. Sess.), § 2.

    § 754. Preemption; savings clause.

    1. Municipal ordinances, resolutions, or bylaws regulating transportation network companies are preempted to the extent they are inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter.
    2. Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to a municipal ordinance, resolution, or bylaw regulating transportation network companies adopted by a municipality with a population of more than 35,000 residents based on the 2010 census and in effect on July 1, 2017. This subsection shall be repealed on July 1, 2022.

    HISTORY: Added 2018, No. 3 (Sp. Sess.), § 2; amended 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 39, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “2022” for “2020” at the end.

    Chapter 11. Financial Responsibility and Insurance

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Automobile insurance surcharges, see 8 V.S.A. chapter 127, subchapter 3.

    Liability insurance policies generally, see 8 V.S.A. chapter 113, subchapter 1.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in American Casualty Co. v. Nordic Leasing, Inc., 42 F.3d 725, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (2d Cir. 1994); Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 VT 61, 175 Vt. 355, 830 A.2d 108, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 141 (2003).

    Notes to Opinions

    Application.

    The financial responsibility and insurance provisions of this chapter have no particular reference to institutional inmates and apply to them in the same way as they apply to the general public. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 93.

    Federal Motor Carrier Act and rules and regulations of Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to insurance promulgated under authority of that Act superseded this chapter insofar as it applied to purely interstate motor carriers for compensation subject to the federal act. 1936-38 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 328.

    Subchapter 1. General Provisions

    § 800. Maintenance of financial responsibility.

    1. Subsection (a) as currently effective; see also subsection (a) and contingent effective date of amendment note set out below.

      No owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered, or operator required to be licensed or issued a learner’s permit, shall operate or permit the operation of the vehicle upon the highways of the State without having in effect an automobile liability policy or bond in the amounts of at least $25,000.00 for one person and $50,000.00 for two or more persons killed or injured and $10,000.00 for damages to property in any one crash. In lieu thereof, evidence of self-insurance in the amount of $115,000.00 must be filed with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and shall be maintained and evidenced in a form prescribed by the Commissioner. The Commissioner may require that evidence of financial responsibility be produced before motor vehicle inspections are performed pursuant to the requirements of section 1222 of this title.

      (a)

      Subsection (a) as amended by 2015, No. 50 , § 6; see also subsection (a) set out above, and contingent effective date of amendment note set out below.

      No owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered, or operator required to be licensed or issued a learner’s permit, shall operate or permit the operation of the vehicle upon the highways of the State without having in effect an automobile liability policy or bond in the amounts of at least $25,000.00 for one person and $50,000.00 for two or more persons killed or injured and $10,000.00 for damages to property in any one crash. In lieu thereof, evidence of self-insurance in the amount of $115,000.00 must be filed with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and shall be maintained and evidenced in a form prescribed by the Commissioner. The Commissioner may adopt rules governing the standards for insurance identification cards. The Commissioner may also require that evidence of financial responsibility be produced before motor vehicle inspections are performed pursuant to the requirements of section 1222 of this title.

    2. A person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $500.00, and such violation shall be a traffic violation within the meaning of chapter 24 of this title.
    3. Every operator of a vehicle required to be registered shall have proof of financial responsibility as required by subsection (a) of this section when operating such vehicle on the highways of this State. A person may prove financial responsibility using a portable electronic device; however, use of a device for this purpose does not in itself constitute consent for an enforcement officer to access other contents of the device. An operator cited for violating this subsection shall not be convicted if he or she sends or produces to the issuing enforcement agency within seven business days of the traffic stop proof of financial responsibility that was in effect at the time of the traffic stop.
    4. A person who violates subsection (c) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $100.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 77 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; amended 1987, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), eff. April 29, 1988; 1989, No. 84 , § 5; 1997, No. 117 , § 33, eff. Jan. 1, 1999; 2011, No. 46 , § 6; 2013, No. 67 , § 14; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2015, No. 50 , § 6; 2019, No. 14 , § 62, eff. April 30, 2019.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019. Subsec. (d): Substituted “civil penalty” for “fine”.

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Added the third sentence, and inserted “also” preceding “require” in the last sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “crash” for “accident”.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “subsection (a) of” following “violates”.

    Subsecs. (c), (d): Added.

    —2013. Subsec. (b): Deleted “not less than $250.00 and” preceding “not more than.”

    —2011. Subsec. (a): In the first sentence, inserted “of a motor vehicle required to be registered” following “owner”; deleted “of a motor vehicle” following “operator”; inserted “or issued a learner’s permit” following “licensed”; and substituted “, and” for “Such financial responsibility” following “vehicles”.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “less than $250.00 and not” preceding “more” and substituted “$500.00” for “$100.00” following “than”.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$25,000.00” for “$20,000.00” and “$50,000.00” for “$40,000.00” in the first sentence and “$115,000.00” for “$100,000.00” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined”, “violation” for “offense”, and “chapter 24” for “chapter 23”.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Deleted “full force and” preceding “effect” and substituted “or bond in the amounts of at least $20,000.00 for one person and $40,000.00 for two or more persons killed or injured and $10,000.00 for damages to property in any one accident” for “a bond or evidence of self-insurance in the amounts required by section 801 of this title” following “policy” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added the third sentence.

    Contingent effective date of amendment. 2015, No. 50 , § 34(b) provides: “Sec. 6 (insurance identification cards) [which would amend subsection (a) of this section] shall take effect if and when five northeastern states require that insurance identification cards include machine-readable technology. As used in this subsection, ‘northeastern states’ means the New England states, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey.”

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    Legislature did not intend to prohibit fellow employee exclusions in business auto policies where employees were already covered by workers’ compensation. Davis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 193, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13682 (D. Vt. 1998), aff'd, 267 F.3d 124, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21455 (2d Cir. 2001).

    Provision is directed toward owners and operators, not insurance companies. Norman v. King, 163 Vt. 612, 659 A.2d 1123, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 37 (1995) (mem.).

    Statutory language that “no owner or operator of a motor vehicle . . . shall operate . . . the vehicle” without required insurance does not require each vehicle owned by an insured to have its own insurance, limiting in turn uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to each individual’s policy. Monteith v. Jefferson Insurance Co., 159 Vt. 378, 618 A.2d 488, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 185 (1992).

    Proof of insurance.

    Unlike the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures fully applies in the civil context and, therefore, applied in the context of a traffic stop related to suspicion of motorist’s failure to have automobile insurance. Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13204 (2d Cir. 1998).

    The fact that Vermont may order citizens to provide proof of insurance in conjunction with a valid traffic stop or when they apply for their annual state inspection sticker does not, however, mean that the State Police may pull motorists over without probable cause for the sole purpose of asking them to provide proof of insurance. Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13204 (2d Cir. 1998).

    Since driving without insurance is a civil infraction, not a criminal offense, the State may require motorists to provide proof of insurance and may draw an adverse inference from a motorist’s refusal to do so, without infringing the Fifth Amendment. Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13204 (2d Cir. 1998).

    Uninsured motorist coverage.

    Financial responsibility laws are separate from an insurer’s obligation to cover insureds wherever they become victims of an uninsured or underinsured motorist. Thus, a passenger who was injured while riding in his own uninsured vehicle was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. Progressive Ins. Co. v. Brown, 2008 VT 103, 184 Vt. 388, 966 A.2d 666, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 95 (2008).

    § 801. Proof of financial responsibility required.

    1. The Commissioner shall require proof of financial responsibility to satisfy any claim for damages, by reason of personal injury to or the death of any person, of at least $25,000.00 for one person and $50,000.00 for two or more persons killed or injured and $10,000.00 for damages to property in any one crash, as follows:
      1. From a person who is convicted of any of the following violations of this title:
        1. Death resulting from:
          1. careless and negligent operation of a motor vehicle; or
          2. reckless driving of a motor vehicle.
        2. Any violation of section 1201 of this title or for any suspension pursuant to section 1205 of this title.
        3. Failing to immediately stop and render such assistance as may be reasonably necessary following a crash resulting in injury to any person or property, other than the vehicle then under his or her control.
        4. Operating, taking, using, or removing a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner in violation of section 1094 of this title.
        5. Operating a motor vehicle after suspension, revocation, or refusal of a license, in violation of section 674 of this title.
        6. [Repealed.]
        7. [Repealed.]
        8. The provisions of subdivisions (a)(1)(A), (C), (D), and (E) of this section shall not apply to an operator furnishing the Commissioner with satisfactory proof that a standard provisions automobile liability insurance policy, issued by an insurance company authorized to transact business in this State insuring the operator against public liability and property damage, in the amounts required under this section with respect to proof of financial responsibility, was in effect at the time of the violation. Nor shall these provisions apply if the operator was a nonresident, holding a valid license issued by the state of his or her residence, at the time of the violation, and satisfactory proof, in the form of a certificate issued by an insurance company authorized to transact business in the state of his or her residence, and accompanied by a power of attorney authorizing the Commissioner to accept service on its behalf, of notice or process in any action arising out of the violation, certifying that insurance covering the legal liability of the operator to satisfy any claim or claims for damage to person or property, in an amount equal to the amounts required under this section with respect to proof of financial responsibility was in effect at the time of the violation.
      2. From a person against whom there is an outstanding unsatisfied judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction within this State for damages arising out of a motor vehicle crash and based upon any violation of the provisions of this title.
      3. From the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a crash that resulted in bodily injury or death to any person or property damage, including to the motor vehicle under the operator’s control, in an aggregate amount to the extent of $3,000.00 or more, excepting, however:
        1. an operator furnishing the Commissioner with satisfactory proof that a standard provisions automobile liability insurance policy, issued by an insurance company authorized to transact business in this State insuring the person against public liability and property damage, in the amounts required under this section with respect to proof of financial responsibility, was in effect at the time of the crash; or
        2. a nonresident operator holding a valid license issued by the state of his or her residence at the time of the crash who furnishes satisfactory proof, in the form of a certificate issued by an insurance company authorized to transact business in the state of his or her residence, when accompanied by a power of attorney authorizing the Commissioner to accept service on its behalf of notice or process in any action upon the policy arising out of the crash, certifying that insurance covering the legal liability of the operator to satisfy any claim or claims for damage to person or property, in an amount equal to the amounts required under this section with respect to proof of financial responsibility, was in effect at the time of the crash.
    2. The provisions of subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall not apply to the operator of a motor vehicle, involved in a crash, if at the time of the crash the motor vehicle he or she was operating, whether attended or unattended, was legally parked in any location other than upon a public highway. Nor shall the provisions of that subdivision apply to the operator of an all-terrain vehicle when the vehicle is registered and operated pursuant to chapter 31 of this title.
    3. In lieu of the insurance policy or surety bond required under this section, a person may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance from the Commissioner, who may, in his or her discretion, upon the application of such person, issue said certificate of self-insurance, when he or she is satisfied that such person is possessed of a net unencumbered capital of at least $115,000.00. The Commissioner may require annual reports from any self-insurer, which reports must show at least $115,000.00 unencumbered net worth. Whenever the Commissioner finds that any self-insurer does not possess $115,000.00 of unencumbered net worth, he or she shall revoke the certificate of self-insurance. Failure to pay any judgment, within statutory limits, after such judgment shall have become final, shall constitute reasonable grounds for the cancellation of a certificate of self-insurance. A certificate of self-insurance obtained by a self-insurer shall insure every person operating a motor vehicle, owned by said self-insurer, with his or her express or implied permission, against loss within statutory limits from the liability imposed by law upon such person arising out of the operation of said motor vehicle and shall be for the benefit of any person suffering personal injuries or property damage arising out of the use of such motor vehicle with such express or implied permission.
    4. Where erroneous information with respect to insurance coverage is furnished to the Commissioner by the operator involved in a crash, the Commissioner shall, after receipt by him or her of correct information with respect to such coverage, take appropriate action as provided in section 802 of this title.
    5. Within 15 days after the receipt from the Commissioner of notice of claimed insurance coverage, the insurance carrier named by the operator shall notify the Commissioner in such manner as he or she may require in case the required insurance was not in effect at the time specified in the notice.  If no such notification is received by the Commissioner within 15 days, the Commissioner may assume that the required insurance was in effect at the time specified in the notice.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 4 , § 1; 1969, No. 227 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. May 1, 1970; 1971, No. 151 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2, eff. March 2, 1972; 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. March 1, 1973; 1977, No. 81 , § 4, eff. April 27, 1977; 1977, No. 220 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 1979, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1979, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1983, No. 61 , § 1; 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1985, No. 230 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1995, No. 17 , § 1; 1995, No. 67 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 34, eff. April 29, 1998, and Jan. 1, 1999; 1999, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; 2011, No. 46 , § 7; 2015, No. 23 , § 122; 2015, No. 47 , § 20; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 164; 2019, No. 170 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 42 , § 1. 1955, No. 124 . 1953, No. 207 , §§ 1, 2. 1953, No. 257 , § 1. 1951, No. 215 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,163. 1947, No. 100 . 1943, No. 83 , § 1. 1941, No. 98 , § 1. 1937, No. 130 , § 1. P.L. § 5190. 1929, No. 76 , § 1. 1927, No. 81 , § 1.

    Editor’s note—

    The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 1999 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 102 and 160, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 1999 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 102 and 160 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 131 substituted “crash” for “accident” and “a crash” for “an accident” throughout subsecs. (a), (b), and (d) and rewrote subdiv. (a)(3).

    Subdiv. (a)(1): Act No. 170 repealed subdivs. (F) and (G) and deleted “and (G)” in subdiv. (H).

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(1)(G): Act No. 23 and Act No. 47 substituted “adopting” for “promulgating” preceding “rules” and “adopt” for “promulgate” preceding “rules” in the last sentence.

    Subdiv. (a)(1)(H): Act No. 47 substituted “the provisions of subdivisions (a)(1)(A), (C), (D), (E), and (G)” for “the provisions of subdivisions (a)(1)(A) and (C) through (a)(1)(E) and (G)” at the beginning of the first sentence.

    —2011. Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “$3,000.00” for “$1,000.00” and made minor grammatical changes.

    Subdiv. (a)(3)(B): Deleted “if the operator was” preceding “a”; inserted “operator” following “nonresident” and “who furnishes” following “accident”, and made a minor grammatical change.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Act No. 102 added “in violation of section 1094 of this title” following “the owner” in subdiv. (a)(1)(D).

    Act No. 160 added new subdiv. (a)(1)(G) and redesignated former subdiv. (a)(1)(G) as subdiv. (a)(1)(H) and inserted “and (G)” following “through (a)(1)(E)” in that subsec.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$25,000.00” for “$20,000.00” and “$50,000.00” for “$40,000.00” in the introductory paragraph.

    Subdiv. (a)(1)(G): Inserted “and (C)” following “subdivisions (a)(1)(A)” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$115,000.00” for “$100,000.00” in three places.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(1): Inserted “or her” preceding “control” in subdiv. (C), added “in violation of section 674 of this title” following “license” in subdiv. (E), rewrote subdiv. (F), and added subdiv. (G).

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Amended generally.

    Subdivs. (a)(4) and (5): Deleted.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “subdivision (a)(3)” for “subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(4)” preceding “of this section”, inserted “or she” preceding “was operating” and added “in any location other than upon a public highway” following “legally parked” in the first sentence, and substituted “that subdivision” for “these subdivisions” preceding “apply” in the second sentence.

    —1995. Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “$1,000.00” for “$500.00” following “extent of”.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(5): Designated existing provisions of subdiv. as subdiv. (A) and added subdiv. (B).

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence.

    —1983. Subsec. (e): Substituted “claimed insurance coverage” for “an accident” preceding “the insurance carrier” and “specified in the notice” for “of such accident” following “time” in the first sentence and for “of the accident” following “time” in the second sentence.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 190 substituted “$500.00” for “$200.00” following “extent of”.

    Act No. 194 substituted “$20,000.00” for “$10,000.00” preceding “for one person and”, “$40,000.00” for “$20,000.00” thereafter, and “$10,000.00” for “$5,000.00” following “killed or injured and” in the introductory paragraph, redesignated former subdivs. (1)(A)1 and 2 as present subdivs. (1)(A)(i) and (ii), respectively, added subdiv. (1)(F), and substituted “subsection (i) of section 802 of this title” for “ 23 V.S.A. § 802(i) ” preceding “who fails” in subdiv. (4).

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(4): Deleted the former second and third sentences.

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Substituted “license” for “licence” following “applying for a” and preceding “was obtained”.

    —1977. Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “$200.00” for “$100.00” following “extent of”.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1)(A): Amended generally by Act No. 258.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Act No. 151 inserted “for which he was wholly or partially at fault as determined by the commissioner after due notice and hearing if requested under and subject to Title 3, chapter 25 notwithstanding section 816(b) of Title 3 and” preceding “which has resulted”.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Act No. 151 inserted “which indicates he was at fault in any degree, or, if no indication of fault, a hearing is held, if requested, as provided under 23 V.S.A. § 802(i) ” following “convicted of such violation” in the first sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “$100.00” for “$35.00” following “extent of” and made minor changes in punctuation.

    —1965. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$5,000.00” for “$2,000.00” following “killed or injured and” in the introductory paragraph and made minor changes in punctuation in subdiv. (3).

    Waiver of proof of financial responsibility. 2019, No. 170 (Adj. Sess.), § 4 provides: “(a) The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall, as soon as practicable but not later than April 1, 2021, relieve operators from the obligation to furnish proof of financial responsibility required pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 801(a)(1) as amended by this act in accordance with 23 V.S.A. § 809 as amended by this act as applicable.

    “(b) If an operator is not required to furnish proof of financial responsibility pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 801(a)(1) as amended by this act, then the Commissioner shall, as soon as practicable but not later than April 1, 2021, relieve the operator from the obligation to furnish proof of financial responsibility.

    “(c) This section shall not be construed to relieve an operator of his or her responsibility to comply with the mandatory insurance requirement set forth in 23 V.S.A. § 800 .”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Duty to stop following an accident, see § 1128 of this title.

    Negligent and grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle, see § 1091 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    That one convicted of a traffic violation indicating fault is not entitled under subdiv. (a)(4) of this section to an independent hearing on the question of fault prior to license suspension is not a denial of due process or equal protection; the driver has the chance for a hearing on the issue by pleading “not guilty” to the violation. Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9364 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 297, 42 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3138 (1974). (Decided under prior law) .

    The fact that subdiv. (a)(3) of this section provides a hearing for drivers who may be at fault in an accident but are not convicted of a motor vehicle violation while subdiv. (a)(4) does not provide a hearing for those convicted of motor vehicle violations does not create an arbitrary and capricious classification in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since a defendant charged with a motor vehicle violation is afforded a hearing in a court of law. Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9364 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 297, 42 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3138 (1974). (Decided under prior law) .

    Provision of subdiv. (a)(4) of this section requiring driver involved in accident to obtain either a written release from all persons who sustained damages as a result of the accident or a security deposit adequate to satisfy any judgment for damages in order to retain his license did not unconstitutionally discriminate against those who could not afford to pay the security deposit. Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9364 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 297, 42 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3138 (1974). (Decided under prior law) .

    Provision of subdiv. (a)(4) of this section requiring security for past accidents was justified by State’s compelling interest in reducing the imposition of financial disaster upon persons injured by insecure and uninsured motorists. Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9364 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 297, 42 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3138 (1974). (Decided under prior law) .

    This section does not unconstitutionally discriminate against a single class of potential debtors. Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9364 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 297, 42 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3138 (1974).

    Provision of subdiv. (a)(4) of this section regarding the posting of security, and provision of section 802(a) of this title enforcing such security provision, were an unconstitutional denial of procedural due process in that no hearing was provided for on the amount of security to be posted. Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9364 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 297, 42 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3138 (1974). (Decided under prior law) .

    Insofar as subdiv. (a)(3) of this section required a showing of financial responsibility without any determination of possibility of fault, it was unconstitutional. McNamara v. Malloy, 337 F. Supp. 732, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10882 (D. Vt. 1971). (Decided under prior law) .

    Conviction of motor vehicle violation.

    The financial responsibility requirements of subdiv. (a)(4) of this section are not predicated upon any admission of guilt evidenced by a plea of nolo contendere or of guilty, but upon conviction on any plea of an accident-related motor vehicle offense. Croteau v. Malloy, 135 Vt. 64, 370 A.2d 206, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 556 (1977). (Decided under prior law) .

    Evidence.

    Certificate showing proof of financial responsibility is not insurance but only an administrative document for the convenience of the Commissioner, and Commissioner could accept a simple surety agreement or even a deposit by the operator himself. Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F.2d 692, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 2794 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 672, 62 S. Ct. 1043, 86 L. Ed. 1747, 1942 U.S. LEXIS 698 (1942).

    Fault.

    That Vermont has a comparative negligence law does not make the administrative hearing finding on the issue of a driver’s fault difficult and complex to determine, for the finding need not be made on a comparative negligence basis and it is sufficient if a determination is made that there is a reasonable possibility that either driver might recover under comparative negligence principles. Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9364 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 297, 42 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3138 (1974). (Decided under prior law) .

    Hearing.

    By amending subdivs. (a)(3) and (4) of this section the legislative intent was to provide for a fault hearing when requested under subdiv. (3) in the absence of a conviction, and provide in subdiv. (4), that the conviction be for an offense indicating fault in the happening of the particular accident or that a hearing, if requested, be held. Croteau v. Malloy, 135 Vt. 64, 370 A.2d 206, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 556 (1977). (Decided under prior law) .

    Notice to Commissioner.

    An automobile liability insurer which failed to notify Commissioner of Motor Vehicles that its insured did not have the required insurance in effect at the time of accident in this state but which wrote letters to injured motorcycle passenger, her father, and motorcycle owner, its insured, stating that insured’s policy applied only to accidents occurring in Massachusetts, did not waive its right to deny liability under this section for an injury occurring in Vermont. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, 127 Vt. 99, 241 A.2d 60, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 183 (1968).

    The liability insurer of a motorcycle involved in an accident in this state was not estopped from denying liability under its policy covering motorcycle only in Massachusetts by its failure to report status of coverage within 15 days after receiving from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles a notice of an accident, in absence of showing that either the injured passenger or insured had been misled to their prejudice or into an altered position by failure of the insurer to give the notice required by subsec. (e) of this section. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, 127 Vt. 99, 241 A.2d 60, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 183 (1968).

    Party insured.

    Relationship between car rental agency, as a self-insurer under Vermont’s financial responsibility law, and lessee of its vehicle was in substance one of insurance, and therefore agency’s obligation to pay under the law was “other collectible insurance” for purposes of lessee’s private automobile liability policy. Champlain Casualty Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 168 Vt. 91, 716 A.2d 810, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 145 (1998).

    Purpose.

    The purpose of the financial responsibility law is to protect the public and ensure that those motor vehicle operators who cause accidents for which they are liable have adequate resources to satisfy any claims arising from the accidents. Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9364 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 297, 42 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3138 (1974).

    The purpose of the financial responsibility law is to reduce the imposition of financial disaster on the general public that may be injured through the negligence or recklessness of financially insecure and uninsured motor vehicle operators and as the legislation is neither arbitrary nor irrational it is, generally, constitutional. Miller v. Malloy, 343 F. Supp. 46, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13661 (D. Vt. 1972).

    Self insurers.

    Statute defining when a motor vehicle is underinsured, 23 V.S.A. § 941(f) , directs mandatory uninsured/underinsured motorists’ coverage in all forms of motor vehicle insurance, including self insurance, so that all motorists have minimum protection from financially irresponsible drivers. Colwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2003 VT 5, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 5 (2003).

    Resolution of the question whether a self-insured employer’s underinsured motorists’ coverage was equal to or less than a tortfeasor-motorist’s liability coverage required a factual inquiry into the limits of the employer’s self-insurance plan because “self insurance” is a term with no specific legal meaning. Colwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2003 VT 5, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 5 (2003).

    Cited.

    Cited in Wells v. Malloy, 402 F. Supp. 856, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15603 (D. Vt. 1975); Goodrich v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 423 F. Supp. 838, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11912 (D. Vt. 1976); Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977); Richardson v. Conway, 136 Vt. 575, 396 A.2d 143, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 673 (1978); Muir v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 147 Vt. 590, 522 A.2d 236, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 426 (1987); State v. Trask, 148 Vt. 385, 533 A.2d 1185, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 517 (1987); Whitney v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 151 Vt. 510, 562 A.2d 467, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 82 (1989); O'Neill v. Berkshire Mutual Insurance Co., 786 F. Supp. 397, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11238 (D. Vt. 1992).

    Notes to Opinions

    Federal employees.

    Operator of federal motor vehicle while in discharge of his official duties need not comply with this section, and in any event, vehicle may be considered as covered, in view of Federal Tort Claims Act. 1952-54 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 253.

    Operator.

    Operator, as used in subdiv. (a)(3) of this section, includes not only a person physically in a vehicle at the time of an accident, but also a person who stopped a car he was driving and left the motor running, with the result the vehicle continued down the street and damaged two cars, while the driver was inside a store. 1964-66 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 170.

    Party insured.

    This section does not require that operator should personally have liability insurance covering claims for damage to persons or property in the particular accident involved so long as owner of vehicle has similar insurance which would cover claims for damage while vehicle was being driven by operator in question. 1946-48 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 219.

    Purpose.

    The purpose of this section is to require uninsured drivers involved in accidents to furnish evidence of financial responsibility for future accidents and the word “operator” used therein should be interpreted broadly. 1964-66 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 170.

    § 802. Suspension of license.

    1. Proof of financial responsibility shall cover a person in the operation of any and all motor vehicles operated by him or her.  If he or she fails to furnish such proof, when required under the provisions of section 801 of this title, within 20 days after notice from the Commissioner is mailed to him or her, until such proof is furnished, the Commissioner shall suspend the license of an operator or the right of an unlicensed operator or nonresident to operate any motor vehicle in this State.
    2. [Repealed.]
    3. When a resident of Vermont, or a person holding a Vermont operator’s license, as a result of a motor vehicle crash in any other state has been required to furnish such other state with evidence of future financial responsibility and because of failure to do so has had his or her operating privilege suspended or revoked therefor, upon being notified by the proper official of such other jurisdiction of such suspension or revocation, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall suspend the Vermont operator’s license or right of such person to operate motor vehicles, and such suspension shall remain in effect until the person suspended shall furnish the Commissioner with satisfactory evidence that he or she has complied with the requirement to furnish such other state with evidence of future financial responsibility.
    4. -(h) [Repealed.]

      (i) No proof of financial responsibility shall be required, under subdivision 801(a)(3) of this title, and no license shall be suspended under that subdivision, unless the operator whose license or right to operate motor vehicles is subject to suspension has been afforded the opportunity of a hearing to determine whether the operator was, at the time of the crash, injury, or damage in question, insured against public liability and property damage in the amounts required under section 801 of this title with respect to proof of financial responsibility. If the operator requests a hearing, and appears at the time and place provided, the Commissioner or his or her appointed representative shall conduct a hearing, make findings, and render a decision. The hearing examiner may consider such evidence as is offered and may consider also the operator and investigating officer report or reports filed in connection with the crash, injury, or damages as well as the assumption permitted under subsection 801(e) of this title. If the decision of the hearing examiner finds the operator to be uninsured at the time of the crash, injury, or damages, then the person shall be required to provide proof of financial responsibility under this subchapter and, if he or she fails to do so, his or her license or right to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended. A person found to be uninsured may have the finding reviewed in the Superior Court. The hearings provided for shall be conducted in Montpelier. Hearings shall be conducted with a minimum of procedural requirements, so as to provide persons an opportunity to be heard without delay and at reasonable expense to them and to the State.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 4 , § 2; 1971, No. 151 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 3, 4, eff. March 2, 1972; 1977, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.); 1977, No. 220 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 3, 4; 1979, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 6, 1980; 1983, No. 61 , § 2; 1995, No. 67 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1997, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 257 . 1953, No. 257 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,164. 1941, No. 98 , § 2. 1937, No. 130 , § 2. P.L. § 5191. 1929, No. 76 , § 1. 1927, No. 81 , § 1.

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” once in subsec. (c) and three times in subsec. (i) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23 and “to do so” for “so to do” in subsec. (c) to correct a grammatical error.

    Amendments

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (i): Substituted “in the superior court” for “under Rule 74 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure” in the fifth sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (i): Amended generally.

    —1983. Subsecs. (d) and (e): Repealed.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “divisions (3) and (4) of subsection (a) and subsections (b) and (c) of” preceding “section 801” in the second sentence and deleted the former third and fourth sentences.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 175 substituted “an operator or the right of an unlicensed operator, or nonresident” for “such person, or if such person is not a resident of this state, suspend the right of such person” preceding “to operate any” in the second sentence of subsec. (a).

    Act No. 220 deleted “and to furnish security” preceding “when required, under the provisions of” and substituted “divisions” for “paragraphs” thereafter, substituted “is” for “and such security, if required, are” preceding “furnished” in the second sentence; deleted “or such proof and such security” following “responsibility” in the third sentence of subsec. (a), and repealed subsecs. (b) and (f)-(h).

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (i): Added.

    —1965. Subdiv. (d)(3): Substituted “$ 5,000.00” for “$ 2,000.00” preceding “has been credited”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Operating after suspension or revocation of license, see § 674 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    Provision of section 801(a)(4) of this title regarding the posting of security and provision of subsec. (a) of this section enforcing such security provision were an unconstitutional denial of due process in that no hearing was provided for on the amount of security to be posted. Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9364 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 297, 42 L. Ed. 2d 261, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3138 (1974). (Decided under prior law) .

    Insofar as subsec. (a) of this section was used to enforce provision of section 801(a)(3) of this title without any prior determination of possibility of fault, it was unconstitutional. McNamara v. Malloy, 337 F. Supp. 732, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10882 (D. Vt. 1971). (Decided under prior law) .

    Judicial review.

    Where subsec. (i) of this section provided that “no findings made . . . by a court on review, shall be used in any way in any litigation . . . arising out of the accident,” findings implied a de novo proceeding, and it was error to deny driver’s request for de novo review. Richardson v. Conway, 136 Vt. 575, 396 A.2d 143, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 673 (1978). (Decided under prior law) .

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977); Croteau v. Malloy, 135 Vt. 64, 370 A.2d 206, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 556 (1977); State v. Cady, 136 Vt. 29, 383 A.2d 607, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 680 (1978); State v. Bradley, 145 Vt. 492, 494 A.2d 129, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 319 (1985).

    § 803. Proof of financial responsibility to be kept in force.

    After a person has been required to file proof of financial responsibility, he or she shall not thereafter be entitled to a renewal of his or her license, unless such proof or a renewal thereof is kept on file and in force, except as provided in section 809 of this title. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, any person required to furnish proof of financial responsibility shall have his or her license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle suspended and shall surrender the license on the date that the insurance expires or is terminated.

    HISTORY: Amended 1981, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 22, 1982.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,165. 1937, No. 130 , § 3. P.L. § 5192. 1929, No. 76 , § 1. 1927, No. 81 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Added the last sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Suspension of license.

    In prosecution for driving with license suspended in violation of section 674 of this title, evidence that driver’s insurance had in fact never terminated was admissible to prove that Department of Motor Vehicles was without authority to suspend driver’s license pursuant to this section. State v. Mohr, 146 Vt. 193, 499 A.2d 769, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 362 (1985).

    § 804. Method of proof.

    1. Proof of financial responsibility shall be furnished by an insurance company authorized to do business in this State, in a form satisfactory to the Commissioner and shall be evidence of the insuring of such person against claims and judgments for personal injury and property damage in the amounts specified in section 801 of this title, provided the policy of insurance shall be noncancellable except after 15 days’ notice to the Commissioner; or such proof may be the bond of a surety company, authorized to transact business in this State, which bond shall be conditioned for the payment of such amounts. An insurance company or surety company issuing such policy or bond shall immediately furnish, for filing with the Commissioner, a satisfactory certificate certifying that such policy or bond has been issued. Instead of the certificate, proof may be furnished by any computer-generated means approved by the Commissioner. Once proof furnished in this manner is accepted by the Commissioner, the insurance company or surety company shall be bound in the same manner as if a certificate had been furnished for filing.
    2. An insurance or surety company shall bear responsibility for its errors, including failure to file in a timely manner, in connection with the filing of the certificate referred to in subsection (a) of this section.  All costs and expenses incurred by insureds and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles as a consequence of the failure to file a properly executed certificate shall be paid by the insurance or surety company.
    3. The Commissioner may require that an insurance or surety company appoint an in-state representative having authority to execute certificates on its behalf when an insurer fails to submit properly executed certificates.
    4. If an insurer is not authorized to do business in this State, the Commissioner may accept a written certificate, provided that the certificate issued on behalf of an operator who is a nonresident of this State otherwise conforms with the provisions of this chapter and the insurer complies with the following conditions with respect to the policies certified:
      1. the insurer executes a power of attorney authorizing the Commissioner to accept service on its behalf of notice or process in any action arising out of a motor vehicle crash in this State; and
      2. the insurer agrees in writing that these policies shall be deemed to conform with the laws of this State.
    5. If an insurer not authorized to transact business in this State but qualified to furnish proof defaults in any undertakings or agreements, the Commissioner shall not accept as proof any certificate of the insurer so long as the default continues.

    HISTORY: Amended 1983, No. 101 (Adj. Sess.); 1987, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1995, No. 67 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 36, eff. Jan. 1, 1999.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 42 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,166. P.L. § 5193. 1931, No. 85 , § 1. 1929, No. 77 , § 1. 1927, No. 81 , § 2.

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” in subdiv. (d)(1) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the first sentence, inserted “by an insurance company authorized to do business in this state”; substituted “shall be evidence” for “may be evidence”; deleted “public liability” before “claims and judgments”; and deleted “in an insurance company authorized to do business in this state” after “property damage”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsecs. (d) and (e): Added.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), substituted “15” for “ten” preceding “days’ notice” in the first sentence of that subsec., and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Added the third and fourth sentences.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Insurance.

    Where a driver in Vermont who has a bad driving record is required to file proof of financial responsibility in the form of insurance or cash bond, the insurance policy may not be canceled without 15 days notice to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles; such notice is required for both the cancellation and lapse of policies and failure to notify the Commissioner renders the cancellation of the policy invalid. American Casualty Co. v. Nordic Leasing, Inc., 42 F.3d 725, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (2d Cir. 1994).

    Purpose.

    Although the financial responsibility portion of the motor vehicle law is unclear about the cancellation of an automobile policy and the lapse of any such policy, the purpose of the statute is to let the state agencies know when dangerous drivers may be forgoing their required insurance and to take steps appropriately, and in the absence of legislative direction, lapses and cancellations of these policies should be treated the same and the insurer should be required in both cases to notify the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles 15 days in advance of such lapse or cancellation. American Casualty Co. v. Nordic Leasing, Inc., 42 F.3d 725, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (2d Cir. 1994).

    § 805. Waiver of defenses against injured party.

    When evidence of the insuring of a person, convicted of a violation of a motor vehicle law within the terms of this title, is offered as proof of financial responsibility, the presentation of such proof shall include certification that the policy of insurance or indemnity bond has a certificate waiving, as against injured persons, all defenses based on false representation or breach of warranties as set forth in the application for the policy of insurance or indemnity bond by the insured attached. Such contract, bond, or policy of insurance shall be for the benefit of a person injured in person or property, to the amounts indicated, to satisfy the legal liability of the insured.

    HISTORY: Amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 165.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 215 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,167. 1947, No. 202 , § 5496. P.L. § 5194. 1931, No. 85 , § 1. 1929, No. 77 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). In the first sentence, deleted “attached thereto” following “bond has” and inserted “attached” following “by the insured”; and in the second sentence, deleted “therein” following “indicated”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Insurer’s obligation.

    Under this section when legal liability of insured is established, insurer’s obligation to pay injured persons becomes absolute. Peerless Casualty Co. v. Cole, 121 Vt. 258, 155 A.2d 866, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 116 (1959).

    While an insurance carrier has privilege of compromising a claim against insured under insuring agreement, it is under no legal obligation to satisfy claim until liability of insured has been legally established. Peerless Casualty Co. v. Cole, 121 Vt. 258, 155 A.2d 866, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 116 (1959).

    § 806. Additional evidence.

    Additional evidence of financial responsibility shall be furnished the Commissioner at any time upon his or her request therefor.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,168. P.L. § 5195. 1931, No. 85 , § 1. 1929, No. 77 , § 1. 1927, No. 81 , § 2.

    § 807. Bond.

    The bond shall be held by the Commissioner to satisfy an execution issued against such person in a case arising out of damage caused by the operation of a motor vehicle owned by such person.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,169. P.L. § 5196. 1927, No. 81 , § 3.

    § 808. Repealed. 2007, No. 61, § 6.

    History

    Former § 808. Former § 808, relating to abstract of motor vehicle licensee’s operating record, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,170; P.L. § 5197; 1927, No. 81 , § 4 and amended by 1963, No. 168 ; 1969, No. 276 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    § 809. Waiver of proof of financial responsibility.

    1. The Commissioner shall relieve an operator from the obligation to furnish proof of financial responsibility after one year from the crash, conviction, or judgment giving rise to the obligation. In the event that a suspension or revocation resulted from the conviction giving rise to the obligation, an operator shall not be relieved of the obligation to furnish proof of financial responsibility until one year after his or her reinstatement eligibility date.
    2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the Commissioner shall not relieve an operator from the obligation to furnish proof of financial responsibility until three years after a conviction of careless and negligent operation of a motor vehicle resulting in death, conviction of reckless driving of a motor vehicle resulting in death, or second and subsequent conviction of a violation of section 1201 of this title. In the event that a suspension resulted from the conviction giving rise to the obligation, an operator shall not be relieved of the obligation to furnish proof of financial responsibility until three years after his or her reinstatement eligibility date.
    3. This section shall not be construed to relieve an operator of his or her responsibility to comply with the mandatory insurance requirement set forth in section 800 of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, no. 69, eff. May 19, 1965; 1977, No. 220 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1979, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Jan 1, 1981; 1983, No. 138 (Adj. Sess.), eff. April 7, 1984; 1987, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1993, No. 17 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1994; 2019, No. 170 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” in subsec. (a) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added the subsec. (a) designation and substituted “one year” for “three years” twice.

    Subsec. (b): Added.

    Subsec. (c): Added the subsec. (c) designation, and substituted “section” for “provision”.

    —1993. Deleted the proviso at the end of the first sentence, and substituted “that” for “of” following “event” and inserted “resulted from the conviction giving rise to the obligation” following “revocation” in the second sentence.

    —1987. Substituted “accident, conviction or judgment” for “event” preceding “giving rise” and added “or for failure to furnish proof of financial responsibility” following “disabilities” in the first sentence, and added the second and third sentences.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “from the event giving rise to the obligation” following “years” in the introductory paragraph, added “and” following “time” in subdiv. (1), deleted former subdiv. (2), redesignated former subdiv. (3) as present subdiv. (2) and substituted “section 604 of this title” for “ 23 V.S.A. § 604 ” following “taxes under” and “section 673 of this title” for “ 23 V.S.A. § 673 ” following “poor under” in that subdiv.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (2): Repealed.

    —1965. Subdivs. (1)-(3): Amended generally.

    Waiver of proof of financial responsibility. 2019, No. 170 (Adj. Sess.), § 4 provides: “(a) The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall, as soon as practicable but not later than April 1, 2021, relieve operators from the obligation to furnish proof of financial responsibility required pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 801(a)(1) as amended by this act in accordance with 23 V.S.A. § 809 as amended by this act as applicable.

    “(b) If an operator is not required to furnish proof of financial responsibility pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 801(a)(1) as amended by this act, then the Commissioner shall, as soon as practicable but not later than April 1, 2021, relieve the operator from the obligation to furnish proof of financial responsibility.

    “(c) This section shall not be construed to relieve an operator of his or her responsibility to comply with the mandatory insurance requirement set forth in 23 V.S.A. § 800 .”

    § 810. Uncompensated victims; reporting requirements.

    The Commissioner of Financial Regulation, with cooperation of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the Commissioner of Public Safety, shall direct any company issuing policies in this State insuring against liability arising out of the maintenance, ownership, or use of any motor vehicle to provide such information, reports, and data as the Commissioner determines will reasonably identify the number and characteristics of uninsured motorists and uncompensated victims of automobile crashes in the State in order to recommend policies designed to further reduce the numbers of uncompensated victims of motor vehicle crashes. As a condition of conducting business in the State, any company writing such policies shall comply with the directives of the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 77 , § 5; amended 1989, No. 225 (Adj. Sess.), § 25(b); 1995, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 38(a); 2011, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crashes” for “accidents” twice in the first sentence in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “commissioner of financial regulation” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” in the first sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, and securities” in the first sentence.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, and securities” for “commissioner of banking and insurance” in the first sentence.

    Subchapter 2. Jitneys

    § 841. Compulsory liability insurance or a surety bond.

    Before a jitney is used in the carrying of passengers for hire, the owner thereof shall procure a contract or policy of insurance issued by a liability insurance company authorized to transact business in this State, or a surety bond executed by such owner and having a surety company authorized to transact business in this State as surety thereon, which insurance or surety bond shall indemnify the insured against any legal liability to the passengers in the jitney or others, for personal injury, the death of a person, or property damage, which injury, death, or damage may result from or have been caused by the use or operation of a motor vehicle covered by such policy of insurance or such bond.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,180. P.L. § 5207. 1925, No. 72 , § 2.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in English v. Myers, 142 Vt. 144, 454 A.2d 251, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 623 (1982).

    § 842. Insurer or surety as co-defendant.

    The insurer or surety may be made co-defendant with the owner of such jitney in an action for such injury, death, or property damage.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,181. P.L. § 5208. 1925, No. 72 , § 2.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Parties.

    Addition of insurer as party defendant under this section does not make the insurer a true party to the action. Stark v. Crowell, 117 Vt. 413, 94 A.2d 585, 1953 Vt. LEXIS 108 (1953).

    Cited.

    Cited in English v. Myers, 142 Vt. 144, 454 A.2d 251, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 623 (1982).

    § 843. Amount of insurance or bond.

    The amount of insurance or bond shall be a minimum of $50,000.00 for injury to or death of any one person in any crash subject to a minimum limit per crash of $100,000.00 for injuries to or death of all persons in any one crash if the vehicle has a seating capacity of seven passengers or less, subject to a minimum limit per crash of $250,000.00 for injuries to or death of all persons in any one crash if the vehicle has a seating capacity from eight to 12 passengers inclusive, subject to a minimum limit per crash of $300,000.00 for injuries to or death of all persons in any one crash if the vehicle has a seating capacity from 13 to 20 passengers inclusive, subject to a minimum limit per crash of $350,000.00 for injuries to or death of all persons in any one crash if the vehicle has a seating capacity from 21 to 30 passengers inclusive, subject to a minimum limit per crash of $300,000.00 for injuries to or death of all persons in any one crash if the vehicle has a seating capacity exceeding 30 passengers, and $50,000.00 from damages to property in any crash.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 109 , § 1; 1981, No. 136 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1983.

    History

    Source.

    1949, No. 238 . V.S. 1947, § 10,182. P.L. § 5209. 1925, No. 72 , § 3.

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” throughout the section in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$50,000.00” for “$10,000.00” following “shall be a minimum of”, “$250,000.00” for “$150,000.00” following “or less, subject to a minimum limit per accident of”, “$300,000.00” for “$200,000.00” following “twelve passengers inclusive, subject to a minimum limit per accident of”, “$350,000.00” for “$250,000.00” following “twenty passengers inclusive, subject to a minimum limit per accident of”, and “$50,000.00” for “$5,000.00” preceding “from damages”.

    —1965. Section amended generally.

    §§ 844-848. Repealed. 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 16.

    History

    Former § § 844-848. Former § 844, relating to filing of insurance or bond for jitney owners, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,183; 1937 No. 131, § 2; P.L. § 5210; 1929, No. 74 , § 1; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 72 , § 4.

    Former § 845, relating to insurance or bond for jitney owners, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,184; P.L. § 5211; 1929, No. 74 , § 1; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 72 , § 4.

    Former § 846, relating to waiver of defenses against injured party, was derived from 1951, No. 215 , § 4; V.S. 1947, § 10,185; P.L. § 5212; 1929, No. 74 , § 1; 1925, No. 72 , § 4.

    Former § 847, relating to operation of a jitney without insurance, bond or certificate, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,186; P.L. § 5213; 1933, No. 157 , § 4909; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 72 , § 5.

    Former § 848, relating to penalties, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,187; P.L. § 5214; 1933, No. 157 , § 4910; 1925, No. 72 , § 6.

    Subchapter 3. Motor Buses

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Liability insurance for school buses, see § 921 of this title.

    Regulation of motor buses by Transportation Board, see 5 V.S.A. chapter 24.

    § 881. Compulsory liability insurance or bond.

    The Commissioner shall not register a motor bus, and a person shall not operate or cause to be operated upon any public highway a motor bus, until the owner thereof has procured insurance or a bond having a surety company authorized to transact business in this State as surety thereon. The insurance or surety bond shall indemnify the insured against any legal liability for personal injury or the death of any person or property damage, which injury, death, or damage results from or is caused by the use or operation of the motor bus described in the contract of insurance or such bond.

    HISTORY: Amended 2015, No. 47 , § 22.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,173. P.L. § 5200. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 73 , § 1. 1923, No. 91 , § 5.

    Amendments

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Condition precedent.

    This section compels adequate financial responsibility as condition precedent to registration and operation of a motor bus on a public highway in this State, to indemnify the carrier against any legal liability for personal injury or property damage which may result from operation of a motor bus. Ploesser v. Burlington Rapid Transit Co., 121 Vt. 133, 149 A.2d 728, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1959).

    Evidence.

    Existence of public liability insurance contract under this section is not prejudicial in a legal sense to insured or his surety on the trial of the issue of insured’s liability in negligence. Ploesser v. Burlington Rapid Transit Co., 121 Vt. 133, 149 A.2d 728, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1959).

    Nature of insurance.

    Public liability insurance, openly required of all motor buses by this section, stands differently from insurance of private vehicles, since public has an interest in the contract and injured person has been given direct right of action against insurer. Ploesser v. Burlington Rapid Transit Co., 121 Vt. 133, 149 A.2d 728, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1959).

    Sufficiency of indemnity.

    Common carriers competing with operator of motor bus line have no such interest in amount or character of indemnity required of petitioner by this section as entitles them to challenge sufficiency thereof, such indemnity being for benefit of bus operator’s passengers for injuries to their persons or property caused by unlawful action or neglect of operator, and is not for benefit of, nor does it in any way affect right or liability of, another common carrier, competing with bus owner in transportation of persons for hire. In re James, 98 Vt. 477, 129 A. 175, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 152 (1925).

    § 882. Insurer or surety as co-defendant.

    The insurer or surety may be made a co-defendant with the owner of such motor bus in an action for such injury, death, or property damage.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,174. P.L. § 5201. 1925, No. 73 , § 1.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Ploesser v. Burlington Rapid Transit Co., 121 Vt. 133, 149 A.2d 728, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1959).

    § 883. Amount of insurance or bond.

    The amount of insurance or of such bond that an owner of a motor bus shall carry as insurance or indemnity against claims for personal injury, death, or property damage shall be determined by the Transportation Board. Such policy or bond shall also indemnify the insured against legal liability resulting from damage to property to the amount of $2,000.00.

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 329 (Adj. Sess.), § 39(b), eff. March 1, 1961; 2015, No. 47 , § 23.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,175. P.L. § 5202. 1925, No. 73 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —2015. Substituted “Transportation Board” for “Public Service Board” in the first sentence.

    —1959 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “board” for “commission” following “public service” at the end of the first sentence.

    § 884. Proof of insurance; notice of cancellation.

    A company issuing such insurance or indemnity bond shall file with the Commissioner proof that the required insurance or indemnity bond has been issued as shall be satisfactory to the Commissioner and such insurance or bond shall not lapse, expire, or be cancelled while the registration is in force until at least 20 days’ written notice of an intention to cancel has been given to the Commissioner. Upon receipt of the notice, the Commissioner shall immediately notify the insured of such intention to cancel, and that if other insurance or indemnity bond is not furnished within 15 days thereafter, the registration of the motor buses of the insured shall be cancelled and the number plates of such motor buses will be taken up by the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 166.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,176. 1937, No. 131 , § 1. P.L. § 5203. 1929, No. 75 , § 1. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 73 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). In the first sentence, deleted “such” preceding “proof that the required”, inserted “of an intention to cancel” following “written notice” and “to” following “given”, and deleted “of an intention to cancel” following “the Commissioner”; and in the second sentence, substituted “immediately” for “forthwith” preceding “notify the insured”, “the” for “such” following “buses of”, and “shall” for “will” preceding “be cancelled”.

    § 885. Waiver of defenses against injured party.

    When evidence of insurance is offered to the Commissioner that a contract or policy of insurance issued by a liability insurance company or a surety bond has been procured in accordance with the provisions of section 881 of this title, the presentation of such proof shall include certification that the policy of insurance or bond includes or has appended a certificate waiving, as against injured persons, all defenses based on false representations or breach of warranties as set forth in the application for the policy of liability insurance or indemnity bond by the insured. Such contract or policy of insurance or surety bond shall be for the benefit of a person injured in person or property, to the amounts indicated, to satisfy the legal liability of the insured.

    HISTORY: Amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 167.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 215 , § 3. V.S. 1947, § 10,177. P.L. § 5204. 1929, No. 75 , § 1. 1925, No. 73 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “thereto” following “appended” in the first sentence and deleted “therein” following “amounts” in the second sentence.

    § 886. Injured person may obtain name and description of insurer.

    A person injured in person or property by a motor bus may apply to the Commissioner for the name and description of the insurer of the motor bus causing such injury, or the name of the surety upon any indemnity bond or the owner thereof.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,178. P.L. § 5205. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 73 , § 4.

    § 887. Penalties.

    A person who violates a provision of sections 881-886 of this title shall be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,179. P.L. § 5206. 1925, No. 73 , § 7.

    § 888. Alternative form of security.

    In lieu of all or part of the insurance or bond required by section 881 of this title, a motor bus owner may file with the Commissioner a bond conditioned for the payment and discharge of all liability described in section 881 of this title provided the policy of insurance, if any, or bond is approved by an order of the Transportation Board filed with the Commissioner determining the amount, if any, of insurance to be procured and the amount of a bond in addition to or in substitution for insurance. The Board may approve a bond without surety if it determines, by order made upon proper showing, that a surety on the bond is not required by the public interest because of the proven financial responsibility of the obligor, or because of collateral security consisting of deposits in a Vermont bank or negotiable securities held by such bank as trustee, or a combination thereof, pledged to secure the performance of the bond upon terms and conditions prescribed by the Board. If the order requires insurance or a surety bond, the policy of insurance or surety bond shall be executed by a company authorized to do business in this State.

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 329 (Adj. Sess.), § 39(b), eff. March 1, 1961; 2015, No. 47 , § 24; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 168.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 191 .

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). In the first sentence, deleted “of Motor Vehicles” preceding “a bond” and “said” preceding “section” and inserted “881 of this title” preceding “provided the policy”; and in the second sentence, substituted “determines” for “shall have determined”.

    —2015. Substituted “Transportation Board” for “Public Service Board” preceding “filed with the Commissioner” in the first sentence, and substituted “the bond” for “said bond” in two places in the second sentence.

    —1959 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “board” for “commission” throughout.

    Subchapter 4. School Buses

    § 921. Liability insurance.

    A motor vehicle owned or hired by a board of school directors shall not be operated in the transportation of schoolchildren at any time when the owner and operator thereof is not insured under a liability policy issued by an insurance company authorized to transact business in this State to indemnify against liability for damages for personal injuries or damages to property. The amount of insurance shall be a minimum of $100,000.00 for injury to or death of any one person in any crash, subject to a minimum limit per crash of $300,000.00 for injuries to or death of all persons in any one crash if the vehicle has a seating capacity of nine passengers or less. If the vehicle has a seating capacity in excess of nine passengers, the amount of insurance shall be a minimum of $300,000.00 for injury to or death of any one person in any crash and subject to a minimum limit per crash of $500,000.00 for injuries to or death of all persons in any one crash. In addition, a minimum limit of $50,000.00 per occurrence for property damage shall be required. It shall be the duty of the school directors to require the filing, by or with them, of proof that the insurance is in force prior to the opening of each school year and that it is kept in force so long as schoolchildren are being transported. A person who violates a provision of this section shall be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. This section shall not apply to any person who transports only his or her own children, whether with or without compensation.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 109 , § 2; 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 155 . 1949, No. 243 , § 5.

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” throughout the section in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the second sentence, and added the third and fourth sentences.

    —1965. Rewrote the first sentence, added the second sentence, and substituted “the” for “such” following “proof that” and “it is” for “the same be” preceding “kept” in the third sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Nonapplicability of section to Type I school bus owned or operated by a common carrier, see § 3 of this title.

    Notes to Opinions

    Children outside district.

    Both a district bus owned by a school board in its official capacity and a private carrier hired by the board to carry school children require liability insurance in the amounts required by this section, and the rates are not changed by a school board agreement to transport a child from another district to its own. 1962-64 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 259.

    Subchapter 5. Insurance Against Uninsured, Underinsured, or Unknown Motorists

    History

    Revision note—

    In the subchapter heading, inserted “Underinsured” following “Uninsured” to conform the heading to the subject matter of § 941 of this subchapter as amended by 1979, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    The court must construe this subchapter and the insurance policy to achieve the primary purpose of the enactment. Rhault v. Tsagarakos, 361 F. Supp. 202, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13137 (D. Vt. 1973).

    This subchapter has fashioned the means to benefit an insured who has provided protection for others, to obtain protection for himself; thus, the law attempts to provide coverage in the insured’s own policy, and at his premium, where it does not exist with the other operator. Rhault v. Tsagarakos, 361 F. Supp. 202, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13137 (D. Vt. 1973).

    Nature of policy.

    The purpose of this subchapter and a policy issued under it is to provide the insured with a source of recovery of damages caused by an uninsured motorist; thus, the policy is in the nature of a limited type of accident insurance, rather than the usual indemnity contract. Rhault v. Tsagarakos, 361 F. Supp. 202, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13137 (D. Vt. 1973).

    Purpose.

    Insurer that issued a comprehensive general liability policy to a company was not required to provided uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) coverage to an executive officer who was injured while riding his personal motorcycle and while he was not on company business because under the circumstances, the executive officer was not an “insured” under the policy. Statutorily required UM/UIM coverage extended only to those insured under the policy. Mayhew v. Alterra Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8453 (D. Vt. Jan. 25, 2012).

    The design of this subchapter is to protect a responsibly insured motorist against the unfortunate hazard presented by an injury inflicted in an accident with an irresponsible operator who is uninsured or has fled the scene, leaving the insured without recourse for the damage inflicted. Rhault v. Tsagarakos, 361 F. Supp. 202, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13137 (D. Vt. 1973).

    § 941. Insurance against uninsured, underinsured, or unknown motorists.

    1. No policy insuring against liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle may be delivered or issued for delivery in this State with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State unless coverage is provided for the protection of persons insured under the policy or a supplemental policy who are legally entitled to recover damages, from owners or operators of uninsured, underinsured, or hit-and-run motor vehicles, for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, and for property damages resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured, underinsured, or hit-and-run motor vehicle. The coverage for property damages shall be sufficient to indemnify a claim for damages to which the claimant is legally entitled of no more than $10,000.00 per claim, subject to a $150.00 deductible; provided, however, to the extent that other direct damage coverage is valid and collectible:
      1. this deductible shall not apply to a claimant who is otherwise insured for direct damages to his or her motor vehicle, in which case:
        1. the coverage for property damages provided in this section shall be applied, without deductible, to pay the deductible of the other direct damage coverage; and
        2. the balance of the direct damage claim, if any, shall be covered by such other direct damages coverage to the extent of its limits;
      2. further, any other claim for property damages, not direct damages, to which the claimant is legally entitled, shall be paid by the coverage required by this section, without deductible, to the extent of the limits provided in this section.
    2. Every policy insuring against liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall provide insurance against loss resulting from the liability imposed by law for damages because of bodily injury or death of any person within this State or elsewhere in the United States and Canada.
    3. The coverages under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for new or renewed policies shall be not less than $50,000.00 for one person and $100,000.00 for two or more persons killed or injured. If the limits of liability coverage in the policy are greater than $50,000.00 for one person and $100,000.00 for two or more persons injured or killed, the limits of uninsured motorist insurance shall be the same, unless the policyholder otherwise directs.
    4. For the purpose of this subchapter an “uninsured motor vehicle” includes an insured other motor vehicle where:
      1. the liability insurer of the other motor vehicle is unable, because of its insolvency, to make payment with respect to the legal liability of its insured within the limits specified in its policy; and
      2. the occurrence out of which the legal liability arose took place while the uninsured vehicle coverage required under subsection (a) of this section was in effect; and
      3. the insolvency of the liability insurer of the other motor vehicle existed at the time of, or within one year after, the occurrence.
    5. If payment is made under uninsured motorist coverage, and subject to the terms of that coverage, to the extent of that payment, the insurer is entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or recovery from any person legally responsible for the damage or personal injury, as to which the payment was made, and to amounts recoverable from the assets of an insolvent insurer of such person. However, if the injured party settles or recovers against any person, any reimbursement due to an insurer under this section shall be reduced by deducting a fair portion of all reasonable expenses of recovery incurred in effecting the settlement or recovery. The expenses of recovery shall be apportioned between the parties as their interests appear at the time of the settlement or recovery.
    6. For the purpose of this subchapter, a motor vehicle is underinsured to the extent that:
      1. the liability insurance limits applicable at the time of the crash are less than the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage applicable to the insured; or
      2. the available liability insurance has been reduced by payments to others injured in the crash to an amount less than the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage applicable to the insured.
    7. Within 30 days of receipt of a written request by a person reasonably claiming the right to recover damages after a crash involving owners or operators of motor vehicles for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, or for property damages resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, an insurer that may be liable to satisfy part or all of the claim under a policy subject to this chapter shall provide a statement, by a duly authorized agent of the insurer, setting forth the names of the insurer and insured, and the limits of liability coverage.

    HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 374 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1979, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1981; 1983, No. 61 , § 3; 1985, No. 77 , § 3; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 35, 37, eff. Jan. 1, 1999; 2005, No. 9 , § 1, eff. May 27, 2005; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 169.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” in subdivs. (f)(1) and (f)(2) and “a crash” for “an accident” in subsec. (g) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    —2014. In section heading, inserted “underinsured, or unknown” following “uninsured” to conform the section heading to the subject matter of the section and the subchapter heading.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the introductory language, deleted “therein, or supplemental thereto,” following “is provided” and substituted “under the policy or a supplemental policy” for “thereunder”; and in subdiv. (a)(2), deleted “herein” preceding “provided” and inserted “in this section” thereafter.

    —2005. Subsec. (f): Deleted “its personal injury limits of liability at the time of an accident are less than the limits of uninsured motorists coverage applicable to any injured party legally entitled to recover damages under said uninsured motorist coverage” following “that” and added subdivs. (1) and (2).

    Subsec. (g): Substituted “reasonably claiming the right” for “legally entitled” and “after an accident involving” for “from”.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote subsec. (c); in subsec. (e), substituted “an insolvent insurer of such person” for “the insolvent insurer of the other motor vehicle” at the end of the first sentence and added the last two sentences; and added subsec. (g).

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1983. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “underinsured” preceding “or hit-and-run” in two places.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “section 801 of this title” for “ 23 V.S.A. § 801 ” following “provisions of”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “subchapter” for “act” following “purpose of” in the introductory paragraph.

    Subsec. (f): Added.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Amount of recovery.

    Where a self-insurer provided a decedent with underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 941 , the UIM coverage did not include punitive damages that would have been assessed against a third party who caused a car accident in which the decedent was killed; thus, evidence of the third party’s intoxication was irrelevant in the UIM dispute between the self-insurer and the decedent’s estate. Pecor v. Elrac, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27601 (D. Vt. July 11, 2003).

    Amount motorist was entitled to receive from uninsured-underinsured motorist insurer under “offset reduction” clause of uninsured motorist policy, which allowed reduction of “any amounts otherwise payable for damages,” was difference between amount recovered from tortfeasor or his insurer and liability limit in policy declarations, not difference between amount recovered from tortfeasor or his insurer and actual amount of insured’s damages. Webb v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 158 Vt. 137, 605 A.2d 1344, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 26 (1992).

    This section does not require that an insured receive the benefits he or she is entitled to under the uninsured motorist provision of his or her policy absent a deduction for reasonable costs incurred in obtaining those benefits. Preziose v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 152 Vt. 604, 568 A.2d 397, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 195 (1989).

    The definition in subsec. (f) of this section makes clear that underinsurance protection only applies to the amount by which the tortfeasor actually is underinsured; it does not apply to the amount by which his coverage differs from plaintiff’s total damages or from plaintiff’s other insurance coverages. Brunet v. American Insurance Co., 660 F. Supp. 843, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4178 (D. Vt. 1987).

    Where plaintiff was injured when uninsured motorist drove his car into her parents’ home, where she resided, and plaintiff and her father each owned an automobile covered by separate insurance policy issued by defendant insurance company, father’s policy covering plaintiff as to uninsured motorists, and each policy providing for the minimum $10,000 amount of uninsured motorist coverage for each person as required by this section and section 801 of this title, plaintiff could recover the statutory minimum from each policy, provided such recovery did not exceed the amount of her actual loss. Goodrich v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 423 F. Supp. 838, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11912 (D. Vt. 1976).

    Once the policyholder has established the liability of the uninsured motorist, and has established his damages, the company’s undertaking is to pay the policyholder as much of the judgment as can be satisfied within the limit specified in the uninsured motorist clause. Rhault v. Tsagarakos, 361 F. Supp. 202, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13137 (D. Vt. 1973).

    If an insured’s injury exceeds the limit specified in the uninsured motorist clause he must look elsewhere for further recovery. Rhault v. Tsagarakos, 361 F. Supp. 202, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13137 (D. Vt. 1973).

    Applicability.

    Court does not read the uninsured/underinsured motorist statute to require an insurer effectively to provide “double liability insurance”; a concept that the court rejected in Hubbard, and an approach that has been uniformly rejected by other courts; this interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the law, with Hubbard, and with the conclusions reached by courts in other states. Thus, a passenger involved in a single-car accident who was not fully compensated under the host-vehicle policy’s liability coverage because of the number of victims was not entitled to recover both liability and UIM benefits under the policy, which contained “owned-vehicle” and “covered-auto” exclusions. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. MMG Ins. Co., 2014 VT 70, 197 Vt. 253, 103 A.3d 899, 2014 Vt. LEXIS 91 (2014).

    Uninsured motorist statute did not apply to a policy that was issued and delivered not in Vermont, but to a Massachusetts company with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. The fact that the car in question, which the company provided to an employee, was garaged at the employee’s house in Vermont did not mean that the statute applied. McGoff v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2011 VT 102, 190 Vt. 612, 30 A.3d 680, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 99 (2011).

    On its face, the uninsured motorist statute limits the application of its requirements to policies “delivered or issued for delivery in this state.” McGoff v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2011 VT 102, 190 Vt. 612, 30 A.3d 680, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 99 (2011).

    Uninsured motorist statute limits application of the statute to policies “delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state.” The two key phrases are connected by the term “with respect to” and thus are conjunctive rather than disjunctive, thereby requiring both elements to be satisfied for the statute to apply. McGoff v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2011 VT 102, 190 Vt. 612, 30 A.3d 680, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 99 (2011).

    Arbitration.

    Arbitration of a claim made under uninsured motorist provision of plaintiffs’ automobile insurance policy did not contravene this section; procedural formalities associated with a trial are not guaranteed by this section. Preziose v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 152 Vt. 604, 568 A.2d 397, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 195 (1989).

    Construction.

    Vermont’s uninsured/underinsured motorist statute now embraces both a “gap coverage” and “excess coverage” approach. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. MMG Ins. Co., 2014 VT 70, 197 Vt. 253, 103 A.3d 899, 2014 Vt. LEXIS 91 (2014).

    Consistent with legislative intent and the plain language of the statute, the law now allows an injured individual to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits under policies that he or she had purchased when a tortfeasor’s liability insurance has been depleted by payments to multiple victims. In other words, rather than engaging in a strict limits-to-limits analysis in multi-victim accidents as in Colwell, it is now appropriate to consider how much an injured party actually recovers under a liability policy and to compare that value to the limits of the victim’s own UM/UIM policies. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. MMG Ins. Co., 2014 VT 70, 197 Vt. 253, 103 A.3d 899, 2014 Vt. LEXIS 91 (2014).

    Legislature’s decision to predicate the application of the uninsured/underinsured motorist statute on the nature of the coverage rather than—as elsewhere in the chapter—the type of policy supports a conclusion that the Legislature fully intended the broad scope that the specific language commands. Absent any evidence of an intent to the contrary, therefore, there are no grounds to depart from the plain meaning of the statute. Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania. v. Johnson, 2009 VT 92, 186 Vt. 435, 987 A.2d 276, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 93 (2009).

    While uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) coverage arises in the context of automobile insurance, it is in essence self-insurance. By purchasing the mandated UM/UIM coverage, the insured is guaranteed at least that amount of recovery regardless of a lower level of liability insurance purchased by a tortfeasor; in that sense, the UM/UIM insurance attaches to the policy holder who purchases it, unlike liability coverage, which attaches to the vehicle insured. Hubbard v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2007 VT 121, 182 Vt. 501, 944 A.2d 891, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 256 (2007).

    Where a tortfeasor-motorist’s liability policy limits are greater than the injured party’s underinsurance limits, but are insufficient to satisfy the injured party’s damages because of payments made to other victims of the same accident, the tortfeasor is not underinsured under the plain language of subsec. (f) of this section. Colwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2003 VT 5, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 5 (2003).

    Subsec. (f) of this section directs mandatory uninsured/underinsured motorists’ coverage in all forms of motor vehicle insurance, including self insurance, so that all motorists have minimum protection from financially irresponsible drivers. Colwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2003 VT 5, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 5 (2003).

    In determining the level of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage available to a single insured who is among multiple injured persons with claims against a tortfeasor’s single-limit policy, subsec. (f) of this section requires comparison of the personal injury limits of liability in the tortfeasor’s policy, irrespective of the number of claimants, to the maximum limit of liability available to any one person under the insured’s UIM coverage. Derosier v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 VT 6, 175 Vt. 76, 819 A.2d 739, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 6 (2003).

    Where underinsured motorist coverage is imposed by operation of 23 V.S.A. § 941 , the coverage does not include punitive damages that would have been assessed against a third-party tortfeasor. Pecor v. Elrac, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27601 (D. Vt. July 11, 2003).

    A motorist’s intentionally throwing a tire iron at plaintiff’s vehicle was not an “accident” under plaintiff’s uninsured motorist coverage, and coverage therefor was not required by this section. Landry v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 166 Vt. 634, 701 A.2d 1035, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 178 (1997) (mem.).

    The benefit that a policyholder receives from uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage is protection against the probability of deficient recovery from the tortfeasor, not guaranteed receipt of payment equal to the UM/UIM coverage. Travelers Cos. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 164 Vt. 368, 670 A.2d 827, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 112 (1995).

    Plain language of statute requires coverage only for the protection of persons insured under the policy; if the Legislature intended 941(a) to provide broader coverage, it would have substituted the phrase “for the protection of persons occupying said motor vehicle” in place of “for the protection of persons insured thereunder.” Norman v. King, 163 Vt. 612, 659 A.2d 1123, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 37 (1995) (mem.).

    It would be inequitable to allow a tortfeasor to escape liability whenever a plaintiff receives timely payment from her uninsured motorist carrier. Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 157 Vt. 477, 601 A.2d 978, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1991).

    The 1983 amendment to subsec. (c) of this section applied only to those policies that were actually new or renewed after the effective date of the amendment, July 1, 1983; the amendment did not apply to all insurance policies then in force. Brunet v. American Insurance Co., 660 F. Supp. 843, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4178 (D. Vt. 1987).

    The language of this section extends coverage to insured persons wherever they may be, provided that they are injured by an uninsured motorist. Sanders v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 148 Vt. 496, 536 A.2d 914, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 563 (1987).

    This section neither promotes nor prohibits stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. Sanders v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 148 Vt. 496, 536 A.2d 914, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 563 (1987).

    Excess policies.

    In providing clearly and unambiguously that no policy insuring against liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle could issue without uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage, the UM/UIM statute plainly encompassed the excess policies here at issue. Both policies provided coverage for amounts in excess of the limit provided by the retained or primary policy. Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania. v. Johnson, 2009 VT 92, 186 Vt. 435, 987 A.2d 276, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 93 (2009).

    Nothing suggests that an excess or umbrella policy which—in the precise language of the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) statute—provides coverage against liability “resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle” should escape the reach of the statute merely because it depends on a primary policy or covers additional types of liability. This conclusion is also consistent with the “full recovery” nature of the statute, which provides that the limits of UM/UIM coverage shall be the same as those of the insured’s basic liability coverage, and with the decisions of most courts construing similar statutes. Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania. v. Johnson, 2009 VT 92, 186 Vt. 435, 987 A.2d 276, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 93 (2009).

    Uninsured/underinsured motorist statute, by its terms, does apply to excess or umbrella policies that provide coverage against liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania. v. Johnson, 2009 VT 92, 186 Vt. 435, 987 A.2d 276, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 93 (2009).

    Insurer’s duty to inform.

    Regardless of what the insurance agents understand about uninsured motorist (UM) statute, the most that can be inferred from the statutory language is that the insured must know that there are options with respect to UM coverage and that the default option is coverage consistent with liability coverage; no other explanation, such as the legislative purpose or advice as to whether to comply with that purpose, is required of the insurance company to make the insured’s voluntary election for lower limits more knowing. Lecours v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 163 Vt. 157, 657 A.2d 177, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1995).

    Although the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to encourage drivers to recognize that it is in their interest to adequately insure themselves against the risk of an accident with an uninsured motorist and although insured argued that such purpose is not furthered by a narrow interpretation of the insurer’s burden to inform, there is no support in the statute or the legislative history to expand the insurer’s burden. Lecours v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 163 Vt. 157, 657 A.2d 177, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1995).

    Insurer’s subrogation rights.

    An uninsured motorist carriers’ right of subrogation is limited because the carrier can obtain reimbursement only after the injured party is fully compensated. Korda v. Chicago Insurance Co., 2006 VT 81, 180 Vt. 173, 908 A.2d 1018, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 162 (2006).

    Lowering amount of coverage.

    Original policyholder’s written consent to have UM/UIM limits lower than his liability limits did not excuse insurer’s obligation to seek specific instruction regarding lowered UM/UIM limits from plaintiff’s mother at time she became an additional named policyholder. Dusharm v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 92 F. Supp. 2d 353, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5337 (D. Vt. 2000).

    Because this section does not create “separate and distinct” categories of coverage for uninsured and underinsured motorists, waivers of the statutory limits in subsec. (c) do not have to be separate for uninsured and underinsured coverages. The insurance carrier may require that the insured choose one “uninsured motorist” limit for uninsured and underinsured (and hit-and-run) motorist coverage. Merkel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 166 Vt. 311, 693 A.2d 706, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1997).

    Any waiver of uninsured-motorist coverage in an initial insurance policy is extended to the renewal policy. Subsec. (c) does not require a new direction to set uninsured motorist coverage limits at each policy renewal. The specific mention of “renewed policies” in this provision, which language was added in 1983, was to provide an effective date for the requirements of the section and not to require a new direction at each policy renewal. Merkel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 166 Vt. 311, 693 A.2d 706, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1997).

    Evidence was sufficient to show that insured’s decision to lower coverage was informed and voluntary where insurance agent testified that insured requested that uninsured motorist (UM) coverage be lowered and insured’s premium payment omitting earlier, higher UM coverage premium corroborated agent’s testimony. Lecours v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 163 Vt. 157, 657 A.2d 177, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1995).

    Court would not infer requirement that for a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage to be effective under 23 V.S.A. § 941(c) it must be in writing. Lecours v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 163 Vt. 157, 657 A.2d 177, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1995).

    Offsets.

    As long as the total uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is offset by the liability payment, the uninsured motorist statute is satisfied. Humphrey v. Vt. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2009 VT 53, 186 Vt. 537, 979 A.2d 452, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 98 (2009) (mem.).

    Primary uninsured/underinsured motorist insurers are entitled to offset their coverage by the full amount of a tortfeasor’s liability payment; any remaining offset inures to the excess insurer’s benefit. Thus, a $100,000 liability payment nullified the primary UIM coverage of $50,000 and offset the excess UIM coverage by $50,000. Humphrey v. Vt. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2009 VT 53, 186 Vt. 537, 979 A.2d 452, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 98 (2009) (mem.).

    Policy provisions.

    Definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” that excluded any vehicle owned by the insured or a relative was unenforceable under the uninsured motorist (UM) statute. Thus, a passenger who was injured while riding in his own uninsured vehicle, which he had allowed a friend to drive, was entitled to UM coverage. Progressive Ins. Co. v. Brown, 2008 VT 103, 184 Vt. 388, 966 A.2d 666, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 95 (2008).

    Owned-vehicle exclusion meant only that an insured could not recover under both the liability portion and the uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) portion of the same contract, and such an exclusion was not at all inconsistent with the UM/UIM statute where the driver’s liability and the insured passenger’s UM/UIM coverages under the same policy were equivalent. Since no gap in coverage could occur, the statute’s purpose was neither defeated nor impinged upon by enforcement of the exclusion. Hubbard v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2007 VT 121, 182 Vt. 501, 944 A.2d 891, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 256 (2007).

    Any limit on uninsured motorist coverage may not reduce the recovery which would have been available to the insured had the tortfeasor purchased insurance with the same (or greater) limits as the insured. Feeley v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2005 VT 87, 178 Vt. 642, 882 A.2d 1230, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 247 (2005) (mem.).

    Policy provision giving the insurance company the right to reduce its obligation under uninsured motorist coverage by “all amounts payable under any workers’ compensation law” is unenforceable. Feeley v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2005 VT 87, 178 Vt. 642, 882 A.2d 1230, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 247 (2005) (mem.).

    Plaintiff did not qualify as an “insured” under a policy held by his mother’s domestic partner as the “named insured.” Congdon v. Automobile Club Ins. Co., 174 Vt. 586, 816 A.2d 504, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 332 (2002) (mem.).

    Policy provisions that merely establish priority of coverage among insurers without compromising coverage for insureds do not violate uninsured motorist statute, and thus a provision labeling uninsured motorist coverage as excess does not, in and of itself, violate Vermont law mandating such coverage. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Powers, 169 Vt. 230, 732 A.2d 730, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 73 (1999).

    In dispute involving multiple uninsured motorist carriers, insurer whose policyholder was owner/operator of vehicle in which plaintiff was injured was primary insurer and was required to exhaust its policy limit before excess coverage of other insurers was tapped; where insurers’ respective policy provisions unambiguously established a consistent method for prioritizing uninsured motorist coverage, court would honor that method because it neither reduced coverage to insured nor violated statutory law or public policy. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Powers, 169 Vt. 230, 732 A.2d 730, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 73 (1999).

    In an action by decedent’s estate to recover uninsured motorist benefits under a business automobile insurance policy covering a company car assigned to the decedent’s mother, summary judgment for the insurer was not appropriate because the definition of “named insured” was ambiguous in the context of the family-oriented language of the contract. Lunge v. National Casualty Co., 977 F. Supp. 672, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15821 (D. Vt. 1997).

    Insurance policy clause, which denied uninsured motorist coverage for accidents in which insured motorists were injured while occupying vehicles they owned but had not insured, was inconsistent with Vermont law and unenforceable. Monteith v. Jefferson Insurance Co., 159 Vt. 378, 618 A.2d 488, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 185 (1992).

    Interpolicy, anti-stacking insurance provisions dealing with underinsured motorists violate this section’s language and underlying purpose. Monteith v. Jefferson Insurance Co., 159 Vt. 378, 618 A.2d 488, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 185 (1992).

    Clause in automobile insurance policy requiring insurer’s written consent to insured’s settlement with uninsured motorist was enforceable under this section. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Eitapence, 924 F.2d 48, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1060 (2d Cir. 1991).

    This section did not require payment for wife’s loss of consortium above and beyond what insurer already paid for husband’s injuries, under motor vehicle policy limiting bodily injury liability to $20,000 “for all damages sustained because of the injury to one person.” Whitney v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 151 Vt. 510, 562 A.2d 467, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 82 (1989).

    This section requires every policy to have a minimum uninsured motorist coverage, rather than requiring every injury to be covered to a minimum level; therefore, an individual policy may not avoid the minimum statutory requirements by comparing its coverage with other insurance coverage an insured might have. Brunet v. American Insurance Co., 660 F. Supp. 843, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4178 (D. Vt. 1987).

    “Anti-stacking” and “excess-escape other insurance” clauses in a personal automobile policy, which permitted the insurer to reduce its liability from the face amount of the uninsured motorist coverage in the policy, were invalid since they violated the minimum statutory requirements for uninsured motorist coverage, which requires and makes the insurer liable for up to the full face amount of its uninsured motorist coverage on each policy. Brunet v. American Insurance Co., 660 F. Supp. 843, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4178 (D. Vt. 1987).

    If a clause in one automobile insurance policy vitiates the uninsured motorist coverage provided in another policy, the latter becomes, in effect, a policy without protection against uninsured motorists in violation of this section. Sanders v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 148 Vt. 496, 536 A.2d 914, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 563 (1987).

    A single automobile insurance policy complies with the mandate of this section the first time it provides the statutory uninsured motorist coverage. Sanders v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 148 Vt. 496, 536 A.2d 914, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 563 (1987).

    Where plaintiff was injured when uninsured motorist drove his car into her parents’ home, where she resided, and plaintiff and her father each owned an automobile covered by separate insurance policy issued by defendant insurance company, father’s policy covering plaintiff as to uninsured motorists, and each policy providing for the minimum $ 10,000 amount of uninsured motorist coverage for each person as required by this section and section 801 of this title, “excess-escape” and “pro-rata” clauses in each policy, providing for payment less than that provided for by policy if other insurance applied, were repugnant to this section and invalid to extent that they purported to deny recovery for actual loss up to $ 20,000; if plaintiff’s actual losses were found to be less than $ 20,000, the “pro-rata” clauses could be given effect for sole purpose of pro-rating loss between two policies to avoid “double recovery.” Goodrich v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 423 F. Supp. 838, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11912 (D. Vt. 1976).

    The provisions of this section do not authorize a clause which requires the insurer’s consent to any settlement with others liable with the uninsured motorist in multiparty actions. Rhault v. Tsagarakos, 361 F. Supp. 202, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13137 (D. Vt. 1973).

    Clause in uninsured motorist coverage, which would reduce insured’s coverage to zero, was in violation of subsec. (c) of this section and thus invalid. Rhault v. Tsagarakos, 361 F. Supp. 202, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13137 (D. Vt. 1973).

    Purpose.

    Ultimate purpose of the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) statute, to guarantee the $200,000 protection purchased by plaintiffs, was satisfied by granting summary judgment for defendant. After receiving a $100,000 liability payment and a $100,000 UM/UIM payment, plaintiffs would be in the same position as if the UM/UIM driver’s auto insurance carried the same amount of liability coverage as the UM/UIM coverage purchased by plaintiffs. Hubbard v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2007 VT 121, 182 Vt. 501, 944 A.2d 891, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 256 (2007).

    The burden of proof is properly on the insurer to show that the insured made a knowing rejection of higher uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage; a lesser requirement would be entirely inconsistent with the broad remedial purpose of the uninsured motorist statute. Lecours v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 163 Vt. 157, 657 A.2d 177, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1995).

    The purpose of this section is to benefit an insured who has provided protection for others to obtain protection himself; neither this section nor the policy behind it is designed for the benefit of the uninsured motorist. Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 157 Vt. 477, 601 A.2d 978, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1991).

    This section was designed to insure the victim of an underinsured motorist a statutory minimum coverage equal to that of the victim of an uninsured motorist. Brunet v. American Insurance Co., 660 F. Supp. 843, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4178 (D. Vt. 1987).

    Reductions from coverage.

    Subsec. (e) of this section applies only to payments a plaintiff receives from the uninsured motorist; it does not provide for reduction in uninsured motorist coverage for payments received from an insured third-party motorist. Muir v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 147 Vt. 590, 522 A.2d 236, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 426 (1987).

    Where plaintiff’s sustained injuries when the car in which they were passengers collided with an car driven by an uninsured motorist, once plaintiffs established that they were legally entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist, their host driver’s insurer stood jointly liable with the uninsured motorist, or in his stead, up to the policy limits provided, and trial court properly refused to give effect to policy terms which provided for a reduction in uninsured motorist recovery by the amount recovered under liability coverage. Muir v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 147 Vt. 590, 522 A.2d 236, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 426 (1987).

    Under subsecs. (e) and (f) of this section, payments by the tortfeasor must be subtracted from the total of the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist policies and the remaining uninsured motorist liability must be apportioned pro rata among such policies. Brunet v. American Insurance Co., 660 F. Supp. 843, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4178 (D. Vt. 1987).

    Any payments made by an insurer under uninsured motorist coverage in a personal automobile policy should be reduced by any amount paid under the insured’s workers’ compensation payments to the insured; taken together, uninsured motorist and workers’ compensation payments cannot add up to more than the insured’s total damages. Brunet v. American Insurance Co., 660 F. Supp. 843, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4178 (D. Vt. 1987).

    No automobile insurance policy can be issued which reduces the amount of coverage mandated by this section. Sanders v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 148 Vt. 496, 536 A.2d 914, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 563 (1987).

    Reimbursement of carrier.

    Summary judgment was granted to insurer one on its claim against insurer two to recover a portion of underinsured motorist’s coverage that insurer one had paid to insureds because the two insurers were excess insurers, and thus each had to pay a pro rata share to be consistent with public policy under 23 VSA § 941(a). Wittik v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 297 (D. Vt. Jan. 12, 2004), aff'd, 142 Fed. Appx. 523, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15202 (2d Cir. 2005).

    The obligation of an uninsured motorist carrier is to provide uninsured motorist coverage up to the limits of its policy, for the portion of the accident victim’s total judgment that is unsatisfied by recovery from other sources; an uninsured motorist carrier is therefore entitled to reimbursement for payments it makes to an accident victim to the extent the victim’s total recovery from all sources exceeds his or her damages. Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 157 Vt. 477, 601 A.2d 978, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1991).

    Tortfeasors jointly liable with an uninsured motorist may not reduce their liability by the amount of payments made under uninsured motorist coverage because any potential windfall to the plaintiff will instead pass through to the uninsured motorist carrier as reimbursement for payments already made. Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 157 Vt. 477, 601 A.2d 978, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1991).

    Where plaintiff was injured at defendant’s maintenance garage when an automobile defendant’s off-duty uninsured employee was repairing crushed her leg, and plaintiff was covered by an uninsured motorist policy, the uninsured motorist carrier was properly reimbursed from a tortfeasor jointly liable with the uninsured motorist to the extent that the award of damages from the tortfeasor combined with the uninsured motorist coverage exceeded plaintiff’s total damages. Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 157 Vt. 477, 601 A.2d 978, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1991).

    Right to recovery.

    Financial responsibility laws are separate from an insurer’s obligation to cover insureds wherever they become victims of an uninsured or underinsured motorist. Thus, a passenger who was injured while riding in his own uninsured vehicle was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. Progressive Ins. Co. v. Brown, 2008 VT 103, 184 Vt. 388, 966 A.2d 666, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 95 (2008).

    Where the tortfeasor’s liability coverage exceeded the UIM coverage provided to the injured insured by plaintiff, he did not fall into the statutory definition of underinsured and, despite the fact that defendant actually recovered less than the limit of UIM coverage provided by plaintiff, he was not entitled to UIM benefits. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Lawton, 2003 VT 7, 175 Vt. 475, 820 A.2d 196, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 7 (2003) (mem.).

    The exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation statute does not bar recovery for underinsured motorists’ (UIM) benefits from a self-insured employer because, as an employer, the company is also an insurer bound to provide UIM coverage on its motor vehicles and, when the employee seeks UIM payments from the employer, the employee is enforcing the employer’s statutory obligation to provide UIM coverage irrespective of the method of insurance. Colwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2003 VT 5, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 5 (2003).

    Vermont law does not allow insurers to condition uninsured motorist/underinsured motorist coverage on location of insured, nor on insured’s status as motorist, passenger in private or public vehicle, or as pedestrian. Monteith v. Jefferson Insurance Co., 159 Vt. 378, 618 A.2d 488, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 185 (1992).

    Where policy limit for personal injury liability, $20,000, was not less than the $20,000 limit of uninsured motorist coverage, plaintiff who was passenger in vehicle involved in one-car accident was not entitled to recover under defendant’s uninsured motorist coverage; vehicle was not underinsured. Stanhope v. Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 155 Vt. 645, 582 A.2d 150, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 166 (1990) (mem.).

    Before an insured can recover under this section, he must establish only his right to recovery from the uninsured or hit-and-run motorist. Rhault v. Tsagarakos, 361 F. Supp. 202, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13137 (D. Vt. 1973).

    Cited.

    Cited in In re White, 155 Vt. 612, 587 A.2d 928, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 10 (1991); O'Neill v. Berkshire Mutual Insurance Co., 786 F. Supp. 397, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11238 (D. Vt. 1992); Fraser v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11461 (D. Vt. Feb. 13, 2009).

    § 942. Binders and renewal endorsements; binders of insurance.

    An insurer authorized to issue automobile liability insurance may issue a binder, in lieu of a policy, and issue a renewal endorsement or evidence of renewal of an existing policy. Renewal endorsements and binders shall be deemed to include provisions in accordance with this subchapter and rules adopted in furtherance thereof.

    HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 374 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 170.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “rules adopted” for “in accordance with regulations of the Commissioner” in the second sentence.

    § 943. Provisions in insurance policies.

    All policies of motor vehicle liability insurance delivered or issued for delivery in this State shall be deemed to include provisions in accordance with this subchapter and rules adopted in furtherance thereof.

    HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 374 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 171.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “rules adopted” for “in accordance with regulations of the Commissioner”.

    Chapter 13. Operation of Vehicles

    History

    Prior law.

    1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 1, 1973, repealed former subchapters 1-4, consisting of §§ 1001-1010, 1031-1054, 1091-1106 and 1141-1147. Section 2 of the act, effective March 1, 1973, redesignated former subchapters 5-8, consisting of §§ 1181-1226, 1241-1257, 1281-1282, 1301-1308, 1321-1324, 1341-1344, 1361, 1362, 1391-1411, 1431, 1432, 1451-1454, 1491 and 1492, as present subchapters 13-16, consisting of those sections formerly contained in subchapters 5-8. Present subchapters 1-12, consisting of §§ 1001-1015, 1021-1028, 1031-1041, 1046-1059, 1061-1065, 1071-1075, 1081-1083, 1091-1096, 1101-1105 and 1111-1133, were enacted by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    The subject matter and derivation of former subchapters 1-4 repealed by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 1, 1973, were as follows:

    Subchapter 1. General Provisions

    § 1001. Rules.

    1. The Commissioner may adopt rules:
      1. relating to motor vehicle equipment in all cases where its use is not defined in this title and whenever the use or nonuse, contrary to the rules, in the judgment of the Commissioner, may render the operation of the motor vehicle hazardous or unlawful;
      2. restricting or prohibiting the use of pictures, advertising matter, or other thing placed on or over any transparent part of a motor vehicle;
      3. relating to any other matter or thing that, in his or her judgment, may hinder or impede the operator in the safe and careful operation of a motor vehicle;
      4. in explanation of and in addition to, but not inconsistent with, the provisions of this title concerning any matter or thing that, in his or her judgment, may render the operation of motor vehicles safer and lessen motor vehicle crashes and resulting injuries or fatalities.
    2. The Commissioner may adopt rules uniform with the regulations of the federal agency having jurisdiction over motor vehicles subject to federal law so far as the regulations are applicable to the vehicles or to vehicles of the same type not subject to federal law, or to both.
    3. The Commissioner shall adopt rules under this section only in accordance with 3 V.S.A. chapter 25.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1975, No. 211 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 172.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crashes” for “accidents” in subdiv. (a)(4) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Substituted “Rules” for “Regulations”.

    Subsec. (a): Substituted “adopt rules” for “make regulations” in the introductory language.

    Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “rules” for “regulation”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “adopt rules” for “make the safety regulations”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “adopt rules” for “make regulations”.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Federal regulation.

    Absent a clear showing that the Secretary of Commerce intended new motor vehicles or items of equipment to be left to state regulation, either through their omission from federal standards or through a statement to that effect, court would not find that state regulation was permissible. Chrysler Corp. v. Malloy, 294 F. Supp. 524, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10114 (D. Vt. 1968), rev'd, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969).

    Violation as negligence.

    Violation of safety statute or regulation of that nature having force of law makes prima facie case of negligence, and gives rise to rebuttable presumption of negligence, which may be overcome by proof of attending circumstances. Rule v. Johnson, 104 Vt. 486, 162 A. 383, 1932 Vt. LEXIS 170 (1932).

    § 1002. Repealed. 1981, No. 82, § 7(7).

    History

    Former § 1002. Former § 1002, relating to publication of regulations, was derived from 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, and amended by 1975, No. 211 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    § 1003. State speed zones.

    1. When the Traffic Committee constituted under 19 V.S.A. § 1(24) determines, on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that shall take into account, if applicable, safe speeds within school zones (or safe speeds within 200 feet of school district-operated prekindergarten program facilities owned or leased by a school district) when children are traveling to or from such schools or facilities, that a maximum speed limit established by this chapter is greater or less than is reasonable or safe under conditions found to exist at any place or upon any part of a State highway, including the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, it may determine and declare a reasonable and safe limit that is effective when appropriate signs stating the limit are erected. This limit may be declared to be effective at all times or at times indicated upon the signs; and differing limits may be established for different times of day, different types of vehicles, varying weather conditions, or based on other factors bearing on safe speeds, which are effective when posted upon appropriate fixed or alterable signs.
    2. When establishing a maximum speed limit on a State highway contiguous to a school, the Traffic Committee shall consider, along with the engineering and traffic investigation, data collected for the purpose of promulgating a school travel plan under the Vermont Safe Routes to School Program.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2003, No. 151 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2009, No. 50 , § 100; 2009, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 40, eff. May 26, 2010.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Inserted “that shall take into account, if applicable, safe speeds within school zones (or safe speeds within 200 feet of school district-operated prekindergarten program facilities owned or leased by a school district) when children are traveling to or from such schools or facilities”, substituted “including” for “except”, and inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding “National System of Interstate and Defense Highways” in the first sentence.

    —2009. Designated existing provisions of section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “the traffic” for “a traffic” preceding “committee” and “constituted under 19 V.S.A. § 1(22) ” for “composed of the secretary of transportation, the commissioner of public safety and the commissioner of motor vehicles” preceding “determines” in the first sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    On duty enforcement officers exempt from speed limits, see § 1011(b) of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Blaine, 133 Vt. 345, 341 A.2d 16, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 402 (1975); Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 619, 442 A.2d 1291, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 463 (1982); State v. Yorkey, 163 Vt. 355, 657 A.2d 1079, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1995).

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 1141.

    Action by selectmen.

    Speed limits fixed by the traffic committee pursuant to this section do not require action by selectmen of the towns. 1950-52 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 394.

    § 1004. Interstate highway rules.

    1. The Traffic Committee has exclusive authority to make and publish, and from time to time may alter, amend, or repeal, rules pertaining to vehicular, pedestrian, and animal traffic, and the public safety on the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways and other limited access and controlled access highways within this State. The rules and any amendments or revisions may be made by the Committee only in accordance with 3 V.S.A. chapter 25. The rules shall be consistent with accepted motor vehicle codes or standards, shall be consistent with law, and shall not be unreasonable or discriminatory in respect to persons engaged in like, similar, or competitive activities. The rules are applicable only to the extent that they are not in conflict with regulations or orders issued by any agency of the United States having jurisdiction and shall be drawn with due consideration for the desirability of uniformity of law of the several states of the United States.
    2. Rules authorized by this section are effective on interstate and other limited access and controlled access highways only, taking precedence over those then in force and future highway laws and rules applicable to highways generally; however, the general highway laws and rules are effective on interstate highways until properly authorized rules providing otherwise are adopted.
    3. Rules, together with alterations and amendments of rules, made under this section have the force of law, and violations shall be traffic violations under section 2302 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1973, No. 16 , § 2, eff. March 1, 1973; 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2009, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 41, eff. May 26, 2010.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Deleted “speed limits” following “animal traffic” and inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding “National System of Interstate and Defense Highways” in the first sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Substituted “rules” for “regulations”.

    Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “Rules” and “rules” for “Regulations” and “regulations” throughout the subsec. and substituted “adopted” for “made and published”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “Rules” for “Regulations”, “of rules” for “thereto”, and “traffic violations under section 2302” for “penalized under section 2205(c)”.

    —1973. Subsec. (c): Substituted “section 2205(c)” for “section 1096(c)” preceding “of this title”.

    Evidence.

    In the case of defendant convicted of exceeding the speed limit, where the trial court took proper judicial notice of the general reliability of radar speedmeters as devices for measuring speed of an auto, the arresting officer testified that he was certified to operate the radar unit, that he had calibrated the unit to ensure that it was operating correctly before he came into contact with defendant, and that defendant’s vehicle was two-tenths of a mile from the radar unit when it was clocked at 69 miles per hour, the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s findings that the radar unit was accurate and that defendant was exceeding the legal speed limit of 55 miles per hour. State v. Amarantes, 143 Vt. 348, 465 A.2d 1383, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 532 (1983).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 552 A.2d 410, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 170 (1988).

    Annotations From Former § 1010

    Information.

    Information alleging that defendant operated his motor vehicle on Interstate 89 at a rate of speed in excess of established speed limit of 65 miles per hour, contrary to regulations governing use of interstate highway, took the prosecution beyond the reach of section 1141 of this title (now § 1081), establishing 50-mile per hour speed limit on certain highways, and placed it squarely within the application of this section. State v. Baril, 127 Vt. 394, 250 A.2d 732, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 242 (1969).

    Information charging defendant with driving on interstate highway at Middlesex on April 6, 1967, “at rate of speed in excess of the established speed limit, to wit, 65 miles per hour, contrary to regulations governing use of interstate highway” was sufficient to inform defendant of place, nature, and cause of accusation presented against him and was entirely adequate to direct him to particular statute upon which the charge was laid, without any impairment to the preparation of his defense. State v. Baril, 127 Vt. 394, 250 A.2d 732, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 242 (1969).

    § 1005. Regulation of parking.

    The Traffic Committee may place signs prohibiting or restricting the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles on any highway under its jurisdiction where, in its opinion, stopping, standing, or parking is dangerous to those using the highway or would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. The signs shall be official signs, and no individual may stop, stand, or park any vehicle in violation of the restrictions stated on such signs.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 173.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading and substituted “individual” for “person” in the second sentence.

    § 1006. Stopping at railroad crossings.

    The Traffic Committee may designate particularly dangerous railroad grade crossings, and the Agency of Transportation shall erect stop signs at each. The expense of erecting these stop signs shall be borne by the Agency of Transportation.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; 1983, No. 25 , § 1; amended 1997, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

    History

    Revision note—

    References to “department of highways” in this section were changed to “agency of transportation” in view of former 3 V.S.A. § 3116 , as enacted by 1977, No. 263 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, which provided that the agency of transportation was to be a successor to and continuation of the highway department. For present provisions relating to the Agency of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. chapter 1.

    Amendments

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “highway” after “dangerous” in the first sentence.

    —1983. Deleted the former second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Stopping at railroad grade crossings, see §§ 1071—1073 and 1076 of this title.

    § 1006a. Highways; emergency closure.

    1. The Traffic Committee may close any part or all of any State highway to public travel to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the public. In such event, the Agency may maintain a detour comprising State or town highways, or both, around the closed section. If the Agency maintains a detour on a town highway, it shall be responsible for repairing any damage to the town highway caused by the detoured traffic.
    2. The Traffic Committee may establish a temporary speed limit within that portion of the State highways that is being reconstructed or maintained.  The limit shall be effective when appropriate signs stating the limit are erected.
    3. Under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25, the Traffic Committee shall adopt such rules as are necessary to administer this section and may delegate this authority to the Agency of Transportation.
    4. Notwithstanding the maximum penalty established in section 2302 of this title and the waiver penalties established under 4 V.S.A. § 1102(d) , the civil penalty for violating a speed limit established under subsection (b) of this section shall be twice the penalty for a non-worksite speed limit violation.

    HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 4 , eff. Feb. 14, 1975; amended 1991, No. 15 , § 1; 1997, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; 2013, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 2015, No. 23 , § 123; 2015, No. 47 , § 25; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 29.

    History

    Revision note—

    In the second sentence of subsec. (a), substituted “agency of transportation” for “department of highways” in view of former 3 V.S.A. § 3116 , as enacted by 1977, No. 263 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, which provided that the agency of transportation was to be a successor to and continuation of the highway department. For present provisions relating to the Agency of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. chapter 1.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Substituted “maximum penalty” for “limit”, inserted “civil” preceding “penalty”, substituted “violating a” for “violation of” preceding “speed” and “limit” for “limits” thereafter, and inserted “a” preceding “non-worksite speed” and substituted “limit violation” for “violations” thereafter.

    —2015. Subsec. (c): Act No. 23 substituted “adopt” for “make and promulgate” preceding “rules”.

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 47 substituted “section 2302” for “subsection 2302(d)” and inserted “and the waiver penalties established under 4 V.S.A. § 1102(d) ” following “of this title”.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1991. Added a new subsec. (b), redesignated former subsec. (b) as subsec. (c) and in that subsec. (c), deleted “and regulations” following “rules” and added “and may delegate this authority to the agency of transportation” following “section”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Lane v. State, 174 Vt. 219, 811 A.2d 190, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 227 (2002).

    § 1006b. Smugglers’ Notch; winter closure of Vermont Route 108; commercial vehicle operation prohibited.

    1. The Agency of Transportation may close the Smugglers’ Notch segment of Vermont Route 108 during periods of winter weather.
      1. As used in this subsection, “commercial vehicle” means truck-tractor-semitrailer combinations and truck-tractor-trailer combinations. (b) (1) As used in this subsection, “commercial vehicle” means truck-tractor-semitrailer combinations and truck-tractor-trailer combinations.
      2. Commercial vehicles are prohibited from operating on the Smugglers’ Notch segment of Vermont Route 108.
      3. Either the operator of a commercial vehicle who violates this subsection, or the operator’s employer, shall be subject to a civil penalty of $1,000.00. If the violation results in substantially impeding the flow of traffic on Vermont Route 108, the penalty shall be $2,000.00. For a second or subsequent conviction within a three-year period, the penalty shall be doubled.
    2. The Agency shall erect signs conforming to the standards established by section 1025 of this title to indicate the closures and restrictions authorized under this section.

    HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 75 , § 37; amended 2007, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 52; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 68.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    § 1006c. Chain requirements for vehicles with weight ratings of more than 26,000 pounds.

    1. As used in this section, “chains” means link chains, cable chains, or another device that attaches to a vehicle’s tire or wheel or to the vehicle itself and is designed to augment the traction of the vehicle under conditions of snow or ice.
    2. The Secretary of Transportation, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, or the Commissioner of Public Safety, or their designees, may require the use of tire chains on specified portions of State highways during periods of winter weather for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of more than 26,000 pounds or gross combination weight rating (GCWR) of more than 26,000 pounds.
    3. When tire chains are required, advance notice shall be given to the traveling public through signage and, whenever possible, through public service announcements. In areas where tire chains are required, there shall be an adequate area for vehicles to pull off the traveled way to affix any chains that might be required.
    4. Under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25, the Traffic Committee may adopt such rules as are necessary to administer this section and may delegate this authority to the Secretary.
    5. When signs are posted and chains required in accordance with this section, chains shall be affixed as follows on vehicles with a GVWR or a GCWR of more than 26,000 pounds:
      1. Solo vehicles.   A vehicle not towing another vehicle:
        1. that has a single-drive axle shall have chains on one tire on each side of the drive axle; or
        2. that has a tandem-drive axle shall have chains on:
          1. two tires on each side of the primary drive axle; or
          2. if both axles are powered by the drive line, on one tire on each side of each drive axle.
      2. Vehicles with semitrailers or trailers.   A vehicle towing one or more semitrailers or trailers:
        1. that has a single-drive axle towing a trailer shall have chains on two tires on each side of the drive axle and on one tire on the front axle and on one tire on one of the rear axles of the trailer;
        2. that has a single-drive axle towing a semitrailer shall have chains on two tires on each side of the drive axle and on two tires, one on each side, of any axle of the semitrailer;
        3. that has a tandem-drive axle towing a trailer shall have:
          1. chains on two tires on each side of the primary drive axle, or if both axles of the vehicle are powered by the drive line, on one tire on each side of each drive axle; and
          2. chains on one tire of the front axle and on one tire on one of the rear axles of the trailer;
        4. that has a tandem-drive axle towing a semitrailer shall have:
          1. chains on two tires on each side of the primary drive axle, or if both axles of the vehicle are powered by the drive line, on one tire on each side of each drive axle; and
          2. chains on two tires, one on each side, of any axle of the semitrailer.
    6. Either the operator of a vehicle required to be chained under this section who fails to affix chains as required in this section, or the operator’s employer, shall be subject to a civil penalty of $1,000.00. If the violation results in substantially impeding the flow of traffic on a highway, the penalty shall be $2,000.00. For a second or subsequent conviction within a three-year period, the penalty shall be doubled.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 50 , § 71; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 69; 2017, No. 113 (Adj. Sess.), § 153; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (e): Act No. 113 inserted “on” preceding “one tire” in subdivs. (2)(A), (2)(C)(i),(ii) and (2)(D)(i), and preceding “two tires” in subdiv. (2)(B).

    Subsec. (f): Act 132 substituted “in this section” for “herein” following “required” in the first sentence.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 1007. Local speed limits.

      1. The legislative body of a municipality may establish, on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation, a speed limit on all or a part of any city, town, or village highway within its jurisdiction, which: (a) (1) The legislative body of a municipality may establish, on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation, a speed limit on all or a part of any city, town, or village highway within its jurisdiction, which:
        1. is not more than 50 miles per hour; however, after considering neighborhood character, abutting land use, bicycle and pedestrian use, and physical characteristics of the highways, the legislative body of a municipality may vote to set the maximum speed limit, without an engineering and traffic investigation, at not more than 50 miles per hour nor less than 35 miles per hour, on all or a portion of unpaved town highways within its boundaries, unless otherwise posted in accordance with the provisions of this section; or
        2. is not less than 25 miles per hour.
      2. If the legislative body of a municipality votes to set the speed limit on all unpaved town highways in its boundaries at no more than 50 miles per hour nor less than 35 miles per hour as provided for in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, signs shall be located at points of change from one speed limit to another.
    1. The legislative body of a city may establish, on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation, a speed limit on all or a part of any State highway, other than a limited access highway, within its jurisdiction, which:
      1. is not more than 50 miles per hour; or
      2. is not less than 25 miles per hour.
    2. Any altered limit is effective at all times or during hours of darkness or at other times as may be determined when appropriate signs giving notice are erected upon the street or highway.
    3. The special regulations have the full force and effect of law and are in the case of regulations adopted under subsections (a) and (b) of this section subject to review by the Traffic Committee, whose decision is final.
    4. Lack of evidence of a traffic and engineering study will not invalidate a local speed limit ordinance as adopted or amended under this section after five years following the day on which the speed limit ordinance took effect.
    5. Notwithstanding the procedure outlined in this section for enacting a local speed limit, a town or village may adopt a local speed ordinance on a State highway, other than on limited access highways, provided the ordinance duplicates the speed limit established under section 1003 of this title.
    6. Notwithstanding any requirements of section 1025 of this title, downtown development districts designated under 24 V.S.A. chapter 76A may have posted speed limits of less than 25 miles per hour.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1973, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1975, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. April 7, 1976; 1989, No. 261 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 16, 1990; 1995, No. 133 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1997, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1999, No. 32 , § 1.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (a), designated subdivs. (a)(1) and (a)(2), and redesignated former subdivs. (a)(1) and (a)(2) as subdivs. (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B), to conform to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —1999. Rewrote subsecs. (a) and (b).

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (g): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (f): Added.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “state aid” preceding “city, town” in the introductory paragraph.

    —1973 (Adj. Sess.). Added present subsec. (b), redesigned former subsecs. (b) and (c) as present subsecs. (c) and (d), respectively, and inserted “in the case of regulations adopted under subsections (a) and (b) of this section” preceding “subject” in present subsec. (d).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Burden of proof.

    In order to prevail in a case involving a violation of a local speed limit, the State must prove not only the fact of excessive speed, but also the content of the ordinance imposing the speed limit and that it had legal effect. State v. Page, 142 Vt. 522, 457 A.2d 653, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 421 (1983).

    Where at defendant’s trial for violation of a local speed limit, the State introduced a certified copy of the certificate of adoption of the speed limit, which stated that the selectmen had adopted the ordinance pursuant to this section, since the plain meaning of such statement was that the requisites set forth in this section were followed, the state met its burden of proving the local ordinance, its content, and its legal authority. State v. Page, 142 Vt. 522, 457 A.2d 653, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 421 (1983).

    Construction.

    Under 23 V.S.A. § 1007 , a town is not permitted to regulate the speed limit on a State highway. State v. Yorkey, 163 Vt. 355, 657 A.2d 1079, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1995).

    The Legislature clearly intended to distinguish between towns and cities in its enactment of 23 V.S.A. § 1007 , the provision governing local speed limits. State v. Yorkey, 163 Vt. 355, 657 A.2d 1079, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1995).

    The plain, ordinary meaning of “town” is that it is an entity that was legislatively created as a town; the distinction between a town and a city is reasonably clear, both historically and legally, and even if there are contexts in which the distinction is not relevant or important - as where all municipalities are treated together - in 23 V.S.A. § 1007 the Legislature adopted a statute in which the distinction is clearly expressed. State v. Yorkey, 163 Vt. 355, 657 A.2d 1079, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1995).

    Engineering survey.

    Failure of State to produce evidence in the form of engineering survey to demonstrate it met requirement to set speed limits based on engineering or traffic investigations required reversal of speeding conviction. State v. Morse, 153 Vt. 651, 572 A.2d 1342, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 21 (1990) (mem.).

    Evidence.

    State’s failure to furnish a certified copy of applicable village ordinance establishing the speed limit at the locality where defendant was stopped for speeding did not constitute reversible error where arresting officer testified that the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. State v. Gagne, 148 Vt. 587, 535 A.2d 790, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 531 (1987).

    Violations.

    Local speed regulations do not duplicate or contradict general statutory provisions, but rather alter them, with the result that violations of the local speed regulations become violations of the applicable statutory provision contained in this title. Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981).

    This section and section 1081 of this title, establishing the State basic speed limit, indicate a general legislative intent to bring speed limits legally established by local authorities within the ambit of this title, so that their violation would have the same status as violation of the general speed limit set up by section 1081. Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981).

    Violations of municipal ordinances or regulations relating to vehicle speed also constitute violations of the State statutory provisions relating to vehicle speed and, being moving violations, fall within the purview of section 673a of this title, authorizing revocation of the operator’s license of any person convicted of eight or more moving violations within a consecutive period of five years. Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Blaine, 133 Vt. 345, 341 A.2d 16, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 402 (1975); Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Atwood, 140 Vt. 301, 438 A.2d 387, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 605 (1981).

    Cited.

    Cited in Purington v. Newton, 114 Vt. 490, 49 A.2d 98, 1946 Vt. LEXIS 98 (1946); State v. Snyder, 123 Vt. 367, 189 A.2d 535, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 106 (1963).

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 1142.

    Arrest for violation.

    State Police and motor vehicle inspectors have the right to make an arrest for the violation of a village speed limit ordinance, unless there is some special provision in the charter of the village confining enforcement of its ordinances to local police officers. 1946-48 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 248.

    § 1007a. Neighborhood electric vehicles; speed limit.

    The maximum speed for a neighborhood electric vehicle shall be 25 miles per hour.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 8 , § 2.

    § 1008. Regulations in municipalities.

    1. The legislative body of a municipality may make special regulations as to the operation, use, and parking of motor vehicles, including angle parking, as to the location, design, and structure of traffic lights, as to “stop” signs and “yield right of way” signs at intersections, as to “no-passing” zones, and as to streets designated for one-way traffic in the thickly settled portions of the municipality and may cause any street or highway of adequate width to be divided by appropriate markings into three or more lanes, and may, by ordinance or regulation, regulate the direction of travel and the turning of vehicles proceeding in those lanes and the passing of vehicles in one lane by overtaking vehicles in another lane, may cause markers, buttons, or signs to be placed within or adjacent to intersections and thereby direct the course traveled by vehicles turning at an intersection, and when markers, buttons, or signs are so placed no driver may turn a vehicle at an intersection other than as directed by the markers, buttons, or signs. However, signs indicating the special regulations must be conspicuously posted in and near all areas affected. Special regulations may not be established on any State highway as defined by 19 V.S.A. § 1(20) . Regulations on all State highways may be made only by the Traffic Committee under section 1003 of this title, except that the Traffic Committee may authorize the legislative body of a municipality to regulate parking within a thickly settled area of a municipality, particularly described in the authorization, on State highways. The board of school directors of a union high school district may make special regulations as to the operation, use, and parking of motor vehicles within the boundaries of its school property.
    2. The legislative body of a municipality may make special regulations as to the use of lights at night on motor vehicles at rest or in motion on well lighted streets.
    3. Municipal motor vehicle regulations shall not duplicate or contradict any provision of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. March 1, 1973; 2017, No. 74 , § 61.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017. Subsec. (a): Substituted “ 19 V.S.A. § 1(20) ” for “ 19 V.S.A. § 19 ” following “as defined by” in the third sentence.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Municipal authority to regulate public highway use generally, see 24 V.S.A. § 2291 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    “Special regulation” under this section imports reference to conditions and not to time merely. Bitensky v. Hicks, 123 Vt. 159, 184 A.2d 216, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 214 (1962).

    Cited.

    Cited in Stone v. Wood, 104 Vt. 105, 157 A. 829, 1932 Vt. LEXIS 124 (1932); State v. Pelletier, 123 Vt. 271, 185 A.2d 456, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 238 (1962); Hebert v. Stanley, 124 Vt. 205, 201 A.2d 698, 1964 Vt. LEXIS 84 (1964); State v. Blaine, 133 Vt. 345, 341 A.2d 16, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 402 (1975); Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981); State v. Page, 142 Vt. 522, 457 A.2d 653, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 421 (1983); State v. Yorkey, 163 Vt. 355, 657 A.2d 1079, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1995).

    § 1008a. Regulation of motor vehicles at State airports.

      1. The Secretary may adopt rules governing the operation, use, and parking of motor vehicles on the grounds of State airports, including the access roads. (a) (1) The Secretary may adopt rules governing the operation, use, and parking of motor vehicles on the grounds of State airports, including the access roads.
      2. In addition, the Secretary may prescribe special restrictions related to parking of plug-in electric vehicles in designated areas on such grounds.
    1. Signs indicating the rules or restrictions shall be conspicuously posted in and near all areas affected.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 61 , § 26, eff. June 3, 1993; amended 2017, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    § 1009. Restrictions of controlled-access roadway.

    1. The Traffic Committee by resolution or order entered in its minutes may regulate or prohibit the use of any controlled-access highway by any class or kind of traffic which is found to be incompatible with the normal and safe movement of traffic.
    2. The Traffic Committee adopting any such prohibition shall erect and maintain official traffic-control devices on the controlled-access highway on which such prohibitions are applicable and when these are in place, no person shall disobey the restrictions stated on such devices.
    3. The Traffic Committee may authorize the stopping of a school bus on a controlled-access highway to pick up or discharge passengers, except the Traffic Committee may only authorize the stopping of a school bus on the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways if, after a traffic and engineering study, it determines that there is no viable alternative and that adequate safety, both for the passengers, school bus, and other highway users, can be maintained.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1981, No. 9 ; 2021, No. 20 , § 238.

    History

    References in text.

    —2007. The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, referred to in subsec. (c), was redesignated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 101-427, and is codified as 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) .

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (c): Inserted “Traffic Committee may only authorize the stopping of a school bus on the Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding “National System” and substituted “, it determines” for “they determine” following “study”.

    —1981. Subsec. (c): Added.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1010. Special occasions; town highway maintenance.

    1. When it appears that traffic will be congested by reason of a public occasion or when a town highway is being reconstructed or maintained or where utilities are being installed, relocated, or maintained, the legislative body of a municipality may make special regulations as to the speed of motor vehicles, may exclude motor vehicles from town highways, and may make such traffic rules and regulations as the public good requires. However, signs indicating the special regulations must be conspicuously posted in and near all affected areas, giving as much notice as possible to the public so that alternative routes of travel could be considered.
    2. Notwithstanding the maximum penalty established in section 2302 of this title and the waiver penalties established under 4 V.S.A. § 1102(d) , the civil penalty for violating a speed limit established under the worksite provision of this section shall be twice the penalty for a non-worksite speed limit violation.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1991, No. 15 , § 2; 1997, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2009, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 42; 2015, No. 47 , § 26; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 30.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “maximum penalty” for “limit”, inserted “civil” preceding “penalty”, substituted “violating a” for “violation of” preceding “speed” and “limit” for “limits” thereafter, and inserted “a” preceding “non-worksite speed” and substituted “limit violation” for “violations” thereafter.

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Substituted “section 2302” for “subsection 2302(d)”, and inserted “and the waiver penalties established under 4 V.S.A. § 1102(d) ”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “town highways” for “certain public highways” in the first sentence, and added “giving as much notice as possible to the public so that alternative routes of travel could be considered” in the second sentence.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions as subsec. (a), added “or where utilities are being installed, relocated or maintained”, and added subsec. (b).

    —1991. Inserted “or when a town highway is being reconstructed or maintained” following “occasion” in the first sentence.

    § 1011. Applicability of this chapter.

    1. The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of motor vehicles apply to operation upon public highways only, except where a different place is specifically referred to.
    2. On duty enforcement officers are exempt from the speed limits established in accordance with sections 1003 and 1007 of this title, and fixed by section 1081 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    § 1012. Obedience to enforcement officers.

    1. A person, while operating or in charge of a motor vehicle shall, upon request by an enforcement officer who reasonably suspects that the person has committed or is committing a violation of this title, give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of the motor vehicle.
    2. The operator shall produce his or her operator’s license and the registration certificate for the motor vehicle. If the operator does not have a valid Vermont operator’s license or does not have the license on his or her person, the operator shall produce other suitable forms of identification. A person operating a motor vehicle shall promptly and carefully stop when signalled to stop by an enforcement officer wearing insignia that identifies the officer.
    3. A person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $1,250.00.
    4. A person who violates subsection (b) of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $250.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1989, No. 109 , § 6, eff. July 1, 1990; 1999, No. 58 , § 7.

    History

    Amendments

    —1999. Section amended generally.

    —1989. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), inserted “who reasonably suspects that the person has committed or is committing a violation of this title” following “officer” and “or her” following “his” in two places in the first sentence and added the second sentence of that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Attempting to elude enforcement officer, see § 1133 of this title.

    Powers of enforcement officers, see chapter 15 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); Stratton v. Hatch, 597 F. Supp. 128, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22602 (D. Vt. 1984); State v. Alexander, 157 Vt. 60, 595 A.2d 282, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 125 (1991).

    § 1013. Authority of enforcement officers.

    Enforcement officers may make arrests for violation of this title, may direct, control, and regulate traffic, and make reasonable orders in enforcement of this title or to prevent or alleviate traffic congestion, property damage, or personal injury. No person may knowingly fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any enforcement officer.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Powers of enforcement officers, see chapter 15 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); Stratton v. Hatch, 597 F. Supp. 128, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22602 (D. Vt. 1984).

    § 1014. Persons riding animals.

    A person riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a road is granted all of the rights and is subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a motor vehicle by this chapter except those provisions of this chapter that by their very nature can have no application.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Control of motor vehicle in presence of animals, see § 1127 of this title.

    § 1015. Authorized emergency vehicles.

    1. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when responding to, but not returning from, a fire alarm and a law enforcement officer operating an authorized emergency vehicle in fresh pursuit of a suspected violator of the law:
      1. may park or stand contrary to the provisions of this chapter;
      2. may proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;
      3. shall come to a full stop when approaching a school bus that is flashing red lights and may proceed only when the flashing red lights are extinguished;
      4. may exceed the maximum speed limits;
      5. may disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions.
    2. The exemptions granted to an authorized emergency vehicle apply only when the vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals meeting the requirements of this title.
    3. The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his or her reckless disregard for the safety of others.
    4. The operator of a school bus, upon the approach of an authorized emergency vehicle as described in subsection (a) of this section, shall take action immediately to get school-children out of the public highway and to a safe place and shall thereafter extinguish the flashing red lights.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1981, No. 97 , §§ 1, 2.

    History

    Amendments

    —1981. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Operation on approach of law enforcement and emergency vehicles, see § 1050 of this title.

    Use of sirens and colored lamps, see § 1252 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction with other laws.

    Provision of subsec. 1050(c) of this title stating that operators of emergency vehicles are not relieved “from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway” does not contradict the conclusion of this section allowing operators of emergency vehicles to violate certain rules of the road when driving to the scene of an emergency. A showing of recklessness is required to hold the driver liable. Rochon v. State, 2004 VT 77, 177 Vt. 144, 862 A.2d 801, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 259 (2004).

    Duty toward others.

    New Hampshire police officer, engaged in pursuit of suspect in Vermont, acted as Vermont law enforcement officer and, therefore, was subject to the requirement of 23 V.S.A. § 1015 that the pursuit be conducted with reasonable safety. Morais v. Yee, 162 Vt. 366, 648 A.2d 405, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 72 (1994).

    Law enforcement officer operating an authorized emergency vehicle in fresh pursuit of suspected violator of the law may disregard most of the rules and regulations for the operation of motor vehicles; however, this exemption shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others. Morais v. Yee, 162 Vt. 366, 648 A.2d 405, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 72 (1994).

    Three law enforcement officers who were, in separate police cruisers, pursuing person who was attempting to elude them, were under a duty to prevent foreseeable danger to other persons, even if that danger arose as a result of intentional and criminal misconduct on the part of the person being chased by the law enforcement officers. Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F. Supp. 271, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12293 (D. Vt. 1975).

    Negligence.

    Sovereign immunity precluded plaintiffs’ action against State for personal injuries caused by accident with police cruiser that was traveling to scene of emergency, because plaintiffs’ claimed that the State was liable for the trooper’s negligence, and to find an operator of an emergency vehicle liable for injuries caused while responding to an emergency call, plaintiff must show that the operator acted recklessly. Rochon v. State, 2004 VT 77, 177 Vt. 144, 862 A.2d 801, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 259 (2004).

    Sufficient material facts existed to preclude grant of summary judgment on negligence claims by parents of decedent against police officers where officers knew that decedent was riding a motorcycle with a damaged front wheel at high speed, officers had no suspicion that decedent had committed a violent crime, and there was evidence that at least two of the officers knew decedent and his family, which suggested that the chase may not have been necessary to apprehend decedent, and the chase covered 25 miles and lasted nearly one-half hour. Morais v. Yee, 162 Vt. 366, 648 A.2d 405, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 72 (1994).

    In negligence action by driver of auto involved in head-on collision with auto driven by defendant attempting to elude co-defendants, three police officers driving their respective police cruisers, motion for summary judgment in favor of a fourth officer, who had given up the chase because suspect had damaged him and his cruiser by driving his auto into the side of the cruiser, would be granted, for even if the fourth officer was initially reckless, any negligence on his part was too remote in time and place from the actual collision to have formed a part of the proximate cause of the ultimate injury. Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F. Supp. 271, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12293 (D. Vt. 1975).

    In negligence action by driver of auto involved in head-on collision with auto being driven by defendant who was attempting to elude co-defendants, three police officers driving their respective police cruisers, the three police officers’ motions for summary judgment would be denied, for the jury could find that the police officers’ aggravated negligence, in continuing high speed pursuit of suspect, was a proximate cause of the collision, even though suspect’s negligence may have been the predominant factor. Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F. Supp. 271, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12293 (D. Vt. 1975).

    Annotations From former § 1143

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Meunier, 126 Vt. 176, 224 A.2d 922, 1966 Vt. LEXIS 191 (1966).

    § 1016. Reports of arrests.

    Law enforcement officers who make arrests or issue citations for violations of this title shall forward a written report on forms prescribed and furnished by the Commissioners of Motor Vehicles and of Public Safety and approved by the Attorney General with respect to any matter affecting the substantive rights of any person, to the Department of Motor Vehicles within 30 days after the arrest is made or the citation is issued.

    HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 72 , eff. April 18, 1975; amended 1981, No. 81 , § 2, eff. May 5, 1981; 2009, No. 39 , § 2.

    History

    Revision note—

    This section, which was originally enacted as § 1017, was redesignated as § 1016 for purposes of conformity with the general classification scheme of V.S.A.

    Amendments

    —2009. Deleted “, or who investigate motor vehicle accidents,” after “title”, substituted “30” for “thirty”, made a minor punctuation change, and deleted “or the accident is investigated” at the end.

    —1981. Deleted “central records division of the” preceding “department of motor vehicles within” and substituted “thirty” for “ten” thereafter.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Investigation and reports of accidents, see §§ 1129 and 1603-1603b of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    Reports of accidents involving motor vehicles used as common carriers, see 5 V.S.A. § 1806 .

    § 1017. Speed limit in school zones.

    Notwithstanding the maximum penalty established in subsection 2302(c) of this title and the waiver penalties established pursuant to 4 V.S.A. § 1102(d) , the civil penalty for violating a State or municipal speed limit in a school zone designated with signs in accordance with 19 V.S.A. § 921 shall be twice the penalty for a non-school zone speed limit violation.

    HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 31.

    Subchapter 2. Traffic Signs, Signals, and Markings

    § 1021. Obedience to traffic-control devices.

    1. The driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control device applicable to him or her placed in accordance with this chapter unless otherwise directed by an enforcement officer, subject to the exceptions granted in this chapter.
    2. No provision of this chapter for which signs are required may be enforced if at the time and place of the alleged violation an official sign is not in approximately proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant person.  Whenever a particular section does not state that signs are required, the section is effective even though no signs are erected or in place.
    3. Whenever official traffic-control devices are placed in positions approximately conforming to this chapter the devices are presumed to have been placed by the official act or direction of lawful authority, unless the contrary is established by competent evidence.
    4. An official traffic-control device placed pursuant to this chapter and purporting to conform to the lawful requirements pertaining to the device is presumed to comply with this chapter, unless the contrary is established by competent evidence.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Existence of signs.

    Driver could not be found guilty of speeding where there was no evidence that a posted speed limit sign was in the area, as required by subsec. (b) of this section. State v. Blaine, 133 Vt. 345, 341 A.2d 16, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 402 (1975).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1022. Traffic-control signals.

    1. Whenever traffic is controlled by traffic-control signals exhibiting different colored lights, or colored lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combination, only the colors green, red, and yellow may be used, except for special pedestrian signals carrying a word legend, and the signals shall indicate and apply to drivers and pedestrians as follows:
      1. Green signal.
        1. Vehicular traffic facing a circular green signal may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign prohibits either turn.  Vehicular traffic, including vehicles turning right or left, shall yield the right of way to other vehicles or to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection or on an adjacent crosswalk at the time the signal is exhibited.
        2. Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow signal, shown alone or in combination with another signal, may cautiously enter the intersection only to make the movement indicated by the arrow, or such other movement as is permitted by other signals shown at the same time.  Vehicular traffic shall yield the right of way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk or to other traffic lawfully using the intersection.
        3. Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal, as provided in section 1023 of this title, pedestrians facing a green signal may proceed across the roadway within any marked or unmarked crosswalk, but not when the sole green signal is a turn arrow.
      2. Steady yellow signal.
        1. Vehicular traffic facing a steady yellow signal is thereby warned that the related green signal is being terminated or that a red signal will be exhibited immediately thereafter, when vehicular traffic shall not enter the intersection.
        2. Pedestrians facing a steady yellow signal, unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal as provided in section 1023 of this title, are advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway before a red signal is shown, and no pedestrian shall then start to cross the roadway.
      3. Steady red signal.
        1. Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular red signal alone shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection.
        2. Except when a sign is in place prohibiting a turn, vehicular traffic facing any steady red signal may cautiously enter the intersection to turn right, or to turn left from a one way street into a one way street, after stopping as required by subdivision (A) of this subdivision (3). This traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection. No motorist shall turn right when facing a red arrow signal indication unless a regulatory sign is present that permits this movement.
        3. Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal as provided in section 1023 of this title, pedestrians facing a steady red signal alone shall not enter the roadway.
    2. If an official traffic-control signal is erected and maintained at a place other than an intersection, this section is applicable except as to those provisions that by their nature can have no application.  Any stop required shall be made at a sign or marking on the pavement indicating where the stop is to be made, but in the absence of any sign or marking the stop shall be made at the signal.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1975, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), eff. Feb. 25, 1976; 1977, No. 8 ; 2007, No. 75 , § 28; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 174.

    History

    Revision note

    —2007. Redesignated subsec. (b) as subdiv. (2) and its subsidiary subdivs. as (A) and (B), redesignated subsec. (c) as subdiv. (3) and its subsidiary subdivs. as (A)-(C), and redesignated subsec. (d) as subsec. (b) to conform to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted a period for a semicolon at the end of each subdiv. heading.

    —2007. Subdiv. (c)(2): Substituted “This” for “Such vehicular” at the beginning of the second sentence and added the last sentence.

    —1977. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (c)(1): Added the second sentence.

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Annotations From Former § 1054

    Construction with other laws.

    The emergency provision of section 1033 of this title (now § 1050) superseded the general right-of-way provisions of this section. Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9265 (2d Cir. 1970).

    § 1023. Pedestrian-control signals.

    Whenever special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting the words “Walk” or “Don’t Walk” are in place the signals indicate as follows:

    1. “Walk”: pedestrians facing the signal may proceed across the roadway in the direction of the signal and shall be given the right of way by all drivers.
    2. “Don’t Walk”: no pedestrian shall start to cross the roadway in the direction of the signal, but any pedestrian who has begun his or her crossing on the “Walk” signal shall proceed to a sidewalk or a safety island while the “Don’t Walk” signal is showing.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Pedestrians’ rights and duties, see chapter 13, subchapter 5 of this title.

    § 1024. Flashing signals.

    1. Whenever a flashing red or yellow signal is used in a traffic sign or signal it requires obedience by vehicular traffic as follows:
      1. Flashing red: When a red lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, drivers shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at a limit line when marked, or, if there are none, before entering the intersection, and the right to proceed is subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a stop sign.
      2. Flashing yellow: When a yellow lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles may proceed through the intersection or past the signal only with caution.
    2. This section does not apply to railroad grade crossings. Conduct of drivers approaching railroad grade crossings is governed by sections 1071, 1072, and 1073 of this title.
    3. This section does not apply to operators of vehicles encountering school buses.  Conduct of drivers encountering school buses is governed by section 1075 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Stop or yield intersections, see § 1048 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1025. Standards.

    1. The U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) for streets and highways as amended shall be the standards for all traffic control signs, signals, and markings within the State. The latest revision of the MUTCD shall be adopted upon its effective date except in the case of projects beyond a preliminary state of design that are anticipated to be constructed within two years of the otherwise applicable effective date; such projects may be constructed according to the MUTCD standards applicable at the design stage. Existing signs, signals, and markings shall be valid until such time as they are replaced or reconstructed. When new traffic control devices are erected or placed or existing traffic control devices are replaced or repaired the equipment, design, method of installation, placement, or repair shall conform with the MUTCD.
    2. The standards of the MUTCD shall apply for both State and local authorities as to traffic control devices under their respective jurisdiction.
    3. Traffic and control signals at intersections with exclusive pedestrian walk cycles shall be of sufficient duration to allow a pedestrian to leave the curb and travel across the roadway before opposing vehicles receive a green light. Determination of the length of the signal shall take into account the circumstances of persons with ambulatory disabilities.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1975, No. 26 ; 1985, No. 138 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2009, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 33; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 145.

    History

    References in text.

    The U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, referred to in subsec. (a), is codified as 23 C.F.R. Part 655 and can also be found on the Federal Highway Administration’s website at http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov .

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “disabilities” for “handicaps” at the end.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Inserted “(MUTCD)” in the first sentence, added the second sentence, and substituted “the MUTCD” for “such standards” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “The standards of the MUTCD shall” for “These standards shall”.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1975. Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Audible traffic signals, see 19 V.S.A. § 905c .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in In re Agency of Transportation, 157 Vt. 203, 596 A.2d 358, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 151 (1991); Searles v. Agency of Transportation, 171 Vt. 562, 762 A.2d 812, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 253 (2000); Lane v. State, 174 Vt. 219, 811 A.2d 190, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 227 (2002) (mem.).

    § 1026. Lane control signals.

    When lane direction control signals are placed over the individual lanes of a street or highway, vehicular traffic shall travel in any lane over which there is a green signal, but may not enter or travel in any lane over which there is a red signal.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1027. Unauthorized signs, signals, or markings.

    1. No person shall place, maintain, or display upon or in view of any highway any unauthorized sign, signal, marking, or device which is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic-control device or railroad sign or signal, or which attempts to direct the movement of traffic, or which obscures or interferes with the effectiveness of an official traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal.
    2. No person shall place or maintain upon any highway, nor may any public authority permit upon any highway, any traffic sign or signal bearing thereon any commercial advertising, except as otherwise provided in 10 V.S.A. chapter 21.
    3. This section shall not be deemed to prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent to highways of signs giving useful directional information and of a type that cannot be mistaken for official signs, nor shall this provision affect any right or obligation created or recognized under 10 V.S.A. chapter 21.
    4. Every prohibited sign, signal, or marking is a public nuisance, and the Agency of Transportation may remove it or cause it to be removed without notice.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    History

    Revision note—

    In subsec. (d), substituted “agency of transportation” for “department of highways” in view of former 3 V.S.A. § 3116 , as enacted by 1977, No. 263 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, which provided that the agency of transportation was to be a successor to and continuation of the highway department. For present provisions, relating to the Agency of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. chapter 1.

    § 1028. Interference with devices or signals.

    No person shall, without lawful authority, alter or attempt to alter, deface, injure, knock down, or remove any official traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal or any inscription, shield, or insignia thereon, or any part thereof.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    § 1029. Municipal signs.

    Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1025 and 1027 of this title, municipalities may erect alternative signs of a guidance or informational nature and creative design, in accordance with the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 494(15) , to assist persons in reaching destinations that are transportation centers, geographic districts, historic monuments, and significant or unique educational, recreational, or cultural landmarks.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 197 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2015, No. 47 , § 27.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Substituted “ 10 V.S.A. § 494(15) ” for “ 10 V.S.A. § 494(13) ”.

    1991, No. 197 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, provided that section 2 of the act, which amended this section, shall take effect upon the travel information council’s procuring permission from the Federal Highway Administration to experiment in the placement of municipal signs within six months from receiving the first request from a municipality for the placement of such signs as provided in section 3 of the act.

    Subchapter 3. Use of Roadway

    § 1031. Driving to right.

    1. Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows:
      1. when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement;
      2. when an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway; provided, any person so doing shall yield the right of way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard;
      3. upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the rules applicable thereon; or
      4. upon a roadway restricted to one-way traffic.
    2. Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then existing shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road or driveway.
    3. Upon any roadway having four or more lanes for moving traffic and providing for two-way movement of traffic, no vehicle shall be driven to the left of the center line of the roadway, except when authorized by official traffic-control devices designating certain lanes to the left side of the center of the roadway for use by traffic not otherwise permitted to use such lanes, or except as permitted under subdivision (a)(2) of this section.  However, this subsection shall not be construed as prohibiting the crossing of the center line in making a left turn into or from an intersecting highway, an alley, private road, or driveway when authorized.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Approaching stationary law enforcement or emergency vehicles and work zones, see § 1050 of this title.

    Slow-moving vehicles, see § 1082 of this title.

    Obstructions.

    Unpaved roads.

    Violation as justification for traffic stop.

    Obstructions.

    Bridge did not become an “obstruction” simply because operator was driving a truck too large to fit under it, and therefore exception contained in subdiv. (a)(2) of this section did not apply and operator’s violation of this section raised a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Brown v. Roadway Express, 169 Vt. 633, 740 A.2d 352, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 243 (1999) (mem.).

    Unpaved roads.

    Where the undisputed testimony of an officer was that defendant was driving left of the center of the road, and that, although the road was wide enough for two cars to pass, it was questionable whether an oncoming car could have passed by defendant because of his position in the center of the road, given defendant’s failure to stay to the right, as required by statute, the officer was justified in stopping him. State v. Doyon, 171 Vt. 546, 758 A.2d 816, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 245 (2000) (mem.).

    In the case of defendant convicted of operating a motor vehicle on the left side of the road, where accident victims testified that at the time of the accident defendant’s oncoming vehicle swerved into their lane as it rounded a curve while their car was well within its own lane and the investigating officer testified that the road was wide enough to permit two cars to safely pass each other, that debris from defendant’s car was found at the point of impact on the left side of the road, and that a skid mark was found which began on the right side of the road, crossed the crown, and ended at the point of impact, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, notwithstanding the fact that the road was unpaved, unmeasured, and without a clearly marked centerline. State v. Kirby, 143 Vt. 369, 465 A.2d 1369, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 524 (1983).

    Violation as justification for traffic stop.

    Trooper who stopped defendant for crossing the center line had a reasonable and articulable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment that defendant committed a traffic violation, as even a slight crossing was sufficient to violate the driving-to-right statute. The fact that defendant might have a defense to the traffic violation was irrelevant in that the question was whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion of a wrongdoing, not whether defendant actually committed a wrongdoing. State v. Howard, 2016 VT 49, 202 Vt. 51, 147 A.3d 88, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 47 (2016).

    Because the trial court found that defendant crossed the centerline in violation of the “drive to the right” statute, either briefly or at length, it erred as a matter of law in finding the ensuing traffic stop unlawful and in granting defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Marshall, 2010 VT 81, 188 Vt. 640, 8 A.3d 1086, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 88 (2010) (mem.).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); Smith v. Gainer, 153 Vt. 442, 571 A.2d 70, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1990).

    Annotations From Former § 1040

    Negligence.

    It is not part of reasonable prudence to travel in lane of opposing traffic especially when traveling on a winding country road. Heath v. Orlandi, 127 Vt. 204, 243 A.2d 792, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1968).

    Where evidence in action by guest showed that defendant entered curve at speed of 50 miles per hour on left-hand side of road, but did not show that any other cars were near or how far to the left defendant was, and was vague as to nature of curve, such evidence was not sufficient to make a jury question on issue of gross negligence. Kelley v. Anthony, 110 Vt. 490, 8 A.2d 641, 1939 Vt. LEXIS 169 (1939).

    Question for jury.

    In action arising out of automobile-truck collision, evidence that truck crossed over into automobile’s lane of traffic was sufficient to create jury question as to truck driver’s negligence. Heath v. Orlandi, 127 Vt. 204, 243 A.2d 792, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1968).

    Whether plaintiff automobile driver who collided with truck which was in his lane of traffic exercised reasonable care in entering gradual curve at speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour while hauling boat trailer was question for jury. Heath v. Orlandi, 127 Vt. 204, 243 A.2d 792, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1968).

    Right to assume clear highway.

    Driver entering curve had right to assume highway around bend was clear and that oncoming driver would observe law of road to keep truck in its assigned lane of travel and he could proceed on this expectation until reasonable prudence indicated such assumption was unwarranted. Heath v. Orlandi, 127 Vt. 204, 243 A.2d 792, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1968).

    § 1032. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions.

    Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right, and upon roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic in each direction, each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of the main-traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Keeping to right.

    It is not the part of reasonable prudence to travel in the lane of opposing traffic especially when traveling on a winding country road. Heath v. Orlandi, 127 Vt. 204, 243 A.2d 792, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1968).

    Plaintiff in automobile negligence action and operator of his care were entitled to assume, though operator was aware that another vehicle was approaching, from opposite direction, covered bridge over which they were passing, that other driver would obey law and keep to right of center of highway so as to allow safe passage, and might persist in that assumption until they saw, or in exercise of reasonable care ought to have seen, that it was unwarranted. Page v. McGovern, 110 Vt. 166, 3 A.2d 543, 1939 Vt. LEXIS 123 (1939).

    Driver of automobile along public highway, who sees another automobile approaching on the wrong side of the road, has a right to assume that it will observe the law of the road and move over to its right so as to pass without interference, and to proceed on this assumption, until he sees, or in the circumstances ought to see, that it is unwarranted. Hatch v. Daniels, 96 Vt. 89, 117 A. 105, 1922 Vt. LEXIS 127 (1922).

    It was error to refuse defendant’s request to charge that the law presumed that he reasonably turned his car to the right of the center of the traveled part of the highway so as to pass the plaintiff without interference, and that this presumption was evidence in his favor and stood with him until overcome by evidence, in view of penalty for failure to so turn to the right. Thayer v. Glynn, 93 Vt. 257, 106 A. 834, 1919 Vt. LEXIS 158 (1919).

    Questions for jury.

    In action arising out of automobile-truck collision evidence that truck crossed over into automobile’s lane of traffic was sufficient to create jury questions as to truck driver’s negligence. Heath v. Orlandi, 127 Vt. 204, 243 A.2d 792, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1968).

    Whether plaintiff automobile driver who collided with truck which was in his lane of traffic exercised reasonable care in entering gradual curve at speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour while hauling boat trailer was question for jury. Heath v. Orlandi, 127 Vt. 204, 243 A.2d 792, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1968).

    Violation as negligence.

    Violation of this section makes a prima facie case of negligence; it gives rise to a rebuttable, rather than a conclusive, presumption of negligence and proof of attendant circumstances may, in a civil case, counterbalance or overcome the effect of this section. Frenier v. Brown, 116 Vt. 538, 80 A.2d 524, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 128 (1951).

    Presumption of negligence arising from violation of this section is rebuttable. Frenier v. Brown, 116 Vt. 538, 80 A.2d 524, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 128 (1951).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); Smith v. Gainer, 153 Vt. 442, 571 A.2d 70, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1990).

    § 1033. Passing motor vehicles and vulnerable users.

    1. Passing motor vehicles generally.   Motor vehicles proceeding in the same direction may be overtaken and passed only as follows:
      1. The driver of a motor vehicle overtaking another motor vehicle proceeding in the same direction may pass to its left at a safe distance, and when so doing shall exercise due care, shall not pass to the left of the center of the highway except as authorized in section 1035 of this title, and shall not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the overtaken vehicle.
      2. Except when overtaking and passing on the right is permitted, the driver of an overtaken motor vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking motor vehicle and shall not increase the speed of his or her vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle.
    2. Approaching or passing vulnerable users.   The operator of a motor vehicle approaching or passing a vulnerable user as defined in subdivision 4(81) of this title shall exercise due care, which includes reducing speed and increasing clearance to a recommended distance of at least four feet, to pass the vulnerable user safely, and shall cross the center of the highway only as provided in section 1035 of this title. A person who violates this subsection shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $200.00.
    3. Approaching or passing certain stationary vehicles.   The operator of a motor vehicle approaching or passing a stationary sanitation, maintenance, utility, or delivery vehicle with flashing lights shall exercise due care, which includes reducing speed and increasing clearance to a recommended distance of at least four feet, to pass the vehicle safely, and shall cross the center of the highway only as provided in section 1035 of this title. A person who violates this subsection shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $200.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 39; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 40.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added “generally” in the subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (b): Added “Approaching or” in the subsec. heading and added “reducing speed and” preceding “increasing clearance”.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Annotations From Former § 1035

    Pedestrians.

    Pedestrians crossing street at place other than regular crossing were “approaching traffic” within meaning of this section. Howley v. Kantor, 105 Vt. 128, 163 A. 628, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 195 (1933).

    Proceeding.

    When truck, from which telephone lineman had just alighted when he was struck and injured by defendant’s automobile, had only momentarily halted to permit plaintiff to alight, and was about to start again, such truck was “proceeding” within meaning of term as used in this section, requiring signal to be given or horn blown when automobile passes another car proceeding in same direction. Clark v. Demars, 102 Vt. 147, 146 A. 812, 1929 Vt. LEXIS 161 (1929).

    § 1034. Passing on the right.

    1. The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle only as follows:
      1. when the vehicle overtaken is making or about to make a left turn;
      2. upon a street or highway of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving vehicles in one or more directions and with unobstructed pavement not occupied by parked vehicles; or
      3. upon a one-way street, or upon any roadway on which traffic is restricted to one direction of movement, where the roadway is free from obstructions and of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving vehicles.
    2. In no event may a vehicle be passed by driving off the pavement or main-traveled portion of the roadway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Slow-moving vehicles, see § 1082 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1035. Limitations.

    1. A vehicle shall not be driven to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle or a vulnerable user proceeding in the same direction unless authorized by the provisions of this chapter and unless the left side is clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic and vulnerable users for a sufficient distance ahead to permit overtaking and passing to be completed without interfering with the operation of any vehicle or with any vulnerable user approaching from the opposite direction, or with the operation of any vehicle or with any vulnerable user overtaken. In every event, the overtaking vehicle shall return to an authorized lane of travel as soon as practicable and, if the passing movement involves the use of a lane authorized for vehicles approaching from the opposite direction, before coming within 200 feet of any approaching vehicle or a vulnerable user.
    2. A vehicle shall not pass another from the rear under any of the following conditions:
      1. when approaching or upon the crest of a grade or upon a curve in the highway where the driver’s view is in any way obstructed;
      2. when approaching within 100 feet of, or traversing, any intersection or railroad grade crossing unless otherwise indicated by official traffic control devices; or
      3. when the view is obstructed upon approaching within 100 feet of any bridge, viaduct, or tunnel.
    3. The foregoing limitations do not apply upon a one-way roadway, or when subdivision 1031(a)(2) of this title applies, or where a vehicle is turning left into an alley, private road, or driveway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1995, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 40.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Rewrote the first sentence and added “or a vulnerable user” following “approaching vehicle” in the last sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (b)(2): Inserted “unless otherwise indicated by official traffic control devices” following “crossing”.

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Annotations From Former § 1037

    Negligence.

    Violation of this section did not establish negligence as a matter of law. Kent v. Smith, 404 F.2d 241, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 4512 (2d Cir. 1968).

    § 1036. No-passing zones.

    1. The Traffic Committee is authorized to determine those portions of any highway under its jurisdiction where overtaking and passing or driving on the left side of the roadway would be especially hazardous and may, by appropriate signs indicate the beginning and end of the zones, and when the signs are in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person, every driver of a vehicle shall obey the directions.
    2. Where signs are in place to define a no-passing zone as set forth in subsection (a) of this section, no driver shall at any time drive to the left of the center of the roadway within the no-passing zone.
    3. Restrictions imposed under this section do not apply when subdivision 1031(a)(2) of this title applies, or where a vehicle is turning left into an alley, private road, or driveway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1037. One-way roadways and rotaries.

    1. The Traffic Committee may designate any highway or any separate roadway under its jurisdiction for one-way traffic and shall erect appropriate signs giving notice thereof.
    2. Upon a roadway designated and signposted for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated.
    3. A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be driven only to the right of the island.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Turn signals.

    In a case where defendant was stopped because he failed to use a turn signal when exiting a rotary, the court could not agree that any exit from any rotary was necessarily a change of direction; it was possible that in some rotaries, the entry and exit locations would be located in such proximity to each other that a vehicle could travel through the rotary without making any discernible or significant change in direction. Given this kind of possibility, and because the turn-signal statute was silent on the subject of rotaries, and the only statutory provision addressing rotaries was silent on the subject of turn signals, it was necessary for the State to demonstrate that defendant’s exit off this particular rotary constituted a change of direction in order to justify the traffic stop; thus, remand for an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress was required. State v. Harris, 2009 VT 73, 186 Vt. 225, 980 A.2d 785, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 79 (2009).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1038. Driving on roadways laned for traffic.

    Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules shall apply in addition to all others consistent therewith:

    1. A vehicle shall only be driven, as nearly as practicable, entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.
    2. Upon a roadway that is divided into three lanes and provides for two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle may be driven in the center lane only when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the same direction when the center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in preparation for making a left turn, or where the center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same direction that the vehicle is proceeding and the allocation is designated by official traffic-control devices.
    3. Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the roadway, and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of the signs.
    4. Official traffic-control devices may be installed prohibiting the changing of lanes on sections of roadway, and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of these devices.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Search and seizure.

    Initial stop of vehicle did not violate Fourth Amendment, because it was adequately supported by officer’s observance of two traffic infractions when officer saw driver veering over lane divider and operating what appeared to be cell phone while driving. United States v. Mayo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158866 (D. Vt. Nov. 6, 2013).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1039. Following too closely, crowding, and harassment.

    1. The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon, and the conditions of, the highway. The operator of a vehicle shall not, in a careless or imprudent manner, approach, pass, or maintain speed unnecessarily close to a vulnerable user as defined in subdivision 4(81) of this title, and an occupant of a vehicle shall not throw any object or substance at a vulnerable user.
    2. The driver of any vehicle, when traveling upon a roadway outside a business or residential district and which is following another vehicle, shall, whenever conditions permit, leave sufficient space so that an overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy the space without danger, except that this shall not prevent a vehicle from overtaking and passing any other vehicle.
    3. Vehicles being driven upon any roadway in a caravan or motorcade, other than a funeral procession, shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between each vehicle or combination of vehicles so as to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy the space without danger.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Added “crowding, and harassment” in the section heading, and added the second sentence in subsec. (a).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Slow-moving vehicles, see § 1082 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Evidence.

    Testimony that plaintiff was following very closely behind the vehicle immediately in front of him, and that allowing a greater distance might have allowed him to avoid the accident, provided sufficient evidence to support the court’s instruction on the statute relating to a driver’s duty not to follow another vehicle more closely “than is reasonable and prudent.” Barber v. LaFromboise, 2006 VT 77, 180 Vt. 150, 908 A.2d 436, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 164 (2006).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1040. Driving on divided highways.

    Whenever any highway is divided into two or more roadways by leaving an intervening space or by a physical barrier or clearly indicated dividing section so constructed as to impede vehicular traffic, every vehicle may be driven only upon the right-hand roadway unless directed or permitted to use another roadway by official traffic-control devices or police officers. No vehicle shall be driven over, across, or within any dividing space, barrier, or section. A vehicle may be driven through an opening in a physical barrier or dividing section or space or at a crossover or intersection as established, unless specifically prohibited by public authority.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1041. Restricted access roadways.

    No person may drive a vehicle onto or from any controlled-access roadway except at entrances and exits established by public authority.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Unlawful use of limited access facilities, see 19 V.S.A. § 1711 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1042. Restricting the use of town highways.

    1. The legislative body of a municipality may, with the approval of the Secretary of Transportation, designate highways and bridges under its control, except for class 1 town highways, for use by specified types of motor vehicles based on volume and type of traffic and character of the neighborhood. However, when the legislative body of a municipality requests in writing, the Secretary of Transportation may set the weight limit on a class 1 town highway at less than the State highway limit under section 1392 of this title if a reasonable alternative route is available for those vehicles traveling at the State highway limit. When a highway or bridge has been so restricted, signs shall be placed in accordance with the provisions of section 1397 of this title.
    2. In making the determination as to whether a reasonable alternative route is available, the Secretary of Transportation shall, at a minimum, consider the following factors:
      1. whether the alternative routing will reduce or relieve traffic congestion in a downtown area;
      2. whether the alternative routing will enhance safety;
      3. the length of the alternative route, and any increase in time made necessary by use of the alternative route;
      4. whether an adverse effect has been created relative to the quiet enjoyment and property values of persons living along the alternative route.
    3. Any decision of the Secretary made under this section may be appealed, in writing, to the Transportation Board within 30 days of the Secretary’s decision. The Transportation Board shall decide the question within 45 days of receipt of the appeal, and may take evidence or testimony.
    4. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 121 , § 20b, eff. June 22, 1989; amended 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2007, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 63; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 175; 2021, No. 20 , § 239.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. In subsec. (a), substituted “its” for “their” following “under” in the first sentence.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(4): Substituted “persons” for “people”.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (d): Repealed.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Designated the existing text of the section as subsec. (a), inserted “except for class 1 town highways” following “control” in the first sentence and added the second sentence of that subsec., and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

    § 1043. Operation of neighborhood electric vehicles.

    1. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the operator of a neighborhood electric vehicle may not operate the vehicle on a highway with a speed limit in excess of 35 miles per hour.
    2. The Traffic Committee for State highways or the legislative body of a municipality for town highways may prohibit the use of neighborhood electric vehicles on highways under their jurisdiction when deemed to be in the interest of public safety.
      1. The operator of a neighborhood electric vehicle may cross a highway that has a speed limit of 50 miles per hour or less if the crossing begins and ends on a highway authorized for use by these vehicles, and there is an intersection that is controlled by traffic control signals. (c) (1) The operator of a neighborhood electric vehicle may cross a highway that has a speed limit of 50 miles per hour or less if the crossing begins and ends on a highway authorized for use by these vehicles, and there is an intersection that is controlled by traffic control signals.
      2. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, the Traffic Committee or the legislative body of a municipality may prohibit the operator of a neighborhood electric vehicle from traversing an intersection under their respective jurisdictions when the prohibition is deemed to be in the best interests of public safety. A prohibition shall become effective when appropriate signs giving notice are erected at the crossing.
    3. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 8 , § 3; amended 2013, No. 89 , § 23; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 176.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (c)(2): Substituted “interests” for “interest” in the first sentence.

    —2013. Deleted “vehicle sales requirements” from the section heading and repealed subsec. (d).

    Subchapter 4. Right of Way

    § 1046. Vehicle approaching or entering intersection.

    1. When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection from different highways at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right.
    2. The right-of-way rule declared in subsection (a) of this section is modified at through highways as otherwise provided in this chapter and as follows:
      1. Whenever enforcement officers are present they have the full power to regulate traffic.
      2. Operators shall approach and enter intersecting highways slowly, with due care to avoid crashes.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 177.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crashes” for “accidents” in subdiv. (b)(2) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    In subsec. (b), substituted “subsection (a) of this section” for “paragraph (a)” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    General obligation to turn and move safely, see § 1064 of this title.

    Pedestrians in crosswalks, see §§ 1051, 1052, and 1057.

    Stopping prohibited, see § 1104 of this title.

    Turning at intersections, see § 1061 of this title.

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); Smith v. Gainer, 153 Vt. 442, 571 A.2d 70, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1990).

    Annotations From Former §§ 1033, 1034

    Common law.

    Common law rules of negligence were not abolished by this section, which prescribed rules with respect to vehicles approaching intersecting highways, but section added additional factor to be considered in measuring and determining negligence between conflicting claimants exercising common right. Jasmin v. Parker, 102 Vt. 405, 148 A. 874, 1930 Vt. LEXIS 136 (1930).

    Duty to look.

    Where automobile involved was within range of defendant’s vision and close to intersection where accident occurred when defendant looked to right, his claim that he looked and saw no car was unavailing, since he was required to look effectively, with the care that a careful and prudent man would have exercised in like circumstances, and was presumed to have seen whatever was in range of his vision if he looked. Senecal v. Bleau, 108 Vt. 486, 189 A. 139, 1937 Vt. LEXIS 151 (1937).

    Operator of motor vehicle has a duty to watch another vehicle approaching an intersection effectively, with the degree of care which a careful and prudent man would have exercised in like circumstances, and he is charged with knowledge of what he would have seen if he had looked. Rich v. Hall, 107 Vt. 455, 181 A. 113, 1935 Vt. LEXIS 199 (1935).

    Motorist approaching intersection of highways must look effectively for approaching cars, that is, with the degree of care that a careful and prudent person would have exercised in like circumstances, and will be presumed to have seen whatever was in her range of vision, if she looked. Beattie v. Parkhurst, 105 Vt. 91, 163 A. 589, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 183 (1933).

    —Generally.

    Violation of statute pertaining to entering an intersection was evidence of negligence. Gilbert v. Churchill, 127 Vt. 457, 252 A.2d 528, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 255 (1969).

    Violation of section relating to approaching intersecting highways did not establish negligence as a matter of law. Kent v. Smith, 404 F.2d 241, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 4512 (2d Cir. 1968).

    Violation of section, which provided that all intersecting highways were to be approached and entered slowly and with due care to avoid accidents, was prima facie evidence of negligence. Tolin v. Hasbrook, 116 Vt. 417, 77 A.2d 914, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 112 (1951).

    To bar recovery plaintiff’s violation of section governing right of way at intersecting highways must have been a proximate cause of accident. Lachance v. Myers, 98 Vt. 498, 129 A. 172, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 156 (1925); Kremer v. Fortin, 119 Vt. 1, 117 A.2d 245, 1955 Vt. LEXIS 79 (1955).

    Duty to yield.

    When two vehicles approach an intersection in point of time and at such distance and rate of speed that collision is to be reasonably apprehended, vehicle entering from disfavored direction must give way and await passage of vehicle favored by statute. Dashnow v. Myers, 121 Vt. 273, 155 A.2d 859, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 119 (1959).

    —Vehicle with right of way.

    Vehicle about to enter an intersection from favored direction does not have exclusive right to proceed without adequate observation and regard for vehicles approaching from disfavored direction. Verchereau v. Jameson, 122 Vt. 189, 167 A.2d 521, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 55 (1961).

    Vehicle about to enter intersection from favored direction has right to assume, in absence of anything to the contrary, that vehicle approaching from disfavored direction would observe section and approach and enter intersection slowly and with due care to avoid accident, but the duty is reciprocal, and first vehicle is not relieved from an equal compliance with statute, and the duty is made more imperative with an increase in the hazards. Fletcher v. White, 114 Vt. 377, 45 A.2d 569, 1946 Vt. LEXIS 83 (1946); Brown v. Gallipeau, 116 Vt. 290, 75 A.2d 694, 1950 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1950); Smith v. Squire, 119 Vt. 59, 118 A.2d 355, 1955 Vt. LEXIS 90 (1955).

    Finding that vehicle entering intersection from favored direction at 25 miles per hour on icy and slippery streets and with obstructed view did not exercise degree of care required by statute and was guilty of contributory negligence held not error. Brown v. Gallipeau, 116 Vt. 290, 75 A.2d 694, 1950 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1950).

    Fact that one vehicle has right of way over others crossing its path does not relieve vehicle thus favored from duty of exercising due care not to injure others at place of crossing. Jasmin v. Parker, 102 Vt. 405, 148 A. 874, 1930 Vt. LEXIS 136 (1930).

    Evidence.

    Fact that there was heavy traffic on two intersecting highways was condition affecting merely the degree of care required of the operator of a vehicle approaching the intersection from the disfavored direction, to be considered by the jury with the other evidence in the case. Rich v. Hall, 107 Vt. 455, 181 A. 113, 1935 Vt. LEXIS 199 (1935).

    Excessive speed.

    Violation of statute because of rate of speed at which motorist entered intersection of streets was not negligence as matter of law. Sulham v. Bernasconi, 106 Vt. 192, 170 A. 913, 1934 Vt. LEXIS 158 (1934).

    Failure to yield.

    Where two vehicles approach highway intersection so nearly at same time or at such rate of speed that if both proceed, each without regard to the other, collision or interference between them is reasonably to be apprehended, it is duty of vehicle approaching from disfavored direction to yield right of way to vehicle approaching from favored direction, and if under such circumstances operator of the vehicle approaching from disfavored direction fails to yield right of way, and such failure to yield is proximate cause of accident, he is guilty of actionable negligence. Rich v. Hall, 107 Vt. 455, 181 A. 113, 1935 Vt. LEXIS 199 (1935).

    Although plaintiff, when approaching intersection of highways, failed to yield right of way to defendant who was approaching from right, such action was not contributory negligence as matter of law, notwithstanding provision of this section, as relative distance of vehicles from point of intersection and their relative rate of speed must be taken into account, and right of precedence at crossing given by such statute has no proper application except when vehicles on intersecting streets approach crossing so nearly at same time and at such rate of speed that if both proceed, collision or interference between them is reasonably to be apprehended. Lachance v. Myers, 98 Vt. 498, 129 A. 172, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 156 (1925).

    Lack of control.

    Where plaintiff failed to have his machine under proper control as he approached intersection, as required by this section, he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Parro v. Meagher, 108 Vt. 182, 184 A. 885, 1936 Vt. LEXIS 172 (1936).

    Presumption.

    Although breach of section governing right of way at intersecting highways made prima facie case of negligence and gave rise to rebuttable presumption of lack of ordinary care on part of delinquent, there could be circumstances under which breach of statutory duty would be determinative of existence of negligence. Kremer v. Fortin, 119 Vt. 1, 117 A.2d 245, 1955 Vt. LEXIS 79 (1955).

    Since section governing right of way at intersecting highways was a safety rule, proof of its breach gave rise to rebuttable presumption of lack of ordinary care on part of delinquent. Dashnow v. Myers, 121 Vt. 273, 155 A.2d 859, 1959 Vt. LEXIS 119 (1959).

    Right of way.

    Vehicle about to enter intersection from favored direction does not have exclusive rights over vehicle approaching from disfavored direction. Brown v. Gallipeau, 116 Vt. 290, 75 A.2d 694, 1950 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1950).

    Motorist approaching intersection of highways from favored direction does not necessarily have right of way over another motorist approaching intersection from unfavored direction, his right of precedence depending upon his distance from intersection, speed, and other factors. Rich v. Hall, 107 Vt. 455, 181 A. 113, 1935 Vt. LEXIS 199 (1935); Bressett v. O'Hara, 116 Vt. 118, 70 A.2d 238, 1950 Vt. LEXIS 120 (1950).

    Where two motor vehicles approach intersection, the rate of speed at which vehicle from favored direction is approaching is important, if not determinative, fact in establishing right of operator of vehicle approaching from disfavored direction to enter and cross intersection ahead of other vehicle. Rich v. Hall, 107 Vt. 455, 181 A. 113, 1935 Vt. LEXIS 199 (1935).

    —Generally.

    Violation of statute pertaining to entering an intersection was evidence of negligence. Gilbert v. Churchill, 127 Vt. 457, 252 A.2d 528, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 255 (1969).

    Violation of section relating to approaching intersecting highways did not establish negligence as a matter of law. Kent v. Smith, 404 F.2d 241, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 4512 (2d Cir. 1968).

    Violation of section, which provided that all intersecting highways were to be approached and entered slowly and with due care to avoid accidents, was prima facie evidence of negligence. Tolin v. Hasbrook, 116 Vt. 417, 77 A.2d 914, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 112 (1951).

    To bar recovery plaintiff’s violation of section governing right of way at intersecting highways must have been a proximate cause of accident. Lachance v. Myers, 98 Vt. 498, 129 A. 172, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 156 (1925); Kremer v. Fortin, 119 Vt. 1, 117 A.2d 245, 1955 Vt. LEXIS 79 (1955).

    —Vehicle with right of way.

    Vehicle about to enter an intersection from favored direction does not have exclusive right to proceed without adequate observation and regard for vehicles approaching from disfavored direction. Verchereau v. Jameson, 122 Vt. 189, 167 A.2d 521, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 55 (1961).

    Vehicle about to enter intersection from favored direction has right to assume, in absence of anything to the contrary, that vehicle approaching from disfavored direction would observe section and approach and enter intersection slowly and with due care to avoid accident, but the duty is reciprocal, and first vehicle is not relieved from an equal compliance with statute, and the duty is made more imperative with an increase in the hazards. Fletcher v. White, 114 Vt. 377, 45 A.2d 569, 1946 Vt. LEXIS 83 (1946); Brown v. Gallipeau, 116 Vt. 290, 75 A.2d 694, 1950 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1950); Smith v. Squire, 119 Vt. 59, 118 A.2d 355, 1955 Vt. LEXIS 90 (1955).

    Finding that vehicle entering intersection from favored direction at 25 miles per hour on icy and slippery streets and with obstructed view did not exercise degree of care required by statute and was guilty of contributory negligence held not error. Brown v. Gallipeau, 116 Vt. 290, 75 A.2d 694, 1950 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1950).

    Fact that one vehicle has right of way over others crossing its path does not relieve vehicle thus favored from duty of exercising due care not to injure others at place of crossing. Jasmin v. Parker, 102 Vt. 405, 148 A. 874, 1930 Vt. LEXIS 136 (1930).

    § 1047. Vehicle turning left.

    1. The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction that is either within the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.
    2. A person operating a vehicle shall not turn left unless the turn can be made at a safe distance from a vulnerable user. A person who violates this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $200.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 42.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing text of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1048. Stop or yield intersections.

    1. Preferential right of way at an intersection may be indicated by “stop” signs or “yield” signs.
    2. Except when directed to proceed by an enforcement officer or traffic-control signal, every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection.  After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right of way to any vehicle that has entered the intersection from another highway or that is approaching so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is moving across or within the intersection.
    3. The driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall in obedience to the yield sign slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions and, if required for safety to stop, shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway. After slowing or stopping, the driver shall yield the right of way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another highway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the driver is moving across or within the intersection. However, if the driver is involved in a collision with a vehicle in the intersection, after driving past a yield sign without stopping, the collision shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the driver’s failure to yield right of way.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1995, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    History

    Amendments

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Substituted “the yield” for “such” following “obedience to” and deleted “at a clearly marked stop line, but if none” preceding “before entering” in the first sentence, substituted “the driver” for “such driver” preceding “is moving” in the second sentence, and substituted “However, if the” for “Provided, however, that if such a” preceding “driver” at the beginning of the third sentence and “the” for “such” following “stopping” and “the driver’s” for “his” preceding “failure” in that sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Flashing signals, see § 1024 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Evidence.

    In an automobile negligence case, the trial court did not err in excluding the opinion testimony of an expert witness that defendant entered the intersection when the other vehicle involved was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard in violation of this section because the witness had no reliable basis for determining where the other vehicle was when defendant pulled into the intersection. Trotier v. Bassett, 174 Vt. 520, 811 A.2d 166, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 238 (2002) (mem.).

    Negligence.

    Violation of subsec. (b) of this section makes out a prima facie case of negligence, subject to the right to rebut the presumption of negligence. Smith v. Gainer, 153 Vt. 442, 571 A.2d 70, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1990).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1049. Vehicle entering from private road.

    The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from an alley, building, private road, or driveway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles and vulnerable users approaching on the highway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 41.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “and vulnerable users” preceding “approaching”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1050. Operation on approach of law enforcement and emergency vehicles or when approaching stationary law enforcement and emergency vehicles or work zone.

    1. Approach of law enforcement and emergency vehicles.   Upon the approach of a law enforcement vehicle sounding a siren or displaying a blue or blue and white signal lamp, or both, or upon the approach of an ambulance, fire apparatus, vehicle operated by a volunteer firefighter, EMS personnel, or motor vehicle used in rescue operations as set forth in section 1252 of this title sounding a siren or displaying a red or red and white signal lamp, or both, all other vehicles shall pull to the right of the lane of traffic and come to a complete stop until the law enforcement or emergency vehicle has passed.
    2. Approaching law enforcement, emergency, and towing and repair vehicles.   The operator of a vehicle approaching a stationary law enforcement vehicle displaying a blue or blue and white signal lamp; a stationary ambulance, fire apparatus, vehicle operated by a volunteer firefighter, or motor vehicle used in rescue operations as set forth in section 1252 of this title displaying a red or red and white signal lamp; or a stationary towing and repair vehicle displaying an amber signal lamp shall proceed with caution and, if traveling on a multilane highway and safety conditions permit, make a lane change into a lane farther away from the stationary vehicle. If the operator of the approaching vehicle must remain in the lane adjacent to the stationary vehicle, then the operator shall slow down to a reasonable, safe, and prudent speed given the safety conditions and posted speed limit.
    3. Approaching work zone.   The operator of a vehicle approaching a properly designated work zone shall proceed with caution and slow down to a reasonable, safe, and prudent speed given the safety conditions and posted speed limit. If workers are only present on one side of a multilane highway and safety conditions permit, the operator shall remain in or make a lane change into a lane farther away from the workers.
    4. Authority of law enforcement.   This section does not relieve the operator of an authorized law enforcement or emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway or the authority of law enforcement to regulate traffic irrespective of the foregoing provisions.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2001, No. 84 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 54; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 36.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “or a stationary towing and repair vehicle displaying an amber signal lamp” following “red signal lamp”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading and subsec. (a), added present subsec. (b), and redesignated former subsec. (b) as present subsec. (c).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving to right, see § 1031 of this title.

    Following fire apparatus prohibited, see § 1122 of this title.

    Operation of authorized emergency vehicles, see § 1015 of this title.

    Sirens and signal lamps, see §§ 1251 and 1252 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Negligence.

    Where fire truck was favored with statutory right of way, act of driving through intersection against red light did not of itself constitute negligence as matter of law. Ferraro v. Earle, 105 Vt. 243, 164 A. 886, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 210 (1933).

    Operation of emergency vehicle.

    Provision of subsec. (c) of this section stating that operators of emergency vehicles are not relieved “from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway” does not contradict the conclusion of section 1015 of this title allowing operators of emergency vehicles to violate certain rules of the road when driving to the scene of an emergency. A showing of recklessness is required to hold the driver liable. Rochon v. State, 2004 VT 77, 177 Vt. 144, 862 A.2d 801, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 259 (2004).

    The emergency provision of this section superseded the general right-of-way provisions of section 1054 of this title (now § 1022). Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9265 (2d Cir. 1970).

    That fire truck was favored with statutory right of way did not authorize driver thereof to proceed in disregard of rights of others, but such right had to be exercised in reasonable manner in view of circumstances. Ferraro v. Earle, 105 Vt. 243, 164 A. 886, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 210 (1933).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1050a. Authorized highway maintenance vehicles.

    1. As used in this section, “authorized vehicle” means a vehicle authorized by the Agency of Transportation (in the case of State highways) or the municipality (in the case of town highways) to perform maintenance on a highway.
    2. The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to any authorized vehicle obviously and actually engaged in work upon a highway when the vehicle displays flashing lights meeting the requirements of subsection 1252(b) of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 37.

    History

    Revision note

    —2013. In subsec. (a), substituted “As used in” for “For purposes of” to conform to V.S.A. style.

    Subchapter 5. Pedestrians’ Rights and Duties

    § 1051. Pedestrians’ right of way in crosswalks.

    1. If traffic-control signals are not in operation, the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if necessary, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk.
    2. No pedestrian may suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle that is so close that it is impossible for a driver to yield.
    3. If any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear may not overtake and pass the stopped vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1985, No. 138 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger” following “crosswalk”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Vehicle approaching or entering intersection, see § 1046 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Jury instructions.

    In a personal injury action brought against a taxi owner and its employee, the driver of a taxi which struck and injured the plaintiff, a pedestrian, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants a charge based upon subsec. (b) of this section, where there had been no sudden departure from the curb by the plaintiff, the plaintiff had not gone into the path of the defendants’ taxi, and it had not been impossible for the driver to yield. English v. Myers, 142 Vt. 144, 454 A.2d 251, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 623 (1982).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1052. Crossing except at crosswalks.

    1. Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
    2. Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
    3. Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.
    4. No pedestrian may cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless authorized by official traffic control devices or an enforcement officer.  When authorized to cross diagonally, pedestrians may cross only in accordance with the official traffic control devices or signal of an enforcement officer.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2003, No. 151 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “at an intersection” following “crosswalk”, and substituted “right-of-way” for “right of way”.

    § 1053. Repealed. 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    History

    Former § 1053. Former § 1053, relating to passing pedestrians on a highway, was derived from 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1054. Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks.

    Pedestrians may move, whenever practicable, upon the right half of crosswalks only.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    § 1055. Pedestrians on roadways.

    1. Where public sidewalks are provided, no person may walk along or upon an adjacent roadway.
    2. Where public sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the left side of the roadway or its shoulder facing the direction of possible oncoming traffic.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    § 1056. Highway solicitations.

    1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no person may stand within the roadway of a highway as defined in subdivision 4(32) of this title for the purpose of soliciting a ride, contributions, employment, or business from the occupant of any vehicle.
    2. Not-for-profit and municipal organizations may solicit contributions on the roadway of a highway, other than limited access highways, provided that approval is granted by the local legislative body, and the legislative body ensures that there is in effect a policy of liability insurance providing adequate coverage for the municipality.  Approval shall not be granted by the local legislative body if the proposed activities or location would, in the judgment of the legislative body, create a safety hazard or cause undue traffic congestion.  No solicitations on the roadway may be done by any person under 16 years of age.
    3. No person may stand within the portion of the highway right of way used for highway purposes for the purpose of soliciting the watching or guarding of any vehicle while parked or about to be parked on a street or highway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1973, No. 20 , eff. March 7, 1973; 1989, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.).

    History

    Revision note—

    In subsec. (a), substituted “32” for “31” to correct an error in the reference.

    Amendments

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Highway solicitations” for “Prohibited acts” in the section heading, added “except as provided in subsection (b) of this section” preceding “no” in subsec. (a), added a new subsec. (b), and redesignated former subsec. (b) as subsec. (c).

    —1973. Subsec. (a): Substituted “roadway of a” for “portion of the” preceding “highway” and “as defined in subsection 31 of section 4 of this title” for “right of way used for highway purposes” thereafter.

    § 1057. Duty toward persons who are blind.

    1. Whenever a pedestrian is crossing or attempting to cross a public street or highway, guided by a guide dog or carrying in a raised or extended position a cane or walking stick, white in color or white tipped with red, the driver of every vehicle approaching the intersection, or place where the pedestrian is attempting to cross, shall bring his or her vehicle to a full stop before arriving at the intersection or place of crossing and before proceeding shall take such precautions as may be necessary to avoid injuring the pedestrian.
    2. It is unlawful for any person, unless totally or partially blind or otherwise having a severe visual disability, while on any public street or highway, to carry in a raised or extended position a cane or walking stick that is white in color or white tipped with red.
    3. Nothing in this section deprives any person who is totally or partially blind or otherwise has a severe visual disability, not carrying a cane or walking stick and not being guided by a dog, of the rights and privileges conferred by law upon pedestrians crossing streets or highways, and the failure of any person who is totally or partially blind or otherwise has a severe visual disability to carry a cane or walking stick, or to be guided by a guide dog upon streets, highways, or sidewalks within this State, does not constitute and is not evidence of contributory negligence.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 146.

    History

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Substituted “persons who are blind” for “blind persons”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “having a severe visual disability” for “incapacitated” following “otherwise”.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “person who is” twice before “totally” and substituted “has a severe visual disability” for “incapacitated person” twice.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1058. Duties of pedestrians.

    All pedestrians shall obey the instructions of all traffic control devices which are applicable to them, and all instructions of enforcement officers relating to control of traffic.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Pedestrian-control signals, see § 1023 of this title.

    Traffic-control signals exhibiting colored lights, see § 1022 of this title.

    § 1059. Driving through safety zone.

    No vehicle shall at any time be driven through or within a safety zone.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Subchapter 6. Turning and Starting and Signals on Stopping and Turning

    § 1061. Turning at intersections.

    A driver intending to turn at an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall proceed as follows:

    1. Right turn.   Both the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.
    2. Left turns on two-way roadways.   At any intersection where traffic is permitted to move in both directions on each roadway entering the intersection, an approach for a left turn shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the centerline thereof and by passing to the right of such centerline where it enters the intersection and after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection to the right of the centerline of the roadway being entered. Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection.
    3. Left turns on other than two-way roadways.   At any intersection where traffic is restricted to one direction on one or more of the roadways, the driver of a vehicle intending to turn left at any such intersection shall approach the intersection in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle and after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection, as nearly as practicable, in the left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction upon the roadway being entered.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Right-of-way at intersection, see §§ 1046—1049 of this title.

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Annotations From Former § 1034

    Duty of passengers.

    Right to assume that defendant, when approaching intersecting highway and about to make a left-hand turn, would comply with requirements of this section by reducing his speed and passing to right of and beyond center of curve, was circumstance to be considered in determining how watchful prudent-man rule required passenger to be. Leclair v. Boudreau, 101 Vt. 270, 143 A. 401, 1928 Vt. LEXIS 150 (1928).

    § 1062. Turning prohibited.

    No person shall turn a vehicle in order to proceed in the opposite direction on any curve, or upon the approach to or near the crest of a grade, where the vehicle cannot be seen by the driver of any other vehicle approaching from either direction for a distance of 500 feet.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1063. Starting parked vehicles.

    No person shall move a vehicle that is stopped, standing, or parked unless the movement can be made with reasonable safety.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Spinning tires.

    Where police officer observed defendant’s automobile stop at an intersection, back up, and then go forward again, spinning its tires as it proceeded, State’s theory that the spinning of the tires made it unsafe to proceed while the tires were in spinning motion was sound and consistent with the language of this section. State v. Thibault, 152 Vt. 91, 564 A.2d 603, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 124 (1989).

    Squealing tires.

    When defendant screeched his tires and revved his engine as he proceeded from a stop and turned the corner, and the road was dry and clear of snow and ice at the time, an officer could conclude that defendant’s squealing of tires was intentional. It was thus reasonable for the officer to suspect that defendant did not have reasonable control of his vehicle, and the stop of defendant’s vehicle therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the Vermont Constitution. State v. Rutter, 2011 VT 13, 189 Vt. 574, 15 A.3d 132, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 15 (2011).

    Protections of the Vermont Constitution do not extend to prohibiting law enforcement officers from stopping motor vehicles where there is an objectively reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred, even if in a particular situation these infractions may appear “trivial” or the officer’s motivation is suspect. There was an objectively reasonable basis for stopping defendant for squealing his tires in violation of the statute applying to starting parked vehicles; therefore, defendant’s argument of pretext lacked merit. State v. Rutter, 2011 VT 13, 189 Vt. 574, 15 A.3d 132, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 15 (2011).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1064. Signals required; general obligation to turn and move safely.

    1. Before changing direction or materially slackening speed, a driver shall give warning of his or her intention with the hand signals as provided in section 1065 of this title, or with a mechanical or lighting device approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. A bicyclist shall give such hand signals unless he or she cannot do so safely.
    2. A person shall not turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in section 1061 of this title, or turn a vehicle to enter an alley, private road, or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless such movement can be made with reasonable safety.
    3. A person shall not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this section to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such signal.
    4. A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. A bicyclist shall comply with this subsection unless he or she cannot do so safely.
    5. The signals provided for in section 1065 of this title shall be used to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position and may not be flashed on one side only on a parked or disabled vehicle, or flashed as a courtesy or “do pass” signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 43; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “A” for “No” preceding “person”, inserted “not” preceding “stop”, and substituted “in this section” for “herein” following “provided”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading, added the second sentence of subsec. (a), substituted “A person shall not” for “No person may” preceding “turn a vehicle” in subsec. (b), and added the second sentence of subsec. (d).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Directional signal lamps, see § 1249 of this title.

    Construction.

    Rotaries.

    Turn-only lane.

    Violation not found.

    Construction.

    Neither of the statutes governing turn signals contains any express exception to eliminate the requirement for use of a turn signal when a car is positioned in a turn-only lane; rather, the statutory language consistently mandates the use of a signal whenever a driver effects a turn, using the word “shall.” The language of these statutes is not unclear or ambiguous. State v. Cook, 2018 VT 128, 209 Vt. 98, 203 A.3d 509, 2018 Vt. LEXIS 242 (2018).

    Turn-signal statute provides that a signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. The last two words, “before turning,” unambiguously qualify the preceding command such that it does not apply unless a vehicle in fact turns; thus, the act of turning is an essential element of any violation of this provision. State v. Hutchins, 2015 VT 38, 198 Vt. 431, 114 A.3d 906, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 12 (2015).

    Plain, ordinary meaning of the language of the statute regarding signals indicates that the operator of a motor vehicle must indicate an intention to turn within one hundred feet of turning regardless of traffic conditions; the “when required” proviso, by its placement in the sentence, refers to the requirement to use the signal at the intersection. Section 1064(d) requires a signal to commence at least one hundred feet before an intersection. State v. Fletcher, 2010 VT 27, 187 Vt. 632, 996 A.2d 213, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 27 (2010) (mem.).

    Rotaries.

    In a case where defendant was stopped because he failed to use a turn signal when exiting a rotary, the court could not agree that any exit from any rotary was necessarily a change of direction; it was possible that in some rotaries, the entry and exit locations would be located in such proximity to each other that a vehicle could travel through the rotary without making any discernible or significant change in direction. Given this kind of possibility, and because the turn-signal statute was silent on the subject of rotaries, and the only statutory provision addressing rotaries was silent on the subject of turn signals, it was necessary for the State to demonstrate that defendant’s exit off this particular rotary constituted a change of direction in order to justify the traffic stop; thus, remand for an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress was required. State v. Harris, 2009 VT 73, 186 Vt. 225, 980 A.2d 785, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 79 (2009).

    Turn-only lane.

    Based on the plain language of the statutes governing turn signals, defendant was required to signal prior to executing a right-hand turn, even though he was in a right-turn-only lane, and the officer who stopped his vehicle for failure to use a turn signal had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. Furthermore, while it had been held that continuing on the natural arc of a road did not trigger the turn-signal requirement, here defendant’s car changed directions from east to south when it made the right turn at the intersection, and there was no natural arc to be followed there. State v. Cook, 2018 VT 128, 209 Vt. 98, 203 A.3d 509, 2018 Vt. LEXIS 242 (2018).

    Violation not found.

    Although defendant here rotated his wheel, he did so to follow the natural course of a road; therefore, he did not “turn,” and the turn-signal statute did not apply to him. He thus had not violated the statute, making a traffic stop illegal and requiring suppression of the evidence. State v. Hutchins, 2015 VT 38, 198 Vt. 431, 114 A.3d 906, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 12 (2015).

    Act of signaling and then not turning does not violate the turn-signal statute because the plain, unambiguous language of that provision makes turning an essential element of any violation. State v. Hutchins, 2015 VT 38, 198 Vt. 431, 114 A.3d 906, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 12 (2015).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Sutphin, 159 Vt. 9, 614 A.2d 792, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 109 (1992).

    Annotations From Former § 1046

    Application.

    The provisions of this section applied on State highways and on local roads. Furgat v. Brooks, 129 Vt. 98, 272 A.2d 125, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 212 (1970).

    Where automobile rear-end collision did not occur while plaintiff was slackening his speed, or changing direction, but occurred after plaintiff had stopped on highway and had been in that position long enough to note the cause of delay ahead and there were no cars in his immediate rear, this section did not apply. Scrizzi v. Baraw, 127 Vt. 315, 248 A.2d 725, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 234 (1968).

    Burden of proof.

    The burden of showing that plaintiff violated this section was on defendant. Connor v. McGill, 127 Vt. 19, 238 A.2d 777, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 167 (1968).

    Jury instructions.

    Where defendant’s answer merely charged contributory negligence and defense was not conducted on theory that plaintiff violated this section, trial judge was not required to include in the charge a reference to this section. Connor v. McGill, 127 Vt. 19, 238 A.2d 777, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 167 (1968).

    Manner of signaling.

    Under this section, driver could give warning with either hand signal or with mechanical or lighting device, the statute being in the alternative. Smith v. Grove, 119 Vt. 106, 119 A.2d 880, 1956 Vt. LEXIS 87 (1956).

    Negligence.

    Violation of this section gave rise to a presumption of negligence. Lambert v. Fuller, 131 Vt. 181, 303 A.2d 471, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 290 (1973).

    Violation of this section made prima facie case of negligence and gave rise to rebuttable presumption of negligence. Smith v. Grove, 119 Vt. 106, 119 A.2d 880, 1956 Vt. LEXIS 87 (1956); Furgat v. Brooks, 129 Vt. 98, 272 A.2d 125, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 212 (1970).

    Failure to comply with this section gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of contributory negligence. Connor v. McGill, 127 Vt. 19, 238 A.2d 777, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 167 (1968).

    § 1065. Hand signals.

    1. A right or left turn shall not be made without first giving a signal of intention either by hand or by signal in accordance with section 1064 of this title. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, all signals to indicate change of speed or direction, when given by hand, shall be given from the left side of the vehicle and in the following manner:
      1. Left turn. — Hand and arm extended horizontally.
      2. Right turn. — Hand and arm extended upward.
      3. Stop or decrease speed. — Hand and arm extended downward.
    2. A person operating a bicycle may give a right-turn signal by extending the right hand and arm horizontally and to the right side of the bicycle.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 20, 2010.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    Neither of the statutes governing turn signals contains any express exception to eliminate the requirement for use of a turn signal when a car is positioned in a turn-only lane; rather, the statutory language consistently mandates the use of a signal whenever a driver effects a turn, using the word “shall.” The language of these statutes is not unclear or ambiguous. State v. Cook, 2018 VT 128, 209 Vt. 98, 203 A.3d 509, 2018 Vt. LEXIS 242 (2018).

    Turn-only lane.

    Based on the plain language of the statutes governing turn signals, defendant was required to signal prior to executing a right-hand turn, even though he was in a right-turn-only lane, and the officer who stopped his vehicle for failure to use a turn signal had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. Furthermore, while it had been held that continuing on the natural arc of a road did not trigger the turn-signal requirement, here defendant’s car changed directions from east to south when it made the right turn at the intersection, and there was no natural arc to be followed there. State v. Cook, 2018 VT 128, 209 Vt. 98, 203 A.3d 509, 2018 Vt. LEXIS 242 (2018).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Subchapter 7. Special Stops Required

    § 1071. Railroad grade crossings.

    1. An operator approaching a railroad grade crossing shall stop within 50 feet of, but not nearer than 15 feet from, the nearest rail of the railroad and may not proceed until he or she can do so safely when:
      1. an electric or mechanical signal device gives warning of the immediate approach of a railroad train or other on-track equipment;
      2. a crossing gate is lowered or a flagger gives a signal of the approach or passage of a railroad train or other on-track equipment;
      3. a railroad train or other on-track equipment approaching within 80 rods (1,320 feet) of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from that distance and the train or other on-track equipment, by reason of its speed or nearness, is an immediate hazard;
      4. a railroad train or other on-track equipment is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to or is at the crossing; or
      5. a stop sign has been erected at the crossing pursuant to section 1006 of this title.
    2. No operator shall drive any vehicle through, around, or under any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad crossing while the gate or barrier is closed or is being opened or closed.
    3. Nothing in this section prohibits an individual from operating a motor vehicle across the tracks of a railroad at grade while a mechanical warning signal is in operation, provided he or she first brings the vehicle to a full stop and reasonably ascertains that the tracks can be crossed safely.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1983, No. 25 , § 2; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 38.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “An operator” for “A driver” in the introductory language.

    Subdiv. (a)(1): Inserted “or other on-track equipment” following “train”.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Inserted “or other on-track equipment” following “train”, and substituted “flagger” for “human flagman”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Inserted “or other on-track equipment” following “train” twice.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Inserted “or other on-track equipment” following “train”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “operator” for “person”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “an individual” for “a person”.

    —1983. Subdiv. (a)(3): Inserted “(1320 feet)” following “eighty rods”.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Added “or” following “crossing”.

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Designation of exempt crossings, see 5 V.S.A. § 3581 .

    Gates, electric signals, and flaggers, see 5 V.S.A. § 3584 .

    Obstruction of highway crossings by railroads, see 5 V.S.A. §§ 3586 and 3587.

    Stopping at railroad crossings, see § 1006 of this title.

    Use of audible warning device, see 5 V.S.A. § 3582 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1072. Certain vehicles must stop.

      1. Before crossing at grade any track or tracks of a railroad, the drivers of the following vehicles shall stop within 50 feet, but not less than 15 feet, from the nearest rail of the railroad and while so stopped shall look and listen in both directions along the track for any approaching train or other on-track equipment and for signals indicating the approach of a train or other on-track equipment, and shall not proceed until he or she can do so safely: (a) (1) Before crossing at grade any track or tracks of a railroad, the drivers of the following vehicles shall stop within 50 feet, but not less than 15 feet, from the nearest rail of the railroad and while so stopped shall look and listen in both directions along the track for any approaching train or other on-track equipment and for signals indicating the approach of a train or other on-track equipment, and shall not proceed until he or she can do so safely:
        1. any motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire except for jitneys designed to carry not more than seven passengers including the driver;
        2. any school bus or multifunction school activity bus; and
        3. any vehicle carrying explosive substances or flammable liquids as cargo or part of its cargo.
      2. After stopping as required in this subsection and upon proceeding when it is safe to do so, the driver of any such vehicle shall cross so that there will be no necessity for changing gears while traversing the crossing, and the driver shall not shift gears while crossing the track or tracks.
    1. No stop need be made at any crossing where an attendant, an enforcement officer, or a traffic-control signal directs traffic to proceed.
    2. The driver of a Type I school bus stopping as required under subsection (a) of this section shall open the door of the bus before crossing the railroad tracks.  Drivers of Type II school buses shall open the left front window.
    3. Except when required by section 1071 of this title, stopping is not required at a crossing that has been signed as “exempt” in accordance with a designation of the Transportation Board.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1979, No. 39 , § 1; 1983, No. 49 , eff. April 21, 1983; 1985, No. 2 ; 1985, No. 2 68 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1991, No. 49 , § 2, eff. June 4, 1991; 1997, No. 32 , § 2; 2015, No. 50 , § 8; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 38.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Inserted “or other on-track equipment” following “train” twice.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “shall” for “may” preceding “proceed”.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “in this subsection” for “herein” following “required” and “shall” for “may” following “driver”.

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Deleted “or other motor vehicle for hire transporting any school child” following “any school bus” in the first sentence.

    —1991. Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1985. Subsec. (c): Inserted “Type I” preceding “school” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1983. Subsec. (a): Inserted “except for jitneys designed to carry not more than seven passengers including the driver” following “passengers for hire” in the first sentence.

    —1979. Subsec. (c): Added.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1073. Heavy equipment.

    1. No individual shall operate or move any crawler-type tractor, steam shovel, derrick, roller, or any equipment or structure having a normal operating speed of 10 miles per hour or less upon or across any tracks at a railroad grade crossing except in accordance with this section.
    2. Before making any crossing, the individual operating or moving any such equipment shall first stop within 50 feet of, but not nearer than 15 feet from, the nearest rail of such railroad and while so stopped shall listen and look in both directions along such track for any approaching train or other on-track equipment and for signals indicating the approach of a train or other on-track equipment, and may not proceed until the crossing can be made safely.
    3. No crossing may be made when warning is given by automatic signal, crossing gates, flagger, or otherwise of the immediate approach of a railroad train or other on-track equipment.
    4. If a flagger is provided by the railroad, movement over the crossing shall be under the flagger’s direction.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; 2021, No. 20 , § 240.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. In subsec. (d), substituted “flagger” for “flagman” and “the flagger’s” for “his or her”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “individual” for “person”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “individual” for “person” and inserted “or other on-track equipment” following “train” twice.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “flagger” for “flagman” and substituted “other on-track equipment” for “car”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1074. Vehicle entering roadway.

    A driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, private road, legal trail, class 4 town highway, class 3 town highway serving only one residence, or driveway shall stop immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across any alleyway or driveway, shall yield the right of way to any pedestrian as may be necessary to avoid contact, and upon entering the roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; 1995, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    History

    Amendments

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “entering roadway” for “emerging from driveway” in the section heading, and inserted “legal trail, class 4 town highway, class 3 town highway serving only one residence” following “private road” in the text of the section.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1075. Passing school bus.

    1. The operator of a motor vehicle, including authorized emergency vehicles under section 1015 of this title, upon meeting or overtaking a vehicle marked and equipped as provided in section 1283 of this title that has stopped on the highway for the purpose of receiving or discharging public or private schoolchildren, shall stop his or her vehicle immediately and shall keep it stationary while the flashing red signal lights are in operation.
    2. The driver of a vehicle need not stop upon a highway with separate roadways upon meeting or overtaking a school bus that is on a different roadway, or upon a controlled access highway where the school bus is stopped in a loading zone that is a part of or adjacent to the highway at a point where pedestrians are not permitted to cross the roadway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1981, No. 97 , § 3.

    History

    Amendments

    —1981. Subsec. (a): Inserted “including authorized emergency vehicles under section 1015” preceding “upon meeting” and deleted “which is transporting children and” following “1283”.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “1283” for “1281(9) and (10)” following “section”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Nonapplicability of section to Type I school bus owned or operated by a common carrier, see § 3 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 1047.

    Lights.

    This section required operators of all vehicles meeting or overtaking a school bus to stop their vehicles and keep them stationary until such school bus resumed motion or until signaled by driver of bus to proceed, only in those instances where the school bus displayed flashing red signal lights. 1948-50 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 200.

    § 1076. Commercial motor vehicles; railroad crossings.

    1. Persons operating a commercial vehicle who are not required to stop at railroad crossings shall slow to a speed sufficient to allow for a clear view of the tracks in both directions and stop before reaching the crossing if a train is approaching in either direction.
    2. Operators of commercial and noncommercial vehicles shall:
      1. allow sufficient space to drive completely through a railroad crossing without stopping;
      2. obey a traffic control device or the directions of an enforcement official at the crossing;
      3. not attempt to cross tracks if there is insufficient undercarriage clearance.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 26 , § 4.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Stopping at railroad crossings, see § 1006 of this title.

    Subchapter 8. Speed Restrictions

    § 1081. Basic rule and maximum limits.

    1. No individual shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event, speed shall be controlled as necessary to avoid colliding with any individual, vehicle, or other object on or adjacent to the highway.
    2. Except when there exists a special hazard that requires lower speed in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, the limits specified in this section or established pursuant to this section are maximum lawful speeds, and no individual shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour.
    3. The maximum speed limits set forth in this section may be altered in accordance with sections 1003, 1004, 1007, and 1010 of this title.
    4. The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, drive at an appropriate, reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching the crest of a hill, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazard exists.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 178.

    History

    Revision note—

    In subsec. (b), substituted “subsection” for “paragraph” preceding “(a) of this section” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “individual” for “person” twice.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “individual” for “person” and “pursuant to this section” for “as hereinafter authorized”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    On duty enforcement officers exempt from speed limits, see § 1011 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction with other laws.

    Whether defendant was operating within the speed limit or was speeding was not dispositive on whether he was grossly negligent for purposes of his conviction for grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle resulting in the death of a passenger, as he was required to operate his vehicle at a speed that was reasonable and prudent in the circumstances when going around a blind curve. State v. Cameron, 2016 VT 134, 204 Vt. 52, 163 A.3d 545, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 146 (2016).

    Violations of municipal ordinances or regulations relating to vehicle speed also constitute violations of this section and, being moving violations, fall within the purview of section 673a of this title, authorizing revocation of the operator’s license of any person convicted of eight or more moving violations within a consecutive period of five years. Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981).

    Local speed regulations do not duplicate or contradict the provisions of this section, but rather alter them, with the result that violations of the local speed regulations become violations of the applicable statutory provision contained in this title. Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981).

    This section and section 1007 of this title, prescribing procedures for establishment of local speed regulations, indicate a general legislative intent to bring speed limits legally established by local authorities within the ambit of this title, so that their violation would have the same status as violation of the general speed limit set up by this section. Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981).

    Evidence.

    Witness’s testimony was sufficient to raise an issue of negligence per se regarding violation of the speeding statute because he testified that the insured left the roadway in response to two oncoming vehicles driving nose-to-tail within foot of the centerline at an excessive rate of speed. Rotman v. Progressive Ins. Co., 955 F. Supp. 2d 272, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91596 (D. Vt. 2013).

    Where there was no evidence that plaintiff exceeded the speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour, it was an error for the court to give an instruction on the statute regarding a driver’s duty not to drive “at a speed greater than is reasonable.” Barber v. LaFromboise, 2006 VT 77, 180 Vt. 150, 908 A.2d 436, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 164 (2006).

    Where the State presented a prima facie case of speeding against defendant based on the arresting officer’s testimony that he had clocked defendant’s vehicle, using a moving radar device in his patrol car, at sixty-one miles per hour in a fifty mile per hour zone, and defendant then undertook to present to the court, through her own testimony and that of her husband, neither of whom was an expert on radar, a series of possibilities which they claimed may have caused a malfunction in the radar device, but introduced no evidence that such possibilities did in fact cause a malfunction, the State was not required to show that a malfunction did not occur, and the trial court was not obligated to accept at face value the evidence of either defendant or her husband. State v. Murray-Miller, 143 Vt. 210, 465 A.2d 237, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 490 (1983).

    Where defendant who had been convicted of speeding claimed that trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the radar device which the arresting officer had used to clock defendant’s speed when evidence had been presented that indicated that potential problems with the radar were possible, since the court’s rejection of that evidence did not constitute judicial notice of the accuracy of the radar device, there was no need for it to do so and the court’s findings were supported by the evidence, trial court was justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Murray-Miller, 143 Vt. 210, 465 A.2d 237, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 490 (1983).

    Conviction for operating motor vehicle at a speed excessive for road conditions could not be sustained by evidence that respondent had exceeded the posted speed limit. State v. Lockerby, 135 Vt. 413, 377 A.2d 1388, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 641 (1977).

    Failure to comply with federal regulation regarding attachment of license to radar unit did not preclude admissibility of radar data in prosecution for speeding. State v. Delaire, 127 Vt. 462, 252 A.2d 531, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 256 (1969).

    Information.

    Information alleging that defendant operated his motor vehicle on Interstate 89, at a rate of speed in excess of established speed limit of 65 miles per hour contrary to regulations governing use of interstate highway took the prosecution beyond the reach of this section and placed it squarely within the application of section 1010 of this title (now § 1004), providing that Traffic Committee had exclusive authority to regulate speed limits on interstate and defense highways. State v. Baril, 127 Vt. 394, 250 A.2d 732, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 242 (1969).

    A criminal complaint based on this section, which alleged a rate of speed less than the maximum rate provided, had to specify the restricted area and the applicable speed limit as regulated by the Traffic Committee. State v. Delaire, 127 Vt. 462, 252 A.2d 531, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 256 (1969); State v. Baril, 127 Vt. 394, 250 A.2d 732, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 242 (1969).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1082. Slow-moving vehicles.

    All slow-moving vehicles shall keep at all times as close to the right-hand side of the highway as is reasonably practicable. A person operating a motor vehicle that impedes other traffic on a highway shall pull off the highway at the first opportunity to allow the traffic to pass before proceeding.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving to right, see § 1031 of this title.

    Following too closely, see § 1039 of this title.

    Passing motor vehicles and vulnerable users, see § 1033 of this title.

    Passing on the right, see § 1034 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1083. Special speed limitations.

    1. No person may drive any vehicle equipped with iron, steel, or solid rubber tires at a speed greater than 10 miles per hour.
    2. No person may drive a vehicle over any bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway at a speed that is greater than the maximum speed that can be maintained with safety to the bridge or structure, except when the bridge or structure is signposted as provided in this section.  The legislative body of a municipality may erect notices one hundred feet in both directions along the highway stating the maximum speed at which vehicles may be operated on the bridge or structure.
    3. The Traffic Committee, upon request from the legislative body of any municipality shall, or upon its own initiative may, conduct an investigation of any bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway, and if it finds that the bridge or structure cannot, with safety to itself, withstand vehicles traveling at the speed otherwise permissible under this chapter, the Committee shall declare the maximum speed of vehicles upon the bridge or structure and shall cause or permit suitable signs stating the maximum speed to be erected and maintained before each end of the bridge or structure.
    4. No person may drive a vehicle towing a trailer exempted from the weight requirements as provided in subsection 1307(h) of this title at speeds greater than 35 miles per hour.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1975, No. 213 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. April 1, 1976.

    History

    Revision note

    —2007. In subsec. (d), substituted “subsection 1307(h)” for “section 1307(c)” for purposes of clarity and to conform to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Subchapter 9. Violations and Penalties

    History

    Legislative intent for increase in penalty for speeding violations. 1989, No. 109 , § 12, provided in part: “It is the intent of the general assembly that the penalty applicable to speeding violations be raised from the current $3.00 per mile for each mile over and in excess of the speed limit to $4.00 per mile for each mile over and in excess of the speed limit. . . .”

    § 1091. Negligent operation; grossly negligent operation.

    1. Negligent operation.
      1. A person who operates a motor vehicle on a public highway in a negligent manner shall be guilty of negligent operation.
      2. The standard for a conviction for negligent operation in violation of this subsection shall be ordinary negligence, examining whether the person breached a duty to exercise ordinary care.
      3. A person who violates this subsection shall be imprisoned not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both. If the person has been previously convicted of a violation of this subsection, the person shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $3,000.00, or both. If serious bodily injury to or death of any person other than the operator results, the operator shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than two years or to a fine of not more than $3,000.00, or both. If serious bodily injury or death results to more than one person other than the operator, the operator may be convicted of a separate violation of this subdivision for each decedent or person injured.
    2. Grossly negligent operation.
      1. A person who operates a motor vehicle on a public highway in a grossly negligent manner shall be guilty of grossly negligent operation.
      2. The standard for a conviction for grossly negligent operation in violation of this subsection shall be gross negligence, examining whether the person engaged in conduct that involved a gross deviation from the care that a reasonable person would have exercised in that situation.
      3. A person who violates this subsection shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $5,000.00, or both. If the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section, the person shall be imprisoned not more than four years or fined not more than $10,000.00, or both. If serious bodily injury to or death of any person other than the operator results, the operator shall be imprisoned for not more than 15 years or fined not more than $15,000.00, or both. If serious bodily injury or death results to more than one person other than the operator, the operator may be convicted of a separate violation of this subdivision for each decedent or person injured.
    3. Prosecution for manslaughter.   The provisions of this section do not limit or restrict the prosecution for manslaughter.
    4. Surcharge.   A person convicted of violating subsection (b) of this section shall be assessed a surcharge of $50.00, which shall be added to any fine or surcharge imposed by the court. The court shall collect and transfer the surcharge assessed under this subsection to be credited to the DUI Enforcement Fund. The collection procedures described in 13 V.S.A. § 5240 shall be utilized in the collection of this surcharge.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1981, No. 220 (Adj. Sess.); 1991, No. 55 , § 16; 1995, No. 21 , § 4; 1995, No. 151 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 23; 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2015, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 179.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (d): Added subsec. heading.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(3): Added the third and fourth sentences.

    Subdiv. (b)(3): Rewrote the third sentence.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(3): Added last sentence.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    —1995. Subsec. (b): Substituted “two” for “three” preceding “years, or both” at the end of the second sentence.

    —1991. Rewrote the section heading, added a new subsec. (c) and redesignated former subsec. (c) as subsec. (d), and substituted “$10,000.00” for “$3,000.00” in the first sentence of that subsec.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “shall be fined not more than $3,000.00, or imprisoned not less than one year nor more than 15 years, or both” for “shall be punished by a fine of not more than $2,000.00 or by imprisonment for not more than five years” following “death of any person” in the first sentence.

    Legislative intent. 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 provides: “It is the intent of the general assembly in this act [which amended this section] to address, among other issues, the Vermont supreme court’s decisions in State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124, and State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96. In LaBounty, the court held that if more than one person was injured, an offender could be charged with only one count of grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle with injury resulting. Similarly, the court held in Martin that if more than one person was killed, an offender could be charged with only one count of boating while intoxicated with death resulting. In this act, the general assembly responds to Martin and LaBounty by amending several motor vehicle statutes to permit an offender to be charged with a separate count of violating the statute for each person who was killed or injured as a result of the offense.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Effect of conviction of motor vehicle offense in another state on license to operate, see § 3905 of this title.

    Penalties for manslaughter, see 13 V.S.A. § 2304 .

    Proof of financial responsibility required, see § 801 of this title.

    Suspension of license for point accumulation; fatality, see § 2506 of this title.

    Burden of proof.

    Charging offense.

    Death resulting.

    Elements.

    Evidence.

    Failure to wear seat belts.

    Falling asleep.

    Intent.

    Jury instructions.

    Probable cause.

    Reckless driving.

    Restitution.

    Sentencing.

    Speeding.

    Burden of proof.

    Denial of acquittal was warranted with respect to a charge against defendant of grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle resulting in the death of a passenger, as the jury could reasonably have found that he was grossly negligent for operating his vehicle around a blind corner at an intersection without extra caution because he drove in such a way that he could not control his car. State v. Cameron, 2016 VT 134, 204 Vt. 52, 163 A.3d 545, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 146 (2016).

    To prove prima facie case of careless and negligent operation of motor vehicle, State was required to show that defendant disregarded a risk of death or injury of such a nature and degree that failure to perceive it, considering nature and purpose of his conduct and circumstances known to him, involved a gross deviation from standard of care a reasonable person would observe in defendant’s situation. State v. Devine, 168 Vt. 566, 719 A.2d 861, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 144 (1998) (mem.).

    The failure of a person to operate a vehicle in conformity with this section establishes a prima facie case of negligence; the burden then shifts to the party against whom the presumption operates to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. Duncan v. Wescott, 142 Vt. 471, 457 A.2d 277, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 412 (1983).

    Where in an action for negligence arising out of an accident which occurred while defendant was operating an automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger, defendant did not demonstrate that she did not violate this section and a doctor testified that with a reasonable medical certainty he could relate plaintiff’s injuries to the accident, plaintiff proved negligence as a matter of law and should have been granted a directed verdict on that issue and that defendant’s negligence proximately caused the accident and plaintiff’s injuries. Duncan v. Wescott, 142 Vt. 471, 457 A.2d 277, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 412 (1983).

    Charging offense.

    It was plain error for the trial court to proceed against defendant on two counts of grossly negligent operation of motor vehicle. The State was required to hold defendant accountable for the injuries resulting from his actions by seeking an enhanced sentence under 23 V.S.A. § 1091(b)(3) , not by charging defendant with multiple violations. State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124, 179 Vt. 199, 892 A.2d 203, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 306 (2005).

    Death resulting.

    In using the word “person,” Legislature intended to limit application of statute to circumstances involving death of individuals who have already been born; death of a viable fetus fell outside purview of statute. State v. Oliver, 151 Vt. 626, 563 A.2d 1002, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1989).

    Element of causation in cases of careless or negligent driving with death resulting is common law standard of direct causation; an intervening cause of death that is not result of defendant’s acts would require verdict of not guilty. State v. Yudichak, 151 Vt. 400, 561 A.2d 407, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 76 (1989). (Decided under former version of section.) .

    Elements.

    Proof of drug intoxication was not an essential element of the crime of careless and negligent operation of a motor vehicle. State v. Devine, 168 Vt. 566, 719 A.2d 861, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 144 (1998) (mem.).

    Evidence.

    It was not harmless error to admit evidence of defendant’s consumption of marijuana without the necessary expert testimony to connect it to whether defendant drove in a grossly negligent manner that caused the death of his passenger, as the jury was left to speculate as to the effect of his marijuana consumption and there is a significant likelihood that the jury was misled to the prejudice of the defendant. State v. Cameron, 2016 VT 134, 204 Vt. 52, 163 A.3d 545, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 146 (2016).

    Defendant was not entitled to acquittal of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle when the evidence showed that defendant chased his neighbor and passed him on a road that was barely as wide as defendant’s car turned sideways, turned abruptly so that his car sat across the roadway, leaving four tire marks, and stopped just in front of the neighbor, requiring the neighbor to put on his brakes to avoid hitting defendant and defendant’s car. The jury could reasonably conclude that this conduct put the neighbor at risk of injury, regardless of the neighbor’s ability to stop in time to avoid a collision. State v. Putnam, 2015 VT 113, 200 Vt. 257, 130 A.3d 836, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 92 (2015).

    Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal of grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Defendant had aggressively closed in on two motorcycles, had pulled immediately in front of the lead motorcycle while both vehicles were traveling at a significant speed, and had suddenly and without cause decelerated. State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 117 (2010).

    It was error to dismiss a charge of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle for insufficient evidence. A jury could find that defendant’s decision to take her eyes off the road to look at her GPS device at a time when the risk of danger was heightened because of the presence of a bicyclist was gross negligence. State v. Carlin, 2010 VT 79, 188 Vt. 602, 9 A.3d 312, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 79 (2010) (mem.).

    Where the evidence showed that defendant had an unobstructed view of the accident site for almost 400 yards, along a relatively straight stretch of road, during daylight hours, and amidst relatively light traffic, the jury could reasonably have concluded that his failure to observe and avoid striking the victim involved a gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable person. State v. Koch, 171 Vt. 515, 760 A.2d 505, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 169 (2000) (mem.).

    Charge of grossly negligent operation was properly dismissed for lack of a prima facie case, since defendant’s inattention to pedestrian for three or four seconds, without any other indicia of negligence, was insufficient to support a conviction for grossly negligent operation. State v. Free, 170 Vt. 605, 749 A.2d 622, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 26 (2000) (mem.).

    Even assuming the sentence of eight to fifteen years imposed for careless and negligent driving under 23 V.S.A. § 1091 was unprecedented, defendant, who was represented by counsel, should have known that the statute authorizes a minimum sentence of one year and a maximum sentence of fifteen years, and although defendant’s trial lawyer later stated in an affidavit that he thought the chance of receiving the sentence imposed was unappreciable and that defendant entered the plea agreement without even considering the possibility, defendant’s lawyer had advised defendant regarding the range of potential sentences; thus, plea of nolo contendere was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Dove, 163 Vt. 429, 658 A.2d 936, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 15 (1995).

    A penalty is not constitutionally excessive unless it is grossly disproportionate or out of all just proportion to the offense; accordingly, defendant could not seriously challenge the Legislature’s judgment in authorizing a one- to fifteen-year sentence for the crime of careless and negligent driving with serious injury resulting. State v. Dove, 163 Vt. 429, 658 A.2d 936, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 15 (1995).

    Court would place little significance on statistics offered by defendant in support of his contention that sentence imposed for careless and negligent driving under 23 V.S.A. § 1091 was unprecedented since the statistics covered only a four-year period during which time only 21 such cases were disposed of, the statistics told nothing of the many factors considered in each case, and the statistics showed only that the minimum sentence imposed was unprecedented; in fact the maximum sentence had been imposed in one out of five recorded cases. State v. Dove, 163 Vt. 429, 658 A.2d 936, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 15 (1995).

    Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of careless and negligent operation of motor vehicle and leaving scene of accident, even though there was no direct evidence which served to place defendant in her car or as its driver at time of accident, as there was evidence that defendant’s vehicle struck barricade, a broken part of which struck and injured a person, and that defendant continued on without stopping, rendering aid, or reporting the accident. State v. Campbell, 146 Vt. 25, 497 A.2d 375, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 426 (1985).

    Where at the time defendant lost control of the automobile she was driving there were no other cars in the area and there was no explanation offered by defendant or any witness as to why she lost control or why the vehicle left the road, the evidence warranted a finding that defendant operated her vehicle in such a manner as to jeopardize the safety of others in violation of this section. Duncan v. Wescott, 142 Vt. 471, 457 A.2d 277, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 412 (1983).

    Where road was paved, level, straight, and wet, but not slippery, and it was night time, and defendant’s auto left the road, traveled 200 feet off the road, hit and severed a telephone pole and traveled 57 feet more before stopping, evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of careless and negligent driving. State v. Levesque, 132 Vt. 585, 326 A.2d 174, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 397 (1974). (Decided under prior law.)

    Failure to wear seat belts.

    In prosecution under this section, victim’s failure to wear available seat belts was not an intervening cause that would absolve the defendant. State v. Dodge, 152 Vt. 503, 567 A.2d 1143, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1989).

    Falling asleep.

    Where there was evidence that defendant disregarded clear warnings that he was likely to fall asleep; indeed, he permitted himself to doze off “a couple of times” before his accident, this was plainly more than momentary inattention. A jury could find that defendant’s conduct in these circumstances was a gross deviation from the care expected of a reasonable person in this situation. Accordingly, it was an error to dismiss the State’s charge of grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle, with serious injury resulting. State v. Valyou, 2006 VT 105, 180 Vt. 627, 910 A.2d 922, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 262 (2006) (mem.).

    Intent.

    A conviction for vehicular homicide requires a mens rea of criminal negligence. State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 605 A.2d 527, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 27 (1992).

    A conviction for violating provision prohibiting operation of a motor vehicle in a careless or negligent manner, based on ordinary negligence, does not supply the requisite mens rea for conviction under separate provision penalizing vehicular homicide. State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 605 A.2d 527, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 27 (1992).

    Jury instructions.

    Where the information on a grossly negligent operation charge, alleged that defendant “operated a motor vehicle . . . in a grossly negligent manner, to wit, drove his truck within inches of [game warden], in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1091(b) ,” the trial court erred in advising the jury in response to a question about the charge that the grossly negligent count referred to defendant’s conduct generally in operating his vehicle. State v. Aiken, 2004 VT 96, 177 Vt. 566, 862 A.2d 285, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 279 (2004) (mem.).

    Where the trial court instructed the jury that the motor vehicle laws it cited were relevant to the issue of defendant’s duty and whether he breached that duty and the court told the jury that if it found that plaintiffs “failed to prove negligence on the part of the defendant, then [its] deliberations are concluded,” the entire jury charge reflected current Vermont law on negligence cases involving safety statutes. Simpson v. Rood, 2005 VT 21, 178 Vt. 474, 872 A.2d 306, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 24 (2005) (mem.).

    In prosecution under this section, failure of court to charge jury that criminal, as opposed to civil, negligence was required to convict, did not amount to plain error. State v. Dodge, 152 Vt. 503, 567 A.2d 1143, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1989). (Decided under former version of section.) .

    Trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it could convict defendant for a violation of vehicular homicide provision if it found that she breached a duty to exercise ordinary care. State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 605 A.2d 527, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 27 (1992). (Decided under former version of section.) .

    Probable cause.

    Defendant’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and Vt. Const. Ch. I, Art. 11 because there was no probable cause to arrest him for negligent operation of a motor vehicle. His driving over a washed-out part of a driveway was not negligent, given that unpaved roads were commonplace in Vermont, and his speed of 25 mph did not change this conclusion since there was no evidence that his speed was excessive under the circumstances or unnecessary to traverse the washout as he did. State v. Hawkins, 2013 VT 5, 193 Vt. 297, 67 A.3d 230, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 3 (2013).

    In sentencing defendant for negligent operation of a motor vehicle, the court did not exceed its broad discretion in considering the reasons for the accident and the relative contributions of defendant and the decedent to the tragedy that ensued while trying to understand defendant’s character and the circumstances of the offense. These factors, all relevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence, were balanced by the court on the record and resulted in a 30-day sentence to serve well within sentencing guidelines. State v. Scott, 2013 VT 103, 195 Vt. 330, 88 A.3d 1173, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 96 (2013).

    In reconsidering defendant’s sentence for careless and negligent driving, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant had caused a motorcyclist’s death. Nothing in the court’s previous decision on appeal precluded such a finding, which was based on a review of the evidence regarding defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the offense—factors within the trial court’s discretion to consider. State v. Kenvin, 2013 VT 104, 195 Vt. 166, 87 A.3d 454, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 98 (2013), overruled as stated in State v. Justice (Vt. 2018).

    Trial court was within its discretion to consider defendant’s negligence and the cause of the decedent’s death in designing defendant’s sentence, which adhered to the statutory maximum for careless and negligent operation. State v. Kenvin, 2013 VT 104, 195 Vt. 166, 87 A.3d 454, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 98 (2013), overruled as stated in State v. Justice (Vt. 2018).

    Fact that causation is not an essential element of negligent operation of a motor vehicle does not mean evidence showing that a defendant’s negligence substantially caused a death is irrelevant or improperly considered under a preponderance of evidence standard at sentencing. State v. Scott, 2013 VT 103, 195 Vt. 330, 88 A.3d 1173, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 96 (2013).

    Reckless driving.

    Conviction under subsec. (b) of this section was affirmed, based on defendant’s conduct in passing two vehicles traveling abreast of each other on two-lane highway by using breakdown lane while driving in excess of speed limit; it was open for trier of fact to conclude that maneuver was consciously and purposefully taken and to reject defendant’s contention that he undertook maneuver for his own safety. State v. Parenteau, 153 Vt. 123, 569 A.2d 477, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 242 (1989). (Decided under former version of section.) .

    Restitution.

    Vermont restitution statute is much narrower than restitution statutes in other jurisdictions and as such requires a direct link between the crime and the financial injury for which restitution is sought. The travel and storage expenses incurred by the decedent’s family were not directly linked to the offense for which defendant was convicted, negligent operation of a motor vehicle; accordingly, there was no basis for the award of those expenses. State v. Kenvin, 2011 VT 123, 191 Vt. 30, 38 A.3d 26, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 121 (2011).

    Violation of the statute proscribing grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle turns entirely on whether the driver’s conduct involved a gross deviation from the care that a reasonable person would have exercised; the same conclusion follows, a fortiori, with respect to the lesser offense of negligent operation, which is defined strictly in terms of whether the defendant breached a duty to exercise ordinary care. Therefore, absent any element of injury or harm, defendant’s conviction of negligent operation could not be causally linked to the decedent’s death, and thus could not support a restitution award for any resulting financial loss. State v. Kenvin, 2011 VT 123, 191 Vt. 30, 38 A.3d 26, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 121 (2011).

    Sentencing.

    In imposing its sentence for negligent operation of a motor vehicle, the sentencing court was well within its discretion when it found that defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and considered the facts of the fatality resulting from the crash, including its impact on the decedent’s mother, at sentencing. The jury’s decision to acquit defendant of grossly negligent operation and convict him of negligent operation did not, as a matter of law, resolve the issue of causation, and therefore could not preclude the court from doing so. State v. Scott, 2013 VT 103, 195 Vt. 330, 88 A.3d 1173, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 96 (2013).

    In reconsidering defendant’s sentence for careless and negligent driving, it was within the trial court’s discretion to make a finding that defendant was “very negligent,” even though the jury had acquitted him of grossly negligent operation, death resulting. The court’s assessment of defendant’s actions leading up to the motor-vehicle accident, characterized by the court as “lazy,” was relevant to evaluating the appropriateness of defendant’s sentence; moreover, the trial court supported this finding in its review of the circumstances of the accident and defendant’s driving history. State v. Kenvin, 2013 VT 104, 195 Vt. 166, 87 A.3d 454, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 98 (2013), overruled as stated in State v. Justice (Vt. 2018).

    Speeding.

    Whether defendant was operating within the speed limit or was speeding was not dispositive on whether he was grossly negligent for purposes of his conviction for grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle resulting in the death of a passenger, as he was required to operate his vehicle at a speed that was reasonable and prudent in the circumstances when going around a blind curve. State v. Cameron, 2016 VT 134, 204 Vt. 52, 163 A.3d 545, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 146 (2016).

    Where the rate of speed of a vehicle is so great that there is a reasonable likelihood of injury to persons or property, the trier of fact may find negligence. State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 552 A.2d 410, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 170 (1988).

    The fact that defendant had experience driving at high speeds, that his automobile was built to operate safely at high speeds, and that road conditions at the time he was stopped were good with only light traffic would not prevent fact finder from concluding that defendant drove to endanger (the standard of this section before 1996 amendment) in driving at a speed of 103 miles per hour. State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 552 A.2d 410, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 170 (1988).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977); Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Curtis, 140 Vt. 621, 443 A.2d 454, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 467 (1982); State v. Covell, 142 Vt. 197, 453 A.2d 1118, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 628 (1982); State v. Quintin, 143 Vt. 40, 460 A.2d 458, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 459 (1983); Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 463 A.2d 232, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 477 (1983); State v. Piper, 143 Vt. 468, 468 A.2d 554, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 558 (1983); State v. Boyer, 144 Vt. 393, 481 A.2d 15, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 606 (1984); State v. Rice, 145 Vt. 25, 483 A.2d 248, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 545 (1984); State v. Wood, 146 Vt. 57, 498 A.2d 494, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 346 (1985); State v. Ayers, 148 Vt. 421, 535 A.2d 330, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 526 (1987); State v. Roy, 151 Vt. 17, 557 A.2d 884, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1989); State v. Conn, 152 Vt. 99, 565 A.2d 246, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 134 (1989); State v. Meyers, 153 Vt. 219, 569 A.2d 1081, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 221 (1989); State v. Roberge, 155 Vt. 121, 582 A.2d 142, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 172 (1990); In re Hatten, 156 Vt. 374, 592 A.2d 896, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 86 (1991); State v. Veach, 157 Vt. 473, 599 A.2d 1374, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 199 (1991).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Crosby, 124 Vt. 294, 204 A.2d 123, 1964 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1964); State v. Meunier, 126 Vt. 176, 224 A.2d 922, 1966 Vt. LEXIS 191 (1966); State v. Sawyer, 126 Vt. 372, 230 A.2d 781, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1967); Weeks v. Burnor, 132 Vt. 603, 326 A.2d 138, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 402 (1974).

    Annotations From Former § 1181

    Admissibility of evidence.

    Where only witness against defendant, convicted of careless and negligent driving, was passenger in vehicle which entered intersection from road intersecting road, on which defendant was driving and struck defendant’s vehicle, and such witness testified that defendant had not stopped at stop sign, and accident occurred at night on snow banked roads in uneven terrain, issue of witnesses’ ability to see whether defendant had stopped was of central concern and refusal to allow testimony of defendant’s witness as to physical obstructions to that vision, as observed a few hours later, in daytime, was reversible error. State v. Fernie, 129 Vt. 605, 285 A.2d 726, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 312 (1971).

    Common law.

    Provision that motor vehicles shall not be operated on public highway in careless or negligent manner is declaratory of common law of negligence. Hunter v. Preston, 105 Vt. 327, 166 A. 17, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1933).

    Construction.

    Words “in a careless or negligent manner,” as used in this section, referred simply to ordinary negligence such as would impose civil liability and to support conviction; there was no necessity for State to produce evidence tending to show criminal negligence, as commonly defined. State v. LaBonte, 120 Vt. 465, 144 A.2d 792, 1958 Vt. LEXIS 126 (1958).

    Under this section driver of automobile had duty of exercising care and prudence that careful and prudent man would exercise in same circumstances. McAndrews v. Leonard, 99 Vt. 512, 134 A. 710, 1926 Vt. LEXIS 167 (1926).

    Pedestrians.

    While there is no specific statutory requirement that operator of motor vehicle approaching pedestrians on highway shall sound a signal, this section imposes obligation to give such signal if in the exercise of ordinary prudence it is necessary to warn pedestrians of approaching automobile. Healy v. Moore, 108 Vt. 324, 187 A. 679, 1936 Vt. LEXIS 194 (1936).

    Pedestrian crossing public highway has right to assume, nothing appearing to contrary, that driver of any approaching automobile will obey law and not drive in a careless or negligent manner. Aiken v. Metcalf, 90 Vt. 196, 97 A. 669, 1916 Vt. LEXIS 260 (1916).

    Pleading.

    Complaint was insufficient, although following language of statute, where it did not specify the particular street on which alleged offense was committed. State v. Aaron, 90 Vt. 183, 97 A. 659, 1916 Vt. LEXIS 257 (1916).

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 1181.

    Races.

    Hill-climbing contest in State Forest park is “race” and “for the purpose of making a record” conducted upon a public highway and, as such, is prohibited by this section. 1952-54 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 235.

    § 1092. Damaging surface of road.

    No person may operate or move upon or over any highway or bridge a vehicle, machine, or contrivance which has any flange, ribs, clamps, or other object attached to or made a part of, its wheels which will injure, cut into, or destroy the surface of the highway or bridge to any appreciable extent. This provision does not restrict the right of any person to use tires which are equipped with “studs” or “cleats,” so-called, of a type designed for general use to facilitate travel in winter.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1093. Smoke screen device.

    No person may operate, or permit to be operated, a motor vehicle that is equipped with any special device or contrivance, subject to the control of the operator, designed to give off a smoke screen, so-called, or designed to impede or hinder any law enforcement officer, in the discharge of his or her duties.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Attempting to elude enforcement officer, see § 1133 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1094. Operation without consent of owner; aggravated operation without consent of owner.

    1. A person commits the crime of operation without consent of the owner if the person, without the consent of the owner, knowingly takes, obtains, operates, uses, or continues to operate the motor vehicle of another.
    2. A person commits the crime of aggravated operation without consent of the owner if the person, without the consent of the owner, knowingly takes, obtains, operates, uses, or continues to operate the motor vehicle of another, and:
      1. the motor vehicle is not recovered within 24 hours of the time it is determined the theft occurred regardless of whether the operator is then in actual or constructive possession of the vehicle; or
      2. the motor vehicle sustains $500.00 or more in damage during the commission of the offense; or
      3. the person does any of the following:
        1. attempts to alter or disguise or alters or disguises the appearance of the motor vehicle;
        2. attempts to alter or remove or alters or removes the vehicle identification number as defined in subdivision 2001(3) of this title;
        3. uses the motor vehicle in the commission of a felony;
        4. causes bodily injury to another while operating or exercising control of the motor vehicle;
        5. abandons the motor vehicle outside the State of Vermont; or
        6. unlawfully attaches or otherwise displays in or upon the motor vehicle registration plates other than those officially issued for the motor vehicle.
    3. A person convicted under subsection (a) of this section of operation without consent of the owner shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both.
    4. A person convicted under subsection (b) of this section of aggravated operation without consent of the owner shall be imprisoned not more than five years or fined not more than $2,000.00, or both.
    5. This section shall not be construed to limit or restrict prosecutions for grand larceny.
    6. A person convicted of violating this section shall be assessed a surcharge of $50.00, which shall be added to any fine or surcharge imposed by the court. The court shall collect and transfer the surcharge assessed under this subsection to be credited to the DUI Enforcement Fund. The collection procedures described in 13 V.S.A. § 5240 shall be utilized in the collection of this surcharge.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.) § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1973, No. 109 , § 9, eff. May 25, 1973; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 24; 1999, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Amendments

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), inserted “or her” following “for his” in the first sentence of that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    —1973. Substituted “two” for “three” preceding “years” in the first sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Grand larceny, see 13 V.S.A. § 2501 .

    Proof of financial responsibility required, see § 801 of this title.

    Suspension of license for conviction for violation of section, see § 2506 of this title.

    Elements of offense.

    General intent is an element of the crime of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. State v. Day, 150 Vt. 119, 549 A.2d 1061, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 128 (1988).

    Operation is an essential element of the crime of operation of a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, and a conviction without that element is not supportable. State v. Derouchie, 140 Vt. 437, 440 A.2d 146, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 637 (1981).

    Greater offense charged.

    Charge of operating a motor vehicle without consent of owner was improperly submitted for consideration of jury, and conviction could not stand, since it was not necessarily included within greater offense, grand larceny of automobile, with which defendant was charged. State v. Nicasio, 136 Vt. 162, 385 A.2d 1096, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 709 (1978).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Emilo, 144 Vt. 477, 479 A.2d 169, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 600 (1984); State v. Robinson, 146 Vt. 486, 505 A.2d 674, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 315 (1986).

    Annotations From Former § 1091

    Elements of offense.

    The gist of the offense of taking and operating a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner is the wrongful taking and the unauthorized operation of the vehicle. State v. Bruley, 129 Vt. 124, 274 A.2d 467, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1970).

    Actual possession of the vehicle was enough, prima facie, to sustain a charge of violating this section. State v. Bruley, 129 Vt. 124, 274 A.2d 467, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1970).

    Where complaining witness’ ownership and custody of motor vehicle was established beyond dispute, violation of this section was complete when it was shown that the vehicle was taken from his possession and operated without his consent. State v. Bruley, 129 Vt. 124, 274 A.2d 467, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1970).

    Owner.

    The term “owner” in this section was not restrictive to one who held the record or legal title. State v. Bruley, 129 Vt. 124, 274 A.2d 467, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 216 (1970).

    § 1095. Entertainment picture visible to the operator.

    A person shall not operate upon a highway in this State a moving motor vehicle carrying or having installed a screen or other device transmitting a moving entertainment picture that is visible to the operator.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1987, No. 112 , § 10; 2005, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. May 20, 2006; 2011, No. 25 , § 1, eff. May 11, 2011.

    History

    Amendments

    —2011. Section amended generally.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “operator, a device capable of transmitting an entertainment picture or a receiver” for “operator, a television receiver” and “an entertainment picture” for “a television broadcast”.

    —1987. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), added “except as otherwise provided” preceding “no person” at the beginning of that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1095a. Junior operator use of portable electronic devices.

    1. An individual under 18 years of age shall not use any portable electronic device as defined in subdivision 4(82) of this title while operating a moving motor vehicle in a place open temporarily or permanently to public or general circulation of vehicles.
    2. In addition, an individual under 18 years of age shall not use any portable electronic device while operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, including while the vehicle is stationary, unless otherwise provided in this section. As used in this subsection:
      1. “Public highway” means a State or municipal highway as defined in 19 V.S.A. § 1(12) .
      2. “Operating” means operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, including while temporarily stationary because of traffic, a traffic control device, or other temporary delays. “Operating” does not include operating a motor vehicle with or without the motor running when the operator has moved the vehicle to the side of or off the public highway and has halted in a location where the vehicle can safely and lawfully remain stationary.
    3. The prohibitions of this section shall not apply when use of a portable electronic device is necessary for an individual to communicate with law enforcement or emergency service personnel under emergency circumstances.
      1. An individual who violates this section commits a traffic violation as defined in section 2302 of this title and shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 and not more than $200.00 for a first violation, and of not less than $250.00 and not more than $500.00 for a second or subsequent violation within any two-year period. (d) (1) An individual who violates this section commits a traffic violation as defined in section 2302 of this title and shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 and not more than $200.00 for a first violation, and of not less than $250.00 and not more than $500.00 for a second or subsequent violation within any two-year period.
      2. An individual convicted of violating this section while operating within the following areas shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $200.00 and not more than $400.00 for a first violation, and of not less than $500.00 and not more than $1,000.00 for a second or subsequent violation within any two-year period and shall have four points assessed against his or her driving record for a first violation and five points assessed for a second or subsequent violation:
        1. a properly designated work zone in which construction, maintenance, or utility personnel are present; or
        2. a school zone marked with warning signs conforming to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.
      3. An individual convicted of violating this section outside the areas designated in subdivision (2) of this subsection shall have two points assessed against his or her driving record.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. June 1, 2010; amended 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 42, eff. Oct. 1, 2014; 2015, No. 50 , § 11; 2019, No. 59 , § 26; 2019, No. 60 , § 28; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 32.

    History

    Editor’s note

    —2019. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2019 session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 59 and 60, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2019 session, the text of Act Nos. 59 and 60 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2019. Subdiv. (d)(1): Added by Act Nos. 59 and 60.

    Subdivs. (d)(2) and (d)(3): Added by Act No. 60.

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “when use of a portable electronic device is necessary for a person to communicate with law enforcement or emergency service personnel under emergency circumstances” for “if it is necessary to place an emergency 911 call” following “apply”.

    § 1095b. Handheld use of portable electronic device prohibited.

    1. Definition.   As used in this section, “hands-free use” means the use of a portable electronic device without use of either hand by employing an internal feature of, or an attachment to, the device.
    2. Use of handheld portable electronic device prohibited.
      1. An individual shall not use a portable electronic device while operating a moving motor vehicle in a place open temporarily or permanently to public or general circulation of vehicles.
      2. In addition, an individual shall not use a portable electronic device while operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in Vermont, including while the vehicle is stationary, unless otherwise provided in this section. As used in this subdivision (b)(2):
        1. “Public highway” means a State or municipal highway as defined in 19 V.S.A. § 1(12) .
        2. “Operating” means operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, including while temporarily stationary because of traffic, a traffic control device, or other temporary delays. “Operating” does not include operating a motor vehicle with or without the motor running when the operator has moved the vehicle to the side of or off the public highway and has halted in a location where the vehicle can safely and lawfully remain stationary.
      3. The prohibitions of this subsection shall not apply:
        1. To hands-free use.
        2. To activation or deactivation of hands-free use, as long as any accessory for securely mounting the device is not affixed to the windshield in violation of section 1125 of this title.
        3. When use of a portable electronic device is necessary for an individual to communicate with law enforcement or emergency service personnel under emergency circumstances.
        4. To use of an ignition interlock device, as defined in section 1200 of this title.
        5. To use of a global positioning or navigation system if it is installed by the manufacturer or securely mounted in the vehicle in a manner that does not violate section 1125 of this title. As used in this subdivision (b)(3)(E), “securely mounted” means the device is placed in an accessory or location in the vehicle, other than the operator’s hands, where the device will remain stationary under typical driving conditions.
    3. Penalties.
      1. An individual who violates this section commits a traffic violation and shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 and not more than $200.00 for a first violation, and of not less than $250.00 and not more than $500.00 for a second or subsequent violation within any two-year period.
      2. An individual convicted of violating this section while operating within the following areas shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $200.00 and not more than $400.00 for a first violation, and of not less than $500.00 and not more than $1,000.00 for a second or subsequent violation within any two-year period and shall have four points assessed against his or her driving record for a first conviction and five points assessed for a second or subsequent conviction:
        1. a properly designated work zone in which construction, maintenance, or utility personnel are present; or
        2. a school zone marked with warning signs conforming to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.
      3. An individual convicted of violating this section outside the areas designated in subdivision (2) of this subsection shall have two points assessed against his or her driving record.
    4. Commercial motor vehicles.
      1. Operators of commercial motor vehicles shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 39 of this title (Commercial Driver’s License Act) instead of the provisions of this chapter with respect to the handheld use of mobile telephones and texting while operating a commercial motor vehicle.
      2. An individual shall not be issued more than one complaint for any violation of this section, section 1095a of this title (junior operator use of portable electronic devices), or section 1099 of this title (texting prohibited) that arises from the same incident.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 57 , § 26, eff. Jan. 1, 2014; amended 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 40, eff. Oct. 1, 2014; 2015, No. 50 , § 12; 2017, No. 71 , § 12; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 180; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 33.

    History

    Editor’s note

    —2020. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2019 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 131 and 149, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2020 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 131 and 149 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivs. (b)(1), (b)(2): Act No. 149 substituted “An individual” and “an individual” for “A person” and “a person”.

    Subdivs. (b)(3)(C) and (c)(3): Act No. 149 substituted “an individual” for “a person”.

    Subdiv. (c)(1): Act No. 131 substituted “civil penalty” for “fine”. Subdivs. (c)(1), (d)(2): Act No. 149 substituted “An individual” for “A person” and “civil penalty” for “fine”.

    Subdivs. (c)(1) and (d)(2): Act No. 149 substituted “An individual” for “A person” and “civil penalty” for “fine”.

    Subdiv. (c)(2): Amended generally by Act No. 149.

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 131 made the heading for subdiv. (d)(1) the heading for subsec. (d) instead and substituted “Driver’s” for “Driver” preceding “License Act”.

    —2017. Subdivs. (c)(2) and (c)(3): Amended generally.

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    § 1096. General penalties.

    1. Any person who violates the speed restrictions of subsection 1083(b) of this title shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $50.00 and is liable for damages for injuries thereby done to the bridge or structure, which may be recovered in a civil action brought under this section in the name and for the benefit of the State or municipal corporation liable for the repairs of the bridge or structure, with costs.
    2. A parent or guardian who knowingly permits a child under 16 years of age, in his or her custody, to violate any provision of sections 1136 through 1141, inclusive, of this title shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $25.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 181.

    History

    Revision note—

    In subsec. (a), substituted “civil” for “tort” preceding “action” to conform reference to Rule 2, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under 4 V.S.A. § 219 .

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “16 years of” for “the” preceding “age” and deleted “of 16 years” thereafter, and substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined”.

    § 1097. Excessive speed.

    No person shall operate a motor vehicle on a public highway at a speed of 60 miles per hour or more and at least 30 miles per hour in excess of a State speed zone or local speed limit. A person who violates this section shall be imprisoned upon a first conviction not more than three months or fined not more than $300.00, or both; and upon a second conviction shall be imprisoned not more than six months or fined not more than $500.00, or both.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 109 , § 5, eff. July 1, 1990.

    § 1098. Disposition of pending cases.

    1. The Judicial Bureau shall enter judgment against the defendant in all cases in which:
      1. prior to January 1, 2007, the defendant filed an answer admitting or not contesting the violation;
      2. the defendant paid all or a portion of the fine, penalty, or surcharge; and
      3. the issuing officer did not file the original complaint prior to July 1, 2007.
    2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, with respect to any judgment entered pursuant to this section, the Judicial Bureau shall immediately seal the record and shall not report the judgment to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. Any funds received by the Judicial Bureau for judgments under this section shall be deposited in the Court Technology Special Fund up to $150,000.00, and the balance to be deposited to the Municipal Ticket Repayment Revolving Fund defined in 4 V.S.A. § 28 .
    3. The Judicial Bureau shall dismiss the action in all cases in which:
      1. the defendant filed an answer denying or contesting the violation prior to January 1, 2007; and
      2. the issuing officer did not file the original complaint prior to July 1, 2007.

    HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 51 , § 17.

    History

    Revision note

    —2007. In subsec. (b), substituted “ 4 V.S.A. § 28 ” for “ 4 V.S.A. § 27 ” to reflect the statutory redesignation of the municipal ticket repayment revolving fund.

    § 1099. Texting prohibited.

    1. As used in this section, “texting” means the reading or the manual composing or sending of electronic communications, including text messages, instant messages, or e-mails, using a portable electronic device as defined in subdivision 4(82) of this title. Use of a global positioning or navigation system shall be governed by section 1095b of this title.
      1. An individual shall not engage in texting while operating a moving motor vehicle in a place open temporarily or permanently to public or general circulation of vehicles. (b) (1) An individual shall not engage in texting while operating a moving motor vehicle in a place open temporarily or permanently to public or general circulation of vehicles.
      2. In addition, an individual shall not engage in texting while operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in Vermont, including while the vehicle is stationary, unless otherwise provided under this section. As used in this subdivision (b)(2):
        1. “Public highway” means a State or municipal highway as defined in 19 V.S.A. § 1(12) .
        2. “Operating” means operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, including while temporarily stationary because of traffic, a traffic control device, or other temporary delays. “Operating” does not include operating a motor vehicle with or without the motor running when the operator has moved the vehicle to the side of or off the public highway and has halted in a location where the vehicle can safely and lawfully remain stationary.
      1. An individual who violates this section commits a traffic violation as defined in section 2302 of this title and shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 and not more than $200.00 for a first violation, and of not less than $250.00 and not more than $500.00 for a second or subsequent violation within any two-year period. (c) (1) An individual who violates this section commits a traffic violation as defined in section 2302 of this title and shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 and not more than $200.00 for a first violation, and of not less than $250.00 and not more than $500.00 for a second or subsequent violation within any two-year period.
      2. An individual convicted of violating this section while operating within the following areas shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $200.00 and not more than $400.00 for a first violation, and of not less than $500.00 and not more than $1,000.00 for a second or subsequent violation within any two-year period and shall have four points assessed against his or her driving record for a first conviction and five points assessed for a second or subsequent conviction:
        1. a properly designated work zone in which construction, maintenance, or utility personnel are present; or
        2. a school zone marked with warning signs conforming to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.
      3. An individual convicted of violating this section outside the areas designated in subdivision (2) of this subsection shall have two points assessed against his or her driving record.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. June 1, 2010; amended 2013, No. 57 , § 24; 2015, No. 50 , § 13; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 34.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “An individual” for “A person”.

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Substituted “an individual” for “a person”.

    Subdiv. (c)(1): Added subdiv. designation (c)(1), substituted “An individual” for “A person”, and inserted “civil” preceding “penalty”.

    Subdiv. (c)(2): Added.

    Subdiv. (c)(3): Added.

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —2013. Subsec. (c): Added “not less than” preceding “$100.00” and “and not more than $200.00” following “$100.00”, and added “of not less than” preceding “$250.00” and “and not more than $500.00” following “$250.00”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Search and seizure.

    Initial stop of vehicle did not violate Fourth Amendment, because it was adequately supported by officer’s observance of two traffic infractions when officer saw driver veering over lane divider and operating what appeared to be cell phone while driving. United States v. Mayo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158866 (D. Vt. Nov. 6, 2013).

    Subchapter 10. Stopping, Standing, and Parking

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Exemption of nonresidents from citations issued for parking or standing violations under the Nonresident Violater Compact, see § 3559 of this title.

    § 1101. Stopping, standing, or parking.

    1. No person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main-traveled part of the highway or within that portion of a highway right of way which the Traffic Committee finds to be a dangerous location on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation and designates as a no-parking zone by suitable signs at each end, and by such additional signs as the Committee may determine.
    2. Where parking is permitted, at all times an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view permitted of any stopped vehicles from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon the highway.
    3. This section does not apply to any vehicle that is disabled while on the paved or main-traveled portion of a highway in a manner and to the extent that it is impossible or impractical to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving the disabled vehicle in that position, nor to stopping at a railroad grade crossing.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    Annotations From Former § 1044

    Parking.

    Violation of provision which prohibited person from leaving vehicle standing on traveled portion of highway in position that would interfere with traffic would not preclude recovery of damages to farm wagon left standing in highway unless offense was proximate cause of accident. Bessette v. Humiston, 121 Vt. 325, 157 A.2d 468, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 123 (1960).

    Term “parking,” as applied to automobiles, includes not only voluntary act of leaving car on highway unattended, but also stopping car on highway, though occupied and attended, for length of time inconsistent with reasonable use of highway for purpose of travel; it does not generally include stopping at curb for purpose of taking in or letting out persons. Naylor v. Dragoon, 116 Vt. 552, 80 A.2d 600, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 130 (1951).

    Parking on a highway so that traffic could travel in one direction only was parking so as to interfere with traffic as prohibited by this section. Naylor v. Dragoon, 116 Vt. 552, 80 A.2d 600, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 130 (1951).

    To “park” car means something more than mere temporary stoppage for temporary purpose. Palmer v. Marceille, 106 Vt. 500, 175 A. 31, 1934 Vt. LEXIS 195 (1934).

    Questions for jury.

    Whether motor vehicle was halted in such a way that it interfered with movement of traffic and whether interference caused accident was for jury. Young v. Lamson, 121 Vt. 474, 160 A.2d 873, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 146 (1960).

    Whether truck was parked or left standing upon improved or used part of highway so as to interfere with traffic thereon in violation of this section was for jury. Palmer v. Marceille, 106 Vt. 500, 175 A. 31, 1934 Vt. LEXIS 195 (1934); Cooper v. Burnor, 170 Vt. 583, 750 A.2d 974, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 409 (1999) (mem.).

    Violation as negligence.

    Mere stopping of a motor vehicle on traveled way does not constitute negligence unless this is proximate cause of resulting accident. Young v. Lamson, 121 Vt. 474, 160 A.2d 873, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 146 (1960); Smith v. Blow & Cote, Inc., 124 Vt. 64, 196 A.2d 489, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 32 (1963); Campbell v. Beede, 124 Vt. 434, 207 A.2d 236, 1965 Vt. LEXIS 266 (1965).

    Evidence that a driver was parked in such a manner as to partially obstruct the highway for a considerable length of time in the nighttime, without lights, and with no warning flares set out in the road, constituted a violation of this section, and made out a prima facie case of negligence. Smith v. Blow & Cote, Inc., 124 Vt. 64, 196 A.2d 489, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 32 (1963).

    Violation of this section made a prima facie case of negligence and gave rise to a rebuttable, rather than a conclusive, presumption of negligence, since proof of attendant circumstances could, in a civil case, counterbalance or overcome the effect of the statute. Farren v. McMahon, 110 Vt. 55, 1 A.2d 726, 1938 Vt. LEXIS 118 (1938); Naylor v. Dragoon, 116 Vt. 552, 80 A.2d 600, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 130 (1951).

    § 1102. Removal of stopped vehicles.

    1. Subject to subsection (c) of this section, any enforcement officer is authorized to:
      1. cause the removal of a vehicle stopped, parked, or standing contrary to section 1101 of this title, or require the driver or other person in charge to move the vehicle to a safe position off the main-traveled part of the highway;
      2. cause the removal of an unattended vehicle or cargo that is an obstruction to traffic or to maintenance of the highway to a garage or other place of safety;
      3. cause the removal of any vehicle found upon a highway, as defined in 19 V.S.A. § 1 , to a garage or other place of safety when:
        1. the officer is informed by a reliable source that the vehicle has been stolen or taken without the consent of its owner; or
        2. the person in charge of the vehicle is unable to provide for its removal; or
        3. the person in charge of the vehicle has been arrested under circumstances that require his or her immediate removal from control of the vehicle.
    2. In the case of a crash involving a serious bodily injury or fatality, clearance of the crash scene may be delayed until the crash investigation is completed.
    3. A towing operator shall undertake removal of a vehicle or cargo under this section only if summoned to the scene by the vehicle owner or vehicle operator, or an enforcement officer, and is authorized to perform the removal as follows:
      1. The owner or operator of the vehicle or cargo being removed shall summon to the scene the towing operator of the owner’s or operator’s choice in consultation with the enforcement officer and designate the location to where the vehicle or cargo is to be removed.
      2. The provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not apply when the owner or operator is incapacitated or otherwise unable to summon a towing operator, does not make a timely choice of a towing operator, or defers to the enforcement officer’s selection of the towing operator.
      3. The authority provided to the owner or operator under subdivision (1) of this subsection may be superseded by the enforcement officer if the towing operator of choice cannot respond to the scene in a timely fashion and the vehicle or cargo is a hazard, impedes the flow of traffic, or may not legally remain in its location in the opinion of the enforcement officer.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, the vehicle owner and the motor carrier, if any, shall be responsible to the law enforcement agency or towing operator for reasonable costs incurred solely in the removal and subsequent disposition of the vehicle or cargo under this section. (d) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, the vehicle owner and the motor carrier, if any, shall be responsible to the law enforcement agency or towing operator for reasonable costs incurred solely in the removal and subsequent disposition of the vehicle or cargo under this section.
      2. When applicable, the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 6615 (liability for release of hazardous materials) shall apply in lieu of this subsection.
    4. Except for intentionally inflicted damage or gross negligence, an enforcement officer or a person acting at the direction of an enforcement officer who removes from a highway a motor vehicle or cargo that is obstructing traffic or maintenance activities or creating a hazard to traffic shall not be liable for damage to the vehicle or cargo incurred during the removal.
    5. Any enforcement officer causing the removal of a motor vehicle under this section shall notify the Department as to the location and date of discovery of the vehicle, date of removal of the vehicle, name of the towing service removing the vehicle, and place of storage. The officer shall record and remove from the vehicle, if possible, any information that might aid the Department in ascertaining the ownership of the vehicle and forward the information to the Department. A motor vehicle towed under authority of this section may qualify as an abandoned motor vehicle under chapter 21, subchapter 7 of this title.
      1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, the operator of a vehicle involved in a crash who is required by law to stop the vehicle, or who elects to stop the vehicle, at the crash scene shall move and stop the vehicle at the nearest location where the vehicle will not impede traffic or jeopardize the safety of a person. (g) (1) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, the operator of a vehicle involved in a crash who is required by law to stop the vehicle, or who elects to stop the vehicle, at the crash scene shall move and stop the vehicle at the nearest location where the vehicle will not impede traffic or jeopardize the safety of a person.
      2. The duty to move a vehicle under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not apply when:
        1. the crash involved the death of or apparent injury to any person;
        2. the vehicle to be moved was transporting hazardous material;
        3. the vehicle cannot be operated under its own power without further damage to the vehicle or the highway; or
        4. the movement cannot be made without endangering other highway users.
      3. An operator required to move a vehicle under this subsection who fails to do so shall not be ticketed, assessed a civil penalty, or have points assessed against his or her driving record.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1973, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1997, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. April 27, 1998; 2015, No. 50 , § 23; 2017, No. 71 , § 25, eff. June 8, 2017.

    History

    Revision note—

    In the first sentence of subsec. (b), substituted “agency of transportation” for “highway department” following “notify the” in view of former 3 V.S.A. § 3116 , as enacted by 1977, No. 263 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, which provided that the agency of transportation was to be a successor to and continuation of the highway department. For present provisions relating to the Agency of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. chapter 1.

    In the second and third sentences of subsec. (b), substituted “transportation board” for “highway board” in view of 1985, No. 269 (Adj. Sess.), § 1. See 19 V.S.A. § 6 .

    Amendments

    —2017. Section amended generally.

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Substituted “Department” for “Agency of Transportation” following “notify the” and “towing” for “wrecker” preceding “service” in the first sentence, rewrote the second and third sentences, and added the fourth sentence.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added “or to maintenance of the highway” in subdiv. (a)(2) and added “or her” in subdiv. (a)(3)(C).

    —1973 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Abandoned motor vehicles, see chapter 21, subchapter 7 of this title.

    Ordinances authorizing removal of illegally parked vehicles, see § 1753 of this title.

    Towing and impoundment of motor vehicle parked contrary to municipal ordinance, see § 1752 of this title.

    § 1103. Repealed. 1973, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 9.

    History

    Former § 1103. Former § 1103, relating to leaving automobiles on public highways, was derived from 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    § 1104. Stopping prohibited.

    1. Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of an enforcement officer or official traffic-control device, no person may:
      1. Stop, stand, or park a vehicle:
        1. on the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a street;
        2. on a sidewalk;
        3. within an intersection;
        4. on a crosswalk;
        5. alongside or opposite any street excavation or obstruction when stopping, standing, or parking would obstruct traffic;
        6. upon any bridge or other elevated structure or within a highway tunnel;
        7. on any railroad tracks; or
        8. at any place where official signs prohibit stopping.
      2. Stand or park a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except momentarily to pick up or discharge a passenger:
        1. in front of a public or private driveway;
        2. within six feet of a fire hydrant;
        3. within 20 feet of a crosswalk at an intersection;
        4. within 30 feet upon the approach to any flashing signal, stop sign, or traffic control light located at the side of a roadway;
        5. within 20 feet of the driveway entrance to any fire station and on the side of a street opposite and within 75 feet of the entrance to any fire station, when properly signposted;
        6. at any place where official signs prohibit standing.
      3. Park a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading merchandise or a passenger:
        1. within 50 feet of the nearest rail of a railroad crossing;
        2. at any place where official signs prohibit parking;
        3. at any place where official signs restrict parking at an electric vehicle charging station and the vehicle violates the restrictions.
    2. No person may move a vehicle not lawfully under his or her control into any prohibited area or an unlawful distance away from a curb.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2017, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 15.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(3)(C): Added.

    § 1105. Additional parking regulations.

    1. Except as otherwise provided by local ordinance, every vehicle stopped or parked upon a two-way roadway shall be stopped or parked with the right-hand wheels parallel to and within 12 inches of the right-hand curb or if there is no curb, within 12 inches of the edge of the roadway.
    2. Except when otherwise provided by local ordinance, every vehicle stopped or parked upon a one-way roadway shall be so stopped or parked parallel to and within 12 inches of a curb or, if there is no curb, within 12 inches of the edge of the roadway, in the direction of authorized traffic movement.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    § 1106. Limitations on use of State highway facilities.

    1. As used in this section, “State highway facility” means a State highway rest area, picnic ground, parking area, or park-and-ride facility.
    2. No individual shall enter or remain on any State highway facility for the purpose of overnight camping unless the particular facility has been designated for that purpose by the Traffic Committee.
      1. On the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation or findings as to adverse effects on the quiet enjoyment and property values of persons living adjacent to a State highway facility, the Traffic Committee may designate the size and types of vehicles allowed to park in a State highway facility or in particular areas of a State highway facility. (c) (1) On the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation or findings as to adverse effects on the quiet enjoyment and property values of persons living adjacent to a State highway facility, the Traffic Committee may designate the size and types of vehicles allowed to park in a State highway facility or in particular areas of a State highway facility.
      2. In addition, the Secretary may prescribe special restrictions related to parking of plug-in electric vehicles in designated areas of a State highway facility.
    3. Notice of the prohibitions or restrictions under this section shall be posted at the affected facilities by regulatory signs conforming to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.

    HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 32; amended 2017, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 182.

    History

    Revision note

    —2013. In subsec. (a), substituted “As used in” for “For purposes of” to conform to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “individual” for “person”.

    Subdiv. (c)(1): Substituted “persons” for “people”.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Designated the existing provisions of the subsec. as subdiv. (1), and added subdiv. (2).

    Subsec. (d): Inserted “or restrictions” following “prohibitions”.

    Subchapter 11. Miscellaneous Rules

    § 1110. Prohibited idling of motor vehicles.

      1. General prohibition.   A person shall not cause or permit operation of the primary propulsion engine of a motor vehicle for more than five minutes in any 60-minute period while the vehicle is stationary. (a) (1) General prohibition.   A person shall not cause or permit operation of the primary propulsion engine of a motor vehicle for more than five minutes in any 60-minute period while the vehicle is stationary.
      2. Exceptions.   The five-minute limitation of subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not apply when:
        1. a military vehicle; an ambulance; a police, fire, or rescue vehicle; or another vehicle used in a public safety or emergency capacity idles as necessary for the conduct of official operations;
        2. an armored vehicle idles while a person remains inside the vehicle to guard the contents or while the vehicle is being loaded or unloaded;
        3. a motor vehicle idles because of highway traffic conditions, at the direction of an official traffic control device or signal, or at the direction of a law enforcement official;
        4. the health or safety of a vehicle occupant requires idling, or when a passenger bus idles as necessary to maintain passenger comfort while nondriver passengers are on board;
        5. idling is necessary to operate safety equipment such as windshield defrosters, and operation of the equipment is needed to address specific safety concerns;
        6. idling of the primary propulsion engine is needed to power work-related mechanical, hydraulic, or electrical operations other than propulsion, such as mixing or processing cargo or straight truck refrigeration, and the motor vehicle is idled to power such work-related operations;
        7. a motor vehicle of a model year prior to 2018 with an occupied sleeper berth compartment is idled for purposes of air-conditioning or heating during a rest or sleep period;
        8. a motor vehicle idles as necessary for maintenance, service, repair, or diagnostic purposes or as part of a State or federal inspection;
        9. a school bus idles on school grounds in compliance with rules adopted pursuant to the provisions of subsection 1282(f) of this title;
        10. the idling of vehicles at the place of business of a registered motor vehicle dealer is necessary to maintain the premises of the place of business; or
        11. a motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less idles on a driveway or parking area on private property.
    1. Operation of an auxiliary power unit, generator set, or other mobile idle reduction technology is an alternative to operating the primary propulsion engine of a motor vehicle and is not subject to the prohibition of subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
    2. In addition to the exemptions set forth in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, in consultation with the Secretary of Natural Resources, may adopt rules governing times or circumstances when operation of the primary propulsion engine of a stationary motor vehicle is reasonably required.
    3. A person adjudicated of violating subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be:
      1. assessed a penalty of not more than $10.00, which penalty shall be exempt from surcharges under 13 V.S.A. § 7282(a) , for a first violation;
      2. assessed a penalty of not more than $50.00 for a second violation; and
      3. assessed a penalty of not more than $100.00 for a third or subsequent violation.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 57 , § 28, eff. May 1, 2014.

    § 1111. Unattended motor vehicle.

    No person shall permit a motor vehicle to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, removing the key from the ignition and effectively setting the brake, air temperatures permitting, and, when the vehicle is standing upon a grade, turning the front of the front wheels toward the curb or side of the highway. This section does not apply to authorized emergency vehicles.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    § 1112. Closed highways.

    1. Except by the written permit of the authority responsible for the closing, a person shall not drive any vehicle over any highway across which there is a barrier or a sign indicating that the highway is closed to public travel.
    2. An authority responsible for closing a highway to public travel may erect a sign, which shall be visible to highway users and proximate to the barrier or sign indicating that the highway is closed to public travel, indicating that violators are subject to penalties and civil damages.
    3. A municipal, county, or State entity that deploys police, fire, ambulance, rescue, or other emergency services in order to aid a stranded operator of a vehicle, or to move a disabled vehicle, operated on a closed highway in violation of this section, may recover from the operator in a civil action the cost of providing the services, if at the time of the violation a sign satisfying the requirements of subsection (b) of this section was installed.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2013, No. 57 , § 18.

    History

    Amendments

    —2013. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a); substituted “a” for “no” following “closing,” and inserted “not” preceding “drive” in that subsec.; and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

    § 1113. Limitations on backing.

    1. The driver of a vehicle shall not back the same unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic.
    2. The driver of a vehicle shall not back the same upon any shoulder or roadway of any controlled-access highway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); Taylor v. Malloy, 138 Vt. 66, 411 A.2d 1357, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1044 (1980).

    Annotations From Former § 1042

    Actions of others.

    Whether driver of motor vehicle, knowing of recent presence of child nearby and charged with knowledge of child’s likelihood to make sudden and unpredictable actions, acted with degree of care required by this section, was question for jury. Callahan v. Disorda, 111 Vt. 331, 16 A.2d 179, 1940 Vt. LEXIS 164 (1940).

    Due and reasonable care.

    Reasonable care, under this section, required due care commensurate with the circumstances attending the event. Desrocher v. Perry, 123 Vt. 156, 184 A.2d 217, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 213 (1962).

    Under this section it is the duty of driver to make such use of his eyes and ears before and while backing as a careful and prudent man would make in like circumstances. Callahan v. Disorda, 111 Vt. 331, 16 A.2d 179, 1940 Vt. LEXIS 164 (1940); McKale v. Weeks, 115 Vt. 155, 55 A.2d 199, 1947 Vt. LEXIS 92 (1947); Hastings v. Soule, 118 Vt. 105, 100 A.2d 577, 1953 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1953); Roberts v. Gray, 119 Vt. 153, 122 A.2d 855, 1956 Vt. LEXIS 94 (1956); Ferris v. Patch, 119 Vt. 274, 126 A.2d 114, 1956 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1956).

    The due and reasonable care imposed by this provision on a person backing a motor vehicle was the care of a prudent man in like circumstances. Eisler v. Wilder, 108 Vt. 37, 182 A. 204, 1936 Vt. LEXIS 146 (1936).

    One backing motor vehicle across street has duty of looking for approaching vehicles before he begins to back, and of continuing to look and listen while backing. Eisler v. Wilder, 108 Vt. 37, 182 A. 204, 1936 Vt. LEXIS 146 (1936).

    It is duty of person, in backing his automobile in public highway, not only to look in all directions from which a traveler might be expected to approach him before beginning to back, but to continue looking while backing. Lee v. Donnelly, 95 Vt. 121, 113 A. 542, 1921 Vt. LEXIS 188 (1921).

    Necessary distance.

    Question whether truck was driven in a backward direction further than absolutely necessary to proceed on its way, in violation of this section, was for jury. Crossman v. Perkins, 101 Vt. 94, 141 A. 594, 1928 Vt. LEXIS 126 (1928).

    § 1114. Riding on motorcycles and motor-driven cycles.

    1. An individual operating a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle shall ride only upon the permanent and regular seat of the motorcycle or motor-driven cycle, and such operator shall not carry any other individual nor shall any other individual ride on a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle unless such motorcycle or motor-driven cycle is designed to carry more than one individual, in which event a passenger may ride upon the permanent and regular seat if designed for two individuals or upon another seat firmly attached to the motorcycle or motor-driven cycle at the rear or side of the operator.
    2. An individual shall only ride upon a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle while sitting astride the seat, facing forward, with one leg on each side of the motorcycle or motor-driven cycle. The requirement of this subsection shall not apply to occupants of autocycles or of sidecars.
    3. No individual shall operate a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle while carrying any package, bundle, or other article that prevents him or her from keeping both hands on the handlebars.
    4. No operator shall carry any passenger, nor shall any passenger ride, in a position that will interfere with the operation or control of the motorcycle or motor-driven cycle or the view of the operator.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1977, No. 20 , § 2; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19f, eff. Sept. 1, 2010; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 36; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 183.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “motor-driven cycles” for “mopeds” and “motor-driven cycle” for “moped” throughout the section.

    —1977. Added “and mopeds” following “motorcycles” in the section heading and inserted “or mo-ped” following “motorcycle” throughout the text of the section.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1115. Operating motorcycles and motor-driven cycles on roadways laned for traffic.

    1. All motorcycles or motor-driven cycles are entitled to full use of a lane and no motor vehicle shall be driven in such a manner as to deprive any motorcycle or motor-driven cycle of the full use of a lane.
    2. The operator of a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle shall not overtake and pass in the same lane occupied by the vehicle being overtaken.
    3. No person shall operate a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle between lanes of traffic or between adjacent lines or rows of vehicles.
    4. No motorcycle or motor-driven cycle may be operated in the same lane with, and alongside or closer than 10 feet ahead of, or 10 feet behind another motorcycle, motor-driven cycle, or other motor vehicle.
    5. Subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall not apply to police officers in the performance of their official duties.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1977, No. 20 , § 3; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19g, eff. Sept. 1, 2010.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subsec. (d), substituted “alongside” for “along side of” to correct the grammar.

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “motor-driven cycles” for “mopeds” and “motor-driven cycle” for “moped” throughout the section.

    —1977. Inserted “and mo-peds” following “motorcycles” in the section heading, inserted “or mo-peds” preceding “are entitled” and “or mo-ped” following “any motorcycle” and deleted the former second sentence in subsec. (a), inserted “or mo-ped” following “motorcycle” in subsecs. (b) and (c), and inserted “or mo-ped” preceding “may be operated” and substituted “mo-ped or other” for “or” preceding “motor vehicle” in subsec. (d).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1116. Clinging to other vehicles.

    No person riding a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle shall attach himself or herself or the motorcycle or motor-driven cycle to any other vehicle on a roadway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1977, No. 20 , § 4; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19h, eff. Sept. 1, 2010.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “motor-driven cycle” for “moped” in two places.

    —1977. Inserted “or mo-ped” following “motorcycle” in two places.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Clinging to other vehicles; bicycle, wagon, etc., see § 1138 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1117. Footrests and handlebars.

    1. Any motorcycle or motor-driven cycle carrying a passenger, other than in a sidecar or enclosed cab, shall be equipped with footrests for such passenger.
    2. No person shall operate any motorcycle or motor-driven cycle with handlebars more than 15 inches in height above that portion of the seat occupied by the operator.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1977, No. 20 , § 5; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19i, eff. Sept. 1, 2010.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “motor-driven cycle” for “moped” in subsecs. (a) and (b).

    —1977. Inserted “or mo-ped” following “motorcycle” in subsecs. (a) and (b).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1118. Obstruction to driver’s view.

    1. A person shall not operate or attempt to operate a motor vehicle when more than three persons over two years of age, including the operator, are occupying the front seat or seats or are in the front or driving compartment of the motor vehicle.  However, this provision does not apply to any motor vehicle the front seat of which was designed by the manufacturer for occupancy by more than three persons, or to any vehicle that has a front seating area that is at least 76 inches in width, as received from the manufacturer.  In no case shall a vehicle be operated with more than four persons over two years of age occupying the front seat or seats or who are in the front or driving compartment of the motor vehicle.
    2. In any event, a person may not operate a motor vehicle when it is so loaded as to obstruct the view of the driver to the front or sides of the vehicle or as to interfere with the driver’s control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle.
    3. No passenger in a vehicle shall ride in such position as to interfere with the driver’s view ahead or to the sides, or to interfere with his or her control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1975, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Amendments

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added “or to any vehicle which has a front seating area which is at least 76 inches in width, as received from the manufacturer” following “three persons” in the second sentence and added the third sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1119. Opening and closing vehicle doors.

    No person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on the side nearest to moving traffic unless it is reasonably safe to do so and can be done without interfering with the movement of traffic, nor may any person leave a door open on the side of a vehicle nearest to moving traffic for a period of time longer than necessary to load or unload passengers.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1120. Repealed. 1983, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    History

    Former § 1120. Former § 1120, relating to riding in trailer coaches moving upon public highways, was derived from 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    § 1121. Coasting prohibited.

    1. [Repealed.]
    2. No driver of a motor truck or motor bus, when traveling upon a downgrade, shall coast with the clutch disengaged.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1997, No. 55 , § 11(1), eff. June 26, 1997.

    History

    Amendments

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Repealed.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1122. Following fire apparatus prohibited.

    No operator of a motor vehicle, other than one on official business relating to the suppression of fire or the handling of an emergency, shall follow any fire apparatus traveling to an emergency closer than 500 feet, or in a manner to interfere with the suppression of a fire or the handling of the emergency, or so as to endanger the life of any occupant of the fire apparatus, or thereafter park his or her vehicle so as to interfere with the suppression of a fire or the handling of the emergency.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1123. Driving over fire hose prohibited.

    No person shall operate a motor vehicle over any unprotected hose of a fire fighting unit laid down on any highway, alley, private road, or driveway, to be used at any fire or alarm of fire, without the consent of the fire department official in command.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1124. Position of operator.

    No person may steer or operate, attempt to steer or operate, or participate in the steering or operation of a motor vehicle, except in an emergency, unless he or she is seated directly and immediately behind the steering wheel or other steering apparatus.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1125. Obstructing windshields, windows.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not operate a motor vehicle on which material or items have been painted or adhered on or over, or hung in back of, any transparent part of a motor vehicle windshield, vent windows, or side windows located immediately to the left and right of the operator. The prohibition of this section on hanging items shall apply only when a hanging item materially obstructs the driver’s view.
    2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a person may operate a motor vehicle with material or items painted or adhered on or over, or hung in back of, the windshield, vent windows, or side windows:
      1. in a space not over four inches high and 12 inches long in the lower right-hand corner of the windshield;
      2. in such space as the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may specify for location of any sticker required by governmental regulation;
      3. in a space not over two inches high and two and one-half inches long in the upper left-hand corner of the windshield;
      4. if the operator is a person employed by the federal, State, or local government or a volunteer emergency responder operating an authorized emergency vehicle, who places any necessary equipment in back of the windshield of the vehicle, provided the equipment does not interfere with the operator’s control of the driving mechanism of the vehicle;
      5. on a motor vehicle that is for sale by a licensed automobile dealer prior to the sale of the vehicle, in a space not over three inches high and six inches long in the upper left-hand corner of the windshield, and in a space not over four inches high and 18 inches long in the upper right-hand corner of the windshield; or
      6. if the object is a rearview mirror, or is an electronic toll-collection transponder located either between the roof line and the rearview mirror post or behind the rearview mirror.
    3. The Commissioner may grant an exemption to the prohibition of this section upon application from a person required for medical reasons to be shielded from the rays of the sun and who attaches to the application a document signed by a licensed physician or optometrist certifying that shielding from the rays of the sun is a medical necessity. The physician or optometrist certification shall be renewed every four years. However, when a licensed physician or optometrist has previously certified to the Commissioner that an applicant’s condition is both permanent and stable, the exemption may be renewed by the applicant without submission of a form signed by a licensed physician or optometrist. Additionally, the window shading or tinting permitted under this subsection shall be limited to the vent windows or side windows located immediately to the left and right of the operator. The exemption provided in this subsection shall terminate upon the transfer of the approved vehicle and at that time the applicable window tinting shall be removed by the seller. Furthermore, if the material described in this subsection tears or bubbles or is otherwise worn to prohibit clear vision, it shall be removed or replaced.
    4. The rear side windows and the back window may be obstructed only if the motor vehicle is equipped on each side with a securely attached mirror, which provides the operator with a clear view of the roadway in the rear and on both sides of the motor vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1977, No. 176 (Adj. Sess.); 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2001, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2005, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2015, No. 50 , § 15.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Made a minor change in punctuation in the introductory paragraph, and added subdiv. (6).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 75 inserted “Except as otherwise provided” preceding “a person,” substituted “operator” for “driver” and “12” for “twelve” in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

    Amended generally by Act No. 112.

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally by Act No. 75.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), inserted “windshield, vent windows or side windows located immediately to the left and right of the driver” preceding “except” in that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    Legislative intent. 2015, No. 50 , § 14 provides: “(a) In State v. Hurley, 2015 VT 46 (March 6, 2015), the Vermont Supreme Court held that the prohibition of 23 V.S.A. § 1125 on objects hanging behind a windshield extends only to an object that ‘materially obstructs the driver’s view.’

    “(b) In adding the second sentence to 23 V.S.A. § 1125(a) as provided in Sec. 15 of this bill, the General Assembly intends to codify the holding of the decision and to codify the logical extension of the Court’s holding to objects hanging behind a vent or side window immediately to the left or right of the driver. In only addressing hanging objects in 23 V.S.A. § 1125(a) , the General Assembly takes no position on whether the Court’s reasoning should extend further to the statute’s prohibition on painting or adhering material or items to such windows or the windshield.”

    ANNOTATIONS

    Material obstruction required.

    Operator of a motor vehicle violates the obstructing-windshields statute only when an object hanging behind the windshield materially obstructs the driver’s view, and a traffic stop is thus impermissible unless the officer can demonstrate a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a hanging object materially obstructs the driver’s view. State v. Hurley, 2015 VT 46, 198 Vt. 552, 117 A.3d 433, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 22 (2015).

    Determination that a hanging object must materially obstruct a driver’s vision to run afoul of the obstructing-windshields statute leaves open the question of whether an object causes a material obstruction. The answer to that question would require a fact-specific inquiry; hanging objects may (or may not) constitute material obstructions depending on their size, their position relative to the driver’s line of vision, and whether they are stationary or mobile. State v. Hurley, 2015 VT 46, 198 Vt. 552, 117 A.3d 433, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 22 (2015).

    Although officer’s stop of defendant for having a pine-tree-shaped air freshener suspended from his rearview mirror was based on a misapprehension of the law, i.e., that the obstructing-windshields statute prohibited the hanging of any item on the inside of a windshield without regard to whether the item materially obstructed the driver’s vision, the officer’s misapprehension was an objectively reasonable one under the circumstances. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment did not require exclusion of the evidence gathered from the traffic stop, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Hurley, 2015 VT 46, 198 Vt. 552, 117 A.3d 433, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 22 (2015).

    § 1126. Putting glass, other items, on highway prohibited.

    1. No person shall drop or deposit upon any highway any glass bottle, glass, nails, tacks, wire, cans, or any other substance likely to injure any person, animal, or vehicle upon the highway.
    2. A person shall immediately remove or cause to be removed any destructive or injurious material that he or she drops or deposits, or permits to be dropped or deposited upon any highway.
    3. If the throwing or depositing was done from a motor vehicle, except a motor bus or a bus transporting schoolchildren, it is prima facie evidence that the throwing or depositing was done by the operator of the motor vehicle.
    4. A person removing a wrecked or damaged vehicle from a highway shall remove any glass or other injurious substance dropped upon the highway from the vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Littering, see 24 V.S.A. § 2201 .

    Obstructing travel, see 19 V.S.A. § 1105 .

    § 1126a. Depositing snow onto or across certain highways prohibited.

    1. No person, other than an employee in the performance of his or her official duties or other person authorized by the Agency of Transportation (in the case of State highways) or selectboard (in the case of town highways), shall plow or otherwise deposit snow onto the traveled way, shoulder, or sidewalk of a State highway or a class 1, 2, or 3 town highway.
    2. Nothing in this section should be construed to be in derogation of any municipal ordinance regulating the deposit of snow within the limits of town highways.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Agency of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. chapter 1.

    § 1127. Control in presence of animals.

    1. Whenever upon a public highway and approaching a vehicle drawn by a draft animal, an animal upon which a person is riding, or animals being herded, the operator of a motor vehicle shall operate the vehicle in such a manner as to exercise every reasonable precaution to prevent the frightening of any animal and to ensure the safety and protection of the animal and the person riding, driving, or herding.
    2. The operator of a motor vehicle shall yield to any animals being herded on or across a highway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1989, No. 55 ; 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    —1989. Added “and cattle” following “horses” in the section heading, designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), and added subsec. (b).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Rights and duties of person riding animal or driving animal-drawn vehicle upon road, see § 1014 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1128. Crashes; duty to stop.

    1. The operator of a motor vehicle who has caused or is involved in a crash resulting in injury to any person other than the operator, or in damage to any property other than the vehicle then under his or her control, shall immediately stop and render any assistance reasonably necessary. Subsection 1102(g) of this title (stopping not to impede traffic or jeopardize safety; exceptions) governs the location where a person shall stop. The operator shall give his or her name, residence, license number, and the name of the owner of the motor vehicle to any person who is injured or whose property is damaged and to any enforcement officer. A person who violates this section shall be fined not more than $2,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
    2. If serious bodily injury results from the crash, a person violating subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $3,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
    3. If death results from the crash, a person violating subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $3,000.00 or imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than 15 years, or both.
    4. A person convicted of violating this section shall be assessed a surcharge of $50.00, which shall be added to any fine or surcharge imposed by the court. The court shall collect and transfer the surcharge assessed under this subsection to be credited to the DUI Enforcement Fund. The collection procedures described in 13 V.S.A. § 5240 shall be utilized in the collection of this surcharge.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1981, No. 205 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1995, No. 151 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 2017, No. 71 , § 26, eff. June 8, 2017; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 184.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” in subsecs. (b) and (c) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “crashes; duty” for “accidents-duty” in the section heading.

    —2017. Subsec. (a): substituted “a crash” for “an accident” preceding “resulting in injury” in the first sentence; added a comma following “her control” in the first sentence; and added the second sentence.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Rewrote the first and second sentences.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Civil liability for emergency medical care, see 12 V.S.A § 519.

    Driver License Compact, see chapter 37 of this title.

    Duty to stop and report accident; all-terrain vehicle, see § 3511 of this title.

    Duty to stop and report accident; motorboats, see § 3313 of this title.

    Duty to stop and report accident; snowmobile, see § 3211 of this title.

    Insurance against hit-and-run motorists, see § 941 of this title.

    Proof of financial responsibility required, see § 801 of this title.

    Suspension of license for conviction for violation of section, see § 2506 of this title.

    Construction.

    Defenses.

    Elements of offense.

    Evidence.

    Indictment and information.

    Jury instructions.

    Nature of duty.

    Purpose.

    Sentence.

    Construction.

    Whether the judicial system ultimately determines that a defendant legally caused a motor vehicle accident or is guilty of vehicular homicide is not dispositive of whether the defendant “caused or was involved in” an accident. State v. Simpson, 160 Vt. 220, 627 A.2d 346, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 45 (1993).

    Defenses.

    Lack of knowledge of the accident and of the resultant injury or damage is a complete defense to a violation of this section. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 431 A.2d 1237, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 502 (1981).

    Elements of offense.

    If a defendant actually knows he was involved in an accident, and an examination of the circumstances of the accident would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a person or property had been injured, imposing criminal liability for a failure to render aid is not unreasonable. State v. Keiser, 174 Vt. 87, 807 A.2d 378, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 144 (2002).

    Under this section, failure either to stop and render assistance or to give the required information at a time and in a manner reasonable under the circumstances is sufficient to convict. State v. Loso, 151 Vt. 262, 559 A.2d 681, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 47 (1989).

    To prove the offense of leaving the scene of an accident, the State need only show that a person failed to stop after an accident or failed to give identification and other required information to the injured party or an enforcement officer. State v. Forcier, 162 Vt. 71, 643 A.2d 1200, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 50 (1994).

    Actual knowledge on the part of the accused that he was involved in an accident is an essential element of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 431 A.2d 1237, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 502 (1981).

    This section requires not only knowledge of an accident, but also knowledge of resultant injury to either the person or property of another. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 431 A.2d 1237, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 502 (1981).

    Evidence.

    Trial court did not improperly overlook mitigating evidence or abuse its discretion in imposing sentence on the count of leaving the scene of an accident with death resulting, where defendant acknowledged that he observed an individual on the right side of the road and a parked vehicle on the left just before he swerved off the highway, and was aware of other vehicles in the vicinity. The evidence thus supported the court’s finding of “a high likelihood that any impact of [defendant’s] car would have an effect on the other traffic, the other vehicles and [the victim].” State v. Daley, 2006 VT 5, 179 Vt. 589, 892 A.2d 244, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 18 (2006) (mem.).

    Jury verdict finding defendant guilty of leaving the scene of an accident, fatality resulting, would not be disturbed where the evidence fairly and reasonably supported a jury determination that defendant possessed either actual or constructive knowledge of injury to a person and therefore did not leave the finding of guilt uncertain or dependent on mere conjecture. State v. Keiser, 174 Vt. 87, 807 A.2d 378, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 144 (2002).

    Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of careless and negligent operation of motor vehicle and leaving scene of accident, even though there was no direct evidence which served to place defendant in her car or as its driver at time of accident, as there was evidence that defendant’s vehicle struck barricade, a broken part of which struck and injured a person, and that defendant continued on without stopping, rendering aid, or reporting the accident. State v. Campbell, 146 Vt. 25, 497 A.2d 375, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 426 (1985).

    In a prosecution for leaving the scene of an accident, the actual knowledge of impact required on the part of the accused may be proven either by means of direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 431 A.2d 1237, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 502 (1981).

    In a prosecution for leaving the scene of an accident, since direct evidence of actual knowledge of impact on the part of the defendant, which is an essential element of the offense, is not normally available, the necessary knowledge may be imputed to the defendant by the use of circumstantial evidence. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 431 A.2d 1237, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 502 (1981).

    In a prosecution for leaving the scene of an accident, evidence of the force of the impact or, in certain circumstances, proof of an impact alone is sufficient to raise an inference of knowledge of injury on the part of the fleeing driver and to thereby permit the prosecution’s case to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 431 A.2d 1237, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 502 (1981).

    In order to prove knowledge of resultant injury or damage to person or property, an essential element of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident, the State need only show constructive knowledge on the part of the defendant; therefore, it is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage because, if an impact occurs under such circumstances that a reasonable person would anticipate injury to person or property, knowledge of that fact is imputed to the driver. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 431 A.2d 1237, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 502 (1981).

    Indictment and information.

    There had been no claim of surprise or prejudice where the information charging leaving the scene of an accident did not contain the word “immediately,” nor could there be. The information and accompanying affidavit clearly explained the charged conduct and related it directly to the statute in question; defendant’s ability to prepare his defense was in no way influenced. State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 117 (2010).

    Information charging leaving the scene of an accident was not insufficient under the Vermont Constitution because it did not contain the word “immediately.” The plain meaning of the phrase “following the crash” and the allegation that there had been a serious injury to which defendant “did not render any assistance reasonably necessary” made clear that the State was not charging defendant with violating the statute by later driving past the scene after he had originally fled or when a trooper questioned him at his home. State v. Neisner, 2010 VT 112, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 117 (2010).

    Jury instructions.

    Defendant was not entitled to a necessity defense instruction on the charge of leaving the scene of an accident. There was little question that defendant was driving his truck around the complaining witness’s property and threatening same, thus creating any “emergency” that existed; furthermore, he had ample opportunity to inform the police of the accident and did not do so. State v. Myers, 2011 VT 43, 190 Vt. 29, 26 A.3d 9, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 43 (2011).

    Instruction on constructive knowledge, allowing the jury to impute to defendant knowledge that a reasonable investigation of the circumstances of the accident would reveal, was consistent with the spirit and doctrine of prior decision that a defendant could be “imputed” with knowledge that a reasonable person would have gathered from the circumstances of the accident or impact, i.e., what a reasonable evaluation of the circumstances would reveal, and did not constitute reversible error. State v. Keiser, 174 Vt. 87, 807 A.2d 378, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 144 (2002).

    Trial court did not err by failing to affirmatively instruct the jury that it could not find defendant guilty if it found that he merely thought or suspected that he had hit (and thus injured) a person because constructive knowledge being an objective inquiry, defendant’s subjective state of mind was not relevant to the inquiry. State v. Keiser, 174 Vt. 87, 807 A.2d 378, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 144 (2002).

    Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the basis of defendant’s argument that the statute should be read to require actual knowledge that an accident involved a person or property of another, separate and distinct from the element of knowledge regarding injury to such. State v. Keiser, 174 Vt. 87, 807 A.2d 378, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 144 (2002).

    After reversal of vehicular homicide conviction because charge permitted jury to convict on civil negligence standard rather than criminal negligence standard, remand for sentence reconsideration of hit-and-run conviction was necessary where sentencing hearing had focused solely on the vehicular homicide conviction. State v. Simpson, 160 Vt. 220, 627 A.2d 346, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 45 (1993).

    Nature of duty.

    The statutory duties imposed on a person “who has caused or is involved” in a motor vehicle accident apply not only to persons with actual knowledge that their conduct was the proximate cause of the accident, but also to persons with actual knowledge that their actions were a precipitating or contributing factor to the accident. State v. Simpson, 160 Vt. 220, 627 A.2d 346, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 45 (1993).

    The duty imposed upon a driver by this section in a collision is not a passive one; it requires that the driver take affirmative action by stopping to give aid and information. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 431 A.2d 1237, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 502 (1981).

    Purpose.

    The legislative purpose of this section is to prohibit drivers of motor vehicles from seeking to evade civil or criminal liability by escaping before their identity can be established, and from leaving persons injured, abandoned, and destitute of first aid or medical care. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 431 A.2d 1237, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 502 (1981).

    Sentence.

    Defendant’s sentence of ten to fifteen years to serve for leaving the scene of an accident, fatality resulting, was not grossly disproportionate based on sentencing statistics spanning a roughly eleven-year period which showed that, while defendant’s minimum was six years greater than the next highest minimum sentence imposed, his maximum sentence was only three years greater than the next highest maximum and, also, his to-serve sentence was five years less than the maximum penalty established by the Legislature for the offense. State v. Keiser, 174 Vt. 87, 807 A.2d 378, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 144 (2002).

    Sentence of ten to fifteen years to serve for leaving the scene of an accident, fatality resulting, was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion based on its conclusions that defendant had actual knowledge that he had hit a person on the night in question; that, judging from the damage to defendant’s car, it was clear to defendant the nature and extent of the accident; and that defendant nevertheless chose his own self-interest of avoiding a potential DWI charge over helping the victim who, as a result, lay on the side of the road for roughly ten hours suffering without medical attention. State v. Keiser, 174 Vt. 87, 807 A.2d 378, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 144 (2002).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Conn, 152 Vt. 99, 565 A.2d 246, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 134 (1989); State v. Coita, 153 Vt. 18, 568 A.2d 424, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 219 (1989); State v. Barber, 157 Vt. 228, 596 A.2d 337, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 269 (1990); State v. Veach, 157 Vt. 473, 599 A.2d 1374, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 199 (1991).

    Annotations From Former § 1004

    Evidence.

    Where identity of defendant’s car as being in collision rested upon inference, negligence of defendant could not be inferred from fact that he did not stop and render assistance. Wellman v. Wales, 97 Vt. 245, 122 A. 659, 1923 Vt. LEXIS 235 (1923).

    Nature of duty.

    Duty imposed on driver of vehicle by this section was not passive but required positive, affirmative action, i.e., to stop and to give aid and information. State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 138 A.2d 425, 1958 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1958).

    Under this section it was the driver’s first duty after an accident to stop, and from then on he had additional duties, each being separate and independent, and the omission of any one or more constituted a violation of this section. State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 138 A.2d 425, 1958 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1958).

    Pleading.

    Complaint containing no allegation that accident resulted in injury to any person or property other than that of respondent was defective and could not be cured by verdict of guilty. State v. Gosselin, 110 Vt. 361, 6 A.2d 14, 1939 Vt. LEXIS 152 (1939).

    Purpose.

    Section was designed to prohibit drivers of motor cars from seeking to evade civil or criminal liability by escaping, before their identity can be established, and from leaving persons injured in collisions in distress or danger for want of proper medical or surgical treatment. State v. Severance, 120 Vt. 268, 138 A.2d 425, 1958 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1958).

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 1004.

    Property.

    As used in this section “property” included a dog which was duly licensed and collared as provided by the dog law. 1942-44 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 185.

    § 1129. Crashes; reports.

    1. The operator of a motor vehicle involved in a crash in which someone is injured or there is total property damage of $3,000.00 or more shall make a written report concerning the crash to the Commissioner on forms furnished by the Commissioner. The written report shall be mailed to the Commissioner within 72 hours after the crash. The Commissioner may require further facts concerning the crash be provided upon forms he or she furnishes.
    2. As used in this section, the word “crash” only refers to incidents and events in which the motor vehicle involved comes into physical contact with an individual or object, including another motor vehicle. It shall not include such contact where a vehicle involved is being used by a law enforcement officer as a barrier to prevent passage of a vehicle being operated by a suspected violator of the law. In such cases, the law enforcement officer shall not be required to make a personal written report of the incident.
    3. The owner and the operator of a motor vehicle covered by one or more policies of liability insurance shall notify any individual injured by the motor vehicle, or the owner of any property damaged by the motor vehicle, of the name and address of all liability insurance companies that may cover the incident and the numbers of the policies. The notification shall be made to the injured individual or owner of the damaged property, or both, within five days after the injury or damage. The information shall be given to the injured individual and owner of the damaged property at the last known address of each.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1977, No. 81 , § 5, eff. April 27, 1977; 1979, No. 46 , § 4, eff. April 26, 1979; 1979, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 185.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “$3,000.00” for “$1,000.00” following “extent of” in the first sentence.

    —1995. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$1,000.00” for “$500.00” following “extent of” in the first sentence and added “or her” following “him” in the third sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added the second and third sentences.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “there is total damage to all property” for “the motor vehicle then under his control or any property is damaged” preceding “to the extent of” and “$ 500.00” for “$ 200.00” thereafter in the first sentence.

    —1979. Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1977. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$ 200.00” for “$ 100.00” following “extent of” in the first sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Investigation and reports of accidents, see §§ 1603-1603b, 3211, 3313, and 3511 of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    Reports of accidents involving motor vehicles used as common carriers, see 5 V.S.A. § 1806 .

    Reports of law enforcement officers making motor vehicle arrests or issuing citations, see § 1016 of this title.

    Annotations From Former § 1005

    Self-incrimination.

    The privilege of operating a motor vehicle is subject to reasonable conditions in the interest of public safety and the requirement of this section that the operator report accidents which occur in the exercise of that privilege does not, of itself, compel the operator to yield up constitutional protection against testimonial incrimination. State v. Sawyer, 126 Vt. 372, 230 A.2d 781, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1967).

    § 1130. Permitting unlicensed or impaired person to operate.

    1. No person shall employ another person as an operator of a motor vehicle knowing that the other person is not licensed as provided in this title.
    2. No person shall permit a motor vehicle owned by him or her or under his or her control to be operated by another person if the person who owns or controls the vehicle knows that the other person has no legal right to operate the vehicle.
      1. No person who owns or is in control of a vehicle shall intentionally create a direct and immediate opportunity for another person to operate the motor vehicle if the person who owns or controls the vehicle has actual knowledge that the operator is: (c) (1) No person who owns or is in control of a vehicle shall intentionally create a direct and immediate opportunity for another person to operate the motor vehicle if the person who owns or controls the vehicle has actual knowledge that the operator is:
        1. under the influence of alcohol; or
        2. under the influence of any other drug or under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of driving safely.
      2. This subsection shall not apply if the defendant was placed under duress or subjected to coercion by the other person at the time the defendant enabled the other person to operate the motor vehicle.
      1. A person who violates subsection (c) of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. (d) (1) A person who violates subsection (c) of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.
      2. If death or if serious bodily injury as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) results to any person other than the operator from a violation of subsection (c) of this section, the person convicted of the violation shall be fined not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. The provisions of this subdivision do not limit or restrict prosecutions for manslaughter.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2011, No. 56 , § 2; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4).

    History

    Amendments

    —2017. Subdiv. (c)(1)(A): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor”.

    —2011. Section heading: Inserted “or impaired” preceding “person”.

    Subsec. (a): Added the subsec. designation; deleted “knowingly” preceding “employ”; substituted “another” for “as operator of a motor vehicle, a” preceding “person”; and inserted “as an operator of a motor vehicle knowing that the other person is” following “person”.

    Subsec. (b): Added the subsec. designation; deleted “knowingly” preceding “employ”; substituted “another” for “a” preceding “person”, “if the person who owns or controls the vehicle knows that the other person” for “who” following “person”; and “operate the vehicle” for “do so, or in violation of a provision of this title”.

    Subsecs. (c), (d): Added.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “employing an” for “permitting” and “; permitting unauthorized operation” for “to operate” in the section heading.

    Repeal of 2009 (Adj. Sess.) amendments. 2011, No. 56 , § 27(1) repealed the amendments to the section heading added by 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving under the influence, see chapter 13, subchapter 13 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Vince v. Wilson, 151 Vt. 425, 561 A.2d 103, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1989).

    § 1131. Warning signal.

    The operator of a motor vehicle, whenever reasonably necessary to ensure safe operation, shall give an audible warning with the horn of his or her vehicle but shall not otherwise use the horn when upon a highway.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Annotations From Former § 1036

    Sounding horn.

    In action for negligence arising out of motor vehicle accident, exception because jury was not instructed that failure of defendant to sound his horn when driving to left of center of highway constituted negligence as being violation of this section was without merit, since this section contained no such requirement and plaintiff, on his own testimony, saw defendant’s truck in time to have avoided accident. Hutchinson v. Knowles, 108 Vt. 195, 184 A. 705, 1936 Vt. LEXIS 174 (1936).

    § 1132. Driving on sidewalk.

    No person shall drive any motor vehicle on a sidewalk or on any area designated exclusively for pedestrian traffic, except while crossing a driveway. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the operation of an electric personal assistive mobility device, at a speed not to exceed eight miles per hour, on a sidewalk by a person who is at least 16 years of age or who has an ambulatory disability as defined in section 304a of this title. Nor shall the provisions of this section limit the authority of a municipality under the provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 2291(1) , (4), and (5) to regulate the use and operation of these devices.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2001, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Added the second and third sentences.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving over, parking on, or otherwise impeding use of sidewalk or footpath, see 19 V.S.A. § 906 .

    Operation of motor-assisted bicycles, see § 1136 of this title.

    Pedestrians on roadways, see § 1055 of this title.

    Riding on roadways and bicycle paths, see § 1139 of this title.

    Stopping prohibited, see § 1104 of this title.

    Vehicle entering roadway, see § 1074 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1133. Eluding a police officer.

    1. No operator of a motor vehicle shall fail to bring his or her vehicle to a stop when signaled to do so by an enforcement officer:
      1. displaying insignia identifying him or her as such; or
      2. operating a law enforcement vehicle sounding a siren and displaying a flashing blue or blue and white signal lamp.
      1. A person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both. (b) (1) A person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both.
      2. A person who violates subsection (a) of this section while operating a vehicle in a negligent or grossly negligent manner in violation of section 1091 of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than five years or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both.
        1. In the event that serious bodily injury to any person other than the operator is proximately caused by the operator’s knowing violation of subsection (a) of this section, the operator shall be imprisoned for not more than 15 years or fined not more than $5,000.00, or both. (3) (A) In the event that serious bodily injury to any person other than the operator is proximately caused by the operator’s knowing violation of subsection (a) of this section, the operator shall be imprisoned for not more than 15 years or fined not more than $5,000.00, or both.
        2. If serious bodily injury to more than one person other than the operator is proximately caused by the operator’s knowing violation of subsection (a) of this section, the operator may be convicted of a separate violation of this subdivision for each decedent or person injured.
        1. In the event that death to any person other than the operator is proximately caused by the operator’s knowing violation of subsection (a) of this section, the operator shall be imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than 15 years or fined not more than $10,000.00, or both. (4) (A) In the event that death to any person other than the operator is proximately caused by the operator’s knowing violation of subsection (a) of this section, the operator shall be imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than 15 years or fined not more than $10,000.00, or both.
        2. If death to more than one person other than the operator is proximately caused by the operator’s knowing violation of subsection (a) of this section, the operator may be convicted of a separate violation of this subdivision for each decedent.
    2. In a prosecution under this section, the operator may raise as an affirmative defense, to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that the operator brought his or her vehicle to a stop in a manner, time, and distance that was reasonable under the circumstances.
    3. A person convicted of violating this section shall be assessed a surcharge of $50.00, which shall be added to any fine or surcharge imposed by the court. The court shall collect and transfer the surcharge assessed under this subsection to be credited to the DUI Enforcement Fund. The collection procedures described in 13 V.S.A. § 5240 shall be utilized in the collection of this surcharge.
    4. As used in this section:
      1. “Operator” includes an operator who, after being signaled to stop under subsection (a) of this section, leaves the vehicle and attempts to elude the officer by other means.
      2. “Serious bodily injury” has the meaning defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021 .

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 26; 2003, No. 47 , § 1; 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2011, No. 42 .

    History

    Amendments

    —2011. Substituted “Eluding“ for “Attempting to elude” in the section heading and rewrote subsec. (b).

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(2): Designated the existing provisions of the subdiv. as subdiv. (A) and inserted “death or” preceding “serious bodily injury” in that subdiv., and added subdiv. (B).

    —2003. Section amended generally.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), inserted “or her” following “bring his” and “identifying him” in that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    Legislative intent. 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 provides: “It is the intent of the General Assembly in this act [which amended this section] to address, among other issues, the Vermont Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124, and State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96. In LaBounty, the Court held that if more than one person was injured, an offender could be charged with only one count of grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle with injury resulting. Similarly, the Court held in Martin that if more than one person was killed, an offender could be charged with only one count of boating while intoxicated with death resulting. In this act, the General Assembly responds to Martin and LaBounty by amending several motor vehicle statutes to permit an offender to be charged with a separate count of violating the statute for each person who was killed or injured as a result of the offense.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Attempting to elude enforcement officer, see §§ 3212, 3311, and 3512 of this title.

    Authority of enforcement officers, see § 1013 of this title.

    Obedience to enforcement officers, see § 1012 of this title.

    Smoke screen device, see § 1093 of this title.

    Suspension of license for conviction for violation of section, see § 2506 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    The term “operator,” as used in this section, means the person operating the motor vehicle. State v. Day, 150 Vt. 119, 549 A.2d 1061, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 128 (1988).

    Elements of offense.

    This section creates a strict liability crime, and no intent element should be added to the statutory language. State v. Roy, 151 Vt. 17, 557 A.2d 884, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1989).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Covell, 142 Vt. 197, 453 A.2d 1118, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 628 (1982); State v. Boyer, 144 Vt. 393, 481 A.2d 15, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 606 (1984); State v. Rice, 145 Vt. 25, 483 A.2d 248, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 545 (1984); State v. Wood, 146 Vt. 57, 498 A.2d 494, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 346 (1985); State v. Roberge, 155 Vt. 121, 582 A.2d 142, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 172 (1990).

    § 1134. Motor vehicle operator; consumption or possession of alcohol or cannabis.

    1. A person shall not consume an alcoholic beverage or cannabis while operating a motor vehicle on a public highway. As used in this subsection, the prohibition on consumption of cannabis by the operator shall extend to the operator’s consumption of secondhand cannabis smoke in the vehicle as a result of another person’s consumption of cannabis.
    2. A person operating a motor vehicle on a public highway shall not possess any open container that contains an alcoholic beverage or cannabis in the passenger area of the motor vehicle.
    3. As used in this section:
      1. “Alcoholic beverage” shall have the same meaning as “alcohol” as defined in section 1200 of this title.
      2. “Passenger area” shall mean the area designed to seat the operator and passengers while the motor vehicle is in operation and any area that is readily accessible to the operator or passengers while in their seating positions, including the glove compartment, unless the glove compartment is locked. In a motor vehicle that is not equipped with a trunk, the term shall exclude the area behind the last upright seat or any area not normally occupied by the operator or passengers.
    4. A person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $500.00. A person who possesses an open container that contains an alcoholic beverage in violation of subsection (b) of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $25.00. A person who possesses an open container that contains cannabis in violation of subsection (b) of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $200.00. A person adjudicated and assessed a civil penalty for an offense under subsection (a) of this section shall not be subject to a civil violation for the same actions under subsection (b) of this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 83 ; amended 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2001, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 23, eff. June 21, 2002; 2013, No. 76 , § 4; 2013, No. 75 , § 22f; 2013, No. 76 , § 5, eff. July 1, 2014; 2017, No. 83 , § 151; 2017, No. 86 (Adj. Sess.), § 13.

    History

    Revision note

    —2013. In subsec. (c), substituted “As used in” for “For the purposes of” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    —2020. Substituted “cannabis” for “marijuana” throughout the section in accordance with 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 32 and 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 26.

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2017. Subsec. (a): Substituted “‘alcohol”’ for “‘intoxicating liquor”’ following “meaning as” in the second sentence.

    —2013. Section heading: Inserted “or marijuana” following “alcohol”.

    Subsec. (a): Inserted “or marijuana” following “beverages”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined” preceding “not” in two places”, “adjudicated and assessed a civil penalty” for “convicted and fined” following “person” in the third sentence, and “a civil violation” for “prosecution” preceding “for” in the third sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Rewrote the section heading, added the second sentence in subsec. (a), added subsecs. (b) and (c), redesignated former subsec. (b) as present subsec. (d), and added the second and third sentences in that subsec.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “$500.00” for “$100.00”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving under the influence, see chapter 13, subchapter 13 of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    § 1134a. Motor vehicle passenger; consumption or possession of alcohol or cannabis.

    1. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a passenger in a motor vehicle shall not consume an alcoholic beverage or cannabis in the passenger area of any motor vehicle on a public highway.
    2. A passenger in a motor vehicle shall not possess any open container that contains an alcoholic beverage or cannabis in the passenger area of the motor vehicle.
    3. As used in this section:
      1. “Alcoholic beverage” shall have the same meaning as “alcohol” as defined in section 1200 of this title.
      2. “Passenger area” shall mean the area designed to seat the operator and passengers while the motor vehicle is in operation and any area that is readily accessible to the operator or passengers while in their seating positions, including the glove compartment, unless the glove compartment is locked. In a motor vehicle that is not equipped with a trunk, the term shall exclude the area behind the last upright seat or any area not normally occupied by the operator or passengers.
    4. A person, other than the operator, may possess an open container that contains an alcoholic beverage in the passenger area of a motor vehicle designed, maintained, or used primarily for the transportation of persons for compensation or in the living quarters of a motor home or trailer coach.
    5. A person who consumes an alcoholic beverage or possesses an open container that contains an alcoholic beverage in violation of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $25.00. A person who consumes cannabis or possesses an open container that contains cannabis in violation of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $200.00.

    HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 24, eff. June 21, 2002; amended 2017, No. 83 , § 152; 2017, No. 86 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (b), substituted “As used in” for “For the purposes of” to conform to V.S.A. style.

    —2020. Substituted “cannabis” for “marijuana” throughout this section in accordance with 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 32 and 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 26.

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2017. Subsec. (a): Substituted “‘alcohol”’ for “‘intoxicating liquor”’ following “meaning as” in the second sentence.

    § 1134b. Using tobacco or cannabis in a motor vehicle with child present.

    1. A person shall not possess a lighted tobacco product or use a tobacco substitute as defined in 7 V.S.A. § 1001 in a motor vehicle that is occupied by a child required to be properly restrained in a federally approved child passenger restraining system pursuant to subdivision 1258(a)(1) or (2) of this title.
    2. A person shall not use cannabis as defined in 18 V.S.A. § 4201 in a motor vehicle that is occupied by a child under 18 years of age.
      1. A person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $100.00 and no points shall be assessed. (c) (1) A person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $100.00 and no points shall be assessed.
      2. A person who violates subsection (b) of this section commits a misdemeanor crime and shall be subject to the following penalties:
        1. a fine of not more than $500.00 for a first offense;
        2. a fine of not more than $750.00 for a second offense;
        3. a fine of not more than $1,000.00 for a third or subsequent offense.
      3. A person who violates subsection (b) of this section shall be assessed two points.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 135 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; amended 2015, No. 108 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2017, No. 86 (Adj. Sess.), § 15.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subsec. (b) and the section heading, substituted “cannabis” for “marijuana” in accordance with 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 32 and 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 26.

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or use a tobacco substitute as defined in 7 V.S.A. § 1001 ” following “lighted tobacco product”.

    § 1135. Trespass by motor vehicle.

    1. A person commits the offense of trespass by motor vehicle if the person, knowing that he or she is not privileged to do so:
      1. operates a motor vehicle and obstructs a private driveway, barway, or gateway; or
      2. operates a motor vehicle and travels over a private road that is so marked, or travels over other private lands; or
      3. operates a motor vehicle on any land that is owned or held by the State:
        1. that is not a place or trail specifically designated and marked by the Secretary of Natural Resources for use by motor vehicles; or
        2. contrary to any rule governing the use of the place or trail.
    2. A person who violates this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $100.00 for each offense or, if the violation results in damage to property, the person shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $175.00 for each offense.
    3. As used in this section, “motor vehicle” does not include an all-terrain vehicle or snowmobile.
    4. This section shall not apply to any highway open to the public.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 247 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 186.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined” twice.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Entry or detainer, see 12 V.S.A. chapter 171.

    Obstruction and use of private roads and lands by motor vehicle, see 13 V.S.A. § 3705 .

    Subchapter 12. Operation of Bicycles, Electric Personal Assistive Mobility Devices, and Play Vehicles

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). 2001, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, inserted “Electric Personal Assistive Mobility Devices” in the subchapter heading.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Bicycle routes generally, see 19 V.S.A. chapter 23.

    Operation of motor-driven cycles, see §§ 1114-1117 of this title.

    § 1136. Application of subchapter; rights and obligations of bicyclists under other laws.

    1. The parent of any child and the guardian of any ward may not authorize or knowingly permit any such child or ward to violate any of the provisions of this subchapter.
    2. This subchapter applies whenever a bicycle is operated upon any highway or upon any path set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles, subject to the exceptions stated in this subchapter.
    3. Every person riding a bicycle is granted all of the rights and is subject to all of the duties applicable to operators of vehicles, except as to those provisions that:
      1. are inconsistent with provisions that specifically address the rights and duties of vulnerable users generally or bicyclists specifically; or
      2. by their very nature can have no application.
      1. Except as provided in this subsection, motor-assisted bicycles shall be governed as bicycles under Vermont law, and operators of motor-assisted bicycles shall be subject to all of the rights and duties applicable to bicyclists under Vermont law. Motor-assisted bicycles and their operators shall be exempt from motor vehicle registration and inspection and operator’s license requirements. A person shall not operate a motor-assisted bicycle on a sidewalk in Vermont. (d) (1) Except as provided in this subsection, motor-assisted bicycles shall be governed as bicycles under Vermont law, and operators of motor-assisted bicycles shall be subject to all of the rights and duties applicable to bicyclists under Vermont law. Motor-assisted bicycles and their operators shall be exempt from motor vehicle registration and inspection and operator’s license requirements. A person shall not operate a motor-assisted bicycle on a sidewalk in Vermont.
      2. A person under 16 years of age shall not operate a motor-assisted bicycle on a highway in Vermont.
      3. Nothing in this subsection shall interfere with the right of municipalities to regulate the operation and use of motor-assisted bicycles pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 2291(1) and (4), as long as the regulations do not conflict with this subsection.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 44, 57; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 13.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “the” for “those” preceding “exceptions” and “in this subchapter” for “herein” following “stated”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Added “rights and obligations of bicyclists under other laws”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “that” for “which” following “provisions”, added subdiv. (1), and added the subdiv. (2) designation.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    § 1136a. Electric bicycles.

    1. Except as provided in this subsection, electric bicycles shall be governed as bicycles under Vermont law, and operators of electric bicycles shall be subject to all of the rights and duties applicable to bicyclists under Vermont law.
    2. Electric bicycles and their operators shall be exempt from:
      1. motor vehicle registration, inspection, and certificate of title requirements under chapter 7 of this title, section 1222 of this title, and chapter 21, subchapter 2 of this title;
      2. operator’s license requirements under chapter 9, subchapter 1 of this title;
      3. financial responsibility requirements under chapter 11 of this title; and
      4. requirements applicable to all-terrain vehicles under chapter 31 of this title.
    3. An electric bicycle shall comply with the equipment and manufacturing requirements for bicycles promulgated by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, including 16 C.F.R. Part 1512 as may be amended, and may only be operated in such a way that the electric motor is disengaged or ceases to function when the operator stops pedaling or applies the brakes.
    4. A class 3 electric bicycle shall be equipped with a speedometer that displays the speed the bicycle is traveling in miles per hour.
      1. An electric bicycle may be ridden in places where bicycles are allowed, including highways, bicycle lanes, and bicycle or multiuse paths. (e) (1) An electric bicycle may be ridden in places where bicycles are allowed, including highways, bicycle lanes, and bicycle or multiuse paths.
      2. Following notice and a public hearing, a municipality, local authority, or State agency having jurisdiction over a bicycle or multiuse path may prohibit the operation of a class 1 electric bicycle or class 2 electric bicycle on that path if it finds that such a restriction is needed for safety reasons or compliance with other laws or legal obligations.
      3. A municipality, local authority, or State agency having jurisdiction over a bicycle or multiuse path may prohibit the operation of a class 3 electric bicycle on that path.
      4. This subsection shall not apply to a trail that is specifically designated as nonmotorized and that has a natural surface tread that is made by clearing and grading the native soil with no added surfacing materials. A municipality, local authority, or State agency having jurisdiction over a trail described in this subdivision may regulate the use of an electric bicycle on that trail.
    5. An individual under 16 years of age shall not operate a class 3 electric bicycle but may ride as a passenger on a class 3 electric bicycle that is designed to accommodate passengers.
    6. Subsection (g) effective January 1, 2022.

      Manufacturers and distributors of electric bicycles shall apply a label that is permanently affixed, in a prominent location, to each electric bicycle. The label shall contain the classification number, top assisted speed, and motor wattage of the electric bicycle and shall be printed in Arial font in at least 9-point type.

    7. Subsection (h) effective January 1, 2022.

      A person shall not tamper with or modify an electric bicycle so as to change the motor-powered speed capability or engagement of an electric bicycle unless the label indicating the classification required in subsection (g) of this section is replaced after modification.

    HISTORY: Added 2021, No. 40 , § 6; amended 2021, No. 40 , § 7, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsecs. (g) and (h): Added.

    Effective date of subsecs. (g) and (h). 2021, No. 40 , § 10(a) provides: “(a) Sec. 7 (electric bicycle labeling requirements; 23 V.S.A. § 1136a(g) and (h)) shall take effect on January 1, 2022.”

    § 1137. Riding on bicycles.

    1. No individual propelling a bicycle may ride other than on or astride a permanent and regular seat attached to the bicycle.
    2. No individual may use a bicycle to carry more individuals at any one time than the number for which it is designed and equipped.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 187.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “individual” for “person”, “on” for “upon”, and “to the bicycle” for “thereto”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “individual” for “person” and “individuals” for “persons”.

    § 1138. Clinging to motor vehicles.

    No person may attach himself or herself or any bicycle, wagon, roller skates, sled, or toy vehicle upon which he or she is riding or will ride to any motor vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Clinging to other vehicles; motor-driven cycle, see § 1116 of this title.

    § 1139. Riding on roadways and bicycle paths.

    1. A person operating a bicycle upon a roadway shall exercise due care when passing a standing vehicle or one proceeding in the same direction. Bicyclists generally shall ride as near to the right side of the improved area of the highway right-of-way as is safe, except that a bicyclist:
      1. Shall ride to the left or in a left lane when:
        1. preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private roadway or driveway;
        2. approaching an intersection with a right-turn lane if not turning right at the intersection; or
        3. overtaking another vulnerable user.
      2. May ride to the left or in a left lane when taking reasonably necessary precautions to avoid hazards or road conditions. Examples include objects on the road, parked or moving vehicles, pedestrians, animals, surface conditions that may impair the bicyclist’s stability, or safety hazards caused by a narrow road or steep embankment, road geometry, or unfavorable atmospheric conditions.
    2. Persons riding bicycles upon a roadway may not ride more than two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles or except as otherwise permitted by the Commissioner of Public Safety in connection with a public sporting event in which case the Commissioner shall be authorized to adopt such rules as the public good requires. Persons riding two abreast shall not impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic and, on a laned roadway, shall ride within a single lane.
    3. [Repealed.]
    4. Bicycles may be operated on the shoulders of partially controlled access highways, which are those highways where access is controlled by public authority but where there are some connections with selected public highways, some crossings at grade, and some private driveway connections. The Traffic Committee may determine that any portion of these highways is unsafe and therefore closed to bicycle operation.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1989, No. 178 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 12, 1990; 1991, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 22, eff. April 1, 1993; 1993, No. 8 , § 1; 1999, No. 18 , § 41u, eff. May 13, 1999; 2003, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 38, eff. June 9, 2004; 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 44.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Rewrote subsec. (a).

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Repealed.

    —1999. Subsec. (b): Added the last sentence.

    —1993. Subsec. (c): Inserted “state” preceding “roadway”, substituted “shall” for “may” preceding “use” and “the” for “only such” thereafter, and deleted “and may not use the roadway” following “path” at the end of the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added “or except as otherwise permitted by the commissioner of public safety in connection with a public sporting event in which case the commissioner shall be authorized to adopt such rules as the public good requires” following “use of bicycles”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Passing vulnerable users, see § 1033 of this title.

    § 1140. Carrying articles.

    No person operating a bicycle may carry any package, bundle, or article that prevents the driver from keeping at least one hand upon the handlebars.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    § 1141. Equipment on bicycles.

    1. A person shall not operate a bicycle at nighttime from one-half hour after sunset until one-half hour before sunrise unless the bicycle or the bicyclist is equipped with a lamp on the front which emits a white light visible from a distance of at least 500 feet to the front. In addition, bicyclists shall operate during these hours with either a lamp on the rear of the bicycle or bicyclist that emits a flashing or steady red light visible at least 300 feet to the rear, or with reflective, rear-facing material or reflectors, or both, with a surface area totaling at least 20 square inches on the bicycle or bicyclist and visible at least 300 feet to the rear.
    2. No person may equip a bicycle with any siren or whistle, or any device simulating a siren of an authorized emergency vehicle, nor may he or she operate a bicycle so equipped.
    3. No person may operate a bicycle unless it is equipped with a brake that will enable the operator to make the braked wheels skid on dry, level, clean pavement.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 1979, No. 22 ; 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Rewrote subsec. (a).

    —1979. Subsec. (b): Deleted the former first sentence.

    § 1141a. Electric personal assistive mobility devices (EPAMD); required equipment; operation.

    1. Equipment.   An electric personal assistive mobility device shall be equipped as follows:
      1. with front, rear, and side reflectors; and
      2. with a system that will enable the operator to bring the device to a controlled stop; and
      3. if the device is operated between one-half hour after sunset and one-half hour before sunrise, with a lamp emitting a white light that, while the device is in motion, shall illuminate the area in front of the operator.
    2. Rights and duties of operator.   The operator of an EPAMD shall have the rights and duties of pedestrians as set forth in chapter 13, subchapter 5 of this title.
    3. Hazardous materials.   No person shall carry or transport on an EPAMD any hazardous materials as defined in 5 V.S.A. § 2001 . Civil penalties imposed for violations of this subsection shall be in accordance with civil penalties imposed for violations of 5 V.S.A. § 2001 .
    4. Municipal authority.   Nothing in this section shall limit the authority of a municipality under the provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 2291(1) , (4), and (5) to regulate the use and operation of EPAMDs.

    HISTORY: Added 2001, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 188.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “Civil penalties” for “Fines” and “civil penalties” for “fines”.

    Subsec. (d): Added subsec. heading.

    § 1142. Penalties.

    A person who violates any provision of sections 1136 through 1141 and subsection 1141a(a) of this title shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $25.00 for each offense, except that a person who violates subsection 1139(b) of this title shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $100.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973; amended 2001, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 44; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 189.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined” twice.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “1141a(a)” for “1141”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Liability of parent or guardian, see § 1096 of this title.

    § 1143. Not evidence of negligence.

    A violation of any provision of sections 1136 through 1141 of this title by any person under 16 years of age is not negligence or evidence of negligence.

    HISTORY: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    Subchapter 13. Drunken Driving

    History

    Revision note—

    Deleted “Negligent and” from the beginning of the subchapter heading in light of the repeal of §§ 1181 and 1182, which related to negligent driving.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driver License Compact, see chapter 37 of this title.

    §§ 1181, 1182. Repealed. 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 20, eff. March 1, 1973.

    History

    Former §§ 1181, 1182. The subject matter of former §§ 1181 and 1182 is now covered by § 1091 of this title.

    Former § 1181, relating to negligent operation of motor vehicles, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,283; 1947, No. 202 , § 5447; P.L. § 5149; 1929, No. 69 , § 1; 1925, No. 70 , § 86; G.L. § 4697; 1917, No. 254 , § 4591; 1908, No. 101 ; P.S. § 4091; 1906, No. 113 , § 1; 1904, No. 86 , § 8; 1902, No. 64 , §§ 1, 3.

    Former § 1182, relating to penalties for negligent operation of motor vehicles, was derived from V.S. 1947, §§ 10,285, 10,286; P.L. §§ 5151, 5152; 1929, No. 69 , § 1; 1925, No. 70 , § 86; G.L. § 4698; P.S. § 4092; 1906, No. 113 , § 2.

    §§ 1183-1195. Repealed. 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    History

    Former §§ 1183-1195. The subject matter of former §§ 1183-1195 is now covered by §§ 1200-1220b of this title.

    Former § 1183, relating to fines and penalties for convictions of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,287; 1935, No. 9 (Sp. Sess.), § 1; P.L. § 5153; 1925, No. 70 , § 87; G.L. § 4696; 1917, No. 132 , §§ 7, 9; P.S. § 4090; 1906, No. 113 , § 8.

    Former § 1184, relating to furnishing a copy of blood sample analysis results to a defendant, was derived from 1957, No. 57 , § 1.

    Former § 1185, relating to revocation of license upon conviction of violation of former § 1181 of this title and conditions for reinstatement of license, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,288; 1945, No. 106 , § 1; P.L. § 5154; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 70 , § 87; G.L. § 4696; 1917, No. 132 , §§ 7, 9; P.S. § 4090; 1906, No. 113 , § 8.

    Former § 1186, relating to application for reinstatement of revoked license, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,289; 1945, No. 106 , § 2.

    Former § 1187, relating to reinstatement of licenses revoked for second and third convictions of driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,290; P.L. § 5155; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 70 , § 87.

    Former § 1187a, relating to issuance of restrictive probationary licenses when license revocation would impose extreme hardship, was derived from 1965, No. 200 .

    Former § 1188, relating to implied consent of motor vehicle operators to submit to testing to determine blood alcohol content, was derived from 1959, No. 212 , § 1.

    Former § 1189, relating to presumptions of intoxication derived from blood alcohol percentages, was derived from 1959, No. 212 , § 2 and amended by 1965, No. 50 .

    Former § 1190, relating to persons authorized to administer blood alcohol tests and admissibility of tests into evidence, was derived from 1959, No. 212 , § 3 and amended by 1963, No. 103 and 1965, No. 133 .

    Former § 1191, relating to refusal to submit to blood alcohol content testing, was derived from 1959, No. 212 , § 4 and amended by 1967, No. 362 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Former § 1192, relating to reports of chemical test results, was derived from 1959, No. 212 , § 5 and amended by 1967, No. 35 .

    Former § 1193, relating to the opportunity of persons to have additional chemical tests, was derived from 1959, No. 212 , § 6.

    Former § 1194, relating to the option to have and procedure for conduct of urine or breath tests, was derived from 1959, No. 212 , § 7 and amended by 1967, No. 362 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    Former § 1195, relating to penalties for driving under the influence of substances other than liquor or drugs, was derived from 1966, No. 38 (Sp. Sess.), § 3.

    § 1200. Definitions.

    As used in this subchapter:

    1. “Alcohol concentration” means
      1. the number of grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or
      2. the number of grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
    2. “Drug” means:
      1. a regulated drug as defined in 18 V.S.A. § 4201 ;  or
      2. any substance or combination of substances, other than alcohol, that affects the nervous system, brain, or muscles of a person so as to impair, noticeably and appreciably, a person’s ability to drive a vehicle safely.
    3. Subdivision (3) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subdivision (3) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      “Evidentiary test” means a breath or blood test that indicates the person’s alcohol concentration or the presence of other drug and that is intended to be introduced as evidence.

      (3)

      Subdivision (3) effective January 1, 2022; see also subdivision (3) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

      “Evidentiary test” means a breath, saliva, or blood test that indicates the person’s alcohol concentration or the presence of other drug and that is intended to be introduced as evidence.

    4. “Alcohol” includes alcohol, malt beverages, spirits, fortified wines, and vinous beverages, as defined in 7 V.S.A. § 2 , and any beverage or liquid containing any of them.
    5. “Law enforcement officer” means a law enforcement officer who has been certified by the Vermont Criminal Justice Council pursuant to 20 V.S.A. § 2358 .
    6. “Vehicle” means a motor vehicle as defined in section 4 of this title and, when on a public highway:
      1. a snowmobile as defined in section 3201 of this title; and
      2. an all-terrain vehicle as defined in section 3501 of this title.
    7. “Highway” has the same meaning as in subdivision 4(13) of this title, except that for purposes of this subchapter, “highway” does not include the driveway that serves only a single-family or two-family residence of the operator. This exception shall not apply if a person causes the death of a person, causes bodily injury to a person, or causes damage to the personal property of another person, while operating a motor vehicle on a driveway in violation of section 1201 of this subchapter.
    8. “Ignition interlock device” means a device that is capable of measuring a person’s alcohol concentration and that prevents a motor vehicle from being started by a person whose alcohol concentration is 0.02 or greater.
      1. “Ignition interlock restricted driver’s license” or “ignition interlock RDL” or “RDL” means a restricted license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle issued by the Commissioner allowing a resident whose license or privilege to operate has been suspended or revoked for operating under the influence of alcohol or in excess of legal limits of alcohol concentration, or for refusing an enforcement officer’s reasonable request for an evidentiary test, to operate a motor vehicle, other than a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 4103 of this title, installed with an approved ignition interlock device. (9) (A) “Ignition interlock restricted driver’s license” or “ignition interlock RDL” or “RDL” means a restricted license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle issued by the Commissioner allowing a resident whose license or privilege to operate has been suspended or revoked for operating under the influence of alcohol or in excess of legal limits of alcohol concentration, or for refusing an enforcement officer’s reasonable request for an evidentiary test, to operate a motor vehicle, other than a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 4103 of this title, installed with an approved ignition interlock device.
      2. “Ignition interlock certificate” means a restricted privilege to operate a motor vehicle issued by the Commissioner allowing a nonresident whose privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Vermont has been suspended or revoked for operating under the influence of alcohol or in excess of legal limits of alcohol concentration, or for refusing an enforcement officer’s reasonable request for an evidentiary test, to operate a motor vehicle, other than a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 4103 of this title, installed with an approved ignition interlock device.
    9. “Random retest” means a test of a vehicle operator’s blood alcohol concentration, other than a test required to start the vehicle, that is required at random intervals during operation of a vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 68 , § 1, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; amended, 1991, No. 55 , § 1; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 10, 11; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. April 29, 1998; 1999, No. 20 , § 1; 2007, No. 170 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. July 1, 2011; 2011, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 45; 2017, No. 83 , § 153; 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 21, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subdiv. (5), substituted “Vermont Criminal Justice Council” for “Criminal Justice Training Council” to correct the name of the Council and in accordance with 2019, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 2(b).

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (3): Added “, saliva,” following “breath”.

    —2017. Subdiv. (4): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (7): Substituted “has the same meaning” for “shall be defined” preceding “as in” in the first sentence.

    Subdivs. (9)(A) and (9)(B): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “influence of”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (9): Designated the existing provisions of the subdiv. as subdiv. (A) and substituted “resident” for “person” and inserted “, or for refusing an enforcement officer’s reasonable request for an evidentiary test,” following “alcohol concentration” in that subdiv. and added subdiv. (B).

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (10): Added.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdivs. (8) and (9): Added.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (2): Added the subdiv. (A) designation and added subdiv. (B).

    —1999. Subdiv. (6): Added subdiv. (A) and (B) designations.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (3): Inserted “or the presence of other drug”.

    Subdiv. (6): Substituted “when on a public highway” for “also means” and “and an all-terrain vehicle as defined in section 3501 of this title” for “when on a public highway”.

    Subdiv. (7): Added.

    —1991. Subdiv. (3): Substituted “person’s alcohol concentration” for “weight of alcohol in a person’s blood, as shown by analysis of the person’s breath or blood” following “indicates the”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    Defendant refused to submit to an “evidentiary test” within meaning of implied consent statute, notwithstanding fact that Department of Health had not yet promulgated regulations governing use of infrared testing device for which defendant refused to provide a sample. State v. King, 160 Vt. 612, 624 A.2d 1144, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 28 (1993) (mem.).

    Although the DataMaster breathalizer test has not been tested pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1200(3) , its trustworthiness as an evidentiary test may be determined using V.R.E. 104(a), and the lower court’s refusal to admit any evidence concerning the DataMaster Process and results was erroneous. State v. Brooks, 162 Vt. 26, 643 A.2d 226, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 184 (1993).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 591 A.2d 53, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1991); State v. O'Brien, 158 Vt. 275, 609 A.2d 981, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 52 (1992).

    § 1201. Section 1201 effective until January 1, 2022; see also section 1201 effective January 1, 2022 set out below. Operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol or other substance; criminal refusal; enhanced penalty for BAC of 0.16 or more.

    1. A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway:
      1. when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.08 or more, or 0.02 or more if the person is operating a vehicle when the operation requires an operator’s license with a school bus endorsement; or
      2. when the person is under the influence of alcohol; or
      3. when the person is under the influence of any other drug or under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug; or
      4. when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.04 or more if the person is operating a commercial motor vehicle as defined in subdivision 4103(4) of this title.
    2. A person who has previously been convicted of a violation of this section shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway and refuse a law enforcement officer’s reasonable request under the circumstances for an evidentiary test where the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was in violation of subsection (a) of this section.
    3. A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway and be involved in a crash or collision resulting in serious bodily injury or death to another and refuse a law enforcement officer’s reasonable request under the circumstances for an evidentiary test where the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person has any amount of alcohol in the system.
      1. A person who is convicted of a second or subsequent violation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section when the person’s alcohol concentration is proven to be 0.16 or more shall not, for three years from the date of the conviction for which the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.16 or more, operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more. The prohibition imposed by this subsection shall be in addition to any other penalties imposed by law. (d) (1) A person who is convicted of a second or subsequent violation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section when the person’s alcohol concentration is proven to be 0.16 or more shall not, for three years from the date of the conviction for which the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.16 or more, operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more. The prohibition imposed by this subsection shall be in addition to any other penalties imposed by law.
      2. A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more if the person has previously been convicted of a second or subsequent violation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section within the preceding three years and the person’s alcohol concentration for the second or subsequent violation was proven to be 0.16 or greater. A violation of this subsection shall be considered a third or subsequent violation of this section and shall be subject to the penalties of subsection 1210(d) of this title.
    4. The fact that a person charged with a violation of this section is or has been entitled to use a drug under the laws of this State shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this section.
    5. A person may not be convicted of more than one violation of subsection (a) of this section arising out of the same incident.
    6. For purposes of this section and section 1205 of this title, the defendant may assert as an affirmative defense that the person was not operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of the vehicle because the person:
      1. had no intention of placing the vehicle in motion; and
      2. had not placed the vehicle in motion while under the influence.
    7. As used in subdivision (a)(3) of this section, “under the influence of a drug” means that a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle safely is diminished or impaired in the slightest degree. This subsection shall not be construed to affect the meaning of the term “under the influence of alcohol.”

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1973, No. 16 , § 1, eff. March 1, 1973; 1973, No. 79 , § 1, eff. May 23, 1973; 1975, No. 10 , § 2, eff. April 9, 1975; 1981, No. 103 , §§ 2, 2a; 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1989, No. 68 , § 2, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; 1991, No. 55 , § 2; 1997, No. 56 , § 1, eff. Aug. 1, 1997; 1999, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; 2001, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2005, No. 37 , § 1; 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2011, No. 56 , § 3; 2013, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 3, 2014; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4); 2019, No. 59 , § 27; 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 22, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “a crash” for “an accident” in subsec. (c) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    § 1201. Section 1201 effective January 1, 2022; see also section 1201 effective until January 1, 2022 set out above. Operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol or other substance; criminal refusal; enhanced penalty for BAC of 0.16 or more.

    1. A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway:
      1. when the person’s alcohol concentration is:
        1. 0.08 or more; or
        2. 0.02 or more if the person is operating a school bus as defined in subdivision 4(34) of this title; or
        3. 0.04 or more if the person is operating a commercial vehicle as defined in subdivision 4103(4) of this title; or
      2. when the person is under the influence of alcohol; or
      3. when the person is under the influence of any other drug or under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug.
    2. A person who has previously been convicted of a violation of this section shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway and refuse a law enforcement officer’s reasonable request under the circumstances for an evidentiary test where the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was in violation of subsection (a) of this section.
    3. A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway and be involved in a crash or collision resulting in serious bodily injury or death to another and refuse a law enforcement officer’s reasonable request under the circumstances for an evidentiary test where the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person has any amount of alcohol or drugs in his or her system.
      1. A person who is convicted of a second or subsequent violation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section when the person’s alcohol concentration is proven to be 0.16 or more shall not, for three years from the date of the conviction for which the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.16 or more, operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more. The prohibition imposed by this subsection shall be in addition to any other penalties imposed by law. (d) (1) A person who is convicted of a second or subsequent violation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section when the person’s alcohol concentration is proven to be 0.16 or more shall not, for three years from the date of the conviction for which the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.16 or more, operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more. The prohibition imposed by this subsection shall be in addition to any other penalties imposed by law.
      2. A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more if the person has previously been convicted of a second or subsequent violation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section within the preceding three years and the person’s alcohol concentration for the second or subsequent violation was proven to be 0.16 or greater. A violation of this subsection shall be considered a third or subsequent violation of this section and shall be subject to the penalties of subsection 1210(d) of this title.
    4. The fact that a person charged with a violation of this section is or has been entitled to use a drug under the laws of this State shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this section.
    5. A person may not be convicted of more than one violation of subsection (a) of this section arising out of the same incident.
    6. For purposes of this section and section 1205 of this title, the defendant may assert as an affirmative defense that the person was not operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of the vehicle because the person:
      1. had no intention of placing the vehicle in motion; and
      2. had not placed the vehicle in motion while under the influence.
    7. As used in subdivision (a)(3) of this section, “under the influence of a drug” means that a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle safely is diminished or impaired in the slightest degree. This subsection shall not be construed to affect the meaning of the term “under the influence of alcohol.”
    8. Evidence of the results of a standardized field sobriety test conducted by a law enforcement officer trained in Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement or a certified Drug Recognition Expert’s systematic evaluation of observable signs and symptoms of a person charged with a violation of this section shall be presumptively admissible at trial to demonstrate whether or not the person was operating under the influence in violation of this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1973, No. 16 , § 1, eff. March 1, 1973; 1973, No. 79 , § 1, eff. May 23, 1973; 1975, No. 10 , § 2, eff. April 9, 1975; 1981, No. 103 , §§ 2, 2a; 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1989, No. 68 , § 2, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; 1991, No. 55 , § 2; 1997, No. 56 , § 1, eff. Aug. 1, 1997; 1999, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; 2001, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2005, No. 37 , § 1; 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2011, No. 56 , § 3; 2013, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 3, 2014; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4); 2019, No. 59 , § 27; 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 22, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.

    History

    Revision note

    —2005. Redesignated subdiv. (a)(2), as added by 2005, No. 37 , § 1, as subdiv. (a)(4) to retain the numerical designations of the existing subdivs. (a)(1)-(a)(3).

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Added subdiv. designations (A) and (B) and added subdiv. (C).

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Deleted.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “or drugs” following “alcohol” and substituted “his or her” for “the” preceding “system”.

    Subsec. (i): Added.

    —2019. Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “vehicle when the operation requires an operator’s license with a school bus endorsement” for “school bus as defined in subdivision 4(34) of this title”.

    —2017. Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” in the section heading and in subdiv. (a)(2) and in subsec. (h).

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(3): Deleted “to a degree which renders the person incapable of driving safely” following “and any other drug”.

    Subsec. (h): Added.

    —2011. Amended section heading; added subdivs. (d)(1) and (2) and redesignated former subsecs. (d)-(f) as present subsecs. (e)-(g).

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Substituted “violation of subsection (a) of” for “offense under” preceding “this section”.

    —2005. Subsec. (a): Added subdiv. (2) and redesignated former subdivs. (2) and (3) as present subdivs. (3) and (4).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (f): Amended generally.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Act No. 116 added “or 0.02 or more if the person is operating a school bus as defined in subdivision 4(34) of this title” following “0.08 or more”.

    Subsec. (f): Added by Act No. 160.

    —1997. Added “criminal refusal” following “substance” in the section heading, added present subsecs. (b) and (c), and redesignated former subsecs. (b) and (c), as present subsecs. (d) and (e).

    —1991. Subsec. (a): Deleted “while” following “highway” in the introductory paragraph, rewrote subdiv. (1), and inserted “when the person is ” preceding “under” in subdivs. (2) and (3).

    —1989. Added “or other substance” following “liquor” in the section heading, substituted “the” for “his” following “alcohol in” and “the person’s” for “his” preceding “breath” in subdiv. (a)(1) and “the person” for “him” preceding “incapable” in subdiv. (a)(3), rewrote subsecs. (b) and (c), and repealed subsecs. (d) through (f).

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “3201 of this title” for “801 of Title 31” preceding “when on a public”.

    —1981. Subsec. (a): Deleted the former second sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Added.

    —1975. Subsec. (e): Reenacted without change.

    —1973. Subsec. (a): Amended generally by Act No. 79.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 16 substituted “(20)” for “(15)” preceding “of section 4 of” and “this title” for “Title 23” thereafter.

    Act No. 79 deleted “subparagraph (20) of” preceding “section (4)”.

    Legislative intent. 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 provides: “It is the intent of the General Assembly in this act [which amended this section] to address, among other issues, the Vermont Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124, and State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96. In LaBounty, the Court held that if more than one person was injured, an offender could be charged with only one count of grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle with injury resulting. Similarly, the Court held in Martin that if more than one person was killed, an offender could be charged with only one count of boating while intoxicated with death resulting. In this act, the General Assembly responds to Martin and LaBounty by amending several motor vehicle statutes to permit an offender to be charged with a separate count of violating the statute for each person who was killed or injured as a result of the offense.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Civil action for damages from unlawful sale of alcoholic beverages, see 7 V.S.A. § 501 .

    Commercial driver’s license disqualification or suspension, see §§ 4116 and 4116a of this title.

    Consumption or possession of alcoholic beverages or cannabis in a motor vehicle, see §§ 1134-1134b of this title.

    Forfeiture and condemnation of seized vehicle or craft, see 7 V.S.A. § 570 .

    Operating a motorboat under the influence of drugs or alcohol, see §§ 3311, 3323, and 3323a of this title.

    Operating a snowmobile under the influence of drugs or alcohol, see §§ 3206 and 3207f of this title.

    Operating an all-terrain vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol, see § 3506 of this title.

    Permitting unlicensed or impaired individual to operate, see § 1130 of this title.

    Proof of financial responsibility required, see § 801 of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    Sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to individuals under 21 years of age, see 7 V.S.A. § 658 .

    Constitutionality.

    —Constitutionality.

    Actual physical control of vehicle.

    Advance notice.

    Aiding in commission of DUI.

    Argument of counsel.

    Arrest.

    Behavior.

    Blood alcohol content tests.

    Burden of proof.

    —Admissibility.

    Chain of custody.

    Charges.

    Circumstantial.

    Criteria for determining reasonableness.

    Defenses.

    Degree of influence.

    Expert testimony.

    Field sobriety tests.

    History.

    Judicial notice.

    Juror prejudice.

    Jury instructions.

    Multiple convictions.

    New trial.

    Operating guidelines.

    Operation of vehicle.

    Opinions.

    Place of operation.

    Prior convictions.

    Purpose.

    Reasonable grounds to believe defendant is under influence.

    Reasonable request for evidentiary test.

    Reasonable suspicion.

    Relevance.

    Sufficiency.

    Symptoms of intoxication.

    Time of operation.

    Vehicle.

    Voluntariness of submission to tests.

    Constitutionality.

    The meaning of subsec. (a) of this section, which prohibits a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor from being “in actual physical control” of a vehicle, is not vague or uncertain within the constitutional strictures of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since its language is sufficient to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden. State v. Trucott, 145 Vt. 274, 487 A.2d 149, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 588 (1984).

    This section’s provision that “a person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor” is not unclear and meets the constitutional standard of a criminal statute, namely, that it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden. State v. Stevens, 137 Vt. 473, 408 A.2d 622, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1071 (1979).

    —Constitutionality.

    Roadblocks to screen intoxicated drivers constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    A warrantless seizure at a roadblock to screen intoxicated drivers is not per se illegal. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    Police officers conducting a roadblock to screen intoxicated drivers do not necessarily have to have a warrant, probable cause, or even a reasonable, articulable, individualized suspicion of illegal activity in order to stop a motorist on the public highway. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    The constitutionality of a roadblock to screen intoxicated drivers will depend upon the reasonableness of the seizure, determined by weighing the public interest in the seizure against the degree of intrusion into personal privacy occasioned by the particular roadblock. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    As a general rule, a roadblock to screen intoxicated drivers will pass constitutional muster if: (1) the initial stop and the contact between the officers in the field and the motorist involves an explanation of the nature of the roadblock and minimal detention of a nonimpaired driver; (2) the discretion of the officers in the field, as to the method to be utilized in selecting vehicles to be stopped, is carefully circumscribed by clear objective guidelines established by a high level administrative official; (3) the guidelines are followed in the operation of the roadblock; (4) approaching drivers are given adequate warning that there is a roadblock ahead; (5) the likelihood of apprehension, fear, or surprise is dispelled by a visible display of legitimate police authority at the roadblock; and (6) vehicles are stopped on a systematic nonrandom basis that shows drivers they are not being singled out for arbitrary reasons. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    Actual physical control of vehicle.

    Defendant who inserted key in ignition in order to roll up windows was in “actual physical control” of vehicle, and fact that he intended to leave his car parked on street and ride with friend was irrelevant. State v. Kelton, 168 Vt. 629, 724 A.2d 452, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 398 (1998) (mem.).

    The fact that a vehicle’s occupant may have been asleep or otherwise unconscious does not prevent a finding of actual physical control within the meaning of this section. State v. Blaine, 148 Vt. 272, 531 A.2d 933, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 483 (1987).

    For purposes of determining whether defendant has “actual physical control” of a vehicle, it is not a necessary element of the offense that defendant be apprehended inside the vehicle and behind the steering wheel. State v. Stevens, 154 Vt. 614, 580 A.2d 493, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 116 (1990).

    In trial for being in control of motor vehicle on highway while under the influence, jury instruction stating that the State was required to prove defendant had the potential to operate vehicle was adequate; jury charge requiring State to prove defendant had immediate potential to operate vehicle was not required. State v. Stevens, 154 Vt. 614, 580 A.2d 493, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 116 (1990).

    Defendant who was apprehended on an exit ramp of an interstate highway, kicking snow from under the wheels of a vehicle whose motor was running and which was straddling a snow bank and who responded in the negative to officer’s inquiry as to whether there was anyone else with defendant had “actual physical control” of the vehicle for purposes of this section. State v. Stevens, 154 Vt. 614, 580 A.2d 493, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 116 (1990).

    In trial for being in control of motor vehicle on highway while under the influence, jury instruction stating that defendant could not be in “actual physical control” of vehicle if vehicle were inoperable was not required where officer who called wrecker to remove vehicle from snow bank did not attempt to move the vehicle nor did he testify at trial that the vehicle was inoperable. State v. Stevens, 154 Vt. 614, 580 A.2d 493, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 116 (1990).

    Conviction of being in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor under this subdivision does not require a demonstration by the State that defendant’s vehicle was fully operable. State v. Garber, 156 Vt. 637, 587 A.2d 404, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1991) (mem.).

    Where at defendant’s trial for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor a police officer who had found defendant asleep behind the steering wheel of a vehicle parked at the side of a road testifies that he was able to awaken defendant, defendant then removed the key from the ignition and immediately reinserted it, defendant looked for, and eventually found, his operator’s license, seconds later, defendant walked from his own vehicle to the police cruiser, and his speech, although slurred, was coherent and made sense, this evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant had the immediate potential to operate the vehicle and, therefore, was in actual physical control of it. State v. Trucott, 145 Vt. 274, 487 A.2d 149, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 588 (1984).

    Defendant was in “actual physical control” of a motor vehicle within meaning of this section where he was found by police with his auto in the highway and blocking one lane at 3:30 a.m., the motor was running and the taillights on, the key was in the ignition and the shift lever in “park,” defendant was slumped behind the wheel either sleeping or unconscious and was roused with some effort, although there was no evidence he was touching any mechanism by which the vehicle could be controlled. State v. Godfrey, 137 Vt. 159, 400 A.2d 1026, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 941 (1979).

    Advance notice.

    Advance notice of the exact location is not an absolute necessity for roadblocks to screen intoxicated drivers, since publishing the exact spot of the checkpoint would lessen the deterrent effect. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    Aiding in commission of DUI.

    A person who aids in the commission of the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol may be held criminally liable for the acts of the principal. State v. Millette, 173 Vt. 596, 795 A.2d 1182, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 15 (2002) (mem.).

    Argument of counsel.

    At trial for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, prosecutor’s statement, in closing arguments, that officer was specifically trained to detect the symptoms of intoxication which he testified he observed, even if amounting to impermissible argument based on facts not in evidence, did not constitute reversible error. State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 582 A.2d 119, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 169 (1990).

    Arrest.

    No reasonable officer could have found arguable probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to arrest a driver for a violation of this section solely based on the video and audio of the field sobriety tests (FST) as the two clues in the FST were minimal, the driver’s performance was otherwise satisfactory, and all remaining evidence tending to show probable cause was disputed; the arrest was the officer’s first DUI arrest and he was motivated to arrest the driver to complete his field training, and the jury could conclude that he unreasonably exaggerated the minimal flaws in the driver’s performance on the FST and determine that there was no probable cause for the driver’s arrest upon which to base qualified immunity for the officer. Sakoc v. Carlson, 656 Fed. Appx. 573, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15537 (2d Cir. 2016).

    Any error by the trial court in finding that probable cause existed for defendant’s arrest existed before a preliminary breath test was administered was harmless. Considering defendant’s poor performance in field sobriety exercises, there was no question that a trooper had probable cause to arrest after the administration of the field-sobriety tests; thus, the trial court’s statement that probable cause also existed earlier during the encounter between the trooper and defendant did not change the outcome—either way, the trooper had probable cause to make the arrest when he did. State v. McGuigan, 2008 VT 111, 184 Vt. 441, 965 A.2d 511, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2008).

    Because defendant was not under arrest for a violation of this section when he was detained by customs inspector for secondary inspection at border crossing, there was no violation of the requirement that the inspector have prior certification giving him the power of arrest, and, therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence secured pertinent to his subsequent arrest at the port of entry by a State Police officer. State v. Lawrence, 2003 VT 68, 175 Vt. 600, 834 A.2d 10, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 149 (2003) (mem.).

    To arrest, without a warrant, for public intoxication, the additional element of disturbing the public or domestic peace and tranquility must be present; and where the facts and law in evidence did not warrant such a conclusion, court would not rule that police officers who saw apparently intoxicated individual had the authority and duty to prevent him from entering and operating automobile, so that it could not be said that State was estopped from prosecuting the individual for driving while intoxicated. State v. Adams, 131 Vt. 413, 306 A.2d 92, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 325 (1973).

    There was no entrapment where police officers, who saw apparently intoxicated person, stopped their cruiser to observe him because they suspected he was about to enter and operate an automobile, and arrested him when he confirmed their suspicion. State v. Adams, 131 Vt. 413, 306 A.2d 92, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 325 (1973).

    Behavior.

    Except in cases where the evidence deals solely with the chemical level of alcohol, a violation of this section is established by observable behavior indicating a loss of full control over the faculties of mind and body, and with this a witnessed fact, the measure of that loss is not material. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Observable behavior indicating a loss of full control over the faculties of mind and body is required to support a claim of “under the influence.” State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Phrase “to a degree which renders him incapable of driving safely” in subdiv. (a)(3) of this section, prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by a person under the influence of a drug or of alcohol and another drug, does not modify the phrase “under the influence” in subdiv. (a)(2), prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor; the latter requires observable behavior indicating a loss of full control but does not require a measure of that loss. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Blood alcohol content tests.

    Although the trial court in a driving-under-the-influence case had good reasons for questioning the validity of the State’s retrograde extrapolation analysis based on the lack of evidence about defendant’s eating and drinking patterns, the trial court’s concerns related to the proper weight to be afforded the evidence, not whether the evidence was admissible in the first place. The trial court specifically weighed one expert against another rather than engaging in a more limited Daubert analysis. State v. Burgess, 2010 VT 64, 188 Vt. 235, 5 A.3d 911, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 59 (2010).

    Single test result on defendant’s blood-alcohol content, accompanied in case by other indicia of reliability, was sufficient to convict for driving under the influence of alcohol. State v. McGovern, 164 Vt. 67, 664 A.2d 275, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 65 (1995).

    Where State’s chemist provided a reasonable explanation that leakage was responsible for the 0.000 percent result following blood-alcohol test on one of defendant’s breath samples and chemist also testified that both samples were analyzed in compliance with the Department of Health’s rules, there was no reason to believe that the 0.168 percent result (following test of second sample) was unreliable. State v. McGovern, 164 Vt. 67, 664 A.2d 275, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 65 (1995).

    The State may use evidence derived from defendant’s breath test results to demonstrate that defendant had, in fact, consumed intoxicating liquor and, as a result of this consumption, could reasonably be found to have been driving while under the influence, even though it may be foreclosed from utilizing the actual numerical result of the test because of a failure to relate the result back to the time of operation. State v. Bushey, 149 Vt. 378, 543 A.2d 1327, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 25 (1988).

    Breath test results that are not related back to the time of operation of a motor vehicle are relevant at a trial for violating subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, and evidence that the results show the defendant did consume intoxicating liquor is admissible because the probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v. Zantanos, 150 Vt. 648, 552 A.2d 387, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1988) (mem.).

    At trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, it was not clearly erroneous for trial court to require defendant to answer question as to whether he had any explanation for why the analysis of his breath indicated that he had more than the one double cocktail he had admitted drinking, since the fact in issue was whether the breath test was correct, defendant’s answer was based upon his own perception, and defendant was not required to be an expert to give an answer. State v. Lettieri, 149 Vt. 340, 543 A.2d 683, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 28 (1988).

    Where results of a breath test showed that defendant consumed intoxicating liquor, failure of the State to exclude the possibility that the consumption occurred after operation of the motor vehicle went to the weight of the test result evidence not its admissibility. State v. Zantanos, 150 Vt. 648, 552 A.2d 387, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1988) (mem.).

    At trial for driving under influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, State chemist’s failure to relate defendant’s blood alcohol content back to time of operation of vehicle was not error, where trial was not by jury, trial judge’s order stated that no inference of blood alcohol content at time of operation could be drawn, and evidence was used by trial judge to corroborate officer’s observation of symptoms. State v. Dupree, 151 Vt. 644, 559 A.2d 693, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1989) (mem.).

    Where results of a breach test showed that defendant consumed intoxicating liquor, failure of the State to exclude the possibility that the consumption occurred after operation of the motor vehicle went to the weight of the test result evidence, not its admissibility. State v. Zantanos, 150 Vt. 648, 552 A.2d 387, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1988) (mem.).

    At trial for driving under influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, State chemist’s failure to relate defendant’s blood alcohol content back to time of operation of vehicle was not error, where trial was not by jury, trial judge’s order stated that no inference of blood alcohol content at time of operation could be drawn, and evidence was used by trial judge to corroborate officer’s observation of symptoms. State v. Dupree, 151 Vt. 644, 559 A.2d 693, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1989) (mem.).

    If the State does not introduce evidence relating the result of a blood alcohol content test back to the time of operation, it may not utilize the actual numerical result of the test. State v. McQuillen, 147 Vt. 386, 518 A.2d 25, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 428 (1986).

    Evidence that a blood alcohol content test demonstrates that the defendant did, in fact, consume intoxicating liquor may be introduced even though the State does not introduce evidence relating the test result back to the time of operation. State v. McQuillen, 147 Vt. 386, 518 A.2d 25, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 428 (1986).

    Proof of an offense under subdiv. (a)(1) of this section requires the prosecution to produce evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol content, and to relate that content back to the time of the operation of the automobile. State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252, 499 A.2d 787, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 367 (1985).

    In a prosecution under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, the numerical result of a blood alcohol content test should be excluded unless it is related back to the time of operation and used pursuant to the permissive presumption of intoxication established under section 1204(a)(3) of this title. State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252, 499 A.2d 787, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 367 (1985).

    In a prosecution under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, evidence of the results of a blood alcohol content test, even though not related back, is admissible to establish the fact that the defendant had consumed some amount of intoxicating liquor before being stopped. State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252, 499 A.2d 787, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 367 (1985).

    At a trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the decision to admit or reject relevant breath test evidence involves a balancing of probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, and rests within the court’s discretion; such decision will only be reversed if it is shown that the judge totally withheld that discretion or exercised it on clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds. State v. Comstock, 145 Vt. 503, 494 A.2d 135, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 323 (1985).

    In a case involving a charge of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while there is .10 percent or more by weight alcohol in an individual’s blood, expert testimony relating the blood-alcohol test results back to the time of operation is indispensable to the prosecution’s case. State v. Carter, 142 Vt. 588, 458 A.2d 1112, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 438 (1983).

    In prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, blood-alcohol tests results are admissible absent expert testimony relating back the results to the time of operation if such results are otherwise relevant. State v. Carter, 142 Vt. 588, 458 A.2d 1112, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 438 (1983).

    In the case of defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, where the State produced scientific evidence indicating traces of alcohol in defendant’s blood forty-five minutes after her initial stop, since she had not had anything to drink between the time of her initial stop and subsequent testing, the test results were relevant to establish the fact that defendant had consumed some amount of intoxicating liquor before being stopped, and since the State’s decision not to relate back the test results to the time of operation did not result in prejudice to defendant, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence. State v. Carter, 142 Vt. 588, 458 A.2d 1112, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 438 (1983).

    The offense of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while there is .10 percent or more by weight alcohol in the blood is complete upon driving with the requisite alcohol content in the blood; a blood or breath test is not an element of the crime but a required element of the proof. State v. Rollins, 141 Vt. 105, 444 A.2d 884, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 480 (1982).

    In prosecution of defendant for operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while there was .10 percent or more by weight alcohol in his blood, the trial court did not err in permitting the arresting officer to testify on the defendant’s condition at the time of arrest since the prosecution had to establish that the .10 percent level existed at the time of operation, and it was incumbent upon the prosecution to relate back the .24 percent level of the breath test taken at 9:14 p.m. to 7:45 p.m., the last time of operation; thus, any evidence relevant to whether the 9:14 p.m. reading accurately reflected the defendant’s blood alcohol level at 7:45 was not only admissible, but indispensable to the prosecution’s case. State v. Rollins, 141 Vt. 105, 444 A.2d 884, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 480 (1982).

    In prosecution of defendant for operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while there was .10 percent or more by weight alcohol in his blood, the trial court did not err in permitting the arresting officer to testify on the defendant’s condition at the time of arrest where the defendant’s physical condition at the time of arrest was logically relevant, as it directly supported the accuracy and timeliness of the chemical test administered at 9:14 p.m., the arrest having occurred at 7:45 p.m., and where the evidence tended to show that the alcohol level was elevated at the time of operation, not just at the time of the test. State v. Rollins, 141 Vt. 105, 444 A.2d 884, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 480 (1982).

    Burden of proof.

    Subsec. (f) of this section provides an affirmative defense that excuses the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated under certain factual circumstances. Because the subsection specifies that it provides an affirmative defense, defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case on the statutory elements. State v. Leopold, 2005 VT 94, 179 Vt. 558, 889 A.2d 707, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 234 (2005).

    At trial for driving while intoxicated, where there were no concessions made by defendant’s counsel of any elements of the offense, it was incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all three elements of the crime: (1) operation of a motor vehicle; (2) on a public highway; (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Noyes, 147 Vt. 426, 519 A.2d 1152, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 438 (1986).

    To obtain a conviction under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section the State must prove three elements: that the accused (1) was the operator of a motor vehicle; (2) was operating the motor vehicle on a public highway; and (3) was operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of operation. State v. Broe, 146 Vt. 135, 498 A.2d 1039, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 337 (1985).

    —Admissibility.

    Suppression of defendant’s statements about his alcohol consumption had no bearing on the outcome of his case because other evidence, including the result of a preliminary breath test and a trooper’s observations, was sufficient to support the trooper’s decision to arrest defendant for driving under the influence. Thus, any potential error under the Fifth Amendment and the Vermont Constitution was harmless. State v. McGuigan, 2008 VT 111, 184 Vt. 441, 965 A.2d 511, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2008).

    When at a criminal trial for driving under the influence, a defendant objects to the admission of testimony a defendant has given at his or her civil suspension merits hearing, the defendant must meet the initial burden of producing evidence that the testimony was in fact provided by the defendant at the civil suspension hearing. Once this is established, if the evidence is to be admitted, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony was not provided by the defendant at his or her civil suspension hearing. State v. Neumann, 2007 VT 123, 183 Vt. 1, 944 A.2d 228, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 252 (2007).

    When a driving-under-the-influence defendant objects to the admission of evidence which the defendant contends is the fruit of his or her civil suspension testimony, the defendant must meet the burden of producing evidence of a relationship between the defendant’s civil suspension hearing testimony and the alleged derivative evidence to which the defendant has objected. Once this prima facie showing has been made, the objection must be sustained unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence the lack of any impermissible relationship between the testimony at the suspension hearing and the evidence offered in the criminal proceeding, and that the evidence offered in the criminal proceeding has a source independent of the suspension hearing testimony; to facilitate this procedure, the defendant should timely file a motion in limine to identify for the court any such issue about which the defendant is aware sufficiently in advance of trial so as to avoid unnecessary delay in the criminal proceeding. State v. Neumann, 2007 VT 123, 183 Vt. 1, 944 A.2d 228, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 252 (2007).

    When defendant at his trial for driving under the influence of alcohol had failed to make any claim regarding the specific use, either direct or derived, of immunized testimony derived from his civil suspension hearing, there was no reason to reverse his conviction. The trial court took appropriate steps to ensure that defendant enjoyed the full extent of this immunity, and defendant had not alleged any actual use of immunized testimony, which was all that the civil suspension immunity statute prohibited. State v. Neumann, 2007 VT 123, 183 Vt. 1, 944 A.2d 228, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 252 (2007).

    The State is entitled to use evidence of defendants’ refusals in a prosecution for criminal refusal without violating the general Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Morale, 174 Vt. 213, 811 A.2d 185, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 242 (2002).

    In prosecutions for criminal refusal, Miranda’s protections did not apply to evidence of defendants’ refusal to submit to breath tests, and thus their rights were not violated. State v. Morale, 174 Vt. 213, 811 A.2d 185, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 242 (2002).

    In a prosecution for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from questioning the State’s expert on the variability of partition ratios; that is, the potential variability among different persons at different times in the conversion rate between their breath-alcohol and blood-alcohol concentration. State v. Hanks, 172 Vt. 93, 772 A.2d 1087, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 10 (2001).

    Because defendant was charged with driving while under the influence in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, rather than driving with an alcohol concentration exceeding the statutory limit, admitting scientifically accepted evidence concerning the variability of partition ratios would not negate a statutory offense or even an element of a statutory offense; rather, it would merely allow defendant to challenge the permissive inference and the State’s charge that he was impaired. State v. Hanks, 172 Vt. 93, 772 A.2d 1087, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 10 (2001).

    In a prosecution for driving under the influence in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, trial court’s limitation of relevant and potentially exculpatory testimony concerning the variability of partition ratios could not be deemed harmless. State v. Hanks, 172 Vt. 93, 772 A.2d 1087, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 10 (2001).

    Court at trial for driving under the influence did not err in admitting results of Datamaster infrared breath test which showed defendant’s blood alcohol content, where defendant conceded at trial that he had been under the influence, and there was thus no perceivable prejudice to defendant from the Datamaster results. State v. Lamb, 168 Vt. 194, 720 A.2d 1101, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 229 (1998).

    Testimony of police officer who had been at scene of accident that defendant was intoxicated was sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and whether defendant’s breath test should have been suppressed became irrelevant once the trial court convicted him under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section. State v. Bedell, 151 Vt. 14, 556 A.2d 101, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 7 (1989).

    At trial for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, officer could testify as to defendant’s behavior and demeanor during routine questioning for booking; because the questioning was not of an incriminatory nature, it was not subject to Fifth Amendment privilege. State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 582 A.2d 119, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 169 (1990).

    In prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the trial court properly allowed officer’s testimony concerning defendant’s behavior and demeanor where observations were made prior to start of interrogation and during routine questioning for booking. State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 582 A.2d 119, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 169 (1990).

    At trial for being in actual physical control of motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the trial court’s error, if any, in admitting evidence that defendant refused to submit to alco-sensor test was harmless where it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have rendered a verdict of guilty absent the offending evidence. State v. Curavoo, 156 Vt. 72, 587 A.2d 963, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 15 (1991).

    There is no restriction imposed by subdiv. (a)(2) of this section which limits the State’s proof to just clinical evidence of driving while under the influence; rather, the State may offer clinical evidence to further buttress a chemical test, or under certain circumstances only clinical evidence. State v. Begins, 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474 (1987).

    Testimony that a person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor is admissible and is not a legal conclusion or an invasion of the province of the jury in its determination of the ultimate issue. State v. Norton, 134 Vt. 100, 353 A.2d 324, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 605 (1976).

    Chain of custody.

    For results of breath test of driver suspected of being under the influence to be admissible, the chain of custody need not be perfectly established; the circumstances need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample. State v. Stevens, 137 Vt. 473, 408 A.2d 622, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1071 (1979); State v. Comstock, 145 Vt. 503, 494 A.2d 135, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 323 (1985).

    Where sample of defendant’s breath arrived at the State Laboratory for analysis in the same condition it was in when the police officer who administered the test prepared it for mailing and there was no evidence of tampering with, change in, or confusion of the sample during the mailing, the chain of custody was sufficiently established at defendant’s trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Comstock, 145 Vt. 503, 494 A.2d 135, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 323 (1985).

    In driving while intoxicated prosecution, where police officer who had taken defendant’s breath sample gave testimony sufficiently establishing chain of custody of the breath sample from officer to police station to chemist to trial, the breath sample and results of chemist’s test of it were properly placed before the jury accompanied by instruction directing jury to decide reliability of the test results, despite the fact that an identifying number had been changed on the exhibit, the chemist stating he had discovered he had assigned the wrong number to it and had changed it as the number originally assigned to it related to another person’s analysis. State v. LaBelle, 138 Vt. 437, 420 A.2d 851, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1364 (1980).

    Where tube used for breath test of driver suspected of being under the influence was crimped and placed in a sealed box, officer wrote his and defendant’s names and the date and time on the box, the box was placed in a refrigerator in the police station, three days later the State Laboratory received the box in the same condition, and there was no evidence of tampering, the test results were properly admitted at trial over objection of impermissible gap in chain of custody. State v. Stevens, 137 Vt. 473, 408 A.2d 622, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1071 (1979).

    Charges.

    Law enforcement officers are not required to offer to, or request of, DUI suspects a breath or blood test as a precondition for prosecution under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section; overruling State v. Lund (1984) 144 Vt. 171, 475 A.2d 1055, to the extent of inconsistency. State v. Begins, 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474 (1987).

    The State has the option to charge defendant with both driving while there is .10 percent or more alcohol in the blood in violation of subdiv. (a)(1) of this section and with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) when it is relying on a chemical test for blood alcohol to obtain a conviction, but the defendant can be convicted of only one of these offenses. State v. Lund, 144 Vt. 171, 475 A.2d 1055, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 430 (1984).

    Law enforcement agents not certified by the Vermont Criminal Justice Training Council to administer a breath test to a person suspected of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor do not have an obligation under section 1202 of this title, governing implied consent to taking of tests to determine blood alcohol content, to request a breath sample and may process suspects without requesting a sample; however, under those circumstances, a prosecution could only proceed under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section for driving under the influence and not under subdiv. (a)(1) for driving while there is .10 percent or more alcohol in the blood. State v. Begins, 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474 (1987).

    Charges of operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol content is .10 percent or more in violation of subdiv. (a)(1) of this section and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section may be brought against a defendant when the charges arise from the same incident, although convictions of both charges is prohibited. State v. Coulombe, 143 Vt. 631, 470 A.2d 1179, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 597 (1983).

    In the case of defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol content was .10 percent or more in violation of subdiv. (a)(1) of this section and with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section and convicted of violating subdiv. (a)(1), since the trial court’s instructions to the jury clearly explained the differences between the two charges, delineated the essential elements of each charge, told the jury that if they found that defendant had violated one subdivision they need not consider whether he violated the other and that they could find defendant guilty of either charge, but not both, these instructions safeguarded the defendant from any prejudice when both violations were presented to the jury and defendant’s right to due process of law was not violated by the State trying him for both violations. State v. Coulombe, 143 Vt. 631, 470 A.2d 1179, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 597 (1983).

    Where this section provided that “a person may not operate, attempt to operate or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,” it was not a substantial defect for the complaint to omit an allegation that operation was on a public highway; therefore, instruction that jury must find that operation was on a public highway was overly restrictive in appellant’s favor and he could point to no prejudice arising from the fact that the complaint did not allege operation on a public highway. State v. McGrail, 134 Vt. 91, 353 A.2d 342, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 602 (1976).

    Where information charged defendant with operating an automobile on a public highway with a blood alcohol content of .15 percent and chemical analysis of defendant’s breath sample showed a .149 percent blood alcohol content, the variance was immaterial and not prejudicial, since the chemical analysis established a blood alcohol content greater than the level prohibited by subdiv. (a)(1) of this section. State v. Lamelle, 133 Vt. 378, 340 A.2d 49, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 409 (1975).

    Circumstantial.

    Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant operated vehicle while under the influence in driving home from police station where defendant’s truck was only vehicle in station parking lot except for two town cars, no one else was seen in area, defendant was seen to open his driver’s door, defendant did not use telephone at police station, and no one was with defendant at home when officer arrived. State v. Warner, 151 Vt. 469, 560 A.2d 385, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 58 (1989).

    Jury properly convicted defendant of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, based on circumstantial facts that police officer observed stopped car located about fifteen feet off the southbound lane of interstate highway, that there were marks going off the road onto the grass, and while the engine was off, the key was in the “on” position, the lights were on and the car’s defroster fan was running, that defendant, the only occupant, was slumped in the driver’s seat and was unresponsive, and that breath sample taken two hours later indicated an alcohol level of .11 percent. State v. Anderson, 152 Vt. 297, 565 A.2d 1342, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 170 (1989).

    Where defendant admitted he was operating auto at time of accident, and police officer arrived shortly after accident and testified that defendant was under the influence of liquor, there was circumstantial evidence that defendant’s condition was continuous from the time the officer found him back to the time of the accident, and the jury properly so found. State v. Levesque, 132 Vt. 585, 326 A.2d 174, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 397 (1974).

    Criteria for determining reasonableness.

    Criteria set forth by Supreme Court to be used in a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a particular roadblock to screen intoxicated drivers are not absolute requirements, and trial courts considering those criteria in relation to the totality of the circumstances may find some of the criteria are not applicable or that additional or different criteria are equally important. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    Where trial court ruled that a roadblock to screen intoxicated drivers violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, failure to make findings concerning the criteria suggested by the Supreme Court for determining the reasonableness of such roadblocks mandated reversal. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    Defenses.

    At trial for driving while intoxicated, necessity defense was not available to defendant as a matter of law, where defendant failed to establish an essential element of the defense, that he was without fault, since defendant’s own conduct created the claimed emergency. State v. Squires, 147 Vt. 430, 519 A.2d 1154, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 440 (1986).

    Where at trial of defendant who was found guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the jury could have concluded from defendant’s testimony that defendant reasonably believed she was confronted with a medical emergency resulting from an alleged assault by her husband, that she was in pain and might well have believed that internal injuries were a possibility, that, with reasonable subjectivity, defendant saw no alternative to driving herself to the hospital, and that her need for treatment, as she conceived it to be, outweighed the criminal wrong of driving under the influence, it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity. State v. Shotton, 142 Vt. 558, 458 A.2d 1105, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 435 (1983).

    Degree of influence.

    In order to prove intoxication, the State need only prove that defendant had lost full control over the faculties of mind and body due to the effect of intoxicating liquor; the measure of that loss is immaterial. State v. Gray, 150 Vt. 184, 552 A.2d 1190, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 249 (1988).

    Evidence was sufficient to support DUI conviction under test of whether defendant, because of use of alcohol, had ceased to retain full control over faculties of mind; State was not required to prove that defendant lost full control of physical and mental abilities. State v. Abbott, 151 Vt. 618, 563 A.2d 640, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 122 (1989).

    Where defendant who had taken codeine and consumed beer was charged with driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section and not charged under subdiv. (a)(3), drug interaction was covered by offense charged so long as defendant was under influence of alcohol to some degree. State v. Frigault, 151 Vt. 537, 561 A.2d 895, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 91 (1989).

    A person is considered to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he or she has lost full control over the faculties of mind and body; the measure of that loss is immaterial. State v. LeBeau, 144 Vt. 315, 476 A.2d 128, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 445 (1984).

    When ruling on a motion to suppress statements made by a defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, finding that at the time defendant waived his constitutional rights his mental capacity was not so overborne by his alcoholic condition that he could not have been conceived to be able to comprehend such rights and make a knowing waiver thereof cited appellate review standard, applicable where the issue of competent waiver was not raised below. State v. Clark, 143 Vt. 11, 460 A.2d 449, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 455 (1983).

    When drugs other than alcohol are involved, subdiv. (a)(3) of this section requires not only that the driver be under the influence but also that the influence be to a degree which renders him incapable of driving safely. State v. Rifkin, 140 Vt. 472, 438 A.2d 1122, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 630 (1981).

    Instruction that if jury trying defendant charged with driving under the influence found him to have been in the slightest degree under the influence it would be enough to sustain a conviction was not error. State v. Wall, 137 Vt. 482, 408 A.2d 632, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1068 (1979).

    In a prosecution for driving under the influence, wherein a test for alcohol content was not made, issue is whether defendant was under the influence, regardless of the amount needed to produce that state, and evidence of objective symptoms may be sufficient to convict. State v. Jacques, 130 Vt. 427, 296 A.2d 246, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 294 (1972).

    Expert testimony.

    Expert testimony as to the number of drinks a person would consume based on an analysis of defendant’s breath test, the results of which had not been placed into evidence, was admissible at trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Bushey, 149 Vt. 378, 543 A.2d 1327, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 25 (1988).

    State’s expert’s determination of defendant’s blood content by using average elimination rate, rather than defendant’s own particular rate, was proper, as calculation need not have been absolute certainty, and jury was instructed on proof beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Blake, 151 Vt. 235, 559 A.2d 676, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 24 (1989).

    In a prosecution under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, expert testimony concerning a blood alcohol content test should be strictly limited to whether the test demonstrates that the defendant did, in fact, consume any intoxicating liquor. State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252, 499 A.2d 787, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 367 (1985).

    Absent the expertise necessary to determine whether a defendant is under the influence of drugs and to a degree rendering him incapable of driving safely, a witness may testify only as to what he in fact observed, and the connection between the symptoms observed and the influence of a drug must then be made by a qualified expert. State v. Rifkin, 140 Vt. 472, 438 A.2d 1122, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 630 (1981).

    Where, during the trial of defendant charged and convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs, police officer testified to a number of symptoms displayed by the defendant at the time of the alleged incident, but no expert testimony was produced to link his symptoms with marijuana consumption or to prove that the quantity allegedly consumed would produce an effect which rendered him incapable of driving safely, the conviction would be overturned since the connection between the symptoms observed and the influence of a drug must be made by a qualified expert. State v. Rifkin, 140 Vt. 472, 438 A.2d 1122, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 630 (1981).

    Competency of a witness offered as an expert is a preliminary question for the trial court, to be decided before the testimony is received, and in permitting chemist to testify regarding chemical analysis of breath of defendant tried for driving under the influence the court implicitly found competency and its ruling was not reversible on appeal unless it appeared from the evidence to be erroneous or founded upon an error of law. State v. Stevens, 137 Vt. 473, 408 A.2d 622, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1071 (1979).

    Chemist with Ph.D. in organic chemistry, training in gas chromatography, and seven years of service in Department of Health as a toxicologist, who had analyzed over three thousand breath samples taken from drivers suspected of being under the influence, and who testified he was well-acquainted with the ratio between alcohol in the blood and alcohol in the breath, was competent to testify as to breath test results and admission of his testimony was not error. State v. Stevens, 137 Vt. 473, 408 A.2d 622, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1071 (1979).

    Field sobriety tests.

    Officer need not evaluate field sobriety test results in a binary fashion. Rather, the officer must interpret the test results based on his training and experience in light of the totality of the circumstances, and some discretion inheres in that interpretation. State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96, 2009 VT 96A, 186 Vt. 389, 987 A.2d 939, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 110 (2009).

    History.

    The meaning of “under the influence” in subsec. (a) of this section developed in Vermont case law at a time before the use of chemical tests of any kind, and its relevance has always been to physical manifestations capable of observation by a witness and reported by testimony. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Judicial notice.

    Courts may take judicial notice of the local and national problem caused by the drunken driver, with its ever increasing toll of injuries and deaths. State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1971).

    Juror prejudice.

    Where jury was impaneled 16 days before trial for driving under the influence, during that time several jurors sat in trial of two felony charges and an editorial in a local paper noted high incidence of liquor-related highway deaths, trial court conducted a second voir dire prior to reception of evidence in order to ascertain any prejudice, and court offered to treat defendant’s motion to dismiss as a motion for a mistrial if any matter which could possibly affect jury’s deliberations were discovered, and none appeared, denial of motion to dismiss was not an abuse of discretion. State v. Stevens, 137 Vt. 473, 408 A.2d 622, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1071 (1979).

    Jury instructions.

    With regard to reasonable grounds for believing that a person was driving under the influence, the trial court instructed that this meant “that the officer had made specific observations reasonably supporting an inference that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while she was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” This description of reasonable grounds was almost identical to the instruction the court had previously approved, and therefore there was no error. State v. Schapp, 2019 VT 27, 210 Vt. 180, 212 A.3d 1226, 2019 Vt. LEXIS 61 (2019).

    Trial court’s one use of “reasonable suspicion” in its instruction concerning reasonable grounds for believing that a person was driving under the influence was harmless given the trial court’s instruction that clearly required a finding of reasonable grounds. State v. Schapp, 2019 VT 27, 210 Vt. 180, 212 A.3d 1226, 2019 Vt. LEXIS 61 (2019).

    Where court failed to clearly separate the charges of driving with excessive blood-alcohol and driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, since defendant failed to preserve the issue for review and did not claim that the error affected any substantial right, there was no plain error insofar as defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s failure to separate the elements of the two charges. State v. Hugo, 156 Vt. 339, 592 A.2d 875, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 87 (1991).

    At trial for driving while intoxicated, instructions which informed the jury that an element of the crime had been conceded, when in fact it had not, improperly relieved the State of its burden of proof. State v. Noyes, 147 Vt. 426, 519 A.2d 1152, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 438 (1986).

    Where, at defendant’s trial for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the court, in its initial instruction, told the jury that “actual physical control” did not require a showing that the vehicle was in motion or that the motor was running, but “that defendant had the immediate potential to operate” and when the jury requested clarification of the instruction, told them that whether defendant had the immediate potential to operate was a question of fact for its determination, the instructions were proper statements of the law and were neither contradictory nor confusing. State v. Trucott, 145 Vt. 274, 487 A.2d 149, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 588 (1984).

    In prosecutions for operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the instruction that, if the jury finds the defendant to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor in the slightest degree, such a finding would be enough to sustain a conviction, may be used only in cases where testimony supports a claim of loss of control of physical and mental faculties, and not where the evidence deals solely with the chemical level of alcohol. State v. Stockwell, 142 Vt. 232, 453 A.2d 1120, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 629 (1982).

    In prosecution for operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the trial court committed no error in instructing the jury that, if it found the defendant to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor in the slightest degree, such a finding would be enough to sustain a conviction where there was testimony by a police officer that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a moderate degree at the time he was apprehended, which constituted evidence of a loss of control of physical and mental faculties, since, once the trial judge determined the evidence of loss of control of physical and mental faculties existed, he was free to give the instruction. State v. Stockwell, 142 Vt. 232, 453 A.2d 1120, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 629 (1982).

    In prosecution for violation of this section, the trial court properly charged the jury that the phrase “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” as used in subsec. (a) means “under the influence in the slightest degree” where the evidence did not include the chemical level of alcohol, but such a charge can be applied only in cases where testimony supports a claim of loss of control of physical and mental faculties and not where the evidence deals solely with the chemical level of alcohol. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    In prosecution under this section, trial court did not commit prejudicial error in instructing jury that they could consider opinion of police officer as to whether defendant was operating vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor where the instruction was in accord with the well-established law that a layman may, on the basis of clinical observations, give an opinion as to the state of a person’s sobriety, the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom supported the opinion, and the trial judge carefully instructed the jury as to the weight to be accorded opinion testimony and on the elements of the offense, including the requirement that the jury find that the operation occurred while the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 438 A.2d 1135, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 634 (1981).

    Where person seated behind steering wheel of automobile at rest stop stated to police officer that he was unable to dim lights of the vehicle because of mechanical malfunctions, statement was direct evidence of his operation of that vehicle several moments before, and combination of this direct evidence and other circumstantial evidence precluded the need for the trial court to submit to the jury the requested instruction that since the State’s evidence of operation was entirely circumstantial, the jury had to be able to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence before it could find the operator guilty. State v. Dragon, 135 Vt. 35, 370 A.2d 218, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 547 (1977).

    Multiple convictions.

    Where court erroneously permitted the jury to return guilty verdicts for the charges of driving while there was .10 percent or more alcohol in his blood and driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor although subsec. (c) of this section expressly prohibited multiple convictions arising out of the same incident, but subsequently dismissed the excessive blood-alcohol conviction, defendant was granted the only remedy to which he was entitled. State v. Hugo, 156 Vt. 339, 592 A.2d 875, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 87 (1991).

    New trial.

    Defendant failed to establish that trial court abused its discretion in granting new trial on conviction of driving motor vehicle under influence of alcohol while leaving intact jury finding in separate proceeding of defendant’s liability to enhanced punishment as subsequent offender where improper prosecutorial comments which necessitated reversal of DUI conviction could not have prejudiced enhancement phase of proceedings and defendant offered no evidence to counter State’s enhancement case. State v. Baril, 155 Vt. 344, 583 A.2d 621, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1990).

    At bifurcated trial in which substantive charge of driving motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol was adjudicated prior to separate proceeding to determine defendant’s liability for enhanced punishment as a subsequent offender, trial court acted within its authority in ordering new trial on substantive offense, on basis of prosecutor’s improper closing arguments, while leaving intact jury’s finding from enhancement phase of trial for use if defendant were found guilty on retrial. State v. Baril, 155 Vt. 344, 583 A.2d 621, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1990).

    Operating guidelines.

    When police establish a roadblock to screen intoxicated drivers, the operating guidelines do not have to be established by administrative, policy-making officers who are totally removed from field operations; neither the possibility of supplemental oral instructions, nor the possibility of changes in operating guidelines in response to field conditions, will necessarily invalidate established guidelines that would otherwise be acceptable. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    Operation of vehicle.

    Defendant’s admission that he had been driving vehicle about ten minutes before being stopped, together with his observed position behind the steering wheel, was sufficient to establish that he operated the vehicle within the meaning of this section. State v. Constantine, 148 Vt. 629, 531 A.2d 1199, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 490 (1987) (mem.).

    Opinions.

    A lay person, on the basis of his personal observations, is competent to give his opinion as to the sobriety of an individual. State v. Jewett, 148 Vt. 324, 532 A.2d 958, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 632 (1986).

    Trial court did not err in permitting witness, who never physically observed defendant, to testify that, in his opinion, the individual operating defendant’s vehicle was drunk, where the testimony was based on erratic and dangerous operation of the vehicle which the witness personally observed. State v. Jewett, 148 Vt. 324, 532 A.2d 958, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 632 (1986).

    In the case of defendant found guilty of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, trial court did not err in allowing arresting officer to testify as to his opinion that defendant was under the influence of intoxicants, since the officer testified that his opinion was based on the odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath and her emotional state and, therefore, a sufficient foundation for such opinion evidence had been shown. State v. LeBeau, 144 Vt. 315, 476 A.2d 128, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 445 (1984).

    An arresting officer or other witness may give an opinion as to whether a defendant is under the influence of drugs and to a degree rendering him incapable of driving safely only when qualified as an expert to determine these issues from the symptoms displayed. State v. Rifkin, 140 Vt. 472, 438 A.2d 1122, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 630 (1981).

    Place of operation.

    Defendant’s private driveway, which was not restricted in any way, was a public highway under 23 V.S.A. § 4(13) for purposes of Vermont’s DUI statute. State v. Eckhardt, 165 Vt. 606, 686 A.2d 104, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1996) (mem.).

    The trial court’s rationale could have been adopted by the Legislature to prohibit driving or control of a vehicle while intoxicated wherever it occurs, but by including as an element of the offense that the operation or control occur on a “highway” and defining the term as it did, the Legislature opted for a more narrow approach. State v. McNeil, 164 Vt. 129, 665 A.2d 51, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 71 (1995).

    Defendant was not in control of her vehicle “on a highway” within 23 V.S.A. §§ 4(13) and 1201(a)(2) because the taxi cab parking lot where defendant was found was used by employees to leave their cars, the taxicabs used in the business, and persons specifically invited to enter; to the public generally, the message was “no trespassing,” a message enforced by requests for police assistance. State v. McNeil, 164 Vt. 129, 665 A.2d 51, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 71 (1995).

    Evidence that road on which defendant was travelling was an interstate highway, and that a number of vehicles were travelling on the same roadway at the time of the offense, was sufficient to allow jury to conclude that road was highway within the meaning of this section. State v. Jewett, 148 Vt. 324, 532 A.2d 958, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 632 (1986).

    The breakdown lane of an interstate highway comes within the meaning of the term “highway.” State v. Bailey, 149 Vt. 528, 546 A.2d 786, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 68 (1988).

    Evidence that road where defendant drove while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was maintained and plowed by town and provided secondary access to store and school supported trial court’s finding that road was open to general circulation of public and, therefore, a highway, even though road was privately owned and “no trespassing” and “private drive” signs indicated exclusion of public. State v. Paquette, 151 Vt. 631, 563 A.2d 632, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 111 (1989).

    In a prosecution for violating this section, it is incumbent upon the State to prove the operation of the vehicle on a highway. State v. Boise, 146 Vt. 46, 498 A.2d 495, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 345 (1985).

    Prior convictions.

    There was no plain error with respect to the trial court’s use of defendant’s prior DUI conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement as to his second DUI conviction, as he did not challenge the prior DUI conviction, but rather how it was established and accepted by the trial court, such that no prejudice was shown. State v. Bangoura, 2017 VT 53, 205 Vt. 36, 171 A.3d 50, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 70 (2017).

    Plain language of the statute allows the same prior driving-under-the-influence conviction to be used both as an element of criminal refusal and to enhance the penalty for the refusal. State v. Wainwright, 2013 VT 120, 195 Vt. 370, 88 A.3d 423, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 119 (2013).

    Under the statutory scheme, the recidivist penalties apply to all successive violations of the driving-under-the-influence statute, regardless of the type. Therefore, although a criminal refusal might be defendant’s first such offense, it was a successive violation of the DUI statute, and therefore the recidivist penalties applied. State v. Wainwright, 2013 VT 120, 195 Vt. 370, 88 A.3d 423, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 119 (2013).

    An out-of-state conviction obtained in compliance with the law of that state, as well as the Federal Constitution, may be used for enhancement purposes under 23 V.S.A. § 1211 . State v. Pecora, 2007 VT 41, 181 Vt. 627, 928 A.2d 479, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 76 (2007) (mem.).

    Since drunken driving convictions are not convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude, their admissibility for impeachment purposes is prohibited by 12 V.S.A. § 1608 . State v. Bushey, 142 Vt. 507, 457 A.2d 279, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 413 (1983).

    Where at defendant’s trial for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the prosecutor elicited testimony as to defendant’s two prior convictions of that offense after the trial court had sustained defense counsel’s objection to that line of questioning, reversal of defendant’s conviction was required. State v. Bushey, 142 Vt. 507, 457 A.2d 279, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 413 (1983).

    Purpose.

    Roadblocks to screen intoxicated drivers serve the public interest as a safety measure, operating as one method of detecting intoxicated drivers, and further the public interest in reducing the number of intoxicated drivers by acting as a deterrent to any person who might consider driving after drinking. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    Reasonable grounds to believe defendant is under influence.

    Term “reasonable grounds” in the evidentiary-test refusal provision is akin to probable cause. The purpose of the “reasonable grounds” language is simply to require that a certain amount of evidence exist before an officer may take a breath test. State v. Perley, 2015 VT 102, 200 Vt. 84, 129 A.3d 93, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 86 (2015).

    With regard to a charge of refusing an evidentiary test, there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol. The officer knew that defendant had been involved in a car accident around noon on a day when the roads were clear and that he had fled the scene; defendant showed signs of intoxication at the time the officer found him in his father’s car a little less than two hours later; and there was no evidence of post-operation consumption. State v. Perley, 2015 VT 102, 200 Vt. 84, 129 A.3d 93, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 86 (2015).

    Reasonable request for evidentiary test.

    With regard to an evidentiary-test-refusal charge, there was no plain error as to defendant’s claim that a request for a test was not reasonable because an officer interfered with his right to consult with an attorney. Although the officer made no attempt to contact the specific lawyer defendant mentioned, he asked defendant if he would like to speak with a public defender, and defendant declined. State v. Perley, 2015 VT 102, 200 Vt. 84, 129 A.3d 93, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 86 (2015).

    Reasonable suspicion.

    Regardless of whether speeding in a snowstorm or being slow to pull over could properly be considered factors in the analysis, or whether the trooper could also properly consider the unopened bottles of beer in places such as defendant’s jacket pocket and the center console, the factors of an odor of alcohol, defendant’s admission to drinking, and the appearance of watery eyes were sufficient indicia of driving under the influence to validate an order for defendant to exit his vehicle. State v. Burgess, 2010 VT 64, 188 Vt. 235, 5 A.3d 911, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 59 (2010).

    Court could not affirm the trial court’s conclusion that a trooper’s suspicion of driving under the influence became unreasonable for the sole reason that defendant passed two field sobriety tests; rather, the trooper was still faced with a situation in which defendant smelled of alcohol, had watery and bloodshot eyes, and admitted to drinking alcohol. The trooper testified that his training and experience suggested that the first two factors indicated possible impairment, and the third required no such training or experience to militate in favor of further investigation. State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96, 2009 VT 96A, 186 Vt. 389, 987 A.2d 939, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 110 (2009).

    Although defendant’s performance on walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests might not, by itself, have supported a reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence, it also did not as a matter of law compel a trooper to cease his roadside investigation. Although defendant did not “fail” the tests, his performance was not flawless, and the officer did not have to evaluate the test results in a binary fashion. State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96, 2009 VT 96A, 186 Vt. 389, 987 A.2d 939, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 110 (2009).

    Trooper’s decision to administer a preliminary breath test (PBT) to defendant rather than allow him to continue driving when defendant smelled of alcohol, admitted to drinking, and had bloodshot eyes was premised on a reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI), imposed a minimal intrusion on defendant’s liberty, and was aimed at preventing serious danger to the public; it did not violate either the Vermont or the United States Constitution. The results of the PBT, in turn, provided probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96, 2009 VT 96A, 186 Vt. 389, 987 A.2d 939, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 110 (2009).

    Relevance.

    Use of chemical test results in a prosecution under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, and of evidence of the defendant’s condition in a prosecution under subdiv. (a)(1), will not result in prejudice to the defendant where the trial court’s scrupulous instruction on the elements of the offense clarifies the relevance of the evidence to the particular offense charged; however, the evidence must be relevant to the offense, and that relevance must outweigh any prejudicial effect. State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252, 499 A.2d 787, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 367 (1985).

    Sufficiency.

    In a prosecution for refusing a breath test, there were sufficient facts to allow the jury to find that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving under the influence. Defendant, who was coming from the direction of a bar, drove over the speed limit, had watery eyes and slurred speech, had a faint odor of alcohol, exhibited clues of intoxication during field sobriety tests, and refused to take a preliminary breath test. State v. Schapp, 2019 VT 27, 210 Vt. 180, 212 A.3d 1226, 2019 Vt. LEXIS 61 (2019).

    Where arresting officer observed defendant’s vehicle weaving erratically across lanes of traffic, after being stopped defendant nearly fell while attempting to leave his car, defendant had difficulty in maintaining an upright position in his car seat, fumbled in his search for his registration, held onto the car to support himself, gave off a strong odor of alcohol, resisted arrest, and admitted drinking one double cocktail earlier in the evening, evidence was sufficient to support jury’s verdict that defendant was operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section. State v. Lettieri, 149 Vt. 340, 543 A.2d 683, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 28 (1988).

    Evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant was under influence of intoxicating liquor where his speech was slurred, gait unsteady, eyes bloodshot and breath had odor of intoxicants, even though defendant argued that other possible conclusions could be drawn from evidence. State v. Warner, 151 Vt. 469, 560 A.2d 385, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 58 (1989).

    Evidence of recent erratic driving by defendant and testimony of police officer as to impaired condition of defendant at the scene of an accident was sufficient to support a guilty verdict under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section. State v. Broe, 146 Vt. 135, 498 A.2d 1039, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 337 (1985).

    Observation of police officer investigating automobile accident that defendant’s speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, defendant was unsteady on his feet, and had an odor of alcohol on his breath, along with breath test result which, when related back to the time of operation, provided a result of .12 ratio of alcohol to body weight, were sufficient to establish that defendant drove while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Comstock, 145 Vt. 503, 494 A.2d 135, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 323 (1985).

    In the case of defendant found guilty of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, where the evidence showed that defendant operated slightly left to the center left of the highway, failed to stop at a “CRASH” road block despite a signal to the contrary, although defendant cooperated during the processing and the officer observed that her speech was normal, her balance steady, her walking and turning sure, and her coordination good, defendant did have a detectable odor of alcohol on her breath, her eyes were glazed, during processing she was emotional and mumbled an obscenity at the officer, and an alco-sensor test revealed an excess of .10 percent of alcohol in her blood, trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. LeBeau, 144 Vt. 315, 476 A.2d 128, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 445 (1984).

    In the case of defendant convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, where the State introduced evidence that defendant had purchased liquor, store cashier testified that he smelled alcohol on defendant’s breath when he sold liquor to defendant, two people who witnessed the accident testified as to the time and location of the accident, positively identified defendant’s car as the car that caused the accident, and testified that defendant was driving on the wrong side of the road and was weaving back and forth along the road prior to and after the accident, the police officer who arrested defendant an hour and a half after the accident testified that defendant had red, watery eyes and had difficulty maintaining his balance, the chemist who analyzed a breath test given defendant about two hours after the accident testified that given the fact that the test showed an alcohol content of .22 percent two hours after the accident, defendant could have had a blood alcohol content of .26 at the time of the accident, and defendant admitted that he had had some beer to drink some time prior to the accident, the State produced sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Fuller, 144 Vt. 485, 479 A.2d 173, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 507 (1984).

    Where following an automobile accident defendant, who was found seated behind the steering wheel with the motor running, admitted to the investigating officer that he operated the vehicle at the time of the accident and a gas chromatograph analysis of defendant’s breath sample revealed a blood alcohol content of .16 percent, the evidence was sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of driving while there was .10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood in violation of subdiv. (a)(1) of this section; therefore, trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. Orvis, 143 Vt. 388, 465 A.2d 1361, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 521 (1983).

    Where there was considerable circumstantial evidence that defendant, who was found sitting behind the steering wheel of an automobile hung up in the guardrails adjacent to a highway, had been operating the vehicle, direct and circumstantial evidence that he was intoxicated at the time the vehicle was discovered, and defendant admitted to the police that he was an alcoholic, had had one beer prior to the accident and no drinks since, a jury of reasonable men and women could properly conclude that defendant was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the accident. State v. Debanville, 142 Vt. 512, 457 A.2d 650, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1983).

    In the case of defendant found guilty of manslaughter, driving under the influence with a fatal accident resulting, driving while license suspended, and driving while intoxicated with injuries resulting, where the State introduced evidence that after the accident defendant showed physical characteristics symptomatic of intoxication, that a breath test taken at the police station showed a blood-alcohol content of 0.26 percent, that he struck a motorcycle head-on in the motorcycle’s lane of traffic, and that as a result of the collision the motorcycle driver was killed and a passenger injured, the jury was justified in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all four counts: therefore, defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied. State v. Poirier, 142 Vt. 595, 458 A.2d 1109, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 437 (1983).

    Symptoms of intoxication.

    Driver’s mere assertion that he has not drunk to excess need not be accepted at face value by an officer who observes other indicia of impairment. State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96, 2009 VT 96A, 186 Vt. 389, 987 A.2d 939, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 110 (2009).

    In a prosecution under subdiv. (a)(1) of this section, evidence of the defendant’s condition at the time of operation, such as an unsteady walk, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, or an alcoholic odor on the breath, while not necessary to the prosecution’s case, is admissible to corroborate the results of a blood alcohol content test. State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252, 499 A.2d 787, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 367 (1985).

    Evidence concerning symptoms of intoxication must be treated with care in a prosecution for driving with .10 percent or more alcohol in the blood in violation of subdiv. (a)(1) of this section, since prejudice to the defendant would result if the jury was unclear about the offense charged and confused the .10 percent offense with driving while under the influence in violation of subdiv. (a)(2) of this section. State v. Rollins, 141 Vt. 105, 444 A.2d 884, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 480 (1982); State v. Coulombe, 143 Vt. 631, 470 A.2d 1179, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 597 (1983).

    Although external manifestations of intoxication are relevant and may be introduced at trial, they are not essential to a successful prosecution for driving while there is .10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood in violation of subdiv. (a)(1) of this section. State v. Orvis, 143 Vt. 388, 465 A.2d 1361, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 521 (1983).

    Time of operation.

    Proof of an offense under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section requires the prosecution to produce evidence of the defendant’s condition at the time of operation. State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252, 499 A.2d 787, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 367 (1985).

    Proof of the time of operation of the vehicle is not essential to a conviction under subdiv. (a)(2) of this section, if there is other reliable evidence indicating operation while intoxicated. State v. Broe, 146 Vt. 135, 498 A.2d 1039, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 337 (1985).

    Where at defendant’s trial for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor evidence was presented, as part of the State’s case, that defendant admitted that he was the operator of a vehicle which had been involved in an accident and that he stopped operating the vehicle about ten p.m., the State satisfied its burden of proof as to the time of operation. State v. Anderkin, 145 Vt. 240, 487 A.2d 142, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 591 (1984).

    Where police officer testified that defendant seemed confused, was slurring his speech, having difficulty with his balance, and emanating a strong odor of alcohol and a chemist, qualified as an expert, testified that he had analyzed a breath sample taken from defendant and that by relating the results of this back to the approximate time of operation, he computed defendant’s blood alcohol level at that time to be above 0.10 percent, the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of operation. State v. Anderkin, 145 Vt. 240, 487 A.2d 142, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 591 (1984).

    Where evidence at trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor showed that a police officer arrived at an accident scene about 26 minutes after receipt of a telephone call from a passerby, that defendant told the officer that the accident had occurred about one-half hour before the officer’s arrival, and the officer described defendant as extremely impaired, but not disoriented, defendant’s admission was not hearsay and there was sufficient evidence for a finding by the jury as to the time at which defendant operated the vehicle. State v. Turner, 145 Vt. 399, 491 A.2d 338, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 308 (1985).

    Vehicle.

    Boom lift is a vehicle for purposes of the driving-under-the-influence statute and the civil suspension statute. State v. Smith, 2011 VT 83, 190 Vt. 222, 27 A.3d 362, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2011).

    Voluntariness of submission to tests.

    Without a challenge to the trial court’s findings that defendant was not ordered to submit to a preliminary breath test or field sobriety tests—or further factual development at the hearing, such as testimony from defendant indicating that he was coerced to participate against his will—the court rejected defendant’s argument that circumstances amounting to no more than a classically mundane police encounter rendered his participation involuntary. State v. McGuigan, 2008 VT 111, 184 Vt. 441, 965 A.2d 511, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2008).

    Cited.

    Cited in McIntyre v. Malloy, 130 Vt. 395, 296 A.2d 222, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 289 (1972); State v. McGrath, 130 Vt. 400, 296 A.2d 636, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 290 (1972); State v. Bessette, 130 Vt. 438, 296 A.2d 179, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 296 (1972); State v. Ladieu, 130 Vt. 496, 296 A.2d 215, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 306 (1972); State v. Hegarty, 130 Vt. 509, 296 A.2d 234, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 309 (1972); Veilleux v. Springer, 131 Vt. 33, 300 A.2d 620, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 263 (1973); State v. Lacaillade, 131 Vt. 161, 303 A.2d 131, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 286 (1973); State v. Mills, 133 Vt. 15, 328 A.2d 410, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 277 (1974); State v. Butler, 133 Vt. 242, 336 A.2d 185, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 375 (1975); State v. Moffitt, 133 Vt. 366, 340 A.2d 39, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 405 (1975); State v. Fournier, 133 Vt. 416, 340 A.2d 71, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1975); State v. Burack, 133 Vt. 482, 346 A.2d 192, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 436 (1975); State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1977); State v. Batchelor, 135 Vt. 366, 376 A.2d 737, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 630 (1977); State v. Cheney, 135 Vt. 513, 380 A.2d 93, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 668 (1977); Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Cady, 136 Vt. 29, 383 A.2d 607, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 680 (1978); State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 385 A.2d 1085, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 706 (1978); State v. Welch, 136 Vt. 442, 394 A.2d 1115, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 771 (1978); State v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537, 394 A.2d 1145, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 662 (1978); State v. Mayo, 137 Vt. 77, 398 A.2d 303, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 929 (1979); Office of State's Attorney v. Office of Attorney General, 138 Vt. 10, 409 A.2d 599, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1096 (1979); State v. Tierney, 138 Vt. 163, 412 A.2d 298, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1046 (1980); State v. Prue, 138 Vt. 331, 415 A.2d 234, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1218 (1980); State v. Dacey, 138 Vt. 491, 418 A.2d 856, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1355 (1980); State v. White, 139 Vt. 23, 421 A.2d 1283, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1383 (1980); McGovern v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 139 Vt. 169, 423 A.2d 489, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1495 (1980); State v. Raymond, 139 Vt. 464, 431 A.2d 453, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 496 (1981); State v. Gracey, 140 Vt. 199, 436 A.2d 741, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 580 (1981); State v. Veilleux, 140 Vt. 517, 439 A.2d 277, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 635 (1981); State v. Mable, 141 Vt. 339, 449 A.2d 903, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 531 (1982); State v. Dole, 141 Vt. 493, 449 A.2d 979, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 557 (1982); State v. White, 142 Vt. 73, 451 A.2d 1137, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 599 (1982); State v. Willette, 142 Vt. 78, 451 A.2d 821, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 600 (1982); State v. Sweet, 142 Vt. 238, 453 A.2d 1131, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 634 (1982); State v. Wetherby, 142 Vt. 248, 453 A.2d 1124, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 630 (1982); State v. Quintin, 143 Vt. 40, 460 A.2d 458, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 459 (1983); Carpenter v. Vermont Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 143 Vt. 329, 465 A.2d 1379, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 529 (1983); State v. Hull, 143 Vt. 353, 465 A.2d 1371, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 525 (1983); State v. Johnson, 143 Vt. 355, 465 A.2d 1366, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 523 (1983); State v. Kilborn, 143 Vt. 360, 466 A.2d 1175, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 539 (1983); State v. Loehmann, 143 Vt. 372, 467 A.2d 118, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 554 (1983); State v. Normandy, 143 Vt. 383, 465 A.2d 1358, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 520 (1983); State v. Young, 143 Vt. 413, 465 A.2d 1375, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 527 (1983); State v. Dustin, 143 Vt. 474, 468 A.2d 927, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 559 (1983); In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 469 A.2d 756, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 578 (1983); State v. Dapo, 143 Vt. 610, 470 A.2d 1173, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 598 (1983); State v. Dapo, 143 Vt. 610, 470 A.2d 1173, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 598 (1983); State v. Snide, 144 Vt. 436, 479 A.2d 139, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 494 (1984); State v. Jarvis, 145 Vt. 8, 482 A.2d 65, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 534 (1984); State v. Gilman, 145 Vt. 84, 483 A.2d 598, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 547 (1984); State v. Vanderlas, 145 Vt. 135, 483 A.2d 263, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 552 (1984); State v. Burnham, 145 Vt. 161, 484 A.2d 918, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 562 (1984); State v. Graves, 145 Vt. 271, 487 A.2d 157, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 589 (1984); State v. Emilo, 145 Vt. 405, 491 A.2d 341, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 310 (1985); State v. Curtis, 145 Vt. 552, 494 A.2d 143, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 324 (1985); State v. Senecal, 145 Vt. 554, 497 A.2d 349, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 407 (1985); State v. Macie, 146 Vt. 28, 497 A.2d 373, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 425 (1985); State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 499 A.2d 761, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 363 (1985); State v. Schwanda, 146 Vt. 230, 499 A.2d 779, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 372 (1985); State v. Greenslet, 146 Vt. 256, 499 A.2d 789, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 368 (1985); State v. Gibbons, 146 Vt. 342, 503 A.2d 540, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 441 (1985); State v. Lombard, 146 Vt. 411, 505 A.2d 1182, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 390 (1985); State v. Kozel, 146 Vt. 534, 505 A.2d 1221, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1986); State v. Robillard, 146 Vt. 623, 508 A.2d 709, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 334 (1986); State v. Trombley, 147 Vt. 371, 518 A.2d 20, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 432 (1986); State v. Robillard, 147 Vt. 484, 520 A.2d 992, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 456 (1986); State v. Greenia, 147 Vt. 596, 522 A.2d 242, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 425 (1987); State v. Bessette, 148 Vt. 17, 530 A.2d 549, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 471 (1987); State v. Bushey, 148 Vt. 197, 531 A.2d 902, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 479 (1987); State v. Boardman, 148 Vt. 229, 531 A.2d 599, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 478 (1987); State v. Drown, 148 Vt. 311, 532 A.2d 575, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 495 (1987); State v. Hoffman, 148 Vt. 320, 532 A.2d 577, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 494 (1987); State v. Armstrong, 148 Vt. 344, 533 A.2d 1183, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 516 (1987); State v. Brunelle, 148 Vt. 347, 534 A.2d 198, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 513 (1987); State v. Tanner, 148 Vt. 384, 532 A.2d 584, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 497 (1987); State v. Hart, 149 Vt. 104, 539 A.2d 551, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 590 (1987); State v. LeBlanc, 149 Vt. 141, 540 A.2d 1037, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1987); State v. Byrne, 149 Vt. 257, 542 A.2d 667, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 8 (1988); State v. Merritt, 149 Vt. 529, 546 A.2d 791, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 69 (1988); State v. Buckley, 149 Vt. 663, 546 A.2d 798, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 74 (1988); State v. Potier, 150 Vt. 15, 547 A.2d 1359, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1988); State v. Day, 150 Vt. 119, 549 A.2d 1061, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 128 (1988); State v. Lovejoy, 150 Vt. 130, 549 A.2d 643, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 115 (1988); State v. White, 150 Vt. 255, 551 A.2d 1204, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 164 (1988); State v. Jacques, 150 Vt. 508, 554 A.2d 655, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 627 (1987); State v. Karmen, 150 Vt. 547, 554 A.2d 670, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 205 (1988); State v. Muir, 150 Vt. 549, 554 A.2d 671, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 193 (1988); State v. Nichols, 150 Vt. 563, 556 A.2d 75, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 224 (1988); State v. Hagen, 151 Vt. 64, 557 A.2d 493, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 10 (1989); State v. West, 151 Vt. 140, 557 A.2d 873, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 240 (1988); State v. Snide, 151 Vt. 343, 560 A.2d 380, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 52 (1989); State v. St. Francis, 151 Vt. 384, 563 A.2d 249, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 90 (1989); State v. Yudichak, 151 Vt. 400, 561 A.2d 407, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 76 (1989); State v. Perry, 151 Vt. 637, 563 A.2d 1007, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1989); Shaw v. District Court, 152 Vt. 1, 563 A.2d 636, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1989); State v. Griffin, 152 Vt. 41, 563 A.2d 642, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 120 (1989); State v. Clark, 152 Vt. 304, 565 A.2d 1332, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 165 (1989); State v. Griffin, 152 Vt. 309, 565 A.2d 1340, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 161 (1989); In re Club 107, 152 Vt. 320, 566 A.2d 966, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 175 (1989); State v. Briggs, 152 Vt. 531, 568 A.2d 779, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1989); State v. Coita, 153 Vt. 18, 568 A.2d 424, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 219 (1989); State v. Felix, 153 Vt. 170, 569 A.2d 493, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 222 (1989); State v. Olson, 153 Vt. 226, 571 A.2d 619, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 261 (1989); State v. Ryea, 153 Vt. 451, 571 A.2d 674, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1990); State v. Baker, 154 Vt. 411, 579 A.2d 479, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1990); State v. Parker, 155 Vt. 340, 583 A.2d 98, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 193 (1990); State v. Lewis, 155 Vt. 653, 586 A.2d 550, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 248 (1990); State v. Parah, 155 Vt. 655, 587 A.2d 403, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 4 (1991); State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35, 587 A.2d 405, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 13 (1991); State v. Beattie, 157 Vt. 162, 596 A.2d 919, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 159 (1991); State v. Zumbo, 157 Vt. 589, 601 A.2d 986, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 223 (1991); State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56, 605 A.2d 510, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1992); State v. Sutphin, 159 Vt. 9, 614 A.2d 792, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 109 (1992); State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 617 A.2d 140, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1992); State v. Pilette, 160 Vt. 509, 630 A.2d 1296, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 70 (1993); State v. DeRosa, 161 Vt. 78, 633 A.2d 277, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 93 (1993); State v. Tatro, 161 Vt. 182, 635 A.2d 1204, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1993); State v. Forcier, 162 Vt. 71, 643 A.2d 1200, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 50 (1994); State v. Welch, 162 Vt. 635, 650 A.2d 516, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1994); State v. Dove, 163 Vt. 429, 658 A.2d 936, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 15 (1995); State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995); State v. Guidera, 167 Vt. 598, 707 A.2d 704, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1998); State v. Fontaine, 167 Vt. 529, 711 A.2d 667, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 156 (1998); State v. Remy, 167 Vt. 541, 711 A.2d 665, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 157 (1998); State v. Lowe, 169 Vt. 575, 740 A.2d 348, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 85 (1999); State v. Longe, 170 Vt. 35, 743 A.2d 569, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 310 (1999); State v. Garbutt, 173 Vt. 277, 790 A.2d 444, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 414 (2001); Landell v. Vermont Public Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d 129, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15770 (2d Cir. 2002); State v. Anderson, 2005 VT 80, 179 Vt. 43, 890 A.2d 68, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 164 (2005) (mem.).

    Annotations From Former § 1183

    Competency of testimony.

    A layman is competent, on the basis of observation, to testify as to the state of a driver’s sobriety. State v. Brown, 125 Vt. 58, 209 A.2d 324, 1965 Vt. LEXIS 198 (1965).

    Recognition of fact of intoxication requires no peculiar scientific knowledge or training and may be evidenced by predisposing circumstances, namely, drinking of intoxicants and by prior and subsequent condition of subject. State v. Coburn, 122 Vt. 102, 165 A.2d 349, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 111 (1960).

    Recognition of fact that person is in intoxicated condition requires no peculiar scientific knowledge. State v. Demars, 118 Vt. 175, 102 A.2d 845, 1954 Vt. LEXIS 98 (1954).

    Defenses.

    In prosecution for driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor, it was proper for defendant to account for his abnormal locomotion and coordination, where these conditions are substantially relied upon by the State. State v. Brisson, 119 Vt. 48, 117 A.2d 255, 1955 Vt. LEXIS 88 (1955).

    —Circumstantial.

    When evidence relied upon to show that respondent was under influence of intoxicating liquor when he operated his automobile is entirely circumstantial, circumstantial proved must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that the respondent is guilty, and such evidence must be so cogent as to exclude every reasonable theory consistent with respondent’s innocence. State v. Sanford, 118 Vt. 242, 108 A.2d 516, 1954 Vt. LEXIS 109 (1954).

    Degree of intoxication.

    Person operating motor vehicle while in the slightest degree under the influence of intoxicating liquor was within the prohibition of this section. State v. Storrs, 105 Vt. 180, 163 A. 560, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1933); State v. Hedding, 114 Vt. 212, 42 A.2d 438, 1945 Vt. LEXIS 72 (1945); State v. Bradbury, 118 Vt. 380, 110 A.2d 710, 1955 Vt. LEXIS 97 (1955).

    Intent.

    In prosecution under this section, no question of intent is involved. State v. Hedding, 114 Vt. 212, 42 A.2d 438, 1945 Vt. LEXIS 72 (1945).

    Operation of vehicle.

    Under this section, attempting to operate and operation meant the same thing. State v. Parker, 123 Vt. 369, 189 A.2d 540, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 103 (1963).

    By admittedly sitting behind steering wheel of an automobile, with engine running while car was in motion, a motorist was operating a motor vehicle within provisions of this section. State v. Hedding, 122 Vt. 379, 172 A.2d 599, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 87 (1961).

    Turning of ignition switch which put self-starter of automobile in motion was operating motor vehicle, within meaning of this section. State v. Storrs, 105 Vt. 180, 163 A. 560, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1933).

    This section intended to forbid intoxicated person to do anything regarding mechanism of motor vehicle whether it had effect on engine or not. State v. Storrs, 105 Vt. 180, 163 A. 560, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1933).

    Where defendant, while under influence of intoxicating liquor, steered or attempted to steer his automobile while it was being towed, he “operated” such automobile within meaning of this section. State v. Tacey, 102 Vt. 439, 150 A. 68, 1930 Vt. LEXIS 144 (1930).

    Place of operation.

    This section did not provide that the offense involved must have been committed on an established, laid out, or public highway. State v. Bruce, 126 Vt. 367, 231 A.2d 107, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1967).

    Purpose.

    This section was designed to protect public from injury to person or property by drunken operation of vehicles on the public highways. State v. Bromley, 117 Vt. 228, 88 A.2d 833, 1952 Vt. LEXIS 127 (1952).

    Questions for jury.

    In prosecution for driving motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor, whether respondent or another was driver of car at time in question was question for jury. State v. Coomer, 105 Vt. 175, 163 A. 585, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 199 (1933).

    Sufficiency.

    Defendant who inserted key in ignition in order to roll up windows was in “actual physical control” of vehicle, and fact that he intended to leave his car parked on street and ride with friend was irrelevant. State v. Kelton, 168 Vt. 629, 724 A.2d 452, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 398 (1998) (mem.).

    Conviction of driving while intoxicated would be sustained where breath test and persuasive evidence of defendant’s symptoms showed him to have been intoxicated and he admitted having had beer and whiskey the afternoon of his arrest. State v. Magoon, 128 Vt. 363, 264 A.2d 779, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 235 (1970).

    Defendant’s admission that he had had several cans of beer prior to accident involving auto he was driving, evidence that blood test taken at hospital after accident showed a .18 percent alcohol content, and testimony of doctor who was a qualified medical expert that alcoholic content of defendant’s blood was between .15 percent and .20 percent when the accident occurred sustained verdict of guilty of driving under influence. State v. Bassett, 128 Vt. 453, 266 A.2d 438, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1970).

    Testimony of service station attendant in prosecution of defendant for driving in an intoxicated condition, that attendant saw defendant drive the automobile into service station while defendant was in an intoxicated condition, sufficiently constituted direct evidence of operation of vehicle by defendant. State v. Bruce, 126 Vt. 367, 231 A.2d 107, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1967).

    —Circumstantial.

    When evidence relied upon to show that respondent was under influence of intoxicating liquor when he operated his automobile is entirely circumstantial, circumstantial proved must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that the respondent is guilty, and such evidence must be so cogent as to exclude every reasonable theory consistent with respondent’s innocence. State v. Sanford, 118 Vt. 242, 108 A.2d 516, 1954 Vt. LEXIS 109 (1954).

    Law Reviews —

    For note relating to proposed administrative license suspension procedures, see 11 Vt. L. Rev. 75 (1986).

    For note, “DWI and the Insanity Defense: A Reasoned Approach”, see 20 Vt. L. Rev. 161 (1995).

    § 1201c. Calculation of suspensions and revocations.

    Notwithstanding any direction or order from any person or entity to the contrary, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall calculate, in accordance with applicable statutes and rules, the duration of suspensions, whether and when revocations, suspensions, and reinstatements shall occur, and all other required actions and calculations.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 13.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    By providing for mandatory one-year license suspension for DUI with fatality resulting, and vesting Commissioner of Motor Vehicles with exclusive authority to calculate suspensions and revocations, Legislature did not expressly or impliedly preempt trial court’s probationary power to limit a defendant’s operating privileges for longer periods; had Legislature actually intended to eliminate trial court’s discretion to prohibit a defendant from driving as a condition of probation for grave vehicular offenses, it would have plainly said so. State v. Nelson, 170 Vt. 125, 742 A.2d 1248, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 332 (1999).

    § 1202. Consent to taking of tests to determine blood alcohol content or presence of other drug.

      1. Implied consent. (a) (1) Implied consent.
      2. Blood test.   If breath testing equipment is not reasonably available or if the officer has reason to believe that the person is unable to give a sufficient sample of breath for testing or if the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is under the influence of a drug other than alcohol, the person is deemed to have given consent to the taking of an evidentiary sample of blood. If in the officer’s opinion the person is incapable of decision or unconscious or dead, it is deemed that the person’s consent is given and a sample of blood shall be taken. A blood test sought pursuant to this subdivision (2) shall be obtained pursuant to subsection (f) of this section.
      3. Evidentiary test.   The evidentiary test shall be required of a person when a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title.
      4. Fatal collision or incident resulting in serious bodily injury.   The evidentiary test shall also be required if the person is the surviving operator of a motor vehicle involved in a fatal incident or collision or an incident or collision resulting in serious bodily injury and the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has any amount of alcohol or other drug in his or her system.

        (a) (1) Implied consent.

        Subsection (a) effective January 1, 2022; see also subsection (a) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

        Every person who operates, attempts to operate, or is in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway in this State is deemed to have given consent to an evidentiary test of that person’s breath for the purpose of determining the person’s alcohol concentration or the presence of other drug in the blood. The test shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer.

        (2) Blood test. If breath testing equipment is not reasonably available or if the officer has reason to believe that the person is unable to give a sufficient sample of breath for testing or if the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is under the influence of a drug other than alcohol, the person is deemed to have given consent to the taking of an evidentiary sample of blood. If in the officer’s opinion the person is incapable of decision or unconscious or dead, it is deemed that the person’s consent is given and a sample of blood shall be taken. A blood test sought pursuant to this subdivision (2) shall be obtained pursuant to subsection (f) of this section.

        (3) Saliva test. If the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is under the influence of a drug other than alcohol, or under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug, the person is deemed to have given consent to providing of an evidentiary sample of saliva. A saliva test sought pursuant to this subdivision (3) shall be obtained pursuant to subsection (f) of this section. Any saliva test administered under this section shall be used only for the limited purpose of detecting the presence of a drug in the person’s body and shall not be used to extract DNA information.

        (4) Evidentiary test. The evidentiary test shall be required of a person when a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title.

      5. Fatal collision or incident resulting in serious bodily injury.   The evidentiary test shall also be required if the person is the surviving operator of a motor vehicle involved in a fatal incident or collision or an incident or collision resulting in serious bodily injury and the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has any amount of alcohol or other drug in his or her system.

      Subsection (a) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subsection (a) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      Every person who operates, attempts to operate, or is in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway in this State is deemed to have given consent to an evidentiary test of that person’s breath for the purpose of determining the person’s alcohol concentration or the presence of other drug in the blood. The test shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer.

    1. A refusal to take a breath test may be introduced as evidence in a criminal proceeding.
    2. A person who is requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to an evidentiary test or tests has a right as limited in this subsection to consult an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to such a test or tests. The person must decide whether or not to submit to the evidentiary test or tests within a reasonable time and not later than 30 minutes after the time of the initial attempt to contact the attorney. The person must make a decision about whether to submit to the test or tests at the expiration of the 30 minutes, regardless of whether a consultation took place.
    3. At the time a test is requested, the person shall be informed of the following statutory information:
      1. Vermont law authorizes a law enforcement officer to request a test to determine whether the person is under the influence of alcohol or other drug.
      2. If the officer’s request is reasonable and testing is refused, the person’s license or privilege to operate will be suspended for at least six months.
      3. If a test is taken and the results indicate that the person is under the influence of alcohol or other drug, the person will be subject to criminal charges and the person’s license or privilege to operate will be suspended for at least 90 days.
      4. Subdivision (d)(4) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subdivision (d)(4) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

        A person who is requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to an evidentiary test or tests has the limited right to consult an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to such a test or tests. The person must decide whether or not to submit to the evidentiary test or tests within a reasonable time and no later than 30 minutes from the time of the initial attempt to contact the attorney, regardless of whether a consultation took place. The person also has the right to have additional tests made by someone of the person’s own choosing at the person’s own expense. The person shall also be informed of the location of one or more facilities available for drawing blood.

        (4)

        Subdivision (d)(4) effective January 1, 2022; see also subdivision (d)(4) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

        A person who is requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to an evidentiary test or tests has the limited right to consult an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to such a test or tests. The person must decide whether or not to submit to the evidentiary test or tests within a reasonable time and not later than 30 minutes from the time of the initial attempt to contact the attorney, regardless of whether a consultation took place. The person also has the right to have additional tests made by someone of the person’s own choosing at the person’s own expense. The person shall also be informed of the location of one or more facilities available for drawing blood.

      5. A person who is requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to an evidentiary test administered with an infrared breath-testing instrument may elect to have a second infrared test administered immediately after receiving the results of the first test.
      6. If the person refuses to take an evidentiary test, the refusal may be offered into evidence against the person at trial, whether or not a search warrant is sought. The person may be charged with the crime of criminal refusal if the person:
        1. has previously been convicted of a violation of section 1201 of this title; or
        2. is involved in a crash or collision resulting in serious bodily injury or death to another, in which case the court may issue a search warrant and order the person to submit to a blood test, the results of which may be offered into evidence against the person at trial.
    4. In any proceeding under this subchapter, a law enforcement officer’s testimony that he or she is certified pursuant to section 20 V.S.A. § 2358 shall be prima facie evidence of that fact.
    5. Subsection (f) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subsection (f) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      If a blood test is sought from a person pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of this section, or if a person who has been involved in a crash or collision resulting in serious bodily injury or death to another refuses an evidentiary test, a law enforcement officer may apply for a search warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure to obtain a sample of blood for an evidentiary test. If a blood sample is obtained by search warrant, the fact of the refusal may still be introduced in evidence, in addition to the results of the evidentiary test. Once a law enforcement official begins the application process for a search warrant, the law enforcement official is not obligated to discontinue the process even if the person later agrees to provide an evidentiary breath sample. The limitation created by Rule 41(g) of the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding blood specimens shall not apply to search warrants authorized by this section.

      (f) (1)

      Subsection (f) effective January 1, 2022; see also subsection (f) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

      If a blood test is sought from a person pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of this section, or if a person who has been involved in a crash or collision resulting in serious bodily injury or death to another refuses an evidentiary test, a law enforcement officer may apply for a search warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure to obtain a sample of blood for an evidentiary test. Pursuant to subdivision (d)(6) of this section, if a blood sample is obtained by search warrant, the fact of the refusal may still be introduced in evidence, in addition to the results of the evidentiary test. Once a law enforcement official begins the application process for a search warrant, the law enforcement official is not obligated to discontinue the process even if the person later agrees to provide an evidentiary sample. The limitation created by Rule 41(g) of the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding blood specimens shall not apply to search warrants authorized by this section.

      (2) If an evidentiary saliva test is sought from a person pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section, a law enforcement officer may apply for a search warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure to obtain a sample of saliva for the evidentiary test. Pursuant to subdivision (d)(6) of this section, if a saliva sample is obtained by search warrant, the fact of the refusal may still be introduced in evidence, in addition to the results of the evidentiary test.

    6. Subsection (g) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subsection (g) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      The Defender General shall provide statewide 24-hour coverage seven days a week to assure that adequate legal services are available to persons entitled to consult an attorney under this section.

      (g)

      Subsection (g) effective January 1, 2022; see also subsection (g) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

      The Defender General shall provide statewide 24-hour coverage seven days a week to ensure that adequate legal services are available to persons entitled to consult an attorney under this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1973, No. 79 , § 2, eff. May 23, 1973; 1977, No. 96 , eff. May 5, 1977; 1981, No. 103 , § 3; 1985, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1989, No. 68 , § 3, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; 1991, No. 55 , § 3; 1991, No. 57 , § 2, eff. July 4, 1991; 1997, No. 56 , §§ 2, 3, eff. Aug. 1, 1997; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2001, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2017, No. 62 , § 9; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 23.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “a crash” for “an accident” in subdiv. (d)(6)(B) and subsec. (f) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Subdiv. (a)(3) added and former subdivs. (a)(3) and (a)(4) redesignated as subdivs. (a)(4) and (a)(5).

    Subdiv. (d)(4): Substituted “not” for “no” preceding “later than 30 minutes” in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (f)(1): Redesignated former subsec. (f) as subdiv. (f)(1), substituted “Pursuant to subdivision (d)(6) of this section” for “If” in the second sentence, and deleted “breath” preceding “sample” in the third sentence.

    Subdiv. (f)(2): Added.

    Subsec. (g): Substituted “ensure” for “assure.”

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Deleted “herein” preceding “limited”; inserted “in this subsection” following “limited”; substituted “not” for “no” preceding “later” and “after” for “from” following “minutes”; and deleted “or not” following “whether”.

    —2017. Section heading: Added “or Presence of Other Drug”.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Added the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (f): In the first sentence, inserted “a blood test is sought from a person pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of this section, or if” preceding “a person”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Inserted “except as provided in subsection (f) of this section” following “shall not be given”.

    Subdiv. (d)(6): Amended generally.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(2): Inserted “the officer has reason to believe that” preceding “the person is unable” in the first sentence.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added the subdiv. designations and headings; inserted “evidentiary” in subdivs. (a)(2)-(4); and substituted “incident” for “accident” twice and inserted “or other drug” in subdiv. (a)(4).

    —1997. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “of the following statutory information” for “that” following “informed” in the introductory paragraph and rewrote subdivs. (4) and (6).

    Subsecs. (f) and (g): Added.

    —1991. Subsec. (a): Act No. 55 substituted “person’s alcohol concentration or the presence of other drug in the blood” for “presence of alcohol or other drug in the blood” following “determining the” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 57 added the second sentence in subdiv. (4), added a new subdiv. (5), and redesignated former subdiv. (5) as subdiv. (6).

    —1989. Section amended generally.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added.

    —1981. Section amended generally.

    —1977. Section amended generally.

    —1973. Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Arrest powers of law enforcement officers of other states, see 13 V.S.A. § 5042 .

    Obedience to and authority of enforcement officers, see §§ 1012 and 1013 of this title.

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 1188.

    Construction.

    The words “any offense,” as used in this section included a situation where a person was not actually seen driving but the arresting officer had taken him into custody for the offense of intoxication and had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 1964-66 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 293.

    Forced tests.

    A police officer has no authority to forcibly take, or to order another to forcibly take, a blood sample from a driver who has refused the test. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 444.

    Request required.

    The word “shall,” as used in reference to officers’ duties, requires an officer to request a test, whenever he has reasonable grounds to believe a person is in violation of section 1201(a) of this title. 1968-70 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 226.

    Ability to give sufficient breath sample.

    —Generally.

    Administration of test.

    Admissibility of evidence.

    Arrest.

    Availability of equipment.

    Certification of officer.

    —Miranda warning.

    Choice of test.

    Conduct.

    Construction.

    Construction with other law.

    Failure to administer prior to blood test.

    Forced tests.

    Implied consent form.

    —Generally.

    Independent test.

    Independent test.

    Information concerning penalties.

    Legal services requirement.

    Officer’s duty generally.

    Preliminary screening test.

    Purpose.

    Reasonable grounds.

    Request required.

    Right to counsel.

    Right to counsel.

    Second test.

    Time for consideration.

    Validity.

    Waiver of rights.

    Ability to give sufficient breath sample.

    A police officer may not determine whether or not a person is capable of giving a sufficient sample of his breath and insist on a blood test if he decides the driver will not be able to give a sufficient sample. Miner v. District Court, 136 Vt. 426, 392 A.2d 390, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 768 (1978).

    —Generally.

    The State is entitled to use evidence of defendants’ refusals in a prosecution for criminal refusal without violating the general Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Morale, 174 Vt. 213, 811 A.2d 185, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 242 (2002).

    In prosecutions for criminal refusal, Miranda’s protections did not apply to evidence of defendants’ refusal to submit to breath tests, and thus their rights were not violated. State v. Morale, 174 Vt. 213, 811 A.2d 185, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 242 (2002).

    Both this section and section 1203 of this title are subject to section 1205 of this title, which allows a person asked to submit to a chemical test to refuse if he or she desires. State v. Yudichak, 147 Vt. 418, 519 A.2d 1150, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 436 (1986).

    Subsec. (c) of this section evidences the Legislature’s concern that any refusal to be tested shall not be lightly decided, by providing for counsel and for time for reflection. State v. Kozel, 146 Vt. 534, 505 A.2d 1221, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1986).

    By providing for counsel and time for reflection in this section, the Legislature demonstrated its concern that any refusal to be tested not be lightly decided, and to allow unauthorized police action to cloud the otherwise voluntary nature of that decision to refuse testing would be inconsistent with that concern. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Right to refuse to take test for blood alcohol content upon detention for suspected driving while intoxicated is solely a creature of statute; there is no constitutional right to refuse. State v. Welch, 136 Vt. 442, 394 A.2d 1115, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 771 (1978).

    Administration of test.

    Where police officer had “reasonable grounds” to believe that defendant had been driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, administration of breath test was permissible, and it did not matter whether the officer administered the test himself or delegated that task to another qualified officer. State v. Comstock, 145 Vt. 503, 494 A.2d 135, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 323 (1985).

    Admissibility of evidence.

    When unlawful police conduct relates solely to police activity that is unconnected to the decision to take the evidentiary breath test, and has no negative consequences to the criminal charge, suppression of a breath test is inappropriate. State v. May, 2005 VT 50, 178 Vt. 575, 878 A.2d 250, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2005) (mem.).

    Where defendant’s purpose in requesting cell phone calls to his father or his attorney at roadside was specifically to seek advice on whether to submit to a preliminary, nonevidentiary breath screening, no causal nexus existed between the refusal to permit the phone calls and any statements that were made after the officer’s refusal; therefore, suppression of an evidentiary breath test taken later at the station was error. State v. May, 2005 VT 50, 178 Vt. 575, 878 A.2d 250, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2005) (mem.).

    To suppress evidence of refusal to submit to a breath test, defendant must show a causal nexus between the alleged illegality and the evidence a defendant seeks to suppress. State v. Powers, 2004 VT 39, 176 Vt. 444, 852 A.2d 605, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 105 (2004).

    Defendant was not denied a fair trial because arresting officer, during cross-examination by defense counsel, twice made reference to giving defendant an alco-sensor test. State v. Beattie, 157 Vt. 162, 596 A.2d 919, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 159 (1991).

    Finding in civil license suspension proceeding that defendant was not given enough time to decide whether to take breath test did not collaterally estop State from introducing evidence at criminal DUI trial that defendant refused to take test, since State did not have full and fair opportunity in civil proceeding to litigate issue of whether defendant refused to take test. State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 617 A.2d 140, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 143 (1992).

    Results of breath test should have been suppressed, where trial court made a finding that the defendant was informed by officer at police station that refusal to take the test could result in overnight lodging. State v. Kozel, 146 Vt. 534, 505 A.2d 1221, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1986).

    Motorist was unduly prejudiced by admission of results of improperly obtained breath test, requiring reversal of conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, where numerical test result was admitted merely as corroboration that motorist had been drinking, the results were not related back to the time of operation, and the State emphasized the importance of the test results in its closing argument. State v. Kozel, 146 Vt. 534, 505 A.2d 1221, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1986).

    In the case of defendant found guilty of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, trial court was without error in denying motion to suppress evidence in connection with breath alcohol test which revealed an excess of .10 percent of alcohol in defendant’s blood where the officer had reasonable grounds to request the test. State v. LeBeau, 144 Vt. 315, 476 A.2d 128, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 445 (1984).

    Since subsec. (b) of this section explicitly states that a preliminary breath test is a screening device only, to be used to aid an officer in determining whether further and more accurate testing is required, and provides that its results are inadmissible as substantive evidence of intoxication, a defendant charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor may not waive the prohibition against using the results of such tests. State v. Hull, 143 Vt. 353, 465 A.2d 1371, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 525 (1983).

    In the case of defendant convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, trial court did not err in granting State’s motion in limine to exclude any evidence relating to alco-sensor preliminary breath test which measured defendant’s blood alcohol at .12 percent, as a result of which he was taken to police barracks and given a gas chromatograph breath test, which showed a reading of .20 percent blood alcohol. State v. Hull, 143 Vt. 353, 465 A.2d 1371, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 525 (1983).

    In the case of defendant convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, where the court granted defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence relating to a breath test, trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to introduce evidence of the fact that he voluntarily took the test, since the possibility of jury speculation as to the suppressed results was sufficient to render the admissibility of the fact that the test was taken a matter of trial court’s discretion. State v. Johnson, 143 Vt. 355, 465 A.2d 1366, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 523 (1983).

    Where the defendant, who was charged with driving under the influence and who remained at the police station without being arrested, while being processed by the police preliminary to being asked for a breath test, was refused the right to call her boyfriend until after the thirty minute waiting period, provided in subsec. (c) of this section, such refusal constituted an unauthorized restraint on the defendant sufficient to cloud the proceedings held pursuant to section 1205 of this title, relating to the defendant’s refusal to submit to the test, rendering evidence of that refusal inadmissible on trial, and was cause for remand for a new trial without the inadmissible evidence. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Arrest.

    The Legislature has made the sanction of license suspension available for refusal to take one of the specified tests measuring the alcoholic content of blood or breath whether or not there is an arrest, and an arrest is not a necessary prerequisite to its validity. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Availability of equipment.

    Breath-testing equipment was not reasonably available for purposes of the implied consent statute. It was not reasonable for an officer to remove defendant from the hospital where he was being treated to obtain a breath test, as he could not determine when the treatment would end and the two-hour permissive inference window would soon close; moreover, there was no evidence that the officer could have reached another location and administered a breath test to defendant within the two-hour window. State v. Dubuque, 2013 VT 3, 193 Vt. 180, 67 A.3d 238, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 5 (2013).

    Implied consent statute does not require law enforcement to make every possible effort to take a breath sample before requesting a blood sample; rather, it states that a person is deemed to give consent to a blood test when the breath-testing equipment is not reasonably available. Breath-testing equipment located outside the hospital facility is not reasonably available if the operator’s medical evaluation and treatment must be interrupted to reach it. State v. Dubuque, 2013 VT 3, 193 Vt. 180, 67 A.3d 238, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 5 (2013).

    Breath testing equipment was reasonably available to test hospitalized driver suspected of being intoxicated where police officer left it behind when he went to barracks to get blood test kit and where it was available at police station minutes away from hospital. Miner v. District Court, 136 Vt. 426, 392 A.2d 390, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 768 (1978).

    Certification of officer.

    In this section’s provisions that a breath sample shall be taken “whenever a state police officer or a law enforcement officer who has been certified by the Vermont criminal justice training council...had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating, attempting to operate or was in actual physical control of any vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor” the certification requirement applies only to the “law enforcement officers,” and not to the State Police. State v. Tierney, 138 Vt. 163, 412 A.2d 298, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1046 (1980).

    —Miranda warning.

    The warnings called for in Miranda do not apply to blood or chemical tests requested or taken under the implied consent law. Veilleux v. Springer, 131 Vt. 33, 300 A.2d 620, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 263 (1973).

    Implied consent law is not criminal in nature and the Miranda warning does not apply to blood tests. State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1971).

    Choice of test.

    Official requesting that a test taken does not have the power under this section and section 1205 of this title to select the test. State v. Pinard, 130 Vt. 41, 285 A.2d 774, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 219 (1971).

    Conduct.

    A refusal to submit to alcohol testing can be inferred from the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances; an individual may refuse testing through his behavior as well as by his words. Fontaine v. District Court, 150 Vt. 28, 547 A.2d 1362, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 96 (1988).

    Where plaintiff, who had been stopped by a police officer on suspicion of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, refused to take a nonevidentiary alco-sensor test, refused to accompany the officer to the police station for further testing, drove away from the scene in defiance of the officer’s express injunction against further driving, refused to go to the station for processing when later confronted by police in a field behind his residence, and countered the requests with cursing and attempted assaultive behavior, plaintiff’s conduct justified the police in concluding that he had refused testing, even though plaintiff was not asked in specific terms to take a “breath test.” nor advised of his attendant rights as provided by subsec. (c) of this section. Craw v. District Court, 150 Vt. 114, 549 A.2d 1065, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 116 (1988).

    Refusal to submit to breath test under this section may demonstrated by conduct which would lead a reasonable person in trooper’s position to believe that the person understood request to submit to test and manifested unwillingness to do so, and a person need not show refusal by an express, affirmative statement; in absence thereof, refusal may be inferred from totality of circumstances. Gilman v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 155 Vt. 251, 583 A.2d 86, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 192 (1990).

    One may refuse a blood alcohol content test by his deeds as well as his words. Stockwell v. District Court, 143 Vt. 45, 460 A.2d 466, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 462 (1983).

    Refusal to submit to testing of blood alcohol content by a person suspected of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor need not be evidenced only by an express, affirmative statement of refusal; in the absence of such a statement, a refusal may be implied from the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Stockwell v. District Court, 143 Vt. 45, 460 A.2d 466, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 462 (1983).

    A refusal to submit to a blood alcohol content test for the purposes of this section occurs when the licensee, upon being asked to take the test, conducts himself in a way which would justify a reasonable person in the officer’s position in believing that the licensee understood that he had been asked to take a test and that he had manifested an unwillingness to take it. Stockwell v. District Court, 143 Vt. 45, 460 A.2d 466, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 462 (1983).

    In the case of plaintiff whose motor vehicle driver’s license was suspended for refusal to submit to chemical test during the course of processing by the State Police on suspicion of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, where after plaintiff spoke with an attorney he would not give any clear verbal expression of either consent or refusal to take the test, responding to questions as to his intent with silence, meaningless insults, and incoherencies, the police were justified in concluding that his actions indicated a refusal nineteen minutes after the attorney had been contacted. Stockwell v. District Court, 143 Vt. 45, 460 A.2d 466, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 462 (1983).

    Construction.

    Defendant refused to submit to an “evidentiary test” within meaning of implied consent statute, notwithstanding fact that Department of Health had not yet promulgated regulations governing use of infrared testing device for which defendant refused to provide a sample. State v. King, 160 Vt. 612, 624 A.2d 1144, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 28 (1993) (mem.).

    This section presumes that a defendant will remain in the presence of the police long enough for them to carry out the provisions of the testing procedure. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    The implied consent law is not a criminal proceeding, thus its provisions need not be strictly construed. State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1971).

    Construction with other law.

    The void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply to a standardized warning read to DUI suspects. It is the statute, not the warning, that establishes the elements of the offense, and it is the statute that must fairly advise suspects of the prohibited conduct. State v. Coburn, 2006 VT 31, 179 Vt. 448, 898 A.2d 128, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 51 (2006).

    Because the statutory right to advisement goes above and beyond any due process requirement of statutory clarity (in that the majority of suspects receive no warning whatsoever before committing a crime, but are nonetheless held accountable to criminal sanctions prescribed in Vermont’s statutes), all that is required to satisfy this right is that the warning convey the information listed in the statute. State v. Coburn, 2006 VT 31, 179 Vt. 448, 898 A.2d 128, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 51 (2006).

    Although it grants a right to counsel, 23 V.S.A. § 1202 contains little detail about that right, and so when called upon to define the nature of the right, the courts have often looked to the public defender act, specifically 13 V.S.A. § 5234 of that act, reasoning that 23 V.S.A. § 1202 and 13 V.S.A. § 5234 should be read in pari materia. State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995).

    The person being processed under 23 V.S.A. § 1202 must be informed of his right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to a chemical test. State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995).

    The rights contained in the public defender act are not directly applicable to the right in the implied consent law to consult counsel before deciding whether to take a blood-alcohol test; the public defender act implements the general right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Article 10 of Chapter I of the Vermont Constitution while the right to consult with counsel contained in the implied consent law is purely statutory, created by 23 V.S.A. § 1202(c) , and is not constitutionally mandated because the decision whether to take the breath test is not a critical stage of the prosecution. State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995).

    The public defender act applies only when the defendant is detained or charged and only with respect to conditions in which a person having his own counsel would be entitled to be so represented, whereas the implied consent statute applies whenever a person is asked to take a blood-alcohol test irrespective of whether the person is detained at the time. State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995).

    13 V.S.A. § 5237 states specifically that it relates only to persons informed of the right to counsel under 13 V.S.A. § 5234 and the waiver of rights created in the public defender act, and thus by its terms the statute does not apply to rights created by the implied consent law and advice given under that law. State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995).

    A written waiver rule is not necessary to implement or safeguard the right to counsel; the court has held that oral waivers of the right to counsel are effective under Miranda, and if a constitutional right to counsel can be waived orally, it would appear that a statutory right to counsel can be so waived. State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995).

    The right to counsel provision of the implied consent law and the waiver provision of the public defender act are not to be held in pari materia, and therefore the written waiver requirement of 13 V.S.A. § 5237 is inapplicable to the waiver of the right to consult counsel prior to deciding whether to take a blood-alcohol test. State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995).

    Failure to administer prior to blood test.

    Officer had no authority to insist that defendant submit to a blood test, based on doctor’s concern that stitches on defendant’s chin might possibly open up if defendant tried to blow into breath testing machine, and therefore trial court erred in holding that defendant had refused to provide an evidentiary sample. State v. Ratliff, 169 Vt. 599, 738 A.2d 96, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 218 (1999) (mem.).

    Failure to administer a breath test prior to a blood test did not violate subsec. (a) of this section where arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that driver was under the influence of drugs contained in over-the-counter medicines in addition to alcohol. State v. Greenia, 147 Vt. 596, 522 A.2d 242, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 425 (1987).

    Where a State Police officer requested a blood sample instead of a breath sample from the surviving operator in a fatal collision, suppression of the results of the blood sample in a subsequent DWI prosecution was required. State v. Yudichak, 147 Vt. 418, 519 A.2d 1150, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 436 (1986).

    Forced tests.

    The statutory right to refuse an evidentiary blood alcohol test under subsec. (b) of this section is absolute, clear, and unmistakable; the sanctions imposed for this refusal are adequate and contemplated by the Legislature in the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Beyor, 161 Vt. 565, 641 A.2d 344, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 183 (1993) (mem.).

    Unauthorized police actions which cloud the voluntary nature of the decision whether to submit to a breath test flaw the procedure and require remedial action. State v. Lombard, 146 Vt. 411, 505 A.2d 1182, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 390 (1985).

    Implied consent form.

    Trial court erred by holding that implied consent form inadequately apprised DUI defendant of the civil consequences of submitting to an alcohol breath test; although form did not fully describe the procedural consequences when operator submitted to breath test and results showed impairment, form did contain all information required by statute. State v. Lynaugh, 158 Vt. 72, 604 A.2d 785, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1992).

    —Generally.

    In the language of subsec. (a) of this section, the Legislature has expressed its preference for breath testing over blood testing. State v. Yudichak, 147 Vt. 418, 519 A.2d 1150, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 436 (1986).

    Independent test.

    In the absence of any language to the contrary, the blood alcohol test consent statute does not require a trooper to inform the defendant of the possibility that a hospital would waive the charge for an independent test and later seek reimbursement from the Office of the Defender General. State v. Richard, 2016 VT 75, 202 Vt. 519, 150 A.3d 1093, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2016).

    Court rejects the suggestion that Webb stands for the proposition that a police officer may never tell a defendant that he or she must pay for an independent test before its administration. Rather, a possible violation of the blood alcohol test consent statute emerges only if the officer does so inaccurately, and it is the defendant’s burden to prove that inaccuracy; indeed, by its plain language, the statute specifically requires a trooper to inform the defendant that an independent test will be at the defendant’s own expense. State v. Richard, 2016 VT 75, 202 Vt. 519, 150 A.3d 1093, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2016).

    There was no statutory violation when the Department of Health’s mislabeling and destruction of defendant’s blood sample prevented him from obtaining an independent test. There was no evidence that the State trooper acted in bad faith or did anything to prevent defendant from obtaining an independent blood sample; it was the Department that failed to correctly label the sample, resulting in it being misfiled and eventually destroyed. State v. Gentes, 2013 VT 14, 193 Vt. 669, 70 A.3d 967, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 12 (2013) (mem.).

    Plain language of subdiv. (d)(4) of this section indicates Legislature’s intent to provide a mechanism for additional chemical tests, but only at expense of person being tested. State v. Wright, 169 Vt. 573, 740 A.2d 347, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 84 (1999) (mem.).

    Defendant who was detained in custody after administration of a breath test should have been advised of the State’s obligation to arrange for an independent blood test upon demand. State v. Karmen, 150 Vt. 547, 554 A.2d 670, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 205 (1988).

    In the case of defendant convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to introduce evidence of the failure of the arresting officer to advise defendant that arrangements for an independent blood test would be made for him if he requested such a test, since the fact that defendant successfully moved to have the results of the evidentiary breath test suppressed cured any possible prejudice resulting from the officer’s failure to advise defendant of that right. State v. Johnson, 143 Vt. 355, 465 A.2d 1366, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 523 (1983).

    Independent test.

    One of the primary purposes of the right to an independent test guaranteed by subsec. (c) of this section is to protect a defendant against possible error involved in testing or in the results of the test made by the authorities. State v. Hoffman, 148 Vt. 320, 532 A.2d 577, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 494 (1987).

    Where trial court found that defendant was detained in custody after administration of a breath test, its conclusion that because defendant made no unequivocal demand for an independent blood test, the police were under no obligation to arrange one, was erroneous. State v. Karmen, 150 Vt. 547, 554 A.2d 670, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 205 (1988).

    One of the primary purposes of subsec. (c) of this section, which gives a person who is requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to an evidentiary breath test the right to an independent blood test to determine alcohol content, is to protect against possible error involved in testing or in the results of the tests made by the authorities; thus, a person who refuses to submit to the evidentiary test is not entitled to an independent test. State v. Johnson, 143 Vt. 355, 465 A.2d 1366, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 523 (1983).

    Information concerning penalties.

    Where defendant conferred with his attorney before submitting to breath test and attorney informed him of penalties for refusal to take test, erroneous information from police officer on penalties did not prejudice defendant and did not warrant reversal of conviction under section 1201(a)(1) of this title. State v. West, 151 Vt. 140, 557 A.2d 873, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 240 (1988).

    Legal services requirement.

    Defender General’s specific direction to on-call attorneys not to provide any legal services to a DUI detainee unless the police officer disclosed the operator’s prior record breached the Defender General’s statutory responsibility to provide twenty-four hour counsel. State v. Velez, 2003 VT 1, 174 Vt. 448, 819 A.2d 712 (2002) (mem.).

    Because the State failed to comply with subsec. (g) of this section, defendant could not obtain legal advice to aid him in weighing his options as the law intended, and the only fair remedy was to suppress the result of defendant’s uninformed choice. State v. Gilman, 173 Vt. 110, 787 A.2d 1238, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 373 (2001).

    Officer’s duty generally.

    A failure to impart all possible information to a detained DUI motorist does not justify suppression or dismissal. State v. Lynaugh, 158 Vt. 72, 604 A.2d 785, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1992).

    A police officer who asks a person suspected of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor to submit to a preliminary field alcohol test is not required to inquire of the motorist the state of his or her driving record, or to calculate the length of revocation of the motorist’s license if there is an election not to take a test, or to inform the motorist of the latest developments in the law. Carpenter v. Vermont Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 143 Vt. 329, 465 A.2d 1379, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 529 (1983).

    Officers arresting driver suspected of driving while intoxicated fully explained requirements of implied consent law to driver and did all that was required of them by such law where they advised him of his rights, though not required to, read standard implied consent law form to him, asked which test he wished to take, allowed him to read form, answered request for breath test given by a doctor with answer that doctor could not give it but a State trooper would, told him he could have an additional test given by a doctor of his choice, and ended the discussion when, after breath test was set up, driver refused to take it and consistently demanded a saliva test, for which facilities were not available, which nonavailability had been explained to driver. State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1971).

    Preliminary screening test.

    The results of a preliminary breath alco-sensor screen test indicating impairment, although inadmissible as evidence, may provide a reasonable ground to believe that a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor and, in addition, may be used to determine whether more accurate testing is appropriate. State v. LeBeau, 144 Vt. 315, 476 A.2d 128, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 445 (1984).

    Results of a preliminary breath alcohol screening test which indicate impairment, although inadmissible as evidence, may loans provide the reasonable grounds to believe a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor required by this section. State v. Orvis, 143 Vt. 388, 465 A.2d 1361, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 521 (1983).

    The inadmissibility of results of preliminary breath alcohol screening devices at trial set forth in subsec. (b) of this section does not deprive them of all utility, but merely reflects a determination that more sensitive measurements are easily available and therefore should be used. State v. Orvis, 143 Vt. 388, 465 A.2d 1361, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 521 (1983).

    Purpose.

    The principal purpose of this section is to encourage the availability of scientific evidence of the presence or absence of alcohol in a person’s blood. State v. Lund, 144 Vt. 171, 475 A.2d 1055, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 430 (1984), State v. Begins (1987) 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474.

    The primary purpose of the Legislature, in authorizing breath and blood tests, was to make available to law enforcement officers an alternative and more science-related aid in detecting the extent of alcohol impairment, if any, of persons suspected of DUI. State v. Begins, 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474 (1987).

    Implied consent law was meant to deal with persons operating vehicles while under the influence of liquor or drugs, promote public safety and welfare and lessen, so far as possible, the danger to the public from persons operating vehicles while under the influence of liquor or drugs, and encourage availability of scientific evidence of presence or absence of alcohol or drugs. State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1971).

    Reasonable grounds.

    Automobile passenger’s driver’s license was properly revoked under section 1205 of this title for fourth refusal to submit to testing where officer had reasonable grounds to believe he was operator, even though passenger claimed he did not actually operate or control vehicle and subsec. (a) of this section relates to consent by person who operates, attempts to operate, or is in control of vehicle. Shaw v. District Court, 152 Vt. 1, 563 A.2d 636, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1989).

    The purpose of requirement of subsec. (a) of this section that a police officer have “reasonable grounds” to take a breath sample from a person suspected of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is to require that a certain amount of evidence exist before an officer may take a breath test. State v. Comstock, 145 Vt. 503, 494 A.2d 135, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 323 (1985).

    In the case of defendant convicted of driving while there was .10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood, trial court properly refused to give defendant’s requested instruction asking the jury to decide whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to request a breath test when defendant acted normally and appeared in control of his faculties, since defendant had informed the officer that he had done a lot of drinking and could “pack it away” without visible effects, and, therefore, reasonable grounds for further investigation existed as a matter of law. State v. Orvis, 143 Vt. 388, 465 A.2d 1361, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 521 (1983).

    Request required.

    Law enforcement officers are not required to offer to, or request of, DUI suspects a breath or blood test as a precondition for prosecution under section 1201(a)(2) of this title; overruling State v. Lund (1984) 144 Vt. 171, 475 A.2d 1055, to the extent of inconsistency. State v. Begins, 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474 (1987).

    This section mandates that whenever a State Police officer or a certified officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the officer must request that the suspect operator submit to testing. State v. Lund, 144 Vt. 171, 475 A.2d 1055, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 430 (1984), State v. Begins (1987) 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474.

    Law enforcement agents not certified by the Vermont Criminal Justice Training Council to administer a breath test to a person suspected of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor do not have an obligation under this section to request a breath sample and may process suspects without requesting a sample; however, under those circumstances, a prosecution could only proceed for driving under the influence and not for driving while there is .10 percent or more alcohol in the blood. State v. Lund, 144 Vt. 171, 475 A.2d 1055, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 430 (1984), State v. Begins (1987) 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474.

    In those instances where it is impossible for a qualified officer to either make a request that a person suspected of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor give a breath or blood sample or to secure a breath or blood sample of the suspect, the State is free to proceed to prosecute the suspect in the same manner as if the defendant had refused to submit to testing, or as if there were no personnel or facilities reasonably available to obtain a sample of the defendant’s breath or blood. State v. Lund, 144 Vt. 171, 475 A.2d 1055, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 430 (1984), State v. Begins (1987) 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474.

    Where sheriff who arrested defendant for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was certified to operate breath testing equipment and had the requisite probable cause to request that defendant submit to a breath test, his failure to make the required request violated this section and required reversal of defendant’s conviction despite the fact that there was evidence to support the jury’s verdict. State v. Lund, 144 Vt. 171, 475 A.2d 1055, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 430 (1984), State v. Begins (1987) 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 474.

    Mandatory aspect of word “shall” as used in this section concerns the duties of the investigating police officers, and in situation where operator is suspected of driving while intoxicated, officers are required to make request that suspect operator submit to testing, although driver retains his statutory option to refuse and suffer consequences. State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1977).

    Right to counsel.

    When the trial court found that defendant repeatedly stated to the police officer his belief that everything, including his conversation with counsel, was being recorded, yet the police officer said nothing to contradict defendant’s belief, a reasonable person in defendant’s circumstances could conclude that the conversation was being recorded given the officer’s silence in response to defendant’s multiple statements that he knew he was being recorded. Accordingly, the motion to suppress should have been granted. State v. Gagne, 2016 VT 68, 202 Vt. 255, 148 A.3d 986, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 64 (2016).

    State did not violate the statute governing consent to taking tests to determine blood alcohol content when the officer took all reasonable steps to provide defendant with his statutory right to counsel: the officer called the two public defenders on duty, allowed defendant to speak privately with the available attorney, again called the two attorneys after defendant said he had been placed on hold, and gave defendant the full thirty-minute period to wait for the attorneys to return his calls. Additionally, defendant was able to reach a public defender and speak with him on the phone, however briefly. State v. Aiken, 2015 VT 99, 200 Vt. 247, 129 A.3d 87, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 78 (2015).

    There was no indication here that the on-call public defender who put defendant on hold was acting under any directive or enforcing any policy of the Defender General in his interaction with defendant. Thus, there was no violation of the statute governing consent to taking tests to determine blood alcohol content. State v. Aiken, 2015 VT 99, 200 Vt. 247, 129 A.3d 87, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 78 (2015).

    Court’s cases involving the statute governing consent to taking tests to determine blood alcohol content emphasize the importance of privacy in the detainee’s consultation with an attorney; the statutory mandate is fulfilled when reasonable efforts are made to allow an arrestee to consult privately with counsel. Although the consultation here was brief, an attorney-client relationship was formed, and peering behind the veil of that privacy to ascertain the quality of the consultation would open the door to eroding the privacy afforded to detainees in their right to counsel. State v. Aiken, 2015 VT 99, 200 Vt. 247, 129 A.3d 87, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 78 (2015).

    Relying upon testimony about the content of confidential communication with counsel is unworkable and puts the State in the position of guarantor that the content of the communication is minimally adequate. The best course is to not allow the content of confidential communications to be the basis for determining a violation of the statute governing consent to taking tests to determine blood alcohol content. State v. Aiken, 2015 VT 99, 200 Vt. 247, 129 A.3d 87, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 78 (2015).

    A DUI suspect’s statutory right to consult an attorney prior to deciding whether to submit to an evidentiary test does not entitle the suspect to a consultation with the attorney of the suspect’s choosing. State v. May, 2005 VT 50, 178 Vt. 575, 878 A.2d 250, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2005) (mem.).

    Having a statutory right to consult with an attorney is completely ineffective unless police inform defendants of that right before administering an evidentiary breath test; further, the conversation must be meaningful and reasonably private. State v. Powers, 2004 VT 39, 176 Vt. 444, 852 A.2d 605, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 105 (2004).

    Defendant’s right to private consultation with an attorney before submitting to a breath test is not absolute; however, police may only monitor a suspect’s conversation if the likelihood that the suspect will flee or present a threat to himself or others outweighs the right. State v. Powers, 2004 VT 39, 176 Vt. 444, 852 A.2d 605, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 105 (2004).

    When faced with a challenge under the statute governing defendant’s right to private consultation with an attorney before submitting to a breath test, where defendant does not present a security risk, a court must determine if the police justifiably monitored the consultation and whether that monitoring caused defendant to feel inhibited during the conversation under an objective standard. State v. Powers, 2004 VT 39, 176 Vt. 444, 852 A.2d 605, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 105 (2004).

    State violated defendant’s right to a reasonably private consultation with an attorney where an officer respecting defendant’s right to a private consultation with an attorney, turned off the audio recording, but because defendant was told that the processing was being recorded, defendant reasonably believed that his conversation with his attorney was also being recorded. State v. Powers, 2004 VT 39, 176 Vt. 444, 852 A.2d 605, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 105 (2004).

    Where defendant made no showing that there was any causal connection between the misinformation in the form used to advise him of his right to consult an attorney before submitting to a breath test and his refusal to take the test, his failure to claim or demonstrate some minimal level of prejudice prevented suppression of the breath test. State v. Roya, 174 Vt. 451, 807 A.2d 371, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 142 (2002) (mem.).

    Requesting an attorney under subsec. (c) of this section was not equivalent to invoking constitutional right to an attorney, and therefore fact that defendant exercised his statutory right to contact an attorney before taking breath test did not affect validity of his subsequent waiver of right to counsel, which he signed prior to being questioned by police. State v. Stenson, 169 Vt. 590, 738 A.2d 567, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 212 (1999) (mem.).

    Consent form read to DUI suspect, informing him of his right to counsel prior to deciding whether to take breath test, failed to adequately advise him that he had right to speak to a public defender regardless of his income level, and therefore District Court properly entered judgment for suspect in his subsequent civil license suspension hearing. State v. Madonna, 169 Vt. 98, 726 A.2d 498, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 25 (1999).

    Constitutional protections available in criminal proceedings do not attach to statutory right to counsel under implied consent statute, either at the time a breath sample is requested, or at a subsequent license-suspension hearing, and therefore Miranda warnings do not apply to blood or chemical tests requested or taken under Vermont’s implied consent law. State v. Nemkovich, 168 Vt. 8, 712 A.2d 899, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 166 (1998).

    Courts should undertake an independent analysis of the validity of an individual’s purported waiver of Miranda rights on the one hand, and waiver of the statutory right to consult an attorney prior to submitting to an evidentiary breath test under the implied consent statute on the other. State v. Nemkovich, 168 Vt. 8, 712 A.2d 899, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 166 (1998).

    District Court erred in suppressing results of DUI defendant’s evidentiary breath test due to invalid waiver of his Miranda rights; validity of waivers of Miranda rights and of implied consent rights should be analyzed independently, and where State trooper read defendant his implied consent rights from processing form, defendant acknowledged his understanding of those rights, and then signed written waiver of right to consult an attorney, this valid waiver of defendant’s implied consent rights was not tainted by earlier invalid Miranda waiver. State v. Nemkovich, 168 Vt. 8, 712 A.2d 899, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 166 (1998).

    Where defendant was told he had a right to talk to a lawyer before questioning and specifically, and in writing, waived that right, defendant executed a written waiver to fully satisfy the requirement of the public defender act, and requiring a written waiver a second time around to respond to the question of whether defendant would take the breath test would be overly formalistic, even ritualistic. State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995).

    DUI defendant did not satisfy his burden of demonstration prejudice arising from alleged deficiencies in implied consent form, where defendant made no claim that he relied on any incomplete information in making his decision to waive assistance of counsel before taking breath test. State v. Lynaugh, 158 Vt. 72, 604 A.2d 785, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1992).

    Although form used by processing officer to record advice given DUI suspect did not indicate defendant was advised of right to consult attorney at public expense before making decision whether to submit to breath test, reversal of suspension of operator’s license was not required; defendant had burden of production on issue of prejudice, and was required to introduce some evidence that any deficiency in the advice he received was prejudicial. State v. Hamm, 157 Vt. 666, 599 A.2d 1048, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 200 (1991) (mem.).

    A person asked to take a breath test must be informed that a needy person may consult with an attorney at public expense before making a decision. State v. Gracey, 140 Vt. 199, 436 A.2d 741, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 580 (1981).

    Law enforcement officer’s failure to inform driver who submitted to blood alcohol test of his right to consult counsel before deciding whether to submit mandated suppression of the results of the test. State v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537, 394 A.2d 1145, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 662 (1978).

    13 V.S.A. § 5234 , requiring that a law enforcement officer clearly inform a person of his right to be represented by an attorney if he is being detained by the officer without charge or judicial process, read in pari materia with this section’s provision that a person requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test for blood alcohol content shall have the right to consult an attorney prior to deciding whether to submit to the test, requires that a person be informed of his right to consult counsel before deciding whether to submit to a blood alcohol test. State v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537, 394 A.2d 1145, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 662 (1978).

    Right to counsel.

    Where perceived monitoring of his conversation with an attorney caused defendant to feel inhibited from asking questions, his inability to get answers to these questions contributed in large part to his decision to refuse the evidentiary breath test, and there was therefore a sufficient causal nexus between the police violation of his statutory right with an attorney and his refusal to submit to the evidentiary breath test; the District Court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of that refusal and, because that evidence was central to the State’s case in the civil suspension hearing, the court further erred in suspending defendant’s driver’s license. State v. Powers, 2004 VT 39, 176 Vt. 444, 852 A.2d 605, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 105 (2004).

    Mechanism established by the Legislature for providing DUI detainees an opportunity to obtain professional advice from counsel before deciding whether to submit to a test places clear responsibilities on two agencies of State government: the police, who must comply with their statutory obligation to contact the public defender at the appropriate time during DUI processing, and the public defenders, who equally must comply with their statutory obligation to counsel detainees. State v. Velez, 2003 VT 1, 174 Vt. 448, 819 A.2d 712 (2002) (mem.).

    The right to consultation is the right for DUI detainees to obtain accurate information about their legal options; it is not the right to unassailable legal advice. State v. Velez, 2003 VT 1, 174 Vt. 448, 819 A.2d 712 (2002) (mem.).

    Defendant’s statutory right to counsel before deciding whether or not to take a breath test is violated where the police unjustifiably monitor a defendant’s legal consultation and the monitoring inhibits, coerces, or otherwise restricts the defendant’s ability to meaningfully engage with his attorney. State v. Sherwood, 174 Vt. 27, 800 A.2d 463, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 60 (2002).

    Conclusion that the State violated defendant’s right to a private consultation with his lawyer prior to his decision to take or forego a breath test by taping the conversation was warranted because the tape itself was evidence that defendant’s conversation with counsel was not, in fact, private, and, as the trial court found, the State did not have a legitimate security concern regarding defendant. State v. Sherwood, 174 Vt. 27, 800 A.2d 463, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 60 (2002).

    Even though the State violated defendant’s right to a private consultation with his lawyer prior to his decision to take or forego a breath test, the remedy of dismissal is simply not warranted in the absence of prejudice to defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Sherwood, 174 Vt. 27, 800 A.2d 463, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 60 (2002).

    Even though the State violated defendant’s right to a private consultation with his lawyer prior to his decision to take or forego a breath test, suppression of his refusal to submit to the test was neither appropriate nor required because some causal nexus must exist between the alleged illegality and the evidence a defendant seeks to keep from the jury, and defendant’s refusal to provide an evidentiary sample of his breath could in no way be construed as the product of the surreptitious videotaping of which he was completely unaware at the time he decided to refuse to submit to the test. State v. Sherwood, 174 Vt. 27, 800 A.2d 463, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 60 (2002).

    Supreme Court will not tolerate police practices which unjustifiably interfere with the statutory right of defendant to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel before submitting to a breath test. State v. Sherwood, 174 Vt. 27, 800 A.2d 463, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 60 (2002).

    Police officer’s refusal to provide criminal record information, and counsel’s subsequent refusal to provide legal advice to DUI suspect, did not amount to total denial of suspect’s opportunity to consult with counsel; mandate of subsec. (c) of this section was satisfied when suspect was allowed to consult on telephone in private with counsel. State v. Ironside, 167 Vt. 628, 711 A.2d 663, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 59 (1998), But see, State v. Velez, 2003 VT 1, 175 Vt. 23, 819 A.2d 712, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 1 (2003) (mem.).

    Fact that arresting officer unintentionally provided erroneous information to public defender concerning number of prior DWI convictions defendant had did not mean defendant was deprived of meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel; right to counsel contained in this section concerns an arrestee’s opportunity to consult freely with an attorney, not with attorney’s right to consult with, or obtain correct information from, police. State v. Fredette, 167 Vt. 586, 705 A.2d 548, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 280 (1997) (mem.).

    Suppression of defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath test was proper where he had declined to submit to a test without consulting an attorney, and the arresting officer was unable to contact his lawyer or a public defender. State v. Berini, 167 Vt. 565, 701 A.2d 1055, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 241 (1997) (mem.).

    The right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution does not attach at the time of decision to take or refuse to take a breath test in accordance with subsec. (c) of this section. State v. West, 151 Vt. 140, 557 A.2d 873, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 240 (1988).

    Right to counsel test is objective test focusing on whether, under totality of circumstances, reasonable efforts were made to afford defendant opportunity to communicate privately with counsel, subjective beliefs are not determinative; focus is on nature of physical setting and how reasonable person in defendant’s position would have understood situation. State v. West, 151 Vt. 140, 557 A.2d 873, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 240 (1988).

    Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel under subsec. (c) of this section, even though police officers remained within sight and range of hearing during defendant’s telephone conversation with his attorney, where defendant knew from his experience as a law enforcement officer that he could have asked for more privacy, there was no evidence that the police attempted to eavesdrop or that they used information obtained from the conversation to defendant’s detriment, and defendant made no showing as to what else he might have desired to ask his attorney had there been no officers nearby. State v. West, 151 Vt. 140, 557 A.2d 873, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 240 (1988).

    Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying petition for extraordinary relief of defendant whose operator’s license had been suspended; defendant’s stance what he would take breath test only after consulting lawyer he knew to be unavailable was tantamount to refusal under this section. Gilman v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 155 Vt. 251, 583 A.2d 86, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 192 (1990).

    In all cases where a person is being processed on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, and regardless of the suspect’s financial need, a public defender shall be notified before the suspect is required to decide whether or not to submit to a blood alcohol test, unless a public defender is waived by the suspect contacts an attorney of choice within thirty minutes. State v. Garvey, 157 Vt. 105, 595 A.2d 267, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 118 (1991).

    Under the totality of the circumstances test, defendant’s delay in taking a blood alcohol evidentiary test amounted to a refusal of such test; the officer made a reasonable effort to contact his attorney of choice several times and did manage to contact a public defender to speak with the defendant; the relevant statute does not require that the defendant speak with the attorney of his choice, just that he be afforded an opportunity to speak with an attorney. State v. George, 157 Vt. 580, 602 A.2d 953, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 230 (1991).

    Defendant’s right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether or not to take a breath test was not compromised by the fact that he consulted with his attorney before he was asked to take the test, rather than after the request was made, where after the conversation with the attorney defendant told a police officer that he had been advised to take the breath test. State v. Trombley, 147 Vt. 371, 518 A.2d 20, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 432 (1986).

    Defendant’s right to consult with counsel before submitting to a breath test under subsec. (c) of this section was not violated because the arresting officer remained in close proximity and was able to overhear parts of the defendant’s conversation with his attorney, since officer’s presence was justified by a legitimate security risk and there was no evidence that defendant felt inhibited, coerced, or restricted in his conversation by the officer’s presence. State v. Lombard, 146 Vt. 411, 505 A.2d 1182, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 390 (1985).

    A person who is asked to take a breath test has the right to consult with an attorney before making a decision. State v. Gracey, 140 Vt. 199, 436 A.2d 741, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 580 (1981).

    Second test.

    Because credibility determinations are solely within the province of the fact finder, the trial court in a civil driver’s license suspension proceeding did not err in choosing to discredit a forensic chemist’s testimony where it directly contradicted the State’s own training manual, which provided that in the event of a fatal error, a machine should be taken out of service. The trial court properly grounded its decision that the second test to actually yield a result was not conducted in a valid or reliable manner in accordance with the Department of Health’s methodology. State v. Spooner, 2012 VT 90, 192 Vt. 465, 60 A.3d 640, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2012).

    Read in light of one another, the driver’s license civil suspension statute and the implied consent statute dictate that if a person elects to have a second blood alcohol test, the methods of that test are reviewable for validity and reliability by the court at a final civil-suspension hearing. State v. Spooner, 2012 VT 90, 192 Vt. 465, 60 A.3d 640, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2012).

    Driver’s license civil-suspension statute clearly calls on the trial judge to review both the reliability of any evidentiary tests conducted and compliance with the implied consent statute. The implied consent statute affords a person a right to a second blood alcohol test, which must be conducted in a reliable fashion; if a court finds that the second test was conducted in an unreliable fashion, the State has necessarily failed to carry its burden to establish compliance with the implied consent statute, and the court must then deny the civil suspension of a defendant’s license. State v. Spooner, 2012 VT 90, 192 Vt. 465, 60 A.3d 640, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2012).

    Statutory compliance is an element the State had the burden to establish to prevail in its civil-suspension complaint. The trial court correctly concluded that the lack of a reliable second test deprived the State of an essential element to establish its civil-suspension case. State v. Spooner, 2012 VT 90, 192 Vt. 465, 60 A.3d 640, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2012).

    Where after the first breath test of defendant, he asked to take a second test, and when the officer attempted to perform the test, the machine malfunctioned, there was no reason to suppress the results of the first test because there was no evidence that the test was invalid or that the police officer acted in bad faith, and defendant was properly informed of his right to take an independent test but chose not to do so. State v. Vezina, 2004 VT 62, 177 Vt. 488, 857 A.2d 313, 2004 Vt. LEXIS 183 (2004) (mem.).

    Time for consideration.

    Where police officer tried five times over a period of forty-one minutes to administer a blood-alcohol test to defendant, who had been arrested for driving under the influence and had stated during his Miranda rights that he refused the test, the defendant’s subsequent consent did not “cure” his earlier refusal since defendant deliberated beyond the thirty-minute statutory time limit imposed by 23 V.S.A. § 1202(c) . State v. Benware, 165 Vt. 631, 686 A.2d 478, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 119 (1996) (mem.).

    The thirty minutes provided in subsec. (c) of this section for consideration of a breath test request is the maximum reasonable time, not a minimum, in which to refuse the test; a refusal within that period tolls its running. State v. Macie, 146 Vt. 28, 497 A.2d 373, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 425 (1985).

    Police officer’s initiation of a second contact with defendant’s attorney did not interfere with defendant’s right under subsec. (c) of this section to a reasonable time to consider whether to submit to a breath test, since it did not interfere with the voluntary nature of defendant’s decision to submit to a test. State v. Macie, 146 Vt. 28, 497 A.2d 373, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 425 (1985).

    If a suspect consents to a breath test at any time prior to the expiration of the thirty minutes provided in subsec. (c) of this section, measured from the time of the initial attempt to contact an attorney, and the surrounding facts and circumstances indicate the expired period to have been a reasonable time for reflection, the police may proceed to administer the test immediately; they are not required to delay its administration until the full thirty minutes has elapsed. State v. Macie, 146 Vt. 28, 497 A.2d 373, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 425 (1985).

    Reasonable time period, during which the operator of a motor vehicle has to decide whether to submit to a test to determine the alcohol content of his blood, does not terminate conclusively against a suspect’s interests as a matter of law until thirty minutes have elapsed following an initial attempt to contact the suspect’s attorney unless he refuses to submit to the test before the thirty minutes has run. Stockwell v. District Court, 143 Vt. 45, 460 A.2d 466, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 462 (1983).

    This section gives any person who is requested to submit to a test a time period of thirty minutes to decide whether or not to undergo the intoximeter test, and where the police elected not to exercise any custodial authority over the person during that period, such as that generated by the procedure of arrest, their authority over the person is correspondingly limited. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Validity.

    Because a defendant can argue that consent under Vermont’s implied consent law was not given voluntarily for purposes of Article 11, and the trial court here did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of voluntariness after defendant raised it, erroneously deciding instead that such a challenge was precluded by the implied consent law, remand for an evidentiary hearing was required. State v. Edelman, 2018 VT 100, 208 Vt. 372, 198 A.3d 556, 2018 Vt. LEXIS 136 (2018).

    Legislature had inherent police regulatory power to enact implied consent law. State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1971).

    Waiver of rights.

    Waiver of the right to an independent blood test will not be recognized in the absence of substantial evidence to support a finding of waiver. State v. Hoffman, 148 Vt. 320, 532 A.2d 577, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 494 (1987).

    Presumption is against waiver of the right to an independent blood test, and the State has the burden of proving a knowing and intelligent waiver. State v. Hoffman, 148 Vt. 320, 532 A.2d 577, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 494 (1987).

    Where defendant requested a blood test at scene of accident, but his disruptive behavior prevented police from processing him until they had taken him to police barracks, during the interim, defendant spoke with his attorney, and when specifically asked during processing whether he wanted a blood test, defendant remained silent, considering the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances, police were justified in construing defendant’s silence as a decision that defendant did not want a blood test. State v. Hoffman, 148 Vt. 320, 532 A.2d 577, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 494 (1987).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Ladieu, 130 Vt. 496, 296 A.2d 215, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 306 (1972); State v. Conti, 132 Vt. 83, 315 A.2d 261, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 304 (1974); Welch v. District Court, 461 F. Supp. 592, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14113 (D. Vt. 1978); Welch v. District Court, 594 F.2d 903, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16184 (2d Cir. 1979); State v. Stevens, 137 Vt. 473, 408 A.2d 622, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1071 (1979); State v. Prue, 138 Vt. 331, 415 A.2d 234, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1218 (1980); State v. Raymond, 139 Vt. 464, 431 A.2d 453, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 496 (1981); State v. Stockwell, 142 Vt. 232, 453 A.2d 1120, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 629 (1982); State v. Normandy, 143 Vt. 383, 465 A.2d 1358, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 520 (1983); State v. Gilman, 145 Vt. 84, 483 A.2d 598, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 547 (1984); State v. Emilo, 145 Vt. 405, 491 A.2d 341, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 310 (1985); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985); State v. Brunelle, 148 Vt. 347, 534 A.2d 198, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 513 (1987); State v. Byrne, 149 Vt. 224, 542 A.2d 276, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 18 (1988); State v. Bedell, 151 Vt. 14, 556 A.2d 101, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 7 (1989); State v. Stevens, 154 Vt. 614, 580 A.2d 493, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 116 (1990); State v. Anderson, 2005 VT 80, 179 Vt. 43, 890 A.2d 68, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 164 (2005).

    Annotations From Former § 1188

    Admissibility of evidence.

    That defendant accused of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor had not been arrested or taken into custody prior to the time he consented to a blood test to determine alcoholic content did not render the results of the test inadmissible. State v. Bassett, 128 Vt. 453, 266 A.2d 438, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1970).

    It was not essential that devices for testing breath, such as the photoelectric intoximeter, be operated by a scientist, or that the operator understood the technical and scientific functioning of the device before the operator could be found competent to testify to the results. State v. Magoon, 128 Vt. 363, 264 A.2d 779, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 235 (1970).

    Proper administration of a breath test must be fully established before results may be admitted in evidence, including full proof that the equipment was in proper order, the operator qualified, and the test correctly given. State v. Magoon, 128 Vt. 363, 264 A.2d 779, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 235 (1970).

    Where officer administering breath test with photoelectric intoximeter had sufficient knowledge, experience, and training to properly set up, operate, and read the intoximeter, the fact that he was unable to explain the technical workings of the intoximeter or precisely identify the constituents of the chemical substances used did not render the results of the test inadmissible as a matter of law. State v. Magoon, 128 Vt. 363, 264 A.2d 779, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 235 (1970).

    The results of accepted chemical testing methods need not be infallible to be admissible, and if a test affords reasonable assistance to the triers of facts, technical shortages in the manner or method of proof may affect the weight of the results but do not control their admissibility. State v. Magoon, 128 Vt. 363, 264 A.2d 779, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 235 (1970).

    Failure to give defendant who voluntarily took intoximeter test warnings as to his right to counsel and to remain silent did not preclude admission of evidence as to result of the test. State v. LaFleche, 127 Vt. 482, 253 A.2d 124, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 260 (1969).

    Arrest was not a statutory prerequisite to the admissibility of a chemical breath test analysis under the provisions of this section if such test was administered with the respondent’s consent. State v. Brown, 125 Vt. 58, 209 A.2d 324 (1965), overruled on other grounds. State v. Dacey, 138 Vt. 491, 418 A.2d 856, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1355 (1980).

    The blood analysis of a driver who consented to the taking of blood, without arrest, was admissible in evidence. State v. Auger, 124 Vt. 50, 196 A.2d 562, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1963).

    Basis of consent.

    The granting of a Vermont license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege granted by the State and is subject to reasonable conditions in the interests of public safety, among which is operator’s implied consent to submit to blood tests for alcohol. State v. Dellveneri, 128 Vt. 85, 258 A.2d 834, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1969).

    Consent of others.

    In trial for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, charge that if father gave consent to test of 18 year old defendant son’s blood, consent was given, even if son did not consent, was error, as consent to a test can be given only by the person requested to take it, but reversal was not required where no harm or prejudice to defendant was demonstrated. State v. Bassett, 128 Vt. 453, 266 A.2d 438, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1970).

    Construction.

    This section deemed consent to be given provided the arresting officer had a reasonable basis for believing that the driver was under the influence. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    Consent to the taking of any of the permitted tests was required to be real and nowhere did these statutes substitute an implication for an expressed consent to a test. State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 188 (1962).

    Determination of reasonable grounds.

    The responsibility for deciding whether reasonable grounds for a request to submit to a test were present resided in the first instance with the officer, subject to review by the court where the driver was brought for arraignment. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    Miranda warning.

    Police request that driver, who had not been arrested, taken into custody, or questioned regarding accident he had been involved in, submit to test for alcoholic content, made after driver was taken to hospital for treatment, did not have to be preceded by Miranda warning. State v. Bassett, 128 Vt. 453, 266 A.2d 438, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1970).

    Opinion or innocence of driver.

    Driver’s belief that officer had no cause to request him to submit to test did not excuse him from submitting to test. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    A claim of innocence of offense charged, even if vindicated by acquittal, afforded no legal justification for refusing a test. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    Purpose.

    Purpose of implied consent law is to encourage availability of scientific evidence of presence of alcohol or drugs, and the law is an expression of the Legislature’s preference for the results of chemical analysis as a means to affirm or reject the uncertain opinion of a layman derived from observation of external symptoms. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    Questions for court.

    Whether State Police officer was a qualified operator of photoelectric intoximeter used to administer breath test and whether test was properly conducted was for the trial court to determine on the evidence at hand. State v. Magoon, 128 Vt. 363, 264 A.2d 779, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 235 (1970).

    Waiver of rights.

    Agreement by a motorist to the taking of a blood sample under this section does not waive his rights under other statutes dealing with the taking of blood in a prosecution for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Auger, 124 Vt. 50, 196 A.2d 562, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1963).

    Law Reviews —

    Vermont’s blood alcohol test, see 2 Vt. L. Rev. 93 (1977).

    § 1203. Administration of tests; retention of test and videotape.

    1. A breath test shall be administered only by a person who has been certified by the Vermont Criminal Justice Council to operate the breath testing equipment being employed. In any proceeding under this subchapter, a person’s testimony that he or she is certified to operate the breath testing equipment employed shall be prima facie evidence of that fact.
    2. Subsection (b) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subsection (b) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      Only a physician, licensed nurse, medical technician, physician assistant, medical technologist, laboratory assistant, intermediate or advanced emergency medical technician, or paramedic acting at the request of a law enforcement officer may, at a medical facility, police or fire department, or other safe and clean location as determined by the individual withdrawing blood, withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or another drug. A law enforcement officer, even if trained to withdraw blood, acting in that official capacity may not withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or another drug. These limitations do not apply to the taking of a breath sample. A medical facility or business may not charge more than $75.00 for services rendered when an individual is brought to a facility for the sole purpose of an evidentiary blood sample or when an emergency medical technician or paramedic draws an evidentiary blood sample.

      (b) (1)

      Subsection (b) effective January 1, 2022; see also subsection (b) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

      Only a physician, licensed nurse, medical technician, physician assistant, medical technologist, laboratory assistant, intermediate or advanced emergency medical technician, or paramedic acting at the request of a law enforcement officer may, at a medical facility, police or fire department, or other safe and clean location as determined by the individual withdrawing blood, withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or another drug. Any withdrawal of blood shall not be taken at roadside, and a law enforcement officer, even if trained to withdraw blood, acting in that official capacity may not withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or another drug. These limitations do not apply to the taking of a breath sample. A medical facility or business may not charge more than $75.00 for services rendered when an individual is brought to a facility for the sole purpose of an evidentiary blood sample or when an emergency medical technician or paramedic draws an evidentiary blood sample.

      (2) A saliva sample may be obtained by a person authorized by the Vermont Criminal Justice Council to collect a saliva sample for the purpose of evidentiary testing to determine the presence of a drug. Any saliva sample obtained pursuant to this section shall not be taken at roadside.

    3. Subsection (c) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subsection (c) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      When a breath test that is intended to be introduced in evidence is taken with a crimper device or when blood is withdrawn at an officer’s request, a sufficient amount of breath or blood, as the case may be, shall be taken to enable the person to have made an independent analysis of the sample and shall be held for at least 45 days from the date the sample was taken. At any time during that period, the person may direct that the sample be sent to an independent laboratory of the person’s choosing for an independent analysis. The Department of Public Safety shall adopt rules providing for the security of the sample. At no time shall the defendant or any agent of the defendant have access to the sample. A preserved sample of breath shall not be required when an infrared breath-testing instrument is used. A person tested with an infrared breath-testing instrument shall have the option of having a second infrared test administered immediately after receiving the results of the first test.

      (c)

      Subsection (c) effective January 1, 2022; see also subsection (c) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

      When blood or saliva is withdrawn at an officer’s request, a sufficient amount of saliva or blood, as the case may be, shall be taken to enable the person to have made an independent analysis of the sample and shall be held for at least 45 days from the date the sample was taken. At any time during that period, the person may direct that the sample be sent to an independent laboratory of the person’s choosing for an independent analysis. The Department of Public Safety shall adopt rules providing for the security of the sample. At no time shall the defendant or any agent of the defendant have access to the sample. A preserved sample of breath shall not be required when an infrared breath-testing instrument is used. A person tested with an infrared breath-testing instrument shall have the option of having a second infrared test administered immediately after receiving the results of the first test.

    4. Subsection (d) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subsection (d) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      In the case of a breath test administered using an infrared breath testing instrument, the test shall be analyzed in compliance with rules adopted by the Department of Public Safety. The analyses shall be retained by the State. A sample is adequate if the infrared breath testing instrument analyzes the sample and does not indicate the sample is deficient. Analysis of the person’s breath or blood that is available to that person for independent analysis shall be considered valid when performed according to methods approved by the Department of Public Safety. The analysis performed by the State shall be considered valid when performed according to a method or methods selected by the Department of Public Safety. The Department of Public Safety shall use rulemaking procedures to select its method or methods. Failure of a person to provide an adequate breath sample constitutes a refusal.

      (d)

      Subsection (d) effective January 1, 2022; see also subsection (d) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

      In the case of a breath, saliva, or blood test, the test shall be analyzed in compliance with rules adopted by the Department of Public Safety. The analyses shall be retained by the State. A sample is adequate if the infrared breath testing instrument analyzes the sample and does not indicate the sample is deficient. An analysis of the person’s saliva or blood that is available to that person for independent analysis shall be considered valid when performed according to methods approved by the Department of Public Safety. The analysis performed by the State shall be considered valid when performed according to a method or methods selected by the Department of Public Safety. The Department of Public Safety shall use rulemaking procedures to select its method or methods. Failure of a person to provide an adequate breath or saliva sample constitutes a refusal.

    5. [Repealed.]
    6. Subsection (f) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subsection (f) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      When a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a person may be violating or has violated section 1201 of this title, the officer may request the person to provide a sample of breath for a preliminary screening test using a device approved by the Commissioner of Public Safety for this purpose. The person shall not have the right to consult an attorney prior to submitting to this preliminary breath alcohol screening test. The results of this preliminary screening test may be used for the purpose of deciding whether an arrest should be made and whether to request an evidentiary test and shall not be used in any court proceeding except on those issues. Following the screening test additional tests may be required of the operator pursuant to the provisions of section 1202 of this title.

      (f)

      Subsection (f) effective January 1, 2022; see also subsection (f) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

      When a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a person may be violating or has violated section 1201 of this title, the officer may request the person to provide a sample of breath for a preliminary screening test using a device approved by the Commissioner of Public Safety for this purpose. The person shall not have the right to consult an attorney prior to submitting to this preliminary breath alcohol screening. The results of this preliminary screening may be used for the purpose of deciding whether an arrest should be made and whether to request an evidentiary test and shall not be used in any court proceeding except on those issues. Following the screening, additional tests may be required of the operator pursuant to the provisions of section 1202 of this title.

    7. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner shall report in writing to the Department of Motor Vehicles the death of any person as the result of a crash involving a vehicle and the circumstances of such crash within five days of such death.
    8. Subsection (h) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subsection (h) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      A Vermont law enforcement officer shall have a right to request a breath or blood sample in an adjoining state or country under this section unless prohibited by the law of the other state or country. If the law in an adjoining state or country does not prohibit an officer acting under this section from taking a breath or blood sample in its jurisdiction, evidence of such sample shall not be excluded in the courts of this State solely on the basis that the test was taken outside the State.

      (h)

      Subsection (h) effective January 1, 2022; see also subsection (h) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

      A Vermont law enforcement officer shall have a right to request a breath, saliva, or blood sample in an adjoining state or country under this section unless prohibited by the law of the other state or country. If the law in an adjoining state or country does not prohibit an officer acting under this section from taking a breath, saliva, or blood sample in its jurisdiction, evidence of such sample shall not be excluded in the courts of this State solely on the basis that the test was taken outside the State.

    9. The Commissioner of Public Safety shall adopt emergency rules relating to the operation, maintenance, and use of preliminary alcohol screening devices for use by law enforcement officers in enforcing the provisions of this title. The Commissioner shall consider relevant standards of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in adopting such rules. Any preliminary alcohol screening device authorized for use under this title shall be on the qualified products list of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
    10. A videotape made of the alleged offense and subsequent processing may be erased or destroyed by the law enforcement agency no earlier than 90 days after final judgment, or, if no civil or criminal action is filed, no earlier than 90 days after the date the videotape was made.
    11. A copy of a videotape made of the alleged offense shall be provided to the defendant within ten days after the defendant requests the copy and pays a $45.00 fee for its reproduction. No fee shall be charged to a defendant whom the court has determined to be indigent.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 1971, No. 14 , § 8, eff. March 11, 1971; 1971, No. 260 (Adj. Sess.), § 48; 1973, No. 79 , § 3, eff. May 23, 1973; 1975, No. 103 , § 1, eff. May 30, 1975; 1981, No. 103 , § 4; 1989, No. 68 , § 4, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; 1991, No. 55 , § 4; 1991, No. 57 , §§ 1, 4, eff. July 4, 1991; 1997, No. 57 , § 2; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. May 29, 2000; 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2011, No. 56 , § 14, eff. March 1, 2012; 2019, No. 59 , § 28; 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 24, eff. Jan. 1, 2022; 2021, No. 65 , § 10, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “a crash” for “an accident” and “crash” for “accident” in subsec. (g) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    —2020. In subsec. (a), substituted “Vermont Criminal Justice Council” for “Vermont Criminal Justice Training Council” in accordance with 2019, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 2(b).

    —2013. In subsec. (b), substituted “physician assistant” for “physician’s assistant” in the first sentence, in accordance with 2013, No. 34 , § 30a.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (b): Added the subdiv. (1) designation; substituted “Any withdrawal of blood shall not be taken at roadside, and a” for “A” preceding “law” in the beginning of the second sentence; and added subdiv. (b)(2).

    Subsec. (c): In the first sentence, deleted “a breath test that is intended to be introduced in evidence is taken with a crimper device or when” preceding “blood” and inserted “or saliva” thereafter and substituted “saliva” for “breath” following “sufficient amount of”.

    Subsec. (d): In the first sentence, inserted “, saliva, or blood” preceding “test” and deleted “administered using an infrared breath testing instrument” thereafter and in the fourth sentence, substituted “An analysis” for “Analysis” preceding “of the person’s” and substituted “saliva” for “breath” thereafter.

    Subsec. (f): Deleted “test” following “screening” at the end of the second sentence and the beginning of the third and fourth sentences.

    Subsec. (h): Inserted “, saliva,” following “breath” in two places.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Added.

    Subsec. (c): In the first sentence, deleted “a breath test which is intended to be introduced in evidence is taken with a crimper device or when” following “When”, inserted “or saliva” following “blood”, and substituted “saliva” for “breath” following “amount of”.

    Subsec. (d): In the first sentence, inserted “, saliva, or blood” preceding the first instance of “test” and deleted “administered using an infrared breath testing instrument” thereafter; in the fourth sentence, substituted “An analysis” for “Analysis” and “saliva” for “breath”; and in the last sentence, inserted “or saliva” following “breath”.

    Subsec. (f): Deleted “test” following “screening” in the second and third sentences and substituted a comma for “test” preceding “additional tests” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (h): Inserted “, saliva,” following “breath” in the first and last sentences.

    —2019. Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —2011. Subsecs. (c), (d), (f), (i): Substituted “public safety” for “health” following “department of ” or “commissioner of ” throughout.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (k): Substituted “$45.00” for “$15.00”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (h): Added the first sentence and inserted “the law in” preceding “an adjoining state”, substituted “does not prohibit” for “authorizes” preceding “an officer” and “from taking” for “to take” preceding “a breath or blood” in the second sentence.

    Subsecs. (j) and (k): Added.

    —1997. Subsec. (i): Added.

    —1991. Subsec. (c): Act No. 57 inserted “with a crimper device” preceding “or when blood”, “at an officer’s request” preceding “a sufficient” and substituted “45” for “60” in the first sentence, and added the fifth and sixth sentences.

    Subsec. (e): Repealed by Act No. 57.

    Subsec. (f): Act No. 55 deleted the second sentence.

    —1989. Rewrote the section heading and subsecs. (a) through (d), added new subsecs. (e) and (f), redesignated former subsec. (e) as subsec. (g), and added subsec. (h).

    —1981. Subsec. (a): Inserted “when a breath test which is intended to be introduced in evidence is taken, or when blood is withdrawn” preceding “a sufficient” and substituted “sixty” for “30” preceding “days” in the third sentence of the first paragraph, substituted “defendant” for “respondent” throughout the first through third sentences, and deleted “chemical” preceding “analysis of the person’s” in the fourth sentence and preceding “analysis” in the fifth sentence of the second paragraph.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “an evidentiary” for “a chemical” following “submits to” and inserted “evidentiary” following “concerning the”.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted “chemical” preceding “analysis” in the first sentence and substituted “defendant” for “respondent” following “direction of the” in the second sentence.

    —1975. Subsec. (a): Deleted “or the date of arraignment, whichever occurs later” following “sample was taken” at the end of the third sentence, inserted “which is available to that person for independent analysis” following “blood” in the seventh sentence, and added the eighth and ninth sentences.

    —1973. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (e): Added.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1971. Subsec. (a): Deleted “or” preceding “urine” and inserted “or saliva” thereafter in the second sentence.

    Effective date of amendments to subsecs. (b)-(d), (f), and (h). 2021, No. 65 , § 20 provides that the amendments to subsecs. (b)-(d), (f), and (h) of this section by 2021, No. 65 , § 10 shall take effect on January 1, 2022.

    Repeal of 2019, No. 164 (Ad. Sess.), § 24 amendments. 2021, No. 65 , § 11 provides: “2020 Acts and Resolves No. 164, Sec. 24 (administration of tests; 23 V.S.A. § 1203 ) is repealed.”

    Constitutionality.

    Additional tests.

    —Purpose.

    Administration of tests.

    Admissibility of evidence.

    Construction.

    Construction with other laws.

    Failure to obtain.

    Fatal accident.

    Method of analysis.

    Number of samples.

    Right to.

    Time of trial.

    Videotape of offense.

    Voluntariness.

    Constitutionality.

    Trooper’s decision to administer a preliminary breath test (PBT) to defendant rather than allow him to continue driving when defendant smelled of alcohol, admitted to drinking, and had bloodshot eyes was premised on a reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI), imposed a minimal intrusion on defendant’s liberty, and was aimed at preventing serious danger to the public; it did not violate either the Vermont or the United States Constitution. The results of the PBT, in turn, provided probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96, 2009 VT 96A, 186 Vt. 389, 987 A.2d 939, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 110 (2009).

    It is reasonable, under both the Fourth Amendment and the Vermont Constitution, for an officer to administer a preliminary breath test to a suspect if the officer can point to specific, articulable facts indicating that an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol. State v. McGuigan, 2008 VT 111, 184 Vt. 441, 965 A.2d 511, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2008).

    When defendant did not challenge the trial court’s findings that a trooper had reasonable grounds to request that he submit to a preliminary breath test and that the results of that preliminary test provided a further basis to request performance of other field sobriety exercises, the officer’s administration of these tests thus met the constitutional requirements imposed by the Vermont Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. State v. McGuigan, 2008 VT 111, 184 Vt. 441, 965 A.2d 511, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2008).

    Preliminary breath test intrudes into an area that is the subject of legitimate expectations of privacy, and thus is a search under both the Vermont and United States Constitutions. State v. McGuigan, 2008 VT 111, 184 Vt. 441, 965 A.2d 511, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2008).

    Additional tests.

    —Purpose.

    Independent analysis of breath sample is permitted as a check on integrity of procedures of police and Health Department, not as a validation or invalidation of any particular reading. State v. Robitaille, 151 Vt. 380, 561 A.2d 412, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 50 (1989).

    Provision of subsec. (a) of this section which gives defendant the right to an independent sample of a blood alcohol content test is solely to provide defendant with the ability to verify the results obtained by the State Police chemists. State v. Normandy, 143 Vt. 383, 465 A.2d 1358, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 520 (1983).

    Administration of tests.

    Because a trooper failed to request that defendant take a preliminary breath test (PBT), but simply held it up to him, his actions contravened the testing statute’s directive. Therefore, the PBT was improperly obtained and the result should not have been considered in the court’s determination of whether there was sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence. State v. Therrien, 2011 VT 120, 191 Vt. 24, 38 A.3d 1129, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 122 (2011).

    Plain meaning of the words that an officer must have “reason to believe” that a person “may be” driving under the influence indicates that an officer need not have incontrovertible proof of the underlying offense and need not even have probable cause of the DUI; at the point a preliminary breath test is administered, the officer needs only to have some basis for believing that a suspect may be driving under the influence. This basis can also be expressed as reasonable, articulable facts supporting the belief that criminal behavior is afoot. State v. Santimore, 2009 VT 104, 186 Vt. 638, 987 A.2d 332, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 130 (2009) (mem.).

    At the point a preliminary breath test (PBT) was administered, an officer needed only to have some basis for believing that a suspect might be driving under the influence; thus, when an officer smelled alcohol and saw that defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, this was enough to provide him with reasonable suspicion that defendant had been driving under the influence (DUI) and justified administration of the PBT and the subsequent dexterity tests. The results of those tests (including a 0.106 blood alcohol content and failure of six measures of dexterity) combined with the other observed indicia of intoxication provided the officer with probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. State v. Santimore, 2009 VT 104, 186 Vt. 638, 987 A.2d 332, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 130 (2009) (mem.).

    Where State’s chemist provided a reasonable explanation that leakage was responsible for the 0.000 percent result following blood-alcohol test on one of defendant’s breath samples and chemist also testified that both samples were analyzed in compliance with the Department of Health’s rules, there was no reason to believe that the 0.168 percent result (following test of second sample) was unreliable. State v. McGovern, 164 Vt. 67, 664 A.2d 275, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 65 (1995).

    Driver did not have statutory right to insist that breath test be administered by a doctor. State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1971).

    Admissibility of evidence.

    Even if the court accepted defendant’s argument that the word “results” in the statute governing admission of breath tests encompassed not just numerical data, but a defendant’s choice to refuse a preliminary breath test (PBT), it was proper to admit defendant’s refusal to take a PBT in the refusal stage of her trial for refusal to take a breath test, as the statute allowed use of a PBT “result” to demonstrate whether the officer had a reasonable basis to ask for a test, which was the purpose for which it was introduced here. State v. Schapp, 2019 VT 27, 210 Vt. 180, 212 A.3d 1226, 2019 Vt. LEXIS 61 (2019).

    Breath test results were admissible in a criminal case when both times a result was sought, the machine returned an error message, then produced a result after being restarted. Because the fact that the officer was able to obtain results indicated that the machine was operating properly at the time of the tests, a chemist’s affidavit was sufficient to meet the standard for admissibility; furthermore, while expert testimony was relevant to show that the test results were unreliable, it did not undermine the admissibility of those results, and the discrepancy between the two test results of .229 and .260 was insufficient to undermine the foundation facts necessary for admissibility. State v. Burnett, 2013 VT 113, 195 Vt. 277, 88 A.3d 1191, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 111 (2013).

    Error in admitting the results of a preliminary breath test (PBT) was harmless. Just as an officer’s observations—the odor of alcohol, defendant’s watery eyes, an empty alcohol container, and defendant’s admission of drinking—provided reasonable suspicion to request a PBT, they also provided reasonable suspicion to conduct field sobriety tests, and defendant’s poor performance of the dexterity tests combined with the officer’s other observations provided probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence. State v. Therrien, 2011 VT 120, 191 Vt. 24, 38 A.3d 1129, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 122 (2011).

    Trial court properly denied DUI defendant’s motion for mistrial, where there was an abundance of evidence for jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, notwithstanding objectionable preliminary test result and court’s refusal to give limiting instruction; moreover, evidence was introduced by defendant himself, who testified to results of test on direct examination. State v. Massey, 169 Vt. 180, 730 A.2d 623, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 80 (1999).

    Construction.

    Under the plain language of the testing statute, when an officer has a reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence, the officer may “request” that the suspect provide a breath sample, but not order such participation; this conclusion is in keeping with the prior interpretation of this statutory language, which delineates that drivers may not be forced to comply with a request to take a preliminary breath test (PBT) and have a right to refuse to take the PBT. Thus, even though there is no statutory or constitutional obligation on law enforcement to inform suspects of their right to refuse, law enforcement officers must “request”—rather than order—a detained motorist to provide a breath sample for a PBT. State v. Therrien, 2011 VT 120, 191 Vt. 24, 38 A.3d 1129, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 122 (2011).

    In construing a statute, the court will defer to the interpretation of the agency that is responsible for implementing the statute, unless there is a compelling indication of error. State v. Rolfe, 166 Vt. 1, 686 A.2d 949, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1996).

    Construction with other laws.

    The provision of 18 V.S.A. § 128(a) allowing appeals to the Board of Health from “an act, decision, or order of the commissioner” was inapplicable to review of the Commissioner’s decision related to DUI breath testing because it is limited to those made “pursuant to [Title 18].” In re Sleigh, 2005 VT 45, 178 Vt. 547, 872 A.2d 363, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 75 (2005) (mem.).

    Subdiv. 1205(g)(4) of this title imposes no independent and additional rulemaking requirements beyond those set forth in 23 V.S.A. § 1203(d) . State v. Rolfe, 166 Vt. 1, 686 A.2d 949, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1996).

    Both this section and section 1202 of this title are subject to section 1205 of this title, which allows a person asked to submit to a chemical test to refuse if he or she desires. State v. Yudichak, 147 Vt. 418, 519 A.2d 1150, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 436 (1986).

    Failure to obtain.

    Upon proper objection and lacking appropriate curative measures, testimony during a trial for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor which reveals the existence of an independent breath sample which may be in defendant’s possession is an error requiring reversal. State v. Normandy, 143 Vt. 383, 465 A.2d 1358, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 520 (1983).

    Where, during trial, judge unnecessarily stated that urine samples for alcohol content are taken not only for the benefit of the State but also for the benefit of driver charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence and that one of the two packages in the kit was reserved for testing by the accused, and State chemist, upon examination by State’s Attorney, stated he received two samples and tested only one, and there was no objection at trial or adequate curative instruction, jury was permitted to draw an impermissible inference against the accused, and that constituted error requiring reversal. State v. Garvey, 133 Vt. 29, 329 A.2d 662, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 280 (1974).

    Where a person administered a test for alcohol content in his blood fails to exercise his statutory right to pick up a retained sample, no inference may thereby be drawn against him, for the policy and purpose of this section is to protect defendant and not to manufacture evidence in favor of the State. State v. Conti, 132 Vt. 83, 315 A.2d 261, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 304 (1974).

    It was error, during trial of defendant on charge of driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor, to overrule objection to prosecutor’s question which asked State trooper “Do you know what he could have done with it?” had defendant exercised his statutory option to pick up breath sample retained by police for independent testing at option of defendant, for the purpose of this section is to protect the defendant, and not to produce evidence in favor of the State. State v. Conti, 132 Vt. 83, 315 A.2d 261, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 304 (1974).

    It was error, during trial of defendant on charge of driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor, to overrule objection to prosecution’s question which asked State trooper whether breath sample retained by police for independent testing at option of defendant had been utilized by defendant; the question could well have led to prejudicial inference by jury. State v. Conti, 132 Vt. 83, 315 A.2d 261, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 304 (1974).

    Comment, in argument to jury, that defendant failed to avail himself of opportunity to pick up breath sample taken at time of his arrest on charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, is improper. State v. Conti, 132 Vt. 83, 315 A.2d 261, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 304 (1974).

    Where, during trial of defendant charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, court improperly admitted testimony revealing that defendant had not exercised statutory right to pick up breath sample, jury instruction stating that, although right was not exercised, that should not be “held against” defendant, was insufficient to remove from the jury consideration of improperly admitted testimony, for the court should have made it unmistakably clear to jury that the evidence was not admissible, that it should be disregarded, and that it should not be taken into consideration in determining defendant’s guilt or innocence. State v. Conti, 132 Vt. 83, 315 A.2d 261, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 304 (1974).

    If a defendant who has been given a blood alcohol test does not pick up, or picks up but does not offer testimony regarding, test sample which this section provides he be given on request, no inference may be drawn against him by the court, prosecutor, or jury. State v. McSheffrey, 131 Vt. 329, 306 A.2d 702, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 311 (1973).

    Fatal accident.

    Fact that subsec. (d) of this section is distinctive and unique from the rest of the statutory scheme, in that the condition precedent to testing is the occurrence of a fatality, does not make this subsection so different that it stands by itself, without relation to the other parts of the statutory scheme. State v. Yudichak, 147 Vt. 418, 519 A.2d 1150, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 436 (1986).

    Where a State Police officer requested a blood sample instead of a breath sample from the surviving operator in a fatal collision, suppression of the results of the blood sample in a subsequent DWI prosecution was required. State v. Yudichak, 147 Vt. 418, 519 A.2d 1150, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 436 (1986).

    Mandatory aspect of word “shall” as used in this section concerns the duties of the investigating police officers, and in situation where fatal accident occurs, officers are required to make request that suspect operator submit to testing, although driver retains his statutory option to refuse and suffer consequences. State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1977).

    Method of analysis.

    Since senior chemist for Department of Health testified that infrared breath testing device used at police barracks complied with performance standards, and DUI defendant did not refute those foundation facts, there was no error in admitting results of test through applicable statutory presumption of validity and admissibility. State v. Massey, 169 Vt. 180, 730 A.2d 623, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 80 (1999).

    State chemist’s testimony that he was familiar with Health Department regulations governing chemical analysis of blood alcohol and followed them was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of compliance with the regulations. State v. Constantine, 148 Vt. 629, 531 A.2d 1199, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 490 (1987) (mem.).

    State need not, in every DUI prosecution relying on breath test, demonstrate soundness of procedures for calculating blood alcohol content of accused. State v. Robitaille, 151 Vt. 380, 561 A.2d 412, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 50 (1989).

    Even though DataMaster breathalizer test does not have a presumption of validity because rulemaking had not been conducted on the device pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1203 , the evidence from the test does not necessarily have to be suppressed. State v. Brooks, 162 Vt. 26, 643 A.2d 226, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 184 (1993).

    Whether gas chromatograph was a valid means of chemical analysis to determine percentage of alcohol in blood was for the jury, and where the jury determined it was, it was improper for the lower court to grant defendant a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that the test method was not approved by the State Department of Health. State v. Mills, 133 Vt. 15, 328 A.2d 410, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 277 (1974).

    Number of samples.

    Single test result on defendant’s blood-alcohol content, accompanied in case by other indicia of reliability, was sufficient to convict for driving under the influence of alcohol. State v. McGovern, 164 Vt. 67, 664 A.2d 275, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 65 (1995).

    Right to.

    Where the police decided to lodge defendant overnight at the police station following his arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the officers were required to read to defendant the paragraph on the implied consent form which explicitly tells a defendant that assertion of his right to an independent sample of his blood alcohol content test is a prerequisite to the existence of that right. State v. Normandy, 143 Vt. 383, 465 A.2d 1358, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 520 (1983).

    Where defendant charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was arrested on January 26, 1980, his right to have an independent analysis conducted on a sample of his breath taken at the time of his arrest expired on February 25, 1980, at the end of the 30- (now 60) day period provided by this section, and the notification to him by the State that the State’s test performed on March 4, 1980, was invalid had no effect on his right to demand an independent analysis, since that right had expired before he received notice of the invalid test. State v. Dole, 141 Vt. 493, 449 A.2d 979, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 557 (1982).

    Defendant was not entitled to two breath samples for independent analysis, even though the State Laboratory’s practice was to analyze two samples. State v. Robitaille, 151 Vt. 380, 561 A.2d 412, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 50 (1989).

    Time of trial.

    Where subsec. (a) of this section gave driver 30 days to pick up alcoholic content test sample reserved for him and “any time within that period” to have it analyzed, it was reversible error to order trial 19 days after arraignment on driving under the influence charge. State v. Fournier, 133 Vt. 416, 340 A.2d 71, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1975).

    Videotape of offense.

    While subsecs. (j) and (k) of this section clearly provide a procedure by which the State will release a videotape made of the alleged offense to the defendant, and guidelines for when it is appropriate to discard that evidence, they neither require that a videotape be made nor provide sanctions if it is not. State v. Dimick, 173 Vt. 54, 790 A.2d 435 (2001) (mem.).

    Infrared breath test was administered correctly and test results were admissible, where defendant made no argument that instrument failed to meet performance standards, and even if first test was performed improperly, there was no dispute that second breath test was administered correctly. State v. Guidera, 167 Vt. 598, 707 A.2d 704, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1998) (mem.).

    This section uses the terminology of validity rather than admissibility, but every court that has interpreted this language has found validity to be synonymous with admissibility; therefore, the statutory language providing that “the analysis performed by the state shall be considered valid when performed” is read as if the term “admissible” was used in place of “valid,” so that the statute sets out the required foundation for admissibility of breath or blood analysis to determine blood alcohol content. State v. Rolfe, 166 Vt. 1, 686 A.2d 949, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1996).

    The Department of Health regulations relating to infrared breath tests used to determine blood-alcohol content (BAC) of defendants charged with driving under the influence of alcohol meet the statutory requirements of 23 V.S.A. §§ 1203(d) and 1205(g) and are valid. When seeking to use the test results at trial as evidence of a driver’s BAC, the State may lay the foundation for the results of infrared breath tests by showing that the analysis met the performance standards contained in the regulations; a defendant faced with criminal charges or civil suspension may contest these foundation facts, but may not otherwise challenge the test’s admissibility. State v. Rolfe, 166 Vt. 1, 686 A.2d 949, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1996).

    In the case of defendant convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the State did not fail to lay a proper foundation for admission of blood alcohol test when it failed to call as an expert witness the doctor who drew the blood sample used for the test but instead called a police officer who had observed the doctor as he acquired the sample, since the officer, in testifying as to his observations of the doctor taking the sample, was relating a procedure that required only common knowledge and experience to judge; expert testimony was not needed. State v. Harris, 144 Vt. 81, 472 A.2d 755, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 411 (1984).

    Contention that container for breath sample, set aside for driver when breath sample were taken for purpose of measuring amount of alcohol in blood, was found to be improperly sealed upon receipt of it by attorney for driver charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, did not make results of test by police inadmissible where this section’s provision requiring that sample be taken and set aside for driver did not require its container to be sealed. State v. Ladieu, 130 Vt. 496, 296 A.2d 215, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 306 (1972).

    Voluntariness.

    Without a challenge to the trial court’s findings that defendant was not ordered to submit to a preliminary breath test or field sobriety tests—or further factual development at the hearing, such as testimony from defendant indicating that he was coerced to participate against his will—the court rejected defendant’s argument that circumstances amounting to no more than a classically mundane police encounter rendered his participation involuntary. State v. McGuigan, 2008 VT 111, 184 Vt. 441, 965 A.2d 511, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 107 (2008).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Stevens, 139 Vt. 184, 423 A.2d 853, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1503 (1980); State v. Raymond, 139 Vt. 464, 431 A.2d 453, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 496 (1981); State v. Beattie, 157 Vt. 162, 596 A.2d 919, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 159 (1991); State v. Zumbo, 157 Vt. 589, 601 A.2d 986, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 223 (1991); State v. King, 160 Vt. 612, 624 A.2d 1144, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 28 (1993) (mem.).

    Annotations From Former § 1190

    Retention of sample.

    This section did not require the retaining of a blood sample by the doctor or State trooper. State v. Auger, 124 Vt. 50, 196 A.2d 562, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1963).

    Notes to Opinions

    Additional tests.

    This section includes no reference to opportunities for additional tests at the request of the subject of a test, other than an independent analysis of the sample taken. 1968-70 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 226.

    § 1203a. Independent chemical test; blood tests.

    1. A person tested has the right at the person’s own expense to have someone of the person’s own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any administered at the direction of the law enforcement officer under section 1203 of this title.  The failure or inability to obtain an additional test or tests by a person shall not preclude the admission in evidence of the test taken at the direction of an enforcement officer unless the additional test was prevented or denied by the enforcement officer.
    2. Subsection (b) effective until January 1, 2022; see also subsection (b) effective January 1, 2022 set out below.

      Arrangements for a blood test shall be made by the person submitting to the evidentiary breath test, by the person’s attorney, or by some other person acting on the person’s behalf unless the person is detained in custody after administration of the evidentiary test and upon completion of processing, in which case the law enforcement officer having custody of the person shall make arrangements for administration of the blood test upon demand but at the person’s own expense.

      (b)

      Subsection (b) effective January 1, 2022; see also subsection (b) effective until January 1, 2022 set out above.

      Arrangements for a blood test shall be made by the person submitting to the evidentiary breath or saliva test, by the person’s attorney, or by some other person acting on the person’s behalf unless the person is detained in custody after administration of the evidentiary test and upon completion of processing, in which case the law enforcement officer having custody of the person shall make arrangements for administration of the blood test upon demand but at the person’s own expense.

    3. If after reasonable efforts the person is unable to arrange transportation necessary to obtain the blood test upon completion of processing, the law enforcement officer shall provide or arrange transportation to a facility available to administer the test unless, for good cause, the officer is unable to do so.  This subsection shall only apply if the person was tested with an infrared testing device.
    4. The physician, licensed nurse, medical technician, physician assistant, medical technologist, or laboratory assistant drawing a sample of blood shall use a sample collection kit provided by the Department of Public Safety or another type of collection kit. The sample shall be identified as to donor, date, and time; sealed; and mailed to the Department of Public Safety where it shall be held for a period of at least 45 days from the date the sample was taken. At any time during that period, the person may direct that the sample be sent to an independent laboratory of the person’s choosing for an independent analysis. The Department of Public Safety may recover its costs of supplies, handling, and storage.
    5. The person requesting the sample is responsible for the costs of transportation, drawing the sample, and subsequent analysis.  If the facility where the sample is drawn is unable to obtain payment from the person at the time the sample is drawn or within a reasonable time thereafter, the facility shall be entitled to reimbursement from the Office of the Defender General.  The Office of the Defender General may recoup those costs and the court may impose conditions of release or probation for that purpose.
    6. The facility, physician, licensed nurse, medical technician, physician assistant, medical technologist, or laboratory assistant drawing blood shall in no manner be liable in any civil or criminal action except for negligence in drawing the blood.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 57 , § 3, eff. July 4, 1991; amended 2011, No. 56 , § 15, eff. March 1, 2012; 2013, No. 34 , § 30a; 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 25, eff. Jan. 1, 2022; 2021, No. 20 , § 241.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (d): Substituted a semicolon for a comma following “time” and inserted a semicolon following “sealed”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “or saliva” following “breath”.

    —2013. Substituted “physician assistant” for “physician’s assistant” in the first sentence of subsec. (d) and in subsec. (f).

    —2011. Subsec. (d): Substituted “public safety” for “health” following “department of” throughout.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    Plain language of this section indicates Legislature’s intent to provide a mechanism for additional chemical tests, but only at expense of person being tested. State v. Wright, 169 Vt. 573, 740 A.2d 347, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 84 (1999) (mem.).

    Expenses of test.

    Vermont’s statutory scheme does not provide a DUI suspect with the right to an independent blood test at the State’s expense; it is only when the facility where the sample is drawn is unable to obtain payment from the person seeking a test that the Defender General becomes responsible for the costs and, even then, the Defender General may attempt to recoup those costs from the suspect. State v. Benoir, 174 Vt. 632, 819 A.2d 699, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 346 (2002) (mem.).

    Failure or inability to obtain test.

    Because defendant did not counter the trooper’s statements that he would have to pay $75 before a hospital would administer an independent test, the trooper had not improperly denied him his right to get the test. State v. Richard, 2016 VT 75, 202 Vt. 519, 150 A.3d 1093, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2016).

    There was no statutory violation when the Department of Health’s mislabeling and destruction of defendant’s blood sample prevented him from obtaining an independent test. There was no evidence that the State trooper acted in bad faith or did anything to prevent defendant from obtaining an independent blood sample; it was the Department that failed to correctly label the sample, resulting in it being misfiled and eventually destroyed. State v. Gentes, 2013 VT 14, 193 Vt. 669, 70 A.3d 967, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 12 (2013) (mem.).

    Where defendant’s request for an independent blood sample was refused by a hospital because he did not have the money to pay for it, there was no state interference with defendant’s statutory right, and therefore suppression of an evidentiary breath test was unwarranted. State v. Benoir, 174 Vt. 632, 819 A.2d 699, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 346 (2002) (mem.).

    In a DUI criminal and civil suspension case, there was no basis to infer that defendant was prevented or improperly discouraged from exercising his right to an independent blood test. Defendant cited no authority for the proposition that an officer was barred from accurately reminding defendant that the test was at his own expense or from attempting to respond to defendant’s questions; he did not demonstrate that the officer’s responses were, in fact, inaccurate; and he acknowledged that he was never told that he would be required to pay for the test that night. State v. Webb, 2010 VT 54, 188 Vt. 137, 998 A.2d 709, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 53 (2010).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Massey, 169 Vt. 180, 730 A.2d 623, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 80 (1999).

    § 1203b. Duty to report blood test results.

    1. Notwithstanding any law or court rule to the contrary, if a health care provider who is providing health services to a person in the emergency room of a health care facility as a result of a motor vehicle crash becomes aware as a result of any blood test performed in the health care facility that the person’s blood alcohol level meets or exceeds the level prohibited by law, the health care provider shall report that fact, as soon as is reasonably possible, to a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the location where the crash occurred.
    2. Any person who in good faith reports the results of a blood test pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed as a result of making a report.
    3. Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $500.00.
    4. A report made under this section, the fact that a report was made, and the results of the blood test that required the report shall not be admissible in any criminal case without the consent of the person whose blood was tested.
    5. A report made under the provisions of this section shall not be considered a waiver of the patient’s privilege.
    6. As used in this section:
      1. “Health care facility” shall be defined as provided in 18 V.S.A. § 9432(8) .
      2. “Health care provider” shall be defined as provided in 18 V.S.A. § 9432(9) .
      3. “Health services” shall be defined as provided in 18 V.S.A. § 9432(10) .
    7. Health care facilities have a responsibility to ensure that all health care providers who work in the health care facility and may provide health care to a person injured as a result of a motor vehicle crash are aware of their responsibilities under this section. Every health care facility that provides health care to persons injured as a result of motor vehicle crashes shall:
      1. adopt a policy that implements this section;
      2. provide a copy of the policy to all health care providers who work in the health care facility who may provide health care to a person as a result of a motor vehicle crash; and
      3. conduct an educational and training program within one month of employment for all health care providers who work at the health care facility who may provide health care to an individual as a result of a motor vehicle crash.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 190; 2021, No. 76 , § 3.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subdiv. (g)(3), substituted “July 1, 1998” for “the effective date of this section”.

    —2014. In subdivs. (f)(1)-(f)(3), substituted “§ 9432(8)” for “§ 9432(7)”, “§ 9432(9)” for “§ 9432(8)”, and “§ 9432(10)” for “§ 9432(9)” to correct errors in the references.

    Amendments

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” and “crashes” for “accidents” throughout the section; and, in subdiv. (g)(3), substituted “employment” for “July 1, 1998”, “who work” for “currently working”, and “who may provide health care to an individual as a result of a motor vehicle crash” for “and, for all such health care providers hired thereafter, within one month of their employment”, deleted “such” preceding “health care providers”, and inserted “health care” preceding “facility”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined”.

    § 1204. Permissive inferences.

    1. Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by a person while operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway, the person’s alcohol concentration shall give rise to the following permissive inferences:
      1. If the person’s alcohol concentration at that time was less than 0.08, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption or permissive inference that the person was or was not under the influence of alcohol, but such fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether the person was under the influence of alcohol.
      2. If the person’s alcohol concentration at that time was 0.08 or more, it shall be a permissive inference that the person was under the influence of alcohol in violation of subdivision 1201(a)(2) or (3) of this title.
      3. If the person’s alcohol concentration at any time within two hours of the alleged offense was 0.10 or more, it shall be a permissive inference that the person was under the influence of alcohol in violation of subdivision 1201(a)(2) or (3) of this title.
    2. The foregoing provisions shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question whether the person was under the influence of alcohol or under the combined influence of alcohol and another drug, nor shall they be construed as requiring that evidence of the amount of alcohol or drug in the person’s blood, breath, urine, or saliva must be presented.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 1973, No. 79 , § 4, eff. May 23, 1973; 1981, No. 103 , § 5; 1987, No. 244 (Adj. Sess.); 1991, No. 55 , § 5; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4); 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 26, eff. Oct. 7, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “or under the combined influence of alcohol and another drug” following “influence of alcohol” and “or drug” following “amount of alcohol”.

    —2017. Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” throughout the section.

    —1991. Rewrote subsec. (a), deleted former subsec. (b), and redesignated former subsec. (c) as subsec. (b).

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “permissive inferences” for “presumptions” in the section heading; in subsec. (a), deleted “at the time alleged” preceding “as shown by analysis” and substituted “permissive inferences” for “presumptions” following “following” in the introductory paragraph, inserted “or permissive inference” following “presumption” in subdiv. (2), substituted “a permissive inference” for “presumed” preceding “that the person was under” in subdiv. (3), and added subdiv. (4).

    —1981. Subsec. (a): Deleted “chemical” preceding “analysis” in the introductory paragraph and in subdiv. (3).

    —1973. Subsec. (a): Substituted “on a highway” for “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor” preceding “the amount”, inserted “or” following “analysis of the person’s blood” and deleted “urine or saliva” preceding “shall give rise” in the introductory paragraph, and rewrote subdiv. (3).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    Where various sections of this subchapter showed that Legislature had decreed that chemical tests, including breath tests, be taken to determine presence of alcohol in the driver’s blood, and various sections referred to weight of alcohol in the blood, expressed as a percentage, as the determining factor, provision of this section that “weight of alcohol in the person’s blood or breath” could create presumption of influence was not unconstitutionally vague due to the reference to weight of alcohol in the breath, but the words “or breath” were unnecessary and would be held severed from the section, for the section did not create a presumption based on weight of alcohol in the breath. State v. Stevens, 137 Vt. 473, 408 A.2d 622, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1071 (1979).

    Jury instructions.

    Trial court did not commit plain error in giving “permissive inference” instruction at DUI trial, since jury did not need to rely on that instruction to reach its verdict as there was ample credible evidence to support conclusion that defendant was under influence of intoxicating liquor at time of operation. State v. Carpenter, 170 Vt. 371, 749 A.2d 1137, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 29 (2000).

    Court at DUI trial properly refused instruction that if defendant’s blood-alcohol content was found to be 0.05 percent or less, jury could presume that defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor; for presumption to arise under then-effective version of “permissive inference” statute, results of breath or blood test must have been introduced into evidence and related back to the time of operation. State v. Zumbo, 157 Vt. 589, 601 A.2d 986, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 223 (1991).

    Presumptions and inferences.

    Legislature has recognized the necessity that an evidentiary test be timely by allowing a permissive inference that a test result of .10 or greater “within two hours” of operation shows operation under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, it is reasonable for an officer to request a test that can be completed within the two-hour window. State v. Dubuque, 2013 VT 3, 193 Vt. 180, 67 A.3d 238, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 5 (2013).

    A blood-alcohol-content (B.A.C.) of .149 percent cannot be rounded off to fall within terms of this section, under which a B.A.C. level of .15 percent or more within the hours of an alleged offense permits an inference that a person was in violation of section prohibiting operation of vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Parah, 155 Vt. 655, 587 A.2d 403, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 4 (1991). (Decided under prior law.)

    In order for mandatory presumption under subdiv. (a)(1) of this section to be properly raised, there must be expert testimony relating the blood alcohol content test results back to the time of operation. State v. Lombard, 146 Vt. 411, 505 A.2d 1182, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 390 (1985).

    Where defendant’s blood alcohol content test results were never introduced into evidence, defendant could not avail himself of the mandatory presumption under subdiv. (a)(1) of this section. State v. Lombard, 146 Vt. 411, 505 A.2d 1182, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 390 (1985).

    Where at defendant’s trial for operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor trial court charged the jury that if it found that at the time defendant operated the vehicle she had a blood alcohol content of 0.05 percent or less, it was “permitted to infer” that she was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, since subdiv. (a)(1) of this section created a mandatory presumption that if the jury found defendant’s blood alcohol content to be 0.05 percent or less, they could not find her to be under the influence, it was reversible error for the court to charge the jury otherwise. State v. Young, 143 Vt. 413, 465 A.2d 1375, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 527 (1983).

    In prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, subdiv. (a)(3) of this section permits but does not compel a jury finding that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor while operating a motor vehicle upon proof of .10 percent or more blood-alcohol content by weight at the time of operation, but in order to take advantage of this inference, the State must produce expert testimony relating the blood-alcohol test results back to the time of operation. State v. Carter, 142 Vt. 588, 458 A.2d 1112, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 438 (1983).

    Inference created by this section is that defendant was under the influence at the time of operation and can only be based on evidence of blood-alcohol content at the time of operation; therefore, for the inference to be raised properly there must be expert testimony relating the test results back to the time of operation, and this section should not be charged to the jury in absence of such relation back. State v. Dacey, 138 Vt. 491, 418 A.2d 856, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1355 (1980).

    This section’s provision that “the amount of alcohol in the person’s blood . . . at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person’s blood or breath shall give rise to the following presumptions” creates a permissive inference, not a mandatory presumption, shifts no burden to defendant, and permits, but does not compel, a jury finding that defendant was under the influence, if it is shown he had .10 percent or more blood-alcohol content; and prior contrary cases are overruled. State v. Dacey, 138 Vt. 491, 418 A.2d 856, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1355 (1980).

    In prosecution for driving under the influence, instruction that this section gives State a presumption that .10 percent alcohol content means defendant was under the influence, which frequently referred to “presumption” which included statute’s mandatory language, and which had the effect of placing at least the burden of producing evidence on defendant when the statute did not compel defendant to do so, was reversible error. State v. Dacey, 138 Vt. 491, 418 A.2d 856, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1355 (1980).

    Where the court’s instructions relating to subdiv. (a)(3) of this section, which allows the jury to find that the defendant was under the influence at the time of operation upon proof of .10 percent blood alcohol content at that time, gave the section the effect of a burden-shifting presumption, rather than the effect of a permissive inference, there was reversible error. State v. White, 139 Vt. 23, 421 A.2d 1283, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1383 (1980).

    Where the breath sample taken from the defendant showed a .18 percent blood alcohol concentration, and the court instructed the jury that it might presume the defendant to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor if it found at the time alleged in the information that there was .10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, the instruction was consistent with the statutory scheme and with the underlying scientific data. State v. Stevens, 137 Vt. 473, 408 A.2d 622, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1071 (1979).

    Cited.

    Cited in McIntyre v. Malloy, 130 Vt. 395, 296 A.2d 222, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 289 (1972); State v. Bessette, 130 Vt. 438, 296 A.2d 179, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 296 (1972); State v. McSheffrey, 131 Vt. 329, 306 A.2d 702, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 311 (1973); State v. Adams, 131 Vt. 413, 306 A.2d 92, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 325 (1973); State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1977); State v. Batchelor, 135 Vt. 366, 376 A.2d 737, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 630 (1977); State v. Dole, 141 Vt. 493, 449 A.2d 979, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 557 (1982); State v. Coulombe, 143 Vt. 631, 470 A.2d 1179, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 597 (1983); State v. Lund, 144 Vt. 171, 475 A.2d 1055, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 430 (1984), State v. Comstock, 145 Vt. 503, 494 A.2d 135, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 323 (1985); State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252, 499 A.2d 787, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 367 (1985); State v. Kozel, 146 Vt. 534, 505 A.2d 1221, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1986); State v. McQuillen, 147 Vt. 386, 518 A.2d 25, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 428 (1986); State v. Bushey, 149 Vt. 378, 543 A.2d 1327, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 25 (1988); State v. Bedell, 151 Vt. 14, 556 A.2d 101, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 7 (1989); State v. Bartlett, 165 Vt. 590, 683 A.2d 9, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 60 (1996); State v. Hanks, 172 Vt. 93, 772 A.2d 1087, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 10 (2001) (mem.).

    § 1205. Civil suspension; summary procedure.

    1. Refusal; alcohol concentration above legal limits; suspension periods.
      1. Upon affidavit of a law enforcement officer that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title and that the person refused to submit to a test, the Commissioner shall suspend the person’s operating license or nonresident operating privilege or the privilege of an unlicensed operator to operate a vehicle for a period of six months and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title. However, during the suspension, an eligible person may operate under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued pursuant to section 1213 of this title.
      2. Upon affidavit of a law enforcement officer that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title and that the person submitted to a test and the test results indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was above a limit specified in subsection 1201(a) of this title, at the time of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control, the Commissioner shall suspend the person’s operating license or nonresident operating privilege or the privilege of an unlicensed operator to operate a vehicle for a period of 90 days and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title. However, during the suspension, an eligible person may operate under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued pursuant to section 1213 of this title.
      3. Upon affidavit of a law enforcement officer that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of subdivision 1201(d)(2) of this title and that the person submitted to a test and the test results indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.02 or more at the time of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control, the Commissioner shall suspend the person’s operating license or nonresident operating privilege or the privilege of an unlicensed operator to operate a vehicle for life. However, during the suspension, an eligible person may operate under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued under section 1213 of this title.
    2. Form of officer’s affidavit.   A law enforcement officer’s affidavit in support of a suspension under this section shall be in a standardized form for use throughout the State and shall be sufficient if it contains the following statements:
      1. The officer is a certified law enforcement officer.
      2. The officer who administered the test was certified to operate the testing equipment.
      3. The officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title (noting the time and date of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control).
      4. The officer informed the person of his or her rights under subsection 1202(d) of this title.
      5. The officer obtained an evidentiary test (noting the time and date the test was taken) and the test indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was above a legal limit specified in subsection 1201(a) or (d) of this title, or the person refused to submit to an evidentiary test.
      6. The officer complied with the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.).
      7. The officer confirmed the person’s correct mailing address.
    3. Notice of suspension.   On behalf of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, a law enforcement officer requesting or directing the administration of an evidentiary test shall serve notice of intention to suspend and of suspension on a person who refuses to submit to an evidentiary test or on a person who submits to a test the results of which indicate that the person’s alcohol concentration was above a legal limit specified in subsection 1201(a) or (d) of this title, at the time of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title. The notice shall be signed by the law enforcement officer requesting the test. A copy of the notice shall be sent to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and a copy shall be mailed or given to the defendant within three business days of the date the officer receives the results of the test. If mailed, the notice is deemed received three days after mailing to the address provided by the defendant to the law enforcement officer. A copy of the affidavit of the law enforcement officer shall also be mailed first-class mail or given to the defendant within seven days of the date of notice.
    4. Form of notice.   The notice of intention to suspend and of suspension shall be in a form prescribed by the Supreme Court. The notice shall include an explanation of rights, a form to be used to request a hearing, and, if a hearing is requested, the date, time, and location of the Criminal Division of the Superior Court where the person must appear for a preliminary hearing. The notice shall also contain, in boldface print, the following:
      1. You have the right to ask for a hearing to contest the suspension of your operator’s license.
      2. This notice shall serve as a temporary operator’s license and is valid until 12:01 a.m. of the date of suspension. If this is your first violation of section 1201 of this title and if you do not request a hearing, your license will be suspended as provided in this notice. If this is your second or subsequent violation of section 1201 of this title, your license will be suspended on the 11th day after you receive this notice. It is a crime to drive while your license is suspended unless you have been issued an ignition interlock restricted driver’s license or ignition interlock certificate.
      3. If you wish to request a hearing before the Criminal Division of the Superior Court, you must mail or deliver your request for a hearing within seven days after (date of notice).
      4. If your request for a hearing is not mailed or delivered within seven days after (date of notice), you waive your right to a hearing and your license will be suspended as provided in this notice.
      5. In order to request a hearing, sign the attached form and mail or deliver the form to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles at the address shown.
      6. If you are charged with a second or subsequent violation of section 1201 of this title, no person shall sell, transfer, or encumber the title to a vehicle that may be subject to immobilization or forfeiture, unless approved by the court in which the charge is filed for good cause shown.
    5. Effective date of suspension.
      1. First offense.   Unless a hearing is requested, a suspension under this section of the license of a person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe violated section 1201 of this title a first time becomes effective on the 11th day after the person receives notice or is deemed to have received notice under subsection (c) of this section. If a hearing is requested, a suspension shall not become effective unless the court orders a suspension after hearing as provided in this section.
      2. Second or subsequent offense.   A suspension of a person’s license under this section shall become effective on the 11th day after the person receives notice or is deemed to have received notice under subsection (c) of this section if:
        1. the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person has violated section 1201 of this title; and
        2. within the last 20 years, the person has:
          1. had his or her operator’s license suspended pursuant to this section; or
          2. been convicted of a violation of section 1201 of this title.
    6. Review by Superior Court.   Within seven days following receipt of a notice of intention to suspend and of suspension, a person may make a request for a hearing before the Superior Court by mailing or delivering the form provided with the notice. The request shall be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, who shall then notify the Criminal Division of the Superior Court that a hearing has been requested and provide the State’s Attorney with a copy of the notice of intention to suspend and of suspension and the officer’s affidavit.
    7. Preliminary hearing.   The preliminary hearing shall be held within 21 days of the alleged offense. Unless impracticable or continued for good cause shown, the date of the preliminary hearing shall be the same as the date of the first appearance in any criminal case resulting from the same incident for which the person received a citation to appear in court. The preliminary hearing shall be held in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Supreme Court.
    8. Final hearing.
      1. If the defendant requests a hearing on the merits, the court shall schedule a final hearing on the merits to be held within 21 days of the date of the preliminary hearing. In no event may a final hearing occur more than 42 days after the date of the alleged offense without the consent of the defendant or for good cause shown. The final hearing may only be continued by the consent of the defendant or for good cause shown. The issues at the final hearing shall be limited to the following:
        1. Whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title.
        2. Whether at the time of the request for the evidentiary test the officer informed the person of the person’s rights and the consequences of taking and refusing the test substantially as set out in subsection 1202(d) of this title.
        3. Whether the person refused to permit the test.
        4. Whether the test was taken and the test results indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was above a legal limit specified in subsection 1201(a) or (d) of this title, at the time of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title, whether the testing methods used were valid and reliable, and whether the test results were accurate and accurately evaluated. Evidence that the test was taken and evaluated in compliance with rules adopted by the Department of Public Safety shall be prima facie evidence that the testing methods used were valid and reliable and that the test results are accurate and were accurately evaluated.
        5. Whether the requirements of section 1202 of this title were complied with.
      2. No less than seven days before the final hearing, and subject to the requirements of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the defendant shall provide to the State and file with the court a list of the issues (limited to the issues set forth in this subsection) that the defendant intends to raise. Only evidence that is relevant to an issue listed by the defendant may be raised by the defendant at the final hearing. The defendant shall not be permitted to raise any other evidence at the final hearing, and all other evidence shall be inadmissible.
        1. Finding by the court.   The court shall electronically forward a report of the hearing to the Commissioner. Upon a finding by the court that the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title and that the person refused to submit to a test, or upon a finding by the court that the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title and that the person submitted to a test and the test results indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was above a legal limit specified in subsection 1201(a) or (d) of this title, at the time the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control, the person’s operating license, or nonresident operating privilege, or the privilege of an unlicensed operator to operate a vehicle shall be suspended or shall remain suspended for the required term and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title. Upon a finding in favor of the person, the Commissioner shall cause the suspension to be canceled and removed from the record, without payment of any fee.

          (j) Venue and conduct of hearings. Venue for proceedings under this section shall be in the territorial unit of the Superior Court where the offense is alleged to have occurred. Hearings under this section shall be summary proceedings conducted by the Criminal Division of the Superior Court without a jury and shall be subject to the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure only as consistent with this section. The State has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Affidavits of law enforcement officers, chemists of either party, or expert witnesses of either party shall be admissible evidence, which may be rebutted by witnesses called by either party. The affidavits shall be delivered to the other party at least five days prior to the hearing.

          (k) Appeal. A decision of the Criminal Division of the Superior Court under this section may be appealed as a matter of right to the Supreme Court. The suspension shall not be stayed pending appeal unless the defendant is reasonably likely to prevail on appeal.

          ( l ) Access to information. In connection with a proceeding under this section, the operator shall have access to all written statements and information in the possession and control of the State concerning the evidentiary test or tests, including the police report, processing forms, certification and affidavit, breath test results, police notes, and the names and addresses of witnesses. If the operator intends to rely on the independent analysis, the State shall have access to the test results from the independent analysis and names and addresses of all witnesses. No depositions or written interrogatories shall be permitted except in extraordinary circumstances.

          (m) Second and subsequent suspensions. For a second suspension under this subchapter, the period of suspension shall be 18 months and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title. However, during the suspension, an eligible person may operate under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued pursuant to section 1213 of this title. For a third or subsequent suspension under this subchapter, the period of suspension shall be life. However, during this lifetime suspension, an eligible person may operate under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued under section 1213 of this title.

          (n) Presumption. In a proceeding under this section, if at any time within two hours of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle a person had an alcohol concentration of above a legal limit specified in subsection 1201(a) or (d) of this title, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person’s alcohol concentration was above the applicable limit at the time of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control.

          (o) Use immunity. No testimony or other information presented by the defendant in connection with a proceeding under this section or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information, may be used for any purpose, including impeachment and cross-examination, against the defendant in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury or giving a false statement.

          (p) Suspensions to run concurrently. Suspensions imposed under this section or any comparable statute of any other jurisdiction and sections 1206, 1208, and 1216 of this title or any comparable statutes of any other jurisdiction, or any suspension resulting from a conviction for a violation of section 1091 of this title from the same incident, shall run concurrently and a person shall receive credit for any elapsed period of a suspension served in Vermont against a later suspension imposed in this State.

          (q) Rules. The Supreme Court shall adopt rules ensuring the fairness of proceedings under this section.

          (r) Surcharge; Public Defender Special Fund; DUI Enforcement Special Fund. A person suspended under this section for a refusal shall be assessed a surcharge of $50.00 that shall be collected by the Department of Motor Vehicles prior to reinstatement of the person’s driving privileges. The Department shall transfer the surcharge assessed under this subsection to the Public Defender Special Fund created in 13 V.S.A. § 5239 specifying the source of the monies being deposited. All such monies shall be used by the Office of the Defender General to cover the cost of providing statewide 24-hour legal services coverage as required by subsection 1202(g) of this title. After $40,000.00 has been deposited in the Public Defender Special Fund in a single fiscal year, all additional collected surcharges assessed under this subsection in that fiscal year shall be credited to the Governor’s Highway Safety Commission for deposit in a DUI Enforcement Special Fund established and managed pursuant to 32 V.S.A. chapter 7, subchapter 5. All such DUI Enforcement Special Fund receipts shall be used exclusively for statewide DUI enforcement and for no other purpose.

          (s) [Repealed.]

          (t) Nonmandatory time limits. For a first offense, the time limits set forth in subsections (g) and (h) of this section are directive only and shall not be interpreted by the court to be mandatory or jurisdictional.

          (u) Testimony by telephone. In any proceeding under this section, for cause shown, a party’s chemist may be allowed to testify by telephone in lieu of a personal appearance.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; amended 1971, No. 14 , § 9, eff. March 11, 1971; 1973, No. 79 , § 5, eff. May 23, 1973; 1975, No. 103 , § 2, eff. May 30, 1975; 1979, No. 58 , § 1; 1981, No. 103 , § 6; 1983, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1989, No. 68 , § 5, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; 1991, No. 55 , § 6; 1995, No. 77 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. March 21, 1996; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. April 22, 1996; 1997, No. 56 , §§ 4, 7, eff. Aug. 1, 1997; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. May 29, 2000; 2001, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. July 1, 2011; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 160; 2011, No. 46 , § 8, eff. July 2, 2011; 2011, No. 56 , §§ 4, 16, eff. March 1, 2012; 2011, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2013, No. 57 , § 19; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 49; 2019, No. 32 , § 8; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 191.

    History

    References in text.

    The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, referenced in subdiv. (b)(6), is currently codified at 50 U.S.C. chapter 50 and is now cited as the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. ( l ), deleted “without limitation” following “including” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    —2011. Subdiv. (h)(1)(D) was amended by 2011, No. 46 , § 8, effective July 2, 2011, and by 2011, No. 56 , § 16, effective March 1, 2012. The text added in No. 46 will be preserved following the effective date of No. 56.

    —2006. Redesignated subsec. (h) as subdiv. (h)(1), redesignated subdivs. (h)(1)-(h)(5) as (h)(1)(A)-(h)(1)(E), and designated the former undesignated paragraph as subdiv. (h)(2).

    Editor’s note—

    Redesignated subdiv. (h)(2), as added by 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, as an undesignated paragraph at the conclusion of subsec. (h), to avoid conflict with existing subdiv. (h)(2).

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (r): Added subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (t): Added subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (u): Added subsec. heading.

    —2019. Subdiv. (e)(2)(B): Substituted “within the last 20 years” for “after July 1, 1991” at the beginning.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Rewrote the second sentences in subdivs. (1)-(3).

    Subdiv. (d)(2): Inserted “or ignition interlock certificate” following “driver’s license” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (m): Amended generally.

    —2013. Subsec. (p): Deleted the third sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2011. Subdiv. (a)(2): Act No. 46 inserted “, or 0.02 or more if the person was operating a school bus as defined in subdivision 4(34) of this title, or 0.04 or more if the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle as defined in subdivision 4103(4) of this title” following “more”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Added by Act No. 56, § 4.

    Subdiv. (b)(5): Act No. 46 inserted “, or 0.02 or more if the person was operating a school bus as defined in subdivision 4(34) of this title, or 0.04 or more if the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle as defined in subdivision 4103(4) of this title,” following “more”.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 46 inserted “, or 0.02 or more if the person was operating a school bus as defined in subdivision 4(34) of this title, or 0.04 or more if the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle as defined in subdivision 4103(4) of this title,” following “more” and deleted the former third and fourth sentences.

    Subdiv. (h)(1)(D): Act No. 46 inserted “, or 0.02 or more if the person was operating a school bus as defined in subdivision 4(34) of this title, or 0.04 or more if the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle as defined in subdivision 4103(4) of this title,” following “more”.

    Subdiv. (h)(1)(D): Act No. 56, § 16 inserted “or 0.02 or more for a violation of subsection 1201(d) of this title” following “more” and substituted “public safety” for “health” following “department of”.

    Subsec. (i): Act No. 46 inserted “, or 0.02 or more if the person was operating a school bus as defined in subdivision 4(34) of this title, or 0.04 or more if the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle as defined in subdivision 4103(4) of this title,” following “more”.

    Subsec. (n): Act No. 46 deleted “there was” preceding “at any” and inserted ”a person had” following “vehicle” and “, or 0.02 or more if the person was operating a school bus as defined in subdivision 4(34) of this title, or 0.04 or more if the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle as defined in subdivision 4103(4) of this title,” following “more”.

    Subsec. (p): Act No. 46 deleted “and” preceding “1208” and inserted “and 1216” following “1208”.

    Subsec. (s): Repealed by Act No. 46.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Act No. 126 added the introductory language and subdiv. (1) and (2) designations, and added the last sentence in subdiv. (2).

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 154 substituted “criminal division of the superior court” for “district court” in the second sentence and “superior court” for “district court” in subdiv. (3).

    Subdiv. (d)(2): Act No. 126 added “unless you have been issued an ignition interlock restricted driver’s license” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Act No. 154 substituted “superior court” for “district court” in the first and second sentence, substituted “criminal division of the superior court” for “district court” and deleted “who shall then” preceding “provide the state’s” in the third sentence.

    Subdiv. (h)(2): Act No. 154 substituted “Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure” for “District Court Civil Rule” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (j): Act No. 154 substituted “superior court” for “district court” in the first sentence, “criminal division of the superior court” for “district court” and “Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure” for “District Court Civil Rules” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (k): Act No. 154 substituted “criminal division of the superior court” for “district court”.

    Subsec. (m): Act No. 126 amended generally.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Rewrote subdiv. (e)(2) and substituted “officers, chemists of either party, or expert witnesses of either party shall” for “officers and chemists shall” in the fourth sentence of subsec. (j).

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (h)(2): Added.

    Subsec. (p): Substituted “any suspension resulting from a conviction for a violation of section 1091 of this title from the” for “any other section of this title for the” in the first sentence.

    Subsecs. (t) and (u): Added.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1997. Subsec. ( l ): Inserted “or subsequent” following “third” and substituted “life” for “three years and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title” in the second sentence and deleted the third sentence.

    Subsec. (q): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (f): Deleted the former third sentence.

    Subsec. (o): Rewrote the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1991. Substituted “alcohol concentration of 0.08” for “BAC of 0.10” following “refusal” in the subsec. (a) heading and “the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more” for “there was 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood” following “indicated that” in the second sentence of that subsec., added a new subsec. (b), redesignated former subsec. (b) as subsec. (c) and rewrote the first, third and fifth sentences of that subsec., redesignated former subsecs. (c) and (d) as subsecs. (d) and (e), and substituted “subsection (c)” for “subsection (b)” in new subsec. (e), redesignated former subsec. (e) as subsec. (f) and rewrote the second sentence in that subsec., redesignated former subsecs. (f) and (g) as subsecs. (g) and (h), and substituted “the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more” for “there was 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood” in new subdiv. (g)(4) and in the second sentence of new subsec. (h), redesignated former subsecs. (h)-(k) as subsecs. (i)-(l), deleted former subsec. (l), and substituted “0.08” for “0.10” following “concentration of” and “the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more” for “there was 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood” following “presumption that” in subsec. (m).

    —1989. Rewrote the section heading and subsecs. (a) through (i) and added subsecs. (j) through (p).

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    —1981. Substituted “an evidentiary” for “a chemical” following “submit to” in the first sentence and “defendant” for “respondent” preceding “was operating” in the second sentence, rewrote the third sentence in subsec. (a), added “and pay the fee provided in section 1209a” following “commissioner” and deleted the former second sentence of subsec. (b), and added subsecs. (c)-(k).

    —1979. Subsec. (b): Substituted “$75.00” for “$50.00” following “exceed” in the second sentence.

    —1975. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), added the last sentence of that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    —1973. Added “but such refusal may be introduced as evidence in a criminal proceeding” following “given” in the first sentence, deleted “and upon arraignment enters a plea of not guilty” following “laws” and inserted “on a highway” preceding “while under”, “other” preceding “drugs” and added “or both” thereafter in the second sentence, and substituted “on a highway, the person’s” for “the respondent’s” following “control of a motor vehicle” and “one year, and the person” for “six months and the respondent” preceding “shall deliver” in the third sentence.

    —1971. Inserted “attempting to operate or in actual physical control of” following “was operating” in the second sentence and “attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle” following “so operating” in the third sentence.

    1991 amendment. 1991, No. 55 , § 19(1), provided that with respect to this section, as amended by section 6 of the act, the 5-year forgiveness period between offenses shall be considered a right which has accrued to the operator if the operator’s license was suspended under this section prior to July 1, 1991.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Criminal division procedures for civil license suspensions and penalties for DWI, see V.R.C.P. 80.5.

    Operating after suspension or revocation of license, see § 674 of this title.

    Proof of financial responsibility required, see § 801 of this title.

    Notes to Opinions

    Forced tests.

    A police officer has no authority to forcibly take, or to order another to forcibly take, a blood sample from a driver who has refused the test. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 444.

    Admissibility of evidence.

    Admissibility of evidence in criminal proceeding.

    Advice of rights.

    Burden of proof.

    Collateral estoppel.

    Conduct.

    Construction.

    Construction with other laws.

    Delay in proceedings.

    Expert testimony.

    Identification of defendant as operator.

    —Generally.

    Issues involved.

    Jury instructions.

    Jury trial.

    Margin of error.

    Presumptions.

    Prior convictions.

    Reasonable grounds.

    Reasonableness.

    Required evidence.

    Review.

    Right to counsel.

    —Nature of proceedings.

    Second test.

    Self-incrimination.

    Suspension or revocation of license.

    Type of test.

    Validity and accuracy of tests.

    Admissibility of evidence.

    The Department of Health regulations relating to infrared breath tests used to determine blood-alcohol content (BAC) of defendants charged with driving under the influence of alcohol meet the statutory requirements of 23 V.S.A. §§ 1203(d) and 1205(g) and are valid. When seeking to use the test results at trial as evidence of a driver’s BAC, the State may lay the foundation for the results of infrared breath tests by showing that the analysis met the performance standards contained in the regulations; a defendant faced with criminal charges or civil suspension may contest these foundation facts, but may not otherwise challenge the test’s admissibility. State v. Rolfe, 166 Vt. 1, 686 A.2d 949, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1996).

    Standards of admissibility of trial evidence do not apply to hearings held under this section to determine reasonableness of officer’s belief that respondent was driving while intoxicated. State v. District Court, 129 Vt. 212, 274 A.2d 685, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 246 (1971).

    Ruling of court in “reasonableness” hearing held under this section, which denied State the right to introduce evidence supporting officer’s belief that driver was driving while intoxicated because such evidence was not firsthand or direct, prevented the State from fully developing the issue and was error. State v. District Court, 129 Vt. 212, 274 A.2d 685, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 246 (1971).

    Admissibility of evidence in criminal proceeding.

    When defendant at his trial for driving under the influence of alcohol had failed to make any claim regarding the specific use, either direct or derived, of immunized testimony derived from his civil suspension hearing, there was no reason to reverse his conviction. The trial court took appropriate steps to ensure that defendant enjoyed the full extent of this immunity, and defendant had not alleged any actual use of immunized testimony, which was all that the civil suspension immunity statute prohibited. State v. Neumann, 2007 VT 123, 183 Vt. 1, 944 A.2d 228, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 252 (2007).

    When at a criminal trial for driving under the influence, a defendant objects to the admission of testimony a defendant has given at his or her civil suspension merits hearing, the defendant must meet the initial burden of producing evidence that the testimony was in fact provided by the defendant at the civil suspension hearing. Once this is established, if the evidence is to be admitted, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony was not provided by the defendant at his or her civil suspension hearing. State v. Neumann, 2007 VT 123, 183 Vt. 1, 944 A.2d 228, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 252 (2007).

    When a driving-under-the-influence defendant objects to the admission of evidence which the defendant contends is the fruit of his or her civil suspension testimony, the defendant must meet the burden of producing evidence of a relationship between the defendant’s civil suspension hearing testimony and the alleged derivative evidence to which the defendant has objected. Once this prima facie showing has been made, the objection must be sustained unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence the lack of any impermissible relationship between the testimony at the suspension hearing and the evidence offered in the criminal proceeding, and that the evidence offered in the criminal proceeding has a source independent of the suspension hearing testimony; to facilitate this procedure, the defendant should timely file a motion in limine to identify for the court any such issue about which the defendant is aware sufficiently in advance of trial so as to avoid unnecessary delay in the criminal proceeding. State v. Neumann, 2007 VT 123, 183 Vt. 1, 944 A.2d 228, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 252 (2007).

    When defendant at his trial for driving under the influence of alcohol had failed to make any claim regarding the specific use, either direct or derived, of immunized testimony derived from his civil suspension hearing, there was no reason to reverse his conviction. The trial court took appropriate steps to ensure that defendant enjoyed the full extent of this immunity, and defendant had not alleged any actual use of immunized testimony, which was all that the civil suspension immunity statute prohibited. State v. Neumann, 2007 VT 123, 183 Vt. 1, 944 A.2d 228, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 252 (2007).

    Since the impact of actions seen as coercive or restrictive is almost impossible to measure after the fact, a mere demonstration that such actions occurred must be treated as creating a flaw in the procedure relative to a refusal hearing under this section which renders refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test inadmissible at trial. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Where the defendant, who was charged with driving under the influence and who remained at the police station without being arrested, while being processed by the police preliminary to being asked for a breath test, was refused the right to call her boyfriend until after the thirty minute waiting period, provided in section 1202 of this title, such refusal constituted an unauthorized restraint on the defendant sufficient to cloud the proceedings held pursuant to this section, rendering evidence of that refusal inadmissible on trial, and was cause for remand for a new trial without the inadmissible evidence. State v. Carmody, 140 Vt. 631, 442 A.2d 1292, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1982).

    Evidence of refusal to submit to a chemical test was admissible at trial for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor regardless of whether a summary “reasonableness” hearing mandated by subsec. (a) of this section had or had not been held. State v. Mayo, 137 Vt. 77, 398 A.2d 303, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 929 (1979).

    Where subsec. (a) of this section expressly provided that if a motorist exercised the right given to him to refuse to take a chemical test for alcohol content of breath or blood the refusal could be admitted in evidence in a criminal proceeding, State v. Dellveneri (1969) 128 Vt. 85, 258 A.2d 834, noting in dictum that refusal to take a test could not be used in evidence in a criminal proceeding, and State v. Hedding (1961) 122 Vt. 379, 172 A.2d 599, upon which Dellveneri relied, which were decided at a time when the applicable statute did not expressly state that a refusal would be admissible, were no longer viable. State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 385 A.2d 1085, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 706 (1978).

    Advice of rights.

    In the case of defendant who refused to take a breath test, statement of investigating officer at the reasonableness hearing that he “read the DWI procedure to [defendant] and advised him of his rights” prior to defendant’s refusal to submit to the test was sufficient to show that defendant was adequately advised of his rights, although the better practice would be to spell out in detail the step-by-step procedures that were followed. State v. Ruud, 143 Vt. 392, 465 A.2d 1377, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 528 (1983).

    Burden of proof.

    At a civil license suspension proceeding, State has burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe person was operating vehicle in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201 , that the person submitted to a test, and that test result indicated a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more at time of operation. State v. Lowe, 169 Vt. 575, 740 A.2d 348, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 85 (1999) (mem.).

    Collateral estoppel.

    Where the jury at defendant’s criminal trial for driving under the influence returned a general verdict of not guilty, but did not specify the grounds upon which the verdict stood (whether defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was under the legal limit, or, regardless of defendant’s BAC, there was an affirmative defense of necessity), because defendant did not, therefore, establish that determination of his BAC was necessary and essential to the criminal verdict, collateral estoppel did not apply and the trial court was correct to allow relitigation of the BAC issue at his driver’s license civil suspension proceeding. State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301, 706 A.2d 1359, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 279 (1997).

    Defendant failed to satisfy the element of collateral estoppel which requires that applying preclusion in a later action is fair. While he argued that the State’s failure at his criminal trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .08 percent or more precluded the State, at his driver’s license suspension hearing, from proving that his BAC was above the legal limit, he ignored that what cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt may still be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301, 706 A.2d 1359, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 279 (1997).

    Conduct.

    In the case of plaintiff whose motor vehicle driver’s license was suspended pursuant to subsec. (a) of this section for refusal to submit to chemical test during the course of processing by the State Police on suspicion of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, where after plaintiff spoke with an attorney he would not give any clear verbal expression of either consent or refusal to take the test, responding to questions as to his intent with silence, meaningless insults, and incoherencies, the police were justified in concluding that his actions indicated a refusal nineteen minutes after the attorney had been contacted. Stockwell v. District Court, 143 Vt. 45, 460 A.2d 466, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 462 (1983).

    Construction.

    Boom lift is a vehicle for purposes of the driving-under-the-influence statute and the civil suspension statute. State v. Smith, 2011 VT 83, 190 Vt. 222, 27 A.3d 362, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 82 (2011).

    In construing a statute, the court will defer to the interpretation of the agency that is responsible for implementing the statute, unless there is a compelling indication of error. State v. Rolfe, 166 Vt. 1, 686 A.2d 949, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1996).

    Construction with other laws.

    This section imposes no independent and additional rulemaking requirements beyond those set forth in 23 V.S.A. § 1203(d) . State v. Rolfe, 166 Vt. 1, 686 A.2d 949, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1996).

    Delay in proceedings.

    Legislature, when it enacted subsec. (t) of the driver’s license civil suspension statute, intended to make the time limits in subsecs. (g) and (h) directive for first offenses, but mandatory and jurisdictional for second or subsequent offenses. Thus, for second or subsequent offenses, the court must comply with the 21-day rule in subsec. (g) and the 21-day and 42-day rules in subsec. (h), absent consent by the defendant or good cause shown, or the civil suspension hearing must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. State v. Love, 2017 VT 75, 205 Vt. 418, 174 A.3d 761, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 86 (2017).

    Because for second or subsequent offenses, both the 21-day rule in subsec. (g) of the driver’s license civil suspension statute and the 21-day rule in subsec. (h) were mandatory and jurisdictional, and defendant’s final hearing was scheduled more than 21 days after her preliminary hearing, her civil suspension had to be dismissed. State v. Love, 2017 VT 75, 205 Vt. 418, 174 A.3d 761, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 86 (2017).

    Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss a civil suspension proceeding. There was no dispute that in his request for a continuance, defendant had waived the deadline for a final hearing, and nothing in the legislative language reflected a design for the deadline to recur at any point following a continuance with a defendant’s consent. State v. Hawkins, 2013 VT 5, 193 Vt. 297, 67 A.3d 230, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 3 (2013).

    Civil driver’s license suspension proceeding should have been dismissed, since final hearing was not held within forty-two days of alleged offense as required by statute, and there was no evidence to support District Court’s assumption that State did all it could to bring proceeding in a timely manner. State v. Tongue, 170 Vt. 409, 753 A.2d 356, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 32 (2000).

    Statutory time limit governing final hearings in civil license suspension proceedings is mandatory, rather than directory; accordingly, if final hearing is not held within forty-two days of date of alleged offense, proceeding must be dismissed unless State demonstrates either that it had defendant’s consent or good cause for delay. State v. Singer, 170 Vt. 346, 749 A.2d 614, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 17 (2000).

    State failed to show good cause for delay in civil license suspension proceeding and thus trial court’s dismissal of proceeding was proper, and fact that State was relying on blood test, rather than breath test, did not in and of itself constitute good cause for delay. State v. Singer, 170 Vt. 346, 749 A.2d 614, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 17 (2000).

    The trial court did not have to dismiss a driver’s license civil suspension even though conducting the proceeding a year after the original criminal driving-under-the-influence processing allegedly undermined the statutory objective of a speedy license-suspension process. Not only did defendant not show how such a delay prejudiced him, but he requested the continuances that effectuated the delay. State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301, 706 A.2d 1359, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 279 (1997).

    Expert testimony.

    In a DUI civil-suspension case, there was no merit to defendant’s argument that a chemist could not rely on a breath-alcohol testing device’s printout (“ticket”) because it was not admitted into evidence. Under the liberal evidentiary rules that applied in DUI civil-suspension proceedings, an expert could rely on information not admitted into evidence in forming an opinion. State v. Taylor, 2015 VT 104, 200 Vt. 96, 129 A.3d 660, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 81 (2015).

    In a civil driver’s license suspension case, the trial court properly found the expert’s calculation to be unreliable because her assumed alcohol elimination rate of 0.015 percent per hour was speculative. The expert offered no credible reason why her assumed elimination rate was reliable as applied to defendant, nor did she testify as to the likelihood that defendant’s blood alcohol content was below 0.08 while driving. State v. Nugent, 2014 VT 4, 195 Vt. 411, 88 A.3d 429, 2014 Vt. LEXIS 1 (2014).

    Identification of defendant as operator.

    This section focuses on actions of driver, not his identity, and in-court identification of defendant as operator of vehicle is not required. State v. Diesl, 157 Vt. 639, 596 A.2d 343, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 130 (1991) (mem.).

    At hearing on refusal to submit to evidentiary test, defendant was adequately identified as operator by arresting officer who testified that he was personally familiar with defendant, even though defendant did not appear in court. State v. Nichols, 150 Vt. 563, 556 A.2d 75, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 224 (1988).

    —Generally.

    Because defendant refused to submit to a breath test, the State did not need to prove he was the operator of the vehicle; therefore, the court’s determination, based on the officer’s affidavits, that the officer was reasonable in his belief that defendant was the operator of the vehicle was sufficient to justify the suspension. State v. Westcom, 173 Vt. 561, 795 A.2d 1146, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 3 (2002) (mem.).

    A person’s license to operate a motor vehicle may not be suspended pursuant to subsec. (a) of this section where coercive or restrictive police practices affect the person’s decision to refuse testing. Pfeil v. Rutland District Court, 147 Vt. 305, 515 A.2d 1052, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1986).

    A person cannot be compelled to take a blood alcohol test against his will although certain statutory consequences follow upon a refusal. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 438 A.2d 1135, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 634 (1981).

    Driver who was read an implied consent procedure form which stated that blood, breath, urine, and saliva tests were reasonably available, selected saliva test, was immediately told it was not available, and refused to take any other test following phone call to, and upon advice of his attorney, was required to submit to one of the tests which were in fact reasonably available, and his failure to do so was tantamount to a refusal and he could not successfully claim that it was error to suspend his license following summary hearing. State v. Hegarty, 130 Vt. 509, 296 A.2d 234, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 309 (1972).

    Officer must inform the suspected offender which of the tests prescribed by statute are reasonably available to him and if the suspected offender fails, or refuses, to take some one of the tests, he is then subject to license suspension proceedings. State v. Pinard, 130 Vt. 41, 285 A.2d 774, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 219 (1971).

    Issues involved.

    The plain language of subsec. (g) of this section indicates the Legislature’s intent to limit the issues that may be presented at a driver’s license civil suspension hearing to those enumerated. Excluding the necessity defense and other affirmative defenses serves the goals of the statute by minimizing procedural delay. State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301, 706 A.2d 1359, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 279 (1997).

    Whether State Police officer had the right to make an independent judgment, upon observing driver, that driver was unable to give a sufficient sample of his breath for test to determine blood alcohol content is a substantial issue of law affecting merits of hearing to determine reasonableness of driver’s refusal to take the test. Miner v. District Court, 136 Vt. 426, 392 A.2d 390, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 768 (1978).

    Upon refusal to submit to a test, the only relevant question for the court to decide at the summary hearing is whether the facts and circumstances provide a reasonable basis for officer’s judgment that driver was operating, attempting to operate or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence. State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1971).

    In a “reasonableness” hearing under this section, the duty of the court is to evaluate the facts and circumstances presented as persuading the officer that he should request the respondent to take a test, and such evaluation is not a test of compliance with evidentiary rules restricting hearsay, but an examination into the reasonableness of officer’s belief. State v. District Court, 129 Vt. 212, 274 A.2d 685, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 246 (1971).

    Jury instructions.

    Where in its charge at trial for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor the trial court referred to permissive inferences which could be drawn from evidence that defendant had refused to take a breath test, since one of the inferences pointed toward guilt, the other did not point towards guilt, and the court further instructed the jury that they need not draw any inference but if they took an unfavorable one, that inference in and of itself was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, the instructions were not erroneous. State v. Emilo, 145 Vt. 405, 491 A.2d 341, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 310 (1985).

    Jury trial.

    There is no right to trial by jury under Chapter I, Article 12 and Chapter II, Section 38 of the Vermont Constitution at hearing on refusal to submit to alcohol testing as proceeding was unknown at common law. Shaw v. District Court, 152 Vt. 1, 563 A.2d 636, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1989).

    Right to trial by jury guaranteed in prosecutions for criminal offenses by Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution does not apply to hearings under this section as proceeding is summary hearing of civil nature and is not criminal prosecution. Shaw v. District Court, 152 Vt. 1, 563 A.2d 636, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1989).

    Margin of error.

    Ten-percent margin of error applicable to Datamaster testing device does not raise legal threshold for blood alcohol concentration to .088 (.08 plus a ten-percent margin of error). State v. Lowe, 169 Vt. 575, 740 A.2d 348, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 85 (1999) (mem.).

    Presumptions.

    Because defendant’s expert provided opinions specific to the instrument used to obtain defendant’s breath test results and about the particular circumstances surrounding collection of defendant’s tests, there was sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of reliability in a civil suspension proceeding. State v. Burnett, 2013 VT 113, 195 Vt. 277, 88 A.3d 1191, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 111 (2013).

    To rebut the presumption in subsec. (n) of this section, defendant must only produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that his BAC was under 0.08 percent at the time of operation. A party is not required to overcome the presumption with evidence, but must only produce evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, and once he has done so, the fact in question is to be established by evidence as are other questions of fact, without aid from the presumption. State v. Giard, 2005 VT 43, 178 Vt. 544, 871 A.2d 976, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 73 (2005) (mem.).

    The State could not rely on the presumption in subsec. (n) of this section where defendant’s testimony as to how much alcohol he consumed prior to the accident, coupled with an expert’s testimony, fairly and reasonably tended to rebut the presumption that his BAC was 0.08 percent or more at the time he last operated his vehicle. State v. Giard, 2005 VT 43, 178 Vt. 544, 871 A.2d 976, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 73 (2005) (mem.).

    State failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that defendant’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more, since defendant’s introduction of 0.079 test result was sufficient to rebut presumption of accuracy and validity of 0.083 test result, and disparate results could properly be explained by ten-percent margin of error applicable to Datamaster testing device. State v. Lowe, 169 Vt. 575, 740 A.2d 348, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 85 (1999) (mem.).

    Nothing in the wording of subdiv. (g)(4) of this section, which governs the issues that may be heard at civil suspension proceedings, suggests that a presumption of admissibility exists in regard to test results; instead, the language of the section sets up an aid in proving that testing methods were valid and reliable and that the test results were accurate and accurately evaluated by establishing a presumption that these issues are resolved by a showing that the test was taken and evaluated in compliance with Department of Health rules, which affects the burden of production of evidence but not its admissibility. State v. Rolfe, 166 Vt. 1, 686 A.2d 949, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1996).

    Presumption as set forth in subsec. (m) of this section does not violate Due Process Clause of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. State v. Paya, 159 Vt. 625, 617 A.2d 165, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 128 (1992) (mem.).

    Trial court erred in refusing to suspend defendant’s automobile operator’s license following civil license suspension hearing where defendant introduced evidence raising a theoretical possibility that the presumption that a person is intoxicated at the time of operation if his blood alcohol content is .10 percent or more within two hours of operation may not be true in all cases, because defendant’s evidence, which was of a general, theoretical nature, was insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption. State v. Pluta, 157 Vt. 451, 600 A.2d 291, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 211 (1991).

    It is true that evidence that the test was taken and evaluated in compliance with rules adopted by the Department of Health shall be prima facie evidence that the testing methods used were valid and reliable and that the test results are accurate and were accurately evaluated. Where an officer does not comply with operating procedures, however, the fact finder is free to find the converse of that presumption. State v. Spooner, 2012 VT 90, 192 Vt. 465, 60 A.3d 640, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2012).

    Prior convictions.

    Lifetime suspension of driver’s license was not unconstitutional as retroactive application of this section, even though one of convictions used to determine length of suspension occurred before enactment of provision allowing lifetime suspension for fourth refusal to submit to testing. Shaw v. District Court, 152 Vt. 1, 563 A.2d 636, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1989).

    A prior conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is deemed to be a refusal to submit to a breath test for the purposes of this section. Carpenter v. Vermont Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 143 Vt. 329, 465 A.2d 1379, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 529 (1983).

    Where plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s license was revoked for a six-year period as a result of three refusals to submit to breath tests, and two of those refusals were actually convictions for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor prior to July 1, 1981, since subsec. (j) of this section, which became effective after July 1, 1981, required plaintiff to refuse to submit to a test, or to be convicted again for driving under the influence before his license could be revoked for three refusals, the subsection’s enactment had no impact on his prior convictions, did not impair his vested rights nor impose new duties, and did not attach new disabilities to prior transactions, in that it did not penalize him anew for his past convictions, and, therefore, was not retrospectively applied. Carpenter v. Vermont Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 143 Vt. 329, 465 A.2d 1379, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 529 (1983).

    Reasonable grounds.

    At a DUI criminal and civil suspension hearing, the trial court erred in preventing defendant from raising the validity of the underlying stop. Defendant’s citing of the provision concerning whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in his list of issues to be raised at the civil suspension hearing necessarily gave notice to the prosecutor that defendant was preserving his right to question the validity of the underlying stop; after the Court’s decision in Lussier, the provision included as a matter of law the issue of the validity of the underlying stop. State v. Webb, 2010 VT 54, 188 Vt. 137, 998 A.2d 709, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 53 (2010).

    In cases involving defendants who submitted to a test after being stopped for driving while intoxicated, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was operating a vehicle, rather than showing merely that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating the vehicle. State v. Green, 173 Vt. 540, 790 A.2d 426, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 421 (2001) (mem.).

    Exclusionary rule applied to civil driver’s license suspension proceedings and was not limited to challenges to reasonableness of underlying stop, but could also be invoked by defendant challenging lawfulness of his arrest on jurisdictional grounds. State v. Nickerson, 170 Vt. 654, 756 A.2d 1240, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 158 (2000) (mem.).

    In permitting defendants in civil license suspension proceedings to dispute whether processing officer had reasonable grounds to believe they were driving while intoxicated, Legislature assumed that a constitutional stop would be a necessary predicate to finding “reasonable grounds” for suspicion of DUI; Legislature thus did not intend to preclude defendants in such proceedings from challenging constitutionality of their underlying stops. State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 757 A.2d 1017, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 170 (2000).

    Under subsec. (a) of this section, trial court does not have to find that plaintiff was operating or attempting to operate vehicle or was in control of vehicle but must find that officer had reasonable grounds to believe there was operation or control. Shaw v. District Court, 152 Vt. 1, 563 A.2d 636, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1989).

    Automobile passenger’s driver’s license was properly revoked for fourth refusal to submit to testing under this section where he was found alone in car, asleep on back seat, and told officer that he was operator, as officer had reasonable grounds to believe he was operator. Shaw v. District Court, 152 Vt. 1, 563 A.2d 636, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1989).

    Reasonableness.

    There is no provision in the implied consent law which allows for a conditional consent to take a sobriety test, thus driver’s statement that he would take test if officer would sign a waiver that if driver was infected by the needle he could sue constituted an unreasonable refusal to take the test. State v. Lyon, 129 Vt. 141, 274 A.2d 478, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 236 (1971).

    Required evidence.

    Court rejects the claim that the civil suspension statute requires, as a matter of law, that the breath-alcohol testing device printout (the “ticket”) itself be admitted into evidence. The statute requires the State to establish several things in a civil-suspension hearing, including whether the “test results” indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was above the legal limit (which is a distinct factor from “whether the testing methods used were valid and reliable”) and whether the “test results” were accurate and accurately evaluated; if the term “test results” included the scientific process that produced the results, including the data on the ticket, the list of the distinct elements of the State’s case in the statute would be redundant. State v. Taylor, 2015 VT 104, 200 Vt. 96, 129 A.3d 660, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 81 (2015).

    Identification at trial of defendant as the operator of the vehicle is a vital and indispensable element of a violation of this section. State v. Ruud, 143 Vt. 392, 465 A.2d 1377, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 528 (1983).

    Review.

    Under the civil-suspension statute, a trial court is expressly authorized to consider the reliability of testing procedures and the accuracy of results, and whether a test is reliable or accurate is a factual finding. Therefore, the trial court’s determination of reliability is not a question of law, but rather a question of fact which the appellate court reviews for clear error, recognizing that the trier of fact is in the best position to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented. State v. Nugent, 2014 VT 4, 195 Vt. 411, 88 A.3d 429, 2014 Vt. LEXIS 1 (2014).

    This section authorizes an appeal from any adverse decision made by the District Court under this section; right to appeal is not limited only to defendant. State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 591 A.2d 53, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1991).

    Defendant’s argument that State could not appeal District Court decision which was based on jurisdictional and procedural grounds where this section provided “that a decision of the district court under this section may be appealed as a matter of right to the supreme court” was rejected; “section” referred to the entire section, not just one of its subsections, and fact that court’s decision was based on jurisdictional and procedural grounds did not take the proceeding out from under this section. State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 591 A.2d 53, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1991).

    Denial of relief from court order suspending driver’s license was affirmed, where defendant failed to demonstrate interference with right to fair trial or to counsel and provisions of this section mandating automatic suspension for refusal to submit to evidentiary test were held constitutional. Brow v. District Court of Vermont, 153 Vt. 488, 572 A.2d 1347, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 13 (1990).

    Review of summary refusal hearing is by way of a proceeding for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of certiorari ordinarily brought in Superior Court. State v. Lynaugh, 148 Vt. 124, 530 A.2d 555, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 465 (1987).

    Hearing on petition for extraordinary relief to review summary refusal hearing is not de novo and, unlike an appeal, reaches only questions of law and is discretionary according to the merits of the case made by the petition and the record. State v. Lynaugh, 148 Vt. 124, 530 A.2d 555, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 465 (1987).

    Since there is no statutory right to appeal from an adverse ruling in a refusal hearing held pursuant to subsec. (a) of this section, the review available is by way of a petition for extraordinary relief under V.R.A.P. 21. Pfeil v. Rutland District Court, 147 Vt. 305, 515 A.2d 1052, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1986).

    Superior Court does not have jurisdiction under V.R.C.P. 75 to review order of District Court requiring suspension of driver’s license for refusal to submit to alcohol testing. Pfeil v. Rutland District Court, 147 Vt. 305, 515 A.2d 1052, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1986).

    Where person charged with driving while intoxicated did not present to trial court the claim that failure of police to advise him of alleged right to counsel to assist in decision whether to take breath test denied right to counsel at critical stage of the proceedings and made refusal inadmissible at trial, the claim could not be considered on appeal, and Supreme Court could find no glaring error so grave that it struck at heart of constitutional rights and allowed consideration of the claim under the “‘plain error” rule. State v. Welch, 136 Vt. 442, 394 A.2d 1115, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 771 (1978).

    Record in summary hearing to determine question whether driver’s license should be suspended was separate and distinct from, and not a part of, subsequent criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, and could not be considered on appeal from conviction in the criminal case, so that claim of error presented on appeal and founded on testimony in summary hearing was without foundation in the evidence in the criminal case and could not be considered. State v. McGrath, 130 Vt. 400, 296 A.2d 636, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 290 (1972).

    A petition for a writ of certiorari is an appropriate remedy to review questions of law arising in the course of a summary hearing held under the implied consent law. State v. Lyon, 129 Vt. 141, 274 A.2d 478, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 236 (1971).

    Right to counsel.

    Consent form read to DUI suspect, informing him of his right to counsel prior to deciding whether to take breath test, failed to adequately advise him that he had right to speak to a public defender regardless of his income level, and therefore District Court properly entered judgment for suspect in his subsequent civil license suspension hearing. State v. Madonna, 169 Vt. 98, 726 A.2d 498, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 25 (1999).

    DUI defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when his telephone conversation with counsel was observed at close proximity by a police officer, even though officer later testified about defendant’s demeanor during the call at defendant’s trial; no use was made at trial of the conversation’s content, and no evidence was presented that defendant was inhibited in his conference with counsel. Brow v. District Court of Vermont, 153 Vt. 488, 572 A.2d 1347, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 13 (1990).

    Driver’s license of defendant suspected of driving while intoxicated should not have been suspended, where his refusal to submit to blood alcohol test was premised on State’s inability to provide him with a consultation with a lawyer before he was required to make up his mind whether to take the test. State v. Garvey, 157 Vt. 105, 595 A.2d 267, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 118 (1991).

    In view of provisions of this section protecting an operator’s right to refuse to take any test when a serious criminal case is involved, the request to submit to a chemical test can rise to level of a “critical stage” in the proceedings, and therefore, police officers may not, without reason, deny access between an accused and his lawyer, when such access is requested and is readily available and will not interfere with investigation of the matter at hand. State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1977).

    —Nature of proceedings.

    A driver’s license suspension proceeding is a civil proceeding, not a criminal prosecution. State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56, 605 A.2d 510, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1992).

    Plain language of this section indicated Legislature intended the summary suspension to be of a civil nature, where title was “civil suspension; summary procedure” and statute embodied distinctly civil procedures. State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56, 605 A.2d 510, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1992).

    For purposes of double jeopardy protections, civil license suspension was not a “punishment,” where governing statute’s plain language indicated suspension was of civil nature, statutory scheme was not so punitive as to negate Legislature’s intent to make it civil in nature, suspension was actually the revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted, license suspensions had historically served a regulatory purpose, element of deterrence present in suspension was common in all losses of licenses or privileges and was not primary focus of statutory scheme, and suspension served rational remedial purpose of protecting public safety. State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56, 605 A.2d 510, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1992).

    Refusal hearing under this section is administrative proceeding in nature of civil hearing, and standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. Shaw v. District Court, 152 Vt. 1, 563 A.2d 636, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 121 (1989).

    Summary refusal hearing provided for in subsec. (a) of this section is in nature of civil administrative hearing. State v. Nichols, 150 Vt. 563, 556 A.2d 75, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 224 (1988).

    The summary refusal hearing provided for in subsec. (a) of this section is in the nature of an administrative proceeding, civil in nature. State v. Lynaugh, 148 Vt. 124, 530 A.2d 555, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 465 (1987).

    The summary refusal hearing held pursuant to subsec. (a) of this section is in the nature of an administrative proceeding and is the determination of a civil matter, involving only the question of suspension. Pfeil v. Rutland District Court, 147 Vt. 305, 515 A.2d 1052, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1986).

    Summary “reasonableness” hearing held under this section is in the nature of an administrative proceeding and is the determination of a civil matter. State v. Mayo, 137 Vt. 77, 398 A.2d 303, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 929 (1979).

    “Reasonableness” summary hearing created by this section is in the nature of an administrative proceeding and is the determination of a civil matter, concerning whether respondent should be subject to having his operator’s license suspended. State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1977).

    Summary hearing under this section is in the nature of an administrative proceeding and is the determination of a civil matter involving only the question of suspension. State v. Mastaler, 130 Vt. 44, 285 A.2d 776, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1971); State v. McGrath, 130 Vt. 400, 296 A.2d 636, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 290 (1972).

    A “reasonableness” hearing under this section is not a criminal prosecution, rather, it is a hearing to determine whether there should be a suspension of an operator’s driving privilege because of his refusal to carry through his implied consent to submit to a sobriety test. State v. District Court, 129 Vt. 212, 274 A.2d 685, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 246 (1971).

    Second test.

    Because credibility determinations are solely within the province of the fact finder, the trial court in a civil driver’s license suspension proceeding did not err in choosing to discredit a forensic chemist’s testimony where it directly contradicted the State’s own training manual, which provided that in the event of a fatal error, a machine should be taken out of service. The trial court properly grounded its decision that the second test to actually yield a result was not conducted in a valid or reliable manner in accordance with the Department of Health’s methodology. State v. Spooner, 2012 VT 90, 192 Vt. 465, 60 A.3d 640, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2012).

    Read in light of one another, the driver’s license civil suspension statute and the implied consent statute dictate that if a person elects to have a second blood alcohol test, the methods of that test are reviewable for validity and reliability by the court at a final civil-suspension hearing. State v. Spooner, 2012 VT 90, 192 Vt. 465, 60 A.3d 640, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2012).

    Driver’s license civil-suspension statute clearly calls on the trial judge to review both the reliability of any evidentiary tests conducted and compliance with the implied consent statute. The implied consent statute affords a person a right to a second blood alcohol test, which must be conducted in a reliable fashion; if a court finds that the second test was conducted in an unreliable fashion, the State has necessarily failed to carry its burden to establish compliance with the implied consent statute, and the court must then deny the civil suspension of a defendant’s license. State v. Spooner, 2012 VT 90, 192 Vt. 465, 60 A.3d 640, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2012).

    Statutory compliance is an element the State had the burden to establish to prevail in its civil-suspension complaint. The trial court correctly concluded that the lack of a reliable second test deprived the State of an essential element to establish its civil-suspension case. State v. Spooner, 2012 VT 90, 192 Vt. 465, 60 A.3d 640, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2012).

    Ten-percent margin of error applicable to Datamaster testing device does not raise legal threshold for blood alcohol concentration to .088 (.08 plus a ten-percent margin of error). State v. Lowe, 169 Vt. 575, 740 A.2d 348, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 85 (1999) (mem.).

    Self-incrimination.

    Since the right of an operator of a motor vehicle to refuse to submit to a test of alcohol content of breath or blood is a creature of statute and granted by legislative grace and is not a constitutional right, the Legislature may properly condition the exercise of the right by providing that any refusal may be introduced as evidence in a criminal proceeding, and admission of refusal evidence does not violate privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 385 A.2d 1085, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 706 (1978).

    Introduction of evidence of driver’s refusal to take a breath test did not violate his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Welch v. District Court, 461 F. Supp. 592, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14113 (D. Vt. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 903, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16184 (2d Cir. 1979).

    Admission of refusal to consent to breath test for blood alcohol content upon arrest for suspected driving under the influence was not in violation of privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Welch, 136 Vt. 442, 394 A.2d 1115, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 771 (1978).

    Suspension or revocation of license.

    At the final hearing on civil suspension of a driver’s license, the court must determine whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was violating the statute on driving under the influence, whether the person’s rights were adequately explained, and whether a test was properly taken and indicated a BAC of 0.08 or higher “at the time of operating, attempting to operate or being in actual physical control of a vehicle.” It is only after the final hearing that the Commissioner suspends a license on the grounds that, at the time of operation, the person’s BAC was 0.08 or more at the time of operation. State v. Anderson, 2005 VT 80, 179 Vt. 43, 890 A.2d 68, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 164 (2005).

    At the hearing on civil suspension of a driver’s license, the State can rely on the officer’s affidavit to prove the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving while under the influence, that the officer explained the person’s rights, and that a test taken by a properly trained officer indicated a BAC level of 0.08 or more. The State can then rely on the affidavit of a chemist who works for the Department of Health, certifying that the test complied with Health Department regulations on breath-testing methods and was an accurate and valid indication of the alcohol concentration in the defendant’s system at the time of the test. Thus, if a test result produces a reading of 0.08 or more, and there is no question of relating the test result back to the time of operation, the summary suspension hearing is indeed summary. State v. Anderson, 2005 VT 80, 179 Vt. 43, 890 A.2d 68, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 164 (2005).

    The necessary prerequisite of a civil suspension notice is an affidavit from the processing officer stating that he requested a breath test and “the test indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more.” The officer’s affidavit necessarily can attest only to the result generated by the test taken during the processing of the operator. State v. Anderson, 2005 VT 80, 179 Vt. 43, 890 A.2d 68, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 164 (2005).

    For a civil suspension of a driver’s license to proceed there must be either a refusal or a test result indicating a BAC of 0.08 or more at the time of operation. That BAC can be shown by the rebuttable presumption or through relation back evidence. But first there must be a test result of at least 0.08. State v. Anderson, 2005 VT 80, 179 Vt. 43, 890 A.2d 68, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 164 (2005).

    No violation of separation of powers existed in State Supreme Court-created administrative motor vehicle license suspension procedure, where civil suspension rule was authorized by both State Constitution and subsec. (p) of this section, and Constitution itself established judicial power for rule promulgation. State v. O'Brien, 158 Vt. 275, 609 A.2d 981, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 52 (1992).

    Requirement in this section that notice of intent to suspend a person’s operating license be mailed immediately is directory, not mandatory; compliance is not essential to a proceeding’s validity. State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 591 A.2d 53, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1991).

    Where this section requires immediate notice of intent to suspend a person’s operating license, the time period begins to run when the law enforcement officer receives the results of the person’s alcohol concentration test. State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 591 A.2d 53, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1991).

    District Court finding that the time for giving “immediate notice of intent to suspend” under this section begins when the sample is analyzed was reversed. State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 591 A.2d 53, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1991).

    Provision of this section requiring “immediate” notice of intent to suspend a person’s operating license was complied with where police officer mailed notice one day after receiving the results of defendant’s blood-alcohol content test. State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 591 A.2d 53, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1991).

    Court at operator’s license suspension hearing properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure of State to meet statutory time limits concerning notice of suspension, officer’s affidavit, and holding of hearing; time limits were directory and not essential to validity of proceeding because this section did not specify any consequence for failure to comply, and defendant was not prejudiced by failure to meet the time limits. State v. Skilling, 157 Vt. 647, 595 A.2d 1346, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 131 (1991) (mem.).

    Once a court finds that there was a reasonable basis for a request that a person suspected of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor submit to a breath test, the ensuing license revocation is accomplished purely by administrative action, since neither the court nor the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles has been granted discretionary power under this section. Carpenter v. Vermont Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 143 Vt. 329, 465 A.2d 1379, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 529 (1983).

    Type of test.

    Summary suspension procedure under this section allows for the use of a gas chromatography test in addition to infrared test. State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 591 A.2d 53, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1991).

    District Court finding that this section was not available where gas chromatography testing device had been used to analyze defendant’s breath sample for alcohol content was reversed. State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 591 A.2d 53, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1991).

    Validity and accuracy of tests.

    Given the affidavits from a chemist and a police officer in a DUI civil suspension case, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the testing methods used were valid and reliable and that the test results were accurate and accurately evaluated, even though the printout (“ticket”) generated by the breath-alcohol testing device was not admitted into evidence. State v. Taylor, 2015 VT 104, 200 Vt. 96, 129 A.3d 660, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 81 (2015).

    Cited.

    Cited in Veilleux v. Springer, 131 Vt. 33, 300 A.2d 620, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 263 (1973); Kendall v. Springer, 131 Vt. 47, 300 A.2d 629, 1973 Vt. LEXIS 264 (1973); State v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537, 394 A.2d 1145, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 662 (1978); State v. Wall, 137 Vt. 482, 408 A.2d 632, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1068 (1979); Office of State's Attorney v. Office of Attorney General, 138 Vt. 10, 409 A.2d 599, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1096 (1979); State v. Kozel, 146 Vt. 534, 505 A.2d 1221, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 321 (1986); State v. Yudichak, 147 Vt. 418, 519 A.2d 1150, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 436 (1986); State v. Hoffman, 148 Vt. 320, 532 A.2d 577, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 494 (1987); State v. Byrne, 149 Vt. 257, 542 A.2d 667, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 8 (1988); Craw v. District Court, 150 Vt. 114, 549 A.2d 1065, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 116 (1988); State v. Lewis, 155 Vt. 653, 586 A.2d 550, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 248 (1990); State v. Lynaugh, 158 Vt. 72, 604 A.2d 785, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1992); State v. Lafountain, 160 Vt. 313, 628 A.2d 1243, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1993); State v. Brooks, 162 Vt. 26, 643 A.2d 226, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 184 (1993); State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 51 (1995); State v. Guidera, 167 Vt. 598, 707 A.2d 704, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1998); State v. Remy, 167 Vt. 541, 711 A.2d 665, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 157 (1998); Johnson v. Agency of Transportation, 2006 VT 37, 180 Vt. 493, 904 A.2d 1060, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 92 (2006) (mem.).

    Annotations From Former § 1191

    Consent of others.

    In trial for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, charge that if father gave consent to test of 18 year old defendant son’s blood, consent was given, even if son did not consent, was error, as consent to a test could be given only by the person requested to take it, but reversal was not required where no harm or prejudice to defendant was demonstrated. State v. Bassett, 128 Vt. 453, 266 A.2d 438, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1970).

    Construction.

    A person charged with operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was not required to submit to a test under this section, but was given the choice of taking the chance that an unfavorable test result would aid in his conviction, or by refusing, lose his license for a period of six months. State v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, 202 A.2d 267, 1964 Vt. LEXIS 90 (1964).

    Hearing.

    Summary hearing under this section was in the nature of an administrative proceeding and was the determination of a civil matter involving only the question of suspension. State v. Dellveneri, 128 Vt. 85, 258 A.2d 834, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1969).

    A criminal trial on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is a distinct and separate proceeding from a hearing to determine whether an operator’s license should be suspended because of the holder’s refusal to submit to a sobriety test. State v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, 202 A.2d 267, 1964 Vt. LEXIS 90 (1964).

    Miranda warning.

    Police request that driver, who had not been arrested, taken into custody, or questioned regarding accident he had been involved in, submit to test for alcoholic content, made after driver was taken to hospital for treatment, did not have to be preceded by Miranda warning. State v. Bassett, 128 Vt. 453, 266 A.2d 438, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1970).

    Opinion of others.

    Evidence of other persons’ opinions that a driver was not under the influence did not refute an officer’s observations and judgment that he was under the influence and was foreign to the issue and properly excluded. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    Opinion or innocence of driver.

    Driver’s belief that officer had no cause to request him to submit to test did not excuse him from submitting to test. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    A claim of innocence of offense charged, even if vindicated by acquittal, afforded no legal justification for refusing a test; the questions at the summary proceeding to determine reasonableness and the issues at the criminal trial were distinctly different. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    Reasonable grounds.

    The responsibility for deciding whether reasonable grounds for a request to submit to a test were present resided in the first instance with the officer, subject to review by the court in which the driver was brought for arraignment. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    Officer’s observance of nearly empty vodka bottle and unopened beer can on floor of auto involved in collision, driver’s difficulty in producing identification, slow and distinct speech, contradictory answers, bloodshot eyes, flushed face, and “yes” answer to question whether he had been drinking gave officer adequate and reasonable grounds for belief that driver was under the influence. McGarry v. Costello, 128 Vt. 234, 260 A.2d 402, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 231 (1969).

    Review.

    The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order made under this section. State v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222, 202 A.2d 267, 1964 Vt. LEXIS 90 (1964).

    Where record showed that motorist refused to submit to blood alcohol test while under arrest for public intoxication but not while under arrest for violation of law involving operating vehicle while intoxicated, whether municipal court exceeded its jurisdiction in suspending operator’s license, under statute providing for such suspension in event of refusal to submit to such test after arrest for driving while intoxicated, presented substantial question of law affecting merits and writ of certiorari would issue. State v. Laplaca, 126 Vt. 171, 224 A.2d 911, 1966 Vt. LEXIS 190 (1966).

    Right to counsel.

    Since deciding whether to refuse to take a test is a decision upon a purely administrative matter, i.e. the possible resultant suspension of license for six months following a civil summary hearing on reasonableness of refusal, failure of an arresting officer to advise person arrested of his right to counsel before requiring him to decide whether he will take intoxication test does not violate his constitutional rights or prevent a finding that refusal to submit to test was unreasonable. State v. Dellveneri, 128 Vt. 85, 258 A.2d 834, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1969).

    Suspension of license.

    Refusal of a motor vehicle operator to take the tests offered was a privilege given by the Legislature and suspension of license resulting therefrom was not a conviction of a criminal offense. State v. Hedding, 122 Vt. 379, 172 A.2d 599, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 87 (1961). But see State v. Blouin, 168 Vt. 119, 716 A.2d 826, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 163 (1998).

    Law Reviews —

    Vermont’s blood alcohol test, see 2 Vt. L. Rev. 93 (1977).

    For note relating to proposed administrative license suspension procedures, see 11 Vt. L. Rev. 75 (1986).

    § 1206. Suspension of license for driving while under influence; first conviction.

    1. First conviction—generally.   Except as otherwise provided, upon conviction of a person for violating a provision of section 1201 of this title, or upon final determination of an appeal, the court shall forward the conviction report forthwith to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The Commissioner shall immediately suspend the person’s operating license or nonresident operating privilege or the privilege of an unlicensed operator to operate a vehicle for a period of 90 days and until the defendant complies with section 1209a of this title.
    2. Extended suspension—fatality or serious bodily injury.   In cases resulting in a fatality or serious bodily injury to a person other than the defendant, the period of suspension shall be one year and until the defendant complies with section 1209a of this title.
    3. Operation during suspension.   During a suspension under this section, an eligible person may operate a motor vehicle under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued under section 1213 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; amended 1973, No. 79 , § 6, eff. May 23, 1973; 1975, No. 103 , § 3, eff. May 30, 1975; 1979, No. 58 , § 2; 1981, No. 103 , § 7; 1983, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. July 1, 2011; 2011, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 50; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 192.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added subsec. heading.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted the former last sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “a refusal to consent to a law enforcement officer’s reasonable request for an evidentiary test or” preceding “collision resulting in serious bodily injury or death” at the end of the last sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Section heading: Substituted “first convictions” for “reinstatement”.

    Subsec. (a): Added “—generally” in the subsec. heading, and added the last sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Added “—fatality” in the subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (c): Added the subsec. heading, substituted “subsection 1201(c)” for “subsection 1201(b) or (c)” and inserted “involving a collision in which serious bodily injury resulted” in the first sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Added “except as otherwise provided” preceding “upon conviction” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1981. Section amended generally.

    —1979. Subsec. (b): Substituted “$75.00” for “$50.00” following “exceed” in the second sentence.

    —1975. Subsec. (a): Rewrote the first sentence, deleted “who has not refused the chemical test authorized under this chapter” preceding “who has complied” in the second sentence, and added the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$50.00” for “$25.00” following “exceed” in the second sentence.

    —1973. Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Operating after suspension of license, see § 674 of this title.

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 1185.

    Conviction.

    Where State’s Attorney entered nolle, after motor vehicle operator who had pleaded guilty to driving under influence later filed motion to strike plea, which was granted and case set for trial, there was no conviction and revocation of license was vacated as not authorized by section. 1938-40 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 290.

    Procedure.

    It was mandatory that Commissioner revoke license, without hearing, of person convicted of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 1938-40 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 291.

    Construction.

    By providing for mandatory one-year license suspension for DUI with fatality resulting, and vesting Commissioner of Motor Vehicles with exclusive authority to calculate suspensions and revocations, Legislature did not expressly or impliedly preempt trial court’s probationary power to limit a defendant’s operating privileges for longer periods; had Legislature actually intended to eliminate trial court’s discretion to prohibit a defendant from driving as a condition of probation for grave vehicular offenses, it would have plainly said so. State v. Nelson, 170 Vt. 125, 742 A.2d 1248, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 332 (1999).

    Suspension Proper.

    Given that the breathalyzer test results were well above the legal limit of 0.08, combined with expert testimony from the State that defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was higher at the time of operation, and absent any evidentiary basis to believe that defendant’s BAC could have been lower at the time of operation, the trial court was correct to rule against defendant in a civil suspension hearing. State v. Burgess, 2010 VT 64, 188 Vt. 235, 5 A.3d 911, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 59 (2010).

    Cited.

    Cited in McIntyre v. Malloy, 130 Vt. 395, 296 A.2d 222, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 289 (1972); State v. Cady, 136 Vt. 29, 383 A.2d 607, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 680 (1978); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985); State v. Potier, 150 Vt. 15, 547 A.2d 1359, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 81 (1988).

    Annotations From Former § 1185

    Procedure.

    Under this section the revocation of a license of a person convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was not accomplished by order of the convicting court, nor was mandatory suspension included in the penal sanction which could be imposed under section 1183 of this title (now § 1201); by operation of this section suspension was accomplished forthwith by administrative action when judgment of guilty had been entered and the licensee identified as the offender. Bolio v. Malloy, 126 Vt. 424, 234 A.2d 336, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 213 (1967).

    Reinstatement.

    Until the specified period of suspension had expired, the Commissioner was without authority to reinstate an operator’s license and then only upon adequate proof that the applicant was a proper person to whom a license should be granted. Bolio v. Malloy, 126 Vt. 424, 234 A.2d 336, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 213 (1967).

    Law Reviews —

    For note relating to proposed administrative license suspension procedures, see 11 Vt. L. Rev. 75 (1986).

    § 1207. Repealed. 1973, No. 79, § 9, eff. May 23, 1973.

    History

    Former § 1207. Former § 1207, relating to license reinstatement, was derived from 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    § 1208. Suspensions for subsequent convictions.

    1. Second conviction.   Upon a second conviction of a person violating a provision of section 1201 of this title and upon final determination of an appeal, the court shall forward the conviction report forthwith to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The Commissioner shall immediately suspend the person’s operating license or nonresident operating privilege or the privilege of an unlicensed operator to operate a vehicle for 18 months and until the defendant complies with section 1209a of this title. However, during the suspension, an eligible person may operate under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued pursuant to section 1213 of this title.
    2. Third conviction.   Upon a third or subsequent conviction of a person violating a provision of section 1201 of this title and upon final determination of any appeal, the court shall forward the conviction report forthwith to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The Commissioner shall immediately revoke the person’s operating license or nonresident operating privilege or the privilege of an unlicensed operator to operate a motor vehicle for life. However, during this lifetime revocation, an eligible person may operate under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued under section 1213 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; amended 1973, No. 79 , § 7, eff. May 23, 1973; 1975, No. 103 , §§ 4, 5, eff. May 30, 1975; 1977, No. 101 , § 2, eff. May 6, 1977; 1979, No. 58 , § 3; 1981, No. 103 , § 8; 1983, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1989, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 14, 1990; 1991, No. 55 , § 7; 1997, No. 56 , § 5, eff. Aug. 1, 1997; 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. July 1, 2011; 2011, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 51.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (b): Rewrote the last sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsecs. (a) and (b): Deleted “a refusal to consent to a law enforcement officer’s reasonable request for an evidentiary test or” preceding “collision resulting in serious bodily injury or death” at the end of the last sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Added the last sentences in subsecs. (a) and (b).

    —1997. Subsec. (b): Inserted “or subsequent” preceding “conviction” in the first sentence and substituted “life” for “three years and until the defendant complies with section 1209a” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted.

    —1991. Added “suspensions for” preceding “subsequent” in the section heading, deleted former subsec. (a), redesignated former subsecs. (b) and (c) as subsecs. (a) and (b) and rewrote the heading for new subsec. (a), deleted “for an offense which occurred within five years of the date of the offense for which there was a first conviction” following “second conviction” in the first sentence and “and until the defendant has satisfactorily completed a therapy program at his own expense agreed to by the individual and the driver rehabilitation program counselor” following “title” in the second sentence of that subsec. and following “section 1209a” in the second sentence of new subsec. (b), redesignated former subsec. (d) as subsec. (c) and rewrote the second sentence of that subsec., and deleted former subsecs. (e) and (f).

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted former subsec. (e) and redesignated former subsecs. (f) and (g) as subsecs. (e) and (f).

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1981. Subsec. (a): Substituted “five” for “three” preceding “years”.

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “the fee as provided in section 1209a” for “a fee not to exceed $75.00 to the commissioner to be used” preceding “solely”.

    Subsec. (d): Rewrote the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Inserted “a” following “successfully completed” and substituted “program” for “programs” preceding “supervised” and “the fee as provided in section 1209a” for “a fee not to exceed $75.00 for the rehabilitation program to the commissioner to be used” preceding “solely”.

    Subsec. (f): Rewrote the first sentence and deleted “from the date of conviction” following “six years” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (g): Added “or drugs or both” following “alcohol” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (h): Added.

    —1979. Substituted “$75.00” for “$50.00” following “exceed” in subsecs. (c) and (e).

    —1977. Subsec. (a): Inserted “if the second offense occurs” preceding “more than three years after” and substituted “the date of the first offense for which he was convicted” for “a first conviction” thereafter.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “for an offense which occurred” preceding “within three years of” and “the date of the offense for which there was” thereafter and substituted “and” for “or” preceding “upon final” in the first sentence and deleted the former fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “whose license has been revoked pursuant to subsection (b) of this section” following “person”.

    Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (e): Added.

    Subsec. (f): Added.

    Subsec. (g): Added.

    —1975. Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1973. Section amended generally.

    1991 amendment. 1991, No. 55 , § 19(2), (3), provided that it is the intention of the general assembly that section 7 of this act, which amended this section by eliminating the 5-year and 15-year forgiveness periods, shall apply as follows:

    “(2) With respect to section 1208 of Title 23, the five-year forgiveness period between offenses shall be considered a right which has accrued to the operator if the first offense occurred at any time prior to July 1, 1991.

    “(3) With respect to section 1208 of Title 23, the 15-year forgiveness period between convictions shall be considered a right which has accrued to the operator if the prior conviction occurred at any time prior to July 1, 1991.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Operating after suspension or revocation of license, see § 674 of this title.

    Application.

    Where plaintiff was convicted for out-of-state instance of DUI subsequent to enactment of Driver License Compact and to amendment of statute to allow out-of-state convictions to be used to calculate subsequent convictions for purposes of license suspension and revocation, fact that newly enacted and amended statutes were applied to add out-of-state conviction to previous Vermont conviction did not constitute impermissible ex post facto application of statutes; statutory amendments would have had no impact on plaintiff absent a new act by him (the out-of-state conviction) which triggered the new rule. Erno v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 156 Vt. 62, 587 A.2d 409, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 12 (1991).

    Prior convictions.

    Under this section, which provides that “upon a fourth or subsequent conviction of a person violating a provision of section 1201,” relating to driving while intoxicated, his driver’s license was to be suspended for life, driver who had two section 1201 convictions and two convictions under former section relating to driving while intoxicated, which was repealed when section 1201 was enacted, could not have his license suspended for life. McGovern v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 139 Vt. 169, 423 A.2d 489, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1495 (1980).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Fournier, 133 Vt. 416, 340 A.2d 71, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1975); State v. Cady, 136 Vt. 29, 383 A.2d 607, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 680 (1978); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 327 (1985).

    Annotations From Former § 1187

    Pardon.

    Where Governor granted full and unconditional pardon covering the three driving while intoxicated convictions of person whose license had been revoked for life, all legal punishment and disqualifications resulting from the convictions were removed and Commissioner of Motor Vehicles properly issued him a license. Brown v. Tatro, 134 Vt. 248, 356 A.2d 512, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 643 (1976).

    Prior convictions.

    Where petitioner’s identity with two offenses of operating motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs was established, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles was without authority to hear and determine his application for reinstatement of his license to operate motor vehicle until expiration of six-year period specified by this section whether or not the first conviction was alleged and proved in prosecution for second offense. Bolio v. Malloy, 126 Vt. 424, 234 A.2d 336, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 213 (1967).

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former § 1187.

    Prior convictions.

    Failure to allege a prior conviction in an information charging violation of section 1183 of this title (now § 1201), operating under the influence, did not prevent the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles from revoking the offender’s driver’s license upon conviction for the second offense and from refusing to reissue such license until the expiration of six years, as provided by this section, since the suspension was not penal in nature but was designed to promote public safety and therefore the “recidivist” statute, section 674 of this title, did not apply, and also because the revocation was not by the convicting court, but by the Commissioner pursuant to valid regulations. 1966-68 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 136.

    § 1209. Repealed. 1973, No. 79, § 9, eff. May 23, 1973.

    History

    Former § 1209. Former § 1209, relating to issuance of restrictive probationary licenses when license revocation would impose extreme hardship, was derived from 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 9.

    § 1209a. Conditions of reinstatement; alcohol and driving education; screening; therapy programs.

    1. Conditions of reinstatement.   No license or privilege to operate suspended or revoked under this subchapter, except a license or privilege to operate suspended under section 1216 of this title, shall be reinstated except as follows:
      1. In the case of a first suspension, a license or privilege to operate shall be reinstated only:
        1. after the person has successfully completed the Alcohol and Driving Education Program, at the person’s own expense, followed by an assessment of the need for further treatment by a State-designated counselor, at the person’s own expense, to determine whether reinstatement should be further conditioned on satisfactory completion of a therapy program agreed to by the person and the Drinking Driver Rehabilitation Program Director;
        2. if the screening indicates that therapy is needed, after the person has satisfactorily completed or shown substantial progress in completing a therapy program at the person’s own expense agreed to by the person and the Driver Rehabilitation Program Director;
        3. if the person elects to operate under an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate, after the person operates under the RDL or certificate for the applicable period set forth in subsection 1205(a) or section 1206 of this title, plus any extension of this period arising from a violation of section 1213 of this title; and
        4. if the person has no pending criminal charges, civil citations, or unpaid fines or penalties for a violation under this chapter.
      2. In the case of a second suspension, a license or privilege to operate shall not be reinstated until:
        1. the person has successfully completed an alcohol and driving rehabilitation program;
        2. the person has completed or shown substantial progress in completing a therapy program at the person’s own expense agreed to by the person and the Driver Rehabilitation Program Director;
        3. after the person operates under an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate for 18 months or, in the case of a person subject to the one-year hard suspension prescribed in subdivision 1213(a)(1)(C) of this title, for one year, plus any extension of the relevant period arising from a violation of section 1213 of this title, except if otherwise provided in subdivision (4) of this subsection (a); and
        4. the person has no pending criminal charges, civil citations, or unpaid fines or penalties for a violation under this chapter.
      3. In the case of a third or subsequent suspension or a revocation, a license or privilege to operate shall not be reinstated until:
        1. the person has successfully completed an alcohol and driving rehabilitation program;
        2. the person has completed or shown substantial progress in completing a therapy program at the person’s own expense agreed to by the person and the Driver Rehabilitation Program Director;
        3. the person has satisfied the requirements of subsection (b) of this section; and
        4. the person has no pending criminal charges, civil citations, or unpaid fines or penalties for a violation under this chapter.
      4. The Commissioner shall waive a requirement under subdivision (2) of this subsection or subsection (b) of this section that a person operate under an ignition interlock RDL or certificate prior to eligibility for reinstatement if:
        1. the person furnishes sufficient proof as prescribed by the Commissioner that he or she is incapable of using an ignition interlock device because of a medical condition that will persist permanently or at least for the term of the suspension or, in the case of suspensions or revocations for life, for a period of at least three years; or
        2. the underlying offenses arose solely from being under the influence of a drug other than alcohol.
    2. Abstinence.
        1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a person whose license or privilege to operate has been suspended or revoked for life under this subchapter may apply to the Commissioner for reinstatement of his or her driving privilege. The person shall have completed three years of total abstinence from consumption of alcohol and nonprescription regulated drugs. The use of a regulated drug in accordance with a valid prescription shall not disqualify an applicant for reinstatement of his or her driving privileges unless the applicant used the regulated drug in a manner inconsistent with the prescription label. (1) (A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a person whose license or privilege to operate has been suspended or revoked for life under this subchapter may apply to the Commissioner for reinstatement of his or her driving privilege. The person shall have completed three years of total abstinence from consumption of alcohol and nonprescription regulated drugs. The use of a regulated drug in accordance with a valid prescription shall not disqualify an applicant for reinstatement of his or her driving privileges unless the applicant used the regulated drug in a manner inconsistent with the prescription label.
        2. The beginning date for the period of abstinence shall be not earlier than the effective date of the suspension or revocation from which the person is requesting reinstatement and shall not include any period during which the person is serving a sentence of incarceration to include furlough. The application shall include the applicant’s authorization for a urinalysis examination, or another examination if it is approved as a preliminary screening test under this subchapter, to be conducted prior to reinstatement under this subdivision. The application to the Commissioner shall be accompanied by a fee of $500.00. The Commissioner shall have the discretion to waive the application fee if the Commissioner determines that payment of the fee would present a hardship to the applicant.
      1. If the Commissioner or a medical review board convened by the Commissioner is satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant has abstained for the required number of years immediately preceding the application, has successfully completed a therapy program as required under this section, and has operated under a valid ignition interlock RDL or under an ignition interlock certificate for at least three years following the suspension or revocation, and the person provides a written acknowledgment that he or she cannot drink any amount of alcohol at all and cannot consume nonprescription regulated drugs under any circumstances, the person’s license or privilege to operate shall be reinstated immediately, subject to the condition that the person’s suspension or revocation will be put back in effect in the event any further investigation reveals a return to the consumption of alcohol or drugs and to such additional conditions as the Commissioner may impose. The requirement to operate under an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate shall not apply if the person is exempt under subdivision (a)(4) of this section.
      2. If after notice and hearing the Commissioner later finds that the person was violating the conditions of the person’s reinstatement under this subsection, the person’s operating license or privilege to operate shall be immediately suspended or revoked for life.
      3. If the Commissioner finds that a person reinstated under this subsection is suspended pursuant to section 1205 of this title or is convicted of a violation of section 1201 of this title subsequent to reinstatement under this subsection, the person shall be conclusively presumed to be in violation of the conditions of his or her reinstatement.
      4. A person shall be eligible for reinstatement under this subsection only once following a suspension or revocation for life.
        1. If an applicant for reinstatement under this subsection resides in a jurisdiction other than Vermont, the Commissioner may elect not to conduct an investigation. If the Commissioner elects not to conduct an investigation, he or she shall provide a letter to the applicant’s jurisdiction of residence stating that Vermont does not object to the jurisdiction issuing the applicant a license if the applicant is required to operate only vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock device for at least a three-year period, unless exempt under subdivision (a)(4) of this section, and is required to complete any alcohol rehabilitation or treatment requirements of the licensing jurisdiction. (6) (A) If an applicant for reinstatement under this subsection resides in a jurisdiction other than Vermont, the Commissioner may elect not to conduct an investigation. If the Commissioner elects not to conduct an investigation, he or she shall provide a letter to the applicant’s jurisdiction of residence stating that Vermont does not object to the jurisdiction issuing the applicant a license if the applicant is required to operate only vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock device for at least a three-year period, unless exempt under subdivision (a)(4) of this section, and is required to complete any alcohol rehabilitation or treatment requirements of the licensing jurisdiction.
        2. If the applicant’s jurisdiction of residence is prepared to issue or has issued a license in accordance with subdivision (A) of this subdivision (6) and the applicant satisfies the requirements of section 675 of this title, the Commissioner shall update relevant State and federal databases to reflect that the applicant’s lifetime suspension or revocation in Vermont under chapter 13, subchapter 13 of this title has terminated.
    3. Screening and therapy programs.   In the case of a second or subsequent suspension, the Commissioner shall notify the person that he or she is required to enroll in the alcohol and driving education screening and therapy program provided for in this section within 30 days of license suspension. If the person fails to enroll or fails to remain so enrolled until completion, the Drinking Driver Rehabilitation Program shall report such failure to the sentencing court. The court may order the person to appear and show cause why he or she failed to comply.
    4. Judicial review.   A person aggrieved by a decision of a designated counselor under this section may seek review of that decision pursuant to Rule 75 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.
    5. Therapy program.   A therapy program required under this section may include outpatient therapy, intensive outpatient therapy, and residential therapy. In the event that the individual and the Driver Rehabilitation Program Director cannot agree on the type of therapy required, the Criminal Division of the Superior Court shall make that determination.
    6. Fees.   The Department of Health’s Drinking Driver Rehabilitation Program shall assess fees for the Alcohol and Driving Education Program and the alcohol assessment screening required by subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section. The fee for the Alcohol and Driving Education Program shall not exceed $250.00. The fee for the alcohol assessment screening shall not exceed $200.00. In the case of a more intensive or weekend residential program combining both the Alcohol and Driving Education Program and the alcohol assessment screening, the total charge shall not exceed $625.00. Charges collected under this section shall be credited to separate special funds for each type of service and shall be available to the Department of Health to offset the cost of operating the Drinking Driver Rehabilitation Program.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 103 , § 9; amended 1983, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1985, No. 202 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1989, No. 68 , § 6; 1989, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 14, 1990; 1991, No. 55 , § 8; 1997, No. 55 , § 7, eff. June 26, 1997; 1997, No. 56 , § 8, eff. Aug. 1, 1997; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 63; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 20; 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2007, No. 76 , § 16; 2009, No. 23 , § 1; 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. July 1, 2011; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238; 2011, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 2015, No. 50 , § 16; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 46; 2017, No. 71 , § 14, eff. June 8, 2017; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subsec. (e), in the first sentence, deleted “without limitation” following “may include” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1)(A): Deleted “Driver Rehabilitation School Director and to the” preceding “Commissioner”; substituted “and” for “or” preceding “nonprescription” and deleted “, or both” following “regulated”.

    Subdiv. (b)(1)(B): Substituted “not earlier” for “no sooner” and inserted “, or another examination if it is approved as a preliminary screening test under this subchapter” following “examination”.

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Deleted “and hearing” following “application”; inserted “and” following “section,”; substituted “provides a written acknowledgement” for “appreciates” following “person” and “at all and cannot consume nonprescription regulated drugs under any circumstances” for “and drive safely” following “alcohol”.

    Subdiv. (b)(4): Substituted “is” for “was” preceding “suspended” and “convicted” and inserted “subsequent to reinstatement under this subsection” following “title”.

    —2017. Subdiv. (b)(1): Added the subdivs. (A) and (B) designations, and in subdiv. (A), inserted “nonprescription regulated” preceding “drugs” in the second sentence and added the third sentence.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2015. Subdiv. (b)(1): Added the fourth sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(2): Added the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (b)(6): Added.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Act No. 126 amended generally.

    Subsec. (e): Act No. 154 substituted “criminal division of the superior court” for “district court”.

    —2009. Redesignated subsec. (b) as subdivs. (b)(1) through (b)(3); in subdiv. (b)(1), substituted “life” for “three years or more” after “suspended for”, deleted the former second sentence, substituted “The” for “In the case of a suspension for life, the” in the second sentence, substituted “The” for “In both cases, the” in the third sentence, and added the fourth and fifth sentences; substituted “subject to the condition that the person’s suspension will be put back in effect in the event any further investigation reveals a return to the consumption of alcohol or drugs and to such additional” for “upon such” in the last sentence of subdiv. (b)(2); substituted “violating the conditions of the person’s” for “operating, attempting to operate or in actual physical control of a vehicle while the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.02 or more following” in subdiv. (b)(3); added subdiv. (b)(4); and substituted “subsection” for “section” in subdiv. (b)(5).

    —2007. Subsec. (f): Substituted “$250.00” for “$180.00” in the second sentence, “$200.00” for “$150.00” in the third sentence, and “$625.00” for “$500.00” in the fourth sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “the person’s” for “there was any amount of” preceding “alcohol” and “concentration was 0.02 or more” for “in the blood” following “alcohol” in the sixth sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Inserted “hearing” following “application and” in the fifth sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “the commissioner shall notify the person that he or she is required to enroll” for “the court shall order the person to enroll” in the first sentence.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 117 deleted “or subsequent” after “second” and added “has successfully completed an alcohol and driving rehabilitation program and” in subdiv. (a)(2) and added subdiv. (a)(3).

    Subsecs. (c) and (d): Added by Act No. 117.

    Subsecs. (e) and (f): Added by Act No. 155.

    —1997. Section heading: Act No. 56 added “; alcohol and driving education; screening; therapy programs” at the end.

    Subdiv. (a)(1): Rewritten by Act No. 56.

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 55 substituted “serving a sentence of incarceration to include furlough” for “incarcerated within the walls of a correctional facility” at the end of the fourth sentence.

    —1991. Subsec. (a): Inserted “except a license suspended under section 1216 of this title” following “subchapter” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “and shall not include any period during which the person is incarcerated within the walls of a correctional facility” following “reinstatement” in the fourth sentence and added the seventh sentence.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added the fourth sentence.

    —1989. Section amended generally.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “after suspension or revocation” preceding “the person” and inserted “following arraignment or after suspension or revocation” following “program” in subdiv. (1), and substituted “secretary of human services” for “commissioner” in two places in subdiv. (2).

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    Applicability to DUI matters. 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 84(b) provides: “The requirement for a second or subsequent DUI offender to operate under an ignition interlock RDL or certificate as a condition of eligibility for reinstatement of the offender’s regular operator’s license or privilege to operate, created under Sec. 46, amending 23 V.S.A. § 1209a , shall apply only in connection with a second or subsequent DUI offense that occurs on or after July 1, 2016.”

    Applicability of subsec. (b). 2017, No. 71 , § 31(e) provides: “In Sec. 14, 23 V.S.A. § 1209a(b) (reinstatement under Total Abstinence Program) shall apply to persons whose periods of abstinence began prior to the effective date of this provision, as well as to persons who begin a period of abstinence on or after the effective date of this provision. In addition to hardship fee waivers authorized under 23 V.S.A. § 1209a(b) , if a person’s application for reinstatement under the Program was denied prior to the effective date solely because of use of a drug in accordance with a valid prescription, and the person used the drug in a manner consistent with the prescription label, the Commissioner shall waive the fee for a subsequent application.”

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction with other law.

    In order to convict defendant of driving with license suspended, State was not required to prove that his license was suspended for violating DUI statute, since evidence of defendant’s failure to satisfy statute conditioning license reinstatement on his successful completion of alcohol and driving education program was sufficient for jury to find fact of the qualifying underlying suspension. State v. Longe, 170 Vt. 35, 743 A.2d 569, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 310 (1999).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56, 605 A.2d 510, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1992).

    § 1210. Penalties.

    1. Screening.   Before sentencing a defendant under this section, the court may order that the defendant submit to an alcohol assessment screening. Such a screening report may be considered at sentencing in the same manner as a presentence report. At sentencing, the defendant may present relevant evidence, including the results of any independent alcohol assessment that was conducted at the person’s own expense. Evidence regarding any such screening or an alcohol assessment performed at the expense of the defendant shall not be admissible for any other purpose without the defendant’s consent.
    2. First offense.   A person who violates section 1201 of this title may be fined not more than $750.00 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
    3. Second offense.   A person convicted of violating section 1201 of this title who has been convicted of another violation of that section within the last 20 years shall be fined not more than $1,500.00 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. At least 200 hours of community service shall be performed, or 60 consecutive hours of the sentence of imprisonment shall be served and may not be suspended or deferred or served as a supervised sentence, except that credit for a sentence of imprisonment may be received for time served in a residential alcohol facility pursuant to sentence if the program is successfully completed.
    4. Third offense.   A person convicted of violating section 1201 of this title who has previously been convicted two times of a violation of that section, including at least one violation within the last 20 years, shall be fined not more than $2,500.00 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. At least 96 consecutive hours of the sentence of imprisonment shall be served and may not be suspended or deferred or served as a supervised sentence, except that credit for a sentence of imprisonment may be received for time served in a residential alcohol facility pursuant to sentence if the program is successfully completed. The court may impose a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment or that does not require that the 96 hours of imprisonment be served consecutively only if the court makes written findings on the record that such a sentence will serve the interests of justice and public safety.
    5. Fourth or subsequent offense.
      1. A person convicted of violating section 1201 of this title who has previously been convicted three or more times of a violation of that section, including at least one violation within the last 20 years, shall be fined not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. At least 192 consecutive hours of the sentence of imprisonment shall be served and may not be suspended or deferred or served as a supervised sentence, except that credit for a sentence of imprisonment may be received for time served in a residential alcohol treatment facility pursuant to sentence if the program is successfully completed. The court shall not impose a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment unless the court makes written findings on the record that there are compelling reasons why such a sentence will serve the interests of justice and public safety.
      2. The Department of Corrections shall provide alcohol and substance abuse treatment, when appropriate, to any person convicted of a violation of this subsection.
    6. Death resulting.
      1. If the death of any person results from a violation of section 1201 of this title, the person convicted of the violation shall be fined not more than $10,000.00 or imprisoned not less than one year nor more than 15 years, or both. The provisions of this subsection do not limit or restrict prosecutions for manslaughter.
      2. If the death of more than one person results from a violation of section 1201 of this title, the operator may be convicted of a separate violation of this subdivision for each decedent.
        1. If the death of any person results from a violation of section 1201 of this title and the person convicted of the violation previously has been convicted two or more times of a violation of that section, a sentence ordered pursuant to this subsection shall, except as provided in subdivision (B) of this subdivision (3), include at least a five-year term of imprisonment. The five-year minimum term of imprisonment required by this subdivision shall be served and may not be suspended, deferred, or served as a supervised sentence. The defendant shall not be eligible for probation, parole, furlough, or any other type of early release until the expiration of the five-year term of imprisonment. (3) (A) If the death of any person results from a violation of section 1201 of this title and the person convicted of the violation previously has been convicted two or more times of a violation of that section, a sentence ordered pursuant to this subsection shall, except as provided in subdivision (B) of this subdivision (3), include at least a five-year term of imprisonment. The five-year minimum term of imprisonment required by this subdivision shall be served and may not be suspended, deferred, or served as a supervised sentence. The defendant shall not be eligible for probation, parole, furlough, or any other type of early release until the expiration of the five-year term of imprisonment.
        2. Notwithstanding subdivision (A) of this subdivision (3), if the death of any person results from a violation of section 1201 of this title and the person convicted of the violation previously has been convicted two or more times of a violation of that section, the court may impose a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment or that includes a term of imprisonment of less than five years if the court makes written findings on the record that such a sentence will serve the interests of justice and public safety.
    7. Injury resulting.
      1. If serious bodily injury, as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) , results to any person other than the operator from a violation of section 1201 of this title, the person convicted of the violation shall be fined not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
      2. If serious bodily injury as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) results to more than one person other than the operator from a violation of section 1201 of this title, the operator may be convicted of a separate violation of this subdivision for each person injured.
        1. If serious bodily injury as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) results to any person other than the operator from a violation of section 1201 of this title and the person convicted of the violation previously has been convicted two or more times of a violation of section 1201, a sentence ordered pursuant to this subsection shall, except as provided in subdivision (B) of this subdivision (3), include at least a five-year term of imprisonment. The five-year minimum term of imprisonment required by this subdivision shall be served and may not be suspended, deferred, or served as a supervised sentence. The defendant shall not be eligible for probation, parole, furlough, or any other type of early release until the expiration of the five-year term of imprisonment. (3) (A) If serious bodily injury as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) results to any person other than the operator from a violation of section 1201 of this title and the person convicted of the violation previously has been convicted two or more times of a violation of section 1201, a sentence ordered pursuant to this subsection shall, except as provided in subdivision (B) of this subdivision (3), include at least a five-year term of imprisonment. The five-year minimum term of imprisonment required by this subdivision shall be served and may not be suspended, deferred, or served as a supervised sentence. The defendant shall not be eligible for probation, parole, furlough, or any other type of early release until the expiration of the five-year term of imprisonment.
        2. Notwithstanding subdivision (A) of this subdivision (3), if serious bodily injury as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) results to any person other than the operator from a violation of section 1201 of this title and the person convicted of the violation previously has been convicted two or more times of a violation of section 1201, the court may impose a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment or that includes a term of imprisonment of less than five years if the court makes written findings on the record that such a sentence will serve the interests of justice and public safety.
    8. Determination of fines.   In determining appropriate fines under this section, the court may take into account the total cost to a defendant of alcohol screening, participation in the Alcohol and Driving Education Program and therapy, and the income of the defendant.
    9. Surcharge; Blood and Breath Alcohol Testing Special Fund.   A person convicted of violating section 1201 of this title shall be assessed a surcharge of $60.00, which shall be added to any fine imposed by the court. The court shall collect and transfer such surcharge to the Department of Public Safety for deposit in the Blood and Breath Alcohol Testing Special Fund established by section 1220b of this title.
    10. Surcharge; Public Defender Special Fund.   A person convicted of violating section 1201 of this title shall be assessed a surcharge of $50.00, which shall be added to any fine or surcharge imposed by the court. The court shall collect and transfer the surcharge assessed under this subsection to the Office of Defender General for deposit in the Public Defender Special Fund, specifying the source of the monies being deposited. The collection procedures described in 13 V.S.A. § 5240 shall be utilized in the collection of this surcharge.
    11. Surcharge; DUI Enforcement Special Fund.   A person convicted of violating section 1201 of this title shall be assessed a surcharge of $50.00, which shall be added to any fine or surcharge imposed by the court. The court shall collect and transfer the surcharge assessed under this subsection to be credited to the DUI Enforcement Special Fund. The collection procedures described in 13 V.S.A. § 5240 shall be utilized in the collection of this surcharge.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; amended 1973, No. 79 , § 8, eff. May 23, 1973; 1975, No. 103 , § 6, eff. May 30, 1975; 1977, No. 101 , § 1, eff. May 6, 1977; 1981, No. 205 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1983, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1989, No. 68 , § 7, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; 1991, No. 55 , § 9; 1991, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1993, No. 25 , § 25, eff. May 18, 1993; 1995, No. 77 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. March 21, 1996; 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 27; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 21; 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2011, No. 56 , § 5; 2011, No. 56 , § 17, eff. March 1, 2012; 2019, No. 32 , § 9; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 193.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2019. Subsec. (a): Substituted “that” for “which” following “independent alcohol assessment”.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “within the last 20 years” following “violation of that section”.

    Subsec. (d): Inserted “, including at least one violation within the last 20 years,” following “violation of that section”.

    Subdiv. (e)(1): Inserted “, including at least one violation within the last 20 years,” following “violation of that section”.

    —2011. Subsec. (d): Deleted “or subsequent” preceding “offense”; substituted “previously” for “twice” preceding “been”; inserted “two times” following “convicted” and “a” preceding “violation”; substituted “96” for “400 hours of community service shall be performed, or 100” preceding “consecutive” and added the last sentence.

    Subdivs. (e)(1) and (2): Added.

    Subsecs. (f)-(k): Former subsecs. (e)-(j) redesignated as subsecs. (f)-(k).

    Subdiv. (f)(3): Added.

    Subdiv. (g)(3): Added.

    Subsec. (i): Act 56, § 17, effective March 1, 2012, substituted “public safety” for “health” and inserted “blood and breath alcohol testing” preceding “special” and “established by section 1220b of this title” following “fund”.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added designation (1) and added subdiv. (2).

    Subsec. (f): Added designation (1), deleted “less than one year nor” preceding “more than 15 years, or both” in that subdiv., and added subdiv. (2).

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Rewrote the second sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Added the second sentence.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (j): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (i): Added.

    —1993. Subsec. (h): Substituted “$60.00” for “$30.00”.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (h): Added.

    —1991. Substituted “two years” for “one year” in subsec. (b) rewrote subsecs. (c) and (d), substituted “$10,000.00 or” for “$3,000.00, and” and inserted “or both” following “15 years” in the first sentence and substituted “subsection” for “section” in the second sentence of subsec. (e), substituted “$5,000.00” for “$3,000.00” in subsec. (f), deleted former subsec. (g) and redesignated former subsec. (h) as subsec. (g).

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “the person’s” for “his” following “conducted at” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “less than $200.00, nor” following “fined not”.

    Subdiv. (c)(1): Deleted “less than $250.00, nor” preceding “more than”.

    Subsec. (d): Deleted “less than $500.00 nor” preceding “more than”.

    Subsec. (h): Added.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —1977. Subsec. (a): Inserted “not less than” preceding “$125.00” and “nor more than $500.00” thereafter.

    —1975. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1973. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    1991 amendment. 1991, No. 55 , § 19(4), (5), provided that it is the intention of the general assembly that section 9 of this act, which amended this section by eliminating the 5-year and 15-year forgiveness periods, shall apply as follows:

    “(4) With respect to section 1210 of Title 23, the five-year forgiveness period between convictions shall be considered a right which has accrued to the operator if the first conviction occurred at any time prior to July 1, 1991.

    “(5) With respect to section 1210 of Title 23, the 15-year forgiveness period used to determine third convictions shall be considered a right which has accrued to the operator if the prior convictions occurred at any time prior to July 1, 1991.”

    Repeal of termination date. 1993, No. 25 , § 26, as modified by 1993, No. 210 (Adj. Sess.), § 118, and 1995, No. 77 (Adj. Sess.), § 15(b), provided for the repeal of subsecs. (h) and (i) on July 1, 1998. However, 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. April 29, 1998, provides: “Notwithstanding Sec. 15(b) of No. 77 of the Acts of 1996, the DUI surcharges imposed under 23 V.S.A. § 1210(h) and (i) shall not terminate on July 1, 1998, but shall remain in effect.”

    Legislative intent. 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 provides: “It is the intent of the general assembly in this act [which amended this section] to address, among other issues, the Vermont supreme court’s decisions in State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124, and State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96. In LaBounty, the court held that if more than one person was injured, an offender could be charged with only one count of grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle with injury resulting. Similarly, the court held in Martin that if more than one person was killed, an offender could be charged with only one count of boating while intoxicated with death resulting. In this act, the general assembly responds to Martin and LaBounty by amending several motor vehicle statutes to permit an offender to be charged with a separate count of violating the statute for each person who was killed or injured as a result of the offense.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Penalties for manslaughter, see 13 V.S.A. § 2304 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Causation.

    At trial for driving under the influence, death resulting, where evidence was admitted that victim had made several suicide attempts during a two-week period before the accident and that her behavior contributed in large measure to her demise, but evidence pointed to fault on defendant’s part in failing to see and appreciate the decedent’s plight and to take defensive measures to avoid hitting her, the jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant’s actions were the cause of death, not merely a cause of death. State v. Papazoni, 157 Vt. 337, 596 A.2d 1276, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 181 (1991).

    In trial for driving under the influence, death resulting, although the evidence of causation, the nexus between defendant’s intoxicated state and the collision, was not strong, taken in the light most favorable to the State and excluding modifying evidence, there was sufficient evidence to fairly and reasonably support a finding of proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Papazoni, 157 Vt. 337, 596 A.2d 1276, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 181 (1991).

    Construction.

    Driving-under-the-influence penalty statute does not contain the additional requirement that one of the convictions cannot be a conviction for criminal refusal, at least if it is the first such conviction. Absent such an indication, the Vermont Supreme Court will not impose this added restriction to implementation of the statute. State v. Wainwright, 2013 VT 120, 195 Vt. 370, 88 A.3d 423, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 119 (2013).

    Effect of amendments.

    Savings clause accompanying 1991 amendment to drunk driving penalty statute was not available to defendant, who had already been convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) three times prior to 1991, and therefore District Court erred in dismissing charge of DUI, fifth offense and amending charge to DUI, second offense. State v. LeBlanc, 171 Vt. 88, 759 A.2d 991, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 176 (2000).

    Because only one of defendant’s prior DUI convictions occurred before 1991, he had no right to fifteen-year forgiveness period specified in savings clause, and therefore he could properly be convicted of DUI, third offense, even though more than fifteen years had elapsed between his first conviction and the date his third offense was allegedly committed. State v. Delisle, 171 Vt. 128, 758 A.2d 790, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 184 (2000).

    Evidence.

    Any confusion as to which of three DUI convictions jury weighed in its deliberations was harmless, and therefore court was not required to decide whether earliest conviction should have been excluded, since statute required only two prior convictions for enhanced penalties to apply and defendant’s two later convictions were admissible under statute’s amended “forgiveness period,” because they were less than fifteen years old. State v. Carpenter, 170 Vt. 371, 749 A.2d 1137, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 29 (2000).

    The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Public Defender Act, announced in State v. DeRosa, 161 Vt. 78, 633 A.2d 277 (1993), which held that when a trial judge denies counsel to an indigent defendant because a sentence of imprisonment will not be imposed, the trial judge may not impose on the defendant a conditionally suspended sentence and probation, applies to earlier convictions (i.e., convictions which were final before DeRosa was decided) that may be used for enhancement purposes under a recidivist statute such as subsec. (d). State v. Brown, 165 Vt. 79, 676 A.2d 350, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1996).

    A prior conviction for which an indigent defendant was denied counsel and sentenced to a suspended sentence may not be used for enhancement purposes, whether or not the defendant was actually imprisoned for the offense. State v. Brown, 165 Vt. 79, 676 A.2d 350, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1996).

    Prior uncounseled convictions, including those where the defendant was sentenced to a suspended sentence, may be used for sentence enhancement purposes where the defendant validly waived his right to counsel. State v. Brown, 165 Vt. 79, 676 A.2d 350, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1996).

    To challenge the use of a prior conviction for sentence enhancement purposes, a defendant must affirmatively show that counsel was denied improperly, and may not simply rely on a record indicating that counsel was denied and a suspended sentence imposed. State v. Brown, 165 Vt. 79, 676 A.2d 350, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1996).

    Trial court did not err in finding that defendant’s three prior DUI convictions were valid, raising the offense charged to a felony, where State presented credible evidence disputing defendant’s claim that at a change of plea hearing for one of the prior offenses the judge indicated that his conviction would be treated as a first offense and defendant’s testimony was insufficient to suggest the existence of any defect. State v. Tatro, 161 Vt. 182, 635 A.2d 1204, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1993).

    Where defendant offered no evidence to refute the validity of his prior DUI convictions, the prior convictions were validly factored in to the determination of defendant’s enhanced sentence. State v. Tatro, 161 Vt. 182, 635 A.2d 1204, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1993).

    In the case of defendant found guilty of manslaughter, driving under the influence with a fatal accident resulting, driving while license suspended, and driving while intoxicated with injuries resulting, where the State introduced evidence that after the accident defendant showed physical characteristics symptomatic of intoxication, that a breath test taken at the police station showed a blood-alcohol content of 0.26 percent, that he struck a motorcycle head-on in the motorcycle’s lane of traffic, and that as a result of the collision the motorcycle driver was killed and a passenger injured, the jury was justified in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all four counts; therefore, defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied. State v. Poirier, 142 Vt. 595, 458 A.2d 1109, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 437 (1983).

    Fatal accident.

    Element of causation in cases of driving under the influence with death resulting in common law standard of direct causation; an intervening cause of death that is not result of defendant’s acts would require verdict of not guilty. State v. Yudichak, 151 Vt. 400, 561 A.2d 407, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 76 (1989).

    Driving under the influence with a fatal accident resulting requires the death of a person resulting from the defendant’s operation of a vehicle on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Poirier, 142 Vt. 595, 458 A.2d 1109, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 437 (1983).

    Since an essential element of the crime of driving under the influence with a fatal accident resulting is that the defendant be under the influence of intoxicating liquor, while the crime of manslaughter does not require this element, trial court did not err in denying motion of defendant, charged with both crimes, to require the State to elect between the charges, although the same act gave rise to each. State v. Poirier, 142 Vt. 595, 458 A.2d 1109, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 437 (1983).

    Inferences.

    In trial for driving under the influence, death resulting, where area traversed by victim was unobstructed, and defendant did not slow down or take evasive action before impact, and ran a red light immediately before reaching the place of accident, and defendant showed usual signs of intoxication after the accident, the inferences to be drawn from all the facts and circumstances were that defendant’s intoxication caused him to be careless in failing to be on the lookout for pedestrians crossing the road, and, in addition, caused him to react belatedly to avoid someone in harm’s way. State v. Papazoni, 157 Vt. 337, 596 A.2d 1276, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 181 (1991).

    Motion to correct.

    Court correctly denied defendant’s motion to correct the record by amending his third driving under the influence (DUI-3) conviction to appear as first driving under the influence because the DUI-3 could not now be amended through Vt. R. Crim. P. 35 since it was correct when entered and as a conviction, not a sentence, was not subject to Vt. R. Crim. P. 35. State v. Rosenfield, 2016 VT 27, 201 Vt. 383, 142 A.3d 1069, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 26 (2016).

    New trial on DUI conviction.

    Defendant failed to establish that trial court abused its discretion in granting new trial on conviction of driving motor vehicle under influence of alcohol while leaving intact jury finding in separate proceeding of defendant’s liability to enhanced punishment as subsequent offender where improper prosecutorial comments which necessitated reversal of DUI conviction could not have prejudiced enhancement phase of proceedings and defendant offered no evidence to counter State’s enhancement case. State v. Baril, 155 Vt. 344, 583 A.2d 621, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1990).

    At bifurcated trial in which substantive charge of driving motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol was adjudicated prior to separate proceeding to determine defendant’s liability for enhanced punishment as a subsequent offender, trial court acted within its authority in ordering new trial on substantive offense, on basis of prosecutor’s improper closing arguments, while leaving intact jury’s finding from enhancement phase of trial for use if defendant were found guilty on retrial. State v. Baril, 155 Vt. 344, 583 A.2d 621, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 201 (1990).

    Prior convictions.

    There was no plain error with respect to the trial court’s use of defendant’s prior DUI conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement as to his second DUI conviction, as he did not challenge the prior DUI conviction, but rather how it was established and accepted by the trial court, such that no prejudice was shown. State v. Bangoura, 2017 VT 53, 205 Vt. 36, 171 A.3d 50, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 70 (2017).

    Plain language of the statute allows the same prior driving-under-the-influence conviction to be used both as an element of criminal refusal and to enhance the penalty for the refusal. State v. Wainwright, 2013 VT 120, 195 Vt. 370, 88 A.3d 423, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 119 (2013).

    Under the statutory scheme, the recidivist penalties apply to all successive violations of the driving-under-the-influence statute, regardless of the type. Therefore, although a criminal refusal might be defendant’s first such offense, it was a successive violation of the DUI statute, and therefore the recidivist penalties applied. State v. Wainwright, 2013 VT 120, 195 Vt. 370, 88 A.3d 423, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 119 (2013).

    Prosecution under criminal law.

    Charging defendant as habitual criminal was not “double enhancement” of his prior convictions for DUI, and since defendant properly faced charge punishable by life imprisonment, he could lawfully be held without bail. State v. Gardner, 167 Vt. 600, 709 A.2d 499, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 15 (1998) (mem.).

    Absence of language in subsec. (f) of this section expressly allowing concurrent prosecution under general provisions of criminal law did not indicate legislative intent to change common law rule allowing such prosecution. State v. Perry, 151 Vt. 637, 563 A.2d 1007, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1989).

    Sentence.

    It was not improper for trial judge to have considered defendant’s prior DWI offenses as part of sentencing where sentence imposed was within the guidelines of subsec. (b) of this section for a first offense. State v. Bessette, 148 Vt. 17, 530 A.2d 549, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 471 (1987).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1977); Miner v. District Court, 136 Vt. 426, 392 A.2d 390, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 768 (1978); State v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537, 394 A.2d 1145, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 662 (1978); State v. Quintin, 143 Vt. 40, 460 A.2d 458, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 459 (1983); State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 499 A.2d 761, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 363 (1985); State v. Greenslet, 146 Vt. 256, 499 A.2d 789, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 368 (1985); In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 469 A.2d 756, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 578 (1983); State v. Brunelle, 148 Vt. 347, 534 A.2d 198, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 513 (1987); State v. Thompson, 150 Vt. 640, 556 A.2d 95, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 5 (1989); State v. Baker, 154 Vt. 411, 579 A.2d 479, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1990); State v. Pilette, 160 Vt. 509, 630 A.2d 1296, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 70 (1993); State v. DeRosa, 161 Vt. 78, 633 A.2d 277, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 93 (1993); State v. Forcier, 162 Vt. 71, 643 A.2d 1200, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 50 (1994); State v. Fontaine, 167 Vt. 529, 711 A.2d 667, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 156 (1998); State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 807 A.2d 358, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 133 (2002); In re Collette, 2008 VT 136, 185 Vt. 210, 969 A.2d 101, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 199 (2008).

    § 1211. Construction of cross references.

    For the purposes of computing offenses under this chapter, references to section 1201 of this title shall be construed to include sections of present or prior law of this or any other jurisdiction that prohibited operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or while having 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood or an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 103 , § 10; amended 1987, No. 62 , § 6; 1991, No. 55 , § 10; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4).

    History

    Amendments

    —2017. Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “influence of”.

    —1991. Substituted “0.08” for “.10” preceding “percent” and inserted “or an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more” following “blood”.

    —1987. Deleted “subsequent” preceding “offenses” and inserted “present or” preceding “prior law” and “of this or any other jurisdiction” thereafter.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    This section is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. State v. Pecora, 2007 VT 41, 181 Vt. 627, 928 A.2d 479, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 76 (2007) (mem.).

    Application.

    Where plaintiff was convicted for out-of-state instance of DUI subsequent to enactment of Driver License Compact and to amendment of statute to allow out-of-state convictions to be used to calculate subsequent convictions for purposes of license suspension and revocation, fact that newly enacted and amended statutes were applied to add out-of-state conviction to previous Vermont conviction did not constitute impermissible ex post facto application of statutes; statutory amendments would have had no impact on plaintiff absent a new act by him (the out-of-state conviction) which triggered the new rule. Erno v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 156 Vt. 62, 587 A.2d 409, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 12 (1991).

    Out-of-state convictions.

    An out-of-state conviction obtained in compliance with the law of that state, as well as the Federal Constitution, may be used for enhancement purposes under this section. State v. Pecora, 2007 VT 41, 181 Vt. 627, 928 A.2d 479, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 76 (2007) (mem.).

    § 1212. Conditions of release and parole; arrest upon violation.

    1. At the first appearance before a judicial officer of a person charged with violation of section 1201 of this title, the court, upon a plea of not guilty, shall consider whether to establish conditions of release. Those conditions may include a requirement that the defendant not operate a motor vehicle if there is a likelihood that the defendant will operate a motor vehicle in violation of section 1201 or 1213 of this title. The court may consider all relevant evidence, including whether the defendant has a motor vehicle or criminal record indicating prior convictions for one or more alcohol-related offenses. Prior convictions may be established for this purpose by a noncertified photocopy of a motor vehicle record, a computer printout, or an affidavit. Nothing in this section limits the authority of a judicial officer to impose other conditions of release, nor does it limit or modify other statutory provisions concerning license suspension or revocation or the right of a person to operate a motor vehicle.
    2. A court that requires as a condition of release that a defendant not operate a motor vehicle shall so notify the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The Commissioner shall take suitable steps to ensure that this information is available to law enforcement officers. The court shall promptly advise the Commissioner of any modification of this condition of release and of the termination of proceedings.
    3. A law enforcement officer who observes a person violating a condition of release requiring that he or she not operate a motor vehicle may promptly arrest the person for violating a condition of bail and shall bring the person before the nearest available judicial officer without unnecessary delay. A law enforcement officer who otherwise has probable cause to believe that a person has violated a condition of release requiring that he or she not operate a motor vehicle shall promptly notify a prosecuting officer.
    4. A law enforcement officer who observes a person violating a condition of parole requiring that the person not operate a motor vehicle may promptly arrest the person for violating the condition and may detain the person pursuant to 28 V.S.A. § 551 . The officer may immobilize the vehicle and shall immediately notify the Parole Board of the suspected violation. If the Parole Board determines pursuant to 28 V.S.A. § 552 that a parole violation has occurred, the Board shall notify the State’s Attorney in the county where the violation occurred, who may institute forfeiture proceedings against the vehicle under section 1213c of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. July 1, 2011; 2011, No. 56 , § 11, eff. May 31, 2011; 2021, No. 20 , § 242.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (b): Substituted “ensure” for “assure” in the second sentence.

    —2011. Section heading: Inserted “and parole” following “release”.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Added “or section 1213 of this title” following “section 1201” in the second sentence.

    § 1213. Ignition interlock restricted driver’s license or certificate; penalties.

      1. An individual whose license or privilege to operate is suspended or revoked under this subchapter may operate a motor vehicle, other than a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 4103 of this title, if issued a valid ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate. Upon application, the Commissioner shall issue an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate to an individual otherwise licensed or eligible to be licensed to operate a motor vehicle if: (a) (1) An individual whose license or privilege to operate is suspended or revoked under this subchapter may operate a motor vehicle, other than a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 4103 of this title, if issued a valid ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate. Upon application, the Commissioner shall issue an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate to an individual otherwise licensed or eligible to be licensed to operate a motor vehicle if:
        1. the individual submits a $125.00 application fee;
        2. the individual submits satisfactory proof of installation of an approved ignition interlock device in any motor vehicle to be operated and of financial responsibility as provided in section 801 of this title;
        3. at least one year has passed since the suspension or revocation was imposed if the offense involved death or serious bodily injury to an individual other than the operator; and
        4. the applicable period set forth in this subsection has passed since the suspension or revocation was imposed if the offense involved refusal of an enforcement officer’s reasonable request for an evidentiary test:
          1. 30 days for a first offense;
          2. 90 days for a second offense;
          3. one year for a third or subsequent offense.
      2. A new ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate shall expire at midnight on the eve of the second birthday of the applicant following the date of issue and may be renewed for one-year terms. The Commissioner shall send by first-class mail an application for renewal of the RDL or certificate at least 30 days prior to the day renewal is required and shall impose the same conditions for renewal as are required for initial issuance. The renewal fee shall be $125.00.
    1. [Repealed.]
    2. [Repealed.]
    3. If a fine is to be imposed for a conviction of a violation of section 1201 of this title, upon receipt of proof of installation of an approved ignition interlock device, the court may order that the fine of an individual with low-income conditionally be reduced by one-half to defray the costs of the ignition interlock device, subject to the individual’s ongoing operation under, and compliance with the terms of, a valid ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate as set forth in this section. In considering whether an individual’s fine should be reduced under this subsection, the court shall take into account any discount already provided by the device manufacturer or provider.
    4. The holder of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate shall pay the costs of installing, purchasing or leasing, and removing the ignition interlock device as well as calibrating the device and retrieving data from it periodically as may be specified by the Commissioner.
      1. Prior to the issuance of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate under this section, the Commissioner shall notify the applicant that the period prior to eligibility for reinstatement may be extended under subsections (f)-(h) of this section. (f) (1) Prior to the issuance of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate under this section, the Commissioner shall notify the applicant that the period prior to eligibility for reinstatement may be extended under subsections (f)-(h) of this section.
        1. Prior to any such extension of the reinstatement period, the ignition interlock RDL or certificate holder shall be given notice and opportunity for a hearing. Service of the notice shall be sent by first-class mail to the last known address of the individual. The notice shall include a factual description of the grounds for an extension, a reference to the particular law allegedly violated, and a warning that the right to a hearing will be deemed waived, and an extension of the reinstatement period will be imposed, if a written request for a hearing is not received at the Department of Motor Vehicles within 15 days after the date of the notice. (2) (A) Prior to any such extension of the reinstatement period, the ignition interlock RDL or certificate holder shall be given notice and opportunity for a hearing. Service of the notice shall be sent by first-class mail to the last known address of the individual. The notice shall include a factual description of the grounds for an extension, a reference to the particular law allegedly violated, and a warning that the right to a hearing will be deemed waived, and an extension of the reinstatement period will be imposed, if a written request for a hearing is not received at the Department of Motor Vehicles within 15 days after the date of the notice.
        2. When a holder receives a notice under subdivision (2)(A) of this subsection (f), the holder shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing, unless a written request for a hearing is received at the Department of Motor Vehicles within 15 days after the date of the notice. If a hearing is not timely requested, the reinstatement period shall be extended in accordance with law.
        3. The provisions of sections 105-107 of this title shall apply to hearings conducted under subdivision (2) of this subsection.
        1. A holder of an ignition interlock RDL or certificate who, prior to eligibility for reinstatement under section 1209a or 1216 of this title, is prevented from starting a motor vehicle because the ignition interlock device records a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 or above, shall be subject to a three-month extension of the applicable reinstatement period in the event of three such recorded events and to consecutive three-month extensions for every additional three recorded events thereafter. The Commissioner shall disregard a recording of 0.04 or above for the purposes of this subdivision if the Commissioner in his or her discretion finds, based on a pattern of tests or other reliable information, that the recording does not indicate the consumption of alcohol by the holder. The Commissioner shall notify the holder in writing after every recording of 0.04 or above that indicates the consumption of alcohol by the holder and, prior to any extension under this subdivision, the holder shall have the opportunity to be heard pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection (f). (3) (A) A holder of an ignition interlock RDL or certificate who, prior to eligibility for reinstatement under section 1209a or 1216 of this title, is prevented from starting a motor vehicle because the ignition interlock device records a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 or above, shall be subject to a three-month extension of the applicable reinstatement period in the event of three such recorded events and to consecutive three-month extensions for every additional three recorded events thereafter. The Commissioner shall disregard a recording of 0.04 or above for the purposes of this subdivision if the Commissioner in his or her discretion finds, based on a pattern of tests or other reliable information, that the recording does not indicate the consumption of alcohol by the holder. The Commissioner shall notify the holder in writing after every recording of 0.04 or above that indicates the consumption of alcohol by the holder and, prior to any extension under this subdivision, the holder shall have the opportunity to be heard pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection (f).
        2. A holder of an ignition interlock RDL or certificate who, prior to eligibility for reinstatement under section 1209a or 1216 of this title, fails a random retest because the ignition interlock device records a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 or above and below 0.08 shall be subject to consecutive three-month extensions of the applicable reinstatement period for every such recorded event. A holder who fails a random retest because of a recording of 0.08 or above shall be subject to consecutive six-month extensions of the applicable reinstatement period for every such recorded event. The Commissioner shall disregard a recording of 0.04 or above for the purposes of this subdivision if the Commissioner in his or her discretion finds, based on a pattern of tests or other reliable information, that the recording does not indicate the consumption of alcohol by the holder. The Commissioner shall notify the holder in writing after every recording of 0.04 or above that is indicative of the consumption of alcohol by the holder, and prior to any extension under this subdivision, the holder shall have the opportunity to be heard pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection (f).
    5. The holder of an ignition interlock RDL or certificate shall operate only motor vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock device, shall not attempt or take any action to tamper with or otherwise circumvent an ignition interlock device, and, after failing a random retest, shall pull over and shut off the vehicle’s engine as soon as practicable. A person who violates any provision of this section commits a criminal offense, shall be subject to the sanctions and procedures provided for in subsections 674(b)-(i) of this title, and, upon conviction, the applicable period prior to eligibility for reinstatement under section 1209a or 1216 of this title shall be extended by six months.
    6. A person who violates a rule adopted by the Commissioner pursuant to subsection (l) of this section shall, after notice and an opportunity to be heard is provided pursuant to subdivision (f)(2) of this section, be subject to an extension of the period prior to eligibility for reinstatement under section 1209a or 1216 of this title in accordance with rules adopted by the Commissioner.
    7. Upon receipt of notice that the holder of an ignition interlock RDL or certificate has been convicted of an offense under this title that would result in suspension, revocation, or recall of a license or privilege to operate, the Commissioner shall suspend, revoke, or recall the individual’s ignition interlock RDL or certificate for the same period that the license or privilege to operate would have been suspended, revoked, or recalled. The Commissioner may impose a reinstatement fee in accordance with section 675 of this title and require, prior to reinstatement, satisfactory proof of installation of an approved ignition interlock device and of financial responsibility as provided in section 801 of this title.
    8. [Repealed.]
    9. A person shall not knowingly and voluntarily tamper with an ignition interlock device on behalf of another person or otherwise assist another person to circumvent an ignition interlock device. A person adjudicated of a violation of this subsection shall be subject to a civil penalty of up to $500.00.
      1. The Commissioner, in consultation with any persons the Commissioner deems appropriate, shall adopt rules and may enter into agreements to implement the provisions of this section. The Commissioner shall not approve a manufacturer of ignition interlock devices as a provider in this State unless the manufacturer agrees to reduce the cost of installing, leasing, and deinstalling the device by at least 50 percent for persons who furnish proof of receipt of 3SquaresVT, LIHEAP, or Reach Up benefits or like benefits in another state. (l) (1) The Commissioner, in consultation with any persons the Commissioner deems appropriate, shall adopt rules and may enter into agreements to implement the provisions of this section. The Commissioner shall not approve a manufacturer of ignition interlock devices as a provider in this State unless the manufacturer agrees to reduce the cost of installing, leasing, and deinstalling the device by at least 50 percent for persons who furnish proof of receipt of 3SquaresVT, LIHEAP, or Reach Up benefits or like benefits in another state.
      2. The rules shall establish uniform performance standards for ignition interlock devices, including required levels of accuracy in measuring blood alcohol concentration, efficacy in distinguishing valid breath samples, the occurrence of random retests while the vehicle is running, and automatic signaling by the vehicle if the operator fails such a retest. After an initial random retest to occur within 15 minutes of the vehicle starting, subsequent random retests shall occur on average not more often than once every 30 minutes. The Commissioner shall certify devices that meet these standards, specify any periodic calibration that may be required to ensure accuracy of the devices, and specify the means and frequency of the retrieval and sharing of data collected by ignition interlock devices. The rules also shall establish a schedule of extensions of the period prior to eligibility for reinstatement as authorized under subsection (h) of this section.
      1. Images and other individually identifiable information in the custody of a public agency related to the use of an ignition interlock device are exempt from public inspection and copying under the Public Records Act and shall not be disclosed except: (m) (1) Images and other individually identifiable information in the custody of a public agency related to the use of an ignition interlock device are exempt from public inspection and copying under the Public Records Act and shall not be disclosed except:
        1. pursuant to a warrant;
        2. if a law enforcement officer, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious bodily injury to any person requires access to the information without delay; or
        3. in connection with enforcement proceedings under this section or rules adopted pursuant to this section.
      2. Images or information disclosed in violation of this subsection shall be inadmissible in any judicial or administrative proceeding.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. May 27, 2010; amended 2011, No. 46 , § 23; 2011, No. 46 , § 24, eff. June 30, 2011; 2011, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 47; 2015, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2017, No. 71 , § 14, eff. Aug. 7, 2017; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4); 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 194.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2017. Subsec. (e): Act No. 71 substituted “The” for “Except as provided in subsection (m) of this section, the” at the beginning.

    Subdivs. (f)(3)(A) and (B): Act No. 83 substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” in two places in each subdiv.

    Subdiv. ( l )(2): Act No. 71 added the second sentence and deleted the former third sentence.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally by Act No. 158.

    Subsec. (m): Added by Act No. 169.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2011. Repealed subsecs. (a)-(c), effective June 30, 2011, and re-added subsecs. (a)-(c) with new language regarding fees, effective July 1, 2011.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    Applicability of subdiv. (l)(2). 2017, No. 71 , § 31(d) provides: “ 23 V.S.A. § 1213 ( l )(2) (timing of random retests and elimination of GPS requirement) shall apply to all persons with ignition interlock restricted driver’s licenses as of the effective date of this provision and to persons whose underlying DUI offenses occurred prior to the effective date of this act, as well as to persons who obtain ignition interlock RDLs on or after the effective date of this provision.”

    Transition rule. 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, effective July 1, 2011, provides: “On July 1, 2011, ignition interlock restricted driver’s licenses shall be available to persons suspended for a violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201 or 1216 or pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1205 prior to July 1, 2011, if such persons otherwise would be eligible for an ignition interlock RDL under this act. Persons who elect to obtain an ignition interlock RDL pursuant to this section shall be subject to all of the provisions of this act but shall not be eligible for the reduced fine specified in subsection (d) of Sec. 9 [see 23 V.S.A. § 1213(d) ], and shall be so notified by the commissioner in advance of obtaining an ignition interlock RDL.”

    § 1213a. Immobilization of vehicle.

    1. Immobilization.   At the time of sentencing after a second or subsequent conviction under section 1201 of this title, the court may, upon the motion of the State, and in addition to any penalty imposed by law, order the motor vehicle operated by the defendant at the time of the offense seized and immobilized by a law enforcement agency designated by the court, as provided in this section and section 1213c of this title.
    2. Immobilization on owner’s property.   A motor vehicle subject to an immobilization order shall be immobilized, whenever possible, on property owned by the owner of the vehicle or on a parking space legally available to the owner of the vehicle. An immobilized vehicle is not exempt from enforcement of liens held by third parties.
    3. Immobilization on State or private property.   If the owner of the motor vehicle does not own property or have a parking area on which the vehicle can be immobilized, the vehicle shall be impounded on property owned by the State or on private property. All costs of impoundment shall be paid by the defendant. The period of impoundment shall run as if the vehicle were immobilized.
    4. Expiration of immobilization order.   An order of immobilization under this section shall expire in 18 months or when the defendant obtains a valid operator’s license, whichever comes first.
    5. Release of vehicle.   When an immobilization order expires, and when the costs provided for in this section have been paid in full by the defendant, the vehicle shall be released to its owner.
    6. Costs.   All costs of towing and impoundment shall be paid by the defendant before the vehicle is released to its owner. If the defendant fails to pay the towing and impoundment costs within 30 days after the immobilization order expires, the State is authorized to sell the vehicle by public auction pursuant to the procedures in 27 V.S.A. chapter 13. The proceeds from the sale of the vehicle shall be used first to offset the costs of towing, impounding, and releasing the vehicle. Any balance remaining, after any liens on the vehicle have been paid in full, shall be paid to the owner of the vehicle.
    7. Disbursement of proceeds.   Proceeds from the defendant’s payment of the release fee and towing and impoundment costs shall be disbursed to the law enforcement agencies that incurred the costs.
    8. Tampering.   A person who tampers with an immobilization device or mobilizes a vehicle that is subject to an order of immobilization shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 18.

    § 1213b. Forfeiture of vehicle.

    At the time of sentencing after a third or subsequent conviction under section 1201 of this title or after a conviction under subdivision 1130(c)(1) of this title, or upon a determination by the Parole Board that a person has violated a condition of parole requiring that the person not operate a motor vehicle, the court may, upon motion of the State and in addition to any penalty imposed by law and after notice and hearing, order the motor vehicle operated by the defendant or parolee at the time of the offense forfeited and sold as provided in section 1213c of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; amended 2011, No. 56 , § 12, eff. May 31, 2011.

    History

    Amendments

    —2011. Inserted “or after a conviction under subdivision 1130(c)(1) of this title, or upon a determination by the parole board that a person has violated a condition of parole requiring that the person not operate a motor vehicle” following “title”, and inserted “or parolee” following “defendant”.

    § 1213c. Immobilization and forfeiture proceedings.

    1. Notice.   The State shall provide the following persons with notice of an immobilization or forfeiture hearing:
      1. the defendant;
      2. the registered owner or owners;
      3. any holder of a security interest in or lien on the vehicle; and
      4. any other person appearing to be an innocent owner or operator as described in subsection (g) of this section.
    2. Content of notice.   The notice shall contain the following:
      1. a description of the motor vehicle, including vehicle identification number, make, model, and year;
      2. the name of the registered owner or owners, lienholder, and any other person appearing to be an innocent owner or operator as described in subsection (g) of this section;
      3. the date, time, and place of the hearing; and
      4. a statement that any person who is an owner, an innocent owner or operator, or who holds a security interest in or claims any interest in the motor vehicle may appear and be heard at the hearing to protect the person’s interest in the motor vehicle.
    3. Service of notice.   The notice of hearing shall be served as provided for in the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure on the registered owner or owners and any lienholders as shown on the certificate of title for the vehicle as shown in the records of the department of motor vehicles in the state in which the vehicle is registered or titled.
    4. Hearing.   The court shall hold a hearing to determine whether or not to order the motor vehicle immobilized or forfeited. The proceeding shall be against the motor vehicle and shall be deemed civil in nature.
    5. Hardship consideration.   In determining the motion, the court may consider any undue hardship that immobilization or forfeiture would cause to a person, other than the defendant, who is dependent on the motor vehicle for essential transportation needs. In making such determination, the court shall consider any evidence of past or current domestic violence.
    6. Order.   The court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall issue a final order. The court may order the motor vehicle immobilized or forfeited if the court finds that:
      1. the motor vehicle is subject to immobilization or forfeiture;
      2. the notice as required by this section was served; and
      3. no party has shown that he or she is an innocent owner or operator as described in subsection (g) of this section.
    7. Rights of innocent owner or operator.   The court shall not order the immobilization or forfeiture of a motor vehicle if an owner, co-owner, or person who regularly operates the motor vehicle, other than the defendant, shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner, co-owner, or regular operator did not consent to or have any express or implied knowledge that the motor vehicle was being or was intended to be operated in a manner that would subject the motor vehicle to immobilization or forfeiture, or that the owner, co-owner, or regular operator had no reasonable opportunity or capacity to prevent the defendant from operating the motor vehicle.
    8. Rented or leased vehicles.   A vehicle that is rented or leased for a period of less than one year shall not be subject to immobilization or forfeiture unless it is established in the proceedings that the owner of the rented or leased vehicle knew of or consented to the operation of the motor vehicle in a manner that would subject the vehicle to immobilization or forfeiture.
    9. Lienholder.   If the court finds that a person has an enforceable lien on or other interest in the motor vehicle that is not held through a straw purchase, trust, or otherwise for the actual benefit of another and that the person did not know of or consent to the operation of the motor vehicle in a manner that would subject the vehicle to immobilization or forfeiture, the court shall:
      1. permit the person to enforce the lien or other interest as provided by law if such enforcement does not result in the return of the motor vehicle to the defendant; or
      2. upon immobilization or forfeiture, order compensation to the person, to the extent of the person’s interest, from the proceeds of the resulting sale.
    10. Order of forfeiture.   If the court orders the motor vehicle forfeited, it shall be delivered into the custody of the Commissioner of Buildings and General Services, who shall dispose of the motor vehicle pursuant to 29 V.S.A. § 1556 . The proceeds from the sale of the vehicle shall first be used to offset any costs of selling the vehicle and then, after any liens on the vehicle have been paid in full, applied to any unpaid restitution owed by the defendant in connection with the charge that resulted in forfeiture. Any balance remaining shall be deposited into the General Fund.
    11. Appeal.   A decision of the court under this section may be appealed as a matter of right to the Supreme Court.
    12. Disbursement of proceeds.   Proceeds from the defendant’s payment of the release fee and towing and impoundment costs shall be disbursed to the law enforcement agencies that incurred the costs.
    13. Owning, leasing, and renting prohibited.   After issuance of an immobilization or forfeiture order, and during the defendant’s license suspension or revocation period, the defendant shall not operate, purchase, lease, or rent a motor vehicle. A person who violates this subsection shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both.
    14. Selling or encumbering prohibited.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, after a person is detained, arrested, lodged, or released upon citation for a second or subsequent violation of section 1201 of this title, no person shall sell, transfer, or encumber the title to a vehicle that the person knows may be subject to immobilization under section 1213a of this title or forfeiture under section 1213b of this title, unless approved by the court in which the charge is filed for good cause shown. A person who violates this section shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both.
      2. If the State has not commenced a prosecution for a second or subsequent violation of section 1201 of this title within 90 days of the detention, arrest, lodging, or release upon citation, the person may sell, transfer, or encumber the subject vehicle.
    15. Funding.   A law enforcement or prosecution agency conducting forfeitures under this section may accept, receive, and disburse in furtherance of its duties and functions under this section any appropriations, grants, and donations made available by the State of Vermont and its agencies, the federal government and its agencies, any municipality or other unit of local government, or private or civil sources.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 20; amended 2001, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2003, No. 41 , § 1; 2007, No. 40 , § 7; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 161; 2015, No. 53 , § 8; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 195, 196.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (n): Made the heading for subdiv. (n)(1) the heading for subsec. (n) instead.

    Subsec. ( o ): Added subsec. heading.

    —2015. Subsec. ( o ): Added.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Substituted “Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure” for “District Court Civil Rules”.

    —2007. Subsec. (j): Inserted “first” following “vehicle shall” and “and then, after any liens on the vehicle have been paid in full, applied to any unpaid restitution owed by the defendant in connection with the charge that resulted in forfeiture” following “any costs of selling the vehicle” in the second sentence and deleted “after any liens on the vehicle have been paid in full” following “balance” in the third sentence.

    —2003. Subsec. (j): Substituted “into the custody of the commissioner of buildings and general services” for “to the state treasurer”, “disposed of” for “sell”, and “pursuant to section 1556 of Title 29” for “at a public sale held under chapter 13 of Title 27”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (n): Designated the existing provisions of the subsec. as subdiv. (1), inserted “except as provided in subdivision (2) of this section” preceding “after a person,” substituted “detained, arrested, lodged or released upon citation for” for “charged with” preceding “a second or” in the first sentence of that subdiv., and added subdiv. (2).

    § 1214. Repealed. 1991, No. 55, § 20.

    History

    Former § 1214. Former § 1214, relating to civil penalties for operation of a motor vehicle by person with BAC of 0.08 percent or more, was derived from 1989, No. 68 , § 8.

    § 1215. Injunctive relief.

    If the Commissioner has not reinstated a license after the suspension or revocation period has run under this subchapter, and the person alleges he or she has complied with section 1209a of this title or alleges that the alcohol assessment screening does not indicate that therapy should be a condition of reinstatement, he or she may seek injunctive relief in the Criminal Division of the Superior Court in the manner provided by the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure. In such actions, the Driver Rehabilitation Program Director shall be the proper defendant.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 68 , § 10, Dec. 1, 1989; amended 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. April 22, 1996; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “criminal division of the superior court” for “district court” in the first sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Added the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Injunctions, see V.R.C.P. 65.

    § 1216. Persons under 21 years of age; alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more.

    1. A person under 21 years of age who operates, attempts to operate, or is in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more commits a civil traffic violation subject to the jurisdiction of the Judicial Bureau and subject to the following sanctions:
      1. For a first violation, the person’s license or privilege to operate shall be suspended for six months and until the person complies with subdivision 1209a(a)(1) of this title. However, during the suspension, an eligible person may operate under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued pursuant to section 1213 of this title. A person who elects to operate under an RDL or certificate shall not be eligible for reinstatement unless he or she operates under the RDL or certificate for six months, plus any extension of this period arising from a violation of section 1213 of this title.
      2. For a second or subsequent violation, the person’s license or privilege to operate shall be suspended until the person reaches 21 years of age or for one year, whichever is longer, and complies with subdivisions 1209a(a)(2)(A), (B), and (D) of this title. However, during the suspension, an eligible person may operate under the terms of an ignition interlock RDL or ignition interlock certificate issued pursuant to section 1213 of this title. A person who elects to operate under an RDL or certificate shall not be eligible for reinstatement unless he or she operates under the RDL or certificate for one year or until the person reaches 21 years of age, whichever is longer, plus any extension of this period arising from a violation of section 1213 of this title.
    2. [Repealed.]
    3. A person who violates this section may also be subject to recall of his or her provisional license under section 607a of this title.
    4. If a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is violating this section, the officer may request the person to submit to a breath test using a preliminary screening device approved by the Commissioner of Public Safety. A refusal to submit to the breath test shall be considered a violation of this section. Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in sections 1202 and 1203 of this title:
      1. the results of the test shall be admissible evidence in a proceeding under this section; and
      2. there shall be no statutory right to counsel prior to the administration of the test.
    5. In a proceeding under this section, if there was at any time within two hours of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.02 or more at the time of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control.
    6. No fine and no points shall be assessed for a violation of this section.
    7. The Alcohol and Driving Program required under this section shall be administered by the Department of Health’s Division of Substance Use Programs and shall take into consideration any particular treatment needs of operators under 21 years of age.
    8. A charge of violating this section shall not bar prosecution for any crime, including a prosecution under section 1201 of this title.
    9. Suspensions imposed under this section or any comparable statute of any other jurisdiction shall run concurrently with suspensions imposed under sections 1205, 1206, and 1208 of this title or any comparable statutes of any other jurisdiction or with any suspension resulting from a conviction for a violation of section 1091 of this title from the same incident, and a person shall receive credit for any elapsed period of a suspension served in Vermont against a later suspension imposed in this State.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 55 , § 17; amended 1997, No. 57 , § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 9, 27; 2009, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. July 1, 2011; 2011, No. 46 , § 9, eff. July 2, 2011; 2011, No. 56 , § 18, eff. March 1, 2012; 2011, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2013, No. 57 , § 20; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 52; 2021, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, effective July 1, 2022.

    History

    Editor’s note—

    1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 9 and 27 both amended this section. The amendments made the same change (changing the name of the judicial bureau), but the text set out in § 9 did not include the amendments from 1997, No. 57 , § 1. The change that § 27 made is described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Inserted “years of age” following “21”.

    Subsec. (a): Substituted “21 years of age” for “the age of 21” in the introductory language and rewrote subdivs. (1) and (2).

    Subsec. (b): Repealed.

    —2013. Subsec. (i): Deleted the former second sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2011. Subsec. (d): Act 56 substituted “public safety” for “health” following “commissioner of”.

    Subsec. (i): Added by Act 46.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “with subdivision 1209a(a)(1) of this title” for “with 1209a of this title” in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “subdivision 1209a(a)(2) of this title” for “section 1209a of this title” in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “judicial” for “traffic and municipal ordinance” preceding “bureau” near the end of the introductory paragraph.

    —1997. Section amended generally.

    § 1217. [Reserved for future use.]

    § 1218. Commercial motor vehicles; 0.04.

    1. A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle:
      1. when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.04 or more; or
      2. when the person is under the influence of alcohol; or
      3. when the person is under the influence of any other drug or under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of driving safely.
    2. A violation of this section shall result in disqualification from driving a commercial motor vehicle as provided in section 4116 of this title or in suspension of the privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle as provided in section 4116a of this title. Those provisions of section 1205 of this title that establish a procedure for civil suspensions shall apply to this section, except that where that section refers to alcohol concentration it shall be deemed to refer to an alcohol concentration of 0.04.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 88 , § 13, eff. April 1, 1992; amended 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4).

    History

    Amendments

    —2017. Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Added “or in suspension of the privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle as provided in section 4116a of this title” in the first sentence.

    § 1219. Commercial motor vehicle; detectable amount; out-of-service.

    A person who is operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle with any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his or her system shall immediately be placed out-of-service for 24 hours by an enforcement officer. A law enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has a measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his or her system on the basis of the person’s general appearance, conduct, or other substantiating evidence may request the person to submit to a test, which may be administered with a preliminary screening device. The law enforcement officer shall inform the person at the time the test is requested that refusal to submit will result in disqualification. If the person refuses to submit to the test, the person shall immediately be placed out-of-service for 24 hours and shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle as provided in section 4116 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 88 , § 14.

    § 1220. Repealed. 2021, No. 76, § 33, effective July 1, 2021.

    History

    Former § 1220. Former § 1220, relating to drunken driving enforcement in fiscal year 1998, was derived from 1997, No. 56 , § 6.

    § 1220a. DUI Enforcement Special Fund.

    1. There is created a DUI Enforcement Special Fund, which shall be a special fund established and managed pursuant to 32 V.S.A. chapter 7, subchapter 5. The DUI Enforcement Special Fund shall be a continuation of and successor to the DUI Enforcement Special Fund established under subsection 1205(r) of this title.
    2. The DUI Enforcement Special Fund shall consist of:
      1. receipts from the surcharges assessed under section 206 and subsections 674(i), 1091(d), 1094(f), 1128(d), 1133(d), 1205(r), and 1210(k) of this title;
      2. beginning in fiscal year 2000 and thereafter, the first $150,000.00 of revenues collected from fines imposed under subchapter 13 of chapter 13 of this title pertaining to DUI related offenses;
      3. beginning May 1, 2013 and thereafter, $0.0038 per gallon of the revenues raised by the motor fuel tax on gasoline imposed by chapter 28 of this title, except for the revenues raised by the tax on aviation gasoline; and
      4. any additional funds transferred or appropriated by the General Assembly.
    3. The DUI Enforcement Special Fund shall be used for the implementation and enforcement of this subchapter for purposes specified and in amounts appropriated by the General Assembly. Effort shall be given to awarding grants to municipalities or law enforcement agencies for innovative programs designed to reduce DUI offenses, and priority shall be given to grants requested jointly by more than one law enforcement agency or municipality.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 117 (Adj. Sess.), § 41; amended 1999, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 77, eff. May 29, 2000; 2011, No. 56 , § 6, eff. May 31, 2011; 2013, No. 12 , § 25, eff. May 1, 2013; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 34, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.

    History

    Revision note—

    In subdiv. (b)(1), substituted “section 206” for “sections 206”; inserted “and subsections” following “section 206” and “1133(d)” for “1133(b)” for purposes of clarity and to conform references to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(3): Inserted “, except for the revenues raised by the tax on aviation gasoline” following “this title”.

    —2013. Subdiv. (b)(3): Substituted “May 1, 2013 and thereafter, $0.0038 per gallon” for “in fiscal year 2000 and thereafter, two percent”.

    —2011. Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “1210(k)” for “1210(j)”.

    Subsec. (c): Added the second sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (b)(3): Substituted “two percent” for “one and three-quarters percent”.

    § 1220b. Blood and Breath Alcohol Testing Special Fund.

    1. There is created a Blood and Breath Alcohol Testing Special Fund, which shall be a special fund established and managed pursuant to 32 V.S.A. chapter 7, subchapter 5.
    2. The Blood and Breath Alcohol Testing Special Fund shall consist of receipts from the surcharges assessed under subsection 1210(i) of this title.
    3. The Blood and Breath Alcohol Testing Special Fund shall be used for the implementation and support of the Blood and Breath Alcohol Testing Program within the Department of Public Safety.

    HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 56 , § 19, eff. March 1, 2012.

    Subchapter 14. Equipment

    Article 1. General Requirements

    § 1221. Condition of vehicle.

    A motor vehicle, operated on any highway, shall be in good mechanical condition and shall be properly equipped.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,224. 1935, No. 114 , § 2. P.L. § 5114. 1925, No. 70 , § 69. G.L. § 4709. 1917, No. 133 , § 1. 1915, No. 137 . 1912, No. 147 , §§ 1, 2. 1910, No. 139 . P.S. § 4094. 1906, No. 113 , § 7. 1904, No. 86 , § 10.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    Because of his experience with older model Jeeps, which provided him with some knowledge of the way they sounded when running in good condition, a trooper had a reasonable basis for believing that the muffler on defendant’s Jeep was not in working order and his stop of the vehicle was justified. State v. Beauregard, 2003 VT 3, 175 Vt. 472, 820 A.2d 183, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 3 (2003) (mem.).

    Because defendant’s passenger vehicle had only one functioning taillight and thus was not properly equipped under statutes, arresting officer had a reasonable and articulable basis for stopping vehicle. State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 757 A.2d 1017, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 170 (2000).

    Evidence.

    Evidence that after accident brakes of decedent’s car were found to be loose did not prove, as matter of law, that at time of the accident he violated this section, in view of other evidence that he was then running slowly and had full control of his car. Bigelow v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 92 Vt. 423, 105 A. 34, 1918 Vt. LEXIS 195 (1918).

    Presumptions.

    In absence of evidence to contrary, it will be presumed that automobile being driven in nighttime was equipped with lights required by statute. Emerson v. Hickens, 105 Vt. 197, 164 A. 381, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1933).

    Stationary vehicles.

    Section applies whether automobile is in motion or stationary. Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 A. 593, 1928 Vt. LEXIS 130 (1928).

    Violation as negligence.

    Instruction to jury that driving car on highway with inadequate brakes to knowledge of defendant, contrary to provisions of this section, if proximate cause of accident, was negligence per se, was reversible error, it being for jury to determine on all evidence in case whether defendant acted negligently under circumstances. Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 A. 593, 1928 Vt. LEXIS 130 (1928).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Ovitt, 128 Vt. 572, 268 A.2d 916, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 276 (1970).

    § 1221a. Defective equipment warning.

    The operator of a motor vehicle who receives a ticket for inoperative lights shall not be required to pay the civil penalty associated with the ticket provided that within 72 hours after receiving the ticket the issuing department receives proof that the defect has been repaired.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 15, eff. April 27, 1998; amended 1999, No. 34 , § 2; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 198.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “civil penalty” for “fine” and “after” for “of” following “72 hours”.

    —1999. Deleted “by an authorized inspection station” following “has been repaired”.

    § 1222. Inspection of registered vehicles.

    1. Except for school buses, which shall be inspected as prescribed in section 1282 of this title, and motor buses as defined in subdivision 4(17) of this title, which shall be inspected twice during the calendar year at six-month intervals, all motor vehicles registered in this State shall undergo a safety and visual emissions inspection once each year and all motor vehicles that are registered in this State and are 16 model years old or less shall undergo an emissions or on board diagnostic (OBD) systems inspection once each year as applicable. Any motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer not currently inspected in this State shall be inspected within 15 days following the date of its registration in the State of Vermont.
      1. The inspections shall be made at garages or qualified service stations, designated by the Commissioner as inspection stations, for the purpose of determining whether those motor vehicles are properly equipped and maintained in good mechanical condition; provided, however, the scope of the safety inspection of a motor vehicle other than a school bus or a commercial motor vehicle shall be limited to parts or systems that are relevant to the vehicle’s safe operation, and such vehicles shall not fail the safety portion of the inspection unless the condition of the part or system poses or may pose a danger to the operator or to other highway users. (b) (1) The inspections shall be made at garages or qualified service stations, designated by the Commissioner as inspection stations, for the purpose of determining whether those motor vehicles are properly equipped and maintained in good mechanical condition; provided, however, the scope of the safety inspection of a motor vehicle other than a school bus or a commercial motor vehicle shall be limited to parts or systems that are relevant to the vehicle’s safe operation, and such vehicles shall not fail the safety portion of the inspection unless the condition of the part or system poses or may pose a danger to the operator or to other highway users.
      2. The charges for such inspections made by garages or qualified service stations designated to conduct periodic inspections shall be subject to the approval of the Commissioner. If a fee is charged for inspection, it shall be based upon the hourly rate charged by each official inspection station or it may be a flat rate fee, and, in either instance, the fee shall be prominently posted and displayed beside the official inspection station certificate. In addition, the official inspection station may disclose the State inspection certificate charge on the repair order as a separate item and collect the charge from the consumer.
    2. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle unless it has been inspected as required by this section and has a valid certification of inspection affixed to it. A person shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $5.00, which penalty shall be exempt from surcharges under 13 V.S.A. § 7282(a) , if he or she is cited for a violation of this section within the 14 days following expiration of the motor vehicle inspection sticker. The month of next inspection for all motor vehicles shall be shown on the current inspection certificate affixed to the vehicle.
    3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, an exhibition vehicle of model year 1940 or before registered as prescribed in section 373 of this title or a trailer registered as prescribed in subdivision 371(a)(1)(A) of this title shall be exempt from inspection; provided, however, the vehicle must be equipped as originally manufactured, must be in good mechanical condition, and must meet the applicable standards of the inspection manual.
    4. A vehicle used as a mail carrier under a contract with the U.S. Postal Service shall not fail inspection solely because, in converting the vehicle to be a right-hand drive vehicle, the right air bag in the front compartment has been disconnected or a nonfactory disconnect switch has been installed to disable the air bag.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 67 ; 1967, No. 104 , § 1; 1969, No. 143 , § 3; 1969, No. 299 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1971; 1977, No. 20 , § 6; 1993, No. 64 , § 3; 1997, No. 32 , § 3; 2003, No. 118 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2005, No. 80 , § 55; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; 2011, No. 62 , § 38; 2017, No. 71 , § 27, eff. June 8, 2017; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 41, eff. May 21, 2018; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 22, eff. May 30, 2018; 2019, No. 59 , § 44, eff. June 14, 2019; 2019, No. 60 , § 33.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,054. 1947, No. 93 . 1943, No. 82 , § 1. 1939, No. 121 . 1935, No. 127 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2019. Subsec. (a): Act No. 59 substituted “undergo a safety and visual emissions inspection” for “be inspected” and added “and all motor vehicles that are registered in this State and are 16 model years old or less shall undergo an emissions or on board diagnostic (OBD) systems inspection once each year as applicable” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 60 substituted “civil penalty” for “fine”; and inserted “, which penalty shall be exempt from surcharges under 13 V.S.A. § 7282(a) ,” preceding “if he”, “the” following “section within”, and “following” preceding “expiration”.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Acts 158 and 206 substituted “following ” for “from” following “days”.

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally by Acts 158 and 206.

    —2017. Subsec. (e): Added.

    —2011. Section amended generally.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Inserted “or a trailer registered as prescribed in subdivision 371(a)(1)(A) of this title” following “section 373 of this title”.

    —2005. Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Added the subsec. (a) and (b) designations; substituted “subdivision” for “section” preceding “4(17)” in subsec. (a); and added subsec. (c).

    —1997. Section amended generally.

    —1993. Added “except for school buses and passenger common carriers” preceding “all motor vehicles”, deleted “except motorcycles and mopeds” preceding “shall be inspected”, substituted “once” for “twice” thereafter and deleted “during months specified by the commissioner of motor vehicles, at intervals of not more than six months” following “each year” in the first sentence, deleted the former fifth and sixth sentences, and deleted “other” preceding “motor vehicles” in the present fifth sentence.

    —1977. Inserted “and mo-peds” following “motorcycles” in the first and fifth sentences.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1969. Rewrote the third sentence and deleted the former fourth sentence.

    —1967. Act No. 67 deleted “periodically” preceding “inspected during” and added “except that any motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer not currently inspected in this state shall be inspected within 15 days from the date of its registration” following “condition” in the first sentence and deleted the former second sentence.

    Act No. 104 added the fourth sentence.

    Sunset of subsec. (e). 2017, No. 71 , § 31(a)(4) provides: “ 23 V.S.A. § 1222(e) , added in Sec. 27 (inspections; mail carrier vehicles), shall be repealed on July 1, 2020.”

    Repeal of sunset of subsec. (e). 2017, No. 71 , § 31(a)(4), which had provided for the repeal of subsec. (e), effective July 1, 2020, was repealed by 2019, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 19 and 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 40.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Motor vehicle pollution, see 10 V.S.A. § 567 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Defenses.

    Any absence of adequate State supervision of motor vehicle inspection stations and inspections had no relevancy to liability to fine of defendant found guilty of driving uninspected vehicle. State v. Diamondstone, 132 Vt. 303, 318 A.2d 654, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 338 (1974).

    Defendant found guilty of operating uninspected motor vehicle presented nothing for Supreme Court’s consideration to condemn inspection law on the alleged grounds that it is an improper delegation of power to private enterprises and has no practical relation to community health and safety. State v. Diamondstone, 132 Vt. 303, 318 A.2d 654, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 338 (1974).

    Defendant found guilty of operating uninspected motor vehicle could take nothing from complaint that police should have prevented him from operating the vehicle rather than giving him a ticket. State v. Diamondstone, 132 Vt. 303, 318 A.2d 654, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 338 (1974).

    Grounds for vehicle stop.

    Where there was a reasonable possibility that defendants were committing the offense of operating a vehicle without a valid inspection certification, this situation, and the fact that both vehicles were stopped after dark, making a passing examination of the date of the vehicles’ current inspection certification difficult or impossible, were sufficient to establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic offense was being committed and, as such, the officers legally stopped defendants’ vehicles in order to investigate possible wrongdoing. State v. Thompson, 175 Vt. 470, 816 A.2d 550, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 432 (2002), limited, Zullo v. State, 2019 VT 1, 209 Vt. 298, 205 A.3d 466, 2019 Vt. LEXIS 1 (2019) (mem.).

    Officers legally stopped defendants’ vehicles in order to investigate possible wrongdoing because defendants did not meet requirements of the Vermont Periodic Inspection Manual, i.e., that any motor vehicle manufactured or assembled with a bumper must have a bumper, and that any motor vehicle manufactured or assembled with a driver’s side rearview mirror must have such a mirror, and therefore there was a reasonable possibility that defendants were committing a traffic offense — operating a vehicle without a valid inspection certification. State v. Thompson, 174 Vt. 172, 807 A.2d 454, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 223 (2002) (mem.).

    Refusing inspection.

    The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles has the power to refuse to pass, in the periodic motor vehicle inspections, on any motor vehicle that is equipped in violation of section 1246 of this title. Chrysler Corp. v. Malloy, 294 F. Supp. 524, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10114 (D. Vt. 1968), rev'd, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Kirby, 143 Vt. 369, 465 A.2d 1369, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 524 (1983); State v. Hewey, 144 Vt. 10, 471 A.2d 236, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 595 (1983).

    § 1222a. Emissions of diesel-powered commercial vehicles.

    1. Except for voluntary exhaust-smoke emission testing, a vehicle may be stopped and an inspection performed under this section only if a law enforcement officer observes an apparent violation of the exhaust-smoke emission standard. If the equipment for smoke testing is not available, a law enforcement officer may require the operator or the owner to submit the vehicle for an emission test at a reasonably convenient time and place. Failure to submit to the test shall be conclusive evidence of the vehicle’s noncompliance with the exhaust-smoke emission standard. Any test administered under this section and any notice of violation issued shall be done by a sworn law enforcement officer trained and certified by the Department of Motor Vehicles. For purposes of this section:
      1. “Commercial motor vehicle” is defined under subdivision 4103(4) of this title.
      2. “Law enforcement officer” means an officer of the Department of Motor Vehicles trained and certified by the Department of Motor Vehicles to conduct exhaust-smoke emission inspections.
    2. No diesel-powered commercial motor vehicle shall be operated on the highways of this State unless the vehicle complies with the exhaust-smoke emission standard and the rules adopted by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. Any person who owns or operates such a vehicle while it is operated in violation of the provisions of this section or the rules adopted by the Commissioner shall be fined:
      1. $200.00 for a first violation per vehicle, except that a person shall not be fined if, within 45 days from the date of the emission inspection, the defect is repaired and notification of the repair is provided to the Department of Motor Vehicles or the vehicle is taken out of service;
      2. $200.00 for a second violation by the same vehicle within a two-year period if the first violation was repaired within 45 days from the date of the emission inspection, except that a person shall not be fined if the second violation occurs within 60 days from the date of repair of the first violation. For purposes of this subdivision, the “date of repair” shall be the date indicated in the notification of repair submitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles under subdivision (b)(1) of this subsection;
      3. $400.00 for a second violation by the same vehicle within a two-year period if the first violation was not repaired within 45 days from the date of the emission inspection;
      4. $ 400.00 for a third or subsequent violation committed by the same vehicle within a two-year period if the first violation was repaired within 45 days from the date of the emission inspection; and
      5. $800.00 for a third or subsequent violation committed by the same vehicle within a two-year period if the first violation was not repaired within 45 days from the date of the emission inspection.
    3. The Commissioner shall establish by rule a process by which the owner of a vehicle that has been taken out of service under this section and that is currently in violation of the exhaust-smoke emission standard shall, prior to sale or transfer of the vehicle, notify the purchaser or transferee that the vehicle does not comply with the exhaust-smoke emission standard.
    4. All fines generated from the violation of this section shall be deposited in the Transportation Fund.

    HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. July 1, 2007.

    History

    Former § 1222a. Former § 1222a, relating to pilot program for certain low mileage utility line vehicles, was derived from 1995, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and was repealed by 1995, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. July 1, 1999.

    § 1223. Prohibitions.

    A person shall not affix or cause to be affixed to a motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer a certification of inspection that was not assigned by an official inspection station to such motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer. No person shall reaffix or cause to be reaffixed an official sticker once removed; instead, replacement stickers shall be affixed as prescribed by the rules for replacement sticker agents. A person shall not knowingly operate a motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer to which a certification of inspection is affixed if the certification of inspection was not assigned by an official station to that vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer.

    HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 104 , § 2; amended 1969, No. 143 , § 4; 2011, No. 46 , § 10.

    History

    Amendments

    —2011. Inserted the second sentence.

    —1969. Section amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Evidence.

    Where defendant was convicted of knowingly operating a motor vehicle to which an unassigned certificate of inspection was attached in violation of this section, since the vehicle was registered to defendant’s wife, the sticker was ripped, its back side, which faced the driver, was completely devoid of any markings indicating the date or place of issuance, nor did the sticker show the month of next inspection, as required by section 1222 of this title, governing inspection of registered vehicles, there was ample circumstantial evidence from which the trial court could infer that defendant knew of the invalidity of the affixed sticker. State v. Kirby, 143 Vt. 369, 465 A.2d 1369, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 524 (1983).

    § 1224. Inspection certificates.

    For each inspection certificate issued by the Department, the designated station shall pay the Commissioner the fee required under section 1230 of this title. All unused inspection certificates and number tabs shall be returned to the Department within two months of the certificate’s expiration date. A designated inspection station shall receive a refund for each unused certificate returned during the two-month period. If the station’s designation is revoked or suspended under section 1228 of this title, the station shall return all unused certificates to the Department and shall not receive a refund.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 66i, eff. Sept. 1, 1998.

    § 1225. Penalty.

    The Commissioner may suspend the registration of any motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer until the owner thereof complies with the requirements of this article.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 143 , § 5; amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 19.

    History

    Amendments

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the former second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Procedure for suspension of license or registration, see § 204 of this title.

    § 1226. Reciprocity.

    The Commissioner may authorize the acceptance in this State of a certificate of inspection and approval issued in another state or province having inspection requirements similar to the requirements in effect in this State. He or she may extend the time within which a certification of inspection shall be obtained in this State by the owner of a motor vehicle registered in this State and so inspected that was not in this State during the time an inspection was required.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 299 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1971.

    § 1227. Certified inspection mechanics.

    1. Periodic inspections may be performed only by mechanics who have been certified by the Commissioner, provided that an uncertified person employed as an inspection mechanic may perform inspections during the first 30 days that he or she is employed by the inspection station.
      1. A person who applies for certification under this section shall: (b) (1) A person who applies for certification under this section shall:
        1. complete an application form prescribed by the Commissioner;
        2. be at least 18 years of age; and
        3. except as otherwise provided pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection (b), pass an examination based on the official inspection manual for each type of vehicle to be inspected and on the inspection requirements for each type of vehicle to be inspected.
      2. A service member or veteran shall not be required to pass an examination pursuant to subdivision (1)(C) of this subsection if he or she has been designated by the U.S. Armed Forces as a 91B Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic or equivalent and has one or more of the following national certifications:
        1. ASE Diesel Mechanic;
        2. ASE Light Truck Engine Repair;
        3. ASE Automobile Service Consultant;
        4. Certified Hazardous Material Manager; or
        5. Associate Safety Professional.
    2. Upon an applicant’s satisfaction of the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, the Commissioner shall issue a certification that shall remain in effect for a period of five years or until surrendered, suspended, or revoked. Inspection mechanics certified by their employer as competent to perform inspections and who were continuously employed by one or more designated inspection stations for a period of at least one year at any time prior to July 1, 1998 shall not be required to take the examination.
    3. To inspect a school bus, a certified inspection mechanic shall not be required to have a commercial driver license if he or she:
      1. uses approved automated brake testing equipment in lieu of an inspection road test; or
      2. only operates the school bus at a safe location that is not a highway as defined in 19 V.S.A. § 1(12) as necessary to conduct an inspection road test.
    4. As used in this section:
      1. “Service member” means an individual who is an active member of:
        1. the U.S. Armed Forces;
        2. a reserve component of the U.S. Armed Forces;
        3. the U.S. Coast Guard; or
        4. the National Guard of any state.
      2. “Veteran” means a former service member who received an honorable discharge or a general discharge under honorable conditions from active duty not more than two years prior to submitting an application for certification under this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 66j, eff. Jan. 1, 1999; amended 2005, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; 2017, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (e): Added.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Inserted “for a period of five years or” following “effect” in the second sentence.

    § 1228. Mechanic certification; inspection designation; revocation.

    Any certification for mechanic or designation as an inspection station may be revoked or suspended for cause as described in the official inspection manuals.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 66k.

    § 1229. Rules.

    1. The Commissioner may adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of sections 1222, 1224, 1227, and 1228 of this title, relating to inspections and certification of inspection mechanics.
    2. In consultation with the Secretary of Natural Resources or the Secretary’s designee, the Commissioner shall adopt rules, pursuant to the provisions in 3 V.S.A. chapter 25, to establish a standard of exhaust-smoke emission for all diesel-powered commercial motor vehicles operated on the highways of this State. In establishing this standard, the Commissioner shall review standards in effect in other states and shall endeavor to maintain consistency with those standards. The rules adopted shall recognize different types and ages of vehicles and comprise standards that shall, at least in part, be based on the age of the vehicle. The standards shall be reviewed by the Commissioner periodically and may be revised in consultation with the Secretary of Natural Resources or the Secretary’s designee, as the Commissioner deems appropriate. Additionally, the Commissioner, in consultation with the Secretary of Natural Resources or the Secretary’s designee, shall adopt rules that select a method or methods for testing the exhaust emissions of diesel-powered commercial motor vehicles and that implement section 1222a of this title. The method selected shall be one that is designed to be performed without unreasonable delay for the vehicle being tested. The rules shall include a process by which the owner of a commercial motor vehicle may arrange with the Department of Motor Vehicles for the voluntary exhaust-smoke emission testing of a vehicle. For the purposes of this section, “commercial motor vehicle” is defined under subdivision 4103(4) of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 66l; amended 2005, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 26, 2006.

    History

    Amendments

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), made a minor change in punctuation in that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    § 1230. Charge.

    For each inspection certificate issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Commissioner shall be paid $6.00, provided that State and municipal inspection stations that inspect only State or municipally owned and registered vehicles shall not be required to pay a fee. All vehicle inspection certificate charge revenue shall be allocated to the Transportation Fund with one-half reserved for bridge maintenance activities.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 66m, eff. Sept. 1, 1998; amended 2005, No. 80 , § 54; 2009, No. 50 , § 50; 2009, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 20; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 41.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$6.00” for “$5.00” in the first sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$5.00” for “$4.00” in the first sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Added the last sentence.

    —2009. Substituted “$4.00” for “$3.00.”

    —2005. Substituted “charge” for “fees” in the section heading, and substituted “$3.00” for “$0.50”.

    § 1231. Administrative penalties.

    1. The Commissioner may impose an administrative penalty of not more than $500.00 for each violation against a designated inspection station or a certified inspection mechanic who violates the laws relating to the performance of periodic motor vehicle inspections or the official inspection manuals within the prior three years.
    2. Each violation is a separate and distinct offense and, in the case of a continuing violation, each day’s continuance may be deemed a separate and distinct offense. In no event shall the maximum amount imposed for a continuing offense exceed $1,000.00.
    3. The Commissioner shall adopt rules establishing categories of violations for which administrative penalties are to be imposed under this section. Categories shall be based on the severity of the violation involved. Penalties assessed for each determination of violation of the inspection rules shall not exceed the following amounts per category:
      1. Violation of State law relative to inspection (Category 1)—$500.00.
      2. Violation of a Category 2 inspection rule—$300.00.
      3. Violation of a Category 3 inspection rule—$250.00.
      4. Violation of a Category 4 inspection rule—$100.00.
      5. Violation of a Category 5 inspection rule—$50.00.
    4. The alleged violator shall be given notice and opportunity for a hearing. Service of the notice shall be sufficient if sent by first-class mail to the station’s address or the most recent address provided by the mechanic. The notice shall include the following:
      1. a factual description of the alleged violation;
      2. a reference to the particular statute allegedly violated;
      3. the amount of the proposed administrative penalty;
      4. a warning that the person will be deemed to have waived his or her right to a hearing, that the penalty will be imposed if no hearing is requested within 15 days from date of notice, and that failure to pay a penalty may result in suspension of his or her license.
    5. A person who receives notice under subsection (d) of this section shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing unless, within 15 days from date of the notice, the person requests a hearing in writing. If the person waives the right to a hearing, the Commissioner shall issue a final order finding the person in default and imposing the penalty.
    6. The provisions of sections 105, 106, and 107 of this title shall apply to hearings conducted under this section.
    7. The Commissioner may collect an unpaid administrative penalty by filing a civil action in Superior Court or through any other means available to State agencies.
    8. If a penalty is not paid within 60 days after it is imposed, the Commissioner may suspend any license, certificate, registration, or permit issued under this subchapter.
    9. The remedies authorized by this section shall be in addition to any other civil or criminal remedies provided by law for violation of this subchapter.
    10. Penalties assessed under this section shall be deposited in the Transportation Fund.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 66n, eff. Jan. 1, 1999; amended 2019, No. 60 , § 11.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019. Subsec. (a): Added “within the prior three years” following “inspection manuals”.

    Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    Article 2. Motor Vehicles Generally

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Labeling of mercury-added products, see 10 V.S.A. § 7106 .

    Motor vehicle parts and accessories, see Title 9 chapter 76.

    Motor vehicle air conditioning, see 10 V.S.A. § 573 .

    New motor vehicle emissions labeling program, see 10 V.S.A. § 579 .

    Wheel weights containing lead, see 9 V.S.A. § 2470h .

    § 1241. Locking device.

    A motor vehicle shall be provided with a lock, key, or other device to prevent such motor vehicle from being set in motion by its own motive power.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,249. P.L. § 5127. 1925, No. 70 , § 73. G.L. § 4711. P.S. § 4095. 1904, No. 86 , § 11.

    § 1242. Safety glass.

    1. A person shall not operate on a highway in this State a motor vehicle registered in Vermont, manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1936, unless such vehicle is equipped with safety glass, wherever glass is used in doors, windows, and windshields.  The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall suspend the registration of any motor vehicle found to be operating in violation of this section until the provisions hereof are satisfactorily complied with.
    2. This section does not apply to trailer coaches.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 31 , § 1.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,250. 1947, No. 202 , § 5417. 1935, No. 116 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —1969. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Procedure for suspension of registration, see § 204 of this title.

    § 1243. Lights.

    1. A motor vehicle, except a motorcycle and motor-driven cycle, in use or at rest on a highway, unless otherwise provided, during the period from 30 minutes after sunset to 30 minutes before sunrise, shall also be equipped with at least two lighted head lamps of substantially the same intensity and with reflectors and lenses of a design approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and with a lighted tail or rear lamp of a design so approved. A motorcycle or motor-driven cycle may be operated during the period mentioned if equipped with at least one lighted head lamp and at least one lighted tail or rear lamp, both of a design approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. A sidecar attached to such motorcycle or motor-driven cycle shall be equipped with a light on the right side of such sidecar visible from the front thereof. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle during the period mentioned unless it is equipped as defined in this section.
    2. Every vehicle upon a highway within this State, at any time from 30 minutes after sunset to 30 minutes before sunrise and at any other time when, due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, persons or vehicles on the highway are not clearly discernible at a distance of 500 feet ahead, shall display lighted lamps and illuminating devices as respectively required for different classes of vehicles, subject to exceptions with respect to parked vehicles.
    3. Local regulations made and promulgated by the legislative bodies of municipalities govern within their respective municipalities with relation to the use of lights at night on motor vehicles at rest or in motion on well-lighted streets. Stop lights, turn signals, and other signaling devices shall be lighted as prescribed for their use.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. March 1, 1973; 1977, No. 20 , § 7; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19j, eff. Sept. 1, 2010.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,225. P.L. § 5115. 1933, No. 157 , § 4813. 1931, No. 80 , § 1. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , §§ 69, 71. G.L. § 4709. 1917, No. 133 , § 1. 1915, No. 137 . 1912, No. 147 , §§ 1, 2. 1910, No. 139 . P.S. § 4094. 1906, No. 113 , § 7. 1904, No. 86 , § 10.

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “motor-driven cycle” for “moped” throughout.

    —1977. Subsec. (a): Inserted “and mo-ped” following “motorcycle” in the first sentence and inserted “or mo-ped” following “motorcycle” in the second and third sentences.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Negligence.

    Where plaintiff’s truck, while being driven in nighttime, collided with defendant’s unlighted truck parked in highway, plaintiff had right to assume that highway was open to public travel, and that defendant would observe law of road and not leave unlighted truck standing in traveled part of highway, and might proceed on such assumption until in exercise of care of prudent man, he saw, or ought to have seen, that it was unwarranted. Chaffee v. Duclos, 105 Vt. 384, 166 A. 2, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 228 (1933).

    In action for injuries to person and property by collision with defendant’s automobile, which defendant had left standing in highway after dark, unattended, with its lamps not burning, plaintiff had burden of proving that defendant’s negligence was proximate cause of injuries. Hatch v. Daniels, 96 Vt. 89, 117 A. 105, 1922 Vt. LEXIS 127 (1922).

    Presumptions.

    In absence of evidence to contrary it will be presumed that defendant’s car was equipped with proper lights. Emerson v. Hickens, 105 Vt. 197, 164 A. 381, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1933).

    Tail lamps.

    Because defendant’s passenger vehicle had only one functioning taillight and thus was not properly equipped under statutes, arresting officer had a reasonable and articulable basis for stopping vehicle. State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 757 A.2d 1017, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 170 (2000).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Bixby, 91 Vt. 287, 100 A. 42, 1917 Vt. LEXIS 245 (1917); Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978); State v. Dupree, 151 Vt. 644, 559 A.2d 693, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1989) (mem.).

    § 1244. Illumination required.

    The light from the front lamps of a motor vehicle other than a motorcycle, while such vehicle is in motion, shall render any substantial object on the ground clearly visible at least 150 feet ahead of such vehicle and, while such vehicle is at rest, shall be visible for at least 200 feet in the direction in which such vehicle is headed.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,229. P.L. § 5119. 1933, No. 157 , § 4817. 1931, No. 80 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 71. G.L. § 4709. 1917, No. 133 , § 1. 1915, No. 137 . 1912, No. 147 , §§ 1, 2. 1910, No. 139 . P.S. § 4094. 1906, No. 113 , § 7. 1904, No. 86 , § 10.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Negligence.

    In negligence action, presumption of contributory negligence occasioned by plaintiff’s violation of section was not conclusive, but rebuttable, and one which might be overcome by proof of attendant circumstances, burden being on plaintiff to meet or overcome prima facie case. Steele v. Fuller, 104 Vt. 303, 158 A. 666, 1932 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1932).

    Presumption.

    In absence of evidence to contrary, it will be presumed that automobile being driven in nighttime was equipped with lights required by statute. Emerson v. Hickens, 105 Vt. 197, 164 A. 381, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1933).

    Visibility required.

    Under this section, one driving in nighttime is required to have automobile equipped with headlights that will render objects in highway clearly visible at least one hundred fifty feet ahead of such vehicle. Emerson v. Hickens, 105 Vt. 197, 164 A. 381, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 203 (1933).

    One driving automobile on public highway at night, lights of which would not show substantial object on road more than fifty feet ahead, violated section. Steele v. Fuller, 104 Vt. 303, 158 A. 666, 1932 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1932).

    § 1245. Illumination required on motorcycles.

    The light from the front lamp of a motorcycle shall render any substantial object on the ground clearly visible at least 100 feet ahead of such motorcycle.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,231. P.L. § 5121. 1925, No. 70 , § 71.

    § 1246. Restrictions.

    A person shall not use on a vehicle of any kind operated on the highway during the period stated in section 1243 of this title any lighting device of over four candle power equipped with a reflector, unless such device and the lens used therein and such candle power is approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, nor unless the same shall be so designed, deflected, or arranged that a beam of reflected light therefrom, when measured 75 feet or more ahead of the lamps shall not rise more than six inches above the height of the bulb in such lamp and in no event more than 42 inches from the level surface on which the vehicle stands under all conditions of load. When vehicles are approaching each other from opposite directions, spotlights shall not be used except when projecting their rays directly on the ground and at a distance not exceeding 30 feet in front of the vehicle.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,226. P.L. § 5116. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 71.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Judicial notice.

    Court will take judicial notice that in meeting a vehicle with bright headlights one’s vision is impaired by their glare so as to make it impossible to see any ordinary object near and to the rear of them. Labrecque v. American News Co., 115 Vt. 305, 58 A.2d 873, 1948 Vt. LEXIS 70 (1948).

    Refusing inspection.

    The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles has the power to pass, in the periodic motor vehicle inspections, on any motor vehicle that is equipped in violation of this section. Chrysler Corp. v. Malloy, 294 F. Supp. 524, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10114 (D. Vt. 1968), rev'd, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969).

    § 1247. Approval of lighting devices.

    The manufacturer or distributor of each device or lens designed to control lights on motor vehicles shall apply to the Commissioner for his or her approval of the use of such device or lens in this State. The Commissioner shall make or cause to be made such laboratory and road tests of each device or lens submitted as he or she deems necessary, or he or she may adopt the approval or disapproval of such device or lens by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators.

    HISTORY: Amended 1981, No. 135 (Adj. Sess.).

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, §§ 10,056, 10,057. P.L. §§ 4995, 4996. 1933, No. 157 , § 4700. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 116.

    Amendments

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Commissioner power.

    Under this section, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is given the power to test motor vehicle headlights that are submitted by a manufacturer for approval. Chrysler Corp. v. Malloy, 294 F. Supp. 524, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10114 (D. Vt. 1968), rev'd, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969).

    Federal standards.

    Federal standards adopted by Secretary of Commerce had not pre-empted state regulation with respect to a certain type of headlighting device and thus Commissioner of Motor Vehicles could interfere with the sale and distribution of motor vehicles equipped with such a light. Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969), reversing Chrysler Corp. v. Malloy, 294 F. Supp. 524, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10114 (D. Vt. 1968).

    § 1248. Taillights.

    1. Every motor vehicle, trailer, semi-trailer, and pole trailer, and any other vehicle that is being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles, shall be equipped with at least two taillamps mounted on the rear, except that one taillamp shall be allowed on any vehicle equipped with only one when it was manufactured.
    2. Either a taillamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light all parts of the rear registration number plate on the vehicle so that all the numerals, letters, and marks on the plate are clearly visible and legible for at least 50 feet from the rear of the vehicle.

    HISTORY: Amended 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,227. P.L. § 5117. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 71. G.L. § 4709. 1917, No. 133 , § 1. 1915, No. 137 . 1912, No. 147 , § 1, 2. 1910, No. 139 . P.S. § 4094. 1906, No. 113 , § 7. 1904, No. 86 , § 10.

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Added subsec. (a), and designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (b) and rewrote that subsec.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    Although only one of two rear license plate lights was functioning on defendant’s truck, State failed to demonstrate a reasonable and articulable basis for stop of vehicle, where State did not dispute defendant’s contentions that he had one functioning rear license plate light that illuminated his plate to degree required by statute. State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 757 A.2d 1017, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 170 (2000).

    Because defendant’s passenger vehicle had only one functioning taillight and thus was not properly equipped under statutes, arresting officer had a reasonable and articulable basis for stopping vehicle. State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 757 A.2d 1017, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 170 (2000).

    § 1249. Directional signal lamps.

    A person shall not operate on a highway in this State a pleasure car, pleasure car with trailer coach attached, motor truck, truck-tractor in combination with a trailer or semi-trailer, motor bus, or school bus registered in Vermont, manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1955, unless such vehicle is equipped with directional signal lamps, of a type approved by the Commissioner, on front and rear of such vehicle or combination.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 177 , §§ 1, 2.

    Revision note—

    In light of the repeal of subsec. (b), deleted the designation for subsec. (a) at the beginning of the section for purposes of conformity with V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Repealed.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Signals required, see § 1064 of this title.

    § 1250. Clearance lamps.

    1. Every motor vehicle, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, having a width at any part in excess of 80 inches, when in use or at rest on a highway, during the period from 30 minutes after sunset to 30 minutes before sunrise, shall display on the left side of the vehicle at least one lamp, to be known as a clearance lamp, displaying an amber light visible under normal atmospheric conditions 500 feet ahead of the vehicle and displaying a red light visible, under like conditions, 500 feet to the rear of the vehicle, to mark as closely as possible the extreme height and width of the vehicle.
    2. All motor vehicles of the pleasure car type having a width at any part in excess of 82 inches shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section.

    HISTORY: Amended 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 269 , §§ 1, 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,230. P.L. § 5120. 1931, No. 80 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 71. G.L. § 4709. 1917, No. 133 , § 1. 1915, No. 137 . 1912, No. 147 , §§ 1, 2. 1910, No. 139 . P.S. § 4094. 1906, No. 113 , § 7. 1904, No. 86 , § 10.

    Amendments

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “such” preceding “motor”, substituted “the” for “such” preceding “vehicle” in three places and “an amber” for “a green” following “lamp, displaying” and added “to mark as closely as possible, the extreme height and width of the vehicle” at the end of the subsec.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Violation as negligence.

    Violation of section gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of negligence which may be overcome by proof of the attendant circumstances if they are sufficient to persuade the jury that a reasonable and prudent driver would have acted as did the person whose conduct is in question. Sheehan v. Nims, 75 F.2d 293, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 2918 (2d Cir. 1935).

    Width.

    Under provisions requiring clearance lights when vehicle exceeding 80 inches in width “in any part” is operated at night, removable parts are to be considered in measuring width while they are attached. Page v. McGovern, 110 Vt. 166, 3 A.2d 543, 1939 Vt. LEXIS 123 (1939).

    § 1251. Sirens and colored signal lamps; out-of-state emergency and rescue vehicles.

    1. A motor vehicle shall not be operated upon a highway of this State equipped with a siren or signal lamp colored other than amber unless a permit authorizing this equipment, issued by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, is carried in the vehicle. A permit may be transferred following the same procedure and subject to the same time limits as set forth in section 321 of this title. The Commissioner may adopt additional rules as may be required to govern the acquisition of permits and the use pertaining to sirens and colored signal lamps.
    2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, when responding to emergencies, law enforcement vehicles, ambulances, fire vehicles, or vehicles owned or leased by, or provided to, volunteer firefighters or rescue squad members that are registered or licensed by another state or province may use sirens and signal lamps in Vermont, and a permit shall not be required for such use, as long as the vehicle is properly permitted in its home state or province.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1985, No. 85 , § 6; 2001, No. 106 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 39; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. June 1, 2010.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 233 . 1953, No. 158 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Act No. 123 added “; out of state emergency and rescue vehicles” in the section heading, designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), and added subsec. (b).

    Act No. 152, in subsec. (a), substituted “A” for “No” preceding “motor vehicle”, inserted “not” preceding “be operated”, and substituted “this equipment” for “such equipment” in the first sentence, and inserted the second sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Deleted “visible from the front of the motor vehicle” following “amber” in the first sentence, and substituted “may adopt additional rules as” for “may promulgate such additional regulations as” in the second sentence.

    —1985. Deleted “colored” preceding “signal lamp” in the first sentence and inserted “colored other than amber” thereafter.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    Notes to Opinions

    Prior law.

    Privately owned and privately used snow removal equipment was not qualified for installation of a red light, etc. 1956-58 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 166.

    § 1252. Issuance of permits for sirens or colored lamps, or both; use of amber lamps.

    1. When satisfied as to the condition and use of the vehicle, the Commissioner shall issue and may revoke, for cause, permits for sirens and colored signal lamps in the following manner:
        1. Sirens, blue signal lamps, or blue and white signal lamps, or a combination thereof, may be authorized for all law enforcement vehicles owned or leased by a law enforcement agency, a certified law enforcement officer, or the Vermont Criminal Justice Council. (1) (A) Sirens, blue signal lamps, or blue and white signal lamps, or a combination thereof, may be authorized for all law enforcement vehicles owned or leased by a law enforcement agency, a certified law enforcement officer, or the Vermont Criminal Justice Council.
        2. A red signal lamp or an amber signal lamp, or a combination thereof, may be authorized for all law enforcement vehicles owned or leased by a law enforcement agency, a certified law enforcement officer, or the Vermont Criminal Justice Council, provided that the Commissioner shall require the lamp or lamps be mounted so as to be visible primarily from the rear of the vehicle.
        3. If the applicant is a constable, the application shall be accompanied by a certification by the town clerk that the applicant is the duly elected or appointed constable and attesting that the town has not voted to limit the constable’s authority to engage in enforcement activities under 24 V.S.A. § 1936a .
        1. Sirens and red or red and white signal lamps may be authorized for all ambulances and other emergency medical service (EMS) vehicles, vehicles owned or leased by a fire department, vehicles used solely in rescue operations, or vehicles owned or leased by, or provided to, volunteer firefighters and voluntary rescue squad members, including a vehicle owned by a volunteer’s employer when the volunteer has the written authorization of the employer to use the vehicle for emergency fire or rescue activities. (2) (A) Sirens and red or red and white signal lamps may be authorized for all ambulances and other emergency medical service (EMS) vehicles, vehicles owned or leased by a fire department, vehicles used solely in rescue operations, or vehicles owned or leased by, or provided to, volunteer firefighters and voluntary rescue squad members, including a vehicle owned by a volunteer’s employer when the volunteer has the written authorization of the employer to use the vehicle for emergency fire or rescue activities.
        2. A blue signal lamp or an amber signal lamp, or a combination thereof, may be authorized for all EMS vehicles or vehicles owned or leased by a fire department, provided that the Commissioner shall require the lamp or lamps be mounted so as to be visible primarily from the rear of the vehicle.
      1. [Repealed.]
      2. No motor vehicle, other than one owned by the applicant, shall be issued a permit until the Commissioner has recorded the information regarding both the owner of the vehicle and the applicant for the permit.
      3. Upon application to the Commissioner, the Commissioner may issue a single permit for all the vehicles owned or leased by the applicant.
      4. Sirens and red or red and white signal lamps or sirens and blue or blue and white signal lamps may be authorized for restored emergency or enforcement vehicles used for exhibition purposes. Sirens and lamps authorized under this subdivision may only be activated during an exhibition, such as a car show or parade.
    2. Amber signal lamps shall be used on road maintenance vehicles, service vehicles, and wreckers and shall be used on all registered snow removal equipment when in use removing snow on public highways, and the amber lamps shall be mounted so as to be visible from all sides of the motor vehicle.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1969, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 1985, No. 85 , § 7; 1987, No. 5 , § 1; 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1991, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 eff. April 10, 1992; 1995, No. 88 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2001, No. 106 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2013, No. 57 , § 21; 2021, No. 76 , § 34.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 158 , § 2.

    Revision note

    —2020. In subdiv. (a)(1), substituted “Vermont Criminal Justice Council” for “Vermont Criminal Justice Training Council” in accordance with 2019, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 2(b).

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “or blue” for “and/or blue” following “sirens” and inserted “or a combination of these” preceding “for all law enforcement vehicles”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “combinations described in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection” for “above”.

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(1): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Inserted “including a vehicle owned by a volunteer’s employer when the volunteer has the written authorization of the employer to use the vehicle for emergency fire or rescue activities” following “members” and made a minor change in punctuation.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “may” preceding “revoke” and “for cause” thereafter in the introductory paragraph, added “owned or leased by a law enforcement agency or a certified law enforcement officer” at the end of subdiv. (1) following “vehicles”, inserted “or leased” following “owned” and “or provided to” preceding “volunteer” in subdiv. (2), and added subdiv. (4).

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “shall” for “may only” following “signal lamps”, substituted a comma for “and” preceding “service vehicles” and inserted “and wreckers” thereafter.

    —1987. Subsec. (b): Rewrote the first sentence.

    —1985. Section amended generally.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “Authorized” preceding “use” in the section heading, “of motor vehicles” following “commissioner” in the introductory paragraph and “wreckers” preceding “and snow” in subdiv. (3).

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    Notes to Opinions

    Constables.

    The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is authorized to issue permits for blue or blue and white signal lamps for all motor vehicles used by first and second constables who have been duly elected or appointed to office by the selectmen, provided that the Commissioner has satisfied himself as to the “condition and use of the vehicle.” 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 345.

    Private equipment.

    Privately owned snow-removal equipment is not, while used on private property, entitled to carry a blue light. 1956-58 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 166.

    § 1253. Inspection of permits.

    Permits issued by the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of sections 1251 and 1252 of this title shall be carried in some easily accessible place in the vehicles authorized to use the equipment and shall be available for inspection at any or all times by any law enforcement officer, or during the inspection by the authorized personnel of an official inspection station designated as such by the Department of Motor Vehicles, as provided by section 1222 of this title. No inspection sticker may be issued for a vehicle equipped with a siren or colored signal lamp, or both, unless a current or valid permit for the siren or colored signal lamp, or both, is produced for inspection. If a vehicle’s permit is issued pursuant to subdivision 1252(a)(5) of this title, a copy of the permit is acceptable.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2001, No. 106 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 158 , § 3.

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “of sections 1251 and 1252 of this title” for “hereof” and “the equipment” for “said equipment” in the first sentence, deleted “except those exempted under section 1255 of this title” following “or both”, substituted “the siren” for “such siren” and made a minor change in punctuation in the second sentence, and added the third sentence.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “of the department of public safety” following “commissioner” substituted “any law enforcement officer” for “a state police or motor vehicle inspector” preceding “or during” and “department of motor vehicles” for “motor vehicle department” preceding “as provided” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    § 1254. Repealed. 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32.

    History

    Former § 1254. Former § 1254, relating to penalties for violations of sections 1251-1253 of this title, was derived from 1953, No. 158 , § 4.

    § 1255. Exceptions.

    1. The provisions of section 1251 of this title shall not apply to directional signal lamps of a type approved by the Commissioner.
    2. All persons with motor vehicles equipped as provided in subdivisions 1252(a)(1) and (2) of this title shall use the sirens or colored signal lamps, or both, only in the direct performance of their official duties. When any person other than a law enforcement officer is operating a motor vehicle equipped as provided in subdivision 1252(a)(1) of this title, the colored signal lamps shall be either removed, covered, or hooded. When any person other than an authorized emergency medical service vehicle operator, firefighter, or authorized operator of vehicles used in rescue operations is operating a motor vehicle equipped as provided in subdivision 1252(a)(2) of this title, the colored signal lamps shall be either removed, covered, or hooded unless the operator holds a senior operator license.

    HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 1985, No. 85 , § 8; 1995, No. 88 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 197; 2021, No. 76 , § 35.

    History

    Revision note—

    In subdiv. (2), substituted “section 1252(a)(1) and (a)(2) of this title” for “section 1252(1) and (2) of this title” to conform reference to section 1252, as amended.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (a): Deleted “of Motor Vehicles” following “Commissioner”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “lamps” for “lamp” following “signal” in the second sentence; and, in the third sentence, substituted “emergency medical service vehicle” for “ambulance” and “operations” for “operation”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Redesignated subdivs. (1) and (2) as subsecs. (a) and (b) and substituted “subdivisions” for “subdivision” in the first sentence of subsec. (b).

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (2): Amended generally.

    —1985. Deleted former subdiv. (2) and redesignated former subdiv. (3) as present subdiv. (2).

    § 1256. Motorcycles; headgear.

    A person may not operate or ride upon a motorcycle upon a highway unless he or she properly wears protective headgear of a type that conforms to the federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards contained in 49 C.F.R. § 571.218, as may be amended. The requirement of this section shall not apply to occupants of fully enclosed autocycles.

    HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 264 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2009, No. 39 , § 3; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 37; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 199.

    History

    Revision note—

    This section, which was originally enacted as § 1255 of this title, was redesignated as § 1256 to avoid conflict with § 1255 as enacted by 1967, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted a semicolon for the dash in the section heading.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “, as may be amended” for “and any amendment or addition to the regulations that may be adopted by the U.S. Secretary of Transportation” and added the second sentence.

    —2009. Section amended generally.

    Supersession of administrative rule. 2009, No. 39 , § 13 provides: “Sec. 3 of this act ( 23 V.S.A. § 1256 ) shall supersede the administrative rule adopted by the commissioner of motor vehicles titled ‘Motorcycle Protective Headgear.”’

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    Motorcycle helmet law is entitled to presumption of constitutionality. Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d 757, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1994).

    There is no heightened concerns for personal liberty embedded in the Vermont Constitution that would render motorcycle helmet law unconstitutional. Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d 757, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1994).

    Link between safety for highway users and motorcycle helmet law is rational, since it minimizes the extent of injuries for which government or individuals are financially responsible. Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d 757, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1994).

    Motorcycle helmet law is not void for vagueness, since statute clearly proscribes failure to wear a helmet and “approved helmet” standards were sufficiently defined or ascertainable. Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d 757, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1994).

    In equal protection challenge to motorcycle helmet law, there is rational basis between motorcyclists and automobile drivers, whose vehicles afford them substantially more protection than does a motorcycle; there is also rational basis for distinction between motorcyclists and moped riders, since the latter travel at a lower rate of speed and are forbidden from riding on State highways. Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d 757, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 19 (1994).

    It lies within power of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the promotion of safety upon the public highways in the interests of motorists and motorcyclists and others who may use them. State v. Solomon, 128 Vt. 197, 260 A.2d 377, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 225 (1969).

    This section applies to all motorcyclists equally, is directly related to highway safety, bears a real and substantial relation to the promotion of the welfare and safety of the general public as distinguished from the welfare solely of the individual motorcycle riders, did not deprive operator convicted of failure to wear protective headgear of his liberty, or restrain his person or actions, is a reasonable requirement, to be observed so that the public safety will not be jeopardized, and as legislation intended to protect persons in other vehicles from exposure to danger created by a motorcycle out of control, is clearly within the State’s police power and in no way violates the State or Federal Constitution. State v. Solomon, 128 Vt. 197, 260 A.2d 377, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 225 (1969).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1257. Eye protection.

    If a motorcycle is not equipped with a windshield or screen, the operator of the motorcycle shall wear either eye glasses, goggles, or a protective face shield when operating the vehicle. The glasses, goggles, or face shield shall have colorless lenses when the motorcycle is being operated during the period of 30 minutes after sunset to 30 minutes before sunrise and at any other time when, due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, persons and vehicles on the highway are not clearly discernible at a distance of 500 feet ahead.

    HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 264 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 20.

    History

    Revision note—

    This section, which was originally enacted as § 1256 of this title, was redesignated as § 1257 to avoid conflict with existing § 1256.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.) Section heading: Substituted “Eye protection” for “Face protection”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    § 1258. Child restraint systems; persons under age 18.

    1. No person shall operate a motor vehicle, other than a type I school bus, in this State upon a public highway unless every occupant under age 18 is properly restrained in a federally approved child passenger restraining system as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 571.213, as may be amended, or a federally approved safety belt, as follows:
      1. all children under the age of one and all children weighing less than 20 pounds, regardless of age, shall be restrained in a rear-facing position, properly secured in a federally approved child passenger restraining system, which shall not be installed in front of an active air bag;
      2. a child weighing more than 20 pounds, and who is one year of age or older and under the age of eight years, shall be restrained in a child passenger restraining system; and
      3. a child eight through 17 years of age shall be restrained in a safety belt system or a child passenger restraining system.
    2. A person shall not be adjudicated in violation of this section if:
      1. the motor vehicle is regularly used to transport passengers for hire, except a motor vehicle owned or operated by a child care facility;
      2. the motor vehicle was manufactured without safety belts; or
      3. the person has been ordered by an enforcement officer, a firefighter, or an authorized civil authority to evacuate persons from a stricken area.
    3. The penalty for violation of this section shall be as follows:
      1. $25.00 for a first violation;
      2. $50.00 for a second violation;
      3. $100.00 for third and subsequent violations.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1987, No. 49 ; 1989, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.); 1993, No. 20 , § 1; 1993, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2003, No. 28 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2004; 2005, No. 174 (Adj. Sess.), § 54; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 61; 2009, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. June 1, 2010; 2015, No. 47 , § 28.

    History

    Editor’s note

    —2006. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2006 session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 174 and 175, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2006 session, the text of Act Nos. 174 and 175 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Substituted “49 C.F.R. § 571.213, as may be amended” for “49 C.F.R. § 571.213 (1993)”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “age 18” for “age 16” in the section heading and in the introductory paragraph of subsec. (a), and substituted “17 years” for “15 years” in subdiv. (a)(3).

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 174 substituted “child” for “day” preceding “care” in subdiv. (b)(1).

    Act No. 175 added subdiv. (b)(3), deleted “or” at the end of subdiv. (b)(1), and inserted “or” at the end of subdiv. (b)(2).

    —2003. Section amended generally.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “other than a type I school bus” following “motor vehicle”.

    —1993. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted “is not equipped with seat belts and” following “vehicle” and substituted “safety” for “seat” preceding “belts” in subdiv. (2) and throughout subdivs. (3) and (4), and “five years” for “one year” following “age of” in subdiv. (4)(A).

    Subsec. (d): Inserted “not more than” preceding “$25.00” and deleted “, except such fine shall be waived for a first violation upon proof of acquisition of a federally approved child passenger restraining system or seat belts” thereafter.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Added a new subsec. (b) and redesignated former subsecs. (b) and (c) as subsecs. (c) and (d), respectively.

    —1987. Subsec. (a): Deleted “registered” following “vehicle”, substituted “five” for “four” preceding “years unless the child is” and inserted “properly” thereafter in the introductory paragraph and substituted “five” for “four” following “ages of one and” in subdiv. (3).

    § 1259. Safety belts; persons 18 years of age or older.

    1. The operator of a motor vehicle shall be guilty of a violation of this section if any person 18 years of age or older is occupying a seating position that has been manufactured with a federally approved safety belt system and is not restrained by the safety belt system while the motor vehicle is in motion on a public highway.
    2. A person is required to be restrained in a safety belt system unless:
      1. the person is a rural mail carrier of the U.S. Postal Service operating a motor vehicle in the performance of employment;
      2. the person is a driver or passenger frequently stopping and leaving the motor vehicle or delivering property from the motor vehicle, if the speed of the motor vehicle between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour;
      3. the person is the operator of any farm tractor;
      4. the person is a member of the emergency personnel of an emergency motor vehicle and finds it necessary to be unrestrained in order to perform his or her duties;
      5. the motor vehicle the person is occupying is a bus or taxi;
      6. the person is required to be restrained under section 1258 of this title; or
      7. the person has been ordered by an enforcement officer, a firefighter, or an authorized civil authority to evacuate persons from a stricken area.
    3. Noncompliance with the provisions of this section shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding.
    4. Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section shall not constitute negligence or contributory negligence in any civil proceeding or criminal action, nor be entered as evidence to bar prosecution of a criminal offense.
    5. This section may be enforced only if a law enforcement officer has detained the operator of a motor vehicle for another suspected traffic violation. An operator shall not be subject to the penalty established in this section unless the operator is required to pay a penalty for the primary violation.
    6. The penalty for violation of this section shall be as follows:
      1. $25.00 for a first violation;
      2. $50.00 for a second violation;
      3. $100.00 for third and subsequent violations.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 18 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1994; amended 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2003, No. 28 , § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2004; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 62; 2009, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. June 1, 2010; 2015, No. 47 , § 42; 2021, No. 20 , § 243.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Section heading: Substituted “18 years of age or older” for “age 18 or over” following “persons”.

    —2015. Subsec. (e): Substituted “another suspected traffic violation” for “a suspected violation of another traffic offense” at the end of the first sentence and substituted “violation” for “offense” at the end of the second sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “age 18” for “age 16” in the section heading, and substituted “18 years of age and older” for “required to be restrained under this section” in subsec. (a).

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(7): Added.

    —2003. Section amended generally.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (b)(4): substituted “farm tractor” for “implement of husbandry”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Evidence.

    Evidence of passenger’s failure to wear safety belt at time of motor vehicle accident was properly excluded, since provisions of safety belt statute prohibiting introduction of evidence of noncompliance with statute were procedural rather than substantive in nature, and thus those provisions applied notwithstanding fact that passenger’s personal injury action was pending at time safety belt statute became effective. Ulm v. Ford Motor Co., 170 Vt. 281, 750 A.2d 981, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 1 (2000).

    Article 3. School Buses

    § 1281. Additional equipment.

    In addition to other equipment required by this title, any school bus as described in section 4 of this title shall be equipped as follows:

    1. A door in the rear and a door on the right side for entrance or exit purposes.
    2. At least one fire extinguisher of a type approved by the Commissioner at all times in good and usable condition and easily accessible to the driver.
    3. A standard first-aid kit of a type approved by the Commissioner at all times filled with necessary articles.
    4. A hot water heater at all times capable of keeping the interior at a comfortable temperature or other type of heater approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
    5. Adequate ventilation facilities.
    6. At least two windows of safety glass on each side to provide interior light and so secured as to afford protection against wind and rain.
    7. Seats securely fastened to the floor or sides of the interior and providing at least 13 inches of seat space for each child to be transported.
    8. In addition to the foregoing, all motor vehicles in which the original seating equipment has been modified or added to must comply with the following:
      1. All seats must be readily accessible by use of an aisle or door without interference from any other seat or seats.
      2. A minimum of 36 inches headroom for sitting position above top of undepressed cushion line of all seats shall be provided.
      3. A minimum of 12 inches shall be provided from the top of the undepressed cushion line to the floor.
      4. Seats shall be covered with fire-resistant material.
      5. Jump seats or portable seats shall not be used.
      6. A seat beside the driver, if regular equipment or installed by the vehicle manufacturer, may be used for student seating.  It shall be securely fastened to the body and shall be so constructed as not to interfere with students entering or leaving vehicle.
      7. All seats shall have at least 12 inches overall depth.
      8. If forward-facing seats are used, they shall be so placed that the distance from center to center measured at top center of the backs shall be not less than 26 inches.
      9. If longitudinal seats are used, only two shall be installed against the sides of the vehicle and the distance between the front edges of seat cushions shall be at least 24 inches.

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 26 , eff. Aug. 1, 1959; 1961, No. 124 , eff. Aug. 1, 1961; 1965, No. 199 ; 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1977, No. 102 , § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1977.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 142 , §§ 1-3. 1951, No. 216 , § 1. 1949, No. 243 , § 2.

    Revision note—

    Redesignated subdiv. (8)(J), as added by 1977, No. 102 , § 4, as subdiv. (8)(I) for purposes of conformity with general V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —1977. Rewrote the introductory paragraph, inserted “a door” following “rear and” in subdiv. (1), substituted “commissioner” for “state fire marshal” following “approved by the” in subdiv. (2), inserted “of a type approved by the commissioner” following “kit” in subdiv. (3), deleted “but no stove of any type shall be used” following “vehicles” in subdiv. (4), and added subdiv. (8).

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “other” preceding “equipment required by”, deleted “subdivision (29) of section 4 of” thereafter and substituted “(34)” for “(28)” following “described in subdivision” in the introductory paragraph, deleted former subdiv. (6), redesignated former subdivs. (7) and (8), as present subdivs. (6) and (7), respectively, and deleted former subdivs. (9)-(11).

    —1965. Subdiv. (11): Added.

    —1961. Subdiv. (2): Deleted “vaporizing liquid” preceding “fire extinguisher” and inserted “of a type approved by the state fire marshal” thereafter.

    —1959. Subdiv. (6): Amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Nonapplicability of section to Type I school bus owned or operated by a common carrier, see § 3 of this title.

    Notes to Opinions

    Doors.

    Subdiv. (1) of this section should be interpreted to mean “two doors, one of which shall be on the right side for entrance or exit purposes and the other in the rear part of the bus including the left rear.” 1948-50 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 196.

    Flashing red lights.

    Although this chapter does not require it, a pleasure car used as a school bus by a private institution may display flashing red lights for the protection of children. 1960-62 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 74.

    § 1281a. Optional equipment.

    In addition to equipment required under section 1283 of this title, any school bus as described in subdivision 4(34) of this title may be equipped with a stop arm sign with flashing red lights, of a type approved by the Commissioner, securely mounted below the left front window on the vehicle in an area approved by the Commissioner and must be visible to the driver when extended. Such sign shall not be activated unless the vehicle has stopped on the highway for the purpose of receiving or discharging public or private schoolchildren. At no time shall the sign be extended when the vehicle is in motion.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 49 , § 1; amended 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1977, No. 102 , § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1977.

    History

    Amendments

    —1977. In the first sentence, substituted “school bus” for “motor vehicle” preceding “as described in” and “division” for “subdivision” thereafter and deleted “not of the pleasure car type” preceding “may be equipped”.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). In the first sentence, substituted “1283” for “1281” preceding “any motor vehicle as described in subdivision” and “(34)” for “(28)” thereafter.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Nonapplicability of section to Type I school bus owned or operated by a common carrier, see § 3 of this title.

    § 1282. Operator, equipment, and inspection.

    1. Before an individual may assume the duty of transporting school pupils in either a Type I or Type II school bus, he or she shall as a minimum:
      1. For Type I, have a valid State of Vermont commercial driver license with a passenger endorsement and a school bus driver’s endorsement or, for Type II, have a valid State of Vermont license with a school bus driver’s endorsement or have a license from another jurisdiction valid for the class or type of vehicle to be driven.
      2. Furnish the Department of Motor Vehicles or, in the case of an individual licensed in another jurisdiction, furnish his or her employer a certificate signed by a licensed physician, or a certified physician assistant, or a nurse practitioner in accordance with written protocols, that he or she is, as far as can be determined by reasonable inquiry and examination, mentally and physically competent to perform his or her duties. Any newly diagnosed diabetic or established diabetic must be stabilized and must be certified by his or her personal physician that he or she has not had a hypoglycemic reaction (loss of consciousness or near loss of consciousness) for the last two years or since his or her last physical, whichever is longer. Any diabetic must be recertified every six months by his or her personal physician who must state that the patient has not had a hypoglycemic reaction during that time.
      3. Have completed training in school bus operation, including evacuation and emergency procedures, as the Commissioner deems necessary.
      4. Be licensed for Type I or Type II, or both, Type I being an automatic qualification for a Type II operator.
      5. Furnish to his or her employer, prior to the first date of employment as a school bus driver, a copy of his or her three-year operating record.
    2. A school bus shall not be operated in the transportation of children to and from school unless and until it is inspected at an inspection station designated as such by the Department of Motor Vehicles. The inspection shall thoroughly cover mechanical conditions, standard equipment, extra equipment, and safety and comfort conditions all as provided in section 1281 of this title and, if the inspected vehicle meets all of these requirements, the inspection station shall give the owner or operator of the inspected vehicle a signed certificate so stating. This certificate shall be shown as soon as possible by the owner or operator to a school director in the town in which this vehicle is to be operated and shall thereafter be carried in some easily accessible place in the vehicle. Thereafter, so long as this bus remains in this service, it must be reinspected as provided in this section during each of the following periods: January to April, May to August, and September to December. School buses of the pleasure car type, if regularly used in this service, shall display signs required in subdivision 1283(a)(1) of this title when transporting schoolchildren.
      1. A school bus shall not regularly transport more passengers than seating space of 13 inches for each child will permit. (c) (1) A school bus shall not regularly transport more passengers than seating space of 13 inches for each child will permit.
      2. Bus routing and seating plans shall be coordinated so as to eliminate standees when a school bus is in motion, and standees shall be permitted only in emergency situations.
      3. There shall be no auxiliary seating accommodations such as temporary or folding jump seats in school buses.
      1. Not less often than every two years, and before the start of a school year, an individual licensed by the Department of Motor Vehicles to assume the duty of transporting school pupils in either a Type I or Type II school bus shall furnish the employer who employs him or her as a school bus driver the following: (d) (1) Not less often than every two years, and before the start of a school year, an individual licensed by the Department of Motor Vehicles to assume the duty of transporting school pupils in either a Type I or Type II school bus shall furnish the employer who employs him or her as a school bus driver the following:
        1. a certificate signed by a licensed physician, a certified physician assistant, or a nurse practitioner in accordance with written protocols, certifying that the licensee is, as far as can be determined by reasonable inquiry and examination, mentally and physically competent to perform his or her duties and that he or she meets or exceeds the minimum hearing standards, based on voice testing, as prescribed by the Commissioner; and
        2. a certificate signed by a properly registered and authorized medical doctor, ophthalmologist, optometrist, or nurse practitioner certifying that he or she meets or exceeds the minimum vision standards as prescribed by the Commissioner.
      2. Upon receipt of a certificate required by this subsection that indicates that the school bus driver is not mentally or physically competent or does not meet the minimum hearing or vision standards, the employer shall immediately notify the Commissioner.
      3. The certificates required under this subsection may be valid for up to two years from the examination.
    3. In the event the school bus driver is subject to 49 C.F.R. Part 391, Subpart E, the provisions of those regulations rather than the standards of this section shall apply.
    4. Subject to State Board of Education rules, which may provide for limited idling, the operator of a school bus shall not idle the engine while waiting for children to board or to exit the vehicle at a school and shall not start the engine until ready to leave the school premises. The Board, in consultation with the Agency of Natural Resources, the Department of Health, and the Department of Motor Vehicles, shall adopt rules to implement this subsection. The rules shall set forth periods or circumstances that reasonably require the idling of the engine, including periods when it is necessary to operate defrosting, heating, or cooling equipment to ensure the health or safety of the driver or passengers or to operate auxiliary equipment; and periods when the engine is undergoing maintenance or inspection.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 137 , § 2; 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32; 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 6, 7; 1985, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.); 1987, No. 209 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 1989, No. 33 , § 1; 1989, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 15, 1990; 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 4, 5; 2003, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 39, eff. June 9, 2004; 2007, No. 48 , § 1, eff. May 25, 2007; 2015, No. 47 , § 29; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 71; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. Sept. 1, 2020.

    History

    Source.

    1953, No. 160 . 1949, No. 243 , § 4.

    Revision note

    —2013. Substituted “physician assistant” for “physician’s assistant” in subdivs. (a)(2) and (d)(1)(A), in accordance with 2013, No. 34 , § 30a.

    —2004. Redesignated introductory paragraph in subsec. (d) as subdiv. (d)(1), subdivs. (d)(1) and (d)(2) as subdivs. (d)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(B), and designated the previously undesignated paragraph at the end of subsec. (d) as subdiv. (d)(2) to conform to V.S.A style.

    Editor’s note

    —1990. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 1990 session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 127 and 239, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 1990 session, the text of Act Nos. 127 and 239 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Inserted a comma following “Equipment”.

    Subsec. (a): Substituted “an individual” for “a person” in the introductory language.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “an individual” for “a person” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “January to April, May to August, and September to December” for “July-August, November-December, and February-March” in the fourth sentence.

    Subdiv. (d)(1): Substituted “Not” for “No” and “an individual” for “a person”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (d)(1): Rewrote the introductory language, and substituted “the licensee” for “he or she” in subdiv. (A).

    Subdiv. (d)(3): Added.

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Substituted “1283(a)(1)” for “1281(9)” preceding “of this title when transporting schoolchildren” at the end of the fourth sentence.

    —2007. Subsec. (f): Added.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.) Act No. 127 deleted “be licensed or relicensed to” preceding “assume the duty” in subsec. (a), added “or have a license from another jurisdiction valid for the class or type of vehicle to be driven” to the end of subdiv. (a)(1) and inserted “or in the case of a person licensed in another jurisdiction furnish his or her employer” near the beginning of subdiv. (a)(2).

    Act No. 239 amended generally subdiv. (a)(1).

    —1989. Subdiv. (d)(2): Deleted “or” following “opthamologist” and inserted “or nurse practitioner” following “optometrist”.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “or she” following “bus, he” in the introductory paragraph and “or a certified physician’s assistant or a nurse practitioner in accordance with written protocols” following “licensed physician” in the first sentence of subdiv. (2), made minor changes in punctuation in subdiv. (4), and added subdiv. (5).

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(2): Amended generally.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —1971. Subsec. (d): Repealed.

    —1961. Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Nonapplicability of section to Type I school bus owned or operated by a common carrier, see § 3 of this title.

    Notes to Opinions

    Flashing red lights.

    Although this chapter does not require it, a pleasure car used as a school bus by a private institution may display flashing red lights for the protection of children. 1960-62 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 74.

    § 1283. Identification and equipment of school buses.

    1. Types I and II school buses shall be:
      1. Identified with the words, “School Bus,” printed in letters not less than eight inches high, located between the warning signal lamps as high as possible without impairing visibility of the lettering from both front and rear.
      2. Painted national school bus glossy yellow, except that the hood shall be either national school bus glossy yellow or lusterless black, the fenders shall be either national school bus glossy yellow or black, and the roof shall be either national school bus glossy yellow or white. For Type II school buses, the requirements of this subdivision and subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall apply to any new bus ordered on or after January 1, 2000.
      3. Equipped with bumpers of glossy black, unless for increased night visibility they are covered with a reflective material, or, if the school bus is a plug-in electric vehicle, blue.
      4. Equipped with a system of signal lamps approved by the Commissioner, including an eight-light system on any new or used school bus ordered on and after July 1, 1976. The driver of a Type I or a Type II school bus shall keep the alternately flashing red signal lamps lighted whenever school children are being received or discharged, and they shall be used only for that purpose. A school bus driver found in violation of this subdivision shall be guilty of a traffic violation.
        1. Equipped with a system of mirrors, if such a system is necessary to give the seated driver a view of the roadway to each side of the bus, and of the area immediately in front of the front bumper, in accordance with the following procedure: when a rod, 30 inches long, is placed upright on the ground at any point along a traverse line one foot forward of the forward most point of a school bus, and extending the width of the bus, at least seven inches of the length of the rod shall be visible to the driver, either by direct view or by means of an indirect visibility system. (5) (A) Equipped with a system of mirrors, if such a system is necessary to give the seated driver a view of the roadway to each side of the bus, and of the area immediately in front of the front bumper, in accordance with the following procedure: when a rod, 30 inches long, is placed upright on the ground at any point along a traverse line one foot forward of the forward most point of a school bus, and extending the width of the bus, at least seven inches of the length of the rod shall be visible to the driver, either by direct view or by means of an indirect visibility system.
        2. In addition, equipped with an inside mirror so located as to give the driver clear vision of the interior of the bus, and an outside mirror located on each side of the bus located so as to give an unobstructed view of the road to the rear.
      5. In compliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards for school buses as of the date of manufacture.
    2. Any school bus meeting the identification requirements of subdivisions (a)(1)-(4) of this section that is permanently converted for use wholly for purposes other than transporting pupils to or from school, or transporting organized groups of preschool or school-age children, shall be painted a color other than national school bus glossy yellow and shall have the stop arm, if any, and equipment required by this section removed.
    3. Type I and Type II school buses being operated on a public highway and transporting primarily passengers other than school pupils shall have the words “School Bus” covered, removed, or otherwise concealed, and the stop arms and equipment permitted by section 1281a of this title shall not be operable through the usual controls.
    4. No motor vehicle other than a school bus shall display the identifying equipment and signs required by this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; amended 1977, No. 102 , § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1977; 1977, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), eff. April 3, 1978; 1979, No. 12 , eff. March 19, 1979; 1979, No. 39 , § 2; 1979, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.); 1987, No. 209 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1997, No. 32 , § 4; 2015, No. 47 , § 30; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv (a)(2): In the first sentence, substituted “national school bus glossy yellow” for “that color” twice and a comma for “and” following “lusterless black” and inserted “, and the roof shall be either national school bus glossy yellow or white” following “or black” at the end.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Inserted “, or, if the school bus is a plug-in electric vehicle, blue” at the end.

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “subdivision” for “subsection” preceding “and subdivision (a)(3) of this section”.

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Substituted “Types I and II” for “Type I” in the introductory paragraph, added the second sentence to subdivs. (2) and (4), and added subdiv. (6).

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(4): Inserted “Type I or a Type II” following “driver of a”.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(4): Deleted “and shall keep such signal lamps lighted while stopped before crossing at grade any track or tracks of a railroad as provided in section 1072(a) of this title” following “discharged” and substituted “that purpose” for “these purposes” following “used only for”.

    —1979. Subdiv. (a)(2): Act No. 12 added “and the fenders shall be either that color or black” following “lusterless black”.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Act No. 39 inserted “and shall keep such signal lamps lighted while stopped before crossing at grade any track or tracks of a railroad as provided in section 1072(a) of this title” following “discharged” and substituted “these purposes” for “that purpose” following “used only for”.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “or transporting organized groups of pre-school or school age children” preceding “shall be painted”.

    —1977. Subsec. (a): Added “be” following “shall” in the introductory clause, deleted “be” preceding “identified” in subdiv. (1) and preceding “painted” in subdiv. (2), substituted “equipped with” for “have” preceding “bumpers” and “reflective” for “retroreflective” preceding “material” in subdiv. (3), rewrote subdiv. (4), substituted “equipped with” for “have” preceding “a system of mirrors” and “if such a system is necessary to” for “that will” thereafter in the first paragraph of subdiv. (5)(A), and substituted “equipped with” for “have” following “addition” in subdiv. (5)(B).

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “of this section” for “above” following “(a)(1)-(4)”.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “and Type II” following “Type I”.

    Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    Use of eight-light system on school buses. 2019, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 37 provides: “(a) Notwithstanding any provision of 23 V.S.A. § 1283(a)(4) to the contrary, the driver of a Type I or a Type II school bus may keep the alternately flashing red signal lamps of an eight-light system lighted when making deliveries of food to school aged children.

    “(b) Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , subsection (a) of this section shall take effect retroactively on March 20, 2020 and continue in effect until the termination of the state of emergency declared by the Governor as a result of COVID-19.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Nonapplicability of section to Type I school bus owned or operated by a common carrier, see § 3 of this title.

    § 1284. Vehicle maintenance.

    1. School buses shall at all times be maintained in a safe operating condition.
    2. A systematic preventive maintenance program shall be established and records kept, which at all times shall be available for inspection by any enforcement officer.
    3. School bus drivers shall perform daily pre-trip inspections of their vehicles and report immediately, in writing, to their supervisors, any defects or deficiencies discovered that may affect the safety of the operation of the vehicle or result in its mechanical breakdown.

    HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 9.

    § 1285. Pupil instruction.

    At least twice during each school year, each pupil who is transported in a school bus shall be instructed by school authorities in safe riding practices, and participate in emergency evacuation drills.

    HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

    § 1286. Penalties.

    Any violation of section 1283, 1284, or 1285 of this title shall be a traffic violation as defined in chapter 24 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 209 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 1997, No. 32 , § 5.

    History

    Amendments

    —1997. Substituted “violation” for “offense” following “traffic” and “24” for “23” following “chapter”.

    § 1287. Multifunction school activity bus.

    1. A “multifunction school activity bus” is a vehicle that is used to transport students on trips other than on a fixed route between home and school and that meets the construction and safety standards for a “multifunction school activity bus” adopted by rule by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
    2. If a school owns a multifunction school activity bus or leases one other than as provided in subdivision 4(34)(A)(vi) of this title, the driver shall be required to hold a license that includes a school bus driver’s endorsement. A school bus endorsement road test may be taken in a multifunction school activity bus, but the resulting endorsement shall be restricted to the operation of the appropriately sized multifunction school activity bus. Otherwise, the endorsement shall be a Type I or Type II endorsement as appropriate to the size of the vehicle.
    3. A multifunction school activity bus may be a color other than national school bus yellow.

    HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 29 , § 2; amended 2015, No. 50 , § 9.

    History

    References in text.

    The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, referred to in subsec. (a), is codified as 49 U.S.C. § 105.

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence and substituted “Otherwise, the endorsement” for “The endorsement” in the beginning of the third sentence.

    Article 4. Buses and Trucks

    § 1301. Emergency exits.

    The owner of a motor bus, designed to carry more than seven passengers and having a closed body, shall not operate such bus or permit the same to be operated, unless it has an exit in the rear end or an exit at the rear on the opposite side from the front door thereof through which passengers may pass in case of emergency.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,252. P.L. § 5129. 1925, No. 70 , § 74.

    § 1302. Rubber tires on trucks; number of trailers.

    1. Motor trucks shall be equipped with rubber tires.
    2. Not more than one trailer shall be attached to one motor truck. However, two vehicles may be towed in driveaway-towaway operations, including double saddlemount, if the operations conform with the safety regulations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration relative to coupling devices and towing methods as set forth in 49 C.F.R. §§ 393.70 and 393.71, as amended. As used in this section, “driveaway-towaway operations” means any operation in which any motor vehicle or motor vehicles, new or used, constitute the commodity being transported, when one set or more of wheels of any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles are off the roadway during the course of transportation, whether or not any such motor vehicle furnishes the motive power.
    3. Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, on the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways and those classes of qualifying Federal-aid Primary System highways as designated by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation, commercial motor vehicle combinations consisting of a truck tractor and two trailing units may be operated with the approval of the Vermont Secretary of Transportation.

    HISTORY: Amended 1963, No. 62 , § 1, eff. April 30, 1963; 1983, No. 74 , § 1, eff. April 28, 1983; 1983, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 200; 2021, No. 20 , § 244.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,274. P.L. § 5144. 1925, No. 70 , § 80.

    References in text.

    The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, referred to in subsec. (c), was redesignated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 101-427, and is codified as 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) .

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (b), replaced “Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety” with “Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration” in light of Pub. L. No. 106-159, establishing the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and granting it duties and powers related to motor carriers and motor carrier safety vested in the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation.

    —2007. In subsec. (b), inserted “49 C.F.R.” preceding “parts 393.70 and 393.71” for purposes of clarity and to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (c): Inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding “National System”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “, as” for “of those regulations as they may from time to time be” in the second sentence and “in this section, ‘driveaway-towaway operations”’ for “herein, driveaway-towaway operation” in the third sentence.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “bureau of motor carrier safety” for “interstate commerce commission” preceding “relative” and “parts 393.70 and 393.71” for “parts 193.70 and 193.71” following “forth in” in the second sentence.

    —1983. Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1963. Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Length of motor vehicles, see § 1432 of this title.

    Liability for damages resulting from violation of section, see § 1492 of this title.

    § 1303. Flares required.

    A person shall not operate a motor truck, except those registered at pleasure car rates and those registered with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than 10,001 pounds, with or without a trailer or semi-trailer attached, or a motor bus, upon a highway outside the lighted area of a town or city, unless there shall be carried in such vehicle, ready at all hours for instant use, three electric flares or three reflector type flares of a type approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. However, if the vehicle is used in the transportation of hazardous material as defined in 5 V.S.A. § 2001(a)(1) , three electric flares or three reflector type flares of a type specified in this section shall be carried.

    HISTORY: Amended 1981, No. 156 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2001, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 32, eff. June 21, 2002.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,278. 1947, No. 97 , § 1. 1937, No. 127 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “and those registered with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than 10,001 pounds” and deleted “three oil burning flares or” preceding “three electric flares” in the first sentence and substituted “the” for “such” preceding “vehicle”, “ 5 V.S.A. § 2001(a)(1) ” for “ 3 V.S.A. § 3116a , there shall be carried therein”, and “in this section shall be carried” for “above” following “specified”.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “except those registered at pleasure car rates” following “truck” and substituted “approved by the commissioner of motor vehicles” for “in conformity with the specifications or approval of the federal interstate commerce commission” following “flares of a type” in the first sentence and rewrote the second sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Smith v. Blow & Cote, Inc., 124 Vt. 64, 196 A.2d 489, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 32 (1963).

    § 1304. Use.

    If such vehicle is disabled so that it is necessary that it remain on the roadway or shoulder of the highway, the driver or other person in charge of such vehicle shall cause operating flares to be placed upon the roadway or shoulder of the highway, one approximately 100 feet in front of such vehicle, one approximately 100 feet to the rear, and one on the traffic side of the vehicle. Such flares shall remain in place until such vehicle is removed from the roadway or shoulder.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 20; 1981, No. 156 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,279. 1947, No. 202 , § 5445. 1937, No. 127 , §§ 2, 3.

    Amendments

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the former fourth sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Smith v. Blow & Cote, Inc., 124 Vt. 64, 196 A.2d 489, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 32 (1963).

    § 1305. Mirror required.

    All motor trucks and motor vehicles towing a trailer or semi-trailer shall be equipped with a mirror not less than five inches in diameter or with less than 25 square inches of reflective area so attached that the driver shall at all times have a reflected view of other vehicles approaching from the rear. The mirror shall be attached in a manner that complies with the width requirements of section 1431 of this title. The extended rear-view mirror shall be retracted or removed when not towing a trailer or semi-trailer.

    HISTORY: Amended 2001, No. 18 , § 1, eff. May 8, 2001.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 192 . V.S. 1947, § 10,275. 1947, No. 97 , § 1. 1945, No. 105 , § 1. 1939, No. 123 , § 1. P.L. § 5145. 1925, No. 70 , § 80.

    Amendments

    —2001. Added “all” preceding “motor trucks” and inserted “and motor vehicles towing a trailer or semi-trailer” thereafter, inserted “or with less than 25 square inches of reflective area” following “diameter”, and deleted “of such motor truck” following “driver” in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Liability for damages resulting from violation of section, see § 1492 of this title.

    § 1306. Rear wheel flaps.

    No person may operate or cause to be operated any bus, truck, trailer, or semi-trailer upon any highway in this State unless the bus, truck, trailer, or semi-trailer is equipped with suitable metal protectors or substantial flexible flaps behind the rearmost wheels to prevent, as far as practicable, the wheels from throwing dirt, water, or any other materials on the windshields of vehicles following or approaching. The flaps shall be of a type and size as specified by the Department of Motor Vehicles. However, this section shall not apply to farm tractors or pole trailers.

    HISTORY: 1959, No. 105 , §§ 1, 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1959; amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32.

    History

    Revision note—

    In light of the repeal of subsec. (b), deleted the designation for subsec. (a) at the beginning of the section for purposes of conformity with V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Repealed.

    § 1307. Brake equipment required.

    1. Every motor vehicle, when operated upon a highway, shall be equipped with brakes acting on all wheels adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, including two separate means of applying the brakes to at least two wheels. If those two separate means of applying the brakes are connected in any way, they shall be so constructed that failure of any one part of the operating mechanism shall not leave the motor vehicle without brakes on at least two wheels.
    2. Motorcycles and motor-driven cycles need only to be equipped with at least one brake that may be operated by hand or foot.
    3. Farm-type tractors and motorized highway building equipment required to be registered need not have brakes on the wheels of the front axle.
    4. Trucks and truck-tractors having three or more axles:
      1. manufactured before July 25, 1980 need not have brakes on the front wheels;
      2. manufactured between July 24, 1980 and October 27, 1986, if any brake components have been removed, must be retrofitted to replace any brake components so that the vehicle meets the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, within one year of May 16, 1990;
      3. manufactured with at least two steerable axles, shall have brakes on at least one steerable axle, except that any such vehicle manufactured after July 1, 1992 shall be equipped with brakes on all wheels.
    5. Trailers, semi-trailers, trailer coaches, or pole trailers of a gross weight not exceeding 3,000 pounds need not have brakes provided the total weight on, and including, the wheels of the trailer, semi-trailer, or pole trailer shall not exceed 40 percent of the gross weight of the towing vehicle when connected to the trailer, semi-trailer, or pole trailer.
    6. Every trailer, semi-trailer, or trailer coach of a gross weight of more than 3,000 pounds but less than 6,000 pounds, when operated upon a highway, shall be equipped with brakes on the wheels of at least one axle, adequate to control the movement of and to stop and to hold the vehicle and so designed as to be applied by the driver of the towing motor vehicle from its cab. The brakes shall be so designed and connected that in case of an accidental break-away of the towed vehicle, the brake thereon shall be automatically applied and remain applied for not less than 15 minutes.
    7. Every trailer, semi-trailer, or trailer coach of a gross weight of 6,000 pounds, or more, when operated upon the highways of this State, shall be equipped with brakes on all wheels adequate to control the movement of and to stop and to hold the vehicle and so designed as to be applied by the driver of the towing motor vehicle from its cab. The brakes shall be so designed and connected that in case of an accidental break-away of the towed vehicle, the brakes thereon shall be automatically applied and remain applied for not less than 15 minutes.
    8. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a farm trailer with a load that exceeds 3,000 pounds, nor to a motor vehicle manufactured or assembled prior to January 1, 1931, if the vehicle has brakes on at least two wheels, nor to a trailer coach with two or three axles with a gross weight in excess of 6,000 pounds manufactured prior to January 1, 1977, provided there are brakes on the wheels on one axle of a two-axle trailer coach and brakes on the wheels of two axles of a three-axle trailer coach.

    HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 206 , § 2; amended 1975, No. 213 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. April 1, 1976; 1979, No. 46 , § 3, eff. April 26, 1979; 1979, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), eff. April 9, 1980; 1989, No. 182 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 16, 1990; 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 47 , § 31.

    History

    Revision note—

    Substituted “May 16, 1990” for “the effective date of this bill” in subdiv. (d)(2) for purposes of clarity.

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Substituted “motor-driven cycles” for “mopeds” preceding “need only to be equipped”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (h): Inserted “farm” preceding “trailer” and deleted “and is used exclusively as an implement of husbandry” following “3,000 pounds”.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (d)(3): Added “except that any such vehicle manufactured after July 1, 1992, shall be equipped with brakes on all wheels” following “steerable axle”.

    Subsec. (f): Deleted “or” preceding “semi-trailer” in the first sentence and substituted “15” for “10” preceding “minutes” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (g): Deleted “more than” preceding “6,000 pounds” and inserted “or more” thereafter in the first sentence and substituted “15” for “10” preceding “minutes” in the second sentence.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (h): Substituted “two or three axles” for “two axles or less” preceding “with a gross”, substituted “on” for “of at least” preceding “one axle” and added “of a two-axle trailer coach and brakes on the wheels of two axles of a three-axle trailer coach” thereafter.

    —1979. Section amended generally.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

    § 1308. Performance ability of brakes.

    1. The service brakes upon any motor truck, truck, and tractor or combination of vehicles shall be adequate to stop such vehicle or vehicles when traveling 20 miles per hour within a distance of 30 feet when upon dry asphalt or concrete pavement surface free from loose material where the grade does not exceed one percent.
    2. Under the conditions contained in subsection (a) of this section, the hand brake shall be adequate to hold such vehicle or vehicles stationary on any grade upon which it is operated.
    3. All braking distances specified in this section shall apply to all vehicles mentioned, whether such vehicles are not loaded or are loaded to the maximum capacity permitted.
    4. All brakes shall be maintained in good working order and shall be so adjusted as to operate as equally as practicable with respect to the wheels on opposite sides of the vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1963, No. 206 , § 3; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 201.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted “above” preceding “conditions” and inserted “contained in subsection (a) of this section” thereafter.

    Article 5. Bicycles

    §§ 1321-1324. Repealed. 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 20, eff. March 1, 1973.

    History

    Former §§ 1321-1324. Former § 1321, relating to warning devices, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,233; 1947, No. 202 , § 5399; and 1939, No. 122 , § 1. The subject matter is now covered by § 1141 of this title.

    Former § 1322, relating to lights, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,234; and 1939, No. 122 , § 2. The subject matter is now covered by § 1141 of this title.

    Former § 1323, relating to liability of a parent or guardian of a child under the age of sixteen, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,235; 1939, No. 122 , § 3; and amended by 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 21. The subject matter is now covered by § 1096 of this title.

    Former § 1324, relating to conduct of a child under the age of sixteen, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,236; 1947, No. 202 , § 5402; and 1939, No. 122 , § 4. The subject matter is now covered by § 1143 of this title.

    Article 6. Trailer Coaches

    § 1341. Trailer coaches—Safety chain.

    In addition to a hitch, trailer coaches shall be secured to the towing vehicle, while in operation on any highway, by a safety chain. The hitch on any motor vehicle towing a trailer coach and the corresponding coupling on such coach and such safety chain shall be adequate to ensure the public safety.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,243. 1937, No. 125 , § 3.

    § 1342. Fire extinguisher.

    There shall be carried on each trailer coach at least one fire extinguisher of a type approved by the State Fire Marshal, in good usable condition and easily accessible. The extinguisher shall be of not less than five pounds capacity, if it is of a CO2 type, and not less than two and one-half pounds capacity, if it is of a dry chemical type.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 38 .

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,244. 1937, No. 125 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —1969. Section amended generally.

    § 1343. Repealed. 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32.

    History

    Former § 1343. Former § 1343, relating to penalties, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,245; 1937, No. 125 , § 5.

    § 1344. Riding in trailer coaches.

    No person may occupy a trailer coach while it is being moved upon a public highway.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 31 , § 2.

    Article 7. Other Vehicles

    § 1361. Lights on vehicles other than motor vehicles.

    Every vehicle on wheels or runners, whether stationary or in motion on a public highway, shall have attached to it a light that shall be so displayed as to be clearly visible from the front and rear during the period from 30 minutes after sunset to 30 minutes before sunrise. However, this section shall not apply to a vehicle that is designed to be propelled by hand. During the same period, towed or trailing vehicles, farm machinery, or other equipment, whether stationary or in motion on a public highway, shall have attached to them a red light or reflector which shall be so displayed as to be clearly visible from the rear, under normal atmospheric conditions, or a reflectorized slow moving vehicle symbol of a standard type approved by the Commissioner. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to affect any statute, rule, or regulation requiring lights on motor vehicles and the obligation of the owner or operator thereof. The driver of a vehicle shall be deemed the responsible party, liable to the penalty for violation hereof.

    HISTORY: Amended 1966, No. 38 (Sp. Sess.), § 4; 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 22.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,232. P.L. § 5122. 1925, No. 70 , § 105. G.L. §§ 4649, 4650. 1917, No. 130 , §§ 1-4.

    Amendments

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “a person who violates a provision of this section shall be fined not more than $ 10.00, and” preceding “the driver” in the fifth sentence.

    —1966. Inserted “clearly” preceding “visible” in the first sentence, rewrote the second sentence, and deleted “or custodian” following “driver” and substituted “hereof” for “thereof” following “for violation” in the fifth sentence.

    § 1362. Night operation.

    Farm tractors, motorized highway building equipment, and road-making appliances when operated upon a public highway during the period from 30 minutes after sunset to 30 minutes before sunrise shall comply with the requirements of this title relating to head lamp and taillight requirements.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,319. 1947, No. 99 , § 2. 1939, No. 109 , § 7.

    Subchapter 15. Weight, Size, Loads

    Article 1. Weight Regulations

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Exemption of nonresidents violating weight limit requirements from citations issued under the Nonresident Violators Compact, see § 3559 of this title.

    § 1391. Tire and axle limits.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person or corporation shall not operate or cause to be operated a tractor, trailer, semi-trailer, motor truck, or any other motor vehicle without sufficient weight maintained upon the front axle of such vehicle to make such vehicle safe in operation, nor shall the maximum load on any axle of such vehicle exceed a gross weight of more than 600 pounds per inch of tire width computed in conformity with the manufacturer’s designated width.
    2. No single axle load shall be in excess of 22,400 pounds and a 10 percent tolerance shall be allowed on each single axle load, nor shall any tandem axle load be in excess of 36,000 pounds, with a 10 percent tolerance allowed, except in the case of such vehicles owned by persons to whom special permits shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of section 1400 of this title.
    3. Unless federal law authorizes the axle load limits, tolerances, or both, provided for in subsection (b) of this section to apply on those highways designated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, no single axle load on those highways shall be in excess of 20,000 pounds with no tolerance allowed, nor shall any tandem axle load be in excess of 34,000 pounds, with no tolerance allowed, except in the case of vehicles owned by persons to whom special permits have been issued in accordance with section 1400 of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1963, No. 206 , § 4; 1964, No. 4 (Sp. Sess.), eff. Feb. 27, 1964; 1971, No. 226 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1977, No. 41 , § 1, eff. April 19, 1977; 1983, No. 86 , § 1; 1991, No. 72 , § 4; 2009, No. 63 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 13, 2010; 2009, No. 63 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, see effective date note; 2011, No. 23 , § 1, eff. May 11, 2011; 2021, No. 20 , § 245.

    History

    Source.

    1949, No. 246 . V.S. 1947, §§ 10,255, 10,273. 1947, No. 95 , § 1. 1941, No. 97 , § 1. 1939, No. 117 , §§ 2, 4. 1935, No. 125 . P.L. §§ 5132, 5143. 1933, No. 157 , § 4829. 1931, No. 61 , § 2. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , §§ 76, 80. 1919, No. 120 , § 1. G.L. §§ 4644, 4699. 1917, No. 129 , § 1. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 2, 7. 1912, No. 152 , § 1. P.S. § 4057. 1898, No. 66 , § 1. 1896, No. 75 , § 1. V.S. § 3516. R.L. § 3135. 1876, No. 78 . 1872, No. 36 , § 1.

    References in text.

    The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, referred to in subsec. (c), was redesignated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 101-427, and is codified as 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) .

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (c): Inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding “National System”; deleted “(the ‘interstate highways’)” following “Defense Highways”; and substituted “those” for “interstate” preceding “highways shall”.

    —2011. Subsec. (c): Substituted “Unless federal law authorizes the axle load limits, tolerances, or both provided for in subsection (b) of this section to apply on” for “On” preceding “these”; inserted “(the ‘interstate highways’)” following “defense highways”; and inserted “on interstate highways” preceding “shall be in excess”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Act No. 63, § 1, substituted “Unless authorized by federal law, on” for “On those highways designated as the national system of” preceding “interstate” and “highway 189” for “highways” following “defense”.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 63, § 3, would substitute “On those highways designated as the national system of” for “Unless authorized by federal law, on” preceding “interstate” and “highways” for “highway 189” following “defense”.

    —1991. Designated the former first sentence as subsec. (a), designated the former second sentence as subsec. (b) and added subsec. (c).

    —1983. Substituted “ten” for “five” preceding “percent tolerance shall be allowed” and preceding “percent tolerance allowed” in the second sentence.

    —1977. Deleted the former third sentence.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). In the second sentence, inserted “with a five percent tolerance allowed” preceding “except” and substituted “title” for “chapter” following “1400 of this”.

    —1964. Added the third sentence.

    —1963. Section amended generally.

    Effective date of 2009 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 2009, No. 63 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b) provided: “Secs. 3 [which amended subsec. (c) of this section] and 4 of this act shall take effect if, and on the day when, the pilot program created by 23 U.S.C. section 127(a)(13) is terminated.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Liability for damages for violation of section, see § 1492 of this title.

    § 1391a. Penalties for overweight operation.

    1. Civil penalties for violations of the following statutory sections shall be in accordance with the schedule established in this section:

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      1. For violation of each of the statutory sections listed in subsection (a) of this section, civil penalties shall be imposed as follows: (b) (1) For violation of each of the statutory sections listed in subsection (a) of this section, civil penalties shall be imposed as follows:
      2. Civil penalties for subsequent violations of subchapter 15, article 1 of this chapter shall be computed in accordance with subdivision (b)(1) of this section with the following percentage increases:
        1. upon a second conviction of a violation occurring within one year, five percent;
        2. upon a third conviction of a violation occurring within one year, ten percent;
        3. upon a fourth or subsequent conviction occurring within one year, 15 percent.
      3. In the calculation of gross overweight, the weight allowed by registration or permit, whichever is greater, shall be the basis. The tolerances allowed by sections 1391, 1392, 1408, and 1410 of this title shall not be considered in the calculation of gross overweight.

      $15.00 for each 1,000 lbs. or portion thereof overweight for the first 5,000 lbs. overweight;

      $30.00 for each 1,000 lbs. or portion thereof overweight when the gross overweight is more than 5,000 lbs. and less than 10,001 lbs.;

      $45.00 for each 1,000 lbs. or portion thereof overweight when the gross overweight is more than 10,000 lbs. and less than 15,001 lbs.;

      $60.00 for each 1,000 lbs. or portion thereof overweight when the gross overweight is more than 15,000 lbs. and less than 20,001 lbs.;

      $90.00 for each 1,000 lbs. or portion thereof overweight when the gross overweight is more than 20,000 lbs. and less than 25,001 lbs.; and

      $150.00 for each 1,000 lbs. or portion thereof overweight when the gross overweight is more than 25,000 lbs.

    2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, in a prosecution for a violation of those statutes listed in subsection (a) of this section, the proper defendant shall be either the owner or lessee of the vehicle or the person who moves or operates the vehicle.
    3. Civil penalties imposed for violations of this section shall be deposited in the Transportation Fund, unless the civil penalties are the result of enforcement actions on a town highway by an enforcement officer employed by or under contract with the municipality, in which case the civil penalty shall be paid to the municipality, except for an administrative charge for each case in the amount specified in 13 V.S.A. § 7251 , which shall be retained by the State.

    Statutory Citation Name of Offense 23 V.S.A. § 1391 Tire and axle limits 23 V.S.A. § 1392 Gross limits on highways 23 V.S.A. § 1399 Construction and maintenance equipment; fire apparatus 23 V.S.A. § 1400 Permit to operate in excess of weight and size limits; State highways 23 V.S.A § 1400a Special local highway and bridge limits; reimbursement for damages; special permits 23 V.S.A. § 1407 Operation of overweight vehicles 23 V.S.A. § 1408 Operating vehicle in excess of registered capacity

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 1, 1978; amended 1983, No. 86 , § 2; 1983, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 27, 1984; 1989, No. 51 , § 43; 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. April 25, 1996; 1997, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 9a; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 34; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 72; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 202.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subdiv. (b)(1), deleted “above” preceding “statutory sections” and inserted “listed in subsection (a) of this section” thereafter for clarity.

    —2014. Inserted “; fire apparatus” following “equipment” in the column “Name of offense” to correct the statutory citation for 23 V.S.A. § 1399 .

    —2007. Inserted “and size” following “weight” in the column “Name of Offense” for the statutory citation of 23 V.S.A. § 1400 .

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “Civil penalties” for “Penalties”.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “Fine Schedule” at the beginning.

    Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “civil penalties” for “fines”.

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Substituted “Civil penalties” for “Fines” and “chapter” for “title”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “Civil penalties” for “Fines”, “civil penalties” for “fines”, and “civil penalty” for “fine”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Substituted “an” for “a $6.00” preceding “administrative charge” and inserted “in the amount specified in 13 V.S.A. § 7251 ” following “each case”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00” in the first item, “$30.00” for “$20.00” in the second item, “$45.00” for “$30.00” in the third item, “$60.00” for “$40.00” in the fourth item, “$90.00” for “$60.00” in the fifth item and “$150.00” for “$100.00” in the sixth item.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(3): Added the phrase “whichever is greater”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1989. Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00” in the first item, “$20.00” for “$10.00” in the second item, “$30.00” for “$15.00” in the third item, “$40.00” for “$20.00” in the fourth item, “$60.00” for “$30.00” in the fifth item and “$100.00” for “$50.00” in the sixth item.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1983. Subdiv. (b)(1): Deleted the former fourth item and added the present fourth through sixth items.

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Added.

    Subdiv. (b)(3): Added.

    § 1392. Gross weight limits on highways.

    Except as provided in section 1400 of this title, a person or corporation shall not operate or cause to be operated a motor vehicle in excess of the total weight, including vehicle, object, or contrivance and load, of:

    1. 16,000 pounds upon any bridge with a wood floor, wood subfloor, or wood stringers on a class 3 or 4 town highway or 20,000 pounds on a bridge with wood floor, wood subfloor, or wood stringers on a class 1 or 2 town highway unless otherwise posted by the selectboard of such town.
    2. 24,000 pounds, upon a class 2, 3, or 4 town highway or bridge with other than wood floor, in any town or incorporated village.
    3. No vehicle may exceed a gross weight in excess of 80,000 pounds unless the operator or owner of the vehicle has complied with the provisions of section 1400 of this title or except as otherwise provided in this section.
    4. Subject to the limit upon the weight imposed upon the highway through any single or tandem axle as set forth in section 1391  of this title, the total gross weight of vehicle with load imposed upon the highway by all axles of a vehicle or combination of axles of a vehicle shall not be in excess of the value in pounds given for the respective distance between the first and last axle of the vehicle or combination of axle spacing for vehicles measured longitudinally to the nearest foot as set forth in the following table:

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      1. Despite the axle load provisions of section 1391 of this title and the distance in feet between first and last axle as provided for in subdivision (4) of this section, a motor truck having three axles, if the two rear axles are both power driven and both equipped with adequate brakes, the gross weight of the three axles of the truck shall not exceed 55,000 pounds. (5) (A) Despite the axle load provisions of section 1391 of this title and the distance in feet between first and last axle as provided for in subdivision (4) of this section, a motor truck having three axles, if the two rear axles are both power driven and both equipped with adequate brakes, the gross weight of the three axles of the truck shall not exceed 55,000 pounds.
      2. When application is made to register a motor truck under the provisions of this subdivision, the applicant shall submit to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles specifications as to its make, brake equipment, and manufacturer’s recommended gross weight. In the Commissioner’s discretion, the Commissioner may refuse registration for its operation under this subdivision if the specifications for the vehicle would not permit its safe operation when so loaded.
    5. Despite the axle load provisions of section 1391 of this title and the distance in feet between first and last axle as provided for in subdivision (4) of this section, a motor truck having four axles, three of which are a tri-axle and at least two axles in this group being power driven and equipped with adequate brakes; the gross weight of the four axles of the truck shall not exceed 60,000 pounds, however:
      1. No two axles in the tri-axle group shall support more than 42,000 pounds with a 10 percent tolerance.
      2. No single axle of the tri-axle group shall support more than 22,400 pounds with a 10 percent tolerance.
      3. The total load supported by the tri-axle group shall not exceed 54,000 pounds.
      4. Three or more axles within a distance of 12 feet or less apart shall be considered as a tri-axle group, and if a single axle is closer than eight feet to the nearest axle of the tri-axle group, the total load shall not exceed that allowed for a tri-axle group.
      5. [Repealed.]
    6. -(10) [Repealed.]

      (11) The weights or tolerances, or both, as set forth in subdivisions (5) and (6) of this section shall not apply to the highways designated as portions of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways unless authorized by federal law.

      (12) [Repealed.]

      (13) Despite the axle-load provisions of section 1391 of this title and the maximum gross load of subdivision (4) of this section, a special annual permit, which shall expire with the vehicle’s registration, except for vehicles not registered in Vermont in which case the permit shall become void on January 1 following date of issue, may be issued to a person or corporation operating on designated routes on the State Highway System for a fee of $415.00 for each vehicle that must be registered for a weight of 80,000 pounds. This special permit shall be issued only for a combination of vehicle and semi-trailer or trailer equipped with five or more axles, with a distance between axles that meets the minimum requirements of registering the vehicle to 80,000 pounds as allowed under subdivision (4) of this section. The maximum gross load under this special permit shall be 90,000 pounds. Unless authorized by federal law, this subdivision shall not apply to operation on the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.

      (14) Despite the axle-load provisions of section 1391 of this title and the axle spacing and maximum gross load provisions of subdivision (4) of this section, a special annual permit, which shall expire with the vehicle’s registration, except for vehicles not registered in Vermont in which case the permit shall become void on January 1 following date of issue, may be issued to a person or corporation transporting loads on vehicles on designated routes on the State Highway System for the following fees for each vehicle unit. Unless authorized by federal law, the provisions of this subdivision regarding weight limits, tolerances, or both, shall not apply to operation on the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. This special permit shall be issued for the following vehicles and conditions:

      1. 3-axle trucks with a single steering axle and a rear tandem axle that have a maximum gross weight of not more than 60,000 pounds when registered for a minimum gross weight of not more than 55,000 pounds, the permit fee shall be $156.00.
      2. 4-axle trucks with a single steering axle and a rear tri-axle unit that have a maximum gross weight of not more than 69,000 pounds when registered for a minimum weight of 60,000 pounds, the permit fee shall be $352.00.
      3. 4-axle tractor semi-trailer or truck trailer combination with a maximum gross weight of not more than 72,000 pounds, provided the distance between the second axle of the tractor and the rear axle of the trailer is at least 24 feet measured to the nearest foot. For each foot or fraction of a foot less than 24 feet, measured to the nearest foot, a reduction of 2,000 pounds in the maximum gross weight shall be made. The permit fee shall be $15.00.
      4. 5- or more axle tractor semi-trailer or truck trailer combination with a maximum gross weight of not more than 76,000 pounds, provided that the distance between the first and last axle of two consecutive sets of tandem axles is at least 24 feet measured to the nearest foot. For each foot or fraction of a foot less than 24 feet, measured to the nearest foot, a reduction of 2,000 pounds in the maximum gross weight shall be made. The permit fee shall be $15.00.
      5. No single axle of a tandem axle unit shall support more than 60 percent of the total weight supported by such tandem axle unit.
      6. No single axle of a tri-axle unit shall support more than 40 percent of the total weight supported by such tri-axle unit.
      7. The maximum load on any axle of such vehicle shall not exceed more than 600 pounds per inch of tire width computed in conformity with the manufacturer’s designated width.
      8. A five percent tolerance shall be allowed on the gross vehicle weights allowed under permits issued pursuant to this subdivision.

        (15) Despite the axle load provisions of section 1391 of this title and the axle spacing and the maximum gross load of subdivision (4) of this section, a 5-axle tractor semi-trailer may operate on State highways with the following conditions:

        (A) For each foot or fraction of a foot less than 36 feet between the first and last axle of two consecutive sets of tandem axles, a reduction of 2,000 pounds in the maximum gross weight of 80,000 pounds shall be made.

        (B) Conditions in subdivisions (14)(D) and (F) of this section shall also apply to this subdivision (B), and unless authorized by federal law, this subdivision shall not apply to operation on the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.

        (16) Notwithstanding the axle load provisions of section 1391 of this title and the maximum gross load of subdivision (4) of this section, a five or more axle truck tractor, semi-trailer combination, or truck trailer combination, when the load consists solely of unprocessed milk products as defined in subdivision 4(55) of this title, may be registered for and operated with a maximum gross weight of 90,000 pounds on State highways without permit and upon posted State and town highways and those highways designated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways when the vehicle has been issued a permit in compliance with the provisions of section 1400 of this title; however:

        (A) Vehicles operated pursuant to this subdivision (16) shall be subject to the same axle spacing restrictions as are applied to five or more axle vehicles registered to 80,000 pounds as set forth in subdivision (4) of this section.

        (B) On those highways designated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, the provisions of subsection 1391(c) of this title shall apply unless other axle load limits, tolerances, or both, are authorized under federal law.

        (C) The fee for the annual permit as provided in this subdivision (16) shall be $10.00 when the fee has been paid to register the vehicle for 90,000 pounds or $382.00 when the vehicle is registered for 80,000 pounds.

        (17) Notwithstanding the gross vehicle weight provisions of subdivision (4) of this section, a truck trailer combination or truck tractor, semi-trailer combination with six or more load-bearing axles shall be allowed to bear a maximum of 99,000 pounds by special annual permit, which shall expire with the vehicle’s registration, except for vehicles not registered in Vermont in which case the permit shall become void on January 1 following the date of issue, for operating on designated routes on State and town highways, subject to the following:

        (A) The combination of vehicles must have, as a minimum, a distance of 51 feet between extreme axles.

        (B) The axle weight provisions of section 1391 of this title and subdivision 1392(6) of this section shall also apply to vehicles permitted under this subdivision.

        (C) When determining the fine for a gross overweight violation of this subdivision, the fine for any portion of the first 10,000 pounds over the permitted weight shall be the same as provided in section 1391a of this title, and for overweight violations 10,001 pounds or more over the permitted weight, the fine schedule provided in section 1391a shall be doubled.

        (D) The weight permitted by this subdivision shall be allowed for foreign trucks that are registered or permitted for 99,000 pounds in a state or province that recognizes Vermont vehicles for weights consistent with this subdivision.

        (E) Unless authorized by federal law, the provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to operation on the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.

        (F) The fee for the annual permit as provided in this subdivision (17) shall be $415.00 for vehicles bearing up to 90,000 pounds and $560.00 for vehicles bearing up to 99,000 pounds.

        (G) [Repealed.]

        (18) The owner of any Vermont or foreign registered motor vehicle seeking permits authorized by this section shall make application for the appropriate permits and pay the appropriate permit fees.

        (19) (A) A person issued a permit under the provisions of subdivision (13), (14), (16), or (17) of this section, and upon payment of a $10.00 administrative fee for each additional permit, may obtain additional permits for the same vehicle, provided the additional permit is for a lesser weight and provided the vehicle or combination of vehicles meets the minimum requirements for the permit sought as set forth in this section.

        (B) A person issued a permit under the provisions of subdivision (14) of this section, and upon payment of the difference in fees for each permit sought, may obtain additional permits for the same vehicle, provided the vehicle or combination of vehicles meets the minimum requirements for the permit sought as set forth in this section.

        (C) [Repealed.]

        (20) [Repealed.]

        (21) All permits issued pursuant to this section shall be carried in the vehicle. The fine for violation of this subdivision shall be $150.00. A violation of this subdivision shall be considered an offense separate from an overweight violation.

    Distance between the center of the first and center of the last axle of any group of two or more axles Maximum load in pounds carried in any group of two or more axles computed to the nearest 500 pounds 2 axles 3 axles 4 axles 5 axles 6 axles 7 axles 8 or less 34,000 34,000 9 39,000 42,500 10 40,000 43,500 11 44,000 12 45,000 50,000 13 45,500 50,500 14 46,500 51,500 15 47,000 52,000 16 48,000 52,500 17 48,500 53,500 18 49,500 54,000 19 50,000 54,500 20 51,000 55,500 66,000 21 51,500 56,000 66,500 22 52,500 56,500 67,000 23 53,000 57,500 68,000 24 54,000 58,000 68,500 74,000 25 54,500 58,500 69,000 74,500 26 55,500 59,500 69,500 75,000 27 56,000 60,000 70,000 75,500 28 57,000 60,500 71,000 76,500 29 57,500 61,500 71,500 77,000 30 58,500 62,000 72,000 77,500 31 59,000 62,500 72,500 78,000 32 60,000 63,500 73,000 78,500 33 64,000 74,000 79,000 34 64,500 74,500 80,000 35 65,500 75,000 80,000 36 66,000 70,500 75,500 80,000 37 66,500 71,000 76,000 80,000 38 67,500 72,000 77,000 80,000 39 68,000 72,500 77,500 80,000 40 68,500 73,000 78,000 80,000 41 69,500 73,500 78,500 80,000 42 70,000 74,000 79,000 80,000 43 75,000 80,000 80,000 44 75,500 80,000 80,000 45 76,000 80,000 80,000 46 76,500 80,000 80,000 47 77,500 80,000 80,000 48 78,000 80,000 80,000 49 78,500 80,000 80,000 50 79,000 80,000 80,000 51 80,000 80,000 80,000

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 63 , eff. March 27, 1959; 1961, No. 94 , eff. May 3, 1961; 1961, No. 281 , §§ 1-5; 1963, No. 206 , § 5; 1967, No. 166 , eff. April 15, 1967; 1967, No. 385 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1975, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. April 7, 1976; 1977, No. 15 ; 1977, No. 41 , § 2, eff. April 19, 1977; 1977, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 2-4, 12, eff. May 1, 1978; 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 11a; 1983, No. 86 , § 3; 1983, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 27, 1984; 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1987, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 3, 4, eff. May 13, 1988; 1987, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 1989, No. 168 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2, eff. May 12, 1990; 1989, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 1991, No. 68 , §§ 1-3, eff. June 24, 1991; 1991, No. 72 , §§ 2, 3; 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. April 25, 1996; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 26, eff. May 15, 2002; 2001, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 38, 39, eff. June 21, 2002; 2003, No. 70 (Adj. Sess.), § 29, eff. March 1, 2004; 2007, No. 61 , § 7; 2009, No. 50 , § 51; 2009, No. 63 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 2, eff. Jan. 13, 2010, § 4, see effective date note; 2011, No. 23 , § 2, eff. May 11, 2011; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 42; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 30, eff. Jan. 1, 2019; 2021, No. 20 , § 246.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 190 . 1955, No. 289 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,256. 1947, No. 95 , § 1. 1941, No. 97 , § 1. 1939, No. 117 , § 2. 1935, No. 125 . P.L. § 5132. 1933, No. 157 , § 4829. 1931, No. 61 , § 2. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4699. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 2, 7. 1912, No. 152 , § 1, eff. Jan. 13, 2010, No. 63 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, see effective date note.

    References in text.

    The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, referred to in subdivs. (11), (16), and (16)(B)(vii), was redesignated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 101-427, and is codified as 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) .

    Revision note

    —2006. Redesignated subdiv. (5) as subdiv. (5)(A) and designated the former undesignated paragraph as subdiv. (5)(B).

    Revision note—. Substituted “subdivisions (5) and (6)” for “divisions (5), (6) and (7)” at the beginning of subdiv. (11) in light of the repeal of subdiv. (7) and to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (2): Substituted “town or incorporated village.” for “town, incorporated village, or city.”

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (13): Substituted “$415.00” for “$310.00” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (14): Raised fees throughout.

    Subdiv. (16)(C): Substituted “$10.00” for “$7.00” and “$382.00” for “$285.00”.

    Subdiv. (17)(F): Substituted “$415.00” for “$310.00” and “$560.00” for “$500.00”.

    —2011. Section heading: Inserted “weight” preceding “limits”.

    Subdiv. (3): Added “or except as otherwise provided in this section” following “this title”.

    Subdiv. (9): Repealed.

    Subdiv. (11): Substituted “The weights or tolerances or both as set forth in subdivisions” for “subdivisions” and added “unless authorized by federal law” following “defense highways”.

    Subdiv. (13): Substituted “Unless authorized by federal law,” for “The provision of”’ preceding “this subdivision” in the last sentence.

    Subdiv. (14): Added the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (15)(B): Added “and unless authorized by federal law, this subdivision shall not apply to operation on the interstate and defense highway system” following “subdivision”.

    Subdiv. (16): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (17): Deleted “the” preceding “state” near the end of the subdiv.

    Subdiv. (17)(E): Added “Unless authorized by federal law” preceding “the provisions”.

    Subdiv. (19)(A): Substituted “subdivision (13), (14), (16), or (17)” for “, subdivisions (13), (14), (16), (17), or (20)”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (11): Act No. 63, § 2 substituted “Unless authorized by federal law, subdivisions” for “Subdivisions” preceding “(5)”; deleted “the highways designated as portions of the national system of” preceding “interstate” and substituted “highway 189” for “highways” following “defense”.

    Subdiv. (11): Act No. 63, § 4 would substitute “Subdivisions” for “Unless authorized by federal law, subdivisions” at the beginning; would insert “the highways designated as portions of the national system of” preceding “interstate” and would substitute “highways” for “highway 189” following “defense”.

    Subdiv. (13): Act No. 63, § 2 substituted “operating” for “transporting unprocessed forest products” following “corporation” and inserted “and on those highways designated as the national system of interstate and defense highways” following “system” in the first sentence; deleted the former second sentence; substituted “Unless authorized by federal law, the” for “The” preceding “provision” and “189” for “system” in the present fourth sentence.

    Subdiv. (13): Act No. 63, § 4 would delete “and on those highways designated as the national system of interstate and defense highways” following “system” in the last sentence; in the first sentence would substitute “The” for “Unless authorized by federal law, the” preceding “provision”, would insert “the” preceding “interstate” and would substitute “system” for “189”.

    Subdiv. (16): Act No. 63, § 2 substituted a comma for a period following “semi-trailer combination” and deleted the comma following “state highways”.

    Subdiv. (16)(A): Act No. 63, § 2 inserted “this” preceding “subdivision” and deleted “of this section” preceding “shall”.

    Subdiv. (16)(B): Act No. 63, § 2 inserted “this” preceding “subdivision” and substituted a colon for the semicolon following “(16)”.

    Subdiv. (16)(B)(vii): Act No. 63, § 2 deleted “those highways designated as the national system of ” preceding “interstate” and substituted “highway 189” for “highways” following “defense” in the last sentence.

    Subdiv. (16)(B)(vii): Act No. 63, § 4 would insert “those highways designated as the national system of” preceding “interstate” and would substitute “highways” for “highway 189” following “defense”.

    Subdiv. (17): Act No. 63, § 2 substituted “load-bearing” for “load bearing”; deleted “and specially equipped for hauling unprocessed milk, unprocessed forest or unprocessed quarry products” following “axles”; and inserted “and on those highways designated as the national system of interstate and defense highways” following “highways”.

    Subdiv. (17): Act No. 63, § 4 would delete “and on those highways designated as the national system of interstate and defense highways” preceding “subject”.

    Subdiv. (17)(E): Act No. 63, § 2 inserted “Unless authorized by federal law” preceding “the provisions” and substituted “189” for “system” following “highway”.

    Subdiv. (17)(E): Act No. 63, § 4 would substitute “The” for “Unless authorized by federal law, the” preceding “provisions” and “system” for “189” following “highway”.

    Subdiv. (17)(F): Act No. 63, § 2 inserted “$310.00 for vehicles bearing up to 90,000 pounds and” preceding “$500.00” and “for vehicles bearing up to 99,000 pounds” following “$500.00”.

    Subdivs. (17)(G) and (20): Repealed by Act No. 63, § 2.

    —2009. Subdiv. (17)(F): Substituted “$500.00” for “$350.00.”

    —2007. Subdiv. (5)(B): Deleted “tire size” preceding “brake equipment” in the first sentence and substituted “the commissioner’s” for “his” at the beginning of the second sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (14)(C): Added “The permit fee shall be $10.00” following the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (14)(D): Substituted “5-” for “5” and inserted “The permit fee shall be $10.00” following the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (19)(A): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subdiv. (20)(F): Substituted “$310.00” for “$200.00”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (13): Act No. 102 substituted “$310.00” for “$200.00” in the first sentence, and deleted “and” preceding “wood chips” and added “sawdust, shavings and bark mulch” thereafter in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (14)(A): Act No. 102 substituted “$115.00” for “$72.50”.

    Subdiv. (14)(B): Act No. 102 substituted “$260.00” for “$165.00”.

    Subdiv. (16): Act No. 102 substituted “subdivision 4(55) of this title” for “ 23 V.S.A. § 4(55) ” in the introductory paragraph.

    Subdiv. (16)(C): Act No. 102 substituted “$7.00” for “$5.00” and “$285.00” for “$225.00”.

    Subdiv. (19)(C): Repealed by Act No. 141.

    Subdiv. (21): Added by Act No. 141.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (2): Inserted “class 2, 3, or 4” preceding “town highway”.

    —1991. Subdiv. (4): Act No. 72 decreased the maximum load allowance for 2 and 3 axle vehicles with an axle spacing of 8 feet or less from “36,000” to “34,000” pounds, for 7 axle vehicles with an axle spacing of 27 feet from “76,000” to “75,500” pounds and for 7 axle vehicles with an axle spacing of 33 feet from “79,500” to “79,000” pounds.

    Subdiv. (8): Repealed by Act No. 72.

    Subdiv. (9): Act No. 72 deleted “or unprocessed milk products” following “quarried rock” in the first sentence and deleted the former second sentence.

    Subdiv. (10): Repealed by Act No. 72.

    Subdiv. (12): Repealed by Act No. 72.

    Subdiv. (16): Act No. 72 inserted “and on those highways designated as the national system of interstate and defense highways” following “town highways” and substituted “been issued a permit in compliance” for “complied” preceding “with the provisions” in the introductory paragraph, substituted “subdivisions (i) and (ii) of this subdivision” for “subdivisions (16)(B)(i) and (ii) of this section” preceding “apply” in the first sentence and added the second sentence in subdiv. (B)(vii) and added subdiv. (C).

    Subdiv. (17)(B): Act No. 68 inserted “axle weight” preceding “provisions of” and substituted “sections 1391 and 1392(6)” for “subdivision (16)(B)” thereafter.

    Subdiv. (19)(A): Act No. 68 deleted “or” preceding “(17)” and inserted “or (20)” thereafter.

    Subdiv. (20): Added by Act. No. 68.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (13): Act No. 192 substituted “axles which meets the minimum requirements of registering the vehicle to 80,000 pounds as allowed under subdivision (4) of this section” for “extreme axles of not less than 40 feet until July 1, 1988, at which time the distance required between extreme axles shall be not less than 51 feet” at the end of the third sentence.

    Subdiv. (17): Added by Act No. 168.

    Subdiv. (18): Added by Act No. 168.

    Subdiv. (19): Added by Act No. 192.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (9): Act No. 145 inserted “or unprocessed milk products” following “quarried rock” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (13): Act No. 187 inserted “except for vehicles not registered in Vermont in which case the permit shall become void on January 1 following date of issue” preceding “may be issued” and substituted “which must be” for “unit in addition to that set by section 367 of this title for vehicles” preceding “registered for a weight” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (14): Act No. 187 inserted “except for vehicles not registered in Vermont in which case the permit shall become void on January 1 following date of issue” preceding “may be issued” in the first sentence of the introductory paragraph.

    Subdiv. (16): Added by Act No. 145.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (13): Substituted“ of $200.00 for each vehicle unit in addition to that” for “as” preceding “set by section 367” and “for vehicles registered for a weight of 80,000 pounds” for “for each vehicle unit” thereafter in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (14): Substituted “the following fees” for “a fee as set by section 367” following “system for” in the first sentence of the introductory paragraph and added “when registered for a minimum gross weight of not more than 55,000 pounds, the permit fee shall be $72.50” following “60,000 pounds” at the end of subdiv. (A) and “when registered for a minimum weight of 60,000 pounds, the permit fee shall be $165.00” following “69,000 pounds” at the end of subdiv. (B).

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (14)(H): Added.

    —1983. Subdiv. (6)(A): Substituted “a ten percent” for “no” preceding “tolerance”.

    Subdiv. (6)(B): Substituted “a ten percent” for “no” preceding “tolerance”.

    Subdiv. (13): Added “until July 1, 1988, at which time the distance required between extreme axles shall be not less than 51 feet” following “40 feet” in the third sentence, and deleted the former second paragraph.

    Subdiv. (14): Added present subdiv. (C), redesignated former subdivs. (C)-(F) as present subdivs. (F)-(G), respectively.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (13): In the first sentence of the first paragraph, inserted “which shall expire coincidentally with the vehicle’s registration” following “permit” and substituted “as set by section 367” for “of $100.00” following “fee”.

    Subdiv. (14): Inserted “which shall expire coincidentally with the vehicle’s registration” following “permit” and substituted “as set by section 367” for “of $100.00” in the first sentence of the introductory paragraph and deleted “a gross weight of” following “exceed” in subdiv. (F).

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (4): In the table, added the sixth and seventh columns relating to maximum loads to be carried by motor vehicles having 6 and 7 axles, respectively.

    Subdiv. (6)(E): Repealed.

    Subdiv. (7): Repealed.

    Subdiv. (13): Rewrote subdiv. (B) of the second paragraph.

    Subdiv. (14): Added.

    Subdiv. (15): Added.

    —1977. Act No. 15 added subdiv. (9).

    Act No. 41 inserted “class 3 or 4” preceding “town highway or twenty” and substituted “class 1 or 2 town” for “state aid” preceding “highway unless” in subdiv. (1), substituted “eighty thousand” for “seventy-three thousand two hundred and eighty” preceding “pounds” in subdiv. (3), rewrote subdivs. (4)-(8), and added subdivs. (10)-(13).

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (2): Deleted “or state aid” following “town”.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (6): Inserted “and the distance in feet between first and last axle as provided for in subsection (4) of this section” following “1391” and deleted “these two rear axles may carry a combined load not to exceed forth-two thousand seven hundred pounds and” following “brakes”.

    —1967. Subdiv. (5): Substituted “1967” for “1964” preceding “models” and “1970” for “1968“ preceding “registration year.”

    —1963. Section amended generally.

    —1961. Act No. 94 amended subdiv. (6) generally.

    Act No. 281 amended subdivs. (3)-(7) generally.

    —1959. Subdiv. (7): Amended generally.

    Effective date of 2009 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 2009, No. 63 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b) provided: “Secs. 3 and 4 [which amended this section] of this act shall take effect if, and on the day when, the pilot program created by 23 U.S.C. section 127(a)(13) is terminated.”

    § 1392a. Authority of Commissioner to delegate permitting functions.

    The Commissioner may delegate any person as his or her agent to perform the duties set forth in sections 1392, 1400 through 1404, 1406, 1415, and 1431 of this title with respect to permits.

    HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 25, 1996.

    History

    Former section 1392a. Former § 1392a, relating to maximum truck loads of natural wood products, was derived from 1977, No. 81 , § 2, and repealed by 1977, No. 81 , § 8, eff. June 30, 1978.

    § 1393. Weight limits in cities; adoption by towns or incorporated villages of State limits; limits on class 1 town highways.

      1. On all highways in a city, the legal load shall be as prescribed for the State Highway System in section 1392 of this title, unless otherwise restricted and posted by the local authorities as provided in this subchapter. (a) (1) On all highways in a city, the legal load shall be as prescribed for the State Highway System in section 1392 of this title, unless otherwise restricted and posted by the local authorities as provided in this subchapter.
      2. With the approval of the Secretary of Transportation, the legislative body of a town or incorporated village may designate any highway under its jurisdiction to carry the same legal load as specified in section 1392 of this title for the State Highway System. When a certain highway has been so approved by the Secretary and the legislative body as to the legal load limit, then the Secretary shall have the highway posted for the legal load limit.
      3. Except as provided in subdivision 1392(1) of this title, State Highway System weight limits as specified in section 1392 of this title shall apply to class 1 town highways.
    1. [Repealed.]
    2. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 214 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 27, 1992; 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2015, No. 47 , § 32; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 31, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,257. 1947, No. 95 , § 1. 1939, No. 117 , § 2. 1935, No. 125 . P.L. § 5132. 1933, No. 157 , § 4829. 1931, No. 61 , § 2. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4699. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 2, 7. 1912, No. 152 , § 1.

    Revision note—

    Reference to “commissioner of highways” following “approval of the” in the second sentence was changed to “secretary of transportation” and references to “commissioner” in two places in the third sentence were changed to “secretary” in view of former 3 V.S.A. § 3106 , as amended by 1977, No. 263 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 19, 1978, which provided that the secretary of the agency of transportation was to be the successor to and have all of the former powers and duties of the commissioner of highways. For present provision relating to the powers and duties of the Secretary of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. § 7 .

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Deleted “Incorporated Villages and” following “Weight Limits in”, added “or Incorporated Villages” preceding “of State Limits”, and added “; limits on Class 1 Town Highways”.

    Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2015. Section heading: Substituted “weight limits in incorporated villages and cities: adoption by towns of state limits” for “limits in incorporated villages and cities” in the section heading.

    Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsecs. (b) and (c): Repealed.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Designated existing text of the section as subsec. (a) and added the fourth sentence in that subsec., and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the fourth through eighth sentences.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “24” for “twenty-four” following “size” and “30” for “twenty-four” preceding “inches, and shall”.

    1991 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 1991, No. 214 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. May 27, 1992, provided: “Existing signs, referred to in Secs. 2 through 5 of this act [which amended this section, sections 1395 and 1397 of this title and section 28 of Title 19], shall be valid until such time as they are replaced or reconstructed. When new signs are erected or placed or existing signs are replaced or repaired, the equipment, design, method of installation, placement or repair shall conform with the standards set forth in this act.”

    § 1394. Designation of class 1 town highways.

    The class 1 town highways connecting the State highways through cities, villages, or municipalities shall be designated by the State Transportation Board and marked by the State Secretary of Transportation. The State Secretary of Transportation shall have signs erected on each road that leads off the State Highway System stating the legal load of the highway leading from the State Highway System.

    HISTORY: Amended 1975, No. 7 , eff. Feb. 14, 1975.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,258. 1947, No. 95 , § 1. 1941, No. 97 . 1939, No. 117 , § 2. 1935, No. 125 . P.L. § 5132. 1933, No. 157 , § 4829. 1931, No. 61 , § 2. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4699. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 2, 7. 1912, No. 152 , § 1.

    Revision note—

    Reference to “state highway board” preceding “and marked” in the first sentence was changed to “state transportation board” in view of 1985, No. 269 (Adj. Sess.), § 1. See 19 V.S.A. § 6 .

    References to “state commissioner of highways” at the end of the first sentence and “state highway commissioner” at the beginning of the second sentence were changed to “state secretary of transportation” in view of former 3 V.S.A. § 3106 , as amended by 1977, No. 263 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 19, 1978, which provided that the secretary of the agency of transportation was to be the successor to and have all of the former powers and duties of the commissioner of highways. For present provision relating to the powers and duties of the Secretary of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. § 7 .

    Amendments

    —1975. Rewrote the section heading and substituted “class 1 town” for “state aid” preceding “highways connecting” and “state highway board” for “cities, villages or municipalities” preceding “and marked” in the first sentence.

    § 1395. Repealed. 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

    History

    Former § 1395. Former § 1395, relating to load limit signs, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,259; 1947, No. 95 , § 1; 1941, No. 97 ; 1939, No. 117 , § 2; 1935, No. 125 ; P.L. § 5132; 1933, No. 157 , § 4829; 1931, No. 61 , § 2; 1929, No. 68 , § 1; 1925, No. 70 , § 76; G.L. § 4699; 1917, No. 131 , §§ 2, 7; 1912, No. 152 , § 1, and amended by 1975, No. 30 , § 1; 1991, No. (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    § 1396. Special limits for bridges and highways.

    1. When, in the opinion of the Secretary of Transportation, a highway or bridge on the State Highway System or class 1 town highway, or when, in the opinion of the legislative body of a municipality, any class 2, 3, or 4 town highway or bridge under the jurisdiction of the municipality may be varied from the weight limit specified in section 1392 of this title, then the Secretary of Transportation for the State Highway System or the legislative body may designate the legal load limit for the highway or bridge. However, when the legislative body of a municipality requests in writing, the Secretary of Transportation may set the weight limit on a class 1 town highway at less than the State highway limit under section 1392 of this title, if a reasonable alternative route is available for those vehicles traveling at the State highway limit.
    2. In making the determination as to whether a reasonable alternative route is available, the Secretary of Transportation shall, at a minimum, consider the following factors:
      1. whether the alternative routing will reduce or relieve traffic congestion in a downtown area;
      2. whether the alternative routing will enhance safety;
      3. the length of the alternative route, and any increase in time made necessary by use of the alternative route;
      4. whether an adverse effect has been created relative to the quiet enjoyment and property values of persons living along the alternative route.
    3. Any decision of the Secretary made under this section may be appealed, in writing, to the Transportation Board within 30 days of the Secretary’s decision. The Transportation Board shall decide the question within 45 days of receipt of the appeal and may take evidence or testimony. Except as otherwise provided, the designated legal load limit for the highway or bridge shall not be less than 20,000 pounds for a single traction engine, tractor, trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle for the State system or any class 1 or 2 town highway nor less than 16,000 pounds for any other town highway.

    HISTORY: Amended 1993, No. 61 , § 27, eff. June 3, 1993; 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 203.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,260. 1947, No. 95 , § 1. 1941, No. 97 , § 1. 1939, No. 117 , § 2. 1935, No. 125 . P.L. § 5132. 1933, No. 157 , § 4829. 1931, No. 61 , § 2. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4699. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 2, 7. 1912, No. 152 , § 1.

    Revision note—

    In the first sentence, substituted “secretary of transportation” for “state highway commissioner” following “opinion of the” and for “commissioner” following “title, then the” in view of former 3 V.S.A. § 3106 , as amended by 1977, No. 263 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 19, 1978, which provided that the secretary of the agency of transportation was to be the successor to and have all of the former powers and duties of the commissioner of highways. For present provision relating to the powers and duties of the Secretary of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. § 7 .

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(4): Substituted “persons” for “people”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “may be varied from” for “is not adequate for” preceding “the weight” and “the” for “such” following “load limit for” in the first sentence and inserted “otherwise” preceding “provided” and deleted “in section 1395(b)(2) of this title” thereafter in the second sentence.

    —1993. Substituted “highway system” for “highways” following “bridge on the state”, “legislative body of a municipality” for “selectmen of a town, the trustees of an incorporated village, or the city council of a city” following “opinion of the”, “under the jurisdiction of the municipality” for “within such town, city or village” preceding “is not adequate” and “or the legislative body” for “the selectmen for the town, the trustees for an incorporated village or the city council for a city” preceding “may designate” in the first sentence and substituted “except as provided in section 1395(b)(2) of this title, the” for “such” preceding “designated,” “the” for “such” following “limit for”, “class 1 or 2 town” for “state aid” preceding “highway nor less” and “other town highway” for “town road” following “pounds for any” in the second sentence.

    § 1397. Signs.

    1. When the weight limit on a highway or bridge has been adjusted by the Secretary of Transportation, the selectboard of a town, the trustees of an incorporated village, or the city council of a city, as to the legal load limit, then the Secretary, selectboard, trustees, or city council shall have each restricted highway or bridge posted for the legal load limit permitted. The notices shall be of a permanent nature and shall be placed at each end of each restricted highway in each town, village, or city affected or on the approaches to each restricted bridge. The notices shall state the legal load limit permitted to be operated over the highway or bridge.
    2. The notices specified in subsection (a) of this section may be omitted when the restricted highway is a class 4 town highway or a class 3 town highway serving only one residence.

    HISTORY: Amended 1991, No. 214 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. May 27, 1992; 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1995, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,261. 1947, No. 95 , § 1. 1939, No. 117 , § 2. 1935, No. 125 . P.L. § 5132. 1933, No. 157 , § 4829. 1931, No. 61 , § 2. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4699. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 2, 7. 1912, No. 152 , § 1.

    Revision note—

    In the first sentence, substituted “secretary of transportation” for “commissioner of highways” following “restricted by the” and “secretary” for “commissioner” following “load limit, then such” in view of former 3 V.S.A. § 3106 , as amended by 1977, No. 263 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 19, 1978, which provided that the secretary of the agency of transportation was to be the successor to and have all of the former powers and duties of the commissioner of highways. For present provision relating to the powers and duties of the Secretary of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. § 7 .

    Amendments

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), substituted “selectboard” for “selectmen” in two places in the first sentence, substituted “each restricted” for “the” preceding “highway” in the first and second sentences and preceding “bridge” in the second sentence of that subsec. and added subsec. (b).

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “the weight limit on” following “when” and substituted “adjusted” for “restricted” in the first sentence, and deleted “and shall be of the size and type specified in section 1395 of this title” following “bridge” in the third sentence.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “on the approaches to” for “at approximately one hundred feet from each end of” following “affected or” in the second sentence.

    § 1398. Certified statement to be filed.

    A certified statement shall be filed with the clerk in each town, village, or city in which the posting occurs, as provided in section 1397 of this title, stating the location of the highway or bridge posted, the legal load limit to which such highway or bridge is restricted, and the date of posting. If such restriction is removed at any time by the Secretary of Transportation, selectboard, trustees, or city council, a similar certified statement of the removal shall be filed with the clerk of the town, village, or city as the case may be.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,262. 1947, No. 95 , § 1. 1939, No. 117 , § 2. 1935, No. 125 . P.L. § 5132. 1933, No. 157 , § 4829. 1931, No. 61 , § 2. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4699. 1917, No. 121 , §§ 2, 7. 1912, No. 152 , § 1.

    Revision note—

    In the second sentence, substituted “secretary of transportation” for “commissioner of highways” preceding “selectmen” in view of former 3 V.S.A. § 3106 , as amended by 1977, No. 263 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 19, 1978, which provided that the secretary of the agency of transportation was to be the successor to and have all of the former powers and duties of the commissioner of highways. For present provision relating to the powers and duties of the Secretary of Transportation, see 19 V.S.A. § 7 .

    § 1399. Exceptions for construction and maintenance equipment; fire apparatus; and heavy-duty tow and recovery vehicles.

    1. As used in this section, “heavy-duty tow and recovery vehicle” means a vehicle that:
      1. is transporting a disabled vehicle from the place where the vehicle became disabled to the nearest appropriate repair facility; and
      2. has a gross vehicle weight that is equal to or exceeds the gross vehicle weight of the disabled vehicle being transported.
    2. Nothing contained in sections 1391-1398 of this title shall restrict the weight of:
      1. Snow plows, road machines, oilers, traction engines, tractors, rollers, power shovels, dump wagons, trucks, or other construction or maintenance equipment when used by any town, incorporated village, city, or the State in the construction or the maintenance of any highway, provided that such construction or maintenance is performed by persons employed by or under contract with such town, incorporated village, city, or the State for this purpose. However, any operation of motorized highway building equipment or road making appliances used in construction work contracted by a town, incorporated village, city, or the State shall be unrestricted as to weight only within a construction area.
      2. Municipal and volunteer fire apparatus.
      3. Heavy-duty tow and recovery vehicles on the Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways.

    HISTORY: Amended 1991, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.); 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,263. 1947, No. 95 , § 1. 1941, No. 97 . 1939, No. 117 , § 2. 1935, No. 125 . P.L. § 5132. 1933, No. 157 , § 4829. 1931, No. 61 , § 2. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4699. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 2, 7. 1912, No. 152 , § 1.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Added “fire apparatus” following “equipment” in the section heading and added the last sentence in the text of the section.

    Notes to Opinions

    Trucks.

    Trucks used entirely in connection with road construction may properly be classified as road machinery. 1926-28 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 43.

    § 1400. Permit to operate in excess of weight and size limits; State highways.

    1. A person or corporation owning or operating a traction engine, tractor, trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle that desires to operate it over State highways or class 1 town highways in excess of the weight and size limits provided by this subchapter shall apply to the Commissioner for a permit. In his or her discretion, with or without hearing, the Commissioner may issue to the person or corporation a permit authorizing the person to operate the traction engine, tractor, trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle upon State highways and class 1 town highways as he or she may designate and containing the regulation subject to which the traction engine, tractor, trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle is to be operated. The permit shall not be granted until satisfactory proof is furnished to the Commissioner that the traction engine, tractor, trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle has been registered and the prescribed fee paid for a gross weight equal to a maximum legal load limit for its class. No additional registration fee shall be payable to authorize the use of the traction engine, tractor, trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle in accordance with the terms of the permit. The approval may be withdrawn for cause, and may be withdrawn without cause any time after March 31 next following the date of issuance. When approval is withdrawn for cause or on March 31, the Commissioner shall forthwith revoke the permit; when approval is withdrawn otherwise, he or she shall revoke the permit within one month.
    2. The provisions of this section shall apply to any vehicle registered in another state, provided the vehicle meets all weight and size requirements of this State and is registered or holds a permit in the other state for the weight that the permit is sought.
    3. In addition, the Commissioner may issue permits to operate vehicles in excess of the size limits provided by this subchapter for operation over any class 2, class 3, or class 4 town highways except when the dimensions are such that blanket permits cannot be issued under the duly adopted rules of the Commissioner. In those instances, permits under section 1400a of this title shall be obtained.
    4. [Repealed.]
    5. Notwithstanding any other statute or rule to the contrary, overweight permits shall not be issued to vehicles registered in another state or province, unless that state or province issues similar permits on a reciprocal basis to vehicles registered in Vermont.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 281 , § 6; 1969, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 25, 1970; 1975, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. April 7, 1976; 1987, No. 91 , § 8, eff. June 22, 1987; 1989, No. 121 , § 20d; 1993, No. 27 , § 7, eff. May 19, 1993; 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. April 25, 1996; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 73.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 250 , § 49. 1955, No. 196 . V.S. 1947, § 10,264. 1939, NO. 117, § 3. P.L. § 5133. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4700. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 4, 7. 1910, No. 129 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Repealed.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “apply to the Commissioner for a permit” for “make application for such permit to the commissioner of motor vehicles” following “shall”; deleted “given for a limited or unlimited length of time, may be” preceding “withdrawn”; and substituted “Commissioner” for “commissioner of motor vehicles” preceding “shall forthwith”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsecs. (d) and (e): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Inserted “or class 1 town highways” following “state highways” in the first and second sentences.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “and size” preceding “limits” and added “state highways” thereafter in the section heading, substituted “it over state highways” for “the same” following “operate” in the first sentence substituted “state” for “the” preceding “highways” and deleted “in this state” thereafter in the second sentence, and deleted the former fifth and eighth through tenth sentences of subsec. (a) and deleted subsec. (c).

    —1993. Subsec. (c): Added the second and third sentences.

    —1989. Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1987. Deleted “and with the concurrence of the state highway board” following “discretion” in the second sentence and added the tenth sentence of the first paragraph.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). In the first paragraph, substituted “regulation” for “regulations” preceding “subject” in the second sentence, deleted “or state aid” preceding “highway other than the” in the fifth sentence and substituted “class 1” for “state aid” thereafter.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). In the first paragraph, substituted “commissioner of motor vehicles” for “state highway commissioner” following “permit to the” in the first sentence, inserted “and with the concurrence of the state highway board” following “discretion” in the second sentence, and substituted “commissioner of motor vehicles” for “commissioner of highways” following “1393 of this title, the” in the fifth sentence and following “March 31 the” in the seventh sentence.

    —1961. Added the second paragraph.

    § 1400a. Special local highway and bridge limits; reimbursement for damages; special permits.

    1. A person or corporation owning or operating a traction engine, tractor trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle that desires to operate it in excess of the weight limits provided in this subchapter over highways and bridges under the jurisdiction of a municipality with the exception of class 1 town highways and subject to the provisions of subsection 1400(c) of this title shall make application for a permit to the appropriate legislative body or its designee.
    2. The application form for such a permit shall be of a uniform type and shall be developed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, after consulting with municipal officials and representatives of the State’s trucking industry.
      1. The selectboard, trustees, or the mayor are authorized to accept for the municipality compensation commensurate with the extra wear or maintenance required on the highway traveled over or on any bridge by reason of the overweight allowed by any permit approved by them or any exemption provided under section 1400d of this title, which shall be used for the maintenance of highways and bridges within the town, village, or city. The following factors, at a minimum, shall be taken into consideration when determining the amount of compensation due: (c) (1) The selectboard, trustees, or the mayor are authorized to accept for the municipality compensation commensurate with the extra wear or maintenance required on the highway traveled over or on any bridge by reason of the overweight allowed by any permit approved by them or any exemption provided under section 1400d of this title, which shall be used for the maintenance of highways and bridges within the town, village, or city. The following factors, at a minimum, shall be taken into consideration when determining the amount of compensation due:
        1. the amount of weight allowed in excess of the normal limit;
        2. the configuration and number of axles of the vehicle involved;
        3. the number and length of trips the vehicle will be making;
        4. the condition of the highway before and after use by the vehicle and costs associated with any needed repair.
      2. If the agreement for the compensation to be paid is in writing, failure on the part of the applicant to pay the sum or sums agreed upon shall be sufficient cause for the selectboard, trustees, or mayor to withdraw approval for the permit. A fee not in excess of $5.00 may be charged for the written approval of a municipality furnished under this section.
    3. A $5.00 fee for administration of permits imposed under this section shall be for the period expiring March 31 of each year. As an alternative, upon payment of an administrative fee of $10.00, an applicant may obtain a permit to operate all of his or her registered vehicles in that municipality, under the conditions of the permit, for the period of the permit. In the event a fleet permit is obtained, individual permits need not be carried in each vehicle permitted.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; amended 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. April 25, 1996; 2003, No. 56 , § 54, eff. June 4, 2003; 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subdivs. (c)(1) and (c)(2), substituted “selectboard” for “selectmen” in accordance with 2013, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 72.

    Amendments

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Redesignated subsec. (c) as subdiv. (c)(1), redesignated former subdivs. (1)-(4) as present subdivs. (1)(A)-(1)(D), designated the previously undesignated paragraph at the end of subsec. (c) as subdiv. (c)(2) to conform to V.S.A style, and inserted “or any exemption provided under section 1400d of this title” in present subdiv. (c)(1).

    —2003. Subsec. (a): Added “, or its designee” at the end of the sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Deleted “and size” following “weight” and inserted “with the exception of class 1 town highways and subject to the provisions of subsection 1400(c) of this title” following “municipality”.

    § 1400b. Filing of restrictions, publication.

    1. Any municipality that has enacted special weight limits that are other than State legal limits for highways or bridges within its jurisdiction shall file a complete copy of the limitations with the Department of Motor Vehicles not later than February 10 of each year. The information filed shall contain a concise listing of each highway or bridge posted, the time of the year the restrictions apply, weight limitations in effect on that highway or bridge, and the name, address, and telephone number of the principal person or persons responsible for issuing the local permit. Additions or deletions to the listing may be made from time to time, as required, by filing with the Department.
    2. Any special municipal weight limits on highways or bridges shall be unenforceable unless they are on file with the Department of Motor Vehicles within three working days of the date of posting. It shall be the responsibility of the municipality to keep records documenting the time and date a highway or bridge is posted, and to keep current restrictions on file with the Department. The Department may prescribe the format that is to be used when filing restrictions under this section.
    3. The Department shall publish, on an annual basis, a list of municipal highways or bridges and their current weight limits. This publication shall be based on the information submitted by the municipalities under subsection (a) of this section, as well as information available through the Agency of Transportation, and shall be available to the public, at a charge not in excess of $25.00, on or before April 1 of each year.
    4. The Department shall also publish, on a quarterly basis, a periodic update of current weight limits for municipal highways and bridges and shall make that available to the general public at a cost of not more than $5.00.
    5. Any person may request information on specific municipalities from the Department and shall pay the Department a fee of $3.00 per request. A single request shall be made for information on each municipality. In the event nothing is filed by a particular municipality, the Department shall provide that information, in written form, and charge the $3.00 fee.
    6. The Commissioner may require prepayments for information requested pursuant to this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. Jan. 1, 1995.

    § 1400c. Gross limits on town highways and bridges.

    When a town bridge or highway is posted for State limits, the gross weight limits on town highways and bridges shall be the weight allowed by the State, including any additional weight allowed by permit.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    § 1400d. Agricultural service vehicles.

    1. An agricultural service vehicle, as defined in subdivision 4(71) of this title, shall be exempt from the provisions of sections 1400 and 1400a of this title if the gross weight does not exceed 60,000 pounds.
    2. Municipalities shall not be liable for injuries or damages to agricultural service vehicles or their operators that result from crossing a posted bridge with an agricultural service vehicle that weighs more than the posted weight limit.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 109 , (Adj. Sess.), § 9.

    History

    Prior law.

    Former § 1400d, relating to agricultural service vehicles, was derived from 2001, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

    § 1401. Contents of permit.

    1. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall incorporate in the permit such descriptive matter as to the highways to be traveled over, his or her restrictions as to width and character of the wheels of such tractor, trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle, and such other regulations as in his or her judgment seem most conducive to a proper use of the highways.
    2. The Commissioner shall adopt rules under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 governing the conditions to be incorporated in the permit. These rules shall also assign each condition to one of three categories, depending on the seriousness of a violation of the condition.
    3. Violation of a rule adopted under this section shall constitute a traffic violation.
    4. A person who violates a rule adopted under this section shall be subject to the following penalties: $100.00 for a Category I violation; $200.00 for a Category II violation; and $300.00 for a Category III violation.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 25, 1970; 1997, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 9b, eff. Aug. 1, 1998.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,265. P.L. § 5134. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4700. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 4, 7. 1910, No. 129 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), substituted “shall incorporate” for “may incorporate” and inserted “or her” after “his” in two places in that subsec., and added subsecs. (b)-(d).

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “commissioner of motor vehicles” for “highway commissioner” preceding “may incorporate”.

    § 1402. Overweight, width, height, and length permits; fees.

    1. Overweight, overwidth, indivisible overlength, and overheight permits.   Overweight, overwidth, indivisible overlength, and overheight permits shall be signed by the Commissioner or by his or her agent and a copy shall be kept in the office of the Commissioner or in a location approved by the Commissioner. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a copy shall also be available in the towing vehicle and must be available for inspection on demand of a law enforcement officer. Before operating a traction engine, tractor, trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle, the person to whom a permit to operate in excess of the weight, width, indivisible overlength, and height limits established by this title is granted shall pay a fee of $40.00 for each single trip permit or $112.00 for a blanket permit, except that the fee for a fleet blanket permit shall be $112.00 for the first unit and $6.00 for each unit thereafter. At the option of a carrier, an annual permit for the entire fleet, to operate over any approved route, may be obtained for $112.00 for the first tractor and $6.00 for each additional tractor, up to a maximum fee of $1,000.00. The fee for a fleet permit shall be based on the entire number of tractors owned by the applicant. An applicant for a fleet permit may apply for any number of specific routes, each of which shall be reviewed with regard to the characteristics of the route and the type of equipment operated by the applicant. When the weight or size of the vehicle-load are considered sufficiently excessive for the routing requested, the Agency of Transportation shall, on request of the Commissioner, conduct an engineering inspection of the vehicle-load and route, for which a fee of $300.00 will be added to the cost of the permit if the load is a manufactured home. For all other loads of any size or with gross weight limits less than 150,000 pounds, the fee shall be $800.00 for any engineering inspection that requires up to eight hours to conduct. If the inspection requires more than eight hours to conduct, the fee shall be $800.00 plus $60.00 per hour for each additional hour required. If the vehicle and load weigh 150,000 pounds or more but not more than 200,000 pounds, the engineering inspection fee shall be $2,000.00. If the vehicle and load weigh more than 200,000 pounds but not more than 250,000 pounds, the engineering inspection fee shall be $5,000.00. If the vehicle and load weigh more than 250,000 pounds, the engineering inspection fee shall be $10,000.00. The study must be completed prior to the permit being issued. Prior to the issuance of a permit, an applicant whose vehicle weighs 150,000 pounds or more, or is 15 or more feet in width or height, shall file with the Commissioner a special certificate of insurance showing minimum coverage of $250,000.00 for death or injury to one person, $500,000.00 for death or injury to two or more persons, and $250,000.00 for property damage, all arising out of any one crash.
    2. Overlength permits.   Except as provided in subsections 1432(c) and (e) of this title, it shall be necessary to obtain an overlength permit as follows:
      1. For vehicles with a trailer or semitrailer longer than 75 feet, anywhere in the State on highways approved by the Agency of Transportation. In such cases, the vehicle may be operated with a single trip overlength permit issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles for a fee of $28.00. If the vehicle is 100 feet or more in length, the permit applicant shall file with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles a special certificate of insurance showing minimum coverage of $250,000.00 for death or injury to one person, $500,000.00 for death or injury to two or more persons, and $250,000.00 for property damage, all arising out of any one crash.
      2. [Repealed.]
    3. Prepayment of permit fees.   The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may accept prepayments of fees under section 1400 of this title. A prepayment shall be credited to the account of the person making the prepayment and the account shall be reduced to the extent of any fees due from that person under this section; provided, however, fees may not be charged to the account in excess of the account balance. Upon oral application of any person having prepaid fees, the Commissioner may issue a permit with an identifying number, and the permit shall become effective immediately. Upon application, the Commissioner shall return any unused portion of the prepayment to the person originally making the prepayment.
    4. [Repealed.]
    5. “Low-bed” trailer permit.
      1. The Commissioner may issue an annual permit to allow the transportation of a so-called “low-bed” trailer. A “low-bed” trailer is defined as a trailer manufactured for the primary purpose of carrying heavy equipment on a flat-surfaced deck, which deck is at a height equal to or lower than the top of the rear axle group.
      2. A blanket permit may be obtained for an annual fee of $275.00 per unit, provided the total vehicle length does not exceed 75 feet, does not exceed a loaded width of 12´6", does not exceed a total weight of 108,000 lbs., and has a height not exceeding 14 feet.
      3. Warning signs and flags shall be required if the vehicle exceeds 75 feet in length or exceeds 8´6" in width.
      4. [Repealed.]
    6. Single trip permit; duration.   A single trip permit issued under this section shall be valid for seven business days.

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 106 , eff. April 14, 1959; 1969, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 25, 1970; 1987, No. 95 , § 2, eff. June 23, 1987; 1989, No. 51 , § 44; 1995, No. 47 , §§ 11, 12, eff. April 20, 1995; 1995, No. 183 (Adj. Sess.), § 18m, eff. May 22, 1996; 1997, No. 46 , §§ 1-3; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 15, eff. Aug. 1, 2000; 2003, No. 70 (Adj. Sess.), § 30, eff. March 1, 2004; 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2009, No. 50 , § 52; 2009, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 56; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 43; 2017, No. 71 , § 15, eff. June 8, 2017; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 204.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 250 , § 50. 1955, No. 261 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 10,266. 1947, No. 202 , § 5431. P.L. § 5135. 1931, No. 81 . 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4700. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 4, 7. 1910, No. 129 , § 2.

    Editor’s note—

    Redesignated subsec. (d), as added by 1995, No. 47 , § 12, as subsec. (e) to avoid conflict with subsec. (d), as added by 1987, No. 95 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Made the heading for subdiv. (e)(1) the heading for subsec. (e) instead.

    Subsec. (f): Added the section heading.

    —2017. Subdiv. (b)(2): Repealed.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$40.00” for “$35.00”, “$112.00” for “$100.00” three times, and “$6.00” for “$5.00” twice.

    Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “$28.00” for “$25.00”.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “crash” for “accident” following “one”.

    Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “crash” for “accident” following “one”.

    Subsec. (d): Repealed.

    Subsec. (f): Added.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (e): Deleted the subsec. heading, and repealed subdiv. (e)(4).

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$35.00” for “$20.00”, “$100.00” for “$70.00” three times, and “$5.00” for “$1.00” twice.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “subsections 1432(c) and (e)” for “subsection 1432(f)”, deleted former subdivs. (b)(1) and (b)(2), redesignated former subdiv. (b)(3) as present subdiv. (b)(1) and substituted “75” for “72” in the first sentence of that subdiv. and “$25.00” for “$10.00” in the second sentence of that subdiv., and added a new subdiv. (b)(2).

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (b)(3): Substituted “$10.00” for “$20.00” in the second sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsecs. (f) and (g): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Deleted “$40.00 for the second unit” following “$70.00 for the first unit” in the third sentence and added the fourth sentence.

    —1995. Subsec. (a): Deleted “of motor vehicles” following “commissioner” in the first and second sentences, inserted “and” preceding “$30.00” in the third sentence, deleted “of motor vehicles” following “commissioner” and added “if the load is a manufactured home” following “permit” in the fourth sentence, and added the fifth and sixth sentences.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$20.00” for “$10.00” following “pay a fee of” in the third sentence.

    —1987. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “provided, however, that any unexpended balance in the account at April 30 shall be returned to the remitter” following “making the prepayment” at the end of the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1959. Substituted “record” for “recording” preceding “fee” in the section heading, “$4.50 for each single trip permit or $10.00 for each blanket permit” for “$3.75 to defray the cost of processing the application and the permit” following “fee of” in the third sentence.

    Revocation of certain reciprocal overweight permits. 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 14a, provided: “All overweight permits previously issued to vehicles registered in another state or province which do not issue similar overweight permits on a reciprocal basis to vehicles registered in Vermont shall be revoked, effective July 1, 2000.”

    § 1403. Expiration or revocation.

    Blanket permits shall expire at the same time as the vehicle’s registration but may be revoked for cause by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles with or without hearing.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. March 25, 1970; 1987, No. 95 , § 1, eff. June 23, 1987; 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    History

    Source.

    1957, No. 134 . V.S. 1947, § 10,267. 1935, No. 123 , § 15. P.L. § 5136. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4700. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 4, 7. 1910, No. 129 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “at the same time as the vehicle’s registration” for “on May 1 next following the date of issue”.

    —1987. Substituted “blanket permits” for “the permit” preceding “shall expire” at the beginning of the section.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “motor vehicle commissioner” for “highway commissioner” preceding “with or without”.

    § 1404. Bond required.

    In his or her discretion, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall require the applicant to file a bond of certificate of insurance in such amount as in his or her judgment seems adequate to cover any probable damage that may be occasioned by the use and operation of such tractor, trailer, motor truck, or other motor vehicle, executed by the applicant as principal and by a surety company authorized to transact business in this State as surety, conditional to pay all injuries or damages sustained by the State or by any municipality or person in consequence of the failure to comply with the provisions of such permit, or the excessive weight allowed by such permit, or the careless, negligent, or unlawful act of such principal or his or her agents or servants.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 25, 1970.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 261 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 10,268. 1947, No. 96 , § 1. P.L. § 5137. 1931, No. 81 . 1931, No. 61 , §§ 2, 5. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4700. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 4, 7. 1910, No. 129 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “commissioner of motor vehicles” for “commissioner of highways” following “discretion, the”.

    Notes to Opinions

    Discretion of Commissioner.

    Commissioner in exercise of sound discretion may issue permit without requiring filing of bond. 1940-42 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 257.

    § 1405. Actions against the bond.

    The State, a person, or a municipal corporation injured by any careless, negligent, or unlawful act of or failure of the principal or his or her agents or servants to comply with the provisions of such permit or on account of the injury to a highway, bridge, or culvert because of the excessive weight allowed by such permit, and, if the death of any person is caused by any careless, negligent, or unlawful act as aforesaid, the executor or administrator, shall have a right of action in the name of the obligee named in such bond for his or her, its, or their use and benefits against the principal and surety named in such bond, and may prosecute the same to final judgment and execution.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 281 , § 7.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,269. P.L. § 5138. 1933, No. 157 , § 4835. 1931, No. 81 . 1931, No. 61 , § 5. 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76. G.L. § 4700. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 4, 7. 1910, No. 129 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —1961. Inserted “highway” preceding “bridge”.

    § 1406. Federally owned vehicles.

    In case of oilers, tractors, rollers, dump wagons, and other road machinery and trucks, tractors, and trailers owned and operated by the federal government, a permit may be issued by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The furnishing of a bond in such cases shall be in the discretion of such Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. March 25, 1970.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,270. P.L. § 5139. 1931, No. 81 . 1929, No. 68 , § 1. 1925, No. 70 , § 76.

    Amendments

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “motor vehicle commissioner” for “highway commissioner” following “issued by the” in the first sentence.

    § 1407. Operation of overweight vehicles.

    A motor truck, truck tractor, tractor, trailer, or other vehicle, machine, or contrivance shall not be operated over the highways of the State of Vermont in violation of any provision of this title relative to the weight of the vehicle, machine, or contrivance. In a prosecution for these violations, the proper defendant shall be either the owner or lessee of the vehicle, machine, or contrivance or the person who moves or operates the vehicle, machine, or contrivance.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 23; 1995, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 86 , § 1. 1953, No. 182 . V.S. 1947, § 10,299. 1947, No. 202 , § 5463. 1939, No. 117 , § 5. 1937, No. 129 . P.L. § 5164. 1933, No. 157 , § 4861. 1925, No. 70 , § 93.

    Amendments

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Rewrote the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 1408. Operating vehicle in excess of registered capacity.

    A motor truck, tractor, trailer, or other vehicle, machine, or contrivance shall not be operated or moved upon any highway with a gross weight, including load and vehicle, greater than the total registered weight of the vehicle and the declared registered capacity thereof and a tolerance of five percent. In a prosecution for a violation of this section, the proper defendant shall be either the owner or lessee of the vehicle, machine, or contrivance or the person who operates the vehicle, machine, or contrivance. This section shall not apply to the operation of a motor truck, tractor, trailer, or other vehicle, machine, or contrivance while being operated strictly in compliance with and in conformity to the provisions of a permit so to do issued by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles as otherwise provided in this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 97 , eff. April 8, 1959; 1969, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. March 25, 1970; 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 24; 1983, No. 86 , § 4; 1995, No. 89 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,300. 1939, No. 117 , § 6.

    Amendments

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Rewrote the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1983. Inserted “and a tolerance of five percent” following “capacity thereof” in the first sentence.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the first sentence.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading and substituted “motor vehicle commissioner” for “highway commissioner” preceding “as otherwise” in the second sentence.

    —1959. Rewrote the section heading and the first sentence and deleted “however” preceding “this section” in the second sentence.

    § 1409. Weighing of vehicles.

    Any uniformed police officer, having reason to believe that the weight of the vehicle and load is unlawful, may stop such motor vehicles up to one hour for the purpose of determining the weight of said vehicle and load. If the operator does not wish to submit to the weighing of such vehicle and load by means of portable scales, he or she may demand that such vehicle be weighed at the nearest public scales reasonably available; however, if public scales are not reasonably available, the officer may require the vehicle to be weighed on portable scales. The officer may demand that the vehicle be weighed at the nearest public scales reasonably available.

    HISTORY: Amended 1977, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. May 1, 1978; 1983, No. 86 , § 5.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 86 , § 2.

    Amendments

    —1983. Added “however, if public scales are not reasonably available, the officer may require the vehicle to be weighed on portable scales” following “nearest public scales reasonably available” in the second sentence and deleted “if the officer does not have portable scales available” preceding “the officer” in the third sentence.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “up to one hour” preceding “for the purpose” in the first sentence and “reasonably” preceding “available” in the second sentence and added the third sentence.

    § 1410. Removal of overloads.

      1. When the gross weight of such vehicle and load is determined to be at least 10,000 lbs. in excess of the weight limits for such trucks on such highways, the enforcement officer may require that such portion of the load that is found to be in excess of these weights be removed. (a) (1) When the gross weight of such vehicle and load is determined to be at least 10,000 lbs. in excess of the weight limits for such trucks on such highways, the enforcement officer may require that such portion of the load that is found to be in excess of these weights be removed.
      2. When it is determined that portions of these loads referred to in this section must be removed, the truck may be driven to a suitable place for such removal.  The enforcement officer may require that portions be removed onto another motor vehicle.
    1. Dispositions of property referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall be treated under the provisions of section 1413 of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1983, No. 86 , § 6.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 86 , § 3.

    Revision note

    —2007. In subsec. (a), designated the first paragraph as subdiv. (a)(1) and the second paragraph as subdiv. (a)(2). In subdiv. (a)(2) deleted “be removed” following “be removed” to correct a grammatical error.

    Amendments

    —1983. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), added the second sentence of the second paragraph of that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    § 1411. Refusal to weigh vehicle or remove overload.

    An operator of a motor truck shall not fail or refuse to stop or submit the vehicle and load to weighing, or fail or refuse when directed by an officer upon weighing of the vehicle to stop the vehicle and otherwise comply with the provisions of sections 1409 and 1410 of this title. A person violating this section or section 1410 shall be fined not less than $500.00 nor more than $2500.00 and, at the time of the violation, the officer may impound the vehicle and have it weighed and after weighing and upon payment of towing charges, the vehicle shall be released or disposed of under the provisions of section 1413 of this title. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1412 of this title, a violator may have sanctions imposed under the provisions of this section and be additionally fined for violation of other weight regulations provided for by this subchapter.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 1977, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. May 1, 1978; 1983, No. 86 , § 7.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 86 , § 4.

    Revision note—

    At the end of the first sentence, substituted “sections 1409 and 1410 of this title” for “this section” to correct an error in the reference.

    Amendments

    —1983. Rewrote the second sentence and added the third sentence.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Added the second sentence.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “shall not fail or refuse” for “who fails or refuses” following “motor truck” and “fail or refuse” for “who fails or refuses” preceding “when directed”.

    § 1412. Multiple weight violations.

    No more than one overweight violation per vehicle shall be written by an enforcement officer at any single incident.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. May 1, 1978.

    § 1413. Disposition of impounded vehicles and loads.

    1. Rights of owner of load.   The title to the load on an impounded vehicle or combination remains in the owner who may repossess the load at any time upon presentation of proof of ownership to the sheriff.  If the load spoils during impoundment the loss shall be on the owner subject to any right of recovery of damages that the owner may have against the owner of the vehicle or combination or against any other party, and the costs of disposition of the load shall be recoverable in addition to the costs of prosecution.
    2. Sale of unclaimed vehicle or load.   In case any impounded vehicle or combination is unredeemed, or the load is unclaimed, for a period of 60 days after notice of impoundment is given, it shall be sold at a public sale by the sheriff upon order of the issuing authority and after 10 days notice of sale to the owners, lienholders, or secured parties of the vehicle or load except that if the sheriff determines it to be necessary to preserve their value, goods which may spoil may be sold in any commercially reasonable manner prior to expiration of the 60-day period and, if impractical to do so, without giving notice to the owners, lienholders, or secured parties.
    3. Disposition of proceeds of sale.   The proceeds of sale shall first be applied to the payment of the fine and costs, and secondly, to the payment of the encumbrances.  The balance shall be remitted to the owner.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 86 , § 9.

    § 1414. Reciprocal enforcement.

    1. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the Commissioner make a reasonable effort to reach agreement with the New England states and New York with respect to a uniform size and weight of motor vehicles to be allowed to operate on the public highways of those jurisdictions and Vermont. The agreement should, to the extent possible, find a balance between the free flow of commerce and the safety of the users on the highways.
    2. The Commissioner may enter into agreements with other states, the District of Columbia, and Canadian provinces providing for the reciprocal enforcement of the overweight or over dimension vehicle permit laws of those jurisdictions entering into the agreement. The agreement is allowed to conflict with sections 1400 through 1408 of this title provided that the overall effect of the interstate agreement maintains standards that are generally comparable to those presently in effect in Vermont, in which case the terms of the agreement shall govern as to vehicles issued permits pursuant to the agreement.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 95 , § 1, eff. June 23, 1987; amended 1997, No. 46 , § 4.

    History

    Amendments

    —1997. Added subsec. (a), designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (b), and inserted “provided that the overall effect of the interstate agreement maintains standards that are generally comparable to those presently in effect in Vermont” in the second sentence of that subsec.

    Revocation of certain reciprocal overweight permits. 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 14a, provided: “All overweight permits previously issued to vehicles registered in another state or province which do not issue similar overweight permits on a reciprocal basis to vehicles registered in Vermont shall be revoked, effective July 1, 2000.”

    § 1415. Transfer of weight permits.

    1. Weight permits issued pursuant to this subchapter may be transferred from one vehicle to another vehicle.  If the permit fee of the motor vehicle for which a permit is sought is less than the permit fee for the transferred motor vehicle, the Commissioner shall certify to the Commissioner of Finance and Management the facts pertinent to the difference of the permit fees, giving the name of the owner of the motor vehicle, his or her address, the amount of the original permit fee paid, the date of application for transfer, and the correct fee for the motor vehicle for which the permit is sought.  The Commissioner of Finance and Management shall issue his or her warrant in favor of the owner for the percent of the difference in permit fees as the unexpired term bears to the entire permit period.  If the permit fee for the motor vehicle for which a permit is sought is greater than the permit issued to the transferred vehicle, the permit applicant shall pay the difference based on the prorated term remaining on the permit.  If a transfer of the permit is made before the 15th day of any month, the transfer shall be considered as having been made on the first day of the month.  If the transfer of a permit is made on or after the 15th day of any month, the transfer shall be considered as having been made on the first day of the month following the application for transfer.
    2. Transfers issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall only be permitted if the applicant or an authorized representative appears at the Department of Motor Vehicles’ office in Montpelier.  Such transfers shall be permitted by mail, if the transfer is between vehicles registered at the same weight.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Article 2. Height, Width, and Length

    § 1431. Height and width limits.

    1. Except for the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, motor vehicles and loads shall not exceed eight and one-half feet in width or 13 feet six inches in height. The term width shall mean the total width of the vehicle and load, excluding safety devices as determined by the Commissioner that may extend up to three inches on each side of the vehicle. The height and width limits of this section shall not apply to snow plows, road machines, oilers, traction engines, tractors, rollers, power shovels, dump wagons, trucks, highway building equipment, and road-making appliances employed on highway maintenance or on highway construction when operated within a construction area, or to vehicles employed by municipalities for transportation and disposal of nontoxic residual waste sludge from wastewater and water treatment facilities while used for those purposes, nor shall the limits apply to traction engines, tractor, trailer, or motor trucks operated on a public highway under a permit from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles as provided in section 1400 of this title. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the use of the stop arm described in section 1281a of this title, and no permit shall be required.
    2. In his or her discretion, with or without hearing, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, or his or her agent, upon application, may issue annually to dealers in farm tractors or other farm implements overwidth permits to transport or draw upon a highway such farm implements as are more than eight and one-half feet in width but not more than 13 feet in width, when such operation is necessary to the conduct of such business, during the period from sunrise to sunset, provided at least two red flags not smaller than 12 inches square be displayed on the left front and rear of each vehicle or implement or combination thereof in such manner as to be clearly visible from the front and rear for a distance of at least 500 feet, except that no vehicles, implements, or combinations thereof shall be operated on any highway after 10:00 a.m. on any Sunday or legal holiday, except on trips not in excess of two miles, nor upon any highway at any time on which operation is prohibited by order of the Commissioner.
    3. The total outside width of a motor home, as defined in 32 V.S.A. § 8902(11) , or a trailer coach as defined in subdivision 4(41) of this title, may exceed eight and one-half feet if the excess width is attributable to an appurtenance that extends no more than six inches beyond the body of the vehicle. The term “appurtenance” does not include any item that is temporarily affixed to the exterior of the vehicle by the vehicle’s owner for the purpose of transporting the item from one location to another, but does include the following:
      1. an awning and its support hardware; and
      2. any appendage that is intended to be an integral part of a motor home or trailer coach that is installed by a manufacturer or dealer.
      1. A person, firm, or corporation whose land is divided by a public highway may operate across the highway, at approximate right angles to the centerline, an unregistered vehicle with or without a load having a width in excess of eight and one-half feet or a height in excess of 13 feet six inches and which, if used on highway construction, would be defined as motorized highway building equipment, provided that the person, firm, or corporation shall first: (d) (1) A person, firm, or corporation whose land is divided by a public highway may operate across the highway, at approximate right angles to the centerline, an unregistered vehicle with or without a load having a width in excess of eight and one-half feet or a height in excess of 13 feet six inches and which, if used on highway construction, would be defined as motorized highway building equipment, provided that the person, firm, or corporation shall first:
        1. have applied to and received from the selectboard of the town or the aldermen or city council of the city in which the land and highway are located a permit in writing specifying the vehicle covered and the point where, time when, and under what conditions the crossing may be made;
        2. have applied to and received from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles a certificate in writing that the vehicle listed in the permit issued by the selectboard or aldermen or city council meets the conditions the Commissioner may impose as to type and size and, further, that the operation of it across the highway will not damage the highway.
      2. The Commissioner may impose conditions regarding size of load or highway surface protection as he or she deems necessary.
      3. A fee of $35.00 shall be paid to the town or city for each permit and the permit shall not cover more than one vehicle. The permit shall be valid for a period of one year from the date of issue. A similar fee of $35.00 shall be paid to the State for each certificate issued by the Commissioner and the certificate shall not cover more than one vehicle and shall be valid for a period of one year from the date of issue.
      4. Provided that the terms and conditions are complied with, no registration of the vehicle shall be required under any other section of this title, nor shall permits of any kind or type be required under any other section of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 286 , § 5, eff. Aug. 1, 1961; 1963, No. 62 , § 2, eff. April 30, 1963; 1969, No. 49 , § 2; 1969, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. March 25, 1970; 1971, No. 55 , § 1; 1975, No. 213 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 1, 1976; 1983, No. 74 , § 4, eff. April 28, 1983; 1987, No. 95 , § 4, eff. June 23, 1987; 2001, No. 18 , § 2, eff. May 8, 2001; 2015, No. 47 , § 33; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 15.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 192 . V.S. 1947, § 10,275. 1947, No. 97 , § 1. 1945, No. 105 , § 1. 1939, No. 123 , § 1. P.L. § 5145. 1925, No. 70 , § 80.

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (d), substituted “selectboard” for “selectmen” in two places in accordance with 2013, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 72.

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —2001. Substituted “except for the provisions of subsection (c) of this section” for “all” and “13” for “thirteen” in the first sentence of subsec. (a), substituted “13” for “thirteen”, “12” for “twelve”, “500” for “five hundred”, and “10:00 a.m.” for “ten o’clock in the morning” in subsec. (b), added present subsec. (c), and redesignated former subsec. (c) as present subsec. (d) and substituted “12” for “twelve” in the first sentence of that subsec.

    —1987. Subsec. (b): Inserted “or her” preceding “discretion”, deleted “and with the concurrence of the state highway board,” thereafter, substituted “his and her agent” for “a permit clerk duly designated by him” preceding “, upon application”, and deleted “of highways” following “order of the commissioner”.

    Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —1983. Subsec. (a): Rewrote the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

    —1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the first sentence, inserted “or to vehicles employed by municipalities for transportation and disposal of nontoxic residual waste sludge from waste water and water treatment facilities while utilized for those purposes” following “construction area”.

    —1971. Subsec. (a): Rewrote the first sentence and substituted “commissioner of motor vehicles” for “commissioner of highways” following “permit from the” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “and with the concurrence of the state highway board” preceding “with or without hearing, the” and substituted “commissioner of motor vehicles” for “commissioner of highways” thereafter.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “$35.00” for “ten dollars” following “fee of” in the third sentence, “one year” for “six months” following “period of” in the fourth sentence, and “$35.00” for “ten dollars” following “fee of” and “one year” for “six months” following “period of” in the fifth sentence.

    —1969. Subsec. (a): Substituted “all motor vehicles” for “motor trucks and trailers” preceding “and loads” in the first sentence, and added the third sentence.

    —1963. Subsec. (a): Substituted “thirteen” for “twelve” following “width or” in the first sentence and substituted “or” for “nor” following “maintenance” in the second sentence.

    —1961. Subsec. (c): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Liability for damages resulting from violation of section, see § 1492 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Ryan v. St. Johnsbury & Lamoille County Railroad, 290 F.2d 350, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4625 (2d Cir. 1961).

    § 1432. Length of vehicles.

    1. Operation of vehicles with or without a trailer or semitrailer.   No motor vehicle without a trailer or semitrailer attached, which is longer than 46 feet overall, shall be operated upon any highway except under special permission from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. A motor vehicle with a trailer or semitrailer shall be operated, with regard to the length of the vehicle, pursuant to this section. If there is a trailer or semitrailer, the distance between the kingpin of the semitrailer to the center of the rearmost axle group shall not exceed 41 feet. An “axle group” is defined as two or more axles where the centers of all the axles are spaced at an equal distance apart.
      1. Vehicles with a trailer or semitrailer not exceeding 75 feet. If the overall length of a vehicle with a trailer or semitrailer does not exceed 75 feet, it may be operated without a permit.
      2. A receiver or shipper of goods located in Vermont may request from the Agency of Transportation access to a State highway for a commercial motor vehicle where the overall length exceeds 75 feet. If the total vehicle length is in excess of 75 feet or the distance from the steering axle to the rearmost tractor axle is longer than 25 feet, a permit may be requested from the Commissioner. In that event, the Agency of Transportation shall review the route or routes requested, making its determination for approval based on safety and engineering considerations, after considering input from local government and regional planning commissions or the metropolitan planning organization. The Agency shall maintain consistency in its application of acceptable highway geometry when approving other routes. The Agency may authorize safety precautions on these highways, if warranted, which shall include precautionary signage, intelligent transportation system signage, special speed limits, and use of flashing lights.
      3. Vehicles with a trailer or semitrailer longer than 75 feet. If the overall length of a vehicle with a trailer or semitrailer is longer than 75 feet, a permit may be issued pursuant to subdivision 1402(b)(1) of this title.
    2. Rear-end protective devices on trailers.   A trailer or semitrailer not in excess of 53 feet may be operated provided the semitrailer is equipped with a rear-end protective device of substantial construction consisting of a continuous lateral beam extending to within four inches of the lateral extremities of the semitrailer and located not more than 22 inches from the surface as measured with the vehicle empty and on a level surface.
    3. Operation on U.S. Route 4.

      Subsection (c) repealed effective July 1, 2022.

      Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, vehicles with a trailer or semitrailer that are longer than 68 feet but not longer than 75 feet may be operated with a single or multiple trip overlength permit issued at no cost by the Department of Motor Vehicles or, for a fee, by an entity authorized in subsection 1400(d) of this title on U.S. Route 4 from the New Hampshire state line to the junction of VT Route 100 south, provided the distance from the kingpin of the semitrailer to the center of the rearmost axle group is not greater than 41 feet.

    4. Operation of pole semitrailers.   The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prevent the operation of so-called pole dinkeys or pole semitrailers when being used to support the ends of poles, timbers, pipes, or structural members capable, generally, of sustaining themselves as beams between the supporting connections, the overall length of which may exceed 75 feet under special permission from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
    5. Operation on interstate highways.   Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, on the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways and those classes of qualifying Federal-aid Primary System highways as designated by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation, and on highways leading to or from the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways for a distance of one mile, unless the Agency of Transportation finds the use of a specific highway to be unsafe, no overall length limits for tractor-semitrailer or tractor semitrailer-trailer combination shall apply. On these highways, no semitrailer in a tractor-semitrailer combination longer than 53 feet and no trailer or semitrailer in a tractor-semitrailer-trailer combination longer than 28 feet shall be operated. However, the limits established by this section shall not be construed in such a manner as to prohibit the use of semitrailers in a tractor-semitrailer combination of such dimensions as were in actual and lawful use in this State on December 1, 1982.
    6. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 99 ; 1963, No. 62 , § 3, eff. April 30, 1963; 1971, No. 55 , § 2; 1973, No. 15 ; 1977, No. 41 , § 3, eff. April 19, 1977; 1983, No. 74 , § 2, eff. April 28, 1983; 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. April 18, 1986; 1987, No. 95 , § 5, eff. June 23, 1987; 1987, No. 157 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 27, 1988; 1991, No. 65 , eff. June 18, 1991; 1995, No. 183 (Adj. Sess.), § 18g, eff. May 22, 1996; 1997, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 9c; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. Aug. 1, 2000; 2007, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 43; 2009, No. 50 , § 102; 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2017, No. 71 , § 16, eff. June 8, 2017; 2021, No. 20 , § 247; 2021, No. 55 , § 10, eff. July 1, 2022.

    History

    Source.

    1949, No. 245 . V.S. 1947, § 10,254. P.L. § 5131. 1933, No. 91 , § 1.

    References in text.

    The Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, referred to in subsec. (e), is codified as 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) .

    Subsec. 1400(d) of this title, referred to in subsec. (c), was repealed by 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 73.

    Revision note

    —2013. In subdiv. (a)(2), deleted “, but not limited to,” following “include” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    —2007. Substituted “junction” for “function” in the first sentence of subsec. (c).

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (c): Repealed by Act No. 55, § 10.

    Subsec. (e): Act No. 20 inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding the first instance of “National System”.

    —2017. Section heading: Deleted “; Authorized Highways” at the end.

    Subsec. (f): Repealed.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “75 feet” for “72 feet”.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Inserted “group” after “axle” and substituted “41” for “43” in the third sentence and added the last sentence.

    Subdiv. (a)(1): Deleted former subdiv. (a)(1), redesignated former subdiv. (a)(2) as present subdiv. (a)(1), substituted “75” for “68” twice, deleted “off the truck network” after “feet” in the first sentence, and deleted “off the truck network” after “permit” in the second sentence.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Redesignated former subdiv. (a)(3) as present subdiv. (a)(2), deleted former first and second sentences, deleted “, not on the truck network,” and substituted “75” for “68 feet but is not longer than 72” in the present first sentence, and substituted “If the total vehicle length is in excess of 75 feet or the distance from the steering axle to the rearmost tractor axle is longer than 25 feet, a permit may be requested from the commissioner. In that event, the” for “The” in the beginning of the present second sentence.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Deleted former subdiv. (a)(4) and redesignated former subdiv. (a)(5) as present subdiv. (a)(3), substituted “75” for “72” twice and substituted “1402(b(1)” for “1402(b)(3).”

    Subsec. (c): Deleted former subsec. (c) and redesignated former subsec. (d) as present subsec. (c), substituted “Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, vehicles” for “Vehicles” in the beginning of the first sentence, inserted “group” after “axle” and substituted “41” for “43” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Redesignated former subsec. (e) as present subsec. (d) and substituted “75” for “60” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Redesignated former subsec. (f) as present subsec. (e).

    Subsec. (f): Redesignated former subsec. (g) as present subsec. (f).

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Inserted “VT Route 279 from the New York state line to the junction of U.S. Route 7;” following “VT Route 100 south;”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (b)(3)(A): Inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding “National”.

    Subdiv. (b)(3)(B): Inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding “National” and substituted “agency of transportation” for “department of motor vehicles”.

    Subdiv. (b)(3)(C): Substituted “agency of transportation” for “department of motor vehicles”.

    —1991. Substituted “65” for “60” preceding “feet” in the first sentence and deleted the second and third sentences of subsec. (a), added new subsecs. (b)-(d), redesignated former subsec. (b) as subsec. (e) and substituted “53” for “48” preceding “feet” in the second sentence of that subsec.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “60” for “65” preceding “feet” and inserted “as otherwise provided herein or” following “except” in the first sentence, rewrote the second sentence, and substituted “60” for “65” preceding “feet” in the third sentence.

    —1987. Subsec. (a): Substituted “65” for “60” preceding “feet” in the first sentence, added the second sentence, and deleted “however” preceding “the provisions” and substituted “65” for “60” preceding “feet” in the third sentence.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted “truck” preceding “tractor-semitrailer” in the first and second sentences, preceding “tractor semitrailer-trailer” in the first sentence and preceding “tractor-semitrailer-trailer” in the second sentence, and substituted “tractor-semitrailer” for “truck-tractor-semitrailer” preceding “combination” in the third sentence.

    —1983. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1977. Substituted “60” for “fifty-five” preceding “feet” in the first and second sentences and deleted the former third sentence.

    —1973. Rewrote the third sentence.

    —1971. Substituted “commissioner of motor vehicles” for “commissioner of highways” following “permission from the” in the first and second sentences.

    —1963. Deleted “special permit” following “vehicles” in the section heading, substituted “fifty-five” for “fifty” preceding “feet” in the first and second sentences, and added the third sentence.

    —1959. Added “special permit” following “vehicles” in the section heading and added “under special permission from the commissioner of highways” following “fifty feet” in the second sentence.

    Prospective repeal of subsec. (c). 2021, No. 55 , § 42(b) provides that subsec. (c) of this section shall be repealed on July 1, 2022.

    Legislative intent. 2021, No. 55 , § 9 provides: “(a) It is the intent of the General Assembly not to repeal 23 V.S.A. § 1432(c) , pursuant to Secs. 10 and 42(b) of this act, until the Agency of Transportation:

    “(1) works with the Town of Woodstock to identify safety concerns related to tractor trailers traveling through the Town on U.S. Route 4; and

    “(2) incorporates improvements it determines, in its sole authority, are feasible within the town highway right-of-way and scope of work for Woodstock NH PC21(5) within the Agency’s Proposed Fiscal Year 2022 Transportation Program for Program Development—Paving.

    “(b) The project identified as Woodstock NH PC21(5) is expected to be completed during the summer 2021 construction season and there is no projected fiscal year 2023 funding for the project included in the Proposed Fiscal Year 2022 Transportation Program, so having the repeal of 23 V.S.A. § 1432(c) be effective on July 1, 2022 should provide sufficient time for the Agency to work with the Town to design and complete the project identified as Woodstock NH PC21(5) and the Town to make any additional improvements that it deems necessary.”

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in 1958-60 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 138.

    § 1433. Reasonable access.

    Reasonable access, within the meaning of 19 V.S.A. § 1111 , shall be permitted to those vehicles operating pursuant to the provisions of subsections 1302(c) and 1432(e) of this title between the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways and any other qualifying Federal-aid Primary System highways, as designated by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Vermont Secretary of Transportation, and terminals; facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest; and points of loading and unloading for household goods carriers. The Vermont Secretary of Transportation shall by rule pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 either designate those portions of the public highways over which such reasonable access shall be permitted or provide for the issuance of permits to allow reasonable access. However, permits shall not be required for tractor-semi-trailer combinations designed for the transportation of automobiles and having provision for transporting motor vehicles on part of the power unit provided the combinations comply with the provisions of subsection 1432(a) of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 74 , § 3, eff. April 28, 1983; amended 1987, No. 95 , § 6, eff. June 23, 1987; 2015, No. 47 , § 35; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; 2021, No. 20 , § 248.

    History

    References in text.

    The Interstate and Defense Highway System, referred to in this section, was redesignated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 101-427, and is codified as 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) .

    Revision note—

    In the first sentence, reference to “section 43 of Title 19” following “within the meaning of” changed to “section 1111 of Title 19” in view of the recodification of Title 19 by 1985, No. 269 (Adj. Sess.).

    Amendments

    —2021. Inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of” preceding “Interstate and Defense” and substituted “Highways” for “Highway System” thereafter in the first sentence.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “designed for” for “engaged in” in the last sentence.

    —2015. Substituted “1432(e) of this title” for “1432(b) of this title” near the beginning of the first sentence.

    —1987. Added the third sentence.

    § 1434. Penalties.

    1. The operation of a vehicle on a public highway in excess of the height, width, or length limits as prescribed in section 1431 or 1432 of this title without first obtaining a permit to operate the vehicle, whether or not a permit is available, shall be a traffic violation as defined in section 2302 of this title. A violation shall be punishable by a civil penalty of $300.00 for a first offense, $600.00 for a second offense within a two-year period, and $800.00 for a third or subsequent offense within a two-year period.
    2. The operation of a vehicle on a public highway in excess of the legal height, width, or length as prescribed in section 1431 or 1432 of this title in violation of the terms of a permit issued in conformance with section 1400 of this title shall be a traffic violation as defined in section 2302 of this title and shall be punishable by a civil penalty of $300.00 for a first offense, $600.00 for a second offense within a two-year period, and $800.00 for a third or subsequent offense within a two-year period.
    3. In the case of a violation under subsection (a) of this section, the Commissioner may refuse to issue a permit to the violator under section 1400 of this title for a period not to exceed three months, if the owner or lessee commits four or more violations within a two-year period. If the holder of a permit commits four or more violations under subsection (b) of this section within a two-year period, the Commissioner may suspend, for a period not to exceed three months, any permit issued to the violator under section 1400 of this title. For the purposes of this section, the owner or lessee of the vehicle shall be considered the holder of, or applicant for, the permit.

    HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. April 25, 1996; amended 1997, No. 46 , § 5; 1997, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 9e; 2015, No. 47 , § 34; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 205.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “civil penalty” for “fine” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “civil penalty” for “fine”.

    —2015. Rewrote subsecs. (a) and (b).

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote subsecs. (a) and (b) and added subsec. (c).

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$300.00” for “$200.00” and “$600.00” for “$400.00”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$150.00” for “$100.00” and “$300.00” for “$200.00”.

    § 1435. Enforcement plan.

    It is the intention of the General Assembly that the Departments of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety, in conjunction with other law enforcement entities throughout the State, produce a coordinated statewide truck enforcement, safety, and training plan. The plan shall provide for a common philosophy and approach to commercial vehicle enforcement while recognizing the different focus and responsibilities of each entity. The plan shall also provide for training of commercial vehicle enforcement officers as well as a process to ensure effective communication of information between enforcement personnel, the over dimension permitting unit, and members of the trucking industry. In addition, the plan shall provide for periodic informational meetings with municipalities, groups of municipalities, regional entities, and the general public.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 46 , § 6; amended 1997, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 9g.

    History

    Amendments

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “and for certification” following “training” in the third sentence.

    § 1436. Statewide Municipal Commercial Motor Vehicle Enforcement Fund.

    A Statewide Municipal Commercial Motor Vehicle Enforcement Fund is created for the purpose of supporting commercial motor vehicle law enforcement initiatives in the State. The Fund shall be administered by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. Municipalities may apply to the Commissioner on forms supplied by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Funds distributed to municipalities, which shall not exceed $12,000.00 annually per municipality under this section, shall be used for training of municipal law enforcement officers for commercial motor vehicle enforcement, temporary replacement officers for those municipal law enforcement officers receiving commercial motor vehicle enforcement training, and other municipal commercial motor vehicle enforcement uses as determined by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall ensure that the activities of the commercial motor vehicle law enforcement initiative are consistent with those of the enforcement plan produced pursuant to section 1435 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 9h; amended 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2003, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 52, eff. June 9, 2004.

    History

    Amendments

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the former sixth sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    § 1437. Exception for towaway trailer transporter combination.

    1. As used in this section:
      1. “Towaway trailer transporter combination” means a combination of vehicles consisting of a trailer transporter towing unit and two trailers or semitrailers with a total weight that does not exceed 26,000 pounds and in which the trailers or semitrailers carry no property and constitute inventory property of a manufacturer, distributor, or dealer of such trailers or semitrailers.
      2. “Trailer transporter towing unit” means a power unit that is not used to carry property when operating in a towaway trailer transporter combination.
    2. Notwithstanding sections 1391-1398 of this title, a towaway trailer transporter combination may be operated on the Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways, those classes of qualifying Federal-aid Primary System highways as designated by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation, and on highways leading to or from the Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways for a distance of one mile or less without a permit if the overall length does not exceed 82 feet unless the Vermont Secretary of Transportation finds the use of a specific highway to be unsafe.

    HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 15a.

    Article 3. Loads

    § 1451. Loads on passenger cars.

    No person shall operate a passenger type motor vehicle upon any highway with any load carried thereon extending beyond the line of the fenders on the left side of such vehicle nor extending more than six inches beyond the line of the fenders on the right side thereof, nor when any baggage or other object is carried in a way to obscure either number plate or any light on such vehicle.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 75 . V.S. 1947, § 10,253. P.L. § 5130. 1925, No. 70 , § 75.

    § 1452. Securing loads of wood or wood products.

    1. As used in this section:
      1. “Load” means the total of wood or wood products being carried.
      2. “Tier” means the total vertical height of all wood or wood products arranged individually or in layers, or in bundles placed one above the other.
      3. “Binding” means chain, wire rope, steel cable, steel strapping, or nylon webbing together with tightening device.
    2. A person may not operate a motor truck, truck tractor, trailer, or semi-trailer on a public highway carrying wood or wood products unless the load is securely fastened to the vehicle and each load or tier up to a length of five feet inclusive shall be fastened with one binding; if the length exceeds five feet but does not exceed 10 feet, it shall be fastened with two bindings; if the length exceeds 10 feet, it shall be fastened with three bindings.
    3. The ends of any bindings, whether the vehicle is loaded or unloaded, shall be so secured that loose ends do not endanger pedestrians, motorists, or other vehicles using the highway.
    4. Any bindings used hereunder shall have a capacity of at least 2,750 pounds working load limit as rated by the manufacturer.
    5. This section shall not be construed to include a truck transporting lumber, wood, or sawmill wastes, when transported in a box-type body with solid sides, provided that such truck is not loaded higher than its side-boards.

    HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 326 (Adj. Sess.); 1971, No. 118 , eff. April 26, 1971; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 206.

    History

    Source.

    1951, No. 219 , §§ 1, 2. 1949, No. 247 . V.S. 1947, §§ 10,280, 10,281. 1947, No. 102 , §§ 1, 2.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1971. Section amended generally.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Rewrote the first sentence and inserted “wire ropes or steel cables” preceding “and any tire” in the second sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in 1946-48 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 247.

    Notes to Opinions

    Purpose.

    The purpose of this section and the intent of the Legislature is one of safety in transporting material loaded on trucks along the public highways. 1968-70 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 166.

    § 1453. Baled products.

      1. An individual shall not operate a motor vehicle loaded with baled hay or straw or other baled products with any portion of the load extending beyond the front end of the vehicle bed; with the exception that a load extension is permitted beyond the front end of a truck bed, over the driver’s compartment or sleeping berth, provided this portion of the load is supported by permanent and substantial steel frame construction. Loads of baled hay, straw, or other baled products shall be solidly packed while in transit. (a) (1) An individual shall not operate a motor vehicle loaded with baled hay or straw or other baled products with any portion of the load extending beyond the front end of the vehicle bed; with the exception that a load extension is permitted beyond the front end of a truck bed, over the driver’s compartment or sleeping berth, provided this portion of the load is supported by permanent and substantial steel frame construction. Loads of baled hay, straw, or other baled products shall be solidly packed while in transit.
      2. Such loads, unless supported by substantially constructed sideboards or rack type bodies, shall be fastened securely to the vehicle by not less than two longitudinal binders and by a cross binder for each tier of baled hay or straw or other baled products, such binders to be of sufficient strength to hold such load in place. Such loads may be transported without sideboards and the binders specified in this subdivision if fastened by any commercial binding device equal or superior to the provisions set forth in this section. Such commercial binding device shall be approved by the Department of Motor Vehicles.
    1. The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to a farmer engaged in farming operations where such transportation requires that he or she use the public highways; provided, however, that the farmer loads and transports the loads in a reasonably safe manner.
    2. Any enforcement officer may stop and inspect vehicles in respect to compliance with the provisions of this section, and if it is found that the load is being transported in violation of this section, the enforcement officer may arrest without warrant and shall prohibit the operator of such vehicle from continuing en route until the load has been made to comply with this section.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 207.

    History

    Source.

    1955, No. 154 , §§ 1, 2.

    Revision note

    —2007. Designated the two paragraphs in subsec. (a) as subdivs. (a)(1) and (a)(2). Substituted “the” for “such” throughout subsecs. (b) and (c) and present subdiv. (a)(2).

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “An individual” for “A person” in the first sentence.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “Such” for “Provided however, that the”, “in this subdivision” for “herein”, and “Department of Motor Vehicles” for “Motor Vehicle Department”.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “nothing herein shall relieve” preceding “the farmer” and inserted “loads and transports” thereafter.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Repealed.

    § 1454. Securing loads.

    1. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle nor draw a trailer or semi-trailer on a highway unless the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer is so constructed and loaded that it will create no hazard to other users of the highway.
    2. The Commissioner may, by rule, impose design and load security requirements, consistent with nationally recognized safety standards, upon motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers in order to provide for the safe and secure transport of any loads.

    HISTORY: 1961, No. 62 , §§ 1, 2; amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32; 1997, No. 46 , § 7.

    History

    Amendments

    —1997. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Repealed.

    Subchapter 16. Liability of Operators

    § 1491. Repealed. 1969, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 12, 1970.

    History

    Former § 1491. Former § 1491, relating to liability of motor vehicle operators for damages for injuries to guest occupants, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,223; P.L. § 5113; 1929, No. 78 .

    § 1492. Liability for damage defined; limitations.

    The owner, driver, operator, or mover of any motor truck, tractor, trailer, wagon, cart, carriage, or other object or contrivance which is moved or operated on any highway in violation of any of the provisions of sections 1098, 1145, 1302, 1305, and 1431 of this title, such portion of section 1141 of this title as pertains to trucks and buses, and such portion of section 1391 of this title as relates to weight in relation to tire surface, shall be liable to the State or municipal corporation in which the act is committed for damages to a public highway occasioned by such moving or operating, to be recovered in a civil action, in the name of the State or municipal corporation, or in an action on the bond provided in this chapter in connection with the issuance of permits, provided the action is brought within two years after such act is committed.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,276. P.L. § 5146. 1933, No. 157 , § 4843. 1931, No. 61 , § 5. 1925, No. 70 , § 81. G.L. § 4699. 1917, No. 131 , §§ 2, 7. 1912, No. 152 , § 1.

    References in text.

    The references to sections 1098, 1141, and 1145 of this title in this section are to the provisions of those sections prior to the revision of chapter 13 of this title, in which those sections appeared, by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1-3, eff. March 1, 1973.

    The subject matter of former § 1098, relating to the prohibition against operating motor vehicles having equipment attached to the wheels which may have damaged road surfaces, is now covered principally by § 1092 of this title.

    The subject matter of former § 1141, relating to speed limits on highways outside the limits of cities and incorporated villages, is now covered by §§ 1003, 1081, and 1083 of this title.

    The subject matter of former § 1145, relating to the weight restriction and speed limit for operation of motor vehicles equipped with iron and steel tires, is now covered principally by § 1083(a) of this title.

    Revision note—

    Inserted “and such portion of section 1391 of this title as relates to weight in relation to tire surface” following “buses” in lieu of a reference to V.S. 1947, § 10,273.

    Substituted “a civil action” for “an action of tort on this statute” following “recovered in” for purposes of conformity with V.R.C.P. 2 pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under 4 V.S.A. § 219 .

    Chapter 15. Powers of Enforcement Officers

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Obedience to enforcement officers, see § 1012 of this title.

    § 1600. Definition.

    Notwithstanding subdivision 4(4) of this title, as used in this chapter, “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Public Safety.

    HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 47 , § 36.

    § 1601. Identification of motor vehicles.

    The Commissioner, his or her deputies, and all enforcement officers may at all times, with or without process, stop any motor vehicle to examine identification numbers and marks thereon and raise the hood or engine cover if necessary to accomplish their purpose, and may demand and inspect the driver’s license, registration certificate, and permits. They may also at all times, with or without process, enter public garages, parking places, and public buildings where motor vehicles are stored or kept, for the purpose of examining identification numbers and marks thereon and may also, in like manner, examine any motor vehicle standing in any public place or way. They may in like manner examine any motor vehicle to ascertain whether its equipment complies with the requirements of law relating to motor vehicles.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,213. P.L. § 5012. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 12.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Defacement of motor vehicle manufacturer’s serial or motor numbers, see §§ 1701-1704 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Covell v. McCarthy, 123 Vt. 472, 194 A.2d 394, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 102 (1963).

    § 1602. Traffic control.

    The Commissioner and enforcement officers may control and direct motor vehicle traffic. They may arrest violators of the motor vehicle laws and the laws relative to lights on teams, on view without process, and take such persons before a court having jurisdiction of the offense. They may control and direct all vehicles in places of traffic congestion.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,214. 1939, No. 110 . P.L. § 5013. 1933, No. 157 , § 4717. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 13. G.L. § 4715. 1917, No. 254 , § 4600. 1912, No. 148 . P.S. § 4096. 1906, No. 113 , § 3. 1904, No. 86 , §§ 4, 9.

    Notes to Opinions

    Arrest for local violations.

    State motor vehicle inspector has right to make arrest for violation of village ordinance. 1936-38 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 504.

    Commitment.

    When court of record orders motor vehicle inspector who made arrest of person charged with violation of motor vehicle laws to commit such person, in default of bail, to keeper of jail until he finds good and sufficient securities, or is otherwise discharged in accordance with law, such commitment is lawful. 1938-40 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 433.

    § 1603. Investigation of crashes.

    The Commissioner of Public Safety shall immediately after receiving notice of a crash where a personal injury occurs, and, in case of notice of a crash where an injury occurs to property, may cause such crash to be investigated by an enforcement officer, and where such investigation reveals facts tending to show culpability on the part of any motor vehicle owner or operator, he or she shall cause such facts to be reported to the State’s Attorney of the county where the crash occurred. The State’s Attorney shall further investigate the crash and may hold an inquest as provided by 13 V.S.A. §§ 5131-5137 . After such investigation or inquest, he or she shall immediately report to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles the result thereof together with his or her recommendation as to the suspension of the license of the operator of any motor vehicle involved in the crash.

    HISTORY: Amended 2021, No. 76 , § 4.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,215. P.L. § 5014. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 14. G.L. § 4712. 1917, No. 132 , §§ 8, 9.

    Editor’s note—

    Although V.S. 1947, § 10,215, from which this section was derived, was in the title of V.S. 1947 relating to the Department of Public Safety, the second “Commissioner” referred to in this section is apparently the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. See chapter 9, subchapter 3 and § 1129 of this title.

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Investigation and reports of accidents, see §§ 1128, 1129, 3211, 3313, and 3511 of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    Reports of accidents involving motor vehicles used as common carriers, see 5 V.S.A. § 1806 .

    § 1603a. Reports of crashes.

    1. All crashes involving a commercial motor vehicle or any vehicle displaying a hazardous materials placard shall be reported to the Agency of Transportation by appropriate law enforcement personnel on forms and in a manner prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation.
    2. Law enforcement officers who investigate motor vehicle crashes other than those involving vehicles described in subsection (a) of this section shall forward a report to the Agency of Transportation within 30 days after the crash is investigated on forms prescribed and furnished by the Secretary of Transportation and approved by the Attorney General with respect to any matter affecting the substantive rights of any person.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 20, eff. Oct. 1, 2000; amended 2009, No. 39 , § 4.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crashes” for “accidents” in the section heading and in subsecs. (a) and (b) and “crash” for “accident” in subsec. (b) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —2009. Deleted “Involving Commercial Motor Vehicles” from the section heading; added subsec. (a) designation; substituted “agency of transportation” for “department of motor vehicles” and substituted “secretary of transportation” for “commissioner” in subsec. (a); and added subsec. (b).

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Investigation and reports of accidents, see §§ 1128, 1129, 3211, 3313, and 3511 of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    Reports of accidents involving motor vehicles used as common carriers, see 5 V.S.A. § 1806 .

    Reports of law enforcement officers making motor vehicle arrests or issuing citations, see § 1016 of this title.

    § 1603b. Agency of Transportation repository for crash reports filed by law enforcement; Department of Motor Vehicles repository for operator crash reports.

    The Agency of Transportation shall be the crash data repository for reports submitted by law enforcement agencies in the State. The Department of Motor Vehicles shall be the repository agency for all operator crash reports.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 39 , § 5.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” in the section heading and throughout the section in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Investigation and reports of accidents, see §§ 1128, 1129, 3211, 3313, and 3511 of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    Reports of accidents involving motor vehicles used as common carriers, see 5 V.S.A. § 1806 .

    Reports of law enforcement officers making motor vehicle arrests or issuing citations, see § 1016 of this title.

    § 1604. Seizure of motor vehicles.

    An enforcement officer, without process, may seize a motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle found by him or her on which the manufacturer’s serial or motor number or any of the identifying numbers placed on the motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle by the manufacturer of the motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle or any of the parts thereof have been obliterated, defaced, or tampered with, or when in his or her judgment the motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle has been stolen, and may retain possession of the motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle until the Commissioner or State’s Attorney of the county where the vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle is found is satisfied as to the rightful ownership thereof. Immediately on the seizure of the motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle, the officer shall report the same, together with all the facts obtainable by him or her, to the Commissioner, and the officer shall notify the State’s Attorney of the county in which the motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle was seized and cause the ownership of the motor vehicle, snowmobile, motorboat, or all-terrain vehicle to be investigated.

    HISTORY: Amended 2007, No. 19 , § 5.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,216. 1939, No. 111 . P.L. § 5015. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 15.

    Amendments

    —2007. Section amended generally.

    § 1605. Repealed. 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32.

    History

    Former § 1605. Former § 1605, relating to summons and service of warrant, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,217; 1947, No. 202 , § 5288; 1939, No. 112 ; P.L. § 5016; 1927, No. 69 , § 2; 1925, No. 70 , § 16; and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

    § 1606. Repealed. 1969, No. 131, § 36, eff. April 23, 1969.

    History

    Former § 1606. Former § 1606, relating to costs for services rendered by State Police, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,218; P.L. § 5017; 1933, No. 157 , § 4721; 1925, No. 70 , § 13.

    § 1607. Section 1607 repealed effective July 1, 2022. Automated license plate recognition systems.

    1. Definitions.   As used in this section:
      1. “Active data” is distinct from historical data as defined in subdivision (3) of this subsection and means data uploaded to individual automated license plate recognition system units before operation as well as data gathered during the operation of an ALPR system. Any data collected by an ALPR system in accordance with this section shall be considered collected for a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
      2. “Automated license plate recognition system” or “ALPR system” means a system of one or more mobile or fixed high-speed cameras combined with computer algorithms to convert images of registration plates into computer-readable data.
      3. “Historical data” means any data collected by an ALPR system and stored on the statewide ALPR server operated by the Vermont Justice Information Sharing System of the Department of Public Safety. Any data collected by an ALPR system in accordance with this section shall be considered collected for a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
      4. “Law enforcement officer” means a State Police officer, municipal police officer, motor vehicle inspector, Capitol Police officer, constable, sheriff, or deputy sheriff certified by the Vermont Criminal Justice Council as a level II or level III law enforcement officer under 20 V.S.A. § 2358 .
      5. “Legitimate law enforcement purpose” applies to access to active or historical data, and means investigation, detection, analysis, or enforcement of a crime or of a commercial motor vehicle violation or a person’s defense against a charge of a crime or commercial motor vehicle violation, or operation of AMBER alerts or missing or endangered person searches.
      6. “Vermont Intelligence Center analyst” means any sworn or civilian employee who through his or her employment with the Vermont Intelligence Center (VIC) has access to secure databases that support law enforcement investigations.
    2. Operation.   A Vermont law enforcement officer shall be certified in ALPR operation by the Vermont Criminal Justice Council in order to operate an ALPR system.
    3. ALPR use and data access; confidentiality.
        1. Deployment of ALPR equipment by Vermont law enforcement agencies is intended to provide access to law enforcement reports of wanted or stolen vehicles and wanted persons and to further other legitimate law enforcement purposes. Use of ALPR systems by law enforcement officers and access to active data are restricted to legitimate law enforcement purposes. (1) (A) Deployment of ALPR equipment by Vermont law enforcement agencies is intended to provide access to law enforcement reports of wanted or stolen vehicles and wanted persons and to further other legitimate law enforcement purposes. Use of ALPR systems by law enforcement officers and access to active data are restricted to legitimate law enforcement purposes.
        2. Active data may be accessed by a law enforcement officer operating the ALPR system only if he or she has a legitimate law enforcement purpose for the data. Entry of any data into the system other than data collected by the ALPR system itself must be approved by a supervisor and shall have a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
          1. Requests to access active data shall be in writing and include the name of the requester, the law enforcement agency the requester is employed by, if any, and the law enforcement agency’s Originating Agency Identifier (ORI) number. To be approved, the request must provide specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the data are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal, missing person, or commercial motor vehicle investigation or enforcement action. The written request and the outcome of the request shall be transmitted to VIC and retained by VIC for not less than three years. (C) (i) Requests to access active data shall be in writing and include the name of the requester, the law enforcement agency the requester is employed by, if any, and the law enforcement agency’s Originating Agency Identifier (ORI) number. To be approved, the request must provide specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the data are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal, missing person, or commercial motor vehicle investigation or enforcement action. The written request and the outcome of the request shall be transmitted to VIC and retained by VIC for not less than three years.
          2. In each department operating an ALPR system, access to active data shall be limited to designated personnel who have been provided account access by the department to conduct authorized ALPR stored data queries. Access to active data shall be restricted to data collected within the past seven days.
        1. A VIC analyst shall transmit historical data only to a Vermont or out-of-state law enforcement officer or person who has a legitimate law enforcement purpose for the data. A law enforcement officer or other person to whom historical data are transmitted may use such data only for a legitimate law enforcement purpose. Entry of any data onto the statewide ALPR server other than data collected by an ALPR system itself must be approved by a supervisor and shall have a legitimate law enforcement purpose. (2) (A) A VIC analyst shall transmit historical data only to a Vermont or out-of-state law enforcement officer or person who has a legitimate law enforcement purpose for the data. A law enforcement officer or other person to whom historical data are transmitted may use such data only for a legitimate law enforcement purpose. Entry of any data onto the statewide ALPR server other than data collected by an ALPR system itself must be approved by a supervisor and shall have a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
        2. Requests for historical data within six months of the date of the data’s creation, whether from Vermont or out-of-state law enforcement officers or other persons, shall be made in writing to a VIC analyst. The request shall include the name of the requester, the law enforcement agency the requester is employed by, if any, and the law enforcement agency’s ORI number. To be approved, the request must provide specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the data are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal, missing person, or commercial motor vehicle investigation or enforcement action. VIC shall retain all requests and shall record in writing the outcome of the request and any information that was provided to the requester or, if applicable, why a request was denied or not fulfilled. VIC shall retain the information described in this subdivision (c)(2)(B) for no fewer than three years.
        3. After six months from the date of its creation, VIC may only disclose historical data:
          1. pursuant to a warrant if the data are not sought in connection with a pending criminal charge; or
          2. to the prosecution or the defense in connection with a pending criminal charge and pursuant to a court order issued upon a finding that the data are reasonably likely to be relevant to the criminal matter.
      1. Active data and historical data shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery, or be admissible in evidence, in any private civil action.
      2. Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of subdivision (2) of this subsection, in connection with commercial motor vehicle screening, inspection, and compliance activities to enforce the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV):
        1. may maintain or designate a server for the storage of historical data that is separate from the statewide server;
        2. may designate a DMV employee to carry out the same responsibilities as a VIC analyst and a supervisor as specified in subdivision (2) of this subsection; and
        3. shall have the same duties as the VIC with respect to the retention of requests for historical data.
    4. Retention.
      1. Any ALPR information gathered by a Vermont law enforcement agency shall be sent to the Department of Public Safety to be retained pursuant to the requirements of subdivision (2) of this subsection. The Department of Public Safety shall maintain the ALPR storage system for Vermont law enforcement agencies.
      2. Except as provided in this subsection and section 1608 of this title, information gathered by a law enforcement officer through use of an ALPR system shall only be retained for 18 months after the date it was obtained. When the permitted 18-month period for retention of the information has expired, the Department of Public Safety and any local law enforcement agency with custody of the information shall destroy it and cause to have destroyed any copies or backups made of the original data. Data may be retained beyond the 18-month period pursuant to a preservation request made or disclosure order issued under section 1608 of this title or pursuant to a warrant issued under Rule 41 of the Vermont or Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
    5. Oversight; rulemaking.
      1. The Department of Public Safety, in consultation with the Department of Motor Vehicles, shall establish a review process to ensure that information obtained through use of ALPR systems is used only for the purposes permitted by this section. The Department of Public Safety shall report the results of this review annually on or before January 15 to the Senate and House Committees on Judiciary and on Transportation. The report shall contain the following information based on prior calendar year data:
        1. the total number of ALPR units being operated by government agencies in the State, the number of such units that are stationary, and the number of units submitting data to the statewide ALPR database;
        2. the number of ALPR readings each agency submitted, and the total number of all such readings submitted, to the statewide ALPR database;
        3. the 18-month cumulative number of ALPR readings being housed on the statewide ALPR database as of the end of the calendar year;
        4. the total number of requests made to VIC for historical data, the average age of the data requested, and the number of these requests that resulted in release of information from the statewide ALPR database;
        5. the total number of out-of-state requests to VIC for historical data, the average age of the data requested, and the number of out-of-state requests that resulted in release of information from the statewide ALPR database;
        6. the total number of alerts generated on ALPR systems operated by law enforcement officers in the State by a match between an ALPR reading and a plate number on an alert database and the number of these alerts that resulted in an enforcement action;
        7. the total number of criminal, missing person, and commercial motor vehicle investigations and enforcement actions to which active data contributed, and a summary of the nature of these investigations and enforcement actions;
        8. the total number of criminal, missing person, and commercial motor vehicle investigations and enforcement actions to which historical data contributed, and a summary of the nature of these investigations and enforcement actions; and
        9. the total annualized fixed and variable costs associated with all ALPR systems used by Vermont law enforcement agencies and an estimate of the total of such costs per unit.
      2. Before January 1, 2018, the Department of Public Safety shall adopt rules to implement this section.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 69 , § 1; amended 2015, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2017, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 25, 2018; repealed on July 1, 2022 by 2019, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 41, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subdiv. (a)(4) and subsec. (b), substituted “Vermont Criminal Justice Council” for “Vermont Criminal Justice Training Council” in accordance with 2019, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 2(b).

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (e)(1)(A): Substituted “operated by government agencies in the State, the number of such units that are stationary,” for “operated in the State”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    Prospective repeal of section. 2019, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 41 provide for the repeal of this section on July 1, 2022. Previously, 2013, No. 69 , § 3 had provided for the repeal of this section on July 1, 2015; 2015, No. 32 , § 1 had extended the date of that repeal until July 1, 2016; 2015, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 6 had further extended the date of that repeal until July 1, 2018; and 2017, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 had further extended the date of that repeal until July 1, 2020.

    § 1608. Section 1608 repealed effective July 1, 2022. Preservation of data.

    1. Preservation request.
      1. A law enforcement agency or the Department of Motor Vehicles or other person with a legitimate law enforcement purpose may apply to the Criminal Division of the Superior Court for an extension of up to 90 days of the 18-month retention period established under subdivision 1607(d)(2) of this title if the agency or Department offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the captured plate data are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal or missing persons investigation or to a pending court or Judicial Bureau proceeding involving enforcement of a crime or of a commercial motor vehicle violation. Requests for additional 90-day extensions or for longer periods may be made to the Superior Court subject to the same standards applicable to an initial extension request under this subdivision.
      2. A governmental entity making a preservation request under this section shall submit an affidavit stating:
        1. the particular camera or cameras for which captured plate data must be preserved or the particular license plate for which captured plate data must be preserved; and
        2. the date or dates and time frames for which captured plate data must be preserved.
    2. Captured plate data shall be destroyed on the schedule specified in section 1607 of this title if the preservation request is denied or 14 days after the denial, whichever is later.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 69 , § 2; amended 2015, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; repealed on July 1, 2022 by 2019, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 41, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Rewrote the first sentence.

    Prospective repeal of section. 2019, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 41 provide for the repeal of this section on July 1, 2022. Previously, 2013, No. 69 , § 3 had provided for the repeal of this section on July 1, 2015; 2015, No. 32 , § 1 had extended the date of that repeal until July 1, 2016; 2015, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 6 had further extended the date of that repeal until July 1, 2018; and 2017, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 had further extended the date of that repeal until July 1, 2020.

    Chapter 17. General Offenses and Jurisdiction

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driver License Compact, see chapter 37 of this title.

    § 1701. Possession of motor vehicles with serial or motor numbers defaced.

    A person shall not knowingly keep in his or her possession or ownership for more than 10 days a motor vehicle or vessel, the manufacturer’s serial or motor numbers or identifying numbers assigned by the Commissioner of which have been changed, tampered with, obliterated, or defaced, unless the person has applied to the Commissioner for the assignment of a new number to be placed on the vehicle or vessel or motor and the application has been granted.

    HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 26; 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,302. P.L. § 5166. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 95.

    Amendments

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or her” preceding “possession”, “or vessel” following “vehicle” in two places, and “or identifying numbers assigned by the commissioner” following “motor numbers”, substituted “the” for “such” preceding “person has applied”, deleted “of motor vehicles” preceding “for the assignment”, and substituted “the” for “such” following “placed on” and preceding “application”.

    —1971 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the former second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Inspection of motor vehicle identification numbers and marks, see § 1601 of this title.

    § 1702. Assignment of new number.

    The application shall not be granted by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles until he or she is satisfied that the person applying for the assignment of such new identifying number is the rightful owner of the motor vehicle described in the application.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,304. P.L. § 5168. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 95.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Inspection of motor vehicle identification numbers and marks, see § 1601 of this title.

    § 1703. Defacing identifying numbers.

    A person who willfully changes or attempts to change, or who tampers with, obliterates, defaces, or in any manner interferes with the original or assigned motor number or manufacturer’s serial number of any motor vehicle or vessel, or with any of the secret or identifying numbers placed by the manufacturer of a motor vehicle or vessel by the Commissioner or any of the parts thereof upon the vehicle or vessel or parts, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, for the first offense and fined not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for each subsequent offense.

    HISTORY: Amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,305. P.L. § 5169. 1925, No. 70 , § 96.

    Amendments

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or vessel” following “vehicle” in two places, “or vessel by the commissioner” preceding “or any of the parts”, and substituted “$1,000.00” for “$500.00” preceding “or imprisoned not more than” and “one year, or both for the first offense and fined not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for each subsequent offense” for “six months, or both” thereafter.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Inspection of motor vehicle identification numbers and marks, see § 1601 of this title.

    § 1704. Possession prima facie evidence of violation.

    The possession by a person of a motor vehicle or vessel, the motor or manufacturer’s serial or Commissioner assigned identifying number of which has been changed, tampered with, obliterated, or defaced, shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of the provisions of section 1703 of this title, unless the person applies to the Commissioner for the assignment of a new number as provided in section 1702 of this title.

    HISTORY: Amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,303. P.L. § 5167. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 96.

    Revision note

    —2007. Substituted “section 1702” for “section 1701” near the end of the section for purposes of clarity.

    Amendments

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or vessel” following “vehicle” and “or commissioner assigned identifying” following “serial”, substituted “the” for “such” preceding “person applies”, and deleted “of motor vehicles” preceding “for the assignment”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Inspection of motor vehicle identification numbers and marks, see § 1601 of this title.

    § 1704a. Alteration of odometers.

    Any person who sells, attempts to sell, or causes to be sold any motor vehicle, highway building appliance, motorboat, all-terrain vehicle, or snowmobile and has actual knowledge that the odometer, hubometer reading, or clock meter reading has been changed, tampered with, or defaced without disclosing same and a person who changes, tampers with, or defaces, or who attempts to change, tamper with, or deface, any gauge, dial, or other mechanical instrument, commonly known as an odometer, hubometer, or clock meter, in a motor vehicle, highway building appliance, motorboat, all-terrain vehicle, or snowmobile, which, under normal circumstances and without being changed, tampered with, or defaced, is designed to show by numbers or words the distance which the motor vehicle, highway building appliance, motorboat, all-terrain vehicle, or snowmobile travels, or who willfully misrepresents the odometer, hubometer, or clock meter reading on the odometer disclosure statement or similar statement, title, or bill of sale shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 for a first offense and fined not more than $2,500.00 for each subsequent offense.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 201 (Adj. Sess.); amended 1983, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 1985; 1997, No. 59 , § 77, eff. June 30, 1997; 2001, No. 69 , § 3.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001. Deleted “or” preceding “attempts to sell” and inserted “or causes to be sold” thereafter.

    —1997. Inserted “motorboat, all-terrain vehicle” following the first occurrence of “building appliance” near the beginning of the sentence, “motorboat or all terrain vehicle” following the second and third occurrences of “building appliance”, and inserted “or who willfully misrepresents the odometer, hubometer or clock meter reading on the odometer disclosure statement or similar statement, title or bill of sale” preceding “shall be fined”.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 1705. Impersonating an inspector or examiner.

    A person who falsely impersonates or attempts to impersonate a motor vehicle inspector, examiner, or State Police shall be imprisoned not more than six months or fined not more than $100.00, or both.

    History

    Source.

    V.S. 1947, § 10,308. P.L. § 5172. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 98.

    § 1706. Repealed. 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 20, eff. March 1, 1973.

    History

    Former § 1706. Former § 1706, relating to placement of substances on highways injurious to tires, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,310; P.L. § 5174; 1925, No. 70 , § 100; G.L. § 4717; 1910, No. 133 ; P.S. § 4082; 1906, No. 113 , § 7; 1904, No. 86 , § 3; and amended by 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 27.

    § 1707. Repealed. 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 39(1).

    History

    Former § 1707. Former § 1707, relating to general penalty for violations of this title, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 10,326; 1947, No. 202 , § 5490; 1945, No. 108 , § 1; P.L. § 5188; 1933, No. 157 , § 4884; 1925, No. 70 , § 109; G.L. §§ 4704, 4718; 1917, No. 131 , §§ 3, 4, 7; 1917, No. 254 , § 4554; 1912, No. 152 , § 2. 1910, No. 129 , § 2. P.S. § 4097; 1906, No. 113 , § 3. 1904, No. 86 , § 9; 1902, No. 64 , § 5; and amended by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. March 1, 1973; 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    § 1708. Repealed. 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 32.

    History

    Former § 1708. Former § 1708, relating to concurrent jurisdiction of justices of the peace with county and district courts over motor vehicle offenses, was derived from 1957, No. 151 , Part 1, § 1; V.S. 1947, § 10,327; 1947, No. 202 , § 5491; 1935, No. 129 , § 1; P.L. § 5189; 1927, No. 79 , § 1 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

    § 1709. Report of convictions to Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

    The Judicial Bureau and every court having jurisdiction over offenses committed under any law of this State or municipal ordinance regulating the operation of motor vehicles on the highways shall forward a record of any conviction to the Commissioner within 10 days for violation of any State or local law relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than a parking violation.

    HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 85 , operative Feb. 1, 1967; 1965, No. 194 , § 10; 1967, No. 138 ; 1969, No. 290 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 1973, No. 25 , § 2, eff. March 15, 1973; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 19, 1974; 2005, No. 37 , § 9.

    History

    Source.

    1965, No. 85 . 1949, No. 240 , § 3. V.S. 1947, § 10,282. P.L. § 5148. 1927, No. 69 , § 2. 1925, No. 70 , § 85. G.L. § 4720. P.S. § 4098. 1906, No. 113 , § 3. 1904, No. 86 , § 9.

    Amendments

    —2005. Section amended generally.

    —1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior” for “county” preceding “and district”.

    —1973. Substituted “motor vehicles” for “public safety” following “commissioner of” in the section heading, and deleted “and justices of the peace” following “district courts” and substituted “motor vehicles” for “public safety for filing in the criminal information center of the department of public safety” in the text of the section.

    —1969 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1967. Section amended generally.

    —1965. Section amended generally by Act No. 85.

    Act No. 194 substituted “district” for “municipal” preceding “courts shall” in the first sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Recommendation of a court for participation in driver retraining program, see § 722 of this title.

    § 1710. Nolo contendere pleas.

    A plea of nolo contendere accepted by the court shall constitute a conviction for the purposes of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 73 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Croteau v. Malloy, 135 Vt. 64, 370 A.2d 206, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 556 (1977).

    § 1711. Felony or misdemeanor.

    A person who, whether present or absent, aids, abets, induces, procures, or causes the commission of an act that, if done directly by him or her, would be a felony or a misdemeanor under a provision of this title, is guilty of the same felony or misdemeanor.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Felonies and misdemeanors defined, see 13 V.S.A. § 1 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Aiding in commission of DUI.

    A person who aids in the commission of the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol may be held criminally liable for the acts of the principal. State v. Millette, 173 Vt. 596, 795 A.2d 1182, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 15 (2002) (mem.).

    There was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant aided in the commission of a driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol based on facts that, when defendant exited the bar, he was aware that he and his friend had consumed too much alcohol to drive safely, defendant attempted to persuade his friend that they should sleep in the car rather than drive home, and his friend took the keys from defendant’s pocket. State v. Millette, 173 Vt. 596, 795 A.2d 1182, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 15 (2002) (mem.).

    Chapter 19. Parking; Police Courts

    § 1741. Definition.

    As used in this chapter, the word “town” shall apply to a town or incorporated village only and the word “selectboard” shall apply to the selectboard of a town and the trustees of an incorporated village only.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 1.

    § 1742. Creation.

    A police court may be created by any town having a population of 1,000 or more according to the preceding U.S. census with the sole jurisdiction of receiving waiver of service of process and trial, admission of violation, and fines from violators of parking ordinances of the town and for the sole purpose and with the sole authority of carrying out the provisions of this chapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 2; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 208.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “more” for “over” and “U.S.” for “United States”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    Use of the term “may” in this section is used in a permissive sense rather than in a mandatory sense. Hambley v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 130 Vt. 204, 290 A.2d 18, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1972).

    § 1743. Powers.

    The chief of police designated by the selectboard of the town shall be the judge of the court and may exercise the powers and perform the functions and duties thereof. However, the judge shall appoint another police officer of the town to act as acting judge whenever the judge is temporarily away from the town or unable to serve by reason of illness or disqualification. The acting judge shall exercise the same powers and perform the same functions and duties as the designated judge. The judge shall specify reasonable hours when the police court is to be opened.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 3; amended 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 76, eff. April 9, 1974.

    History

    Amendments

    —1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “the chief of police” for “a justice of the peace” preceding “designated” in the first sentence and “police officer” for “justice of the peace” following “another” in the second sentence.

    § 1744. Clerk.

    The judge of the court shall act as the clerk thereof, and keep its files and records, or shall appoint his or her deputy or assistant to so act.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 4.

    § 1745. Quarters.

    The town shall maintain the police court and provide quarters for it in the town offices.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 5.

    § 1746. Violations; admission; waiver.

    1. Any person who has violated any ordinance of the town that regulates, districts, or defines the time, place, or manner of parking vehicles in the town and who has not been convicted of any violation of the parking ordinances more than twice before in the same calendar year may, within three business days after the date of such violation, by a statement signed by him or her, admit the violation and waive the issuance of any process and a trial by jury or hearing, and may voluntarily pay to the police court of the town the prescribed penalty.
    2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, whenever in the opinion of the court the gravity of the offense requires a fine in excess of the prescribed penalty, as provided in section 1749 of this chapter, the court may refuse to accept the signed statement and penalty and refer the matter to the State’s Attorney who may proceed against the offender in the manner prescribed by law. In that event, the signed statement and penalty shall be returned to the offender and shall not be considered as an admission or used as evidence in any court in this State.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 6; amended 2017, No. 11 , § 53; 2017, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 209.

    History

    Revision note—

    Reference to “section 8 of this act” preceding “the court may refuse” in the first sentence was changed to “section 1749 of this title” to conform reference to V.S.A. style in view of the codification of 1961, No. 103 , §§ 1-12 as §§ 1741-1752, respectively, and to correct an error in the reference.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “after” for “from” following “within three business days” and inserted “prescribed” preceding “penalty” and deleted “herein prescribed” thereafter.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Added subsec. designations and amended section generally.

    —2017. Inserted “business” following “within three” and preceding “days”.

    § 1747. Signed statement.

    The court shall treat the signed statement, if accepted and accompanied by the prescribed penalty, as a plea of guilty and shall make an entry thereof on its records. No costs, fees, or other charges may be assessed against any person so admitting a violation of any such ordinance or shall be allowed or paid to any officer or person because of the violation, but the penalty shall be accepted by the court in full discharge of the criminal liability of the person as a result of the violation.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 7; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 210.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). In the first sentence, inserted “prescribed” preceding “penalty” and deleted “herein prescribed” thereafter.

    § 1748. Collection record.

    The court shall retain all such signed statements for a period of two years from the date thereof and shall keep a record, available to the public at any reasonable time, of all money collected and all other official acts done in connection therewith.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 8.

    § 1749. Penalty.

    1. The penalty that may be voluntarily paid by any person so violating any ordinance regulating metered parking in the town shall be $1.00.  For other violations involving parking a penalty not to exceed $5.00 for the first violation and not to exceed $15.00 for the second or subsequent offense within 30 days of a previous violation shall be paid.  Other violations of the ordinances of the town shall be punished in the manner prescribed by law.
    2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a person violating a parking ordinance for persons with disabilities may be fined not more than $25.00 for each offense.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 9; amended 1977, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 19, 1978; 1981, No. 5 ; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 147.

    History

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted “handicapped” following “violating a” and inserted “for persons with disabilities” following “ordinance”.

    —1981. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 1750. Collections.

    All money so collected by the court in any one month shall be covered into the treasury of the town on the first day of the following month with a statement of the names of the persons from whom the money was collected and the amount paid by each and the date on which the same was collected. However, the court may turn over the money collected during any shorter period at the end of the period with a statement of the same.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 10.

    § 1751. Referendum.

    Sections 1741-1750 and 1752 of this title shall take effect when they have been adopted by a majority of the voters of the town, present and voting at any regular or special meeting warned for that purpose.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 11, eff. May 3, 1961.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Hambley v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 130 Vt. 204, 290 A.2d 18, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1972).

    § 1752. Parked vehicles.

    1. Whenever a motor vehicle is parked on the highways of the town contrary to an ordinance of the town regulating parking so as to interfere with the policing, construction, or maintenance of the highways, including the removal of snow, the police department of the town may cause the motor vehicle to be towed away at the expense of the owner in an amount to be determined by the legislative body of the municipality, provided signs indicating that vehicles may be towed away at the owner’s expense shall be posted conspicuously at or near all areas affected where parking is restricted by ordinance of the town.
    2. The police department and any other enforcement personnel, if authorized by specific action of the local legislative body of a municipality, may impound by use of a so-called “Denver Boot” or other immobilizing device, any vehicle, the owner of which has four or more unpaid parking violations in a calendar year; providing notice that the vehicle in question is subject to impoundment is sent to the offender by first-class mail at least 15 days prior to impoundment.

    HISTORY: Added 1961, No. 103 , § 12; amended 1967, No. 292 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1977, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 19, 1978; 1983, No. 47 , § 1; 1983, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.).

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (a), deleted “but not limited to” following “including” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1983. Substituted “to be determined by the legislative body of the municipality” for “not to exceed $20.00” following “in an amount”.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$20.00” for “$15.00” following “exceed”.

    —1967 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$15.00” for “$5.00” following “exceed”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Removal of stopped vehicles, see § 1102 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Hambley v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 130 Vt. 204, 290 A.2d 18, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1972).

    § 1753. Ordinances authorizing removal.

    The selectboard of a town, the trustees of a village, or the board of aldermen of a city may enact ordinances authorizing the removal of motor vehicles parked without authorization on publicly or privately owned land and including, by illustration and not limitation, public, municipal, or private parking lots, drives, and ways. The owner of the motor vehicle may be required to pay reasonable towing and storage charges, as determined by the legislative body of the municipality, for which a lien may be imposed against the motor vehicle and its owner, or both, which may be in addition to any criminal penalty.

    HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 292 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1977, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. April 19, 1978; 1983, No. 47 , § 2; 1989, No. 9 , § 1.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. Substituted “selectboard” for “selectmen” in the first sentence in accordance with 2013, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 72.

    Amendments

    —1989. Substituted “motor vehicles” for “automobiles” preceding “parked” in the first sentence and rewrote the second sentence.

    —1983. Substituted “in an amount to be determined by the legislative body of the municipality” for “not to exceed $20.00” following “towing charge” and “$2.00” for “$1.00” following “exceed” in the second sentence.

    —1977 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$20.00” for “$15.00” preceding “for such removal” in the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Abandoned motor vehicles, see chapter 21, subchapter 7 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Hambley v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 130 Vt. 204, 290 A.2d 18, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 253 (1972).

    § 1754. Form of payment.

    As a condition of employment on behalf of a municipality, a person hired to remove illegally parked motor vehicles may accept a personal check but in any case is required to accept cash or a certified or bank check, and must also recognize at least two national bank credit cards, any of which may be used as payment for any towing and storage charges.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. April 19, 1978; amended 1989, No. 9 , § 2.

    History

    Amendments

    —1989. Substituted “motor vehicles may accept a personal check but in any case” for “automobiles” preceding “is required to accept”, “cash or a certified or bank” for “a personal” thereafter, and “any” for “all” following “credit card”, and deleted the second and third sentences.

    Chapter 20. Interstate Compact for Motor Vehicle Safety Equipment

    Subchapter 1. Interstate Compact for Motor Vehicle Safety Equipment

    §§ 1801-1810. Repealed. 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

    History

    Former §§ 1801-1810. Former §§ 1801-1810, relating to the interstate compact for motor vehicle safety equipment, were derived from 1963, No. 194 , § 1. Former § 1803 was also amended by 2007, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 63.

    Subchapter 2. Provisions Relating to Interstate Compact for Motor Vehicle Safety Equipment

    §§ 1821-1828. Repealed. 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

    History

    Former §§ 1821-1828. Former §§ 1821-1828, relating to the interstate compact for motor vehicle safety equipment, were derived from 1963, No. 194 , §§ 2-9. Former § 1827 was also amended by 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b).

    Chapter 21. Title to Motor Vehicles

    History

    Revision note—

    Sections 2001-2005, 2011-2029, 2041-2047, 2061-2069 and 2081-2087 of this chapter were originally enacted by 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1-3, as chapter 21, comprising §§ 2001-2031 of this title, chapter 22, comprising §§ 2082-2087 of this title, and chapter 23, comprising §§ 2088-2096 of this title. The sections appearing in chapters 21-23 of this title as added by 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.) were redesignated and the subchapter headings were added in order to provide for a logical and comprehensible integration into Vermont Statutes Annotated of the provisions relating to title to motor vehicles.

    1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, provided: “This act may be cited as the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act.”

    Construction. 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, provided: “This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform to the similar laws of other states.”

    ANNOTATIONS

    Purpose of Act.

    The Certificate of Title Act was enacted to prevent theft and protect creditors with a security interest in a vehicle, not to determine ownership claims underlying insurance coverage disputes. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sumner, 171 Vt. 572, 762 A.2d 849, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 305 (2000) (mem.).

    Cited.

    Cited in Stearns v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 154 Vt. 126, 573 A.2d 692, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 47 (1990).

    Subchapter 1. General Provisions

    § 2001. Definitions.

    Except when the context otherwise requires, as used in this chapter:

    1. “Dealer” means a person as defined in subdivision 4(8) of this title.
    2. “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
    3. “Identification number” means the numbers and letters, if any, on a vehicle designated by the Commissioner for the purpose of identifying the vehicle.
    4. “Lienholder” means a person holding a security interest in a vehicle.
    5. “Owner” for certificate of title purposes, means a person, other than a lienholder, having the property in or title to a vehicle.  The term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest in another person, but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as security.
    6. “Security agreement” means a written agreement which reserves or creates a security interest.
    7. “Security interest” means an interest in a vehicle reserved or created by agreement and which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The term includes the interest of a lessor under a lease intended as security. The term also includes a nonpossessory attachment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction within this State. The term also includes liens obtained by the Commissioner of Taxes pursuant to the provisions of Title 32. Notwithstanding subdivision 2041(2) of this title, the term also includes arrearage liens obtained by the Office of Child Support pursuant to the provisions of Title 15. A security interest is “perfected” when it is valid against third parties generally, subject only to specific statutory exceptions.
    8. “State” means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a province of the Dominion of Canada.
    9. “Vehicle” means a motor vehicle as defined by section 4 of this title.
    10. “Manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate of origin” means the original written instrument or document required to be executed and delivered by the manufacturer to his or her agent or dealer, or a person purchasing direct from the manufacturer, certifying the origin of the vehicle.
    11. “Salvage dealer” means any person who, in a single year, purchases or in any manner acquires three motor vehicles as salvage or who scraps, dismantles, or destroys three motor vehicles in a single year.
    12. “Rebuilt motor vehicle” means a vehicle upon which a salvage certificate of title, parts-only certificate, or other document indicating the vehicle is not sold for re-registration purposes, has been issued and which has been rebuilt and restored for highway operation.
    13. “Salvaged motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle that has been purchased or otherwise acquired as salvage; scrapped, dismantled, or destroyed; or declared a total loss by an insurance company.
    14. “Totaled motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle that has been declared by an insurance company to be a total loss.
    15. “Title or certificate of title” means a written instrument or document that certifies ownership of a vehicle and is issued by the Commissioner or equivalent official of another jurisdiction. These terms do not include an exempt vehicle title authorized to be issued under subdivision 2013(a)(2) of this chapter.
    16. “Secure assignment of title” means a form prescribed by the Commissioner that must be used to transfer ownership of a titled vehicle if all space for assignments upon the title itself has been used.
    17. “Salvage certificate of title” means a title that is stamped or otherwise branded to indicate that the vehicle described thereon is a salvaged motor vehicle.
    18. “Time of sale or transfer” or “date of sale” means the date when physical delivery of the vehicle to the purchaser occurs.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1983, No. 60 , §§ 1, 12; 1983, No. 129 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1987, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 8, 9; 1997, No. 63 , § 19b, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; 2001, No. 69 , § 4; 2015, No. 50 , § 33a, eff. Jan. 1, 2016; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 74.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (13): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (17): Amended generally.

    —2015. Subdiv. (15): Added the second sentence.

    —2001. Subdiv. (18): Added.

    —1997. Subdiv. (7): Added the fifth sentence.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “destroyed or declared a total loss by an insurance company” for “or destroyed” following “dismantled” in subdiv. (13) and added subdivs. (15)-(17).

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Added subdivs. (12)-(14).

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (7): Added the fourth sentence.

    —1983. Subdiv. (7): Added the third sentence.

    Subdiv. (11): Added.

    § 2002. Fees.

    1. The Commissioner shall be paid the following fees:
      1. for any certificate of title, including a salvage certificate of title, or an exempt vehicle title, $35.00;
      2. for each security interest noted upon a certificate of title, including a salvage certificate of title, $11.00;
      3. for a certificate of title after a transfer, $35.00;
      4. for each assignment of a security interest noted upon a certificate of title, $11.00;
      5. for a duplicate certificate of title, including a salvage certificate of title, $35.00;
      6. for an ordinary certificate of title issued upon surrender of a distinctive certificate, $35.00;
      7. for filing a notice of security interest, $11.00;
      8. for a certificate of search of the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, for each motor vehicle searched against, $22.00;
      9. for filing an assignment of a security interest, $11.00;
      10. for a certificate of title after a security interest has been released, $35.00;
      11. for a certificate of title for a motor vehicle acquired by a veteran with financial assistance from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and exempt from registration fees pursuant to section 378 of this title, no fee;
      12. for a corrected certificate of title, $35.00.
    2. If an application, certificate of title, or other document required to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner under any provision of this chapter is not delivered to the Commissioner within 10 days from the time it is required to be mailed or delivered, the Commissioner shall collect, as a penalty, an amount equal to the fee required for the transaction.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1979, No. 202 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, Pt. III, eff. Sept. 1, 1980; 1983, No. 60 , § 6; 1983, No. 129 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1985, No. 118 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1987, No. 112 , § 1; 1989, No. 51 , § 45; 1995, No. 47 , § 13, eff. April 20, 1995; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 27, eff. May 15, 2002; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; 2009, No. 50 , § 53; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 21; 2015, No. 50 , § 33a, eff. Jan. 1, 2016; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 44; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(11): Substituted “acquired by” for “granted” following “vehicle”, “with financial assistance from” for “by” following “veteran”, and “U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs” for “Veterans’ Administration” preceding “and exempt”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivs. (a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(10), and (a)(12): Substituted “$35.00” for “$33.00”.

    Subdivs. (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(7), and (a)(9): Substituted “$11.00” for “$10.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(8): Substituted “$22.00” for “$20.00”.

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(1): Inserted “or an exempt vehicle title” preceding “$33.00”.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Changed fees throughout.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Changed fees throughout.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$28.00” for “$15.00” in subdivs. (1), (3), (5), (6), (10), and (12).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00” in subdivs. (1), (3), (5), (6), (10), and (12), “$7.00” for “$5.00” in subdivs. (2), (4), and (9), and “$20.00” for “$15.00” in subdiv. (8).

    —1995 amendment. Subdiv. (a)(1): Amended generally.

    —1989. Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “$5.00” for “$3.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Substituted “$5.00” for “$3.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(6): Substituted “$10.00” for “$3.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(7): Substituted “$5.00” for “$3.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(8): Substituted “$15.00” for “$7.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(9): Substituted “$5.00” for “$3.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(10): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(12): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00”.

    —1987. Subdiv. (a)(10): Deleted “clear” preceding “title after” and substituted “a” for “the” thereafter and “has” for “or interests have” following “interest”.

    Subdiv. (a)(11): Made minor changes in punctuation.

    Subdiv. (a)(12): Added.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(11): Added.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(2): Inserted “including a salvage certificate of title” preceding “$3.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Inserted “including a salvage certificate of title” preceding “$5.00”.

    —1983. Subdiv. (a)(10): Added.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “$5.00” for “$2.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “$3.00” for “$1.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “$5.00” for “$2.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Substituted “$3.00” for “$1.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Substituted “$5.00” for “$3.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(6): Substituted “$3.00” for “$1.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(7): Substituted “$3.00” for “$1.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(8): Substituted “$7.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(9): Substituted “$3.00” for “$1.00”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Veteran’s exemption from motor vehicle purchase and use tax, see 32 V.S.A. § 8911 .

    Veteran’s exemption from operator’s license fee, see § 609 of this title.

    Veteran’s exemption from registration fee, see § 378 of this title.

    § 2003. Power and duties of Commissioner.

    1. The Commissioner shall prescribe and provide suitable forms of applications, certificates of title, notices of security interests, and all other notices and forms necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
    2. The Commissioner may:
      1. make necessary investigations to procure information required to carry out the provisions of this chapter;
      2. adopt and enforce reasonable rules to carry out the provisions of this chapter;
      3. assign a new identification number to a vehicle if it has none, or its identification number is destroyed or obliterated, and shall issue a new certificate of title showing the new identification number for a fee of $5.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1983, No. 60 , § 2.

    History

    Amendments

    —1983. Subdiv. (b)(3): Deleted “or its motor is changed” preceding “and shall” and “either” thereafter and substituted “for a fee of $5.00” for “or make an appropriate endorsement on the original certificate” following “number”.

    § 2004. Hearing.

    A person aggrieved by an act or omission to act of the Commissioner under this chapter is entitled, upon request, to a hearing in accordance with section 105 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.

    History

    Revision note—

    Deleted “subsection (e) of” preceding “section 105 of this title” as section 105 of this title is not divided into subsecs.

    § 2005. Appeal.

    A person aggrieved by an act or omission of the Commissioner under this chapter may appeal to the Superior Court for Washington County in the same manner as is provided for in other civil actions.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 211.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “to act” following “omission” and “therefrom” following “appeal”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Appeals from decisions of governmental agencies, see V.R.C.P. 74.

    Subchapter 2. Certificates of Title

    § 2011. Certificate of origin.

    When a new vehicle is delivered in this State by the manufacturer to his or her agent or his or her franchised dealer, the manufacturer shall execute and deliver to his or her agent or his or her franchised dealer a certificate of origin in the form prescribed by the Commissioner, and no person shall bring into this State any new vehicle unless he or she has in his or her possession the certificate of origin as prescribed by the Commissioner. The certificate of origin shall contain the manufacturer’s vehicle identification number of the motor vehicle, the name of the manufacturer, the make of the vehicle, the model year, number of cylinders, a general description of the body, if any, and the type of model. When a new vehicle is sold in this State, the manufacturer, his or her agent, or his or her franchised dealer shall execute and deliver to the purchaser, in case of an absolute sale, assignment of the certificate of origin or if other than absolute sale, assignment of the certificate of origin subject to contract, signed or executed by the manufacturer, his or her agent, or his or her dealer, with the genuine names and business or residence addresses of both stated thereon, and certified to have been executed with full knowledge of the contents and with the consent of both purchaser and seller. For good cause shown, the Commissioner may accept any other satisfactory evidence of the information required under this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1983, No. 60 , § 3; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 212.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). In the last sentence, deleted “above required” preceding “information” and inserted “required under this section” thereafter.

    —1983. Inserted “the make of the vehicle, the model year” preceding “number of cylinders” in the second sentence and added the fourth sentence.

    § 2012. Exempted vehicles.

    No certificate of title need be obtained for:

    1. a vehicle owned by the United States, unless it is registered in this State;
    2. a vehicle owned by a manufacturer or dealer and held for sale, even though incidentally moved on the highway or used for purposes of testing or demonstration, or used by an educational institution approved by the Agency of Education for driver training purposes, or a vehicle used by a manufacturer solely for testing;
    3. a vehicle owned by a nonresident of this State and not required by law to be registered in this State;
    4. a vehicle regularly engaged in the interstate transportation of persons or property for which a currently effective certificate of title has been issued in another state;
    5. a self-propelled wheelchair or invalid tricycle;
    6. a motorcycle that has less than 300 cubic centimeters of engine displacement or a motorcycle powered by electricity with less than 20 kilowatts of engine power;
    7. any trailer with an unladened weight of 1,500 pounds or less;
    8. a motor-driven cycle;
    9. any other type of vehicle designed primarily for off-highway use and deemed exempt by the Commissioner; or
    10. a vehicle that is more than 15 years old.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1971, No. 54 , § 1, eff. April 14, 1971; 1977, No. 20 , § 11; 1983, No. 60 , § 7; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 19k, eff. Sept. 1, 2010; 2011, No. 46 , § 11; 2013, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), § 269, eff. Feb. 14, 2014; 2015, No. 50 , § 33a, eff. Jan. 1, 2016.

    History

    Revision note—

    Deleted the designation for subsec. (a) at the beginning of the introductory clause to conform with V.S.A. style. For explanation of redesignation of section generally, see note set out following the section analysis for this chapter.

    Amendments

    —2015. Subdiv. (10): Added.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (2): Substituted “Agency of Education” for “department of education”.

    —2011. Subdiv. (6): Inserted “or a motorcycle powered by electricity with less than 20 kilowatts of engine power” following “displacement”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (8): Substituted “motor-driven cycle” for “moped”.

    —1983. Subdiv. (9): Added.

    —1977. Subdiv. (8): Added.

    —1971. Subdiv. (2): Inserted “or used by an educational institution approved by the department of education for driver training purposes” following “demonstration”.

    Subdiv. (5): Made minor changes in punctuation.

    Subdiv. (6): Added.

    Subdiv. (7): Added.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sumner, 171 Vt. 572, 762 A.2d 849, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 305 (2000) (mem.).

    § 2013. When certificate required; issuance of exempt vehicle title upon request.

      1. Except as provided in section 2012 of this title, the provisions of this chapter shall apply to and a title must be obtained for all motor vehicles at the time of first registration or when a change of registration is required under the provisions of section 321 of this title by reason of a sale for consideration. (a) (1) Except as provided in section 2012 of this title, the provisions of this chapter shall apply to and a title must be obtained for all motor vehicles at the time of first registration or when a change of registration is required under the provisions of section 321 of this title by reason of a sale for consideration.
      2. In addition, a Vermont resident may apply at any time to the Commissioner to obtain an “exempt vehicle title” for a vehicle that is more than 15 years old. Such titles shall be in a form prescribed by the Commissioner and shall include a legend indicating that the title is issued under the authority of this subdivision. The Commissioner shall issue an exempt vehicle title if the applicant pays the applicable fee and fulfills the requirements of this section, and if the Commissioner is satisfied that:
        1. the applicant is the owner of the vehicle;
        2. the applicant is a Vermont resident; and
        3. the vehicle is not subject to any liens or encumbrances.
      3. Prior to issuing an exempt vehicle title pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection, the Commissioner shall require all of the following:
        1. The applicant to furnish one of the following proofs of ownership, in order of preference:
          1. a previous Vermont or out-of-state title indicating the applicant’s ownership;
          2. an original or a certified copy of a previous Vermont or out-of-state registration indicating the applicant’s ownership;
          3. sufficient evidence of ownership as determined by the Commissioner, including bills of sale or original receipts for major components of homebuilt vehicles; or
          4. a notarized affidavit certifying that the applicant is the owner of the vehicle and is unable to produce the proofs listed in subdivisions (i)-(iii) of this subdivision (3)(A) despite reasonable efforts to do so.
        2. A notarized affidavit certifying:
          1. the date the applicant purchased or otherwise took ownership of the vehicle;
          2. the name and address of the seller or transferor, if known;
          3. that the applicant is a Vermont resident; and
          4. that the vehicle is not subject to any liens or encumbrances.
        3. Assignment of a new vehicle identification number pursuant to section 2003 of this title, if the vehicle does not have one.
    1. The Commissioner shall not require an application for a certificate of title upon the renewal of the registration of a vehicle.
    2. The Commissioner shall note on the face of the registration of each vehicle for which a certificate of title has been issued a statement to that effect.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1971, No. 54 , § 2, eff. April 14, 1971; 1995, No. 112 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. Sept. 1, 1996; 2015, No. 50 , § 33a, eff. Jan. 1, 2016; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Revision note—

    At the beginning of subsec. (a), substituted “section 2012” for “section 2002” in view of the redesignation of that section. For explanation of redesignation of section generally, see note set out following the section analysis for this chapter.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “15” for “25” in the first sentence.

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “that are more than 15 years old” for “of 1971 model year or older” following “vehicles” at the end of the sentence.

    —1971. Subsec. (a): Substituted “this title” for “Title 23” following “321 of” and “1971” for “1968” preceding “model”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in In re Covey, 470 F. Supp. 1048, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12660 (D. Vt. 1979).

    § 2014. Repealed. 1971, No. 54, § 3, eff. April 14, 1971.

    History

    Former § 2014. Former § 2014, relating to titles for non-registered vehicles, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 2015. Application for certificate.

    1. The application for the first certificate of title of a vehicle in this State shall be made by the owner to the Commissioner on the form he or she prescribes and shall contain:
      1. the name, residence, and mail address of the owner;
      2. a description of the vehicle, including, so far as the following data exist, its make, model, identification number, odometer reading, or hubometer reading or clock meter reading on all vehicles, type of body, the number of cylinders, and whether new or used;
      3. the date of purchase by the applicant, the name and address of the person from whom the vehicle was acquired, and the names and addresses of any lienholders in the order of their priority and the dates of their security agreements and, if a new vehicle, the application shall be accompanied by a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate of origin;
      4. any further information the Commissioner reasonably requires to identify the vehicle and to enable him or her to determine whether the owner is entitled to a certificate of title and the existence or nonexistence of security interests in the vehicle.
      5. [Repealed.]
    2. If the application refers to a vehicle purchased from a dealer, it shall contain the name and address of any lienholder holding a security interest created or reserved at the time of the sale and the date of his or her security agreement and be signed by the dealer as well as the owner, and the dealer shall promptly mail or deliver the application to the Commissioner unless title is in the possession of a lienholder at the time of sale, in which case the dealer shall have until 30 calendar days after the date the dealer acquired the vehicle to mail or deliver the application to the Commissioner. The dealer shall not be entitled to the extension if the lien on the vehicle was granted by the dealer to finance vehicle inventory acquisition.
    3. If the application refers to a vehicle last previously registered in another state or country, the application shall contain or be accompanied by:
      1. any certificate of title issued by the other state or country;
      2. any other information and documents the Commissioner reasonably requires to establish the ownership of the vehicle and the existence or nonexistence of security interests in it; and
      3. any other proof of the identity of the vehicle the Commissioner reasonably requires.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1983, No. 60 , § 8; 1983, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1985; 1995, No. 19 , § 12, eff. April 17, 1995; 2019, No. 60 , § 19; 2021, No. 76 , § 5, eff. April 1, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (c)(3): Deleted “the certificate of a person authorized by the Commissioner that the identification number of the vehicle has been inspected and found to conform to the description given in the application, or” preceding “any”.

    —2019. Subsec. (b): Inserted “unless title is in the possession of a lienholder at the time of sale, in which case the dealer shall have until 30 calendar days after the date the dealer acquired the vehicle to mail or deliver the application to the Commissioner” following “Commissioner” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1995. Subdiv. (a)(5): Repealed.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(2): Inserted “odometer reading or hubometer reading or clock meter reading on all vehicles” preceding “type”.

    —1983. Subdiv. (a)(5): Added.

    Retroactive effective date of 2021 amendment. 2021, No. 76 , § 38(b) provides: “Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , Sec. 5 (certificate of title; 23 V.S.A. § 2015(c) ) shall take effect retroactively on April 1, 2020.”

    ANNOTATIONS

    Bankruptcy.

    Lienors had no lien on a Chapter 7 debtor’s truck under 23 V.S.A. §§ 2042(b) and 2015(b) because the title application did not identify them until after the bankruptcy petition was filed. The trustee was able to avoid the transfer under either 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 or 11 U.S.C.S. § 549, and the debtors could not exempt the truck after avoidance under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(g) because the transfer was voluntary and the security interest at issue was a purchase money security interest. Obuchowski v. Bourbeau (In Re: Bourbeau), 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 2165 (Bankr. D. Vt. July 18, 2000).

    § 2016. Commissioner to check identification number.

    The Commissioner, upon receiving application for a first certificate of title or exempt vehicle title, shall check the identification number of the vehicle shown in the application against the records of vehicles required to be maintained by section 2017 of this title and against the record of stolen and converted vehicles required to be maintained by section 2084 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; 2015, No. 50 , § 33a, eff. Jan. 1, 2016.

    History

    Revision note—

    Substituted “section 2017” for “section 2009” in view of the redesignation of that section. For explanation of redesignation of section generally, see note set out following the section analysis for this chapter.

    Amendments

    —2015. Inserted “or exempt vehicle title” following “certificate of title”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    § 2017. Issuance of certificate; records.

    1. The Commissioner shall file each application received and, when satisfied as to its genuineness and regularity and that the applicant is entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title, shall issue a certificate of title of the vehicle.
    2. The Commissioner shall maintain at his or her central office a record of all certificates of title issued by him or her for vehicles 15 years old and newer, and of all exempt vehicle titles issued by him or her, under a distinctive title number assigned to the vehicle; under the identification number of the vehicle; alphabetically, under the name of the owner; and, in the discretion of the Commissioner, by any other method he or she determines. The original records may be maintained on microfilm or electronic imaging.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1979, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1983, No. 60 , § 4; 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2015, No. 50 , § 33a, eff. Jan. 1, 2016.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Inserted “and of all exempt vehicle titles issued by him or her” following “old and newer” in the first sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added “or electronic imaging” following “microfilm” in the last sentence.

    —1983. Subsec. (b): Deleted “shall be maintained for two years and” preceding “may” and “thereafter” thereafter in the second sentence.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence.

    § 2018. Information on certificate.

    1. Each certificate of title issued by the Commissioner shall contain:
      1. The date issued.
      2. The name and address of the owner.
      3. The names and addresses of any lienholders, in the order of priority as shown on the application or, if the application is based on a certificate of title, as shown on the certificate; however, no more than two lienholders may appear on a certificate. In the event that there are more than two lienholders on the vehicle, the certificate of title shall contain an appropriate legend as determined by the Commissioner.
      4. The title number assigned to the vehicle.
      5. A description of the vehicle, including, so far as the following data exist, its make, model, identification number, odometer reading, or hubometer reading or clock meter reading on all vehicles, type of body, number of cylinders, whether new or used, and, if a new vehicle, the date of the first sale of the vehicle for use.
      6. Any other data the Commissioner prescribes.
    2. Unless a bond is filed as provided in subdivision 2020(2) of this title, a distinctive certificate of title shall be issued for a vehicle last previously registered in another state or country the laws of which do not require that lienholders be named on a certificate of title to perfect their security interests. The certificate shall contain an appropriate legend as determined by the Commissioner and may contain any other information the Commissioner prescribes. If no notice of a security interest in the vehicle is received by the Commissioner within four months from the issuance of the distinctive certificate of title, he or she shall, upon application and surrender of the distinctive certificate, issue a certificate of title in ordinary form.
    3. The certificate of title shall contain forms for assignment and warranty of title by the owner and for assignment and warranty of title by a dealer, and may contain forms for applications for a certificate of title by a transferee, the naming of a lienholder, and the assignment or release of the security interest of a lienholder.
    4. A certificate of title issued by the Commissioner is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it.
    5. A certificate of title for a vehicle is not subject to garnishment, attachment, execution, or other judicial process, but this subsection does not prevent a lawful levy upon the vehicle.
    6. If a vehicle has been returned to the manufacturer after final determination, adjudication, or settlement pursuant to the provisions of 9 V.S.A. chapter 115 or after final determination, adjudication, or settlement under similar laws of any other state, any certificate of title for the vehicle shall contain an appropriate legend as determined by the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1983, No. 60 , § 5; 1983, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1985; 1999, No. 18 , § 34, eff. May 13, 1999; 2015, No. 50 , § 17.

    History

    Revision note—

    In the first sentence of subsec. (b), substituted “subdivision (2) of section 2020 of this title” for “section 2012” in view of the redesignation of that section and to conform reference to V.S.A. style. For explanation of redesignation of section generally, see note set out following the analysis for this chapter.

    Amendments

    —2015. Rewrote subdiv. (a)(3) and subsecs. (b) and (f).

    —1999. Subsec. (f): Added.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(5): Inserted “odometer reading or hubometer reading or clock meter reading on all vehicles” preceding “type”.

    —1983. Subdiv. (a)(3): Added “however, no more than two lienholders may appear on a certificate” following “the certificate” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    § 2019. Mailing or delivering certificate.

    The certificate of title shall be mailed or personally delivered, upon proper identification of the individual, to the first lienholder named in it or, if none, to the owner. However, a person is entitled to a personal delivery of only one title in a single day and of no more than three titles in a calendar month.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1979, No. 10 ; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 75.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or delivering” preceding “certificate” in the section heading and added the second sentence.

    —1979. Inserted “or personally delivered, upon proper identification of the individual” following “mailed”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    § 2020. Withholding of certificate; bond required.

    If the Commissioner is not satisfied as to the ownership of the vehicle or that there are no undisclosed security interests in it, the Commissioner may register the vehicle but shall either:

    1. Withhold issuance of a certificate of title until the applicant presents documents reasonably sufficient to satisfy the Commissioner as to the applicant’s ownership of the vehicle and that there are no undisclosed security interests in it; or
    2. As a condition of issuing a certificate of title, require the applicant to file with the Commissioner a bond in the form prescribed by the Commissioner and executed by the applicant, and either accompanied by the deposit of cash with the Commissioner or also executed by a person authorized to conduct a surety business in this State. The bond shall be in an amount equal to one and one-half times the value of the vehicle as determined by the Commissioner and conditioned to indemnify any prior owner and lienholder and any subsequent purchaser of the vehicle or person acquiring any security interest in it, and their respective successors in interest, against any expense, loss, or damage, including reasonable attorney’s fees, by reason of the issuance of the certificate of title of the vehicle or on account of any defect in or undisclosed security interest upon the right, title, and interest of the applicant in and to the vehicle. Any such interested person has a right of action to recover on the bond for any breach of its conditions, but the aggregate liability of the surety to all persons shall not exceed the amount of the bond. The bond, and any deposit accompanying it, shall be returned at the end of three years or earlier if the vehicle is no longer registered in this State and the currently valid certificate of title is surrendered to the Commissioner, unless the Commissioner has been notified of the pendency of an action to recover on the bond.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 213.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (2): Substituted “earlier” for “prior thereto” in the last sentence.

    § 2021. Refusal of certificate.

    The Commissioner shall refuse issuance of a certificate of title or an exempt vehicle title if any required fee is not paid or if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that:

    1. the applicant is not the owner of the vehicle;
    2. the application contains a false or fraudulent statement; or
    3. the applicant fails to furnish required information or documents or any additional information the Commissioner reasonably requires.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 2015, No. 50 , § 33a, eff. Jan. 1, 2016.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Inserted “or an exempt vehicle title” following “certificate of title” in the introductory paragraph.

    § 2022. Duplicate certificate.

    1. If a certificate is lost, stolen, mutilated, or destroyed or becomes illegible, the first lienholder or, if none, the owner or legal representative of the owner named in the certificate, as shown by the records of the Commissioner, shall promptly make application for and may obtain a duplicate upon furnishing information satisfactory to the Commissioner. It shall be mailed to the first lienholder named in it or, if none, to the owner.
    2. [Repealed.]
    3. A person recovering an original certificate of title for which a duplicate has been issued shall promptly surrender the original certificate to the Commissioner.
    4. When a duplicate certificate of title is issued, the Commissioner shall cause the original certificate of title for that vehicle to be revoked.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1983, No. 60 , § 9; 1985, No. 106 (Adj. Sess.); 2015, No. 50 , § 18.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Deleted the former second sentence.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Repealed.

    —1983. Subsec. (d): Added.

    § 2023. Transfer of interest in vehicle.

    1. If an owner transfers his or her interest in a vehicle, other than by the creation of a security interest, he or she shall, at the time of delivery of the vehicle, execute an assignment and warranty of title to the transferee in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the Commissioner prescribes, and of the odometer reading or hubometer reading or clock meter reading of the vehicle at the time of delivery in the space provided therefor on the certificate, and cause the certificate and assignment to be mailed or delivered to the transferee or to the Commissioner. Where title to a vehicle is in the name of more than one person, the nature of the ownership must be indicated by one of the following on the certificate of title:
      1. TEN ENT (tenants by the entirety);
      2. JTEN (joint tenants);
      3. TEN COM (tenants in common);
      4. PTNRS (partners); or
      5. TOD (transfer on death).
    2. Upon request of the owner or transferee, a lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall, unless the transfer was a breach of his or her security agreement, either deliver the certificate to the transferee for delivery to the Commissioner or, upon receipt of notice from the transferee of the owner’s assignment, the transferee’s application for a new certificate, and the required fee, mail or deliver the certificate, application, and fee to the Commissioner. The delivery of the certificate does not affect the rights of the lienholder under his or her security agreement. If a dealer accepts a vehicle with a preexisting security interest as part of the consideration for a sale or trade from the dealer, the dealer shall mail or otherwise tender payment to satisfy the security interest within five days of the sale or trade.
    3. If a security interest is reserved or created at the time of the transfer, the certificate of title shall be retained by or delivered to the person who becomes the lienholder, and the parties shall comply with the provisions of section 2043 of this title.
    4. Except as provided in section 2024 of this title and as between the parties, a transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of this section and section 2026 of this title have been complied with; however, an owner who has delivered possession of the vehicle to the transferee and has complied with the provisions of this section and section 2026 of this title requiring action by him or her is not liable as owner for any damages thereafter resulting from operation of the vehicle.
    5. Notwithstanding other provisions of the law, whenever the estate of an individual who dies intestate consists principally of an automobile, the surviving spouse shall be deemed to be the owner of the motor vehicle and title to the same shall automatically and by virtue hereof pass to the surviving spouse. Upon request, the Department shall register and title the vehicle in the name of the surviving spouse, and no fee shall be assessed. This transaction is exempt from the provisions of the purchase and use tax on motor vehicles.
      1. Notwithstanding other provisions of the law, and except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, whenever the estate of an individual consists in whole or in part of a motor vehicle, and the person’s will or other testamentary document does not specifically address disposition of motor vehicles, the surviving spouse shall be deemed to be the owner of the motor vehicle and title to the motor vehicle shall automatically pass to the surviving spouse. Upon request, the Department shall register and title the vehicle in the name of the surviving spouse, and no fee shall be assessed. This transaction is exempt from the provisions of the purchase and use tax on motor vehicles.
      2. This subsection shall apply to no more than two motor vehicles, and shall not apply if the motor vehicle is titled in the name of one or more persons other than the decedent and the surviving spouse.
    6. Where the title identifies a person who will become the owner upon the death of the principal owner (transfer on death), the principal owner shall have all rights of ownership and rights of transfer until his or her death. The designated transferee shall have no rights of ownership until such time as the principal owner has died as established by a valid death certificate. At that time, the transferee shall become the owner of the vehicle subject to any existing security interests.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1975, No. 71 , § 2, eff. April 17, 1975; 1983, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1985; 1983, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1985; 1989, No. 51 , § 46; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 28, eff. May 15, 2002; 2007, No. 39 , § 1; 2009, No. 55 , § 6; 2011, No. 46 , § 13; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 45.

    History

    Revision note—

    Substituted “to the transferee” for “of the transferee” in subsec. (d) to correct a typographical error.

    In the first sentence of subsec. (a), inserted “reading” following “clock meter” for purposes of conformity with the subject matter of that subsec.

    At the end of subsec. (c), substituted “section 2043” for “section 2022” in view of the redesignation of that section.

    In subsec. (d), substituted “2024” for “2016” following “provided in section” and “2026” for “2018” following “this section and section” in two places in view of the redesignation of those sections.

    For explanation of redesignation of the sections of this chapter, see note set out following the section analysis for this chapter.

    Editor’s note

    —1984. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 1983 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 104 and 141, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 1983 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 104 and 141 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e) and subdiv. (e)(1): Amended generally.

    —2011. Subsec. (a): Corrected a typographical error.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “of notice” following “receipt” and substituted “the certificate, application, and fee” for “them” following “deliver”; inserted “or her” following “his”; and added the last sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Inserted “and titling” following “Registration”.

    Subdiv. (e)(1): Substituted “and titling” for “title” following “Registration”.

    —2009. Deleted “or” at the end of subdiv. (a)(3); added “or” at the end of subdiv. (a)(4); added subdiv. (a)(5); and added subsec. (f).

    —2007. Subdiv. (e)(1): Added subdiv. (1) designation, and amended generally.

    Subdiv. (e)(2): Added.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Substituted “$7.00” for “$5.00” in the second sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (e): Substituted “of $5.00” for “not in excess of $2.00” following “transfer fee” in the second sentence.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 104 added the second sentence.

    Act No. 141 inserted “and of the odometer reading or hubometer reading or clock meter of the vehicle at the time of delivery in the space provided therefor on the certificate” following “prescribes” in the first sentence.

    —1975. Subsec. (e): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Distribution of estate by court generally, see 14 V.S.A. § 1721 .

    ANNOTATIONS

    Applicability.

    The provisions of this section and section 2024 of this title did not apply in an action involving a sale between dealers, because these sections apply to sales in which at least one party is a non-dealer owner. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sumner, 171 Vt. 572, 762 A.2d 849, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 305 (2000) (mem.).

    Transfer not effective.

    Decedent’s 2006 registration application did not effectively transfer an interest in the vehicle to appellant, his daughter. Form VD-119 on its own did not purport to serve as a legal mechanism for the transfer of ownership; the decedent failed to assign an interest in the vehicle to appellant in the space provided on the title certificate; and there was no evidence of a bill of sale recording the decedent’s transfer of an interest in the vehicle to appellant. In re Estate of George, 2021 VT 12, — Vt. —, 253 A.3d 899, 2021 Vt. LEXIS 19 (Vt. 2021).

    § 2024. Resale by dealer.

    If a dealer buys a vehicle, holds it for resale, and obtains the certificate of title from the owner or the lienholder, then the certificate need not be sent to the Commissioner. When the dealer transfers the vehicle to a person, other than by the creation of a security interest, he or she shall simultaneously execute the assignment and warranty of title by filling in the spaces on the certificate of title or as prescribed by the Commissioner or, if title is held by a finance source, execute a form prescribed by the Commissioner that provides proof of the transfer but does not release the lien. The certificate shall be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner with the transferee’s application for a new certificate.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 2001, No. 69 , § 5; 2019, No. 60 , § 20.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019. Inserted a comma and deleted “and” preceding “holds it”, inserted a comma following “for resale”, deleted “within 10 days after receiving the vehicle” following “the lienholder”, and inserted “then” preceding “the certificate need not be sent” in the first sentence and added “or, if title is held by a finance source, execute a form prescribed by the Commissioner that provides proof of the transfer but does not release the lien” following “Commissioner” in the second sentence.

    —2001. Section amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Applicability.

    The provisions of section 2023 of this title and this section did not apply in an action involving a sale between dealers, because these sections apply to sales in which at least one party is a non-dealer owner. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sumner, 171 Vt. 572, 762 A.2d 849, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 305 (2000) (mem.).

    § 2025. Involuntary transfers.

    1. If the interest of an owner in a vehicle passes to another other than by voluntary transfer, the transferee shall, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, promptly mail or deliver to the Commissioner the last certificate of title, if available, proof of the transfer, and his or her application for a new certificate in the form the Commissioner prescribes.
    2. If the interest of the owner is terminated or the vehicle is sold under a security agreement by a lienholder named in the certificate of title, the transferee shall promptly mail or deliver to the Commissioner the last certificate of title, his or her application for a new certificate in the form the Commissioner prescribes, and an affidavit made by or on behalf of the lienholder that the vehicle was repossessed and that the interest of the owner was lawfully terminated or sold pursuant to the terms of the security agreement.  If the lienholder succeeds to the interest of the owner and holds the vehicle for resale, he or she need not secure a new certificate of title but, upon transfer to another person, shall promptly mail or deliver to the transferee or to the Commissioner the certificate, affidavit, and other documents required to be sent to the Commissioner by the transferee.
    3. A person holding a certificate of title whose interest in the vehicle has been extinguished or transferred other than by voluntary transfer shall mail or deliver the certificate to the Commissioner upon request of the Commissioner. The delivery of the certificate pursuant to the request of the Commissioner does not affect the rights of the person surrendering the certificate, and the action of the Commissioner in issuing a new certificate of title is not conclusive upon the rights of an owner or lienholder named in the old certificate.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 214.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Deleted “as provided herein” preceding “is not conclusive” in the second sentence.

    § 2026. Fee to accompany applications.

    1. An application for a certificate of title shall be accompanied by the required fee when mailed or delivered to the Commissioner.
    2. An application for the naming of a lienholder or his or her assignee on a certificate of title shall be accompanied by the required fee when mailed or delivered to the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.

    § 2027. Issuance of new certificate.

    1. The Commissioner, upon receipt of a properly assigned certificate of title, with an application for a new certificate of title, the required fee, and any other documents required by law, shall issue a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee as owner and mail to the first lienholder named in it or, if none, to the owner.
    2. The Commissioner, upon receipt of an application for a new certificate of title by a transferee other than by voluntary transfer, with proof of the transfer, the required fee, and any other documents required by law, shall issue a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee as owner. If the outstanding certificate of title is not delivered to him or her, the Commissioner shall make demand therefor from the holder thereof.
    3. The Commissioner shall file and retain for five years every surrendered certificate of title so as to permit the tracing of title of the corresponding vehicles.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1979, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2011, No. 46 , § 20; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 215.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Deleted “, the file to be maintained” following “certificate of title” and substituted “corresponding vehicles” for “vehicle designated therein”.

    —2011. Subsec. (c): Deleted the former second sentence.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added the second sentence.

    § 2028. Repealed. 1983, No. 60, § 11(1).

    History

    Former § 2028. Former § 2028, relating to certificates of title for dismantled or destroyed vehicles, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    The subject matter is now covered by § 2091 of this title.

    § 2029. Suspension or revocation of certificate.

    1. The Commissioner shall suspend or revoke a certificate of title or exempt vehicle title, upon notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard in accordance with section 2004 of this chapter, if he or she finds:
      1. the certificate of title or exempt vehicle title was fraudulently procured or erroneously issued; or
      2. the vehicle has been scrapped, dismantled, or destroyed.
    2. Suspension or revocation of a certificate of title does not, in itself, affect the validity of a security interest noted on it.
    3. When the Commissioner suspends or revokes a certificate of title or exempt vehicle title, the owner or person in possession of it shall, immediately upon receiving notice of the suspension or revocation, mail or deliver the certificate to the Commissioner.
    4. The Commissioner may seize and impound any certificate of title or exempt vehicle title which has been canceled, suspended, or revoked.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 2001, No. 69 , § 6; 2015, No. 50 , § 33a, eff. Jan. 1, 2016.

    History

    Revision note—

    In the introductory paragraph of subsec. (a), substituted “2004” for “2030” following “section” in view of the redesignation of that section. For explanation of redesignation of section generally, see note set out following the section analysis for this chapter.

    In the introductory paragraph of subsec. (a), substituted “chapter” for “act” preceding “if he finds” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2015. Inserted “or exempt vehicle title” following “certificate of title” in two places in subsec. (a) and in subsecs. (c) and (d).

    —2001. Subsec. (d): Inserted “canceled” preceding “suspended”.

    Subchapter 3. Security Interests

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in In re Rule, 38 B.R. 37, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 4932 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983).

    § 2041. Certain liens and security interests not affected.

    This chapter does not apply to or affect:

    1. a lien given by statute or rule of law to a supplier of services or materials for the vehicle;
    2. a lien given by statute to the United States, this State, or any political subdivision of this State;
    3. a security interest in a vehicle created by a manufacturer or dealer who holds the vehicle for sale, but a buyer in the ordinary course of trade from the manufacturer or dealer takes free of the security interest.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.

    § 2042. Perfecting security interest.

    1. Unless excepted by section 2041 of this title, a security interest in a vehicle of a type for which a certificate of title is required is not valid against creditors of the owner or subsequent transferees or lienholders of the vehicle unless perfected as provided in this subchapter.
    2. A security interest is perfected by the delivery to the Commissioner of the existing certificate of title, if any, an application for a certificate of title containing the name and address of the lienholder and the date of his or her security agreement, and the required fee.  It is perfected as of the time of its creation if delivery is completed within 20 days thereafter, otherwise as of the time of the delivery.
    3. If a vehicle is subject to a security interest when brought into this State, the validity of the security interest is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the vehicle was when the security interest attached, subject to the following:
      1. If the parties understood at the time the security interest attached that the vehicle would be kept in this State and it was brought into this State within 30 days thereafter for purposes other than transportation through this State, the validity of the security interest in this State is determined by the law of this State.
      2. If the security interest was perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the vehicle was when the security interest attached, the following rules apply:
        1. If the name of the lienholder is shown on an existing certificate of title issued by that jurisdiction, his or her security interest continues perfected in this State.
        2. If the name of the lienholder is not shown on an existing certificate of title issued by that jurisdiction, the security interest continues perfected in this State for four months after a first certificate of title of the vehicle is issued in this State, and also thereafter if, within the four-month period, it is perfected in this State.  The security interest may also be perfected in this State after the expiration of the four-month period; in that case perfection dates from the time of perfection in this State.
      3. If the security interest was not perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the vehicle was when the security interest attached, it may be perfected in this State; in that case, perfection dates from the time of perfection in this State.
      4. A security interest may be perfected under subdivision (2)(B) or subdivision (3) of this subsection either as provided in subsection (b) of this section or by the lienholder delivering to the Commissioner a notice of security interest in the form the Commissioner prescribes and the required fee.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1979, No. 38 .

    History

    Revision note—

    In subsec. (a), substituted “2041” for “2003” following “section” and “subchapter” for “chapter” following “provided in this” in view of the redesignation of that section and provisions relating to perfection of security interest of former chapter 21 of this title, as enacted by 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, as this subchapter, comprising §§ 2041-2047.

    In the second sentence of subdiv. (c)(2)(B), substituted “in” for “of” following “time of perfection” to correct a grammatical error.

    Amendments

    —1979. Subsec. (b): In the second sentence, substituted “twenty” for “ten” preceding “days”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Clerical errors.

    A creditor perfects its security interest in a vehicle by delivering an application for a certificate of title in accordance with subsec. (b) of this section, despite a clerical failure to note the encumbrance on the title. In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    A security interest in a vehicle is perfected once the creditor has presented the proper application for a certificate of title; a clerk’s erroneous omission of the lienholder’s name on the certificate of title will not defeat perfection of the lien. In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    A lienholder who has fully complied with this section and has not contributed to the erroneous omission of the lien on the certificate of title enjoys a perfected security interest in the titled vehicle. In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    Construction with other laws.

    It was not error for a bankruptcy court to conclude that a creditor’s interest was unsecured because the prior lienholder properly returned the certificate of title to the debtor and the creditor did not take any affirmative steps to assure that its security interest in the debtor’s commercial truck was protected. Tenn. Commerce Bank v. Hutchins, 409 B.R. 680, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67232 (D. Vt. 2009).

    The perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle is governed both by Title 9A, the Uniform Commercial Code, and this section, which must be read in pari materia. In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    In view of explicit statutory commands regarding what is essential for the creation and perfection of a security interest in a previously registered motor vehicle, reliance on principles and precepts of the Uniform Commercial Code relative to the subject is misplaced. In re Covey, 470 F. Supp. 1048, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12660 (D. Vt. 1979).

    Title application.

    Lienors had no lien on a Chapter 7 debtor’s truck under 23 V.S.A. §§ 2042(b) and 2015(b) because the title application did not identify them until after the bankruptcy petition was filed. The trustee was able to avoid the transfer under either 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 or 11 U.S.C.S. § 549, and the debtors could not exempt the truck after avoidance under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(g) because the transfer was voluntary and the security interest at issue was a purchase money security interest. Obuchowski v. Bourbeau (In Re: Bourbeau), 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 2165 (Bankr. D. Vt. July 18, 2000).

    This section does not require a creditor to ensure that its lien is indicated on the certificate of title issued pursuant to subdiv. 2018(a)(3) of this title; the title application alone satisfies the requirement for perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle. In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    A title application alone satisfies the requirement for perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle. GMAC v. Lefevre, 38 B.R. 980, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12901 (D. Vt. 1983).

    Unperfected interests.

    Where dealer selling truck mistakenly thought bank loaning money for it had a security interest in truck and listed bank as first lienholder on application for certificate of title and Commissioner sent bank a certificate indicating bank was first lienholder, and bank had not taken a security interest in the truck, taking one in land instead, and four months later the bank and buyer exchanged the security interest in the land for one in the truck, but bank did not file an application listing it as lienholder, as required by this chapter, bank had no security interest and thus had no valid claim to the truck when buyer went bankrupt; and the prior mistaken filing by dealer could not be relied upon by bank on theory that it put subsequent purchasers, creditors, and lienholders on notice of existence of bank’s security interest and that bank should thus be regarded as having a perfected security interest. In re Covey, 470 F. Supp. 1048, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12660 (D. Vt. 1979).

    Notes to Opinions

    Construction with other laws.

    Section 2047 of this title indicates that as to motor vehicles, the provisions of sections 9-301 et seq. and 9-401 et seq. of Title 9A, necessitating certain filings with the town clerk in order to perfect security interests, have been superseded by this section. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 348.

    § 2043. Duties on creation of security interest.

    If an owner creates a security interest in a vehicle:

    1. The owner shall immediately execute the application, in the space provided therefor on the certificate of title or on a separate form the Commissioner prescribes, to name the lienholder on the certificate, showing the name and address of the lienholder and the date of his or her security agreement, and cause the certificate, the application, and the required fee to be delivered to the lienholder.
    2. The lienholder shall immediately cause the certificate, the application, and the required fee to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner.
    3. Upon request of the owner or subordinate lienholder, a lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall either mail or deliver the certificate to the subordinate lienholder for delivery to the Commissioner or, upon receipt from the subordinate lienholder of the owner’s application and the required fee, mail or deliver them to the Commissioner with the certificate.  The delivery of the certificate does not affect the rights of the first lienholder under his or her security agreement.
    4. Upon receipt of the certificate of title, the application, and the required fee, the Commissioner shall either endorse the certificate or issue a new certificate containing the name and address of the new lienholder, and mail the certificate to the first lienholder named in it.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction with other laws.

    In view of explicit statutory commands regarding what is essential for the creation and perfection of a security interest in a previously registered motor vehicle, reliance on principles and precepts of the Uniform Commercial Code relative to the subject is misplaced. In re Covey, 470 F. Supp. 1048, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12660 (D. Vt. 1979).

    Unperfected interests.

    Where dealer selling truck mistakenly thought bank loaning money for it had a security interest in truck and listed bank as first lienholder on application for certificate of title and Commissioner sent bank a certificate indicating bank was first lienholder, and bank had not taken a security interest in the truck, taking one in land instead, and four months later the bank and buyer exchanged the security interest in the land for one in the truck, but bank did not file an application listing it as lienholder, as required by this chapter, bank had no security interest and thus had no valid claim to the truck when buyer went bankrupt; and the prior mistaken filing by dealer could not be relied upon by bank on theory that it put subsequent purchasers, creditors, and lienholders on notice of existence of bank’s security interest and that bank should thus be regarded as having a perfected security interest. In re Covey, 470 F. Supp. 1048, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12660 (D. Vt. 1979).

    § 2044. Assignment of security interest.

    1. A lienholder may assign, absolutely or otherwise, his or her security interest in the vehicle to a person other than the owner without affecting the interest of the owner or the validity of the security interest, but any person without notice of the assignment is protected in dealing with the lienholder as the holder of the security interest and the lienholder remains liable for any obligations as lienholder until the assignee is named as lienholder on the certificate.
    2. The assignee may, but need not to perfect the assignment, have the certificate of title endorsed or issued with the assignee named as lienholder, upon delivering to the Commissioner the certificate and an assignment by the lienholder named in the certificate in the form the Commissioner prescribes.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.

    § 2045. Release of security interest.

    1. Upon satisfaction of a security interest in a vehicle for which the lienholder possesses the certificate of title, the lienholder shall, within 12 business days after a request for release of the security interest, fully execute a release of the security interest in the space provided on the certificate or in the form the Commissioner prescribes and mail or deliver the certificate and release to the next named lienholder or, if none, to the owner or any person authorized by the owner to receive the certificate (hereafter, “owner’s designee”). The owner or the owner’s designee, other than a dealer holding the vehicle for resale, shall promptly cause the certificate and release to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner, who shall release the lienholder’s rights on the certificate or issue a new certificate.
    2. Upon satisfaction of the security interest of a subordinate lienholder who does not possess the certificate of title, the subordinate lienholder shall, within 12 business days after a request for release of the security interest, fully execute a release in the form the Commissioner prescribes and deliver the release to the owner or the owner’s designee. The lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall either deliver the certificate to the owner or the owner’s designee for delivery to the Commissioner or, if the lienholder in possession receives the release, mail or deliver it with the certificate to the Commissioner, who shall release the subordinate lienholder’s rights on the certificate or issue a new certificate. A subordinate lienholder whose security interest is fully satisfied but receives the certificate of title pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall, within three business days of its receipt, mail or deliver the title to the owner or the owner’s designee.
    3. For purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, a release not sent by electronic means is deemed fully executed when it is completed and placed in the U.S. mail postage prepaid or delivered to the person requesting the release as shown on the form so requesting it.
    4. A lienholder that fails to satisfy the requirements of subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall, upon written demand sent by certified mail, be liable to pay the owner or the owner’s designee $25.00 per day for each day that the requirements of subsection (a) or (b) remain unsatisfied, up to a maximum of $2,500.00, in addition to any other remedies that may be available at law or equity. If the lienholder fails to pay the amount owed under this subsection within 60 days following the written demand, the owner or the owner’s designee may bring a civil action and, if the lienholder is found to have violated subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the amount owed under this subsection shall be trebled, resulting in an award of up to $7,500.00, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs shall be awarded.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 2011, No. 46 , § 14; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 216.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the first sentence, deleted “therefor” following “space provided” and inserted “named” preceding “lienholder” and deleted “named therein” thereafter.

    —2011. Subsec. (a): Inserted “lienholder possesses the” preceding “certificate”; substituted “the lienholder” for “is in the possession of the lienholder, he or she”, following “title”, “12 business” for “10 days” following “within”; substituted “a request for release of the security interest, fully” for “demand and, in any event, within 30 days” following “after”, “in the form” for “as” following “certificate or”, authorized by” for “who delivers to the lienholder an authorization from” following “person”; inserted “(hereafter, ‘owner’s designee’)” following “certificate” and “or the owner’s designee” following “owner”.

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    Subsecs. (c) and (d): Added.

    § 2046. Lienholder to furnish information.

    A lienholder named in a certificate of title shall, upon written request of the owner or of another lienholder named on the certificate, disclose any pertinent information as to his or her security agreement and the indebtedness secured by it.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.

    § 2047. Method of perfecting security interest exclusive.

    The method provided in this subchapter of perfecting and giving notice of security interests subject to this subchapter is exclusive. Security interests subject to this subchapter are hereby exempted from the provisions of law that otherwise require or relate to the filing of instruments creating or evidencing security interests.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.

    History

    Revision note—

    In the first sentence, substituted “subchapter” for “chapter” in view of the redesignation of provisions relating to perfection of security interests of former chapter 21 of this title, as enacted by 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, as this subchapter, comprising §§ 2041-2047.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction with other laws.

    In view of explicit statutory commands regarding what is essential for the creation and perfection of a security interest in a previously registered motor vehicle, reliance on principles and precepts of the Uniform Commercial Code relative to the subject is misplaced. In re Covey, 470 F. Supp. 1048, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12660 (D. Vt. 1979).

    Cited.

    Cited in In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    Notes to Opinions

    Construction with other laws.

    The wording of this section indicates that to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter, provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code governing perfection of security interests have been superseded by this subchapter. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 348.

    § 2048. Terminal rental adjustment clauses; vehicle leases that are not sales or security interests.

    In the case of motor vehicles or trailers, notwithstanding any other provision of law, a transaction does not create a sale or security interest merely because it provides that the rental price is permitted or required to be adjusted under the agreement either upward or downward by reference to the amount realized upon sale or other disposition of the motor vehicle or trailer.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 27 , § 6.

    Subchapter 4. Previously Registered Vehicles

    §§ 2061-2069. Repealed. 1983, No. 60, § 11(2)-(10).

    History

    Former §§ 2061-2069. Former § 2061, relating to definition of “previously registered vehicle”, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Former § 2062, relating to exemptions of previously registered vehicles, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Former § 2063, relating to issuance of distinctive certificates, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Former § 2064, relating to perfection of security interest, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Former § 2065, relating to perfection of security interest under other statutes, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Former § 2066, relating to filing of notice of security interest, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and amended by 1979, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    Former § 2067, relating to assignment of security interest, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Former § 2068, relating to release of security interest, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Former § 2069, relating to lienholders furnishing information, was derived from 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    Subchapter 5. Anti-Theft Provisions and Penalties

    § 2081. Application of subchapter.

    1. This subchapter does not apply to a self-propelled wheelchair or invalid tricycle.
    2. The provisions of this subchapter that apply to certificates of title shall also apply to salvage certificates of title, exempt vehicle titles, certificates of origin, and secure assignments of title.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2015, No. 50 , § 33a, eff. Jan. 1, 2016.

    History

    Revision note—

    This section, which was originally enacted by 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, as 2002(b) in chapter 21 of this title and redesignated as § 2081, was rewritten in view of that redesignation. For explanation of redesignation of section generally, see note set out following the section analysis for this chapter.

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Inserted “exempt vehicle titles” following “certificates of title”.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    § 2082. Altering, forging, or counterfeiting certificates; penalty.

    1. A person who with fraudulent intent commits any of the following acts shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) of this section:
      1. alters, forges, counterfeits, or knowingly makes or causes to be made a false official certificate of title;
      2. alters or forges an assignment of a certificate of title, or an assignment or release of a security interest, on a certificate of title or a form the Commissioner prescribes;
      3. has possession of or uses a certificate of title knowing it to have been altered, forged, counterfeited, or fraudulently obtained or made; or
      4. uses a false or fictitious name or address, or makes a material false statement, or fails to disclose a security interest, or conceals any other material fact in or alters information on or forges a signature on an application for a certificate of title or duplicate certificate of title.
    2. A person convicted of violating this section shall be fined not less than $500.00 or more than $5,000.00 or be imprisoned not less than one year or more than five years, or both.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 2001, No. 69 , § 7; 2015, No. 47 , § 37.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —2001. Subdiv. (1): Deleted “or” preceding “counterfeits” and substituted “or knowingly makes or causes to be made a false official” for “a” thereafter and made a minor change in punctuation.

    Subdiv. (3): Deleted “or” preceding “counterfeited” and inserted “or fraudulently obtained or made” thereafter and made a minor change in punctuation.

    Subdiv. (4): Inserted “or alters information on or forges a signature on” following “fact in” and made a minor change in punctuation.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (4): Inserted “or duplicate certificate of title” preceding “shall be fined” and substituted “$5,000.00” for “$1,000.00” preceding “or be imprisoned”.

    § 2083. Other offenses.

    1. A person who:
      1. knowing that another person is not entitled to use or possess a certificate of title, knowingly permits that person to use or possess the certificate, shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in subdivision (5) of this subsection;
      2. knowingly fails to mail or deliver a certificate of title or application for a certificate of title to the Commissioner within 30 days after the transfer or creation or satisfaction of a security interest shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in subdivision (5) of this subsection;
      3. knowingly fails to deliver to his or her transferee a certificate of title within 30 days after the transfer shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in subdivision (5) of this subsection;
      4. knowingly and without authority signs a name other than his or her own on any title, or knowingly alters or inaccurately states the chain of ownership or other information required on any title, or knowingly fails to return a certificate of title that has been fraudulently made, or knowingly has unauthorized possession of blank certificates of title or manufacturer’s certificates of origin, shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in subdivision (5) of this subsection;
      5. knowingly violates any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subdivision (6) of this subsection or section 2082 of this title, shall be fined not more than $2,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both; or
      6. knowingly represents as his or her own or sells or transfers a motor vehicle or vessel to which he or she does not hold legal title or is not authorized by the titleholder to sell or transfer, shall be fined not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, for each offense.
    2. Absent a showing of a knowing failure to deliver as provided in subdivision (a)(3) of this section, a person who fails to deliver to his or her transferee a certificate of title within 30 days after the transfer commits a traffic violation and shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $1,000.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2001, No. 69 , § 8; 2009, No. 39 , § 6; 2011, No. 46 , § 15; 2019, No. 60 , § 22.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019. Subdivs. (a)(2) and (a)(3): Substituted “30” for “20”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “30” for “10”.

    —2011. Section amended generally.

    —2009. Added subsec. (a) designation; in subdiv. (a)(1), inserted “who is” after “another” and deleted “thereto” after “entitled”; in subdiv. (a)(2), substituted “for a certificate of title” for “therefor” and substituted “20” for “10”; substituted “20” for “10” in subdiv. (a)(3); made two minor punctuation changes in subdiv. (a)(4); in subdiv. (a)(5), substituted “(6)” for “(5)” and made a minor punctuation change; made two minor punctuation changes in subdiv. (a)(6); and added subsec. (b).

    —2001. Section amended generally.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (4): Substituted “$1,000.00” for “$500.00” preceding “or imprisoned” and “one year” for “six months” preceding “or both”.

    § 2084. Report of theft, recovery of unclaimed vehicle.

    1. An enforcement officer, sheriff, or constable who learns of the theft of a vehicle not since recovered, or of the recovery of a vehicle whose theft or conversion he or she knows or has reason to believe has been reported to the Commissioner, shall forthwith report the theft or recovery to the Commissioner.
    2. An owner or a lienholder may report the theft of a vehicle, or its conversion if a crime, to the Commissioner, but the Commissioner may disregard the report of a conversion unless a warrant has been issued for the arrest of a person charged with the conversion.  A person who has so reported the theft or conversion of a vehicle shall, forthwith after learning of its recovery, report the recovery to the Commissioner.
    3. An operator of a place of business for garaging, repairing, parking, or storing vehicles for the public, in which a vehicle remains unclaimed for a period of 30 days, shall, within five days after the expiration of that period, report the vehicle as unclaimed to the Commissioner. A vehicle left by its owner whose name and address are known to the operator or his or her employee is not considered unclaimed. A person who fails to report a vehicle as unclaimed in accordance with this subsection forfeits all claims and liens for its garaging, parking, or storing and shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $25.00 for each day his or her failure to report continues.
    4. The Commissioner shall maintain and appropriately index weekly any cumulative public records of stolen, converted, recovered, and unclaimed vehicles reported to him or her pursuant to this section. The Commissioner may make and distribute copies of the weekly records so maintained to enforcement officers upon request without fee and to others for the fee, if any, the Commissioner prescribes.
    5. The Commissioner may suspend the registration of a vehicle whose theft or conversion is reported to him or her pursuant to this section; until the Commissioner learns of its recovery or that the report of its theft or conversion was erroneous, he or she shall not issue a certificate of title for the vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 217.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined” in the last sentence.

    § 2085. False report.

    A person who knowingly makes a false report of the theft or conversion of a vehicle to an enforcement officer or to the Commissioner shall be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.

    § 2086. Impeachment of defendant.

    In a prosecution for a crime specified in this subchapter, a certified copy of a conviction under section 2082 of this title is admissible to impeach the credibility of the defendant.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.

    § 2087. Construction with other laws.

    The penal provisions of this subchapter in no way repeal or modify any existing provision of criminal law but are additional and supplementary.

    HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 297 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1971; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 218.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “thereto” at the end.

    Subchapter 6. Salvage Title

    § 2091. Salvage certificates of title; forwarding of plates and titles of crushed vehicles.

    1. Except for vehicles for which no certificate of title is required pursuant to section 2012 of this title and for vehicles that are more than 15 years old, any person who purchases or in any manner acquires a vehicle as salvage; any person who scraps, dismantles, or destroys a motor vehicle; or any insurance company or representative thereof who declares a motor vehicle to be a total loss, shall apply to the Commissioner for a salvage certificate of title within 15 days of the time the vehicle is purchased or otherwise acquired as salvage; is scrapped, dismantled, or destroyed; or is declared a total loss. However, an insurance company or representative thereof proceeding under subsection (c) of this section may apply outside this 15-day window to the extent necessary to comply with the requirements of that subsection.
    2. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the application shall be accompanied by:
      1. any certificate of title; and
      2. any other information or documents that the Commissioner may reasonably require to establish ownership of the vehicle and the existence or nonexistence of any security interest in the vehicle.
      1. An insurer required to obtain a salvage certificate of title under this section for a vehicle declared a total loss, or a representative of the insurer, may obtain the title without satisfying the requirements of subsection (b) of this section if the application for the salvage certificate of title is accompanied by: (c) (1) An insurer required to obtain a salvage certificate of title under this section for a vehicle declared a total loss, or a representative of the insurer, may obtain the title without satisfying the requirements of subsection (b) of this section if the application for the salvage certificate of title is accompanied by:
        1. the required fee;
        2. evidence that the insurer has made payment for the total loss of the vehicle, and evidence that the payment was made to any lienholder identified in the records of certificates of title of the Department and to the vehicle owner, if applicable; and
        3. a copy of the insurer’s written request for the certificate of title sent at least 30 days prior to the application to the vehicle owner and to any lienholder identified in the records of certificates of title of the Department, proof that the request was sent by certified mail or was delivered by a courier service that provides proof of delivery, and copies of any responses from the vehicle owner or lienholder.
      2. If the Commissioner issues a salvage certificate of title to an eligible person under this subsection, the title shall be issued free and clear of all liens.
    3. Except for vehicles for which no certificate of title is required under this chapter, when a vehicle is destroyed by crushing for scrap, the person causing the destruction shall immediately mail or deliver to the Commissioner the certificate of title endorsed “crushed” and signed by the person, accompanied by the original plate showing the original vehicle identification number. The plate shall not be removed until such time as the vehicle is crushed.
    4. This section shall not apply to, and salvage certificates of title shall not be required for, unrecovered stolen vehicles or vehicles stolen and recovered in an undamaged condition, provided that the original vehicle identification number plate has not been removed, altered, or destroyed and the number thereon is identical with that on the original title certificate.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 60 , § 10; amended 1983, No. 129 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2007, No. 19 , § 6; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 76.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2007. Subsec. (a): Substituted “15” for “ten” preceding “years” near the beginning of the first sentence and “The” for “Such” preceding “application” at the beginning of the second sentence.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “and for vehicles which are more than ten years old” preceding “any person” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “the person causing the destruction shall immediately mail or deliver to the commissioner the certificate of title, if any, endorsed ‘crushed’ and signed by the person” for “in addition to the requirements set forth in subsection (a), the application shall also be” preceding “accompanied” in the first sentence.

    § 2092. Issuance of salvage title.

    The Commissioner shall file and maintain in the manner provided in section 2017 of this title each application received and when satisfied as to its genuineness and regularity and that the applicant is entitled to the issuance of a salvage certificate of title, shall issue a salvage certificate of title to the vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 60 , § 10; amended 1983, No. 129 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    History

    Amendments

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the former second sentence.

    § 2093. Salvaged, totaled, and rebuilt vehicles.

    1. If a vehicle upon which a salvage certificate of title, a parts-only certificate, or other document indicating the vehicle is not sold for re-registration purposes has been or should have been issued by the Commissioner or by any other jurisdiction or person, or a vehicle that has been declared a totaled motor vehicle is rebuilt and restored for highway operation, the owner thereof shall not apply for a certificate of title or registration, and none shall be issued until the vehicle has been inspected by the Commissioner or his or her authorized representative. The inspection of the vehicle shall be conducted in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner and shall include verification of the vehicle identification number and bills of sale or titles for major component parts used to rebuild the vehicle. When necessary, a new vehicle identification number shall be attached to the vehicle as provided by section 2003 of this title. Any new title issued for such vehicles shall contain the legend “rebuilt.”
    2. Any person who sells, trades, or offers for sale or trade any interest in a salvaged, salvaged and rebuilt, or totaled vehicle shall disclose the fact that the vehicle has been salvaged, salvaged and rebuilt, or totaled to a prospective purchaser both orally and in writing before a sale, trade, or transfer is made.  Written disclosure that the vehicle has been salvaged, salvaged and rebuilt, or totaled, in addition to being disclosed on the certificate of title as required by this subchapter, shall also be conspicuously disclosed on any bill of sale, transfer, purchase, or other agreement.
    3. Failure of the seller to provide the notices required by this section shall result in the seller being required, at the option of the buyer, to refund to the buyer the purchase price, including taxes, license fees, and similar governmental charges.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 60 , § 10; amended 1987, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2015, No. 50 , § 19.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Substituted “or” for “and or both” following “jurisdiction or person” in the first sentence and “ ‘rebuilt’ ” for “ ‘rebuilt vehicle’ ” in the last sentence.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “or should have been” following “purposes has been” and “or person and/or a vehicle that has been declared a totaled motor vehicle” following “jurisdiction” in the first sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Salvaged, totaled and rebuilt” for “Rebuilt” in the beginning of the section heading, designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and inserted “, a parts-only certificate or other document indicating the vehicle is not sold for re-registration purposes” preceding “has been issued by” in the first sentence of that subsec., and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Buyer’s right to refund.

    Requiring a seller to refund the purchase price under the salvage title law without receiving the car in return would be a windfall for the buyer. Therefore, at the buyer’s election, either the seller had to reimburse the buyer for the purchase price of the car, along with taxes and fees, in exchange for the return of the car, or the buyer could keep the car and the seller had to prove the actual value of the car as a salvaged vehicle and reimburse him for the difference between his purchase price and the newly established value. Gregory v. Poulin Auto Sales, Inc., 2010 VT 85, 188 Vt. 619, 9 A.3d 679, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2010) (mem.).

    Trial court erred in finding that buyer intended to keep car where buyer took car back to dealership and demanded immediate refund of purchase price together with cost of his repairs, and when buyer did not obtain satisfaction, he took car with him and had his attorney write and advise dealership that he was revoking acceptance and would return car at time and place that was mutually convenient. Jensvold v. Town & Country Motors, Inc., 162 Vt. 580, 649 A.2d 1037, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 98 (1994).

    After offer to tender vehicle for refund is rejected, buyer’s use of vehicle does not nullify offer, otherwise any seller could deprive buyer of refund remedy under Salvage Title Act by refusing to refund purchase price and forcing buyer to retain vehicle. Jensvold v. Town & Country Motors, Inc., 162 Vt. 580, 649 A.2d 1037, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 98 (1994).

    Buyer’s visit to dealership, to demand immediate refund of purchase price together with cost of repairs, and attorney’s letter were each independently sufficient to notify seller that buyer did not want vehicle and did not desire to retain it. Jensvold v. Town & Country Motors, Inc., 162 Vt. 580, 649 A.2d 1037, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 98 (1994).

    Buyer was entitled to refund of purchase price, taxes, license fees, and similar governmental charges where seller knew vehicle was “clipped” but did not disclose that fact to buyer. Jensvold v. Town & Country Motors, Inc., 162 Vt. 580, 649 A.2d 1037, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 98 (1994).

    Effect of buyer’s use.

    Although buyer was entitled to refund of purchase price of vehicle which seller knew was “clipped,” seller was entitled to setoff equivalent to value of buyer’s use of vehicle under general equitable principles even though this section is silent on subject. Jensvold v. Town & Country Motors, Inc., 162 Vt. 580, 649 A.2d 1037, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 98 (1994).

    Security interests.

    A creditor’s perfected security interest in a truck which was destroyed in an accident did not extend to a reconstructed truck, incorporating parts salvaged from the original vehicle, which was given a new vehicle identification number. In re Farnham, 57 B.R. 241, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

    Seller’s liability.

    Nothing in the salvage title law suggests protection for an innocent seller nor requires that the seller be aware of any defect; the application of the statute is not predicated on the seller’s knowledge of any title defects. Accordingly, there was no merit to a seller’s argument that there was no violation of the statute because the seller had no knowledge that the car it sold was salvaged. Gregory v. Poulin Auto Sales, Inc., 2010 VT 85, 188 Vt. 619, 9 A.3d 679, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2010) (mem.).

    There was no merit to a seller’s argument that the car it sold did not fall under the purview of the salvage title statute because the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) had failed to issue a salvage title. While the statute laid out facets of the inspection the DMV had to undertake before issuing a salvage title, it placed any liability and all responsibility squarely on the seller; the question was the condition of the vehicle and the demand for a refund, not the status of the title. Gregory v. Poulin Auto Sales, Inc., 2010 VT 85, 188 Vt. 619, 9 A.3d 679, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2010) (mem.).

    § 2094. Records; inspection.

    1. Each person who purchases or in any manner acquires a motor vehicle as salvage shall keep and maintain for a period of not less than five years such records as may be prescribed by the Commissioner which are reasonably necessary to substantiate the information contained in the application required by sections 2091 and 2093 of this title. These records shall include parts and accessories obtained and used for the repair or rebuilding, or both, of a vehicle, and such financial records that will allow the Commissioner to determine if the person qualifies to become or remain licensed as a “salvage dealer.”
    2. The Commissioner or his or her agents may inspect and examine the books, records, premises, and vehicles on the premises of any salvage dealer during the usual business hours of the day to verify the truth and accuracy of any information furnished in connection with the provisions of this subchapter.
    3. Any salvage dealer who in any manner receives a motor vehicle which does not have a plate attached to said vehicle bearing the vehicle identification number shall notify the Commissioner in writing that such a vehicle has been received within seven days.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 60 , § 10; amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (a), deleted “but are not limited to” following “shall include” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added the second sentence.

    § 2095. Penalty.

    1. A person who violates any provision of section 2094 of this subchapter shall be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
    2. A person who violates any provision of this subchapter other than section 2094 shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 60 , § 10; amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 15.

    History

    Amendments

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), inserted “section 2094 of” preceding “this subchapter” in that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

    Subchapter 7. Abandoned Motor Vehicles

    § 2151. Definitions.

    As used in this subchapter:

      1. “Abandoned motor vehicle” means: (1) (A) “Abandoned motor vehicle” means:
        1. a motor vehicle that has remained on public or private property or on or along a highway for more than 48 hours without the consent of the owner or person in control of the property and has a valid registration plate or public vehicle identification number that has not been removed, destroyed, or altered; or
        2. a motor vehicle that has remained on public or private property or on or along a highway without the consent of the owner or person in control of the property for any period of time if the vehicle does not have a valid registration plate or the public vehicle identification number has been removed, destroyed, or altered.
      2. “Abandoned motor vehicle” does not include a vehicle or other equipment used or to be used in construction or in the operation or maintenance of highways or public utility facilities, which is left in a manner that does not interfere with the normal movement of traffic.
    1. “Landowner” means a person who owns or leases or otherwise has authority to control use of real property.
    2. “Public vehicle identification number” means the public vehicle identification number that is usually visible through the windshield and attached to the driver’s side of the dashboard, instrument panel, or windshield pillar post or on the doorjamb on the driver’s side of the vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 101 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 77.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 2152. Authorized removal of abandoned motor vehicles.

    1. Public property.   A law enforcement officer is authorized to remove or cause removal of an abandoned motor vehicle from public property, and may contact a towing service for its removal, based upon personal observation by the officer that the vehicle is an abandoned motor vehicle.
    2. Private property.
      1. A law enforcement officer is authorized to remove or cause removal of an abandoned motor vehicle from private property, and may contact a towing service for its removal, based upon the request of the landowner on whose property the vehicle is located and information indicating that the vehicle is an abandoned motor vehicle.
      2. A landowner of private property is authorized to remove or cause removal of an abandoned motor vehicle from that property or to any other place on any property of the landowner, and may contact a towing service for its removal. A landowner who removes or causes removal of an abandoned motor vehicle shall immediately notify the police agency in the jurisdiction from which the vehicle is removed and provide the registration plate number, the public vehicle identification number, if available, and the make, model, and color of the vehicle. The landowner may remove the vehicle from the place where it is discovered to any other place on any property owned by him or her, or cause the vehicle to be removed by a towing service under the provisions of this subsection, without incurring any civil liability to the owner of the abandoned vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 101 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 77.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 2153. Abandoned motor vehicle certification.

    1. A landowner on whose property an abandoned motor vehicle is located shall apply to the Department for an abandoned motor vehicle certification on forms supplied by the Department within 30 days of the date the vehicle was discovered on or brought to the property unless the vehicle has been removed from the property. An abandoned motor vehicle certification form shall indicate the date that the abandoned motor vehicle was discovered or brought to the property; the make, color, model, and location of the vehicle; the name, address, and telephone number of the landowner; and a certification of the public vehicle identification number, if any, to be recorded by a law enforcement officer. This subsection shall not be construed as creating a private right of action against the landowner.
    2. Upon receipt of an abandoned motor vehicle certification form, the Commissioner shall attempt to identify and notify the owner of the vehicle as required by section 2154 of this title. If no owner can be determined by the Commissioner within the time period allowed by section 2154 of this title, the Commissioner shall issue a certificate of abandoned motor vehicle with appropriate title or salvage title, or both, and the vehicle may be disposed of in the manner set forth in section 2156 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 101 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 77.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “of Motor Vehicles” preceding “shall attempt” in the first sentence, and inserted “of this title” following “section 2154” in the second sentence.

    § 2154. Identification and reclamation of abandoned motor vehicles.

    1. The Department shall make a reasonable attempt to locate an owner of an abandoned motor vehicle.
      1. If the abandoned motor vehicle is not identifiable by its registration plates or public vehicle identification number, and if no owner can be determined within 21 days of the date of receipt of the abandoned motor vehicle certification form, the Commissioner shall issue a certificate of abandoned motor vehicle with an appropriate title or salvage title.
      2. If the abandoned motor vehicle is identifiable by its registration plates or public vehicle identification number, the Department shall, within three business days of receipt of the form for certification of abandoned motor vehicle, send notice to the last known registered owner and lienholder of the vehicle. The notice shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, and shall advise the last known registered owner of the motor vehicle’s location and a telephone number where additional information about the motor vehicle may be obtained. If the receipt is not returned to the Department within seven business days, the Commissioner shall, by first-class mail, send a second notice. Within 21 days of sending the second notice, the last known registered owner or lienholder may reclaim and retrieve the motor vehicle by presenting to the Department satisfactory evidence of ownership and paying or arranging to pay any fees or charges authorized by section 2155 of this title. If the last known registered owner or lienholder fails or refuses to reclaim the motor vehicle within 21 days of the second mailing, the Commissioner shall issue a certificate of abandoned motor vehicle with appropriate title or salvage title.
    2. An owner or lienholder may reclaim an abandoned motor vehicle by presenting to the Department satisfactory evidence of ownership, and paying or reimbursing, or making arrangements to pay or reimburse, the towing agency, the Department, or the landowner, as the case may be, any towing fee or storage charges permitted under section 2155 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 101 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 77.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “of Motor Vehicles” following “Department” and following “Commissioner” throughout the section, and substituted “landowner” for “owner or agent of private property” preceding “, as the case may be,” in subsec. (b).

    § 2155. Fees and charges.

    1. Towing fees.   For towing an abandoned motor vehicle from private property, a towing service may charge a reasonable fee to be paid by the vehicle owner or the landowner of the private property.
    2. Storage charges.   In addition to any towing fee, an owner or lienholder reclaiming an abandoned motor vehicle may be charged and shall pay a fee for the costs of storage of the vehicle, except that no fee may be charged for storage for any period preceding the date upon which the form for abandoned motor vehicle certification is sent to the Department.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 101 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 77.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “vehicle” preceding “owner or” and substituted “the landowner” for “agent of the owner” preceding “of the private”.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “by the towing service” following “certification is sent” and “of Motor Vehicles” following “Department”.

    § 2156. Disposal of abandoned motor vehicles.

    1. If the Commissioner issues the certificate of abandoned motor vehicle, title to the motor vehicle shall pass to the holder of the certificate of abandoned motor vehicle, free from all claims of the owner or prior holder of the motor vehicle, and of all persons claiming through or under the owner or prior holder. The Commissioner shall issue an appropriate title or salvage title of the motor vehicle at no charge.
    2. Except for intentionally inflicted damage or gross negligence, neither the State nor any of its agents or employees shall be liable to the owner for any damage to the motor vehicle during the period in which the State retains custody.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 101 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 2157. Municipal enforcement.

    The provisions of this subchapter shall not preempt any municipal abandoned motor vehicle ordinance.

    HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 101 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 2158. Fees for towing; public property; funding.

    1. A towing service may charge a fee of up to $40.00 for towing an abandoned motor vehicle from public property under the provisions of sections 2151-2157 of this title. This fee shall be paid to the towing service upon the issuance by the Department of Motor Vehicles of a certificate of abandoned motor vehicles under section 2156 of this title. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall notify the Commissioner of Finance and Management who shall issue payment to the towing service for vehicles removed from public property. Payments under this section shall terminate upon the payment of a total of $16,000.00 for towing abandoned motor vehicles from public property in any fiscal year. A towing company shall not be eligible for more than 50 percent of this annual allocation.
    2. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is authorized to expend up to $16,000.00 of the Department’s annual appropriation for the purpose of this section.

    HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 53.

    Chapter 23. Traffic Offenses

    History

    Effect of repeal of chapter. 2015, No. 47 , § 39 provides: “In connection with any traffic ticket issued for a traffic offense on or before the effective date of this act [July 1, 2015]:

    “(1) Consistent with 1 V.S.A. § 214(b) , the repeal of 23 V.S.A. chapter 23 does not affect the validity or enforceability of the ticket.

    “(2) Consistent with 1 V.S.A. § 214(c) , such tickets are to be enforced as civil, not criminal, violations, and any reduction in penalty since issuance of the ticket shall inure to the benefit of the respondent.

    “(3) Such tickets are under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Bureau and shall be enforced in accordance with 4 V.S.A. chapter 29.”

    §§ 2201-2207. Repealed. 2015, No. 47, § 38.

    History

    Former §§ 2201-2207. Former § 2201, relating to definition of traffic offense, was derived from 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and amended by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1977, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 1983, No. 86 , § 8; 1983, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; and 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 12.

    Former § 2202, relating to jurisdiction and venue of traffic offense, was derived from 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and amended by 1989, No. 109 , § 10 and 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

    Former § 2203, relating to complaint or information and summons; form, was derived from 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; and amended by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 10, 15.

    Former § 2204, relating to procedure on failure to appear; notice, was derived from 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; and amended by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    Former § 2205, relating to answers to traffic ticket, was derived from 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; and amended by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 1977, No. 81 , § 7,; 1977, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1979, No. 168 (Adj. Sess.); 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; and 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

    Former § 2206, relating to evidence, was derived from 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Former § 2207, relating to Supreme Court rules, was derived from 1971, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Annotations From Former § 2205

    Constitutionality.

    Fines.

    Jury trial.

    Suspension criteria.

    Annotations From Former § 2205

    Constitutionality.

    This section is not constitutionally infirm because of its failure to require a hearing prior to suspension of motor vehicle operator’s license, since Due Process Clause does not require that Vermont provide a separate presuspension hearing determining degree of hardship suspension will cause to motorists who face possible suspension of their operator’s licenses; opportunity to contest the actual traffic offense in court provides the motorist with a hearing which is sufficient to meet due process standards. Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977), amended, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    This section does not violate Equal Protection Clause since rational basis exists for providing presuspension hearings for Vermont licensees who have been convicted of motor vehicle offenses in other states and who are deemed improper or incompetent to operate motor vehicles, while denying presuspension hearings for Vermont licensees convicted of traffic offense in Vermont; those convicted of traffic offenses outside Vermont who are provided with presuspension hearings would otherwise have no opportunity to be heard in Vermont, while those traffic offenders inside Vermont who are denied presuspension hearings retain the right to a full judicial hearing in Vermont on the facts underlying the charges against them. Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977), amended, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Since Commissioner’s procedural guidelines, administered in suspending motor vehicle operator’s licenses, are reasonably specific and ascertainable and prescribe suspensions which are both within the statutory maximum and within normally acceptable limits, the scheme of this section does not unconstitutionally fail to provide standards for the exercise of administrative discretion. Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977), amended, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Fines.

    Fifty dollar fine for operating uninspected motor vehicle was not excessive as to defendant claiming penalty provision violated Fourteenth Amendment as it imposed a fine without reference to violator’s income, and did not violate his equal protection rights. State v. Diamondstone, 132 Vt. 303, 318 A.2d 654, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 338 (1974).

    Jury trial.

    The plain meaning of the Uniform Traffic Ticket Act as adopted by Vermont negates any legislative intention to abrogate the right to trial by jury in prosecutions under the act; and driver given a ticket for operating an unregistered motor vehicle was entitled to a jury trial. State v. Santi, 132 Vt. 615, 326 A.2d 149, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 404 (1974).

    Suspension criteria.

    Suspensions under subsec. (c) of this section and section 671(c) of this title must follow prescribed administrative criteria. Calabi v. Conway, 468 F. Supp. 76, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7038 (D. Vt. 1978).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Santi, 132 Vt. 615, 326 A.2d 149, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 404 (1974); State v. Thompson, 174 Vt. 172, 807 A.2d 454, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 223 (2002); State v. Thompson, 175 Vt. 470, 816 A.2d 550, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 432 (2002) (mem.).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977); State v. Atwood, 140 Vt. 301, 438 A.2d 387, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 605 (1981).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 552 A.2d 410, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 170 (1988).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Blaine, 133 Vt. 345, 341 A.2d 16, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 402 (1975); State v. Gagne, 148 Vt. 587, 535 A.2d 790, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 531 (1987).

    Cited.

    Cited in Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F. Supp. 1165, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559 (D. Vt. 1977); State v. Atwood, 140 Vt. 301, 438 A.2d 387, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 605 (1981).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 552 A.2d 410, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 170 (1988).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Blaine, 133 Vt. 345, 341 A.2d 16, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 402 (1975); State v. Gagne, 148 Vt. 587, 535 A.2d 790, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 531 (1987).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Blaine, 133 Vt. 345, 341 A.2d 16, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 402 (1975); State v. Gagne, 148 Vt. 587, 535 A.2d 790, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 531 (1987).

    Chapter 24. Traffic Violations

    History

    Legislative findings and purpose. 1989, No. 109 , § 1, eff. July 1, 1990, provided: “The general assembly recognizes that minor traffic violations must be dealt with fairly but do not require the full weight of the criminal justice system. Minor traffic violations do not involve terms of imprisonment or substantial monetary penalties and persons who commit minor traffic violations should not be treated as criminal offenders. The purpose of this act [which added §§ 1097, 2301-2308, and 2500 of this title, and amended 12 V.S.A. § 5702 , 13 V.S.A. §§ 7251 , 7282, and 7283, and §§ 1012, 2202, and 2502 of this title] is to treat minor traffic violations as civil violations, removing them from the criminal courts and removing the label of criminality from those who commit them.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Point assessments for motor vehicle violations, see chapter 25 of this title.

    § 2301. Repealed. 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 39(2).

    History

    Former § 2301. Former § 2301, creating the traffic and municipal ordinance bureau, was derived from 1989, No. 109 , § 2, eff. July 1, 1990; amended 1993, No. 237 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1995, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. Sept. 1, 1996; 1997, No. 58 , § 9. For creation of the Judicial Bureau to perform similar functions, see 4 V.S.A. chapter 29.

    § 2301a. Repealed. 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 39(3).

    History

    Former § 2301a. Former § 2301a, relating to jurisdiction of assistant judges in Essex County, was derived from 1993, No. 237 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. Nov. 1, 1994.

    § 2302. Traffic violation defined.

    1. As used in this chapter, “traffic violation” means:
      1. a violation of any provision of this title or rule adopted under this title for which no term of imprisonment is provided by law and for which a penalty of no more than $1,000.00 is provided;
      2. a violation of this title with a maximum penalty set at not more than $1,000.00 and for which no term of imprisonment is provided by law;
      3. a violation of this title with a scheduled penalty of not more than $1,000.00 established pursuant to 4 V.S.A. § 1102(d) and for which no term of imprisonment is provided by law;
      4. a violation of any municipal ordinance relating to the operation or use of motor vehicles or to the use of highways by pedestrians or by the operation of any other vehicle. Violations of municipal ordinances relating to parking of motor vehicles shall not be considered traffic violations;
      5. a violation of 5 V.S.A. chapter 28, relating to transportation of hazardous materials, and rules adopted pursuant to 5 V.S.A. § 2001 ;
      6. a violation of 5 V.S.A. chapter 29, relating to motor carrier safety standards, and rules adopted pursuant to 5 V.S.A. § 2101 ;
      7. a violation of 5 V.S.A. § 3408(c) , relating to trail use of certain State-owned railroad corridors, or of 5 V.S.A. § 3734 , related to trespassing on railroad property;
      8. a violation of 19 V.S.A. § 7(j) , relating to access to or use of environmental mitigation sites administered by the Agency of Transportation;
      9. a violation for which the penalties are calculated under section 1391a of this title;
      10. a violation of subsection 3024(b) of this title;
      11. a violation of subsection 1006b(b), section 1006c, or subsections 4120(a) and (b) of this title; or
      12. a violation of section 4123 of this title.
    2. A traffic violation is not a crime and shall be treated as a civil action.
    3. A violation of a traffic law in this title for which no penalty is otherwise provided shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $1,000.00.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 109 , § 2, eff. July 1, 1990; amended 1991, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 19, 1992; 1993, No. 211 (Adj. Sess.), § 26, eff. June 17, 1994; 1995, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 1999, No. 156 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. May 29, 2000; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 22; 2003, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2005, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 17, 70.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(7): Added “, or of 5 V.S.A. § 3734 , related to trespassing on railroad property” following “corridors”.

    Subdiv. (a)(11): Inserted “subsection 1006b(b), section 1006c, or” following “a violation of”.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Made a minor change in punctuation in subdiv. (10), and added subdivs. (11) and (12).

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(7): Substituted “subsection” for “section”.

    Subdivs. (a)(9) and (10): Added.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Act No. 156 added subdiv. (8).

    Act No. 160 substituted “a violation of this title” for “any traffic complaint” in subdiv. (2) and for “for any traffic violation” and “ 4 V.S.A. § 1102(d) ” for “subsection (d) of this section” in subdiv. (3).

    Subsec. (d): Repealed by Act No. 160.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted former subdivs. (a)(1), (a)(4), and (a)(5), listing types of violations, added subdivs. (a)(2) and (a)(3), redesignated the other subdivs. accordingly, and substituted “provided” for “assessed” at the end of subdiv. (a)(1).

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$1,000.00” for “$175.00”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted the phrase “For any traffic violation for which no term of imprisonment is provided by law, for which the minimum penalty is less than $1,000.00, or for which a penalty is not otherwise established” for “Whenever a penalty for a traffic violation is not otherwise established.”

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Rewrote subdiv. (2) and inserted “by law” following “provided” in subdiv. (4).

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(7): Added “or” following “section 2101 of Title 5”.

    Subdiv. (a)(8): Added.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Added “or” following “provided” in subdivs. (2) and (4) and added subdivs. (5)-(7).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Classifications.

    Driving without insurance is a civil infraction, rather than a criminal offense, under Vermont law; the sanctions imposed for driving without insurance in Vermont are not sufficiently punitive as to transform the offense from a civil, regulatory violation into a criminal one. Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13204 (2d Cir. 1998).

    Change in law that reclassified as a civil violation, rather than a criminal offense, the operation of a motor vehicle with a suspended license after suspension period had expired and prior to reinstatement was applied retroactively since the change did not remove all liability for violative conduct. State v. Flagg, 160 Vt. 141, 624 A.2d 864, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 34 (1993).

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Lafountain, 160 Vt. 313, 628 A.2d 1243, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1993); Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13204 (2d Cir. 1998).

    § 2303. Expungement of violation records.

    1. Expungement.   Two years following the satisfaction of a judgment resulting from an adjudication or conviction of a violation identified in this subsection, the Judicial Bureau shall make an entry of “expunged” and notify the Department of Motor Vehicles of such action consistent with the data transfer policy between the Judicial Bureau and the Department. The data transfer to the Department shall include the name, date of birth, ticket number, offense, license number, and personal identifying number. The Judicial Bureau shall make the expungement entry pursuant to this section for the following violations:
      1. section 301 of this title (operating an unregistered vehicle);
      2. subsection 307(a) of this title (failing to possess registration);
      3. section 611 of this title (failing to possess license);
      4. subsection 676(a) of this title (operating after suspension);
      5. section 601 of this title (operating without a license);
      6. section 800 of this title (operating without insurance); and
      7. subsection 1222(c) of this title (operating an uninspected vehicle).
    2. Effect of expungement.
      1. Upon entry of an expungement order, the order shall be legally effective immediately and the individual whose record is expunged shall be treated in all respects as if he or she had never been convicted or adjudicated of the violation. This includes the expungement of any points accumulated pursuant to chapter 25 of this title.
      2. Upon an entry of expunged, the case will be accessible only by the Clerk of the Court for the Judicial Bureau or the Clerk’s designee. Convictions or adjudications that have been expunged shall not appear in the results of any Judicial Bureau database search by name, date of birth, driver’s license number, or any other data identifying the defendant. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, any documents or other records related to an expunged conviction or adjudication that are maintained outside the Judicial Bureau’s case management system shall be destroyed.
      3. Upon receiving an inquiry from any person regarding an expunged record, the Judicial Bureau and Department of Motor Vehicles shall respond that “NO RECORD EXISTS.”
    3. Exception for research entities.   Research entities that maintain conviction or adjudication records for purposes of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating criminal justice data shall not be subject to the expungement requirements established in this section. Research entities shall abide by the policies established by the Court Administrator and shall not disclose any identifying information from the records they maintain.
    4. Policies for implementation.   The Court Administrator shall establish policies for implementing this section.

    HISTORY: Added 2021, No. 58 , § 4.

    History

    Joint Legislative Justice Oversight Committee; expungement and sealing study. 2021, No. 58 , § 5 provides: “During the 2021 legislative interim, the Joint Legislative Justice Oversight Committee shall consider how to simplify and automate the process of expungement and sealing of criminal history records and consider a comprehensive policy that provides an avenue for expungement or sealing of records for all or most offenses except those listed in 33 V.S.A. § 5204(a) . In its analysis of what offenses should be eligible, the Committee shall consider whether to exclude from eligibility those offenses associated with and resulting from domestic and sexual violence. The Committee shall propose legislation for the 2022 legislative session on its recommendations regarding:

    “(1) a policy to make all or most criminal history records eligible for sealing or expungement, except for conviction records of offenses listed in 33 V.S.A. § 5204(a) and any other offenses the Committee deems appropriate for exclusion;

    “(2) the individuals or entities that should have access to sealed criminal history records;

    “(3) whether Vermont should continue to employ a two-track system that provides for sealing or expungement of criminal history records based on the nature of the offense, or whether Vermont should employ a one-track system that provides for either sealing or expungement for all eligible offenses;

    “(4) implementing an automated process, not requiring a petition, to seal and expunge criminal conviction records that provides for notice to the prosecuting office and an opportunity for the prosecutor to oppose the sealing or expungement.”

    Former § 2303. Former § 2303, relating to summons and complaint, was derived from 1989, No. 109 , § 2, and amended by 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 11. This section was previously repealed by 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 23.

    § 2304. Repealed. 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 39(4).

    History

    Former § 2304. Former § 2304, relating to answer and default, was derived from 1989, No. 109 , § 2, eff. July 1, 1990.

    § 2305. Procedure.

    Traffic violations shall be heard by the Judicial Bureau and the procedure shall be as provided in 4 V.S.A. chapter 29.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 109 , § 2, eff. July 1, 1990; amended 1991, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 5, 1992; 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 12.

    History

    Amendments

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Procedure” for “Hearing” in the section heading and substituted the current text for former subsecs. (a)-(f), which set out in detail the procedure for hearings.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Added the last sentence.

    § 2306. Repealed. 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 39(5).

    History

    Former § 2306. Former § 2306, relating to appeals, was derived from 1989, No. 109 , § 2, eff. July 1, 1990.

    § 2307. Repealed. 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 31, 2016.

    History

    Former § 2307. Former § 2307, relating to remedies for failure to pay traffic violations, was derived from 1989, No. 109 , § 2 and amended by 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2005, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2007, No. 51 , § 5; 2013, No. 18 , § 1; and 2013, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

    § 2308. Reports.

    The Court Administrator shall prepare audits, records, and reports relating to traffic complaints and violations. The Court Administrator shall also notify the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of any violations that are uncontested or admitted or that are determined after hearing to have been committed or in connection with which a default judgment has been entered. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall file and record information on violations received under this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 109 , § 2, eff. July 1, 1990.

    § 2309. Violation report; assessment of points.

    The Bureau shall send a report of each finding of a traffic violation to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. Such a finding shall be prima facie evidence of a violation and shall result in assessment of points and suspension or revocation of the person’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

    Chapter 25. Motor Vehicle Violations; Point System

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Trask, 148 Vt. 385, 533 A.2d 1185, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 517 (1987).

    § 2500. Application to traffic violations.

    The provisions of this chapter shall apply to traffic violations covered under chapter 24 of this title and for that purpose a determination by the Judicial Bureau that a person has committed a traffic violation, whether by admission, no contest, determination after hearing, or entry of a default judgment, shall be deemed a conviction under this chapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 109 , § 3, eff. July 1, 1990; amended 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 15.

    History

    Amendments

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “judicial bureau” for “traffic bureau”.

    § 2501. Motor vehicle point system.

    1. For the purpose of identifying habitually reckless or negligent drivers and frequent violators of traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles, a uniform system is established assigning demerit points for convictions of violations of this title or of ordinances adopted by local authorities regulating the operation of motor vehicles. Notice of each assessment of points may be given. No points shall be assessed for violating a provision of a statute or municipal ordinance regulating standing, parking, equipment, size, or weight, or if a Superior judge or Judicial Bureau hearing officer has waived the assessment of points in the interest of justice and in accordance with subsection (b) of this section. The conviction report from the court shall be prima facie evidence of the points assessed unless points are specifically waived in the conviction report. The Department of Motor Vehicles also is authorized to suspend the license of a driver when the driver’s driving record identifies the driver as a habitual offender under section 673a of this title.
    2. A Superior judge or Judicial Bureau hearing officer may waive the assessment of points against a person’s driving record for a moving violation if the waiver of points is in the interests of justice and if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
      1. the person has not had points assessed against his or her driving record within five years of the date of the moving violation;
      2. the person has had no more than three points assessed against his or her driving record within 10 years of the date of the moving violation;
      3. the moving violation is an offense for which no more than three points is specified under section 2502 of this title;
      4. the person was not operating a commercial motor vehicle as defined at section 4103 of this title at the time of the moving violation; and
      5. the moving violation did not result in bodily injury to another person or damage to property of another person.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 1, 1979; amended 2005, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2013, No. 57 , § 31a; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 219.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “of Motor Vehicles” following “The Department” and substituted “a” for “an” preceding “habitual” in the last sentence.

    —2013. Section amended generally.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “but notice is required when the point accumulation reaches 50 percent of the number at which suspension is authorized” from the end of the second sentence and substituted “the driver’s” for “his” preceding “driving” and “the driver” for “him” following “identifies” in the last sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981).

    § 2502. Point assessment; schedule.

    1. Unless the assessment of points is waived by a Superior judge or a Judicial Bureau hearing officer in the interests of justice and in accordance with subsection 2501(b) of this title, a person operating a motor vehicle shall have points assessed against his or her driving record for convictions for moving violations of the indicated motor vehicle statutes in accord with the following schedule: (All references are to this title of the Vermont Statutes Annotated.)

      (6) Two points assessed for sections 1003 and 1007. State speed zones and local speed limits, less than 10 miles per hour over and in excess of speed limit.

      (7) Three points assessed for sections 1003 and 1007. State speed zones and local speed limits, more than 10 miles per hour over and in excess of speed limit.

      (8) Five points assessed for sections 1003 and 1007. State speed zones and local speed limits, more than 20 miles per hour over and in excess of speed limit.

      (9) Eight points assessed for sections 1003 and 1007. State speed zones and local speed limits, more than 30 miles per hour over and in excess of the speed limit.

      1. Two points assessed for: (A) § 601. License required; (B) § 602. Exceptions for farm tractors and highway equipment; (C) § 611. Possession of license certificate; (D) § 612. Restrictions of license; (E) § 614. Rights under license; (F) § 615. Unlicensed operators; (G) § 1004. Interstate highway regulations; (H) § 1008. Regulations in municipalities; (I) § 1009. Restrictions on controlled-access roadway; (J)  §§ 1021 and 1022. Failure to obey traffic-control signals; (K) § 1024. Failure to obey flashing signals; (L) § 1026. Failure to obey lane control signals; (M) § 1031. Illegal driving to right; (N) § 1032. Failure to keep to the right of center when meeting oncoming traffic; (O) § 1037. One-way roadways and rotaries; (P) § 1038. Driving on roadways laned for traffic; (Q) § 1041. Restricted access roadways; (R) § 1046. Failure to yield right of way at intersection; (S) § 1047. Failure to turn to left properly; (T) § 1048. Failure to stop or yield at intersections; (U) § 1049. Failure of vehicle to yield right of way when entering from private road; (V) [Repealed.] (W) § 1059. Driving through safety zone; (X) § 1061. Illegal turning at intersections; (Y) § 1062. Turning prohibited; (Z) § 1063. Unsafe starting of parked vehicle; (AA) § 1064. Failure to use required signals; (BB) § 1065. Improper use of hand signals; (CC) § 1071. Illegal driving on or near railroad grade crossing; (DD) § 1072. Failure to stop at railroad crossings; (EE) § 1073. Improper crossing at a railroad grade by heavy equipment; (FF) § 1074. Improper emerging from driveway; (GG) § 1081. Basic rule and maximum limits; (HH) § 1082. Slow-moving vehicles; (II) § 1083. Special speed limitations; (JJ) § 1092. Damaging surface of road; (KK) § 1093. Smoke screen device; (LL)(i) § 1095. Entertainment picture visible to operator;  (ii) § 1095a(d)(3). Junior operator use of portable electronic device outside work or school zone;  (iii)  § 1095b(c)(3). Use of portable electronic device outside work or school zone; (MM) § 1099(c)(3) Texting outside work or school zone; (NN) § 1113. Illegal backing; (OO) § 1114. Illegal riding on motorcycles; (PP) § 1115. Illegal operation of motorcycles on roadways laned for traffic; (QQ) § 1116. Clinging to other vehicles; (RR) § 1117. Illegal footrests and handlebars; (SS) § 1118. Obstructing the driver’s view; (TT) § 1119. Improper opening and closing vehicle doors; (UU) § 1121. Coasting prohibited; (VV) § 1122. Following fire apparatus prohibited; (WW) § 1123. Driving over fire hose; (XX) § 1124. Position of operator; (YY) § 1127. Unsafe control in presence of animals; (ZZ) § 1131. Failure to give warning signal; (AAA) § 1132. Illegal driving on sidewalk; (BBB) § 1243. Lighting requirements; (CCC) [Repealed.] (DDD) § 1257. Eye protection; (EEE) § 800. Operating without financial responsibility; (FFF) All other moving violations that have no specified points; (2) Three points assessed for: (A) § 1033. Illegal passing on the left; (B) § 1034. Illegal passing on the right; (C) § 1035. Limitations on passing; (D) § 1036. No passing zone; (E) § 1039. Following too closely; (F) § 1040. Improper driving on divided highway; (3) Four points assessed for: (A) § 1012. Failure to obey enforcement officer; (B) § 1013. Authority of enforcement officers; (C) § 1051. Failure to yield to pedestrian; (D) § 1057. Failure to yield to persons who are blind; (E) § 1095a(d)(2) Junior operator use of portable electronic device in work or school zone—first offense; (F) § 1095b(c)(2). Use of portable electronic device in work or school zone—first offense; (G) § 1099(c)(2) Texting in work or school zone—first offense; (4) Five points assessed for: (A) § 1050. Failure to yield to emergency vehicles; (B) § 1075. Illegal passing of school bus; (C) § 1099(c)(2). Texting in work or school zone—second and subsequent offense; (D) § 1095a(d)(2). Junior operator use of portable electronic device in work or school zone—second and subsequent offenses; (E) § 1095b(c)(2). Use of portable electronic device in work or school zone—second and subsequent offenses; (5) Ten points assessed for: (A) [Repealed.] (B) § 1091. Negligent operation; (C) § 1094. Operation without owner’s consent and aggravated operation without owner’s consent; (D) § 1128. Failure to stop when involved in a crash; (E) § 1133. Attempting to elude a police officer.

        Click to view

    2. Two additional points shall be assessed for any violation that has resulted in a crash that was the fault of the violator, provided that before these additional points are added a determination on fault must have been made.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 1, 1979; amended 1985, No. 77 , § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; 1985, No. 85 § 9; 1989, No. 68 , § 9, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; 1989, No. 109 , § 4, eff. July 1, 1990; 1991, No. 55 , §§ 14, 15; 1999, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2009, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2011, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2013, No. 57 , § 27, eff. July 1, 2013 in part and Jan. 1, 2014 in part; 2013, No. 57 , § 31b; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 148; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 41, eff. Oct. 1, 2014; 2015, No. 47 , § 43; 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 2017, No. 71 , § 13; 2017, No. 74 , § 61a; 2019, No. 60 , § 29; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 35.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “a crash” for “an accident” in subdiv. (a)(5)(D) in the table and “a crash” for “an accident” in subsec. (b) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    During the 1989 Session this section was amended by Act No. 68 and by Act No. 109, resulting in two versions of this section. The merged version of the section was determined by the Statutory Revision Commission to reflect the legislative intent that Act No. 68 be the law even after July 1, 1990.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1)(MM): Added.

    Subdiv. (a)(3)(G): Added.

    Subdiv. (a)(4)(C): Inserted “(c)(2)” and substituted “in work or school zone—second and subsequent offense” for “prohibited”.

    —2019. Added subdiv. (a)(1)(LL)(ii), redesignated former subdiv. (a)(1)(LL)(ii) as present subdiv. (a)(1)(LL)(iii), added subdiv. (a)(3)(E), redesignated former subdiv. (a)(3)(E) as present subdiv. (a)(3)(F), added subdiv. (a)(4)(D), and redesignated former subdiv. (a)(4)(D) as present subdiv. (a)(4)(E).

    —2017. Subdiv. (a)(1)(LL)(ii): Amended generally by Act No. 71.

    Subdiv. (a)(1)(YY): Act No. 74 substituted “animals” for “horses and cattle” in the table.

    Subdiv. (a)(3)(E): Added by Act No. 71.

    Subdiv. (a)(4)(D): Act No. 71 inserted “or school” following “work”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(1)(CCC): Repealed.

    Subdiv. (a)(1)(DDD): Substituted “Eye Protection” for “Face Protection”.

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(1)(V): Repealed.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivs. (a)(1)(LL)(ii) and (a)(4)(D): Act No. 189 inserted “(c)(2)” following “§ 1095b”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3)(D): Act No. 96 substituted “persons who are blind” for “blind persons” at the end.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Act 57, § 31b, substituted “Unless the assessment of points is waived by a superior judge or a Judicial Bureau hearing officer in the interests of justice and in accordance with subsection 2501(b) of this title, a” for “Any”.

    Act 57, § 27, rewrote subdivs. (a)(1)(LL) and (a)(4)(D) eff. Jan. 1, 2014, and repealed subdiv. (a)(1)(MM) and rewrote subdiv. (a)(4)(C) eff. July 1, 2013.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(4)(D): Repealed.

    Subdiv. (a)(5)(A): Repealed.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(1): Added new subdiv. (MM) and redesignated former subdivs. (MM)-(EEE) as subdivs. (NN)-(FFF).

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Added new subdiv. (C) and redesignated former subdiv. (C) as subdiv. (D).

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(5)(C): Added “and aggravated operation without owner’s consent”.

    —1991. Subdiv. (a)(4)(C): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (a)(5)(A): Substituted “or revocation” for “, revocation or refusal” following “suspension”.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Act No. 68 added subdiv. (4).

    Section amended generally by Act No. 109.

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 109 deleted “court” preceding “determination”.

    —1985. Subdiv. (a)(1)(MMM): Added by Act No. 77.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Act No. 85 deleted former subdiv. (a)(2)(B), and redesignated former subdivs. (a)(2)(C)-(I) as present subdivs. (a)(2)(B)-(H).

    ANNOTATIONS

    Classifications.

    Change in law that reclassified as a civil violation, rather than a criminal offense, the operation of a motor vehicle with a suspended license after suspension period had expired and prior to reinstatement was applied retroactively since the change did not remove all liability for violative conduct. State v. Flagg, 160 Vt. 141, 624 A.2d 864, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 34 (1993).

    Cited.

    Cited in Meacham v. Conway, 140 Vt. 191, 435 A.2d 961, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 571 (1981); State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 552 A.2d 410, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 170 (1988).

    § 2503. Recording assessments.

    Points shall remain assessed against the driving record of any person for a period of two years from the date of conviction.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 1, 1979; amended 1979, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Amendments

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “conviction” for “violation” following “date of”.

    § 2504. Repealed. 1997, No. 55, § 11(2), eff. June 26, 1997.

    History

    Former § 2504. Former § 2504, relating to warning letter of point assessment record, was derived from 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 2505. Suspension or revocation of license.

    When a person receives a number of convictions for moving violations sufficient to raise his or her point total to at least 10 points in a two-year period, the Commissioner shall initiate suspension proceedings pursuant to section 2506 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 1, 1979; amended 1979, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    History

    Amendments

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “such” following “receives”, inserted “convictions for” preceding “moving violations” and substituted “sufficient” for “so as” thereafter.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in State v. Bradley, 145 Vt. 492, 494 A.2d 129, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 319 (1985).

    § 2506. Procedure.

    When a sufficient number of points has been acquired, the Commissioner shall suspend the license of an operator or the privilege of an unlicensed individual or nonresident to operate a motor vehicle, upon not less than 10 days’ notice, and upon hearing, if requested for verification of the conviction records. The suspension shall be for 10 days for an accumulation of 10 points, 30 days for 15 points, 90 days for 20 points, and for a period increasing by 30 days for each additional 5 points; except the suspension period for a conviction for first offense of sections 1091, 1094, 1128, and 1133 of this title shall be 30 days, for a second conviction 90 days, and for a third or subsequent six months, or the suspension period under the point values, whichever is greater. If a fatality occurs, the suspension shall be for a period of one year in addition to the suspension under the point values. For purposes of this section, a month equals 30 days and one year equals 365 days.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 1, 1979; amended 1979, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1981, No. 229 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2011, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 220.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “individual” for “person” in the first sentence, and “equals” for “shall be considered as” and “equals” for “shall equal” in the last sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “has been acquired” for “have been acquired” in the first sentence, and deleted “674,” preceding “1091” in the second sentence.

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “but if a fatality occurs, the suspension shall be for a period of one year” following “greater” in the second sentence and added the third sentence.

    —1979 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “for” for “a period of” preceding “10 days” in the second sentence and added the third sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    First offense.

    Trial court properly granted Commissioner of Motor Vehicles’ motion for summary judgment upon plaintiff’s petition for review of 365-day suspension of his motor vehicle operator’s license following his first offense conviction of careless and negligent operation with death resulting. Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 463 A.2d 232, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 477 (1983).

    Punctuation.

    Semicolon following provision of this section which states that the period of suspension of a motor vehicle operator’s license for a first offense of careless and negligent operation is to be thirty days is grammatically wrong and creates thereby an ambiguity justifying statutory construction. Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 463 A.2d 232, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 477 (1983).

    Purpose.

    Intent of Legislature in enacting this section was to subject all drivers who operate in violation of the enumerated offenses with a death resulting to the section’s one year suspension provision. Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 463 A.2d 232, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 477 (1983).

    § 2507. Legislative review.

    1. Prior to September 15 of every year, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or the Chair of either the House Committee on Transportation or the Senate Committee on Transportation may request a meeting in joint session to review the operations and point values assigned under this chapter.
    2. Legislation may be introduced on the operations and point values assigned under this chapter in any legislative year, provisions on reconsideration notwithstanding.

    HISTORY: Added 1977, No. 238 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 1, 1979; amended 1981, No. 229 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (a), substituted “Senate Committee on Transportation” for “Senate Highways and Traffic Committee” in accordance with Vermont Senate Rule 24.

    Amendments

    —1981 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Chapter 27. Diesel Fuel Tax

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Gasoline tax, see chapter 28 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Central Vermont Railway v. Department of Taxes, 144 Vt. 601, 480 A.2d 419, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 519 (1984).

    § 3000. Statutory purposes.

    The statutory purpose of the exemption for diesel tax in section 3003 of this title is to relieve off-road uses and farm truck uses from the user fee for the State highway system.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 200 (Adj. Sess.), § 19.

    § 3001. Purpose.

    The purpose of this chapter is to impose a tax on all users of diesel fuel upon the sale or use of such fuel by motor vehicles on public highways.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3002. Definitions.

    As used in this chapter:

    1. “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or any officer or employee of the Department duly authorized by him or her to perform the functions mentioned or described in this chapter.
    2. “Dealer” means any person who sells or delivers fuel into the fuel supply tanks of motor vehicles owned or operated by others.
    3. “Distributor” means any person who sells or delivers fuel into bulk storage tanks of a dealer or user.
    4. “Fuel” means clear diesel fuel that has not been dyed in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 4082 or section 211(I) of the Clean Air Act and any blend of undyed diesel and other fuel used or suitable for use for the generation of power to propel motor vehicles.
    5. “Motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle using fuel on the public highways and registered or required to be registered for operation thereon.
    6. “Motor bus” means any motor vehicle with a seating capacity of more than 20 persons.
    7. “Motor truck” means a motor vehicle designed primarily for the transportation of property and goods, and not primarily for the transportation of passengers.
    8. “Railroad fuel” means diesel fuel and any blend of diesel and other fuel used or suitable for use for the generation of power to propel a railroad train.
    9. “Use” means the consumption of fuel by a user to propel motor vehicles on the highways of the State.
    10. “User” means any person who uses fuel to propel a motor vehicle, owned or operated by him or her, upon the highways of this State. The term shall also include a lessor rental or leasing company when the lessor leases motor vehicles without drivers to a lessee under a contract where cost of fuel is included in lease payments and the lessor purchases fuel and maintains records of fuel used and miles traveled by such leased vehicles. In all other cases, upon application by either the lessor or lessee, the Commissioner will determine and approve the reporting and tax payment procedure to be used; provided, however, that the lessor and lessee shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the tax in any event.
    11. “Mail,” “mails,” “mailing,” and “mailed” mean any method of delivery authorized by the Commissioner, which shall include by hand, U.S. mail, and electronic transmission.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1987, No. 98 , § 4, eff. March 1, 1988; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2015, No. 47 , § 44; 2017, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    References in text.

    Section 211(I) of the Clean Air Act, referred to in subdiv. (4), is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 7545(i) .

    Revision note

    —2014. Substituted “As used in” for “For the purposes of” in the introductory paragraph to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (11): Added.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (1): Deleted “herein” preceding “mentioned” and inserted “in this chapter” following “described”.

    —2015. Subdiv. (10): Deleted “but is not limited to” following “the term shall also include” near the beginning of the second sentence and deleted the last sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (3): Deleted “licensed” preceding “user”.

    Subdiv. (4): Inserted “clear” preceding “diesel fuel” and inserted “that has not been dyed in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 4082 or section 211(I) of the Clean Air Act” thereafter and “undyed” following “blend of”.

    —1987. Subdiv. (10): Added the last sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Davey Oil Co. v. State, 146 Vt. 632, 508 A.2d 717, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 333 (1986).

    § 3003. Imposition of tax; exceptions.

    1. A tax of $0.28, a fee of $0.01 established pursuant to the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 1942 , and a $0.03 motor fuel transportation infrastructure assessment, which for purposes of the International Fuel Tax Agreement only shall be deemed to be a surcharge, are imposed on each gallon of fuel:
      1. sold or delivered by a distributor; or
      2. used by a user.
    2. Collection of the tax and its payment to the State shall be as follows:
      1. The distributor shall collect the tax from a dealer or user on delivery of fuel into the dealer’s or user’s bulk tanks. The tax shall attach at the time of delivery into the bulk tank. When a distributor collects a tax from a dealer or user, the distributor shall pay the same to the Commissioner with the monthly report required by section 3014 of this title.
      2. A user who uses fuel shall pay the tax to the Commissioner as provided in section 3015 of this title. The tax shall attach at the time of the consumption of such fuel in the propulsion of a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State.
    3. A tax of three cents per gallon is imposed on each gallon of railroad fuel used in the State.
      1. For users, the following uses shall be exempt from the tax and motor fuel transportation infrastructure assessment imposed under this chapter and be entitled to a credit for any tax paid for such uses under section 3020 of this title: (d) (1) For users, the following uses shall be exempt from the tax and motor fuel transportation infrastructure assessment imposed under this chapter and be entitled to a credit for any tax paid for such uses under section 3020 of this title:
        1. uses, the taxation of which would be precluded by the laws and Constitution of the United States and this State;
        2. uses for agricultural purposes not conducted on the highways of the State;
        3. uses by any State, municipal, school district, fire district, or other governmentally owned vehicles for official purposes;
        4. uses by any vehicle off the highways of the State; and
        5. uses by any vehicle registered as a farm truck under subsection 367(f) of this title.
      2. Provided, however, that no tax shall be due with respect to fuel for use in any State, municipal, school district, fire district, nonprofit public transit system as defined in 24 V.S.A. § 5088(3) , or other vehicle owned, leased, or contracted for other than single-trip use by a government entity, as long as the distributor takes from the purchaser at the time of sale an exemption certificate in the form prescribed by the Commissioner; and provided, further, that no tax shall be due with respect to fuel delivered for farm use to a farm bulk fuel storage tank.
    4. A distributor may use as the measure of the tax so levied and assessed the gross quantity of diesel fuel purchased, imported, produced, refined, manufactured, and compounded by the distributor, instead of the quantity sold, distributed, or used.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1983, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.) eff. Feb. 29, 1984; 1985, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1987, No. 282 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 1, 1989; 1989, No. 51 , § 2, eff. June 1, 1989; 1993, No. 65 , § 1; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2009, No. 50 , §§ 22, 23, eff. Oct. 1, 2009; § 77, eff. July 1, 2010; 2013, No. 12 , § 21; 2013, No. 12 , § 22, eff. July 1, 2014; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 1, 2016; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 1a, eff. June 1, 2017.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Act No. 159, § 1, eff. June 1, 2016, substituted “0.5 percent” for “one percent”.

    Subsec. (e): Act No. 159, § 1a, eff. June 1, 2017, deleted “less 0.5 percent for shrinkage, loss by evaporation, or otherwise,” following “the distributor”.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Act No. 12, § 21, eff. July 1, 2013, substituted “A tax of $0.27” for “A tax of $0.25” at the beginning.

    Subsec. (a): Act No. 12, § 22, eff. July 1, 2014, substituted “A tax of $0.28” for “A tax of $0.27” at the beginning.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (d)(1): Substituted “the tax and motor fuel transportation infrastructure assessment imposed” for “taxation” after “exempt from” in subdiv. (d)(1); added “and” at the end of subdiv. (d)(1)(D); and deleted former subdiv. (d)(1)(E) and redesignated former subdiv. (d)(1)(F) as present subdiv. (d)(1)(E).

    Subdiv. (d)(2): Inserted “, nonprofit public transit system as defined in 24 V.S.A. § 5088(3) ,” after “fire district”, deleted “governmentally-owned” before “vehicle”, and inserted “owned, leased, or contracted for other than single-trip use by a government entity” after “vehicle”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “25 cents” for “16 cents” in the introductory paragraph, rewrote subdiv. (1), deleted former subdiv. (2), and redesignated former subdiv. (3) as present subdiv. (2).

    Subsec. (b): Rewrote subdiv. (1), deleted former subdiv. (2), redesignated former subdiv. (3) as present subdiv. (2), and deleted former subdiv. (4).

    Subsec. (d): Added the concluding paragraph.

    Subsec. (e): Added.

    —1993. Subsec. (d): Deleted “and” at the end of subdiv. (4), made a minor change in punctuation and added “and” at the end of subdiv. (5) and added subdiv. (6).

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “16” for “fourteen” preceding “cents” and added “established pursuant to the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 1942 ” following “fuel” in the introductory paragraph.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “and a fee of one cent per gallon” preceding “is imposed” in the introductory paragraph.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(2): Inserted “except from a separate pump for off-road use and home heating oil sales under the provisions of section 3027 and” following “method of delivery”.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(2): Inserted “or from any other method of delivery except from a home heating oil delivery truck which has been registered pursuant to section 367 of this title” following “pump”.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Pump sales.

    Subdiv. (b)(2) of this section, as originally adopted, did not automatically impose a diesel fuel tax on all sales from a pump, but rather directed the taxpayer to collect whatever tax was due when he sold or delivered fuel from the pump. Davey Oil Co. v. State, 146 Vt. 632, 508 A.2d 717, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 333 (1986).

    Prior to the 1984 amendment of subdiv. (b)(2) of this section, no tax was due or payable if a pump sale was to a heating oil customer. Davey Oil Co. v. State, 146 Vt. 632, 508 A.2d 717, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 333 (1986).

    After the 1984 amendment of subdiv. (b)(2) of this section, taxpayer was required to collect diesel tax on all sales at the pump, whether or not destined for home heating purposes. Davey Oil Co. v. State, 146 Vt. 632, 508 A.2d 717, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 333 (1986).

    § 3004. Repealed. 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    History

    Former § 3004. Former § 3004, relating to collection and payment of tax by a fuel dealer, was derived from 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3005. Dealer’s and distributor’s licenses; application; issuance.

    1. It is unlawful for any person to act as a distributor or dealer without being licensed as such.
    2. An applicant for a dealer’s or distributor’s license shall file by mail an application furnished by the Commissioner with the Commissioner. The application shall not be under oath but shall contain a declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.
    3. When a licensee acts in a capacity other than that for which his or her license has been issued, he or she shall apply for additional licenses in accordance with this section.
    4. Upon the receipt of an application in proper form and the other conditions and requirements of this chapter having been complied with, the Commissioner may issue a license to an applicant that will remain in effect until such time as surrendered or revoked.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1985, No. 58 , §§ 1, 2; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): In the first sentence, inserted “by mail an application furnished by the Commissioner” preceding “with the Commissioner” and deleted “an application prepared and furnished by the Commissioner” thereafter.

    —1985. Subsec. (b): Deleted “on or before June 1 of each year” preceding “an applicant” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Deleted “for one year or” preceding “until”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Notification of change of name or address, see § 205 of this title.

    § 3006. Display of licenses and identification markers.

    Distributors and dealers shall conspicuously display their licenses in their established place of business or location in this State.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3007. Diesel fuel user’s license.

    1. In addition to any other provision of law relating to registration of motor vehicles, or fees paid therefor, a person owning or operating upon the highways of the State a motor truck that is registered in the State and uses fuel as defined in section 3002 of this title shall, for each motor truck to be so operated, apply to the Commissioner for a diesel fuel user’s license, which shall be renewed at the time of renewal of the truck’s registration. Application shall be made upon a form prescribed by the Commissioner and shall set forth such information as the Commissioner may require. Applications filed at the time of the initial registration or renewal of a registration shall be accompanied by a $6.50 annual license fee for each motor truck listed in the application, except that no fee shall be required for motor trucks with a gross weight of less than 26,001 pounds.
    2. [Repealed.]
    3. This section shall not apply to users’ vehicles exempt from reporting requirements under section 3014 of this title or to users’ vehicles exempt from taxation under subdivision 3003(d)(1)(C) of this title, or to users’ vehicles that are being operated under the provisions of section 463 or 516 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1985, No. 58 , § 9; 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. April 18, 1986; 1987, No. 98 , § 5, eff. March 1, 1988; 1987, No. 109 , § 2; 1987, No. 283 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1989, No. 46 , § 2, eff. May 5, 1989; 1989, No. 51 , § 47; 1989, No. 51 , § 47a, eff. July 1, 1990; 1991, No. 137 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1993, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 16.

    History

    Revision note—

    Subsec. (e), as added by 1989, No. 46 , was redesignated as subsec. (d) for purposes of conformity with V.S.A. style.

    Editor’s note—

    The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 1987 session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 98 and 109, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 1987 session, the text of Act Nos. 98 and 109 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “that” for “, which” following “truck”, “state and uses” for “state, using” following “registered in the”, and “the Commissioner” for “such commissioner” preceding “and shall”.

    Subsec. (b): Repealed.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “subdivision 3003(d)(1)(C)” for “subdivisions 3003(d)(3) and (5)” following “taxation under” and “section” for “sections” preceding “463 or 516”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Deleted “of motor vehicles” following “commissioner” in the first sentence, substituted “26,001 pounds” for “18,000 pounds” in the third sentence and deleted the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “using fuel” following “motor truck” and substituted “state, using fuel as defined in section 3002 of this title shall for each such motor truck apply” for “state, shall apply” and deleted “for each motor truck to be so operated” following “license” in the first sentence, substituted “the commissioner” for “he or she” in the second sentence, “26,001 pounds” for “18,000 pounds” and deleted “the purpose of paving” preceding “the cost” in the third sentence and deleted the last sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Repealed.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 186 substituted “$6.50” for “$6.00” in the third sentence of subsecs. (a) and (b).

    Act No. 212 substituted “for registration” for “therefor” following “fees paid” and inserted “base” preceding “registered” in the first sentence and substituted “21” for “twenty-one” following “exceed” in the sixth sentence of subsec. (b).

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted “of motor vehicles” following “commissioner” in the first sentence, substituted “he or she” for “the commissioner” following “information as” in the second sentence, substituted “except as otherwise provided any” for “any such” preceding “license” and added “or, when determined by the commissioner, 12 months from the first day of the month of issue” following “thereafter” in the fifth sentence and made other minor changes in phraseology.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Act No. 51, § 47 substituted “$5.50” for “$50.00” preceding “annual” in the third sentence and added the fourth sentence.

    Act No. 51, § 47a substituted “$6.00” for “$5.50” preceding “annual” in the third sentence and “1990” for “1989” following “July 1” in the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Added by Act No. 46, § 2.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “which is not registered in this state” preceding “shall apply to” in the first sentence, substituted “$5.00” for “$50.00” following “accompanied by a” and added “the fee being for the purpose of paying the cost of the license, cab card and tag, plate or sticker” following “listed in the application” in the third sentence, inserted “cab card” following “license” in the fourth and fifth sentences, and inserted “and cab cards” following “licenses” in the sixth sentence.

    —1987. Act No. 109 substituted “subsection” for “section” following “permits under” and added “or to users’ vehicles that are being operated under the provisions of sections 463 or 516 of this title” following “subdivisions 3003(d)(3) and (5)” in subsec. (d).

    Act No. 98 deleted former subsec. (c), redesignated former subsec. (d) as present subsec. (c) and deleted “to users obtaining trip permits under section 422(b) or” following “apply” in that subsec.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “on or before July 1, 1982” following “commissioner of motor vehicles” in the first sentence and “only” preceding “applications filed” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Deleted “which is not registered in this state” preceding “shall apply” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Deleted “3010 or” preceding “422(b)”.

    —1985. Subsec. (b): Deleted “on or before December 1, 1982” following “commissioner of motor vehicles” in the first sentence, deleted “prior to December 1, 1982” preceding “under section 415” in the third sentence, and substituted “each January 1” for “October 1, 1983 and each October 1” preceding “thereafter” in the fifth sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Nondiesel fuel user’s license, see § 415 of this title.

    Notification of change of name or address, see § 205 of this title.

    Waiver of requirements for emergency response units, see § 3021(f) of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    Fee system imposed under 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), requiring owners or operators of trucks weighing 18,000 pounds or more, whether registered in Vermont or not, to either pay a $50.00 annual fuel user’s license fee under this section and section 415 of this title or acquire a $50.00 single trip permit or temporary authorization under section 3010 of this title, was unconstitutional and unenforceable as violative of the Commerce Clause, since Act 172 also reduced by $50.00 the registration fee owed by owners of Vermont-registered trucks weighing 18,000 pounds or more. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019, 107 S. Ct. 3262, 97 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2939 (1987).

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'n v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 566 A.2d 1323, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 189 (1989); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 152 Vt. 383, 566 A.2d 1335, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 176 (1989).

    § 3008. Refusal to issue license.

    1. The Commissioner may refuse to issue a license after a finding that the application:
      1. is filed by a person whose license has been revoked previously by the Commissioner;
      2. contains any misrepresentation, misstatement, or omission of material information required by the application;
      3. is filed by a person as a subterfuge for the real person in interest whose license has been revoked by the Commissioner; or
      4. is filed by a person who is delinquent in the payment of any tax, interest, penalty, or other expense due the Commissioner by him or her.
    2. Such findings may be made by the Commissioner after a hearing held not less than 15 days after mailing notice thereof to the applicant, at which the applicant shall have the right to appear in person or by counsel and to present evidence.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3009. Discontinuance, revocation, and reinstatement of licenses.

    1. When any person ceases to be a licensee by reason of a discontinuance, sale, or transfer of his or her business at any location, he or she shall notify the Commissioner in writing by mail at the time the discontinuance, sale, or transfer takes effect. The notice shall give the date of discontinuance and, in the event of a sale or transfer of the business, the name and address of the purchaser or transferee. All taxes, interest, and penalties not yet due and payable under the provisions of this chapter shall be due and payable, notwithstanding such provisions, concurrently with the discontinuance, sale, or transfer. The licensee shall file a report by mail and simultaneously pay all taxes, interest, penalties, and other expenses due by him or her and surrender to the Commissioner the license certificate issued to him or her together with all duplicates and copies, and a user shall remove and surrender to the Commissioner all identification markers from his or her motor vehicles. Until such notice has been given to the Commissioner by a licensee required to file a bond, the seller and his or her surety shall be liable for the taxes, interest, penalties, and other expenses accruing against the transferee, but only to the extent of the value of the property transferred.
    2. The Commissioner may suspend or revoke the license, the right to operate any vehicle, and any registrations of a person who fails to comply with any provision of this chapter or any rule adopted pursuant to this chapter. Such suspension or revocation shall be effective upon not less than 15 days’ notice unless within those 15 days the licensee mails a written request for a hearing to show cause why the suspension or revocation should not become effective.
    3. The Commissioner may reinstate a suspended license or issue a new license at any time upon satisfaction by the licensee of the delinquency for which such license was revoked.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1983, No. 44 , § 9, eff. April 21, 1983; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “by mail” following “in writing” in the first sentence and following “a report” in the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “mails a written request for” for “shall request in writing” in the second sentence.

    —1983. Subsec. (b): Inserted “the right to operate any vehicle and any registrations” following “the license” in the first sentence and rewrote the second sentence.

    § 3010. Temporary authorization.

    Any vehicle registered in a jurisdiction other than Vermont that is eligible for motor fuel tax licensing under the International Fuel Tax Agreement Plan and that is not licensed in Vermont for fuel tax reporting purposes may obtain a trip permit prior to entering this State. The fee for the permit shall be $15.00. The permits shall be valid for a period of 72 hours and shall satisfy motor fuel tax reporting and payment obligations that may arise from the trip. Trip permits must be kept with the vehicle while being operated.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. April 18, 1986; 1997, No. 55 , § 8, eff. June 26, 1997; 1997, No. 59 , § 78, eff. June 30, 1997; 2021, No. 20 , § 249.

    History

    Editor’s note—

    During the 1997 session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 55 and 59, resulting in two versions of this section. The amendments were nearly identical, except for grammar and punctuation. The version codified is the one enacted by Act No. 59.

    Amendments

    —2021. Inserted “and” following “Plan” and preceding “that is not licensed”.

    —1997. Section amended generally by Act Nos. 55 and 59.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Constitutionality.

    Fee system imposed under 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), requiring owners or operators of trucks weighing 18,000 pounds or more, whether registered in Vermont or not, to either pay a $50.00 annual fuel user’s license fee under sections 415 and 3007 of this title or acquire a $50.00 single trip permit or temporary authorization under this section, was unconstitutional and unenforceable as violative of the Commerce Clause, since Act 172 also reduced by $50.00 the registration fee owed by owners of Vermont-registered trucks weighing 18,000 pounds or more. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019, 107 S. Ct. 3262, 97 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2939 (1987).

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'n v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 566 A.2d 1323, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 189 (1989); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 152 Vt. 383, 566 A.2d 1335, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 176 (1989).

    § 3011. Bond requirement; amount; failure of security.

    1. When the Commissioner deems it necessary to protect the revenues to be obtained under this chapter, he or she may require a user, dealer, or distributor to file with him or her a bond, issued by a surety company authorized to transact business in this State and approved by the Commissioner of Financial Regulation of this State as to solvency and responsibility, in an amount fixed by the Commissioner, but not to exceed the total potential liability of such person, to secure the payment of any tax or penalties or interest due or that may become due from a licensee under this chapter. In the event that the Commissioner determines that such person is to file a bond, he or she shall notify the user, dealer, or distributor by mail of the amount of the bond required. That person shall file a bond within 15 days after the giving of the notice unless within those 15 days he or she shall request in writing sent by mail a hearing before the Commissioner at which the necessity, propriety, and amount of the bond shall be determined by the Commissioner. The Commissioner’s determination shall be final and shall be complied with within 15 days after mailing to the user, dealer, or distributor. In lieu of a bond, securities approved by the Commissioner or cash in such amount as he or she may prescribe may be deposited, which shall be kept in the custody of the State Treasurer who may at any time upon instructions from the Commissioner without notice to the depositor apply them to any tax or interest or penalties due, and for that purpose the securities may be sold by him or her at public or private sale without notice to the depositor thereof.
    2. The total amount of the bond required of a licensee may be fixed by the Commissioner and may be increased or decreased by him or her at any time subject to the limitations imposed by this section.
    3. If the liability upon a bond filed by a licensee with the Commissioner becomes discharged or reduced, whether by judgment rendered, payment made, or otherwise, or if in the opinion of the Commissioner any surety on a bond has become unsatisfactory or unacceptable, the Commissioner shall require the licensee to file a new bond with satisfactory sureties in the same amount and, upon failure to do so, the Commissioner shall forthwith revoke the license.
    4. If a licensee fails or refuses to increase the amount of a bond or file a bond as required by the Commissioner within 15 days after notice mailed to him or her, his or her license shall be revoked forthwith.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1989, No. 225 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 1995, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Revision note

    —2012. In subsec. (a), in the first sentence, substituted “commissioner of financial regulation” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” in accordance with 2011, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “notify the user, dealer, or distributor by mail of” for “give notice to him or her to that effect, specifying” in the second sentence, inserted “sent by mail” following “request in writing” in the third sentence, and inserted “Commissioner’s” preceding “determination” and substituted “mailing to the user, dealer, or distributor” for “the giving of notice thereof” in the fourth sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “commissioner of financial regulation” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, and securities”.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “banking, insurance, and securities” for “banking and securities” following “approved by the commissioner of”.

    § 3012. Discharge of surety.

    Any surety on a bond furnished by a licensee shall be discharged from any liability to the State accruing on the bond after expiration of 60 days from the date the surety filed by mail with the Commissioner a written request to be released and discharged, but the surety shall not be released or discharged from liability already accrued or that shall accrue before the expiration of the 60-day period. The Commissioner, upon receipt of such a request, shall promptly notify by mail the licensee who furnished the bond. Unless the licensee, prior to the expiration of the 60-day period, files a new bond satisfactory to the Commissioner, the Commissioner shall revoke his or her license.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). In the first sentence, deleted “shall have” preceding “filed” and inserted “by mail” thereafter.

    § 3013. Records; sales invoice; inspection.

    1. Each licensed user under this chapter shall keep and retain for a period of not less than three years such records as may be prescribed by the Commissioner that are reasonably necessary to substantiate the reports required by section 3014 of this title.
    2. Each sale or delivery of fuel by a dealer to a user shall be recorded on demand by the user upon a preprinted, serially numbered invoice approved in form and content by the Commissioner and delivered to the user by mail. The sales invoice shall constitute a receipt for the amount of tax collected by the dealer upon payment by the user. Copies of the sales invoices shall be retained by the user and the dealer for not less than three years. For the purposes of claiming a tax credit or refund under sections 3015 and 3020 of this title, a user with the approval of the Commissioner may submit as a receipt a record of purchases made upon which the tax was paid at the time of purchase; provided, however, that the supporting documents are available for audit purposes in readily accessible form or on readable microfilm.
    3. The Commissioner or his or her agents may examine the books and records of any distributor, dealer, or user during the usual business hours of the day to verify the truth and accuracy of any statement, report, or return or to determine if the tax imposed by this chapter has been paid.  If the books and records of a nonresident licensee are not available for examination in this State, the Commissioner may request him or her to furnish at his or her office in Montpelier such books and records he or she reasonably requires.  If such licensee shall be unable or unwilling to comply with the request, the Commissioner is authorized to charge him or her a reasonable per diem fee and expenses for the auditor making such examination out of state, which shall be payable within 30 days of the mailing of a bill by the Commissioner.
    4. The Commissioner may enter into agreements with officials of other states, the District of Columbia, and Canadian provinces for the cooperative examination of licensee reports, returns, books, and records, and for the collection of fees and penalties.  In performing such duties, officials of other states, the District of Columbia, and Canadian provinces shall be deemed authorized agents of the Commissioner for such purposes.  The Commissioner may provide information about the receipt, storage, delivery, sale, use, or other disposition of fuel by any licensee to officials in other states, the District of Columbia, and Canadian provinces who administer fuel tax laws, provided such officials may furnish similar information to the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1983, No. 44 , § 1, eff. April 21, 1983; 1989, No. 182 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. May 16, 1990; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted “a copy” preceding “delivered to the user” and inserted “by mail” thereafter in the first sentence.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Inserted “the District of Columbia and Canadian provinces” following “other states” in the first through third sentences.

    —1983. Subsec. (b): Added the fourth sentence.

    § 3014. Reports; exceptions.

    1. Every distributor or dealer, on or before the 25th day of each month, shall file by mail with the Commissioner on forms prescribed by him or her a report for the preceding month that shall include the number of gallons of fuel sold or delivered. A distributor’s report shall also include the identity of the person to whom the fuel was sold or delivered, the amount of the tax collected and by whom, and the monthly total of fuel sold or delivered. The report shall be filed even though no fuel was sold or delivered.
    2. Every licensed user shall file by mail a report with the Commissioner on forms prescribed or in a form approved by him or her that shall include the number of gallons of fuel used in Vermont by motor vehicles owned or operated by him or her. All users shall file on a quarterly basis on or before April 30 for the calendar quarter ending March 31, on or before July 31 for the calendar quarter ending June 30, on or before October 31 for the calendar quarter ending September 30, and on or before January 31 for the calendar quarter ending December 31. The report shall be filed even though no motor fuel was used or delivered.
    3. Any user whose sole use of fuel is for the propulsion of a pleasure car or motor truck registered for not more than 26,001 pounds is exempt from filing the report.
    4. If the Commissioner deems it necessary in order to ensure payment of the tax, or to facilitate the administration of this chapter, the Commissioner may require reports and payment of tax to be made for other than and in addition to quarterly periods. A user may apply to the Commissioner for approval to file reports and pay taxes on a more frequent basis.
    5. The Commissioner may exempt a dealer from the monthly report requirement if the dealer holds a valid license and annually certifies that the dealer purchases all fuel sold or delivered from a licensed distributor and pays the tax on such fuel to the distributor. A dealer so exempted shall retain and make available for inspection by the Commissioner or designated agents such records as may be required to substantiate the certification, including pump meter readings and delivery invoices.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1983, No. 44 , §§ 2, 3, 6, 8; 1987, No. 98 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988; 1987, No. 111 , § 1; 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1989, No. 84 , § 6; 1995, No. 47 , § 14, eff. April 20, 1995; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 20; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 221; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsec. (e), deleted “but not limited to” following “including” in the second sentence in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 149 inserted “by mail” following “shall file” and substituted “that” for “which” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 149 inserted “by mail” following “shall file” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 131 substituted “ensure” for “insure” in the first sentence.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “25th” for “last” preceding “day”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    —1995. Subdiv. (d)(2): Deleted “in excess of $10.00” following “owed” in the second sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (c): Deleted “under sections 361 and 374” following “car rate” and “under section 367 of this title” following “10,000 pounds” in the second sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “or motor truck registered for not more than 10,000 pounds” for “vehicle” following “pleasure car” and “vehicle” for “automobile” following “tank of the user’s” in the first sentence, rewrote the second sentence, and inserted “or truck registered for not more than 10,000 pounds” following “vehicle” and “or she” following “he” in two places in the third sentence.

    —1987. Subsec. (b): Act No. 111 made minor changes in phraseology in the first sentence, added the second sentence, and added “or delivered” following “used” at the end of the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Amended generally by Act No. 98.

    —1983. Subsec. (b): Inserted “or in a form approved” following “prescribed” in the first sentence, deleted the former second sentence, rewrote the present second sentence, and added the present fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “367 and 374” for “and 367” following “361” and added “when such vehicle is designed to carry eight or more passengers including the operator” following “compensation” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “a certification that” for “an affidavit that his operations are wholly within the state” following “files” and “in use” for “and” following “facilities” and added “and pays the tax on the fuel to the dealer” following “dealers” in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

    Subsec. (g): Added.

    § 3015. Computation and payment of tax.

    Each report required under section 3014 of this title from licensed distributors, dealers, or users shall be accompanied by evidence of an electronic funds transfer payment or a remittance payable to the Department of Motor Vehicles for the amount of tax due, which shall be computed and transmitted in the following manner:

    1. The distributor’s tax shall be determined by multiplying the number of gallons of fuel sold or delivered into the bulk tanks of dealers or users by the rate per gallon stated in section 3003 of this title.
    2. Except as provided in subdivision 3002(9) of this title, the user’s tax shall be determined by multiplying the number of gallons of fuels used in Vermont in motor vehicles operated by the user at the rate per gallon stated in section 3003 for vehicles weighing or registered for 26,001 pounds or more. The taxable gallonage shall be computed on the basis of miles traveled within the State as compared to total miles traveled, with the actual method of computation prescribed by the Commissioner. A distributor may use as the measure of the tax so levied and assessed the gross quantity of fuel purchased, imported, produced, refined, manufactured, and compounded by the distributor, instead of the quantity sold, distributed, or used. From this amount of tax due, there shall be deducted the tax on fuel purchased in this State on which the tax has been previously paid by the user, provided the tax-paid purchases are supported by copies of the sales invoices showing the amount of tax paid. Such copies shall be retained by the taxpayer for a period of not less than three years and shall be available for inspection by the Commissioner or his or her designated agents. If the computation shows additional tax to be due, it shall be remitted with the report filed under section 3014 of this title.
      1. Distributors and dealers filing a report required under subsection 3014(a) of this title shall transmit payment of taxes due to the Department of Motor Vehicles by means of an electronic funds transfer. (3) (A) Distributors and dealers filing a report required under subsection 3014(a) of this title shall transmit payment of taxes due to the Department of Motor Vehicles by means of an electronic funds transfer.
      2. Users filing a report required under subsection 3014(b) of this title shall transmit payment of taxes due to the Department of Motor Vehicles by means of an electronic funds transfer payment or by a remittance through the U.S. mail. If a remittance is sent through the U.S. mail properly addressed to the Department of Motor Vehicles, it shall be deemed received on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope containing the report only for purposes of avoiding penalty and interest. In the event a mailing date is affixed to the envelope by a machine owned or under the control of the person submitting the report and the U.S. Post Office has corrected or changed the date stamped thereon by causing the official U.S. Post Office postmark to also be imprinted on the envelope, the date shown by the official Post Office postmark shall be the accepted date if different from the original postmark.
    3. All taxes, interest, user license fees, and penalties collected by the Department of Motor Vehicles under this chapter shall be forthwith paid to the State Treasurer and credited to the Transportation Fund.
    4. Notwithstanding subdivision (4) of this section, the one cent per gallon fee imposed by this chapter shall be deposited into the Petroleum Cleanup Fund established by 10 V.S.A. § 1941 . These fees shall be deemed the petroleum distributor licensing fee established by 10 V.S.A. § 1942 .

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1983, No. 44 , § 7, eff. April 21, 1983; 1987, No. 111 , § 2; 1987, No. 282 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 1989, No. 51 , § 3, eff. April 1, 1989; 1989, No. 51 , § 4, eff. April 1, 1990; 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. June 1, 2016; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 2a, eff. June 1, 2017; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. July 1, 2019; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. July 1, 2020; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 222.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (2): Substituted “traveled” for “travelled” following “basis of miles” and “traveled” for “travelled within and without the State” in the second sentence.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Introductory language: Act 206, § 9 inserted “evidence of an electronic funds transfer payment or” following “by” and “and transmitted” following “computed”.

    Subdiv. (3): Amended generally by Act 206, § 9.

    Subdiv. (3)(A): Act 206, § 10 deleted “with a tax liability of more than $25,000.00” following “dealers”.

    Subdiv. (3)(B): Act 206, § 10 substituted “Users” for “Distributors and dealers with a tax liability of 25,000.00 or less filing a report required under subsection 3014(a), of this title and users” preceding “filing”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (3): Added the sixth sentence.

    —1989. Subdiv. (3): Act No. 51, § 3 inserted “or her” following “operated by him” and added “for vehicles of less than 10,000 pounds, and at the rate of 22 cents per gallon for vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or more” following “section 3003” in the first sentence.

    Act No. 51, § 4 substituted “25” for “22” preceding “cents” in the first sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (7): Added.

    —1987. Subdiv. (6): Added.

    —1983. Subdiv. (3): Added the third sentence.

    § 3016. Additional assessment; time limit.

    1. If the Commissioner is not satisfied that the report filed or the amount of tax paid by a taxpayer is accurate, after investigating and finding such inaccuracy, he or she may make an additional assessment of taxes due from the taxpayer based upon his or her investigation. In estimating the tax due from a licensed user, fuel consumption shall be computed at the rate of 10 miles per gallon for vehicles registered up to and including 10,000 pounds and at four miles per gallon for all vehicles registered over 10,000 pounds for any unreported Vermont mileage in excess of four percent of the operator’s total Vermont mileage. Any tax assessed for mileage up to four percent of the operator’s total Vermont mileage shall be assessed based on the operator’s fuel consumption average for his or her entire fleet. A penalty equal to 10 percent and interest at the rate of one and one-half percent per month shall be payable on the additional assessment, with interest computed from the date the tax payment was due. The Commissioner shall give notice by mail to the taxpayer of the additional assessment, penalty, and interest and shall designate the error or reason for the assessment. Payment shall be due within 30 days of the date of mailing the notice. The Commissioner may, in his or her discretion, waive all or any part of the penalty.
    2. When no report or payment of tax has been made as required by sections 3014 and 3015 of this title, or when a willfully false or fraudulent report has been filed, the tax may be assessed at any time; in all other cases, no assessment of additional tax, and the mailing of notice, shall be made after the expiration of three years from the date of filing a report.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1985, No. 58 , § 3, eff. May 16, 1985; 1987, No. 111 , § 3; 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Added the last sentence.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Rewrote the second sentence.

    —1987. Subsec. (a): Substituted “taxpayer” for “licensed user” preceding “is accurate” and preceding “based upon” in the first sentence and following “mail to the” in the fifth sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “of this title” following “3015” and deleted “thereof” following “notice”.

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Inserted “or she” preceding “may make” and “or her” preceding “investigation” in the first sentence, substituted “four” for “three” preceding “miles per gallon” and added “for any unreported Vermont mileage in excess of four percent of the operator’s total Vermont mileage” thereafter in the second sentence and added the third sentence.

    § 3017. Failure to file a report or pay the tax when due; penalty.

    1. Any person who fails to file a report when due shall pay a fee of $10.00 as partial compensation for the added administrative costs.
    2. In addition to the fee prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, any person who fails to pay any tax when due, except a tax assessed pursuant to sections 3016 and 3018 of this title, shall pay in addition to the tax interest calculated at one and one-half percent per month on the tax from the due date, until paid.  In addition, if the taxpayer fails to pay the tax liability in full within 30 days, a penalty equal to five percent of the outstanding tax liability for each month or portion thereof shall be paid; provided, however, that in no event shall the amount of the penalty imposed hereunder exceed 25 percent of the tax liability unpaid on the prescribed date of payment.  The Commissioner may remit all or any part of the penalty if he or she is satisfied that the delay was excusable.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3018. Neglect or refusal to file a report; estimate of tax by Commissioner; penalty and interest.

    If any person neglects or refuses to file any report required by this chapter, the Commissioner shall make an estimate of the tax due, based upon information available to the Commissioner, for the period for which that person failed to make the report and shall assess the tax due from the licensee, adding to the amount thus determined a penalty of 50 percent. In estimating the tax due from a licensed user, fuel consumption shall be computed at the rate of 10 miles per gallon for vehicles registered up to 10,000 pounds and four miles per gallon for those vehicles registered over 10,000 pounds. The assessment shall bear interest at the rate of one and one-half percent per month from the date the tax payment was due until paid. The Commissioner shall give the licensee notice by mail of the assessment and payment shall be due within 15 days of the date of the mailing of the notice.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1985, No. 58 , § 4, eff. May 16, 1985; 1987, No. 111 , § 4; 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    History

    Amendments

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the second sentence.

    —1987. In the first sentence, substituted “any person” for “a licensed user” preceding “neglects”, “that person” for “the licensed user” preceding “failed” and “the” for “such” preceding “licensee” and deleted “thereof” following “50 percent”.

    —1985. Substituted “the commissioner” for “him” following “available to” in the first sentence and “four” for “three” preceding “miles” in the second sentence.

    § 3019. Assessment; hearing permitted.

    Any person against whom assessment is made pursuant to section 3016 or 3018 of this title may appear in person or by counsel in the office of the Commissioner within 15 days after the mailing to him or her of notice of the assessment then and there to show cause why the assessment is in error or to present any other facts or testimony that would bear on the amount of the assessment or the manner in which it was made. The hearing may be continued from time to time. If the person or his or her agent does not appear within the 15 days, the assessment shall become final.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1987, No. 111 , § 5.

    History

    Amendments

    —1987. Substituted “any person” for “a licensed user” preceding “against” and inserted “of this title” following “3018” and “or her” following “mailing to him” in the first sentence and substituted “person” for “licensed user” preceding “or his” and inserted “or her” thereafter in the third sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Jordan v. State, 166 Vt. 509, 702 A.2d 58, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 113 (1997).

    § 3020. Credits and refunds.

    1. Credits.
      1. A user who purchased fuel within this State from a dealer or distributor upon which he or she paid the tax at the time of purchase, or a user exempt from the payment of the tax under subsection 3003(d) of this title who purchased fuel within this State upon which he or she paid tax at the time of purchase, shall be entitled to a credit equal to the amount of tax per gallon in effect when the fuel was purchased. When the amount of the credit to which any user is entitled for any reporting period exceeds the amount of his or her tax for the same period, the excess shall be credited to the user’s tax account and the user shall be notified of the date and amount of the credit by mail.
      2. If the Commissioner determines that a tax, penalty, interest, or fee required by this chapter has been paid more than once by a user, or has been illegally or erroneously collected or computed, the excess amount paid or collected shall be credited to the user’s tax account and the user shall be notified of the date and amount of the credit by mail.
      3. A user who also sells or delivers fuel subject to the tax imposed by 32 V.S.A. chapter 233 upon which the tax imposed by this chapter has been paid shall be entitled to a credit equal to the amount of such tax paid pursuant to this chapter. When the amount of the credit to which any user is entitled for any reporting period exceeds the amount of his or her tax for the same period, the excess shall be credited to the user’s tax account and the user shall be notified of the date and amount of the credit by mail.
      4. Any credits in the user’s tax account shall be allowed as a credit against either the tax for which the user otherwise would be liable for in a succeeding reporting period or any registration fees assessed pursuant to chapter 35 of this title.
    2. Refunds.   A user may request, in writing by mail, a refund of any credits in the user’s tax account, but in no case may a user collect a refund requested more than 33 months following the date the amount was credited to the user’s tax account.
    3. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1983, No. 44 , § 4, eff. April 21, 1983; 1985, No. 58 , § 5; 1987, No. 98 , § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1988; 1993, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 20, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “fuel within this” for “fuel with this” and inserted “or distributor” following “a dealer” in the first sentence.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “the” for “such” following “effect when” in the first sentence and following “tax for which” in the second sentence and “11” for “three” and “39” for “nine” in the sixth sentence.

    —1987. Subsec. (a): In the last sentence, inserted “any of” preceding “the next” and “three” thereafter and substituted “periods” for “period” preceding “but in no case” and “nine” for “three” preceding “months”.

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Inserted “or she” following “he” in the first and fourth sentences and “or her” following “his” in the second sentence and added the third and fifth sentences and “but in no case may credits or refunds be claimed more than three months following the due date of the report covering the reporting period in which the purchase was made” following “following reporting period” in the sixth sentence.

    —1983. Subsec. (a): Substituted “person” for “licensed user” preceding “who purchased” and for “user” preceding “exempt” in the first sentence and for “licensed user” preceding “is entitled” and for “user” preceding “otherwise” in the second sentence.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction.

    Legislative intent to refund amounts paid under statutes later declared invalid could not be inferred from subsec. (b) of this section. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019, 107 S. Ct. 3262, 97 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2939 (1987).

    Purpose.

    Subsec. (b) of this section has the clear purpose of redressing errors in the enforcement or implementation of the diesel fuel tax and merely provides for a refund mechanism if errors are made in determining what tax is imposed. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019, 107 S. Ct. 3262, 97 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2939 (1987).

    Cited.

    Cited in Davey Oil Co. v. State, 146 Vt. 632, 508 A.2d 717, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 333 (1986); Williams v. State, 156 Vt. 42, 589 A.2d 840, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 271 (1990).

    § 3021. General powers of Commissioner.

    1. The Commissioner shall have the authority to administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter.
    2. In addition to the powers specifically granted to the Commissioner in this chapter, he or she may:
      1. Make, amend, and repeal rules under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 as limited by this chapter and prescribe forms appropriate to the purposes of this chapter.
      2. Delegate to any officer or employee in his or her Department powers he or she may deem necessary to carry out efficiently the provisions of this chapter, and the person or persons to whom the power has been delegated shall possess and may exercise all of the power and perform all of the duties conferred and imposed upon the Commissioner.
      3. With the approval of the Governor and Secretary, enter into agreement with other states, the District of Columbia, and Canadian provinces, providing for the reciprocal enforcement of the fuel use tax laws imposed by the states or provinces entering into such an agreement, which agreement may empower the duly authorized officer of any contracting state or province, which extends like authority to officers or employees of this State, to sue for the collection of that state’s or province’s fuel use taxes in the courts of this State.  The agreement is allowed to conflict with sections 3007, 3009, and 3014 through 3019 of this title and the agreement shall govern licensees covered by the agreement.
      4. Hold hearings, cause depositions to be taken, administer oaths, and examine under oath any person relating to his or her business or relating to any matter under this chapter. This chapter shall also apply to any person who the Commissioner has reason to believe is liable for the payment of a tax.
      5. Compel the attendance of witnesses and order the production of any relevant books, records, papers, vouchers, accounts, or other documents of any person the Commissioner has reason to believe is liable for the payment of a tax or of any person believed to have information pertinent to any matter under investigation by the Commissioner at any hearing held under this chapter. The fees for travel and attendance of witnesses summoned or used by the Commissioner and fees for officers shall be the same as for witnesses and officers before a court and shall be paid by the State upon presentation of proper bills of cost to the Commissioner of Finance and Management, but no fees or expenses shall be payable to a witness charged with a use tax liability.
    3. Any examination under oath conducted by the Commissioner may, in his or her discretion, be reduced to writing and willful false testimony shall be deemed perjury and be punishable as such.
    4. Any Superior judge upon application of the Commissioner may compel the attendance of witnesses, the giving of testimony, and the production of any books, records, papers, vouchers, accounts, or documents before the Commissioner in the same manner, to the same extent, and subject to the same penalties as if before a Superior Court.
    5. When under the laws of any other state, any taxes, fines, penalties, licenses, fees, deposits, or other obligations or prohibitions, additional to any imposed by this State upon any class of private or public motor vehicles not registered in such state are imposed upon any class of private or public motor vehicles in this State and their owners and operators traveling upon the public highways of such state, the same or similar taxes, fines, penalties, licenses, fees, deposits, or other obligations or prohibitions may be imposed upon all similar classes of private or public motor vehicles registered in such state and traveling upon the public highways of this State so long as such laws shall remain in force.  The Commissioner shall determine the method of reciprocity.
    6. In the event of a natural disaster that causes or may cause substantial damage or injury to persons or property, the Commissioner may waive the licensing requirements of sections 415 and 3007 of this title for emergency response units.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1983, No. 74 , §§ 5, 6, eff. April 28, 1983; 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b); 1987, No. 112 , § 7; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 162; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 223, 224.

    History

    Revision note—

    In the second sentence of subdiv. (b)(5), substituted “commissioner of finance” for “finance director” following “cost to the” in view of 1971, No. 92 .

    In the second sentence of subdiv. (b)(5), substituted “commissioner of finance and management” for “commissioner of finance and information support” following “cost to the” in light of Executive Order No. 35-87, which provided for the abolition of the department of finance and information support and the transfer of the duties, responsibilities and authority of the commissioner of finance and information support to the commissioner of the department of finance and management as established by the order. By its own terms, Executive Order No. 35-87 took effect on July 1, 1987, pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 2002 .

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(2): Deleted “therein” following “duties”.

    Subsec. (c): Deleted “therein” following “testimony”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (b)(5): Substituted “a” for “a district” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Deleted “or district” following “superior” in two places.

    —1987. Subsec. (f): Added.

    —1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(5): Substituted “commissioner of finance and information support” for “commissioner of finance” following “cost to the” in the second sentence.

    —1983. Subdiv. (b)(3): Added the second sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Witness fees, see 32 V.S.A. chapter 17, subchapter 5.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Jordan v. State, 166 Vt. 509, 702 A.2d 58, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 113 (1997).

    § 3022. Proceedings to recover tax.

    1. Whenever any person fails to pay any tax, penalty, or interest, the Attorney General shall, upon the request of the Commissioner, enforce the payment on behalf of the State in any court of the State or of any other state of the United States or of any province of Canada.
    2. The remedy for the collection of taxes provided by 32 V.S.A. § 9811(b) shall be available to the Commissioner as an additional or alternate remedy and the Commissioner may issue a warrant directed to an enforcement officer who may exercise throughout the State the same powers granted to a sheriff in his or her county.
    3. The Commissioner is authorized to contract with private collection agencies for collection of tax penalties and interest imposed on persons who have failed to pay after reasonable notification of the debt.  The Commissioner may agree to pay collection agencies a fixed rate for services rendered or a percentage of the amount actually collected by the agencies and remitted to the State.  Notwithstanding 32 V.S.A. § 502 , the Commissioner may charge against the collections an agreed-upon fixed rate or percentage of collections.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1987, No. 111 , § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —1987. Subsec. (a): Substituted “fails” for “shall fail” following “person” and deleted “thereof” preceding “on behalf”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “the commissioner” for “in the commissioner’s discretion, he” preceding “may issue” and inserted “or her” preceding “county”.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    § 3023. Review of Commissioner’s decision.

    1. Any aggrieved licensed user or taxpayer may have any decision, order, or finding of the Commissioner made under this chapter reviewed under Rule 75 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.  Such review shall be to the Washington Superior Court or, in the discretion of the appellant, to the Superior Court in the county where the licensed person has his or her principal place of business or residence.  The hearing on the review shall be de novo.
    2. The appeal provided by this section shall be the exclusive remedy available to any licensed user or taxpayer for review of a decision of the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1985, No. 58 , § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

    Where the Agency of Transportation mailed petitioners a letter listing the amount of a fuel-tax assessment and notifying them of their right to administrative appeal; petitioners returned a letter expressing disagreement with the assessment and requesting an appeal; a hearing was scheduled; and, although petitioners failed to attend the hearing, a decision was issued stating that “the hearing finds that the assessment, interest and penalty were proper”; having requested and received administrative review of the assessment (i.e., exhausted their administrative remedies), petitioners were within their statutory rights to seek de novo review of the decision in Superior Court. Jordan v. State, 166 Vt. 509, 702 A.2d 58, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 113 (1997).

    Cited.

    Cited in American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579, 508 A.2d 408, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1986).

    § 3024. Penalties.

    1. Any person under this chapter who shall willfully: fail or refuse to pay the tax imposed or engage in any activity for which a license is required without having procured and maintained such license; fail to make any of the reports required; make any false statement in any application, report, or statement required; refuse to permit the Commissioner or any deputy to make the examination as provided by subsection 3013(c) of this title; fail to keep proper records of quantities of fuel received, sold, used, or delivered in this State as required; make any false statement on any delivery ticket or invoice as to the quantity of fuel delivered, sold, or used; make any false statement in connection with a report or an application for the refund of any monies or taxes; or engage in any act or activity with the intent to evade payment to or prevent collection by the State of the tax imposed shall be, in addition to any other prescribed penalties, guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
    2. It shall be unlawful for any person:
      1. to operate a motor vehicle subject to the provisions of this chapter upon any public highway in the State without first obtaining the diesel fuel user’s license and marker required under section 3007 of this title or to so operate without displaying the marker or to so operate without having in the vehicle the license issued under section 3007 or a permit issued under section 3010 of this title;
      2. to violate any regulation issued by the Commissioner pursuant to the authority granted hereunder; or
      3. to operate a motor truck without maintaining the record required by section 3025 of this title.
    3. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (b) of this section shall be fined not more than $2,000.00 or not less than $500.00.  Such penalty shall be in addition to the penalty imposed by any other section of this chapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1983, No. 44 , § 10, eff. April 21, 1983; 1985, No. 58 , § 7; 2015, No. 47 , § 45; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 225.

    History

    Revision note—

    In subdiv. (b)(3), substituted “record” for “log” to conform language to text of section 3025 of this title, as amended by 1983, No. 44 , § 5.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “prescribed” preceding “penalties” and deleted “herein or elsewhere prescribed” thereafter.

    —2015. Subdiv. (b)(1): Substituted “displaying the marker or to so operate without having in the vehicle the license” for “displaying said marker or to so operate without having in the vehicle either the license or telegram”.

    —1985. Subdiv. (b)(1): Added “or to so operate without having in the vehicle either the license or telegram issued under section 3007 or a permit issued under section 3010” following “said marker”.

    —1983. Subdiv. (b)(1): Added “or to so operate without displaying said marker” following “section 3007”.

    § 3025. Records required.

    1. The user of a motor truck with a gross weight or registered weight of 26,001 pounds or more shall maintain a daily record of total miles traveled and miles traveled within the State.
    2. Such records shall be retained by the user for a period of not less than four years and shall be available for inspection by the Commissioner or designated agents or enforcement officers.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1983, No. 44 , § 5, eff. April 21, 1983; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 226.

    History

    Revision note—

    In the section heading, substituted “Records” for “Logs” for purposes of conformity with language of the section as amended by 1983, No. 44 , § 5.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “total” preceding “miles”, substituted “traveled and miles traveled” for “travelled both” following “miles”, and, deleted “and without” preceding “the State” and “of Vermont” thereafter.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “weight or registered weight of 26,001 pounds or more shall” for “weight of 18,000 pounds or over shall”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “four years” for “three years” and “commissioner or designated” for “commissioner, his designated”.

    —1983. Subsec. (a): Substituted “record of miles travelled both within and without the state of Vermont” for “log in the form prescribed by the commissioner” following “daily” in the first sentence and deleted the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “records” for “logs” following “such” in the first sentence and deleted the second sentence.

    § 3026. Reports by railroads.

    1. Every person or corporation operating a railroad in the State shall file by mail a report with the Commissioner on forms prescribed by him or her, which shall include the number of gallons of fuel used in Vermont by railroad trains owned or operated by them on a quarterly basis on or before October 31 for the calendar quarter ending September 30, on or before January 31 for the calendar quarter ending December 31, on or before April 30 for the calendar quarter ending March 31, and on or before July 31 for the calendar quarter ending June 30.
    2. Each report required under this section shall be accompanied by a remittance payable to the Agency of Transportation for an amount computed by multiplying the number of gallons of fuel indicated on the report at the rate per gallon for railroad fuel indicated in section 3003 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1981, No. 172 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1987, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “by mail” following “shall file”.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    § 3027. Civil penalty.

    In addition to any other penalty imposed for violation of this chapter, a civil penalty of $1,000.00 shall be imposed upon a purchaser or user for each instance in which the purchaser or user uses untaxed fuel to propel a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 227.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “penalty” for “fine” in the section heading and following “civil”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    § 3028. Bulk sales; transferee liability.

    1. Whenever a licensee (transferor) required to collect and remit the tax required by this chapter shall make any sale, transfer, lease, or assignment (transfer) in bulk of any part or the whole of the assets of a business, otherwise than in the ordinary course of the business, the purchaser, transferee, lessee, or assignee (transferee) shall, at least 10 days before taking possession of the subject of the transfer or before payment therefor if earlier, notify the Commissioner in writing by mail of the proposed transfer and of the price and date thereof; and whether or not the transferor has represented to, or has informed the transferee that the transferor owes any tax, interest, or penalties required by this chapter and whether or not the transferee has knowledge that such taxes, interest, or penalties are owed, and whether any taxes, interest, or penalties are in fact owed.
    2. Whenever the transferee shall fail to give notice to the Commissioner as required by subsection (a) of this section, or whenever the Commissioner shall inform the transferee that a possible claim for tax, interest, or penalty exists, any sums of money, property, or choses in action, or other consideration, that the transferee is required to transfer over to or for the transferor shall be subject to a first priority right and lien for any taxes, interest, or penalty theretofore or thereafter determined to be due from the transferor to the State, and the transferee is forbidden to transfer the consideration to or for the transferor to the extent of the amount of the State’s claim.
    3. For failure to comply with this section, the transferee shall be personally liable to the State for the amount of the State’s claim theretofore or thereafter determined to be due to the State from the transferor and the liability may be assessed and enforced against the transferee in the same manner as provided for by this chapter against the transferor.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 36; amended 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “by mail” following “in writing”.

    § 3029. Personal liability.

    Any licensee who fails to collect the tax required by this chapter or to pay it to the Commissioner in the manner required by this chapter shall be personally and individually liable for the amount of such tax and any interest and penalty assessed thereon pursuant to sections 3017 and 3018 of this title; and if the licensee is a corporation or other entity, the personal liability shall extend and be applicable to any officer or agent of the corporation or entity who as an officer or agent of the same is under a duty to collect the tax and pay it to the Commissioner as required in this chapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 37.

    § 3030. Tax liability as property lien; discharge and foreclosure.

    1. If any licensee required to pay the tax under this chapter neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand is made by the Commissioner, the amount, together with all penalties and interest provided for in this chapter and together with any additional costs that may accrue, shall be a lien in favor of the State upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such licensee. Such lien shall arise at the time demand is made by the Commissioner and shall continue until the liability for such sum with interest and costs is satisfied or becomes unenforceable. Such lien shall have the same force and effect as the lien provided for in 32 V.S.A. § 5895 , and notice of such lien shall be recorded as provided for in 32 V.S.A. § 5895 .
    2. Release and foreclosure of the lien shall be as provided in 32 V.S.A. § 5895(b) and (c).
    3. This section shall also apply to any officer or agent found personally liable pursuant to section 3029 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 228.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the first sentence, inserted “additional” preceding “costs” and deleted “in addition thereto” following “accrue” and “of Vermont” following “State”; and in the last sentence, deleted “is” following “recorded as”, inserted “for” following “provided”, and substituted “ 32 V.S.A. § 5895 ” for “said section” at the end.

    § 3031. Lien fees.

    Notwithstanding 32 V.S.A. § 502 , the Commissioner may charge against any collection of liability any related lien filing fees specified in 32 V.S.A. § 1671(a)(6) or § 1671(c) paid by the Commissioner. Fees collected under this section shall be credited to a special fund established and managed pursuant to 32 V.S.A. chapter 7, subchapter 5, and shall be available as payment for the fees of the clerk of the municipality.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 40.

    Chapter 28. Gasoline Tax

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Diesel fuel tax, see chapter 27 of this title.

    Subchapter 1. General Gasoline Tax

    Annotations From Former 32 V

    Constitutionality.

    The tax imposed by this subchapter on each gallon of gasoline sold or used in the State by a distributor as therein defined was not to be condemned as unconstitutional in its incidence upon gasoline purchased by a railroad company outside the State, stored by it within the State and withdrawn from storage for use in the operation of its trains in interstate commerce operated only as an indirect burden on interstate commerce and did not contravene the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Central Vermont Railway v. Campbell, 108 Vt. 510, 192 A. 197, 1937 Vt. LEXIS 154 (1937).

    Nature of tax.

    The tax on gasoline imposed by this chapter was an excise tax upon the domestic sale or use of gasoline measured by gallonage. Central Vermont Railway v. Campbell, 108 Vt. 510, 192 A. 197, 1937 Vt. LEXIS 154 (1937).

    § 3101. Definitions; scope.

    1. As used in this chapter:
      1. “Distributor” means a person who imports or causes to be imported gasoline or other motor fuel for use, distribution, or sale within the State, or any person who produces, refines, manufactures, or compounds gasoline or other motor fuel within the State for use, distribution, or sale. When a person receives motor fuel in circumstances that preclude the collection of the tax from the distributor by reason of the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and thereafter sells or uses the motor fuel in the State in a manner and under circumstances as may subject the sale to the taxing power of the State, the person shall be considered a distributor and shall make the same reports, pay the same taxes, and be subject to all provisions of this subchapter relating to distributors of motor fuel.
      2. “Dealer” means any person who sells or delivers motor fuel into the fuel supply tanks of motor vehicles or aircraft owned or operated by others.
      3. “Motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle using motor fuel on the public highways and registered or required to be registered for operation on these highways.
      4. “Mail,” “mails,” “mailing,” and “mailed” mean any method of delivery authorized by the Commissioner, which shall include by hand, U.S. mail, and electronic transmission.
    2. As used in this subchapter:
      1. “Gasoline or other motor fuel” or “motor fuel” includes aviation gasoline and shall not include the following:
        1. kerosene;
        2. clear or undyed diesel “fuel” as defined in section 3002 of this title;
        3. “railroad fuel” as defined in section 3002 of this title;
        4. aircraft jet fuel; or
        5. natural gas in any form.
    3. Except for “railroad fuel” taxed under section 3003 of this title, the taxation or exemption from taxation of dyed diesel fuel is not addressed under this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1989, No. 46 , § 3; 2011, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 44, eff. July 1, 2013; 2017, No. 75 , § 16; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 33, eff. Jan. 1, 2019; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “ ‘Distributor’ means” for “The term ‘distributor’ as used in this subchapter shall mean” and deleted “, firm, or corporation” following “person” twice.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Added.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1989. Subsec. (c): Added.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former 32 V.S.A. § 8801 .

    Distributor.

    An instate owner of gasoline storage tanks who placed an order for a carload of gasoline with the representative of an out-of-state firm, which held a Vermont distributor license, and received the carload shipped directly from the storage facilities of the out-of-state firm, was required to take out a distributor’s license although the out-of-state firm agreed to pay the tax. 1930-32 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 196.

    An instate owner of gasoline tanks who was not an importer and did not cause gasoline to be imported, but bought gasoline already within the state from a licensed distributor, was not required to take out distributor’s license. 1930-32 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 196.

    The city of Burlington was held to be a distributor and, therefore, required to procure a license as provided by former section 8802 of this title; however, since the gasoline was for the use of the city alone, no tax would be imposed. 1926-28 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 34.

    A company which purchased gasoline out-of-state for its own use in the State was probably a distributor under this section, but would not be subject to the tax imposed since it did not resell the fuel. 1926-28 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 25.

    Motor fuel.

    The Department of Motor Vehicles would be justified in classing outside of the definition “other motor fuel” commercial solvents or commercial naphthas sold by recognized manufacturers to recognized industrial firms for industrial use only. 1942-44 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 187.

    U.M. & P. naphtha or paint thinner, varnolene, gas, machine gasoline and aviation gasoline could be used for motor fuel and were subject to tax. 1926-28 Op. Atty. Gen. 44, Op. Atty. Gen. 187. See also 1942-44 .

    Varnolene was not subject to tax as a motor fuel. 1928-30 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 55.

    Naphtha and benzine which could be used as motor fuel were subject to the tax. 1928-30 Op. Atty. Gen. 32, 34, Op. Atty. Gen. 187. But see 1942-44 .

    § 3102. Licensing and bonding of distributors.

    1. Before commencing business, on application, a distributor shall first procure a license from the Commissioner permitting him or her to continue or to engage in business as a distributor. Before the Commissioner issues a license, the distributor shall file with the Commissioner a surety bond in a form and with sureties as the Commissioner may require for a sum based on an estimate of the tax liability for a two-month period, but not to exceed $700,000.00, conditioned upon the issuance of the report and the payment of the tax, penalties, and fines provided in this subchapter. Upon approval of the application and bond, the Commissioner shall issue to the distributor a nonassignable license that shall continue in force until surrendered or revoked.
      1. The amount of the surety bonds required shall be reviewed annually in September. If the Commissioner retains or reimposes a bond requirement, the amount required shall be the sum of the highest two months’ payment during the preceding year or $1,000.00, whichever is greater, but in no case shall it exceed $700,000.00. (b) (1) The amount of the surety bonds required shall be reviewed annually in September. If the Commissioner retains or reimposes a bond requirement, the amount required shall be the sum of the highest two months’ payment during the preceding year or $1,000.00, whichever is greater, but in no case shall it exceed $700,000.00.
      2. A distributor may request release or reduction of the bond if the distributor has complied with all licensing and reporting requirements for at least the last three consecutive years. If the Commissioner determines that release or reduction of the bond will not unreasonably jeopardize State revenues, the bond shall be released or reduced, notwithstanding subdivision (1) of this subsection.  Upon a finding to the contrary, the Commissioner shall retain the bond.  If a bond is released or reduced under this subdivision, the Commissioner may reimpose a bond or increase the bond in accordance with subdivision (1) of this subsection if he or she determines that a material change in circumstances has occurred and State revenues will be unreasonably jeopardized without the reimposition or increase.  A distributor aggrieved by a decision of the Commissioner to retain, reimpose, or increase a bond may request a hearing, which shall be conducted in accordance with sections  105-107 of this title, and appeals shall be governed by section 3115 of this chapter.
    2. Notwithstanding the limits established in subsection (b) of this section, if payments and reports are delinquent for more than 10 days for more than one reporting period in a calendar year, the bond amount shall be increased to be the sum of the tax liability for the highest four months of the year.  A distributor aggrieved by a decision of the Commissioner to increase the bond under this subsection may request a hearing, which shall be conducted in accordance with sections  105-107 of this title, and appeals shall be governed by section 3115 of this chapter.
    3. All distributors shall mail financial statements to the Commissioner on an annual basis. If the distributor does not wish to submit a financial statement, a bond in the amount established in accordance with subsection (c) of this section shall be required.
    4. As used in this section, the term surety bond may also include, in the discretion of the Commissioner as to the best interests of the State, other good and sufficient surety instead of a bond.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 122 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 5, 1992; 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 39; 2005, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 21; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 229; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Act No. 149 substituted “mail” for “submit” preceding “financial statements” and inserted “to the Commissioner” thereafter.

    Subsec. (e): Act No. 131 substituted “interests” for “interest”.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (b): Added the designation for subdiv. (1); substituted “If the Commissioner retains or reimposes a bond requirement, the” for “The minimum” in the beginning of the first sentence, substituted “$700,000.00” for “$400,000.00” following “exceed”, deleted the former last sentence, and added subdiv. (2).

    Subsec. (c): Deleted the former first sentence, substituted “Notwithstanding the limits established in subsection (b) of this section” for “In addition” in the beginning of the former second sentence, and added the present second sentence.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “September” for “November” in the first sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “$400,000.00” for “$100,000.00” and made a minor change in punctuation in the second sentence of subsecs. (a) and (b).

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added.

    § 3103. Discontinuance, revocation, and reinstatement of licenses.

    1. When any person ceases to be a licensee by reason of a discontinuance, sale, or transfer of his or her business at any location, he or she shall notify the Commissioner in writing by mail at the time the discontinuance, sale, or transfer takes effect. The notice shall give the date of discontinuance and, in the event of a sale or transfer of the business, the name and address of the purchaser or transferee. All taxes, interest, and penalties not yet due and payable under the provisions of this chapter shall be due and payable, notwithstanding those provisions, concurrently with the discontinuance, sale, or transfer. The licensee shall mail a report and simultaneously pay all taxes, interest, penalties, and other expenses due by him or her and surrender to the Commissioner the license certificate issued to him or her together with all duplicates and copies. Until the notice has been mailed to the Commissioner by a licensee, the seller and his or her surety shall be liable for the taxes, interest, penalties, and other expenses accruing against the transferee, but only to the extent of the value of the property transferred.
    2. The Commissioner may suspend or revoke the license, the right to operate any vehicle, and any registrations of a person who fails to comply with any provision of this chapter or any rule adopted pursuant to this chapter. The suspension or revocation shall be effective upon not less than 15 days’ notice unless within those 15 days the licensee mails a written request for a hearing to show cause why the suspension or revocation should not become effective.
    3. The Commissioner may reinstate a suspended license or issue a new license at any time upon satisfaction by the licensee of the delinquency for which the license was revoked.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “by mail” following “in writing” in the first sentence, substituted “mail” for “file” in the fourth sentence, and substituted “mailed” for “given” in the last sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “mails a written request for” for “requests in writing” in the second sentence.

    § 3104. Calibration of tank vehicles.

    A distributor shall cause all tank vehicles used by him or her in the delivery of motor fuel to be calibrated under the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture, Food and Markets and under rules as he or she may prescribe, so as to show the number of gallons of motor fuel contained in these vehicles. The distributor shall make application in writing to the Secretary for calibration stating the number of tank vehicles to be calibrated.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2021, No. 76 , § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Substituted “Secretary of Agriculture, Food and Markets” for “director of weights and measures” in the first sentence and “Secretary” for “director” in the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Regulation of weights and measures generally, see 9 V.S.A. chapter 73.

    § 3105. Records of sales and importations.

      1. A distributor shall keep a record of all sales of motor fuel that shall include the number of gallons sold, the date of sale, and also the number of gallons used by the distributor. With every consignment of motor fuel to a purchaser within the State, each distributor shall also deliver a written statement containing the date and the number of gallons delivered and the names of the purchaser and the seller. The distributor shall also keep a record of all importations of motor fuel that shall include the number of gallons imported and the date of importation. (a) (1) A distributor shall keep a record of all sales of motor fuel that shall include the number of gallons sold, the date of sale, and also the number of gallons used by the distributor. With every consignment of motor fuel to a purchaser within the State, each distributor shall also deliver a written statement containing the date and the number of gallons delivered and the names of the purchaser and the seller. The distributor shall also keep a record of all importations of motor fuel that shall include the number of gallons imported and the date of importation.
      2. With respect to any sale, use, consignment, or importation of aviation gasoline, a distributor shall separately record the same information required under subdivision (1) of this subsection.
      3. The records and statements shall be preserved by distributors and purchasers, respectively, for a period of three years and shall be offered for inspection upon verbal or written demand of the Commissioner or his or her agent.
    1. The Commissioner or his or her agents may examine the books and records of any distributor or dealer during the usual business hours of the day to verify the truth and accuracy of any statement, record, report, or return or to determine if the tax imposed by this chapter has been paid.  If the books and records of a nonresident licensee are not available for examination in this State, the Commissioner may request him or her to furnish at his or her office in Montpelier such books and records he or she reasonably requires.  If the licensee is unable or unwilling to comply with the request, the Commissioner is authorized to charge him or her a reasonable per diem fee and expenses for the auditor making the examination out of state, which shall be payable within 30 days of the mailing of a bill by the Commissioner.
    2. The Commissioner may enter into agreements with officials of other states, the District of Columbia, and Canadian provinces for the cooperative examination of licensee reports, returns, books, and records, and for the collection of fees and penalties. In performing these duties, officials of other states, the District of Columbia, and Canadian provinces shall be deemed authorized agents of the Commissioner for these purposes.  The Commissioner may provide information about the receipt, storage, delivery, sale, use, or other disposition of fuel by any licensee to officials in other states, the District of Columbia, and Canadian provinces who administer fuel tax laws, provided these officials may furnish similar information to the Commissioner.
    3. A dealer shall keep a record of all purchases of motor fuel that shall include the date of purchase, number of gallons, the identity of the seller, and, if applicable, shall separately record this information with respect to the purchase of aviation gasoline. The records and statements shall be preserved for a period of three years. Except for purchases of aviation gasoline, the record shall include daily motor fuel meter readings.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1989, No. 46 , §§ 4, 5; 1989, No. 182 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. May 16, 1990; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 33, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (d): Added “, and, if applicable, shall separately record this information with respect to the purchase of aviation gasoline” to the first sentence, substituted “Except for purchase of aviation gasoline, the” for “The” in the beginning of the second sentence, and made related changes.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Inserted “the District of Columbia and Canadian provinces” following “other states” in the first through third sentences.

    —1989. Subsec. (b): Inserted “or her” preceding “agents”, “or dealer” following “distributor” and “record” following “statement” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Reciprocal motor fuel tax on out-of-state vehicles, see chapter 28, subchapter 2 of this title.

    § 3106. Imposition, rate, and payment of tax.

      1. Except for sales of motor fuels between distributors licensed in this State, which sales shall be exempt from the taxes and assessments authorized under this section, unless exempt under the laws of the United States at the time of filing the report required by section 3108 of this title, each distributor shall pay to the Commissioner: (a) (1) Except for sales of motor fuels between distributors licensed in this State, which sales shall be exempt from the taxes and assessments authorized under this section, unless exempt under the laws of the United States at the time of filing the report required by section 3108 of this title, each distributor shall pay to the Commissioner:
        1. a tax of $0.121 upon each gallon of motor fuel sold by the distributor; and
        2. the following assessments:
          1. a motor fuel transportation infrastructure assessment that is the greater of:
            1. $0.0396; or
            2. two percent of the tax-adjusted retail price upon each gallon of motor fuel sold by the distributor; and
          2. a fuel tax assessment, which shall be used exclusively for transportation purposes and not be transferred from the Transportation Fund, that is the greater of:
            1. $0.134 per gallon; or
            2. four percent of the tax-adjusted retail price or $0.18 per gallon, whichever is less, upon each gallon of motor fuel sold by the distributor.
      2. For the purposes of subdivision (1)(B) of this subsection:
        1. The tax-adjusted retail price applicable for a quarter shall be the average of the retail price for regular gasoline collected and determined to three decimal places and published by the Department of Public Service for each of the three months of the preceding quarter after all federal and State taxes and assessments, and the petroleum distributor licensing fee established by 10 V.S.A. § 1942 , applicable in each month have been subtracted from that month’s retail price. Calculations of the tax-adjusted retail price applicable for a quarter shall be permanently maintained on the website of the Department of Public Service.
        2. In calculating assessment amounts under subdivisions (a)(1)(B)(i)(II) and (a)(1)(B)(ii)(II) of this section, the Department of Motor Vehicles shall calculate the amounts to four decimal places. The Department of Motor Vehicles shall permanently retain the records of its calculations, any corrections to the calculations, and the data that are the basis for the calculations.
      3. The consolidated Executive Branch fee report and request for transportation made pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 605(b)(1) may recommend an adjustment in the tax specified in subdivision (1)(A) of this subsection to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.
      4. The distributor shall also pay to the Commissioner the tax and assessments specified in this subsection upon each gallon of motor fuel used within the State by him or her.
      5. Monies collected on the sales and use of aviation gasoline pursuant to this subsection shall be used exclusively for aviation purposes consistent with 49 U.S.C. § 47133 and Federal Aviation Administration regulations and policies.
    1. On or before the due date established by section 3108 of this title, payment of taxes due as shown by a report required by this chapter shall be transmitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles by means of an electronic funds transfer payment.
    2. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, and subdivision 1220a(b)(3) of this title, all taxes, interest, and penalties collected by the Department of Motor Vehicles under this chapter shall be paid to the State Treasurer and credited to the Transportation Fund.
    3. Since many nonresidents and residents drive to outdoor areas of Vermont in order to view our natural resources, to hunt and fish, and to use our natural resources for other healthful recreational purposes, it is the policy of this State that a portion of the gasoline tax shall be dedicated for the purpose of conserving and maintaining our natural resources. Therefore, beginning in fiscal year 1998, three-eighths of one cent of the tax collected under subsection (a) of this section, except for the tax collected on aviation gasoline, shall be transferred 76 percent to the Fish and Wildlife Fund and 24 percent to the Department of Forests, Parks and Recreation for natural resource management. Of the funds deposited in the Fish and Wildlife Fund, the interest earned by deposited funds and all funds remaining at the end of the fiscal year shall remain in the Fish and Wildlife Fund.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1989, No. 51 , § 5, eff. June 1, 1989; 1993, No. 211 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 30, 31, eff. June 17, 1994; 1995, No. 178 (Adj. Sess.), § 203; 1997, No. 60 , § 71; 1997, No. 61 , § 192, eff. June 26, 1997; 1999, No. 1 , § 96, eff. March 31, 1999; 2009, No. 50 , § 24, eff. June 1, 2009; 2011, No. 62 , § 31; 2013, No. 12 , § 23, eff. May 1, 2013; 2013, No. 12 , § 23a, eff. July 1, 2014; 2013, No. 57 , § 31c, eff. May 30, 2013; 2015, No. 40 , § 23; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 22; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 33, eff. Jan. 1, 2019; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. July 1, 2019; 2017, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. July 1, 2020; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 230.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(2)(B): Substituted “to the calculations” for “thereto” in the second sentence.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(2): Act 158, § 22 added the (a)(2)(A) designation; substituted “gasoline collected and determined to three decimal places” for “gasoline determined”; added the last sentence; and added subdiv. (a)(2)(B).

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Added by Act 158, § 33.

    Subsec. (b): Act 206, § 11 amended subsec. generally.

    Subsec. (b): Act 206, § 12 deleted the subdivs. (1) and (1)(A) designations and “as follows:” following “Vehicles”, “If the tax liability is more than $25,000.00, it shall be sent” preceding “by”, and deleted subdiv. (2).

    Subsec. (d): Act 158, § 33 inserted “, except for the tax collected on aviation gasoline,” following “under subsection (a) of this section” in the second sentence.

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(1)(B): Amended generally.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Amended generally by Act No. 12, § 23, eff. May 1, 2013.

    Subdiv. (a)(1): Act No. 12, § 23a, eff. July 1, 2014, substituted “$0.121” for “$0.182” in subdiv. (a)(1)(A), “$0.134” for ‘$0.067” in subdiv. (a)(1)(B)(ii)(I), and “four percent of the tax-adjusted retail price or $0.18 per gallon” for “two percent of the tax-adjusted retail price or $0.09 per gallon” in subdiv. (a)(1)(B)(ii)(II).

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Amended generally by Act No. 57, § 31c, eff. May 30, 2013.

    —2011. Subsec. (a): Deleted “exclusive of all federal and state taxes” following “price” and inserted “exclusive of: all federal and state taxes, the petroleum distributor licensing fee established by 10 V.S.A. § 1942 , and the motor fuel transportation infrastructure assessment authorized by this section” following “distributor”.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): In the first sentence, inserted “and from the motor fuel transportation infrastructure assessment” after the first reference of “tax”, substituted “upon each” for “per” after “$0.19”, and inserted “of motor fuel sold by the distributor, and a motor fuel transportation infrastructure assessment in the amount of two percent of the retail price exclusive of all federal and state taxes” after “gallon”; added the second and third sentences; and in the last sentence, inserted “and a motor fuel transportation infrastructure assessment” after “tax” and substituted “amounts” for “amount.”

    —1999. Subsec. (c): Inserted “and section 1220a(b)(3) of this title” following “this section”.

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Act No. 60 substituted “19 cents” for “15 cents” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Act No. 61 substituted “beginning in fiscal year 1998, three-eighths” for “one-quarter” in the second sentence and deleted the fourth sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (d): Rewrote the former second sentence as the second and third sentences.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added “except as provided in subsection (d) of this section” preceding “all taxes”.

    Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “15” for “13” preceding “cents per gallon” in the first sentence.

    Annotations From Former 32 V

    Constitutionality.

    The tax imposed by this section on gasoline “used” by a distributor within the State would be invalid as placing a direct burden commerce when applied to fuel consumed in interstate transportation if the word “used” denoted simply consumption of gasoline; however, if the word was taken to refer to withdrawal from storage, as it must be then the withdrawal was a purely domestic transaction although its purpose was thereafter to furnish motive power to propel an interstate train, and the tax constituted only an indirect burden which was not prohibited by any constitutional provision. Central Vermont Railway v. Campbell, 108 Vt. 510, 192 A. 197, 1937 Vt. LEXIS 154 (1937).

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former 32 V.S.A. § 8806 .

    Constitutionality.

    A tax could constitutionally be imposed by the State with respect to gasoline purchased by railroads in the State and used in interstate commerce. 1930-32 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 201.

    Construction.

    Gasoline or motor fuel purchased and delivered outside of the State by a railroad and brought into the State and there used in its interstate commerce could not be taxed under this section since it was imported by the railroad only for its use in interstate commerce and not for distribution or sale. 1930-32 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 205.

    Use of gasoline by operators conducting pilot training schools under contract with the federal government was properly taxable under this section. 1940-42 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 232.

    § 3106a. Imposition, rate, and payment of license fee.

    In all cases where a distributor is required to pay a tax under this chapter, the distributor shall also pay to the Commissioner in the same manner and time the license fee, established under 10 V.S.A. § 1942 , of one cent per gallon upon each gallon of such motor fuel sold by the distributor in the State. The Commissioner shall deposit these license fees into the Petroleum Cleanup Fund established by 10 V.S.A. chapter 59.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 282 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. April 1, 1989.

    § 3107. Alternative basis for computing tax.

    A distributor may use as the measure of the tax so levied and assessed the gross quantity of motor fuel purchased, imported, produced, refined, manufactured, and compounded by the distributor, instead of the quantity sold, distributed, or used.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. June 1, 2016; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 3a, eff. June 1, 2017.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 159, § 3a, deleted “less 0.5 percent for shrinkage, loss by evaporation, or otherwise,” following “compounded by the distributor”.

    Act No. 159, § 3, substituted “0.5 percent” for “one percent”.

    § 3108. Returns.

    For the purpose of determining the amount of the tax levied and assessed, by the 25th day of each calendar month, each distributor shall mail to the Commissioner upon a form prepared and furnished by him or her a statement or return under oath or affirmation, showing:

    1. both the number of gallons of motor fuel sold and the number of gallons of motor fuel used by the distributor during the preceding calendar month;
    2. separately, both the number of gallons of aviation gasoline sold and the number of gallons of aviation gasoline used by the distributor during the preceding calendar month; and
    3. any further information that the Commissioner prescribes.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1993, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 106, eff. April 15, 1994; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 33, eff. Jan. 1, 2019; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “mail” for “send” in the introductory paragraph.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “by the twenty-fifth” for “on or before the last” following “assessed” in the first sentence.

    § 3109. Failure to file a report or pay the tax when due; penalty.

    1. Any person who fails to file a report when due shall pay a fee of $10.00 as partial compensation for the added administrative costs.
    2. In addition to the fee prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, any person who fails to pay any tax when due shall pay in addition to the tax, interest calculated at one and one-half percent per month on the tax from the due date, until paid.  In addition, if the taxpayer fails to pay the tax liability in full within 30 days, a penalty equal to five percent of the outstanding tax liability for each month or portion of a month shall be paid; provided, however, that in no event shall the amount of the penalty imposed exceed 25 percent of the tax liability unpaid on the prescribed date of payment.  The Commissioner may remit all or any part of the penalty if he or she is satisfied that the delay was excusable.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3110. Additional assessment; time limit.

    1. If the Commissioner is not satisfied that the report filed or the amount of tax paid by a distributor is accurate, after investigating and finding such inaccuracy, he or she may make an additional assessment of taxes due from the distributor based upon his or her investigation.  A penalty equal to 10 percent and interest at the rate of one and one-half percent per month shall be payable on the additional assessment, with interest computed from the date the tax payment was due.  The Commissioner shall give notice by mail to the distributor of the additional assessment.  Payment shall be due within 30 days of the date of mailing the notice.
    2. When no report or payment of tax has been made as required by sections 3106 and 3108 of this title, or when a willfully false or fraudulent report has been filed, the tax may be assessed at any time.  In all other cases, no assessment of additional tax, and the mailing of notice, shall be made after the expiration of three years from the date of filing a report.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in In re Kelscot, Ltd., 152 Vt. 579, 568 A.2d 378, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 214 (1989).

    § 3111. Neglect or refusal to file a report; estimate of tax by Commissioner; penalty and interest.

    If a distributor neglects or refuses to file any report required by this chapter, the Commissioner shall make an estimate of the tax due, based upon information available to the Commissioner, for the period for which the distributor failed to make the report, and shall assess the tax due from the licensee, adding to the amount thus determined a penalty of 50 percent. The assessment shall bear interest at the rate of one and one-half percent per month from the date the tax payment was due until paid. The Commissioner shall give the licensee notice by mail of the assessment and payment shall be due within 15 days of the date of the mailing of the notice.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Construction with other laws.

    This section specifically vests in the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles the power to make gasoline tax assessments, notwithstanding more general provision found in 19 V.S.A. § 5 , which gives Transportation Board quasi-judicial functions relating to transportation. In re Kelscot, Ltd., 152 Vt. 579, 568 A.2d 378, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 214 (1989).

    § 3112. Assessment; hearing permitted.

    A distributor against whom assessment is made pursuant to section 3110 or 3111 of this title may appear in person or by counsel in the office of the Commissioner within 15 days after the mailing to him or her of notice of the assessment then and there to show cause why the assessment is in error or to present any other facts or testimony that would bear on the amount of the assessment or the manner in which it was made. The hearing may be continued. If the distributor or his or her agent does not appear within the 15 days, the assessment shall become final.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in In re Kelscot, Ltd., 152 Vt. 579, 568 A.2d 378, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 214 (1989).

    § 3113. Reports of common carriers.

    The Commissioner, upon his or her written or verbal demand, may require from common carriers within the State reports as to the shipment of motor fuels into the State.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3114. Penalties.

    A person who violates any provision of this subchapter shall be fined not more than $2,000.00 nor less than $500.00. This penalty shall be in addition to the penalty imposed by any other section of this subchapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3115. Appeals.

    1. Any aggrieved person may have any decision, order, or finding of the Commissioner made under this chapter reviewed under Rule 75 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.  The review shall be to the Washington Superior Court or, in the discretion of the applicant, to the Superior Court in the county where the person has his or her principal place of business or residence.  The hearing on the review shall be de novo.
    2. The appeal provided by this section shall be the exclusive remedy available to any person for review of a decision of the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 46 , § 6.

    § 3116. Proceedings to recover tax.

    1. Whenever any person fails to pay any tax, penalty, or interest under this title, the Attorney General shall, upon the request of the Commissioner, enforce the payment on behalf of the State in any court of the State or of any other state of the United States or of any province of Canada.
    2. The remedy for the collection of taxes provided by 32 V.S.A. § 9811(b) shall be available to the Commissioner as an additional or alternate remedy and the Commissioner may issue a warrant directed to an enforcement officer who may exercise throughout the State the same powers granted to a sheriff in his or her county.
    3. The Commissioner is authorized to contract with private collection agencies for collection of tax penalties and interest imposed on persons who have failed to pay after reasonable notification of the debt. The Commissioner may agree to pay collection agencies a fixed rate for services rendered or a percentage of the amount actually collected by the agencies and remitted to the State. Notwithstanding 32 V.S.A. § 502 , the Commissioner may charge against the collections an agreed-upon fixed rate or percentage of collections.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 41.

    § 3117. Bond requirement; amount; failure of security.

    1. Notwithstanding any language in section 3102 of this title to the contrary, when the Commissioner deems it necessary to protect the revenues to be obtained under this subchapter, he or she may require a licensee to file with him or her a bond, issued by a surety company authorized to transact business in this State and approved by the Commissioner of Financial Regulation of this State as to solvency and responsibility, in an amount fixed by the Commissioner, but not to exceed the total potential liability of such person, to secure the payment of any tax or penalties or interest due or that may become due from a licensee under this subchapter. In the event that the Commissioner determines that such person is to file a bond, the Commissioner shall give notice to such person to that effect, specifying the amount of the bond required. That person shall file a bond within 15 days after the giving of the notice unless within those 15 days he or she shall request in writing a hearing before the Commissioner at which the necessity, propriety, and amount of the bond shall be determined by the Commissioner. The determination shall be final and shall be complied with within 15 days after the giving of notice thereof. In lieu of a bond, securities approved by the Commissioner or cash in such amount as the Commissioner may prescribe may be deposited, which shall be kept in the custody of the State Treasurer who may at any time upon instructions from the Commissioner without notice to the depositor apply them to any tax or interest or penalties due, and for that purpose the securities may be sold by the Commissioner at public or private sale without notice to the depositor thereof.
    2. The total amount of the bond required of a licensee may be fixed by the Commissioner and may be increased or decreased by him or her at any time subject to the limitations imposed by this section.
    3. If the liability upon a bond filed by a licensee with the Commissioner becomes discharged or reduced, whether by judgment rendered, payment made, or otherwise, or if in the opinion of the Commissioner any surety on a bond has become unsatisfactory or unacceptable, the Commissioner shall require the licensee to file a new bond with satisfactory sureties in the same amount and, upon failure to do so, the Commissioner shall forthwith revoke the license.
    4. If a licensee fails or refuses to increase the amount of a bond or file a bond as required by the Commissioner within 15 days after notice mailed to him or her, such license shall be revoked forthwith.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 42.

    History

    Revision note

    —2012. In subsec. (a), in the first sentence, substituted “commissioner of financial regulation” for “commissioner of banking, insurance, securities, and health care administration” in accordance with 2011, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    § 3118. Bulk sales; transferee liability.

    1. Whenever a licensee (transferor) required to collect and remit the tax required by this subchapter shall make any sale, transfer, lease, or assignment (transfer) in bulk of any part or the whole of the assets of a business, otherwise than in the ordinary course of the business, the purchaser, transferee, lessee, or assignee (transferee) shall, at least 10 days before taking possession of the subject of the transfer or before payment therefor if earlier, notify the Commissioner in writing by mail of the proposed transfer and of the price, and date thereof; and whether or not the transferor has represented to, or has informed the transferee that the transferor owes any tax, interest, or penalties required by this subchapter and whether or not the transferee has knowledge that such taxes, interest, or penalties are owed, and whether any taxes, interest, or penalties are in fact owed.
    2. Whenever the transferee shall fail to give notice to the Commissioner as required by subsection (a) of this section, or whenever the Commissioner shall inform the transferee that a possible claim for tax, interest, or penalty exists, any sums of money, property, or choses in action, or other consideration, which the transferee is required to transfer over to or for the transferor shall be subject to a first priority right and lien for any taxes, interest, or penalty theretofore or thereafter determined to be due from the transferor to the State, and the transferee is forbidden to transfer the consideration to or for the transferor to the extent of the amount of the State’s claim.
    3. For failure to comply with this section, the transferee shall be personally liable to the State for the amount of the State’s claim theretofore or thereafter determined to be due to the State from the transferor and the liability may be assessed and enforced against the transferee in the same manner as provided for by this chapter against the transferor.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 43; amended 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “by mail” following “in writing”.

    § 3119. Personal liability.

    Any licensee who fails to collect the tax required by this subchapter or to pay it to the Commissioner in the manner required by this subchapter shall be personally and individually liable for the amount of such tax and any interest and penalty assessed thereon pursuant to sections 3110 and 3111 of this title; and if the licensee is a corporation or other entity, the personal liability shall extend and be applicable to any officer or agent of the corporation or entity who as an officer or agent of the same is under a duty to collect the tax and pay it to the Commissioner as required in this subchapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 44.

    § 3120. Tax liability as property lien; discharge and foreclosure.

    1. If any licensee required to pay the tax under this subchapter neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand is made by the Commissioner, the amount, together with all penalties and interest provided for in this subchapter and together with any additional costs that may accrue, shall be a lien in favor of the State upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such licensee. Such lien shall arise at the time demand is made by the Commissioner and shall continue until the liability for such sum with interest and costs is satisfied or becomes unenforceable. Such lien shall have the same force and effect as the lien provided for in 32 V.S.A. § 5895 , and notice of such lien shall be recorded as is provided in 32 V.S.A. § 5895 .
    2. Release and foreclosure of the lien shall be as provided in 32 V.S.A. § 5895(b) and (c).
    3. This section shall also apply to any officer or agent found personally liable under section 3119 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 45; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 231.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the first sentence, inserted “additional” preceding “costs” and deleted “in addition thereto” following “accrue” and “of Vermont” following “State”; and at the end of the last sentence, substituted “ 32 V.S.A. § 5895 ” for “said section”.

    § 3121. Lien filing fees.

    Notwithstanding 32 V.S.A. § 502 , the Commissioner may charge against any collection of liability any related lien filing fees specified in 32 V.S.A. § 1671(a)(6) or 1671(c) paid by the Commissioner. Fees collected under this section shall be credited to a special fund established and managed pursuant to 32 V.S.A. chapter 7, subchapter 5 and shall be available as payment for the fees of the clerk of the municipality.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 46; amended 2021, No. 76 , § 7.

    History

    References in text.

    The references to “subdivision 1671(a)(6) or subsection 1671(c) of this title” are incorrect references. The references should probably be to “ 32 V.S.A. § 1671(a)(6) or (c)” as this title does not contain a section 1671 and the use of “this title” following “subdivision 1671(a)(6) or subsection 1671(c)” was most likely in reference to Title 32.

    Revision note

    —2007. Substituted “subchapter 5 of chapter 7 of Title 32” for “chapter 7, subchapter 5 of Title 32” to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

    Revision note—. Substituted “Title 32” for “this title” following “chapter 7, subchapter 5”.

    Amendments

    —2021. Substituted “32 V.S.A. §” for “subdivision” preceding “1671(a)(6)” and deleted “subsection” preceding “1671(c)” and “of this title” thereafter.

    Subchapter 2. Reciprocal Motor Fuel Tax on Out-of-State Vehicles

    § 3171. Imposition and rate of reciprocal tax.

    Whenever under the laws of any other state or province any tax or toll is imposed upon the use of gasoline or other motor fuel by residents of this State for the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of such state or province, excepting, however, a tax or toll imposed upon gasoline or other motor fuel purchased within such state or province, a tax computed and applied in the same manner as the tax or toll of such other state or province shall be imposed by this State upon the use of gasoline or other motor fuel by motor vehicles registered in such other state or province so long as the tax or toll imposed by such other state or province shall remain in force.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former 32 V.S.A. § 8871 .

    Construction with other laws.

    So far as motor trucks as defined in 23 V.S.A. § 420 were concerned, 23 V.S.A. § 417 repealed the provisions of this section. 1950-52 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 215.

    § 3172. Agreements for reciprocal waiver of tax.

    The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may enter into reciprocal agreements with the appropriate officials of any other state or province under which he or she may waive all or any part of the requirements imposed by this subchapter, upon waiver of similar requirements by such state or province.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3173. Gasoline or other motor fuel defined.

    For the purpose of this subchapter, gasoline or other motor fuel shall be defined to mean any type of fuel, by whatever name it may be called, used in an internal combustion engine to generate power to propel a motor vehicle upon a highway.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3174. Rules.

    The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may make rules as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    Chapter 29. Snowmobiles, Vessels, and Water Sports

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Chapter heading: Substituted “vessels” for “motorboats”.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 1987, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 8, 1988, deleted “and” preceding “Motorboats” and added “and Water Sports” thereafter in the chapter heading.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Hunting from snowmobile or motorboat, see 10 V.S.A. § 4705 .

    Taxation of snowmobiles, boats, and outboard motors as personal property, see 32 V.S.A. § 3692 .

    Uniform snowmobile/boating complaint procedure, see Administrative Order No. 16, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

    Subchapter 1. Snowmobiles

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Alteration of odometers, see § 1704a of this title.

    Titling of snowmobiles, see chapter 36 of this title.

    § 3201. Definitions.

    As used in this chapter:

    1. “Commissioner” means Commissioner of Motor Vehicles unless otherwise stated.
    2. “Department” means Department of Motor Vehicles unless otherwise stated.
    3. “Operate” includes an attempt to operate and shall be construed to cover all matters and things connected with the presence and use of snowmobiles whether they be at motion or rest.
    4. “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Agency of Natural Resources.
    5. “Snowmobile” means a self-propelled vehicle intended for off-road travel primarily on snow, having a curb weight of not more than 793.783 kg (1,750 lbs.); driven by track or tracks in contact with the snow; and steered by a ski or skis in contact with the snow. The maximum width of a snowmobile shall be no more than 48 inches. An all-terrain vehicle converted to operate with tracks shall not be considered to be a snowmobile.
    6. “VAST” means the Vermont Association of Snow Travelers.
    7. “Trails maintenance assessment” (TMA) means a permit issued by the Vermont Association of Snow Travelers, Inc. granting use of Vermont snowmobile trails on public and private land. TMAs shall be issued in three different classifications: Vermont resident snowmobiles, nonresident snowmobiles, and commercial operation.
    8. “Public land” means all land that is either owned or controlled by a local, State, or federal governmental body.
    9. “Commercial operation” means the operation of a snowmobile on the SSTS by an individual participating in a guided tour or who has rented a snowmobile from an individual or corporate entity charging a fee for the tour or rental.
    10. “Direct supervision” means sufficiently close and able to control, by communicating visually or orally, the operation of a snowmobile by an operator under 16 years of age, taking into account the noise created by snowmobiles and protective headgear worn by the operator.
    11. “Tour” means a snowmobile ride led by a guide or leader over a defined route or routes lasting anywhere from one-half hour to less than a day and participated in by one or more individuals that have paid a fee to an individual or corporate entity for the privilege of riding a snowmobile.
    12. “Closed season” shall be defined as the time from April 16 to December 15.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1987, No. 76 , § 18; 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; 1995, No. 64 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2, eff. Jan. 30, 1996; 1997, No. 3 , § 1, eff. March 8, 1997; 1999, No. 20 , §§ 2, 3; 2001, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 12, 2002; 2003, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 45.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. Substituted “As used in” for “For the purposes of” at the beginning of the section to conform to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (12): Substituted “December 15” for “the Sunday in December preceding the third Monday”.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (5): Substituted “793.783 kg (1,750 lbs.)” for “453.59 kg (1,000 lbs.)” and added the second and third sentences.

    Subdiv. (12): Added.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivs. (10) and (11): Added.

    —1999. Subdiv. (7): Added the last sentence.

    Subdiv. (9): Added.

    —1997. Subdiv. (8): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (5): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (7): Added.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (6): Added.

    —1987. Subdiv. (4): Substituted “agency of natural resources” for “agency of environmental conservation”.

    § 3202. Registration and TMA decal required; exceptions.

    1. Registration and decal required.   A person shall not operate a snowmobile in this State unless it is registered and numbered by the State of Vermont or another state or province and displays a valid Vermont Trails Maintenance Assessment (TMA) decal adjacent to the registration decal on the left side of the snowmobile in accordance with this chapter, except when operated:
      1. On the property of the owner of the snowmobile.
      2. Off the highway, in a ski area while being used for the purpose of packing snow, or in rescue operations.
      3. For official use by a federal, State, or municipal agency and only if the snowmobile is identified with the name or seal of the agency in a manner approved by the Commissioner.
      4. Solely on privately owned land when the operator has the written consent of the owner, or his or her agent, of the property.
      5. On frozen bodies of water as designated by the Agency of Natural Resources under the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 2607 . For purposes of this subdivision, a snowmobile shall not be required to display a TMA decal if not operating on a portion of the Statewide Snowmobile Trail System. Liability insurance as provided for in subdivision 3206(b)(19) of this title and a valid registration decal are required.
      6. For emergency use by fire service personnel.
      7. By a person who possesses a completed TMA form processed electronically and either printed out or displayed on a portable electronic device. The printed or electronic TMA form shall be valid for 10 days after the electronic transaction. Use of a portable electronic device to display a completed TMA form does not in itself constitute consent for an enforcement officer to access other contents of the device.
    2. Registration period.   The registration year for snowmobiles is from September 1 to August 31.
    3. Use of snowmobile on public or private lands.   The registration of a snowmobile does not in and by itself constitute a license to cross or operate a snowmobile on public or private lands.
    4. Equipment condition and number.   A snowmobile that does not comply with the provisions of section 3205 of this title or that has had its motor or serial number altered may not be registered by the Commissioner.
    5. Special decal exemptions.   A snowmobile legally registered in another state or province may enter and operate in this State without a TMA decal as follows:
      1. Using a portion of the Statewide Snowmobile Trail System, a public right-of-way open to snowmobiles, or private land that is posted open to snowmobiles, for a distance not to exceed three miles for the sole purpose of accessing the closest food, fuel, lodging, and repair services. At a point three miles from the State line, trails shall be posted “VT TMA Required Beyond This Point.”
      2. In Addison, Bennington, and Rutland Counties, from the New York border to Poultney village via corridor trail 4A (Delaware Hudson Rail Trail); from the New York border in Pawlet in the north to the New York border in the south in the town of Rupert (13 miles) along corridor trail 4; and from Lake Champlain at Benson Landing to the town of Benson via the local snowmobile trail.
      3. For the purpose of accessing international customs services, on the so-called “Keyhole Trail,” for a distance of approximately one-half mile from United States/Canadian Customs at Beecher Falls to the town line of Pittsburg, New Hampshire, and for a distance of approximately four miles via Vermont Association of Snow Travelers snowmobile corridor 105 to Canaan and to the West Stewartstown, New Hampshire bridge connecting to the New Hampshire 3A snowmobile trail on the Beecher Falls to Colebrook, New Hampshire railbed, and on immediately adjacent areas for services.
      4. In Essex County, for a distance of approximately 18 miles to and from the New Hampshire border to the village of Beecher Falls in the town of Canaan, via Vermont Association of Snow Travelers snowmobile trails 103 to 96 to 105/96 to 105.
      5. The Commissioner may authorize the temporary operation of snowmobiles on designated regular or temporary trails for special events.
    6. -(h) [Repealed.]

      (i) Authority of Agency of Natural Resources. Nothing in this section relating to operation on frozen bodies of water shall be construed to affect the authority of the Agency of Natural Resources to regulate uses of public bodies of water.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1987, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1989, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Feb. 23, 1990; 1991, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Feb. 21, 1992; 1993, No. 1 , § 1, eff. Feb. 19, 1993; 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; 1995, No. 64 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Jan. 30, 1996; 1997, No. 3 , § 2, eff. March 8, 1997; 1999, No. 20 , § 4; 1999, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2001, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. June 12, 2002; 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 75, eff. Jan. 31, 2005; 2003, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2011, No. 138 (Adj. Sess.), § 27, eff. May 14, 2012; 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 22.

    History

    Revision note—

    Added headings to subsecs. (a) and (c) to conform with style of section.

    Editor’s note—

    The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2003 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 115 and 116, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2003 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 115 and 116 were merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(5): Substituted “TMA” for “trails maintenance assessment” preceding “decal”.

    Subdiv. (a)(7): Added.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (i): Act No. 115, § 75, eff. Jan. 31, 2005, substituted “natural” for “water” preceding “resources” in two places.

    Subsec. (a): Act No. 116, § 4, eff. Jul. 1, 2004, substituted “privately-owned” for “privately owned” preceding “land” in subdiv. (4), and added subdivs. (5) and (6).

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Rewrote the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Amended generally.

    —1999. Subsec. (e): Amended generally.

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Deleted “offering registration reciprocity” following “state or province” in the introductory paragraph.

    Subsec. (f): Deleted “required” following “reciprocity” in the subsec. heading, and inserted “not” preceding “contingent upon”, substituted “other” for “the” preceding “states and provinces”, and deleted “enumerated in subsections (e) and (g) of this section” thereafter in the second sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Inserted “or other state or province offering registration reciprocity and displays a valid Vermont trails maintenance assessment decal adjacent to the registration decal on the left side of the snowmobile” preceding “in accordance with this chapter” in the introductory paragraph.

    Subsec. (f): Added the first sentence, and substituted “provinces enumerated in subsections (e) and (g)” for “province enumerated in subsection (e)” in the second sentence.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section heading.

    Subsec. (a): Inserted “person shall not operate a” preceding “snowmobile”, deleted “may not be operated” thereafter and inserted “in accordance with this chapter” following “Vermont” in the introductory paragraph and substituted “has” for “is specifically invited to do so by the owner of that property and has on his person” following “operator” and added “or his or her agent, of the property” following “of the owner” in subdiv. (4).

    Subsec. (b): Added the subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “in and by itself” preceding “constitute”.

    Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (e): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (f): Added the subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (g): Added the subsec. heading, deleted “Vermont” following “Customs at Beecher Falls”, inserted “snowmobile” preceding “corridor 105 to Canaan”, deleted “Vermont” thereafter, substituted “the New Hampshire” for “NH” following “connecting”, and inserted “New Hampshire” following “Colebrook”.

    Subsec. (h): Added the subsec. heading and deleted “upon recommendation of the governor’s snowmobile advisory council” following “commissioner”.

    Subsec. (i): Added the subsec. heading.

    —1993. Subsec. (g): Inserted “and for a distance of approximately four miles via Vermont Association of Snow Travelers Corridor 105 to Canaan, Vermont, and to the West Stewartstown, New Hampshire bridge connecting to NH 3A Snowmobile Trail on the Beecher Falls to Colebrook rail bed” preceding “and immediately”.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (e)(4): Inserted “and/or Colebrook” preceding “New Hampshire”.

    Subsec. (g): Substituted “the town line of Pittsburg” for “Stewartstown” following “Vermont to the”.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Added subsecs. (e)-(g).

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Repealed.

    Statutory revision. 2011, No. 138 (Adj. Sess.), § 27 provides: “To effect the purpose of this act of transferring the rulemaking authority of the water resources panel to the secretary of natural resources, the office of legislative council is directed to revise the existing Vermont Statutes Annotated and, where applicable, replace the terms ‘natural resources board,’ ‘water resources panel of the natural resources board,’ ‘water resources panel,’ ‘water resources board,’ and similar terms with the term ‘secretary of natural resources,’ ‘secretary,’ ‘agency of natural resources,’ ‘agency,’ ‘department of environmental conservation,’ or ‘department’ as appropriate.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Electronic receipt to show registration, see § 305 of this title.

    Notification of change of name or address, see § 205 of this title.

    § 3203. Termination of registration.

    The registration of a snowmobile ends when the owner transfers title to another. The former owner shall immediately return to the Commissioner the registration certificate previously assigned to the transferred snowmobile with the date of sale, name, and residence of the new owner endorsed on the back thereof. When a person transfers the ownership of a registered snowmobile to another, files a new application, and pays a fee of $3.00, he or she may have registered in his or her name another snowmobile for the remainder of the registration year without payment of any additional registration fee.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 46.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$3.00” for “$2.00”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Cancellation of registration upon return of unused number plates, see § 327 of this title.

    § 3204. Registration fees and dealer plates.

    1. Fees.   Annual registration fees for snowmobiles other than as provided for in subsection (b) of this section are $28.00 for residents and $36.00 for nonresidents. Duplicate registration certificates may be obtained upon payment of $6.00.
    2. Dealer registration and plates; manufacturer plates; fees.
      1. A person engaged in the business of selling or exchanging snowmobiles as defined in subdivision 4(8) of this title shall register as a dealer and obtain registration certificates and identifying number plates, subject to such rules as may be adopted by the Commissioner and to the requirements of chapter 7 of this title. A manufacturer of snowmobiles may register and obtain registration certificates and identifying number plates under this section. Plates shall be valid for the following purposes only: testing; adjusting; demonstrating; temporary use of customers for a period not to exceed 14 days; private business or pleasure use of such person or members of his or her immediate family; and use at fairs, shows, or races when no charge is made for such use.
      2. Fees for dealer registration certificates shall be $55.00 for the first certificate issued to any person and $6.00 for any additional certificate issued to the same person within the current registration period. Fees for temporary number plates shall be $3.00 for each plate issued.
    3. Temporary registration pending issuance of permanent registration.   The Commissioner, by rules adopted pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25, shall provide for the issuance of temporary registrations of snowmobiles pending issuance of the permanent registration. VAST shall be an agent of the Commissioner for the issuance of such temporary registrations. The fees for the temporary registrations shall be $28.00 for residents and $36.00 for nonresidents and shall also constitute payment of the registration fee required by subsection (a) of this section. VAST shall promptly remit any fees collected to the Commissioner in accordance with rules adopted under this subsection. Temporary registrations shall be kept with the snowmobile while being operated and shall authorize operation without the registration decal being affixed for a period not to exceed 60 days from the date of issue.
    4. Delegation.   The Commissioner may authorize the Vermont Association of Snow Travelers, or its successor, and its agents to register snowmobiles, or to renew or assist with renewal of registrations, for residents and nonresidents.
    5. Fee setting.   Only the General Assembly may change the fees provided for in this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 250 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1987, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1989, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Feb. 23, 1990; 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 29, eff. May 15, 2002; 2009, No. 50 , § 57; 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 50 , § 3; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 47; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 232.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subdiv. (b)(1), substituted “subsection 3205(f)” for “subsection 3205(d)” to correct an incorrect cross-reference arising from the 2007 subsection redesignations of section 3205.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Made the heading for subdiv. (b)(1) the heading for subsec. (b) instead.

    Subdiv. (b)(1): Inserted “of” following “chapter 7”.

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Deleted the subdiv. heading.

    Subsec. (d): Added the subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (e): Added the subsec. heading.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$28.00” for “$25.00”, “$36.00” for “$32.00”, and “$6.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Substituted “$55.00” for “$40.00” and “$6.00” for “5.00”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “$28.00” for “$25.00” and “$36.00” for “$32.00”.

    —2015. Subdiv. (b)(1): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Substituted “$3.00” for “$1.00” in the last sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “Annual registration fees” for “Registration fees”.

    Subsec. (c): Added the fourth sentence.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$25.00” for “$15.00”, “$32.00” for “$22.00”, and “$5.00” for “$2.00.”

    Subsec. (c): In the third sentence, substituted “$25.00” for “$15.00” and “$32.00” for “$22.00.”

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Designated the former first paragraph as subdiv. (1) and substituted “subsection 3205(d)” for “section 3205(d)” in that subdiv., and designated the former second paragraph as subdiv. (2) and substituted “$40.00” for “$25.00” and “$5.00” for “$3.00” in that subdiv.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “dealer” preceding “plates in the section heading.

    Subsec. (a): Added the subsec. heading and deleted “to the department” following “$2.00” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (c): Added the subsec. heading, substituted “shall” for “may” following “chapter 25” in the first sentence, rewrote the second sentence, and substituted “decal” for “number” preceding “being affixed” and “60” for “30” preceding “days” in the fourth sentence.

    Subsec. (d): Inserted “and its agents to register snowmobiles, or” following “successor” and substituted “and” for “or” preceding “nonresidents”.

    Subsec. (e): Added.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00” preceding “for residents and” and “$22.00” for “$17.00” thereafter in the first sentence of subsec. (a) and in the third sentence of subsec. (c).

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Refund of fees paid, see §§ 207 and 327 of this title.

    § 3204a. Antique snowmobiles.

    1. The one-time registration fee for a snowmobile that is at least 25 years old and is used exclusively in exhibitions, parades, and public functions shall be $50.00. The registration process for snowmobiles registered under this section shall be the same as provided in section 3204 of this title.
    2. The owner of a snowmobile that satisfies the criteria established in subsection (a) of this section shall be entitled to display antique snowmobile plates that shall be distributed according to rules adopted by the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 48.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$50.00” for “$42.00”.

    § 3205. Snowmobile equipment; windshield; use of headlight; illegal noise level; exemption from equipment requirement.

    1. Snowmobile; required equipment.   All snowmobiles shall be equipped with one or more operational:
      1. headlight;
      2. red rear light;
      3. a fully functional brake in good mechanical condition;
      4. efficient muffler; and
      5. such other equipment and devices as may be required to meet the noise level specifications of subsection (d) of this section.
    2. Windshield.   If the snowmobile is equipped with a windshield, it shall be free from sharp or jagged edges.
    3. Light.   Lights shall be on during operation and the lenses of headlights shall be clear, as supplied by the manufacturer, and unimpaired by the installation of colored lenses or other devices that would impair the ability of the headlight to perform to its original equipment design specifications.
    4. Exhaust system; noise emissions.   An individual shall not operate the following on the State Snowmobile Trail System:
      1. a snowmobile manufactured after February 1, 2007 that does not display a visible and unaltered marking of “SSCC Certified” issued by the Snowmobile Safety and Certification Committee (SSCC) on all critical components of the exhaust system; or
      2. a snowmobile, regardless of the date of manufacture, with an exhaust system that has been modified in a manner that amplifies or otherwise increases total noise emission above that of the snowmobile as originally constructed.
    5. Prohibited sale; illegal noise level; notice to consumer.
      1. No person shall sell for operation, or offer to sell for operation, within the State of Vermont, a snowmobile that does not comply with the exhaust system requirements specified in subsection (d) of this section.
      2. No snowmobile shall be equipped in any manner that permits the operator to bypass the muffler.
      3. No person shall sell or offer to sell a replacement exhaust system or component of an exhaust system that will not meet or exceed the exhaust noise reduction capabilities of the snowmobile manufacturer’s original equipment specifications for the snowmobile.
      4. Any person selling or offering to sell a snowmobile or replacement exhaust system shall include in the specifications precise information concerning the designed maximum sound levels of the snowmobile or replacement exhaust system as outlined by the SSCC.
    6. Exemption from equipment requirements; racing contest.   This section shall not apply to any snowmobile entered in a racing contest sponsored by a racing or snowmobile club, organization, or association during the period the snowmobile is actually participating in or practicing or preparing for a racing event at an area especially provided for the purpose.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; 2001, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. June 12, 2002; 2015, No. 47 , § 46; 2021, No. 20 , § 250; 2021, No. 76 , § 8.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subdiv. (a)(5) and in two places in subdiv. (e)(1), substituted “subsection (d)” for “subsection (b)” to correct incorrect cross-references arising from the subsec. designations of this section in 2007.

    —2007. Added introductory subheading “Snowmobile; equipment required” to subsec. (a). Designated paragraphs entitled “Windshield” “Light” and “Muffler devices, noise levels” as subsecs. (b), (c) and (d), and redesignated existing subsec. (c) “Prohibited sale; illegal noise level; noise to consumer” and subsec. (d) “Exemption from registration and equipment requirements; racing contests” as subsecs. (e) and (f).

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsecs. (d) and (e): Amended generally by Act Nos. 20 and 76.

    —2015. Section heading: Deleted “registration and” preceding “equipment requirement” near the end of the section heading.

    Subsec. (f): Deleted “registration and” preceding “equipment requirements” in the subsec. heading.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added “and the lenses of headlights shall be clear, as supplied by the manufacturer, and unimpaired by the installation of colored lenses or other devices that would impair the ability of the headlight to perform to its original equipment design specifications” in the paragraph headed “Light”.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 3206. Operation on and across public highways, sidewalks; age restrictions; private lands; prohibited areas and prohibited methods of operation; reckless operation; SWI; financial responsibility; trail access limited; head and face protection.

    1. A person shall operate, or cause to be operated, a snowmobile only in accordance with this chapter.
    2. A snowmobile shall not be operated:
      1. Across or on a plowed public highway unless:
        1. the crossing is made at an angle of approximately 90 degrees to the direction of the highway and at a place where no obstruction prevents a quick and safe crossing; and
        2. the operator brings the snowmobile to a complete stop before entering the traveled portion of the highway; and
        3. the operator yields the right of way to motor vehicles and pedestrians using the highway; and
        4. the operator is 16 years of age or older. If the operator is under 16 years of age but at least 12 years of age, that operator must be under the direct supervision of a person 18 years of age or older.
      2. On a public highway, unless it is not being maintained and plowed for use by motor vehicles during the snow season.
      3. On a public highway, unless the operator is not closer than five feet from the plowed portion. However, this section shall not apply to class IV roads or trails that are privately maintained or plowed.
      4. On a public highway, unless the highway has been opened to snowmobile travel by the selectmen or trustees or local governing body and is so posted by the municipality.
      5. On any privately owned land or body of private water unless:
        1. the operator is the owner, or member of the immediate family of the owner or lessee of the land or private body of water; or
        2. the operator has, on his or her person, the written consent of the owner or lessee of the land to operate a snowmobile in the specific area in which the operator is operating, or the snowmobile displays a valid TMA decal as required by subsection 3202(a) of this title that serves as proof that the snowmobile and its operator by virtue of the TMA are members of a VAST-affiliated snowmobile club to which such consent has been given orally or in writing; or
        3. the owner of the land has designated the area for use by snowmobiles by posting the area in a manner approved by the Secretary to give reasonable notice that snowmobiling is permitted.
      6. On any public land, body of public water, or natural area established under the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 2607 , or other State, federal statute, or municipal ordinance, unless the Secretary has designated such area for use by snowmobiles in manners chosen by the Secretary or other public land manager.
      7. By a child under eight years of age unless he or she is on land owned by his or her parents, family, or legal guardian.
      8. By a person born after July 1, 1983, on private or public land and water without first obtaining a certificate of snowmobile education, unless he or she is operating on land owned, leased, or farmed by his or her parents, family, or guardian or the operator is the land owner.
        1. A person who is required to have a certificate of snowmobile education shall:
          1. possess the certificate or a copy of the certificate when operating a snowmobile on public or private lands and waters of the State; and
          2. show the certificate or a copy of the certificate on demand of an enforcement officer wearing an insignia identifying him or her as a law enforcement officer. No person charged with violating this subdivision shall be convicted if the person produces in court, to the officer, or to a State’s Attorney, a certificate or a copy of the certificate that was valid at the time the violation occurred. A person may show an electronic copy of the certificate using a portable electronic device; however, use of a device for this purpose does not in itself constitute consent for an enforcement officer to access other contents of the device.
        2. The following persons are exempt from the requirements of this subdivision:
          1. a person is operating on land owned by his or her parents, family, or guardian or the operator is the landowner;
          2. any other person exempted by rules of the Department of Public Safety;
          3. any person who is under the direct supervision of a certified snowmobile safety instructor;
          4. a child not yet 12 years of age, but not younger than eight when under the direct supervision of a parent or legal guardian who shall be liable for the actions of the child.
        3. The Department of Public Safety shall adopt rules:
          1. That establish criteria for a course of instruction in snowmobile safety education.
          2. Relating to transient snowmobilers.
          3. To administer a verbal test when appropriate.
          4. To coordinate a statewide program of snowmobile safety instruction and certification and ensure that a course of safety education is available within each county.
          5. That a course of snowmobile safety education is available at the age of eight. Any child eight years of age but not yet 12 who passes the course may operate a snowmobile only when under the direct supervision of a parent or legal guardian who shall be liable for the actions of the child.
        4. Any course of snowmobile safety education that is offered shall provide a minimum of six hours of instruction.
        5. Any State-certified instructor may offer a course of instruction in snowmobile safety education approved by the Department of Public Safety.
        6. The Department of Public Safety or its designee shall issue a certificate of snowmobile safety education to a person who:
          1. passes a departmentally prescribed course of snowmobile safety education; or
          2. passes a snowmobile safety equivalency examination administered by persons authorized to offer a course of snowmobile safety education.
        7. Upon request, the Department of Public Safety shall provide, without charge, snowmobile safety education materials to persons who plan to take the snowmobile safety equivalency examination.
        8. Once issued, the certificate of snowmobile education is valid for the lifetime of the person to whom it was issued and may not be revoked by the Department of Public Safety or a court of law.
        9. The Department of Public Safety shall replace, without charge, a lost or destroyed certificate if the Department issued the certificate or has a record that the certificate was issued.
        10. A snowmobile safety certificate issued in another state or country in accordance with or substantially equivalent to criteria of the International Association of Snowmobile Administrators is sufficient to comply with the requirements of this section.
        1. In any manner intended, or could reasonably be expected to, harass, drive, or pursue any wildlife; or (9) (A) In any manner intended, or could reasonably be expected to, harass, drive, or pursue any wildlife; or
        2. In any manner intended to cause an animal undue pain or suffering.
      9. If the registration certificate or written consent is not available for inspection and the registration number, or plate of a size and type approved by the Commissioner, and TMA decal are not displayed on the snowmobile in a manner approved by the Commissioner. However, a TMA decal need not be displayed if the operator possesses a completed TMA form in accordance with subdivision 3202(a)(7) of this title.
      10. While the operator is under the influence of drugs or alcohol as defined in section 3207a of this title.
      11. In a reckless manner so as to endanger a person or property.
      12. Within any cemetery, public or private, as defined in 18 V.S.A. § 5302 .
      13. On limited access highways, rights-of-way, or approaches unless permitted by the Agency of Transportation. In no case shall snowmobiling be permitted on any portion of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways unless the Agency of Transportation permits operation on such highways.
      14. On a sidewalk unless permitted by the selectmen or trustees or the local governing body.
      15. While the person’s privilege to operate a snowmobile has been suspended.
      16. In an unreasonable or imprudent manner, and:
        1. No person shall drive a snowmobile on the Statewide Snowmobile Trail System or a public right-of-way, open to snowmobiling, at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, having regard for the actual and potential hazards there existing. In every event, speed shall be controlled as necessary to avoid collision with any person, vehicle, snowmobile, or other object on or adjacent to the snowmobile trail.
        2. The operator of every snowmobile shall drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding trail, and when a special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic by reason of weather or trail conditions.
        3. Snowmobiles operating on a public right-of-way open to snowmobiling shall comply with the provisions established in sections 1003, 1007, and 1008 of this title.
        4. The maximum speed limit on State lands and public waters shall be determined by the Agency of Natural Resources.
        5. Any law enforcement officer or emergency personnel may disregard speed regulations in accordance with section 1015 of this title.
      17. In a commercial manner unless the individual or entity offering the snowmobile for rent or hired for tour complies with the following:
        1. On any privately owned land or body of private water, unless the individual or entity offering a snowmobile for commercial operation has first obtained the written consent of the snowmobile club responsible for obtaining landowner permission for snowmobile trails and for trail maintenance in that area with consent from the proper owner over whose property the trail passes.
        2. For commercial purposes, on any public land, body of public water, or natural area, unless the individual or entity has first obtained the written consent of the snowmobile club responsible for trail maintenance, and the Secretary or other public land manager has designated such area for use by snowmobiles in a manner chosen by the Secretary or public land manager to give reasonable notice that snowmobiling is permitted. The commercial operation of snowmobiles on public land or public water shall be by permit or license issued by the Secretary or public land manager in a manner chosen by the Secretary or public land manager.
        3. A commercial snowmobile operating on any private or public land, private or public water, or natural area shall display a commercial TMA.
        4. A commercial snowmobile operating on any private or public land, private or public water, or natural area shall display a decal or flag identifying the individual or entity that owns the snowmobile.
      18. Without liability insurance as described in this subdivision. No owner or operator of a snowmobile shall operate or permit the operation of the snowmobile on the Statewide Snowmobile Trail System or public right of way, except on the property of the owner, without having in effect a liability policy or bond in the amounts of at least $25,000.00 for one person and $50,000.00 for two or more persons killed or injured and $10,000.00 for damages to property in any one crash. In lieu thereof, evidence of self-insurance in the amount of $115,000.00 must be filed with the Commissioner. Such financial responsibility shall be maintained and evidenced in a form prescribed by the Commissioner. The standards and process established in subsection 801(c) of this title shall be adopted.
      19. On the Statewide Snowmobile Trail System or on a public right-of-way after the hour of 11:00 p.m. and before the hour of 6:00 a.m., if requested by the landowner or ordered by a town or municipality through ordinance, unless the operation is more than 500 feet from a residence or residences or the operation is taking place to groom the trail. All trails impacted by this subdivision shall be posted to indicate that they are closed between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
      20. Without proper head and face protection.
        1. No person shall operate, ride in or on a snowmobile, or on a sled or device pulled by a snowmobile on the Statewide Snowmobile Trail System (SSTS) without wearing, upon his or her head, protective headgear of a type approved by the Commissioner, unless the operator of the snowmobile is in the process of grooming the trail. The headgear shall be equipped with a strap to secure the headgear in place.
        2. No person shall operate a snowmobile on the SSTS that is not equipped with a factory-installed or approved factory or aftermarket replacement windshield that adequately protects the operator’s face, or the operator shall wear eyeglasses, goggles, or a protective face shield.
      21. During the closed season on the Statewide Snowmobile Trail System or any public land, except for the following purposes:
        1. grooming operations;
        2. trail maintenance; or
        3. search and rescue operations conducted by law enforcement officers defined in subdivision 3302(2) of this title or emergency medical personnel defined in 24 V.S.A. § 2651(6) or emergency use by fire service personnel defined in 20 V.S.A. § 3151 or private individuals who are assisting such officers or personnel.
      22. During the open season when the Statewide Snowmobile Trail System has not been officially opened by the Vermont Association of Snow Travelers, Inc., due to lack of snow or for temporary closures caused by lack of snow or dangerous trail conditions, except for the following purposes:
        1. grooming operations;
        2. trail maintenance; or
        3. search and rescue operations conducted by law enforcement officers defined in subdivision 3302(2) of this title or emergency medical personnel defined in 24 V.S.A. § 2651(6) or emergency use by fire service personnel defined in 20 V.S.A. § 3151 or private individuals who are assisting such officers or personnel.
    3. It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution for trespass under subdivision (b)(5) of this section that the operator of the snowmobile was unable, after a reasonable diligent search, to locate, within the State of Vermont, a person with authority to grant or deny such permission.
      1. No public or private landowner or their agents shall be liable for any property damage or personal injury sustained by any person operating or riding as a passenger on a snowmobile, or upon a vehicle or other device drawn by a snowmobile upon the public or private landowner’s property, whether or not the public or private landowner has given permission to use the land, unless the public or private landowner charges a cash fee to the operator or owner of the snowmobile for the use of the property, or unless the damage or injury is intentionally inflicted by the landowner. (d) (1) No public or private landowner or their agents shall be liable for any property damage or personal injury sustained by any person operating or riding as a passenger on a snowmobile, or upon a vehicle or other device drawn by a snowmobile upon the public or private landowner’s property, whether or not the public or private landowner has given permission to use the land, unless the public or private landowner charges a cash fee to the operator or owner of the snowmobile for the use of the property, or unless the damage or injury is intentionally inflicted by the landowner.
      2. If VAST has exercised reasonable care in marking the boundaries of the SSTS, it shall not be liable for ordinary negligence for any property damage or personal injury sustained by any person that arises from operation of a snowmobile outside the SSTS. However, VAST’s liability shall not be limited under this subdivision if an operator leaves the SSTS because of an unsafe condition on the SSTS and the damage or injury occurs before the operator is able to return safely to the SSTS.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1987, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1989, No. 247 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; 1995, No. 64 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Jan. 30, 1996; 1999, No. 20 , §§ 5-7; 2001, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. June 12, 2002; 2003, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 3, 5; 2015, No. 47 , § 47; 2015, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4); 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 22, eff. July 13, 2020; 2021, No. 20 , § 251.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” in subdiv. (b)(19) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    References in text.

    —2007. The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, referred to in subdiv. (b)(14), was redesignated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 101-427, and is codified as 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) .

    Revision note—

    Substituted “ 10 V.S.A. § 2607 ” for “ 10 V.S.A. § 1309 ” in subdiv. (b)(7) to correct an error in that reference.

    In subdiv. (b)(4), substituted “subdivision (b)(3)” for “subdivision 3” for purposes of clarity.

    In subsec. (c), substituted “subdivision (b)(6)” for “subdivision (6)” for purposes of clarity.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (b)(14): Inserted “Dwight D. Eisenhower” preceding “National System”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(8)(A)(i): Inserted “or a copy of the certificate” following “certificate”.

    Subdiv. (b)(8)(A)(ii): Inserted “or a copy of the certificate” following “certificate” in the first sentence, substituted “No” for “However, no” and “or a copy of the certificate that” for “which” in the second sentence, and added the last sentence.

    —2017. Subdiv. (b)(11): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor”.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Redesignated existing text as subdiv. (d)(1), and added subdiv. (d)(2).

    —2015. Subdiv. (b)(10): Added the last sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(9): Added the designation for subdiv. (A) and added subdiv. (B).

    Subdivs. (b)(22) and (23): Added.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Amended section heading and section generally.

    —1999. Subdiv. (b)(7): Substituted “Public land” for “Natural area” in the subdiv. heading; inserted “or other state, federal statute, or municipal ordinance” following “ 10 V.S.A. § 2607 ”; substituted “manners” for “a manner” preceding “chosen by” and “or other public land manager” for “to give reasonable notice that snowmobiling is permitted” following “secretary”.

    Subdiv. (b)(9): Rewrote the subdiv.

    Subdivs. (b)(18) and (19): Added.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Substituted “or on a plowed public highway” for “a public highway” in the introductory paragraph of subdiv. (1), rewrote subdiv. (1)(D) and subdiv. (8), and substituted “and trails maintenance assessment decal are not displayed” for “is not displayed” preceding “on the snowmobile” in subdiv. (11).

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(3)(B): Substituted “and” for “or” following “club”.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(3)(B): Inserted “or her” preceding “person”, “or she” following “proof that he” and “snowmobile” preceding “club” and preceding “association”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving under the influence, see chapter 13, subchapter 13 of this title.

    Operating snowmobile within fences on railroad, see 5 V.S.A. § 3646 .

    § 3207. Penalties and revocation of registration; SWI; privilege; suspension; criminal penalty.

    1. A person who violates any of the following sections of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of $35.00 for each violation:

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      (g) The Commissioner or his or her authorized agent may suspend or revoke the registration of any snowmobile registered in this State and repossess the number and certificate to it, when he or she is satisfied that:

      1. a snowmobile has been stolen;
      2. the registrant is not the legal owner;
      3. a snowmobile is operated without proper equipment after the owner has been notified by a law enforcement officer to procure and use such equipment as is required by law or Department rules; or
      4. the owner of a snowmobile has perpetrated some fraud upon the Department of Motor Vehicles.

        (h) Civil penalties established under this section shall be mandatory and may not be reduced.

    § 3203 failure to return transferred registration § 3205(a)-(c) operation with defective or inadequate equipment, except improper muffling device § 3205(e) sale of a snowmobile for operation without required equipment; improper operation; permitting improper operation § 3206(b)(8) by a person without a certificate of snowmobile education § 3206(b)(1)(D) by a person under 16 years of age § 3206(b)(10) display of registration plate (b) A person who violates any of the following sections of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of $55.00 for each violation: § 3206(b)(1) on a public highway § 3206(b)(2), (3) on a plowed highway § 3206(b)(4) on a municipal highway § 3206(b)(13) in cemeteries § 3206(b)(14) interstate and limited access highways § 3206(b)(15) sidewalks (c) A person who violates any of the following sections of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of $135.00 for each violation: § 3202 operation of an unregistered snowmobile § 3205(a) alterations made to headlight lenses § 3206(a) permitting operation of an unregistered snowmobile § 3206(b)(6) natural area § 3206(b)(20) trail access limited § 3206(b)(21) failure to wear proper protective headgear (d) A person who violates any of the following sections of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of $300.00 for each violation: § 3204(b) misuse of manufacturer’s/seller’s registration § 3206(b)(5) private land or private body of water § 3206(b)(16) operation after privilege suspended § 3206(b)(17) operation of a snowmobile in unreasonable manner § 3206(b)(18)(C) display of improper TMA by a snowmobile used in a commercial operation § 3206(b)(18)(D) failure to display commercial identification § 3209 defacing numbers on snowmobiles § 3209a defacing trail signs (e) A person who violates any of the following sections of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of up to $500.00 for each violation: § 3205(d) operation with an improper muffling device § 3206(b)(19) liability insurance § 3206(b)(22) operation of a snowmobile in closed or open and (23) season § 3206(b)(9)(A) harassing wildlife (f) A person who violates any of the following provisions of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both. If the person has been previously convicted of the same violation, the person shall be imprisoned for not more than two years or fined not more than $3,000.00, or both: § 3206(b)(9)(B) intentionally causing animal pain or suffering § 3206(b)(12) reckless operation PARASTAT=“s” DESISTAT=“”> § 3211 leaving scene of a crash § 3212 attempting to elude law enforcement officer

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; 1999, No. 20 , §§ 8, 11; 2001, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 5, 6, eff. June 12, 2002; 2003, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 233; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 23, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “a crash” for “an accident” in subsec. (f) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    —2014. In subsec. (a), substituted “§ 3205(a)-(c)” for “§ 3205(a)” and substituted “§ 3205(e)” for “§ 3205(c)”, and in subsec. (e), substituted “§ 3205(d)” for “§ 3205(b)” to correct incorrect cross-references arising from the 2007 subsec. redesignations of section 3205.

    —2007. In subsec. (a), substituted “§ 3206(b)(1)(D)” for “§ 3206(b)(9)” and “§ 3206(b)(10)” for “§ 3206(b)(9)” and in subsec. (b), substituted “§ 3206(b)(13)” for “§ 3206(b)(14)”, “§ 3206(b)(14)” for “§ 3206(b)(15)” and “§ 3206(b)(15)” for “§ 3206(b)(16)” to correct errors in the references and for purposes of clarity.

    —2001. Subsec (e), as added by 2001 No. 126, § 6, was redesignated as subsec. (g) to avoid conflict with existing subsec. (e).

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 149 substituted “civil penalty” for “fine” throughout the section.

    Subsec. (a): Act No. 149 substituted “without a certificate of snowmobile education” for “under 12” and deleted “age” preceding “16” and inserted “years of age” thereafter.

    Subsec. (g): Act No. 131 deleted the subsec. heading and “of Motor Vehicles” following “Commissioner”.

    Subsec (h): Act No. 149 substituted “Civil penalties” for “Fines”.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (e): Added.

    —1999. Subsec. (c): Added entries for violations of §§ 3206(b)(18) and 3206(b)(19)(D).

    Subsec. (d): Inserted entry for violation of § 3206(b)(19)(C).

    Subdiv. (e)(2): Substituted “or shall be” for “and” following “six months” and added “or both” following “following fines” in the introductory paragraph.

    Subdiv. (e)(3): Inserted “serious bodily injury or” in the subdiv. heading, and “or serious bodily injury” following “death” in the text of the subdiv.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$300.00” for “$100.00” and added “unless otherwise provided by law” following “offense”.

    § 3207a. Operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs; SWI.

    1. A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of a snowmobile on any lands, waters, or public highways of this State:
      1. when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.08 or more; or
      2. when the person is under the influence of alcohol; or
      3. when the person is under the influence of any other drug or under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a snowmobile.
    2. A person who is a habitual user of or under the influence of any narcotic drug or who is under the influence of any other drug, substance, or inhalant other than alcohol to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a snowmobile may not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of a snowmobile.
    3. The fact that a person charged with a violation of this section is or has been entitled to use such drug under the laws of this State shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this section.
    4. A person may not be convicted of more than one offense under this section arising out of the same incident.
    5. As used in this section, “alcohol” includes “alcohol,” “malt beverages,” “spirits,” “fortified wines,” and “vinous beverages” as defined in 7 V.S.A. § 2 , and any beverage or liquid containing any of them.
    6. As used in this section, “drug” means a regulated drug as defined in 18 V.S.A. § 4201 .
    7. If a person violates this section on a public highway, that person may be convicted of a violation of this section or a violation of section 1201 of this title, but not both.
    8. Any person who is convicted of violating this section shall have his or her privilege to operate a snowmobile suspended for a period of one year and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title. Additionally, a person convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be penalized under the provisions of section 1210 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; amended 1999, No. 20 , § 10; 2003, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2017, No. 83 , § 154.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subsecs. (e) and (f), substituted “As used in” for “For the purposes of” to conform to V.S.A. style.

    Amendments

    —2017. Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” in the section heading, in subdiv. (a)(2), and in subsec. (b), and rewrote subsec. (e).

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (h): Added.

    —1999. Subsec. (g): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving under the influence, see chapter 13, subchapter 13 of this title.

    § 3207b. Preliminary screening device.

    When a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a person may be violating or has violated section 3207a of this title, the officer may request the person to provide a sample of breath for a preliminary screening test using a device approved by the Commissioner of Health for this purpose. The person shall not have the right to consult an attorney prior to submitting to this preliminary breath alcohol screening test. The results of this preliminary screening test may be used for the purpose of deciding whether an arrest should be made and whether to request an evidentiary test and shall not be used in any court proceeding except on those issues. Following the screening test, additional tests may be required of the operator pursuant to the provisions of section 1202 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. Nov. 1, 1994.

    § 3207c. Implied consent.

    Any person who operates, attempts to operate, or is in actual physical control of a snowmobile on any lands, waters, or public highways of this State is deemed to have given consent to the taking of more than one sample of his or her breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood. The samples shall be taken and the tests administered and analyzed consistently with the provisions of sections 1202, 1203, and 1203a of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. Nov. 1, 1994.

    § 3207d. Permissive inferences.

    Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by a person while operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a snowmobile on any lands, waters, or public highways of this State, the person’s alcohol concentration shall give rise to the following permissive inferences:

    1. If the person’s alcohol concentration at that time was less than 0.08, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption or permissive inference that the person was or was not under the influence of alcohol, but such fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether the person was under the influence of alcohol.
    2. If the person’s alcohol concentration at that time was 0.08 or more, it shall be a permissive inference that the person was under the influence of alcohol in violation of subdivision 3207a(a)(2) or (3) of this title.
    3. If the person’s alcohol concentration at any time within two hours of the alleged offense was 0.10 or more, it shall be a permissive inference that the person was under the influence of alcohol in violation of subdivision 3207a(a)(2) or (3) of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; amended 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4).

    History

    Revision note—

    In subdivs. (2) and (3), substituted “section 3207a(a)(2) or (3)” for “section 3207(a)(2) or (3)” to correct an error in the reference.

    Amendments

    —2017. Subdivs. (1)-(3): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “influence of”.

    § 3207e. Refusal to submit to test.

    If the person refuses to submit to an evidentiary test it shall not be given, but the refusal may be introduced as evidence in a criminal proceeding.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. Nov. 1, 1994.

    § 3207f. Persons under 21; alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more.

    1. A person under the age of 21 who operates, attempts to operate, or is in actual physical control of a snowmobile on any lands, waters, or public highways of this State when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more commits a civil traffic violation subject to the jurisdiction of the Judicial Bureau and subject to the following sanctions:
      1. For a first violation, the person’s privilege to operate a snowmobile on any lands, waters, or public highways of this State shall be suspended for six months and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title.
      2. For a second or subsequent violation, the person’s privilege to operate a snowmobile on any lands, waters, or public highways of this State shall be suspended until the person reaches the age of 21 or for one year, whichever is longer, and complies with section 1209a of this title.
    2. Notwithstanding the provisions in subsection (a) of this section to the contrary, a person’s privilege to operate that has been suspended under this section shall not be reinstated until the Commissioner has received satisfactory evidence that the provider of the therapy program has been paid in full.
    3. If a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is violating this section, the officer may request the person to submit to a breath test using a preliminary screening device approved by the Commissioner of Health. Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in sections 1202 and 1203 of this title:
      1. the results of the test shall be admissible evidence in a proceeding under this section; and
      2. there shall be no statutory right to counsel prior to the administration of the test.
    4. A refusal to submit to an evidentiary test shall be considered a violation of this section.
    5. In a proceeding under this section, if there was at any time within two hours of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a snowmobile on the lands, waters, or public highways of this State an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.02 or more at the time of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control.
    6. The alcohol program required under this section shall be administered by the Department of Health’s Division of Substance Use Programs and shall take into consideration any particular treatment needs of operators under 21 years of age.
    7. A charge of violating this section shall not bar prosecution for any crime, including a prosecution under section 3207a of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 57 , § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; amended 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 28; 2021, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, effective July 1, 2022.

    History

    Amendments

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “judicial bureau” for “traffic and municipal ordinance bureau” near the end of the introductory paragraph.

    § 3208. Administration and enforcement.

    1. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall administer the provisions of this subchapter, except as otherwise provided, and may adopt rules prescribing forms and procedures for application and registration as necessary to carry its provisions into effect.
    2. The Secretary of Natural Resources shall provide to the Agency of Transportation a list of public lands, public waters and natural areas on or over which a snowmobile may not be operated.  The information provided shall be incorporated in the booklet made available pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.
    3. This subchapter and rules adopted under this subchapter, together with the list provided by the Secretary of Natural Resources, shall be printed in booklet form and made available to the public by the Agency of Transportation.
    4. The provisions of this subchapter and rules adopted pursuant to this subchapter shall be enforced by law enforcement officers as defined in section 3302 of this title in accordance with the provisions of 4 V.S.A. chapter 29. Testimony of a witness as to the existence of navigation or snowmobile control signs, signals, or markings shall be prima facie evidence that such control, sign, signal, or marking existed pursuant to a lawful statute, regulation, or ordinance and that the defendant was lawfully required to obey a direction of such device.
    5. Law enforcement officers as defined in section 3302 of this title may conduct safety inspections on snowmobiles stopped for other snowmobile law violations on the Statewide Snowmobile Trail System. Safety inspections may also be conducted in a designated area by law enforcement officials. A designated area shall be warned solely by blue lights either on a stationary snowmobile parked on a trail or on a cruiser parked at a roadside trail crossing.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. June 21, 1994; 2003, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2017, No. 71 , § 19; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 234.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “subchapter” for “chapter” twice.

    Subsec. (d): Deleted “the” preceding “rules” and substituted “to this subchapter” for “thereto” in the first sentence.

    —2017. Subsec. (d): Substituted “4 V.S.A. chapter 29” for “12 V.S.A. chapter 193” at the end of the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    Subsec. (e): Deleted “, in accordance with the provisions of 12 V.S.A. chapter 193,” following “section 3302 of this title” in the first sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Added.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Authority of deputy fish and wildlife wardens to enforce provisions of this chapter, see 10 V.S.A § 4192.

    § 3209. Defacing manufacturer identification and serial numbers.

    A person shall not willfully change or attempt to change, or tamper with, obliterate, deface, or in any manner interfere with the original or assigned motor number or manufacturer’s serial number of any snowmobile.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. Nov. 1, 1994.

    History

    Amendments

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 3209a. Placing and defacing trail signs.

    1. A landowner or VAST may place snowmobile trail signs, markers, or posters on or adjacent to a snowmobile trail maintained by VAST if the landowner has granted permission for use of the land and for placement of the signs, markers, or posters.
    2. A person may not remove, deface, alter, or destroy trail signs, markers, or posters erected pursuant to subsection (a) of this section without the permission of VAST.
    3. The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not prevent a landowner from removing signs, markers, or posters that have been erected without permission of the landowner or that remain on the property after permission has been withdrawn.

    HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. Nov. 1, 1994.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subsec. (a), substituted “markers” for “marker” for clarity and to be consistent with other language in that subsec. and the balance of the section.

    § 3210. Municipal ordinances.

    Municipalities shall have the power to adopt ordinances pursuant to 24 V.S.A. chapter 59 for the purpose of regulating the time, manner, and location of operation of snowmobiles within their limits, provided such ordinances do not controvert the provisions of this subchapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    § 3211. Crashes; duty to stop and report.

    1. The operator of a snowmobile who has caused or is involved in a crash resulting in injury to any person or property, other than the snowmobile then under his or her control, shall immediately stop and render such assistance as may be reasonably necessary. The operator shall give his or her name, residence, registration number, and the name of the owner of the snowmobile to the party whose person or property is injured.
    2. The operator of a snowmobile involved in a crash resulting in death or injury to any person, or damage to property other than the snowmobile he or she is operating, in excess of $500.00, shall immediately notify a law enforcement officer and file a report of the incident with the Commissioner within 72 hours, on forms prescribed by the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 15, eff. Nov. 1, 1994.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crashes” for “accidents” in the section heading and “a crash” for “an accident” in subsecs. (a) and (b) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “or her” following “his” in the first sentence and substituted “The operator” for “He” preceding “shall give his” and inserted “or her” thereafter in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “or she” preceding “is operating”, substituted “$500.00, shall immediately” for “$100.00, shall” preceding “notify” and “a law” for “an” thereafter, deleted “immediately” following “officer” and made other minor changes in punctuation.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Civil liability for emergency medical care, see 12 V.S.A. § 519 .

    Duty to stop and report accident, see §§ 1016, 1128, 1129, and 1603-1603b of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    § 3212. Attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.

    An operator of a snowmobile shall bring the snowmobile to a stop and not attempt to elude a law enforcement officer when signaled to do so by a law enforcement officer wearing insignia identifying him or her as such, or operating a law enforcement vehicle or snowmobile sounding a siren or displaying a flashing blue or blue and white signal lamp.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 16, eff. Nov. 1, 1994.

    History

    Amendments

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “the snowmobile” for “his vehicle” preceding “to a stop”, inserted “and not attempt to elude a law enforcement officer” thereafter, substituted “a law” for “an” following “signalled to do so” and inserted “or her” following “identifying” and “or snowmobile” preceding “sounding”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Attempting to elude enforcement officer, see § 1133 of this title.

    § 3213. Proof of payment of tax.

    1. No license, permits, registration, or similar authorization to own or operate any snowmobile shall be issued under this subchapter until proof of payment of or exemption from the tax imposed by 32 V.S.A. chapter 233 has been established in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner of Taxes.
    2. A current or expired registration certificate or other acceptable proof from the state or province of residence shall suffice as proof of payment of the tax referred to in subsection (a) of this section for persons applying for nonresident registration in this State.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1987, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. June 21, 1994.

    History

    Amendments

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “subchapter” for “chapter” following “under this”.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “or expired” following “current” and “certificate or other acceptable proof” preceding “from the state”.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    § 3214. Allocation of fees and penalties; liability insurance; authority to contract for law enforcement services.

    1. The amount of $5.00 from the sale of every resident and nonresident snowmobile registration shall be allocated to the Transportation Fund. The balance of fees and penalties collected under this subchapter, except interest, shall be remitted to the Agency of Natural Resources, which may retain for its use up to $11,500.00 during each fiscal year for oversight of the Statewide Snowmobile Trail Program, and the remainder shall be allocated to VAST for:
      1. Development and maintenance of the Statewide Snowmobile Trail Program (SSTP).
      2. Procuring trails’ liability insurance in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
      3. Contracting for law enforcement services with any constable, sheriff’s department, municipal police department, the Department of Public Safety, or the Department of Fish and Wildlife to ensure compliance with the provisions of this chapter. The allocation for snowmobile law enforcement services shall be an amount equal to $5.00 from the sale of every resident and nonresident snowmobile registration. If this allocation for law enforcement services is not fully expended, the unexpended amount carried forward may be used to purchase capital equipment to aid law enforcement in the provision of services. VAST shall include proposed spending on law enforcement services and on capital equipment as part of the annual expenditure plan required by section 3215 of this chapter. The Departments of Public Safety and of Fish and Wildlife are authorized to contract with VAST to provide law enforcement services.
    2. VAST shall purchase a trails’ liability insurance policy in the amount of $1,000,000.00. The State of Vermont shall be named an additional insured. The policy shall extend to all VAST affiliated snowmobile clubs and their respective employees and agents to provide for trails’ liability coverage for development and maintenance of the Statewide Snowmobile Trail Program, including groomer use and operation. The Office of the Secretary of Administration shall assist VAST with the procurement of trails liability and other related insurance.
    3. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize or create any cause of action to accrue or to be maintained against the State of Vermont.
    4. Any fees and penalties allocated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall not revert but shall be available until spent. Any accrued interest shall be deposited in the Transportation Fund.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1987, No. 89 , § 313; 1987, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. June 21, 1994: 1995, No. 63 , § 214, eff. May 4, 1995; 2005, No. 215 (Adj. Sess.), § 281; 2009, No. 50 , § 60; 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2013, No. 50 , § E.101.5; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 23.

    History

    Revision note—

    In subsec. (b), substituted “department of buildings and general services” for “general services department” for purposes of conformity with 1995, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 4(c)(2), eff. May 5, 1996.

    Amendments

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2013. Subsec. (b): Substituted “Office of the Secretary of Administration” for “department of buildings and general services” in the last sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Added the first sentence, in the second sentence, inserted “balance of” before “fees”, substituted “is” for “are” before “hereby”, inserted “an amount equal to $5.00 from the sale of every resident and nonresident snowmobile registration shall be allocated” before “to contract”, and added “; the allocation for snowmobile law enforcement shall be included as a part of the annual expenditure plan required by section 3215 of this chapter” at the end.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1995. Subsec. (e): Substituted “appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section” for “collected pursuant to this subchapter” following “penalties” in the first sentence.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1987. Section amended generally.

    § 3215. Expenditure plan.

    VAST shall prepare a plan for the expenditure of funds for the SSTP that are allocated in section 3214 of this title and shall submit this plan to the Governor’s Snowmobile Council for its review, advice, and consent. The plan shall include provisions for:

    1. administration of the program;
    2. trail development and maintenance including contractual arrangements where appropriate; and
    3. periodic audits if requested by the Council or Auditor of Accounts.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. June 21, 1994; 2005, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 81.

    History

    Amendments

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “allocated” for “appropriated” and made a minor change in punctuation in the first sentence of the introductory paragraph.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 3216. Governor’s Snowmobile Council.

      1. The Governor’s Snowmobile Council is created. The members of the Council shall consist of: (a) (1) The Governor’s Snowmobile Council is created. The members of the Council shall consist of:
        1. the President or designee of VAST;
        2. the Secretary of Natural Resources or designee;
        3. the Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife or designee;
        4. the Commissioner of Public Safety or designee;
        5. the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or designee;
        6. the Commissioner of Forests, Parks and Recreation or designee;
        7. the President of the Vermont Sheriffs’ Association or designee;
        8. the President of the Vermont Chiefs of Police Association or designee;
        9. five members appointed by the Governor to represent geographic regions of the State;
        10. one member of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House; and
        11. one member of the Senate appointed by the Committee on Committees.
      2. The Chair shall be appointed by the Governor.
    1. The Council shall serve the following functions:
      1. to review, advise, and consent on development of the annual plan for the expenditure of funds for the Statewide Snowmobile Trail Program;
      2. to review and advise the Governor and General Assembly on matters relating to snowmobiling in Vermont, including environmental and community impacts, development of snowmobile trails, ways to encourage snowmobile traffic in those communities that seek more traffic and control the growth in municipalities that desire less traffic, adequacy of parking areas, carrying capacity of trails, State laws and rules affecting snowmobilers, and promoting snowmobiling in this State;
      3. to help coordinate efforts of VAST and State and federal agencies, private industry, and nonprofit organizations in meeting the needs of snowmobilers in Vermont;
      4. to perform any other duties or functions regarding snowmobiling assigned by the Governor; and
      5. to ensure that municipal legislative bodies are given advance notice and an opportunity for input before trail or parking lot expansion takes place in the community.
    2. The members appointed by the Governor shall serve for two-year terms and all others shall serve the term of their office.
    3. The Council may designate technical work groups, composed of representatives of appropriate public agencies, private organizations, and individuals, to assist in the collection, study, and evaluation of information and to advise the Council on particular issues.
      1. The appointed members of the Council and the President or designee of VAST shall be entitled to compensation at the rate provided for in 32 V.S.A. § 1010 . Expenditures shall be paid from snowmobile funds appropriated to the Agency of Natural Resources for administration of the program. (e) (1) The appointed members of the Council and the President or designee of VAST shall be entitled to compensation at the rate provided for in 32 V.S.A. § 1010 . Expenditures shall be paid from snowmobile funds appropriated to the Agency of Natural Resources for administration of the program.
      2. Legislative members shall be entitled to compensation and reimbursement of expenses as provided for by 2 V.S.A. § 23 .
      3. Technical work group members shall not be entitled to compensation or reimbursement of expenses.
    4. The Council is attached to the Office of the Secretary of Natural Resources for administrative support.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1987, No. 76 , § 18; 1993, No. 234 (Adj. Sess.), § 21, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; 1999, No. 20 , § 9; 2001, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. June 12, 2002; 2013, No. 19 , § 1, eff. May 7, 2013; 2021, No. 20 , § 252.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subdiv. (e)(2), substituted “ 2 V.S.A. § 23 ” for “ 2 V.S.A. § 406 ” in accordance with 2019, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 12(2).

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (b)(5): Substituted “ensure” for “assure” preceding “that”.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): In the second sentence inserted “the commissioner of motor vehicles or designee” following “safety or designee”, substituted “the president of the Vermont chiefs of police association or designee; five” for “four” preceding “members appointed”, inserted “to represent geographic regions of the state” following “governor”, “member of the house of representatives appointed” preceding “by the speaker”, “member of the senate appointed” preceding “by the committee” and deleted “in the senate” following “committees”.

    —1999. Section amended generally.

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —1987. Substituted “agency of natural resources” for “agency of environmental conservation” following “secretary of the” in the second sentence of subsec. (a) and in subdiv. (b)(1), following “appropriated to the” in the second sentence of subsec. (d), and preceding “for administrative” in subsec. (e).

    § 3217. Liability insurance; trail maintenance.

    The State may extend coverage of its liability insurance to parties under contract with the Department of Forests, Parks and Recreation for development and maintenance of the snowmobile trail system. Insurance coverage shall match the State’s current financial liability limits and shall be limited to those activities defined by the development and maintenance contract. The Secretary of Administration shall pay for this extended coverage with funds from snowmobile registration receipts.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 126 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; amended 2013, No. 50 , § E.101.6.

    History

    Revision note—

    Substituted “department of buildings and general services” for “general services department” for purposes of conformity with 1995, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 4(c)(2), eff. May 5, 1996.

    Amendments

    —2013. Substituted “Secretary of Administration” for “department of buildings and general services” in the last sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    State insurance generally, see 29 V.S.A. chapter 55.

    § 3218. Law enforcement officer’s testimony.

    In any proceeding under this subchapter, a law enforcement officer’s testimony that he or she is certified pursuant to 20 V.S.A. § 2358 shall be prima facie evidence of that fact.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 20 , § 12.

    § 3219. Administrative penalties.

    1. The Commissioner may impose an administrative penalty of not more than $250.00 against VAST or its agent for each violation of this subchapter or the rules adopted thereunder. A penalty arising from a single violation may be assessed against VAST or its agent, as may be appropriate, but not against both.
    2. Each violation is a separate and distinct offense, and, in the case of a continuing violation, each day’s continuance may be deemed a separate and distinct offense. In no event shall the maximum penalty imposed for a continuing offense exceed $500.00.
    3. The Commissioner shall adopt rules establishing a schedule of administrative penalties to be imposed under this section. Penalties shall be based on the severity and frequency of the violation.
    4. VAST or its agent shall be given notice and opportunity for a hearing on any alleged violation. Service of the notice shall be sent by first-class mail. The notice shall include the following:
      1. a factual description of the alleged violation;
      2. a reference to the particular statute or rule allegedly violated;
      3. the amount of the proposed administrative penalty; and
      4. a warning that the right to a hearing will be deemed waived and a penalty will be imposed if no hearing is requested within 15 days from the date of the notice, and that failure to pay a penalty may result in suspension or cancellation of the privilege of issuing registrations pursuant to the provisions of section 3204 of this title by VAST or its agent.
    5. When VAST or its agent receives notice under subsection (d) of this section, it shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing unless, within 15 days from the date of the notice, a hearing is requested in writing. If the right to a hearing is waived, the Commissioner shall issue a final order finding VAST or its agent in default and imposing the penalty.
    6. The provisions of sections 105, 106, and 107 of this title shall apply to hearings conducted under this section.
    7. The Commissioner may collect an unpaid administrative penalty by filing a civil action in Superior Court or through any other means available to State agencies.
    8. If a penalty is not paid within 60 days after it is imposed, the Commissioner may suspend or cancel the privilege of issuing registrations granted to VAST or its agent under the provisions of section 3204 of this title.
    9. The remedies authorized by this section shall be in addition to any other civil or criminal remedies provided by law for a violation of this subchapter.
    10. All penalties collected under this section shall be deposited in the Transportation Fund.

    HISTORY: Added 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    Subchapter 2. Vessels

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subchapter heading: Substituted “Vessels” for “Motorboats”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Navigation and waters, see Title 25.

    Titling of vessels, see chapter 36 of this title.

    Unauthorized use of boats or aircraft, see 13 V.S.A. § 2505 .

    Use of public waters generally, see 10 V.S.A. § 1424 .

    § 3301. Declaration of policy.

    It is the policy of this State to promote safety for persons and property in and connected with the use, operation, and equipment of vessels and to promote uniformity of laws relating to the use, operation, and equipment of vessels.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 235.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “to the use, operation, and equipment of vessels” for “thereto”.

    § 3302. Definitions.

    As used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires a different meaning:

    1. “All-round light” means a light showing an unbroken light over an arc of the horizon of 360 degrees.
    2. “Holding tank” means a container or device designed to provide for the retention of wastes on board a vessel and to prevent the discharge of wastes into the waters of this State.
    3. “Law enforcement officer” means a person designated in subdivision 4(11) of this title and includes deputy State game wardens and auxiliary State Police officers.
    4. “Marine toilet” means any toilet on or within any vessel except those that have been permanently sealed and made inoperative.
    5. “Masthead light” means a white light placed over the fore and aft centerline of the vessel showing an unbroken light over an arc of the horizon of 225 degrees and so fixed as to show the light from right ahead to 22.5 degrees abaft the beam on either side of the vessel, except that on a vessel of less than 12 meters in length, the masthead light shall be placed as nearly as practicable to the fore and aft centerline of the vessel.
    6. “Motorboat” means any vessel equipped with machinery capable of propelling the vessel, whether or not such machinery is the principal source of propulsion.
    7. “Operate” means to navigate or otherwise use a vessel.
    8. “Owner” means a person, other than a lienholder, having the property in or title to a vessel. The term includes a person entitled to the use or possession of a vessel subject to an interest in another person, reserved or created by agreement and securing payment or performance of an obligation, but the term excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as security.
    9. “Person” means an individual, partnership, firm, corporation, association, or other entity.
    10. “Personal watercraft” means a class A vessel that uses an inboard engine powering a water jet pump as its primary source of motive power and that is designed to be operated by an individual or individuals sitting, standing, or kneeling on or being towed behind the motorboat rather than in the conventional manner of sitting or standing inside the vessel.
    11. “Public waters of the State” means navigable waters as defined in 10 V.S.A. chapter 49, excepting those waters in private ponds and private preserves as set forth in 10 V.S.A. §§ 5204 , 5205, 5206, and 5210.
    12. “Racing shell or rowing scull” means a manually propelled vessel that is recognized by national or international racing associations for use in competitive racing, and one in which all occupants row or scull, with the exception of a coxswain, if one is provided, and is not designed to carry and does not carry any equipment not solely for competitive racing.
    13. “Sailboard” means a sailboat whose unsupported mast is attached to a surfboard-like hull by a flexible joint.
    14. “Sailing vessel” means any vessel under sail, provided that propelling machinery, if fitted, is not being used.
    15. “Sidelights” mean a green light on the starboard side and a red light on the port side, each showing an unbroken light over an arc of the horizon of 112.5 degrees and so fixed as to show the light from right ahead to 22.5 degrees abaft the beam on its respective side. On a vessel of less than 20 meters in length the side lights may be combined in one lantern carried on the fore and aft centerline of the vessel, except that on a vessel of less than 12 meters in length the sidelights, when combined in one lantern, shall be placed as nearly as practicable to the fore and aft centerline of the vessel.
    16. “Sternlight” means a white light placed as nearly as practicable at the stern, showing an unbroken light over an arc of the horizon of 135 degrees and so fixed as to show the light 67.5 degrees from right aft on each side of the vessel.
    17. “Vessel” means every description of watercraft, other than a seaplane on the water or a racing shell or rowing scull occupied exclusively by persons over 12 years of age, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.
    18. “Waste” means effluent, sewage, or any substance or material, liquid, gaseous, solid, or radioactive, including heated liquids, whether or not harmful or deleterious to waters of this State.
    19. “Waters of this State” means any waters within the territorial limits of this State.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1989, No. 65 , § 1; 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2019, No. 14 , § 63, eff. April 30, 2019; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 236; 2021, No. 76 , § 11.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (4): Inserted “successor” preceding “federal agency” and deleted “successor thereto” thereafter.

    —2019. Subdiv. (4): Substituted “that” for “which” following “vessel”, and “U.S. Customs and Border Protection” for “the Bureau of Customs of the United States government”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Added new subdiv. (10), redesignated former subdivs. (10)-(13) as present subdivs. (11)-(14), and inserted “or a racing shell or rowing scull occupied exclusively by persons over 12 years of age” in present subdiv. (12).

    —1989. Redesignated former subdiv. (10) as subdiv. (1), added a new subdiv. (2), redesignated former subdiv. (9) as subdiv. (3), redesignated former subdivs. (1)-(3) as subdivs. (4)-(6), deleted former subdiv. (7) and redesignated former subdiv. (4) as subdiv. (7), added new subdivs. (8)-(10), redesignated former subdiv. (5) as subdiv. (11), redesignated former subdiv. (8) as subdiv. (12), and redesignated former subdiv. (6) as subdiv. (13).

    § 3303. Operation of unnumbered motorboats prohibited.

    Except for motorboats exempt from numbering under subdivisions 3307(a)(2)-(6) of this title, every motorboat on the waters of this State shall be numbered. A person shall not operate or give permission for the operation of any motorboat on such waters unless the motorboat is numbered in accordance with this subchapter, or in accordance with applicable federal law, or in accordance with a federally approved numbering system of another state, and unless:

    1. the certificate of number awarded to such motorboat is currently valid; and
    2. the identifying number set forth in the certificate of number is displayed on each side of the bow of such motorboat.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2015, No. 47 , § 48; 2021, No. 76 , § 12.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subdiv. (2), substituted “subdivision 3307(1)(E)” for “subdivision 3307(5)” to conform reference to section 3307, as revised.

    Amendments

    —2021. Substituted “3307(a)(2)-(6)” for “3307(a)(2)-(4)” following “subdivisions” in the introductory paragraph.

    —2015. Added “Except for motorboats exempt from numbering under subdivisions 3307(a)(2)-(4) of this title, every” preceding “motorboat on the waters”, substituted “A person shall not operate” for “no person shall operate” in the second sentence of the introductory paragraph, and deleted the second sentence in subdiv. (2).

    § 3304. Classification.

    Motorboats subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be divided into four classes as follows:

    Class A. Less than 16 feet in length.

    Class 1. 16 feet or over and less than 26 feet in length.

    Class 2. 26 feet or over and less than 40 feet in length.

    Class 3. 40 feet or over.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    § 3305. Fees.

    1. An individual shall not operate a motorboat on the public waters of this State unless the motorboat has a valid marine document issued by U.S. Customs and Border Protection or any successor federal agency or is registered in accordance with this chapter.
    2. Annually or biennially, the owner of each motorboat required to be registered by this State shall file an application for a number with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles on forms approved by him or her. The application shall be signed by the owner of the motorboat and shall be accompanied by an annual fee of $31.00, or a biennial fee of $57.00, for a motorboat in class A; by an annual fee of $49.00, or a biennial fee of $93.00, for a motorboat in class 1; by an annual fee of $80.00, or a biennial fee of $155.00, for a motorboat in class 2; by an annual fee of $153.00, or a biennial fee of $303.00, for a motorboat in class 3. Upon receipt of the application in approved form, the Commissioner shall enter the application upon the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles and issue to the applicant a registration certificate stating the number awarded to the motorboat and the name and address of the owner. The owner shall paint on or attach to each side of the bow of the motorboat the identification number in such manner as may be prescribed by rules of the Commissioner in order that it may be clearly visible. The registration shall be void one year from the first day of the month following the month of issue in the case of annual registrations or void two years from the first day of the month following the month of issue in the case of biennial registrations. A motorboat of less than 10 horsepower used as a tender to a registered motorboat shall be deemed registered, at no additional cost, and shall have painted or attached to both sides of the bow the same registration number as the registered motorboat with the number “1” after the number. The number shall be maintained in legible condition. The registration certificate shall be pocket size and shall be available at all times for inspection on the motorboat for which issued, whenever the motorboat is in operation. A duplicate registration may be obtained upon payment of a fee of $3.00 to the Commissioner. Registration fees shall be allocated in accordance with section 3319 of this title.
    3. A person engaged in the business of selling or exchanging motorboats, as defined in subdivision 4(8) of this title, of a type otherwise required to be registered by this subchapter shall register and obtain registration certificates for use as described under subdivision (1) of this subsection, subject to the requirements of chapter 7 of this title. A manufacturer of motorboats may register and obtain registration certificates under this section.
      1. A dealer motorboat registration number may be used:
        1. for the purpose of testing or adjusting motorboats in the immediate vicinity of his or her place of business;
        2. for some purpose directly connected with the business of purchasing, selling, or exchanging motorboats by the dealer;
        3. for demonstration when the prospective purchaser is operating the motorboat and is not accompanied by the dealer or his or her employee, but not for more than three days;
        4. for the temporary accommodation of a customer whose motorboat, because of crash or wear, is disabled and is left with the dealer for repairs for not more than 14 days;
        5. for the private business or pleasure use of the dealer and members of his or her immediate family residing in the same household;
        6. for the use of those motorboats at regattas, marine parades, or water festivities where no charge is made for that use.
      2. The word “dealer” for the purpose of subdivision (1)(E) of this subsection shall include the principal officers of a corporation or dealer and those partners in a copartnership registered as a dealer as are actively and principally engaged in the motorboat business, but shall not include directors and stockholders nor inactive and silent partners.
      3. An application for a dealer motorboat registration and registration number shall be accompanied by the following fees:
        1. for the registration and first number applied for, $42.00;
        2. for each additional number applied for in the current registration period, $12.00.
      4. The Commissioner shall issue a registration certificate of number for each identifying number awarded to the dealer in the manner described in subsection (a) of this section, except that a motorboat shall not be described in the certificate. A dealer’s registration certificate expires one year from the first day of the month of issuance.
      5. A dealer’s identifying number shall be displayed as required by subsection (a) except that the number may be temporarily attached.
      6. A dealer or representative of a dealer shall not use a dealer’s identifying number for any purpose other than those described in subdivision (1) of this subsection.
      1. Registration of a motorboat ends when the owner transfers title to another. The former owner shall immediately return directly to the Commissioner the registration certificate previously assigned to the transferred motorboat with the date of sale and the name and residence of the new owner endorsed on the back of the certificate. (d) (1) Registration of a motorboat ends when the owner transfers title to another. The former owner shall immediately return directly to the Commissioner the registration certificate previously assigned to the transferred motorboat with the date of sale and the name and residence of the new owner endorsed on the back of the certificate.
      2. When a person transfers the ownership of a registered motorboat to another, files a new application, and pays a fee of $6.00, he or she may have registered in his or her name another motorboat of the same class for the remainder of the registration period without payment of any additional registration fee. However, if the fee for the registration of the motorboat sought to be registered is greater than the registration fee for the transferred motorboat, the applicant shall pay the difference between the fee first paid and the fee for the class motorboat sought to be registered.
    4. If an agency of the U.S. government has in force an overall system of identification numbering for motorboats within the United States, the numbering system employed under this subchapter by the Commissioner shall conform with that system.
    5. Every registration certificate awarded under this subchapter shall continue in effect as prescribed in subsection (b) of this section unless sooner ended under this chapter. The registration certificate may be renewed by the owner in the same manner provided for in securing the initial certificate.
    6. The owner shall notify the Commissioner of the transfer of any part of his or her interest other than the creation of a security interest in a motorboat numbered in this State under subsections (a) and (b) of this section or of the destruction or abandonment of the motorboat, within 15 days of the transfer, destruction, or abandonment. The transfer, destruction, or abandonment shall end the certificate of number for the motorboat except that in the case of a transfer of a part interest which does not affect the owner’s right to operate the motorboat, the transfer shall not end the certificate of number.
    7. Any holder of a registration certificate shall notify the Commissioner within 15 days if his or her address ceases to be the address appearing on the certificate and shall, as a part of the notification, furnish the Commissioner with his or her new address. The Commissioner may provide by rule for the surrender of the certificate bearing the former address and its replacement with a certificate bearing the new address or for the alteration of an outstanding certificate to show the new address of the holder.
    8. No number other than the number awarded to a motorboat or granted reciprocity under this subchapter may be painted, attached, or otherwise displayed on either side of the bow of the motorboat.
    9. The Commissioner, by rules adopted pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25, may provide for the issuance of temporary registrations of motorboats pending issuance of the permanent registration. Motorboat dealers may issue temporary motorboat registrations. The dealer’s fee for the temporary registrations shall be $6.00 for each registration purchased from the Department of Motor Vehicles. Temporary registrations shall be kept with the motorboat while being operated and shall authorize operation without the registration number being affixed for a period not to exceed 60 days from the date of issue.
    10. The Commissioner shall enclose with every permanent and temporary motorboat registration and registration renewal certificate issued pursuant to this chapter a statement, based on current aquatic nuisance threats and spread prevention methods, regarding the danger of aquatic nuisances, how aquatic nuisance species are spread, and how spread of aquatic nuisance species may be controlled.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 90 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1989, No. 65 , § 2; 1989, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 3, 4, eff. March 1, 1991; 1993, No. 52 , § 1; 1995, No. 16 , § 1; 1997, No. 62 , § 52, eff. June 26, 1997; 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 30, eff. May 15, 2002; 2001, No. 143 (Adj. Sess.), § 56; 2003, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 24, eff. June 10, 2004; 2009, No. 46 , § 5, eff. July 1, 2010; 2009, No. 50 , § 59; 2013, No. 57 , § 7; 2015, No. 50 , § 4; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 49; 2021, No. 76 , § 13.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” in subdiv. (c)(1)(D) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Substituted “subsection” for “section” following “subdivision (1) of this” at the end of the introductory paragraph of subsec. (c) and following “subdivision (1)(E) of this” in subdiv. (c)(2) for purposes of clarity.

    Editor’s note—

    The text of subsec. (b) of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2001 Adjourned Session, subsec. (b) of this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 75 and 143, resulting in the two versions of that subsec. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2001 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 75 and 143 was merged to arrive at a single version of subsec. (b). The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (a): Substituted “An individual” for “person” preceding “shall” and inserted “has a valid marine document issued by U.S. Customs and Border Protection or any successor federal agency or” following “unless the motorboat”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “motorboat” for “vessel” in three places in the sixth sentence.

    Subdiv. (c)(4): Substituted “motorboat” for “boat” in the first sentence.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (c)(3)(A): Substituted “$42.00” for “$25.00 and a surcharge of $5.00”.

    Subsec. (c)(3)(B): Substituted “$12.00” for “$5.00 and a surcharge of $5.00”.

    Subdiv. (d)(2): Substituted “$6.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subsec. (j): Substituted “$6.00” for “$3.00”.

    —2015. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (j): Substituted “60” for “30” in the last sentence.

    —2013. Subsec. (b): Added “or biennially” in the first sentence; substituted “an annual” for “a” throughout the second sentence; inserted “or a biennial fee of $39.00 and a surcharge of $10.00” following “$5.00”, “or a biennial fee of $61.00 and a surcharge of $20.00”, “or a biennial fee of $115.00 and a surcharge of $20.00”, and “or a biennial fee of $247.00 and a surcharge of $20.00” following “$10.00” throughout the second sentence; and inserted “in the case of annual registrations, or void two years from the first day of the month following the month of issue in the case of biennial registrations” in the fifth sentence.

    Subdiv. (d)(2): Substituted “period” for “year”.

    Subsec. (f): Substituted “as prescribed in subsec. (b) of this section” for “for one year from the first day of the month of issue”.

    —2009. Subsec. (b): Act No. 50 substituted “$22.00” for “$17.00”, “$33.00” for “$28.00”, “$60.00” for “$55.00”, and “$126.00” for “$121.00” in the second sentence; and added the last sentence.

    Subsec. (k): Amended generally by Act No. 46.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “$17.00” for “$15.00”, “$28.00” for “$25.00”, “$55.00” for “$50.00”, and “$121.00” for “$110.00”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Act No. 75 substituted “month following the month of issue” for “month of issue” in the fifth sentence.

    Act No. 143 inserted “and a surcharge of $5.00” following “$15.00” and “and a surcharge of $10.00” in three places in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Act No. 143 added “and a surcharge of $5.00” in subsecs. (3)(A) and (B).

    Subsec. (j): Act No. 102 substituted “$3.00” for “$1.00” in the third sentence.

    —1997. Subsec. (k): Added.

    —1995 amendment. Subsec. (b): Deleted “on or before March 1” preceding “the owner” in the first sentence and added the fifth sentence.

    Subdiv. (c)(4): Substituted “one year from the first day of the month” for “the day before March 1 following the date” preceding “of issuance” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (f): Substituted “for one year from the first day of the month of issue” for “until March 1 following the date of issuance” preceding “unless” in the first sentence.

    —1993. Subsec. (b): In the second sentence, substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00”, “$25.00” for “$20.00”, “$50.00” for “$40.00”, and “$110.00” for “$100.00”.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): In the second sentence, substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00”, “$20.00” for “$10.00”, “$40.00” for “$20.00”, and “$100.00” for “$50.00”.

    Subdiv. (c)(3): Substituted “$50.00” for “$25.00” in subdiv. (A) and “$10.00” for “$5.00” in subdiv. (B).

    —1989. Added a new subsec. (a), redesignated former subsec. (a) as subsec. (b) and added the fifth sentence of that subsec., redesignated former subsec. (b) as subsec. (c) and substituted “a dealer” for “dealer’s” preceding “motorboat registration” and “number” for “numbers” thereafter in the introductory clause of subdiv. (1) of that subsec. and substituted “a dealer motorboat registration number” for “dealer’s numbers” in the introductory clause of subdiv. (3) of that subsec., and redesignated former subsecs. (c)-(i) as subsecs. (d)-(j).

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (i): Added.

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Inserted “or her” following “him” in the first sentence, substituted “$5.00” for “$2.50”, “$10.00” for “$5.00”, “$20.00” for “$10.00”, and “$50.00” for “$25.00” in the second sentence, “application” for “same” following “enter the” in the third sentence, and “the” for “such” following “whenever” in the sixth sentence, and added the seventh sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “by this subchapter” for “hereunder” following “registered” and inserted “or her” following “him” in the introductory paragraph and inserted “or her” following “his” in subdivs. (1)(A), (C) and (E).

    Subsec. (c): Deleted “thereto” following “title” in the first sentence and substituted “of the certificate” for “thereof” following “back” in the second sentence of the first paragraph and substituted “$ 5.00, he or she” for “$ 1.00, he” preceding “may have registered in his” in the first sentence of the second paragraph and inserted “or her” thereafter.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “with that system” for “therewith” following “conform”.

    Subsec. (e): Inserted “securing” preceding “the initial” in the second sentence and substituted “certificate” for “securing of the same” thereafter.

    Subsec. (f): Inserted “or her” following “his” and substituted “of the transfer, destruction or abandonment” for “thereof” following “days” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (g): Inserted “or her” following “his” throughout the first sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Electronic receipt to show registration, see § 305 of this title.

    Notification of change of name or address, see § 205 of this title.

    Refund of fees paid, see §§ 207 and 327 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Cited.

    Cited in Bigelow v. Department of Taxes, 163 Vt. 33, 652 A.2d 985, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 169 (1994).

    § 3305a. Privilege to operate a vessel; suspension of privilege; minimum age for operation of a motorboat.

    1. An individual who meets the applicable requirements of this subchapter shall have the privilege to operate a vessel on the public waters of this State, as those waters are defined in 10 V.S.A. § 1422 .
    2. An individual whose privilege to operate a vessel has been suspended shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of a vessel on the public waters of this State until the privilege to operate a vessel has been reinstated by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
    3. An individual under 12 years of age shall not operate a motorboat powered by more than six horsepower on the public waters of this State.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 65 , § 3; amended 2021, No. 76 , § 13.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsecs. (a) and (b): Substituted “An individual” for “A person” preceding “who” and “whose” respectively.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “An individual” for “ A person” preceding “under” and “12 years of age” for “the age of 12” thereafter.

    § 3305b. Boating safety education; rules.

    1. When required.   An individual born after January 1, 1974 shall not operate a motorboat on the public waters of this State without first obtaining a certificate of boating education.
    2. Possession of certificate.   An individual who is required to have a certificate of boating education shall:
      1. Possess the certificate when operating a motorboat on the public waters of the State.
      2. Show the certificate on the demand of an enforcement officer wearing insignia identifying him or her as such or operating a law enforcement vessel. However, an individual charged with violating this subsection shall not be convicted if the individual produces a certificate that was valid at the time the violation occurred in court to the officer or to a State’s Attorney.
    3. Exemptions.   The following individuals are exempt from the requirements of this section:
      1. an individual who is licensed by the U.S. Coast Guard to operate a vessel for commercial purposes;
      2. an individual operating a motorboat on a body of water located on private property; and
      3. any other individual exempted by rules of the Department of Public Safety.
    4. Rules.   The Department of Public Safety shall:
      1. adopt rules that establish criteria for a course of instruction in boating safety education;
      2. adopt rules relating to transient boaters and persons who hire chartered vessels;
      3. administer a verbal test when appropriate;
      4. coordinate a Statewide program of boating safety instruction and certification and ensure that a course of boating safety education is available within each county;
      5. ensure that a course of boating safety education is available at the earliest practicable age for children; and
      6. ensure that the course includes an educational component regarding the environmental harm caused by aquatic nuisance species and how the spread of such species may be controlled when boaters follow specific steps to clean boats and trailers after use in State waters.
    5. Hours of instruction.   Any course of boating safety education that is offered shall provide a minimum of eight hours of instruction.
    6. Persons offering courses.   The following persons may offer the course of instruction in boating safety education if approved by the Department of Public Safety:
      1. the Department of Public Safety;
      2. the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary;
      3. the U.S. Power Squadrons;
      4. a political subdivision;
      5. a municipal corporation;
      6. a State agency;
      7. a public or nonpublic school; and
      8. any group, firm, association, or person.
    7. Issuance of certificate.   The Department of Public Safety or its designee shall issue a certificate of boating safety education to an individual who:
      1. passes the departmentally prescribed course in boating safety education; or
      2. passes a boating safety equivalency examination administered by persons authorized to offer the course on boating safety education.
    8. Education materials.   Upon request, the Department of Public Safety shall provide, without charge, boating safety education materials to individuals who plan to take the boating safety equivalency examination.
    9. Lifetime issuance.   Once issued, the certificate of boating safety education is valid for the lifetime of the individual to whom it was issued and may not be revoked by the Department of Public Safety or a court of law.
    10. Certificate replacement.   The Department of Public Safety shall replace, without charge, a lost or destroyed certificate if the Department issued the certificate or has a record that the certificate was issued.
    11. Out-of-state certificate.   A boating safety certificate issued in another state or country in accordance with or substantially equivalent to criteria of the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators is sufficient to comply with the requirements of this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 65 , § 4; amended 2009, No. 46 , § 6, eff. July 1, 2010; 2021, No. 76 , § 13.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    —2009. Subdiv. (d)(6): Added.

    § 3306. Lights and equipment.

    1. Every vessel shall carry and show the following lights, in the intensity prescribed under 33 C.F.R. § 83.22, as amended, when underway between sunset and sunrise and during other periods of restricted visibility:
      1. Unpowered vessels.
        1. A sailing vessel shall exhibit:
          1. sidelights; and
          2. a sternlight.
        2. A sailing vessel may, in addition to the lights prescribed in subdivision (A) of this subdivision (1), exhibit at or near the top of the mast, where they can best be seen, two all-round lights in a vertical line, the upper being red and the lower being green.
        3. Notwithstanding subdivision (A) of this subdivision (1), on a sailing vessel of less than 20 meters in length, the lights prescribed in subdivision (A) of this subdivision (1) may be combined in a single light and exhibited at or near the top of the mast, where it can best be seen, but may not also have exhibited two all-round lights in a vertical line, as permitted in subdivision (B) of this subdivision (1).
        4. Notwithstanding subdivision (A) of this subdivision (1), a sailing vessel of less than seven meters in length shall, if practicable, exhibit the lights prescribed in subdivision (1) of this subsection (a) but, if not practicable, shall exhibit or have onboard an all-round white light that shall be exhibited in sufficient time to prevent collision.
        5. A vessel under oars or one or more paddles may exhibit the lights prescribed in subdivision (1) of this subsection (a), but, if such lights are not exhibited, the vessel shall exhibit or have onboard an all-round white light that shall be exhibited in sufficient time to prevent collision.
      2. Motorboats.
        1. A motorboat, including one that is also proceeding under sail, shall exhibit:
          1. a masthead light forward;
          2. a second masthead light abaft of and higher than the light required under subdivision (i) of this subdivision (A) if the vessel is 50 meters or more in length;
          3. sidelights; and
          4. a sternlight.
        2. A motorboat that is also proceeding under sail shall exhibit forward, where it can best be seen, a conical shape, apex downward.
      3. Lights approved by the U.S. Coast Guard.   Any light or combination of lights approved by the U.S. Coast Guard for inland waters shall be considered legal for Vermont waters.
      1. Personal flotation devices.   Each vessel, except sailboards, shall, consistent with federal regulations, carry for each individual aboard at least one wearable U.S. Coast Guard-approved personal flotation device that is in good and serviceable condition and capable of being used in accordance with the U.S. Coast Guard approval label. (b) (1) Personal flotation devices.   Each vessel, except sailboards, shall, consistent with federal regulations, carry for each individual aboard at least one wearable U.S. Coast Guard-approved personal flotation device that is in good and serviceable condition and capable of being used in accordance with the U.S. Coast Guard approval label.
      2. Vessels; individuals less than 12 years of age.   In addition to the provisions of this subsection, an individual under 12 years of age aboard a vessel, while under way and the individual is on an open deck, shall wear a properly secured wearable U.S. Coast Guard-approved personal flotation device as intended by the manufacturer.
      3. Sailboards; individuals less than 16 years of age.   An individual under 16 years of age aboard a sailboard shall wear a properly secured wearable U.S. Coast Guard-approved personal flotation device as intended by the manufacturer.
      4. Inspected commercial vessels.   U.S. Coast Guard-inspected commercial vessels shall be exempt from the provisions of this subsection.
    2. Every motorboat, except a motorboat that is less than 26 feet in length, that has an outboard motor and an open construction, and is not carrying passengers for hire shall carry on board, fully charged and in good condition, U.S. Coast Guard-approved hand portable fire extinguishers as follows:
      1. motorboats with no fixed fire extinguisher system in the machinery space and that are:
        1. less than 26 feet in length, one extinguisher;
        2. 26 feet or longer, but less than 40 feet, two extinguishers;
        3. 40 feet or longer, three extinguishers.
      2. motorboats with a fixed fire extinguisher system in the machinery space and that are:
        1. 26 feet or longer but less than 40 feet, one extinguisher;
        2. 40 feet or longer, two extinguishers.
    3. The extinguishers referred to by this section are class B-I or 5-B extinguishers, but one class B-II or 20-B extinguisher may be substituted for two class B-I or 5-B extinguishers.
    4. Every marine toilet on board any vessel operated on the waters of the State shall also incorporate or be equipped with a holding tank. Any holding tank or marine toilet designed so as to provide for an optional means of discharge to the waters on which the vessel is operating shall have the discharge openings sealed shut and any discharge lines, pipes, or hoses shall be disconnected and stored while the vessel is in the waters of this State.
    5. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the discharge of adequately treated wastes from any vessel operating under the provisions of a valid discharge permit issued by the Department of Environmental Conservation.
    6. Motorboats operated on waters that the U.S. Coast Guard has determined to be navigable waters of the United States and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the United States must have lights and other safety equipment as required by U.S. Coast Guard rules and regulations.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 90 , § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; 1987, No. 76 , § 18; 1989, No. 65 , § 5; 1989, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2017, No. 71 , § 28, eff. June 8, 2017; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 237; 2021, No. 76 , § 13.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —2017. Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “and” for “a white light in the forepart of the boat showing all around,” following “two miles,”.

    Subdiv. (g): Added.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(2): Inserted “while under way and the person is on an open deck” preceding “shall wear” in the second sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —1987. Subsec. (f): Substituted “department of environmental conservation” for “department of water resources and environmental engineering” following “issued by the”.

    —1985. Subdiv. (a)(2): Deleted “combination twenty-point” following “two miles, a”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Substituted “light showing all around” for “twelve-point light aft” preceding “visible” and “white” for “combination twenty-point” following “miles, and a”.

    Subdiv. (a)(5): Substituted “of lights” for “thereof” preceding “approved”.

    Subsec. (c): Inserted “and auxiliary powered sailboats” preceding “except”.

    Subdiv. (c)(1): Inserted “and auxiliary powered sailboats” preceding “with”.

    Subdiv. (c)(2): Inserted “and auxiliary powered sailboats” preceding “with”.

    Subsec. (f): Substituted “department of water resources and environmental engineering” for “department of water resources” following “issued by”.

    § 3307. Exemption from Vermont numbering provisions.

    1. A motorboat is not required to have a Vermont number under this chapter if it is:
      1. already covered by a number in effect that has been awarded to it under federal law or a federally approved numbering system of another state if the boat has not been within the State for more than 90 days;
      2. a motorboat from a country other than the United States if the boat has not been within the State for more than 90 days;
      3. a motorboat owned by a state or subdivision of a state and used principally for governmental purposes and that is clearly identifiable as such, provided that the state or subdivision has jurisdiction over the motorboat and follows the guidance of 33 C.F.R. § 173.19;
      4. a vessel’s lifeboat;
      5. licensed, numbered, or otherwise registered under New Hampshire laws for operation on waters in that state, but only when it is operated on such parts of the Connecticut River and impoundments of the river as may lie in Vermont and only when and to the same extent as New Hampshire laws allow motorboats licensed, numbered, or otherwise recognized by Vermont laws as being registered for lawful operation on waters within Vermont to be operated on such parts of the Connecticut River and impoundments of the river as may be in New Hampshire;
      6. a motorboat that has a valid marine document issued by U.S. Customs and Border Protection or any successor federal agency.
    2. Any exemptions provided in this section shall apply to an owner or operator of a motorboat only to the extent that under the laws of the foreign country or state of his or her residence like exemptions and privileges are granted to operators and owners of motorboats duly registered under the laws of this State.
    3. Failure to meet one of the exemptions of this section will require registration and numbering in Vermont.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 90 , § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; 2015, No. 47 , § 49; 2021, No. 76 , § 14.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (a)(3): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Substituted “vessel’s” for “ship’s” preceding “lifeboat”.

    Subdiv. (a)(6): Added.

    —2015. Section amended generally.

    —1985. Deleted “consecutive” following “90” in subdiv. (1), substituted “if the boat has not been within the state for more than 90 days” for “temporarily using the waters of this state” following “States” in subdiv. (2), substituted “of the United States or a state” for “thereof” following “subdivision” in the first sentence and “of the government” for “thereof” preceding “owning” in the second sentence of subdiv. (3), substituted “of the river” for “thereof” following “impoundments” in two places in subdiv. (6), inserted “or her” following “his” in subdiv. (5), and added the last undesignated paragraph of the section.

    § 3307a. Documented motorboat validation sticker.

    1. Annual validation required.
      1. An owner of a motorboat that has been registered in another state under a federally approved numbering system, or that has a valid document issued by the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or any other federal agency, and that is used in the waters of the State for at least 60 days in any calendar year shall apply annually to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for validation of the out-of-state or federal registration of that motorboat.
      2. The Commissioner shall issue a validation sticker to any owner who submits an application and pays a fee as required by subsection (b) of this section, provided that the out-of-state or federal registration is valid and that the requirements of section 3322 of this title are met.
      3. A validation sticker issued under this section shall be valid through December 31 of the year in which it is issued.
    2. Application; fee.   The owner of the motorboat shall:
      1. submit an application, on a form that the Commissioner requires, signed by every owner of the motorboat to the Commissioner; and
      2. pay to the Commissioner an application fee in the same amount as would be paid if the motorboat was being registered under subsection 3305(b) of this title.
    3. Sale of motorboat.   Within 30 days after the sale or other transfer of a motorboat that is or should be validated under this section:
      1. the transferor shall give notice of the transfer to the Commissioner on a form that the Commissioner requires; and
      2. if the transferee intends to continue to use the motorboat on the waters of the State for at least 30 days in any calendar year, he or she shall submit an application for validation and pay the fee as required by subsection (b) of this section.
    4. Display of sticker.   The validation sticker shall be displayed on or about the forward half of the motorboat.
    5. Operation without sticker prohibited.   Unless the motorboat that is subject to the validation requirement of this section displays a current validation sticker:
      1. an individual may not operate the motorboat on the waters of the State; and
      2. the owner may not knowingly permit the motorboat to be operated on the waters of the State.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 251 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1989, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 1, 1991; 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2019, No. 14 , § 64, eff. April 30, 2019; 2021, No. 20 , § 253; 2021, No. 76 , § 15.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subdiv. (a)(1), substituted “3302(6)” for “3302(11)” to correct cross reference to definition of “owner”.

    Editor’s note

    —2021. During the 2021 session, this section was amended in conflicting ways by two different acts. Only the amendments from Act No. 76 are reflected in the text of this section, however, and not the amendments from Act No. 20, as the stated purpose of Act No. 20 was to make only technical amendments and § 371 of the act specified that, to the extent that Act. No. 20 may conflict with other acts of the same biennium, “the substantive changes in other acts shall take precedence over the technical changes of this act.”

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally by Act No. 76.

    —2019. Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “U.S. Customs and Border Protection,” for “the U.S. Bureau of Customs”.

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(2): Substituted “in the same amount as would be paid if the vessel was being registered under subsection 3305(b) of this title” for “of $10.00”.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “ 23 V.S.A. § 3302(11) ” for “ 23 V.S.A. § 3302(5) ”.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “for a motorboat in class A; $20.00 for a motorboat in class 1; $40.00 for a motorboat in class 2; and $100.00 for a motorboat in class 3” following “$10.00” in subdiv. (2).

    Repeal of 1989 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 1989, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 10(b), provided for the repeal of 1989, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 1, 1994, which amended subdiv. (a)(1) and subsec. (b) of this section.

    § 3308. Boat liveries.

    The owner of a boat livery shall cause to be kept a record of the name and address of the person or persons hiring any vessel that is designed or permitted by him or her to be operated as a motorboat and the identification number and the date and time of rental. The record shall be preserved for at least six months.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 90 , § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 1986.

    History

    Amendments

    —1985. Inserted “or her” following “him” and deleted “thereof” following “number” in the first sentence.

    Repeal of 1989 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 1989, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 10(b), provided for the repeal of 1989 No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 1, 1994, which amended subdiv. (a)(1) and subsec. (b) of this section.

    § 3309. Muffling devices.

    The exhaust of every internal combustion engine used on any motorboat shall be effectively muffled by equipment so constructed and used as to muffle the noise of the exhaust in a manner that reduces the maximum machine operating noise level to not more than 82 decibels on the A scale at 50 feet, in a normal operating environment. The use of cutouts is prohibited except for motorboats competing in a regatta or boat race approved as provided in section 3316 of this title, and for such motorboats while on trial runs, during a period not to exceed 48 hours immediately preceding such regatta or race and for such motorboats while competing in official trials for speed records during a period not to exceed 48 hours immediately following such regatta or race.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1989, No. 65 , § 6.

    History

    Amendments

    —1989. Deleted “reasonable” preceding “manner” and added “which reduces the maximum machine operating noise level to not more than 82 decibels on the A scale at 50 feet, in a normal operating environment” thereafter in the first sentence.

    § 3310. Swimming areas.

    1. The Commissioner of Forests, Parks and Recreation or a municipality in administering a swimming beach or waterfront program may designate a swimming area in front of the beach or land that the State or a municipality owns or controls and may make rules pertaining to the area. The rules may provide that no individual, except a lifeguard on duty and other authorized personnel, may operate a vessel, seaplane, racing shell, or rowing scull of any sort within the designated swimming area.
    2. A designated swimming area shall have bounds marked by buoys spaced no more than 100 feet apart.  The buoys shall be displayed 24 inches above the water or shall have red flags not smaller than 12 by 18 inches displayed 18 inches above the water.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2009, No. 135 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 2021, No. 76 , § 16.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (a): Substituted “individual” for “person” and “a vessel, seaplane, racing shell, or rowing scull” for “any boat, canoe, or water vehicle”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “commissioner” for “state board” in the first sentence.

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former 25 V.S.A. § 310 .

    Boats.

    The Department of Forests and Parks had authority to promulgate regulations restricting the movement of motor-driven boats in State park areas designated for public swimming. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 197.

    § 3311. Operation of vessels; prohibited acts; authority of law enforcement officers.

    1. Careless and negligent operation.   An individual shall not operate any vessel or manipulate any water skis, surfboard, or similar device in a careless or negligent manner or in any manner to endanger or jeopardize the safety, life, or property of another person.
    2. Permitting use by intoxicated individual.   The owner or person in charge or in control of a vessel shall not knowingly authorize or knowingly permit it to be propelled or operated by any individual who is under the influence of alcohol, narcotic drugs, or barbiturates.
    3. Distance requirements.
      1. An individual shall not operate any vessel, seaplane, racing shell, or rowing scull, except a sailboard or a police or emergency vessel, within 200 feet of the shoreline; an individual in the water; a canoe, rowboat, or other vessel; an anchored or moored vessel containing any individual; or anchorages or docks, except at a speed of less than five miles per hour that does not create a wake.
      2. An individual shall not operate any vessel, seaplane, racing shell, or rowing scull, except a nonmotorized canoe, a nonmotorized rowboat, or a police or emergency vessel, within 200 feet of a divers-down flag.
      3. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit rendering assistance to another individual, picking up an individual in the water, necessary mooring or landing, or leaving shore, or operating in any other place where obstruction, other than the shoreline, would prevent abiding by this statute.
      4. An individual shall not operate a vessel, except at speeds of less than five miles per hour, within 200 feet of a designated swimming area.
    4. Underwater historic preserve area.   A vessel shall not be operated in an “underwater historic preserve area” except as provided in this subsection.  These areas are historic and archaeological sites located on the bottomlands of the waters of the State and are designated as public recreational areas. The Division for Historic Preservation may designate underwater historic preserve areas and they shall be identified by a floating special purpose yellow buoy marked “State of Vermont Underwater Historic Preserve.” The following requirements shall govern the operation of vessels at the preserves:
      1. A vessel may secure to a yellow buoy only when diving or remotely operated vehicle diving at the preserve. In this subsection, “remotely operated vehicle diving” means using an unstaffed underwater robot to view a preserve site.
      2. Vessels 35 feet in length or less may secure to a buoy.
      3. Vessels 50 feet in length or less and piloted by a U.S. Coast Guard-licensed captain may secure to a buoy for the purpose of remotely operated vehicle diving.
      4. A divers-down flag shall be displayed whenever a vessel is secured to a buoy.
      5. On sites with multiple buoys, one vessel may be secured to each buoy.
      6. When a vessel is secured to the buoy, all other vessels shall remain at least 200 feet from the buoy.
      7. Anchoring is not permitted within 200 feet of the buoy.
    5. Overloaded vessel.   A vessel shall not be loaded with passengers or cargo beyond its safe carrying capacity taking into consideration weather and other existing operating conditions.
    6. Attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.   An operator of any vessel shall bring his or her vessel to a stop and not attempt to elude a law enforcement officer when signaled to do so by the officer wearing insignia identifying him or her as such or operating a law enforcement vessel sounding a siren and displaying a flashing blue or blue and white signal lamp. The officer may board the vessel.
    7. Residential vessels prohibited on certain waters.   The use of vessels for residential purposes is prohibited on all lakes and ponds that are located wholly within Vermont and on which there are no boat sanitary waste pumpout facilities approved by the Department of Environmental Conservation.  For purposes of this subsection, “residential purposes” includes sleeping overnight on a vessel.  Vessels operated by agencies, entities, authorities, or instrumentalities of the State, including the State Colleges and the University of Vermont, shall comply with this subsection, except when law enforcement, an emergency, or the performance of official duties requires otherwise.
    8. Power of law enforcement officers; authority to stop and board.   A law enforcement officer may stop and board any motorboat afloat on public waters of the State at any time to:
      1. inspect its documents;
      2. inspect the licenses and permits of the operator of the motorboat; or
      3. conduct a safety inspection for required equipment.
    9. Power of law enforcement officers; general.   A law enforcement officer may make arrests for violations of this subchapter; may direct, control, and regulate vessel traffic; and may make reasonable orders in the enforcement of this subchapter. No individual may knowingly fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 261 (Adj. Sess.), eff. June 4, 1986; 1987, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 8, 1988; 1989, No. 65 , § 7; 1989, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 2, 3; 2009, No. 30 , § 2; 2009, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 30; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4); 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 238, 239; 2021, No. 20 , §§ 254, 255; 2021, No. 76 , §§ 17, 18.

    History

    Revision note

    —2013. In subsec. (g), deleted “but is not limited to” following “includes” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Editor’s note

    —2021. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2021 session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 20 and 76, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2021 session, the text of Act Nos. 20 and 76 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (c): Act Nos. 20 and 76 substituted “individual” for “person” and “an individual” for “a person” in subdivs. (1) and (3); and Act No. 76 inserted “, seaplane, racing shell, or rowing scull” following “operate any vessel” in subdivs. (1) and (2).

    Subsec. (h): Act No. 76 substituted “motorboat” for “motorized vessel” in the introductory language and “motorboat” for “vessel” in subdiv. (2).

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “An individual” for “A person”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “individual” for “person” twice.

    Subdiv. (c)(1): Substituted “An individual” for “A person” and “individual” for “person”.

    Subdiv. (c)(2): Deleted the subdiv. heading and substituted “An individual” for “A person”.

    Subdiv. (c)(3): Substituted “in this subsection” for “herein”.

    Subdiv. (c)(4): Substituted “An individual” for “A person”.

    Subsec. (h): Added subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (i): Substituted “individual” for “person” and added subsec. heading.

    —2017. Subsec. (b): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “influence of”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (d): Rewrote former subdivs. (1)-(6) as present subdivs. (1)-(7).

    —2009. Section heading: Added “authority of law enforcement officers” following “acts”.

    Subsecs. (h) and (i): Added.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (c)(2): Deleted “swimming area and” preceding “divers” in the subdiv. heading and “designated swimming area or of a” preceding “divers-down” in the text of the subdiv.

    Subdiv. (c)(4): Added.

    —1989. Section amended generally.

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Inserted “or displaying divers-down flags as required by subchapter 3 of this chapter” following “swimming” in the first sentence.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Inserted “or her” following “his” and following “him” and added “and the officer may board the vessel” following “enforcement motorboat or vessel” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Display of diving flags, see § 3381 of this title.

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former 25 V.S.A. § 311 .

    Swimming areas.

    The Department of Forests and Parks had authority to promulgate regulations restricting the movement of motor-driven boats in State park areas designated for public swimming. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 197.

    § 3312. Operations rules as between vessels.

    1. When two motorboats are approaching each other “head on” or in a manner so as to involve risk of collision, each motorboat shall bear to the right and pass the other motorboat on its left side.
    2. When two vessels approach each other obliquely or at right angles, the vessel approaching on the right side should maintain its course and speed.
    3. A vessel may overtake another vessel on either side but must be prepared to take early and substantial action to avoid collision. The vessel being overtaken should maintain its course and speed.
    4. The U.S. Coast Guard Inland Navigation Rules, 33 C.F.R. Part 83, as may be amended, are hereby adopted as the operative rules for Lake Champlain, Lake Memphremagog, and Wallace Pond in Canaan.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1989, No. 65 , § 8; 2015, No. 47 , § 50; 2021, No. 76 , § 19.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    —2015. Subsec. (d): Substituted “33 C.F.R. Part 83, as may be amended” for “(33 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2038 and 2071-2073, as amended from time to time)”.

    —1989. Substituted “vessels” for “boats” following “between” in the section heading and added subsec. (d).

    § 3312a. Operation of personal watercraft.

    1. An individual less than 16 years of age shall not operate a personal watercraft.
    2. All individuals operating or riding on a personal watercraft shall wear a properly secured wearable U.S. Coast Guard-approved personal flotation device as intended by the manufacturer.
    3. Personal watercraft shall not be operated at any time between sunset and sunrise.
    4. Every individual operating a personal watercraft equipped by the manufacturer with a lanyard type engine cut-off switch shall attach the lanyard to his or her wrist, clothing, or personal flotation device as appropriate for the specific craft.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 65 , § 9; amended 2009, No. 30 , § 1; 2021, No. 76 , § 19.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    —2009. Subsec. (c): Deleted “during the hours” following “time”, “one-half hour after” following “between”, and “one-half hour before” preceding “sunrise.”

    § 3313. Collisions, crashes, and casualties.

    1. The operator of a vessel involved in a collision, crash, or other casualty, so far as he or she can do so without serious danger to his or her own vessel, crew, and passengers, shall render to other individuals affected by the collision, crash, or other casualty such assistance as may be practicable and as may be necessary in order to save them from or minimize any danger caused by the collision, crash, or other casualty. Also, he or she shall give his or her name, address, and identification of his or her vessel in writing to any individual injured and to the owner of any property damaged in the collision, crash, or other casualty.
    2. If a collision, crash, or other casualty involving a vessel results in death or injury to an individual or damage to property in excess of $2,000.00, the operator shall file with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles within 36 hours a full description of the collision, crash, or other casualty, including such information as the Commissioner may, by rule, require.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 90 , § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; 2021, No. 76 , § 19.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Section amended generally.

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Inserted “or she” following “he” and “or her” following “his” throughout the subsec.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Civil liability for emergency medical care, see 12 V.S.A. § 519 .

    Duty to stop and report accident, see §§ 1128 and 1129 of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    Notes to Opinions

    Annotations From Former 25 V.S.A. § 313 .

    Reports.

    Under statutory law, motorboats were not “motor vehicles” and accident reports relating to them and on file in the Department of Public Safety were not available to the general public. 1970-72 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 389.

    § 3314. Transmittal of information.

    In accordance with any request duly made by an authorized official or agency of the United States, any information compiled or otherwise available to the Department of Motor Vehicles under subsection 3313(b) of this title shall be transmitted to the official or agency of the United States.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    § 3315. Water skis and surfboards.

    1. Except as provided in this subsection, an individual shall not operate a vessel on any waters of this State to tow an individual or individuals on water skis, aquaplane, kite skis, wakeboard, kneeboard, or similar device unless the individual being towed is wearing a U.S. Coast Guard-approved personal flotation device and unless there is in the vessel an individual who is at least 12 years of age, in addition to the operator, in a position to observe the progress of the individual or individuals being towed. Individuals engaged in barefoot waterskiing may elect at their own risk to wear a non-Coast Guard-approved barefoot wetsuit designed specifically for this activity. An observer shall not be required if the vessel is:
      1. a tow boat approved by the American Water Ski Association and equipped with a wide-angle mirror having a viewing surface of at least 48 square inches;
      2. being operated by an individual who is at least 18 years of age; and
      3. being operated within an American Water Ski Association regulation slalom course.
    2. The provisions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply to a performer engaged in a professional exhibition nor to an individual engaged in an activity authorized under section 3316 of this title.
    3. An individual shall not operate or manipulate any vessel, tow rope, or other device by which the direction or location of water skis, a surfboard, or similar device may be affected or controlled in such a way as to cause the water skis, surfboard, or similar device or any individual thereon to approach within 100 feet of an individual swimming or a canoe, rowboat, or other light craft conveying any individual. This subsection does not prohibit necessary mooring or landing or leaving shore.
    4. The Commissioner may designate areas less than 200 feet from the shoreline of a body of water, other than a river, to allow for the operation of a motorboat used for the purpose of towing an individual or individuals on water skis, aquaplane, kite skis, surfboard, or similar device. The Commissioner shall adopt rules to establish criteria governing the designation of such areas and conditions that may be placed on the designated areas. The Commissioner may consider safety, potential environmental damage, the impact on adjacent areas and uses, and any other related concerns.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 23 ; 1985, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.); 1989, No. 65 , § 10; 1989, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2005, No. 196 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 240; 2021, No. 20 , § 256.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (c): Substituted “individual” for “person” preceding “thereon” in the first sentence.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Inserted “who is at least 12 years old” preceding “in addition” in the first sentence and deleted the third sentence.

    —1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “aquaplane, kite skis” for “or a” preceding “surfboard” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Substituted “wearing a United States Coast Guard approved personal flotation device and unless there is in the vessel a person, in addition to the operator, in a position to observe the progress of the person or persons being towed” for “equipped with a life preserver or life belt” following “towed is” in the first sentence and “$25.00” for “$10.00” in the second sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Display of diving flags, see § 3381 of this title.

    § 3316. Regattas; races; marine parades; tournaments; water skiing events or exhibitions; triathlons.

    1. The Commissioner of Public Safety may authorize the holding of public regattas, motorboat or other vessel races, marine parades, tournaments, water skiing events, exhibitions, or triathlons on any waters of this State and any associated public roads. He or she shall adopt and may, from time to time, amend rules concerning the safety of motorboats and other vessels and individuals on these vessels, either observers or participants, and of individuals swimming, cycling, or running in or observing an event. Whenever a public regatta, motorboat or other vessel race, marine parade, tournament, water skiing event, exhibition, or triathlon is proposed to be held, the person in charge shall, at least 15 days prior to the event, file an application with the Department of Public Safety for permission to hold the regatta, motorboat or other vessel race, marine parade, tournament, water skiing event, exhibition, or triathlon. A copy of such application shall be sent to the municipality and organized lake association where the event is to be held 15 days in advance of the event to allow for comment. The application shall set forth the date, time, and location where it is proposed to hold the regatta, motorboat or other vessel race, marine parade, tournament, water skiing event, exhibition, or triathlon, and it shall not be conducted without authorization of the Department of Public Safety in writing, except that this provision shall not apply to unscheduled vessel races to which the public has not been invited.
    2. The provisions of this section shall not exempt any person from compliance with applicable federal law or regulation, but nothing contained in this section shall be construed to require the securing of a State permit if a permit has been obtained from an authorized agency of the United States.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 90 , § 6, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; 1989, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1999, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 80, eff. May 24, 2000; 2021, No. 76 , § 20.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (a): Substituted “vessel” for “boat” and “individuals” for “persons” throughout the subsection.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1989 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “water skiing events” following “tournaments” in the section heading and in the first sentence of subsec. (a) and “water skiing event” following “tournament” in two places in the third sentence and in the fourth sentence of that subsec.

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Inserted “or she” following “He” and substituted “on these vessels” for “thereon” following “persons” in the second sentence, deleted “thereof” following “charge” and substituted “to the event” for “thereto” preceding “, file” in the third sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “in this section” for “herein” following “contained” and deleted “pursuant to this section” preceding “if a permit” and “therefor” thereafter.

    § 3317. Penalties.

    1. Penalty; $50.00 maximum.   A person who violates any of the following sections of this title shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $50.00 for each violation:

      § 3303 unnumbered boat

      § 3305(a) unregistered boat

      § 3305(d) old registered certificate to be returned

      § 3305(e) compliance with federal motorboat ID system

      § 3305(h) change of address

      § 3305(i) incorrect number displayed on boat

      § 3305(j) temporary registration

      § 3305a(a) qualified person may operate

      § 3305a(c) underage operation

      § 3305(b) operating without boat certificate

      § 3306(a)-(d) and (g) lights and equipment

      § 3307a documented boat validation sticker

      § 3308 boat rental records

      § 3309 muffling device

      § 3311(c) distance requirements

      § 3311(d) underwater historic preserve area

      § 3311(e) overloaded vessel

      § 3311(h)-(i) authority of law enforcement officer

      § 3312 rules between vessels

      § 3313(b) failing to file report

      § 3315(a) water ski observer

      § 3315(c) improper ski towing

      § 3316 boat races

    2. Penalty or fine; $300.00 or $1,000.00 maximum.   A person who violates a requirement under 10 V.S.A. § 1454 shall be subject to enforcement under 10 V.S.A. § 8007 or 8008 or a fine under this chapter, provided that the person shall be assessed a penalty or fine of not more than $1,000.00 for each violation. A person who violates a rule adopted under 10 V.S.A. § 1424 shall be subject to enforcement under 10 V.S.A. chapter 201, provided that the person shall be assessed a penalty of not more than $300.00 for each violation. A person who violates any of the following sections of this title shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $300.00 for each violation:

      § 3306(e) marine toilet

      § 3312a operation of personal watercraft

    3. Fine; $300.00 maximum.   A person who violates any of the following sections of this title shall be imprisoned not more than three months or fined not more than $300.00, or both, for each violation:

      § 3305a(b) operating privilege suspended

      § 3311(a) careless and negligent operation

      § 3311(b) permitting use by intoxicated person

      § 3311(f) attempting to elude a law enforcement officer

      § 3311(g) residential vessel prohibited

      § 3313(a) leaving scene of crash

    4. Boating while intoxicated; privilege suspension.   Any person who is convicted of violating section 3323 of this title shall have his or her privilege to operate a vessel, except a nonmotorized canoe and a nonmotorized rowboat, suspended for a period of one year and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title.
    5. Boating while intoxicated; criminal penalty.   Any person who violates a provision of section 3323 of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year and subject to the following fines:
      1. for a first offense, not less than $200.00 nor more than $750.00;
      2. for a second or subsequent offense, not less than $250.00 nor more than $1,000.00.
    6. Boating while intoxicated; death or serious bodily injury resulting.
        1. If the death of any person results from the violation of section 3323 of this title, the person convicted shall, instead of any other penalty imposed in this section, be imprisoned not less than one year nor more than 15 years or fined not more than $10,000.00, or both; but the provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit or restrict prosecutions for manslaughter. (1) (A) If the death of any person results from the violation of section 3323 of this title, the person convicted shall, instead of any other penalty imposed in this section, be imprisoned not less than one year nor more than 15 years or fined not more than $10,000.00, or both; but the provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit or restrict prosecutions for manslaughter.
        2. If the death of more than one person results from a violation of section 3323 of this title, the operator may be convicted of a separate violation of this subdivision for each decedent.
        1. If serious bodily injury, as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) , results to any person other than the operator from a violation of section 3323 of this title, the person convicted of the violation shall be fined not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. (2) (A) If serious bodily injury, as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) , results to any person other than the operator from a violation of section 3323 of this title, the person convicted of the violation shall be fined not more than $5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
        2. If serious bodily injury as defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) results to more than one person other than the operator from a violation of section 3323 of this title, the operator may be convicted of a separate violation of this subdivision for each person injured.
    7. Defective, stolen, or fraudulently registered motorboat; registration revocation or suspension.   The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or his or her authorized agent may suspend or revoke the registration of any motorboat registered in this State and repossess the number and certificate to it, when he or she is satisfied that:
      1. a motorboat has been stolen and that the registrant has not legal title; or
      2. a motorboat is in such poor mechanical or structural condition as to make it unseaworthy; or
      3. a motorboat is operated without proper equipment after the owner has been notified to procure and use such equipment as is required by law or Department rules; or
      4. the owner of a motorboat has perpetrated some fraud upon the Department of Motor Vehicles.
    8. More than two violations; education program required.   Any person convicted of more than two boating violations concerning the operation of, or safety equipment on, a vessel within a two-year period shall, in addition to penalties provided for in this section, have his or her privilege to operate a vessel on the waters of this State suspended until the person has successfully completed the boating safety education program provided in section 3305b of this title.  A person shall also be required to complete the program if convicted of careless or negligent operation or of operation under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  The requirements of this subsection apply regardless of whether a person has completed the education program one or more times.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 90 , § 7, eff. May 30, 1985; 1989, No. 65 , § 11; 1999, No. 42 , § 3, eff. May 25, 1999; 2003, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 70, eff. June 8, 2004; 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2009, No. 30 , § 3; 2015, No. 61 , § 11, eff. June 17, 2015; 2017, No. 67 , § 6, eff. June 8, 2017; 2017, No. 71 , § 29, eff. June 8, 2017; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 241.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” in subsec. (c) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    —2005. In subsec. (c), substituted “3305a(b)” for “3306(a)(b)” to correct cross reference to operating privilege suspended.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (b): Added subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (c): Added subsec. heading.

    Subsec. (f): Inserted “or serious bodily injury” in the subsec. heading.

    Subdiv. (f)(2)(A): Deleted the subdiv. heading.

    —2017. Subsec. (a): Act No. 71 substituted “penalty” for “fine” following “subject to a” in the introductory language and, in the table, inserted “and (g)” following “3306(a)-(d)”.

    Subsec. (b): In the first sentence, Act No. 67 substituted “§ 8007 or 8008 or a fine under this chapter” for “chapter 201” and inserted “or fine” following “penalty”.

    —2015. Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Added “§ 3311(h)-(i) authority of law enforcement officer” after “§ 3311(e) overloaded vessel.”

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Added the (1)(A) designation and substituted “not less than one year nor more than 15 years or fined not more than $10,000.00” for “not more than five years or fined not more than $2,000.00” therein, and added subdivs. (1)(B), (2)(A), and (2)(B).

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $1,000.00 for each violation. A person who violates” following “Title 10”.

    —1999. Subsec. (b): Inserted “section 1266 of Title 10” and substituted “penalty” for “fine” in the introductory paragraph, and deleted the entry for a rule promulgated under section 1424 of Title 10.

    —1989. Section amended generally.

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Inserted “(a) through (d)” following “3306” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “shall, instead” for “thereof shall, in lieu” following “convicted”.

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “or her” for “duly” following “his” and inserted “or she” following “he”.

    Subdiv. (d)(5): Inserted “or operator” following “owner” and substituted “to an extent which renders him or her incapable of operating safely” for “to excess” following “drugs”.

    Legislative intent. 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 provides: “It is the intent of the general assembly in this act [which amended this section] to address, among other issues, the Vermont supreme court’s decisions in State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124, and State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96. In LaBounty, the court held that if more than one person was injured, an offender could be charged with only one count of grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle with injury resulting. Similarly, the court held in Martin that if more than one person was killed, an offender could be charged with only one count of boating while intoxicated with death resulting. In this act, the general assembly responds to Martin and LaBounty by amending several motor vehicle statutes to permit an offender to be charged with a separate count of violating the statute for each person who was killed or injured as a result of the offense.”

    § 3318. Administration and enforcement.

    1. The administration of the provisions of this chapter, as they pertain to the registration and numbering of vessels and the suspension of the privilege to operate vessels, shall be the responsibility of the Department of Motor Vehicles.
    2. This subchapter and rules adopted under this subchapter shall be printed in booklet form and made available to the public by the Department of Public Safety.
    3. The provisions of this subchapter and the rules adopted pursuant to this subchapter shall be enforced by law enforcement officers as defined in section 3302 of this title in accordance with the provisions of 4 V.S.A. chapter 29. Law enforcement officers as defined in section 3302 of this title may also enforce the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 1454 and the rules adopted pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 1424 in accordance with the requirements of 10 V.S.A. chapter 50.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1985, No. 90 , § 8, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; 1989, No. 65 , § 12; 1999, No. 42 , § 4, eff. May 25, 1999; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238; 2015, No. 61 , § 12, eff. June 17, 2015; 2017, No. 71 , § 20; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 242.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “subchapter” for “chapter” twice and “adopted” for “promulgated”.

    —2017. Subsec. (c): Substituted “4 V.S.A. chapter 29” for “12 V.S.A. chapter 193” at the end of the first sentence.

    —2015. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Substituted “superior” for “district court” in the second sentence.

    —1999. Subsec. (c): Inserted “the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 1266 and the” preceding “rules adopted pursuant to” in the first sentence and added the second and third sentences.

    —1989. Section amended generally.

    —1985. Subsec. (a): Substituted “under this chapter” for “hereunder” following “promulgated” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “to this subchapter” for “thereto” following “pursuant”.

    § 3319. Fees collected; special fund.

    1. There is hereby established a special fund to be known as the Motorboat Registration Fund for the purposes of ensuring that the fees and penalties collected under this subchapter are utilized in the protection and maintenance of the State’s water resources. Any interest earned on the monies in this Fund will be deposited in the General Fund.
    2. The fees and penalties collected under the provisions of this subchapter shall be deposited in the Motorboat Registration Fund and shall be allocated as follows:
      1. 10 percent to the Department of Public Safety, to be used for enforcement of this subchapter and implementation of a boating safety education program.
      2. 34 percent to the Department of Fish and Wildlife, to be used to match federal funds; for upgrading and expanding boating access areas and facilities located at those areas; for developing and constructing new boating access areas; and for facilitating or establishing and maintaining pump out stations, which may be, in the discretion of the Commissioner, constructed or operated either by the Department or on a contractual basis by a private person or entity. Users shall be charged reasonable and appropriate fees.
      3. 17 percent to the Department of Environmental Conservation for the purpose of aquatic nuisance control pursuant to 10 V.S.A. chapter 50.
      4. Seven percent to the Agency of Agriculture, Food and Markets for the purpose of mosquito control pursuant to 6 V.S.A. chapter 85.
      5. 20 percent to the Department of Environmental Conservation for the purpose of an Aquatic Nuisance Control Grant Program pursuant to 10 V.S.A. chapter 50.
      6. 12 percent to the Transportation Fund.
    3. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1989, No. 65 , § 13; 1989, No. 265 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1993, No. 52 , § 3, eff. July 1, 1994; 2001, No. 143 (Adj. Sess.), § 57; 2003, No. 42 , § 2, eff. May 27, 2003; 2009, No. 46 , § 7, eff. July 1, 2010; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 50.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2009. Subdiv. (b)(3): Substituted “chapter 50 of Title 10” for “ 10 V.S.A. §§ 921 , 922, 923, and 1263a.”

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “chapter 50” for “sections 921, 922, and 923.”

    § 3320. Motorboats on Dufresne Dam waters prohibited.

    1. The use and operation of motorboats on the waters impounded by the Dufresne Dam, so-called, on the Battenkill River in the Town of Manchester is prohibited.
    2. The Department of Fish and Wildlife shall post notice of this section conspicuously at the boat launching areas at the Dufresne Dam impoundment.
    3. A person who violates this section shall be fined not more than $20.00 for each offense.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2021, No. 76 , § 21.

    History

    Revision note

    —2007. In subsec. (b) substituted “Dufresne Dam” for “above” for purposes of specificity.

    Revision note—. At the beginning of subsec. (b), substituted “fish and wildlife department” for “fish and game department” pursuant to 1983, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.).

    Amendments

    —2021. Substituted “motorboats” for “motor propelled boats” in the section heading and in subsec. (a).

    § 3321. Motorboats in South Pond prohibited.

    1. The use and operation of motorboats on the waters of South Pond in the Town of Marlboro is prohibited.
    2. The Department of Fish and Wildlife shall post notice of this section conspicuously at the boat launching areas at the South Pond impoundment.
    3. A person who violates this section shall be fined not more than $20.00 for each offense.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2021, No. 76 , § 21.

    History

    Revision note

    —2007. In subsec. (b) substituted “South Pond” for “above” for purposes of specificity.

    Revision note—. At the beginning of subsec. (b), substituted “fish and wildlife department” for “fish and game department” pursuant to 1983, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.).

    Amendments

    —2021. Substituted “motorboats” for “motor propelled boats” in the section heading and in subsec. (a).

    § 3322. Proof of payment of tax.

    No license, permit, registration, validation, or similar authorization to own or operate any vessel shall be issued under this chapter until proof of payment of or exemption from the tax imposed by 32 V.S.A. chapter 233 has been established in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner of Taxes.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 212 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1987, No. 251 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    History

    Amendments

    —1987 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “validation” preceding “or similar” and substituted “vessel” for “motorboat” following “operate any”.

    § 3323. Operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs; B.W.I.

    1. A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of a vessel on the waters of this State while:
      1. there is 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his or her blood, as shown by analysis of his or her breath or blood; or
      2. under the influence of alcohol; or
      3. under the influence of any other drug or under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of operating safely.
    2. As used in this section, “alcohol” includes “alcohol,” “malt beverages,” “spirits,” “fortified wines,” and “vinous beverages” as defined in 7 V.S.A. § 2 , and any beverage or liquid containing any of them.
    3. A person who is a habitual user of or under the influence of any narcotic drug or who is under the influence of any other drug, substance, or inhalant other than alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely operating a vessel may not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of a vessel. The fact that a person charged with a violation of this section is or has been entitled to use such drug under the laws of this State shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this section.
    4. For the purposes of this section, “drug” means a regulated drug as defined in 18 V.S.A. § 4201 .
    5. A person may not be convicted of more than one violation of subsection (a) of this section arising out of the same incident.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 65 , § 14; amended 1997, No. 57 , § 3; 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2017, No. 83 , § 155.

    History

    Amendments

    —2017. Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “influence of” in the section heading and in subdiv. (a)(2); substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “other than” in the first sentence of subsec. (c) and rewrote subsec. (b).

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Substituted “violation of subsection (a) of” for “offense under” preceding “this section”.

    —1997. Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “0.08 percent” for “0.10 percent”.

    Legislative intent. 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 provides: “It is the intent of the general assembly in this act [which amended this section] to address, among other issues, the Vermont supreme court’s decisions in State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124, and State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96. In LaBounty, the court held that if more than one person was injured, an offender could be charged with only one count of grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle with injury resulting. Similarly, the court held in Martin that if more than one person was killed, an offender could be charged with only one count of boating while intoxicated with death resulting. In this act, the general assembly responds to Martin and LaBounty by amending several motor vehicle statutes to permit an offender to be charged with a separate count of violating the statute for each person who was killed or injured as a result of the offense.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving under the influence, see chapter 13, subchapter 13 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Jury instructions.

    Where a defendant’s unlawful act is established in the chain of direct legal causation, he is criminally responsible for the course of events which naturally follow from that act, unless the act of another breaks the chain of causation of the original negligent actor. Thus, in a boating-while-intoxicated case which resulted in two deaths, the trial court correctly instructed that defendant’s actions had to be a cause, rather than the sole cause, of the accident. State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96, 182 Vt. 377, 944 A.2d 867, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 263 (2007).

    Location of vessel.

    In a prosecution for boating while intoxicated, although there was no direct evidence of the precise global positioning system (GPS) location of the boat at the moment it capsized, the State’s evidence, which included GPS recordings based on the recollections of three rescuers who were found to be credible, unbiased, and confident in their recollections, was sufficient for the trial court to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the boat was in Vermont waters at the time of the capsize. State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96, 182 Vt. 377, 944 A.2d 867, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 263 (2007).

    In a boating-while-intoxicated case, the trial court did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to defendant to establish where the boat was at the time of capsize. The trial court expressly found that the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the boat capsized within the boundaries of the State of Vermont, and its statement that there was “insufficient evidence to tie the defense expert’s general information about lake currents to the particular time and place at issue here” was in the context of its explanation of why it did not credit defendant’s evidence over the State’s evidence. State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96, 182 Vt. 377, 944 A.2d 867, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 263 (2007).

    Multiple convictions.

    Multiple convictions are prohibited for a violation of the first section of the boating-while-intoxicated statute, for just as the statute prohibiting grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle defines the prohibited act “solely by reference to the standard of care required of drivers,” with enhanced sentence provisions depending on the consequences, the act prohibited by the boating-while-intoxicated statute is defined solely by the operation of a vessel while intoxicated, with enhanced sentencing provisions depending on the consequences. Because death resulting was not included in the actus reus—the criminalized conduct of the offense—defendant’s second conviction could not stand when two children had died in the boating accident he caused. State v. Martin, 2007 VT 96, 182 Vt. 377, 944 A.2d 867, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 263 (2007).

    § 3323a. Persons under 21; years of age; alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more.

    1. A person under the age of 21 who operates, attempts to operate, or is in actual physical control of a vessel on the waters of this State when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more, commits a civil traffic violation subject to the jurisdiction of the Judicial Bureau and subject to the following sanctions:
      1. For a first violation, the person’s privilege to operate a vessel, except a nonmotorized canoe and a nonmotorized rowboat, on the waters of this State shall be suspended for six months and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title.
      2. For a second or subsequent violation, the person’s privilege to operate a vessel, except a nonmotorized canoe and a nonmotorized rowboat, on the waters of this State shall be suspended until the person reaches the age of 21 or for one year, whichever is longer, and complies with section 1209a of this title.
    2. Notwithstanding the provisions in subsection (a) of this section to the contrary, a person’s privilege to operate that has been suspended under this section shall not be reinstated until the Commissioner has received satisfactory evidence that the provider of the therapy program has been paid in full.
    3. If a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is violating this section, the officer may request the person to submit to a breath test using a preliminary screening device approved by the Commissioner of Health. Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in sections 1202 and 1203 of this title:
      1. the results of the test shall be admissible evidence in a proceeding under this section; and
      2. there shall be no statutory right to counsel prior to the administration of the test.
    4. A refusal to submit to a breath test shall be considered a violation of this section.
    5. In a proceeding under this section, if there was at any time within two hours of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a vessel on the waters of this State an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.02 or more at the time of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control.
    6. The alcohol program required under this section shall be administered by the Department of Health’s Division of Substance Use Programs and shall take into consideration any particular treatment needs of operators under 21 years of age.
    7. A charge of violating this section shall not bar prosecution for any crime, including a prosecution under section 3323 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 57 , § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; amended 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 29; 2021, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, effective July 1, 2022.

    History

    Amendments

    —1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “judicial bureau” for “traffic and municipal ordinance bureau” near the end of the introductory paragraph.

    § 3324. Implied consent.

    Any person who operates, attempts to operate, or is in actual physical control of a vessel on the waters of this State is deemed to have given consent to the taking of more than one sample of his or her breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood. The samples shall be taken and the tests administered and analyzed consistently with the provisions of sections 1202 and 1203 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 65 , § 14.

    § 3325. Permissive inferences.

    1. Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by a person while operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vessel on the waters of this State, the amount of alcohol in the person’s blood or breath at the time alleged as shown by analysis of the person’s blood or breath shall give rise to the following permissive inferences or presumptions:
      1. If there was at that time 0.05 percent or less by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood or breath, it shall be presumed that the person was not under the influence of alcohol.
      2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 percent but less than 0.08 percent by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood or breath, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption or permissive inference that the person was or was not under the influence of alcohol, but such fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether the person was under the influence of alcohol.
      3. If there was at that time 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood or breath, as shown by analysis of the person’s blood or breath, it shall be a permissive inference that the person was under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 3323 of this title.
      4. If there was at any time within two hours of the alleged offense, 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood or breath as shown by analysis of the person’s blood or breath, it shall be a permissive inference that the person was under the influence of alcohol in violation of subdivision 3323(a)(2) or (3) of this title.
    2. Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon milligrams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
    3. The foregoing provisions shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question whether the person was under the influence of alcohol, nor shall they be construed as requiring that evidence of the amount of alcohol in the person’s blood or breath must be preserved.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 65 , § 14; amended 1997, No. 57 , § 5; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4).

    History

    Amendments

    —2017. Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “influence of” in subdivs. (a)(1) through (a)(4) and in subsec. (c).

    —1997. Substituted “0.08 percent” for “0.10 percent” in subdivs. (a)(2) and (a)(3) and “0.10 percent” for “0.15 percent” in subdiv. (a)(4).

    § 3326. Refusals; sanctions.

    1. Refusals.   If the person refuses to submit to an evidentiary test it shall not be given, but the refusal may be introduced as evidence in a criminal proceeding.  If the person is charged with a violation of this subchapter, the court at the arraignment or as soon thereafter as is practicable shall hold a summary hearing, and take evidence relating to the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that the defendant was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vessel on the waters of this State while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, or both.
    2. Penalty; first refusal.   Upon a finding by the court that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was so operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vessel on the waters of this State, the court shall impose a civil penalty of not more than $750.00.  In addition, the person’s privilege to operate a vessel, except a nonmotorized canoe and a nonmotorized rowboat, on the waters of this State shall be suspended for a period of one year and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title.
    3. Second occurrence after five years.   Upon a second refusal to submit to testing and upon a finding by the court under subsection (a) of this section, if the second offense occurs more than five years after the date of the first offense for which a refusal was given, the court shall impose the same penalty and suspension as for a first refusal under this section.
    4. Second occurrence within five years.   Upon a second refusal to submit to testing and upon a finding by the court under subsection (a) of this section, if the offense occurred within five years of the date of the offense for which there was a first refusal by that person, and upon final determination of an appeal, the court shall impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000.00.  In addition, the person’s privilege to operate a vessel, except a nonmotorized canoe and a nonmotorized rowboat, on the waters of this State shall be suspended for a period of two years and until the person complies with section 1209a of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 65 , § 14; amended 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4).

    History

    Amendments

    —2017. Subsec. (a): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “influence of”.

    § 3327. Responsibility to follow lawful order of law enforcement officer.

    1. A person while operating or in charge of a vessel shall, upon request by a law enforcement officer who reasonably suspects that the person has committed or is committing a violation of this subchapter, give his or her name, date of birth, and address and the name and address of the owner of the vessel.
    2. The operator of the vessel shall identify himself or herself upon request from a law enforcement officer and produce the registration certificate for the vessel if required. A person operating a vessel shall promptly and carefully stop when signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer wearing insignia that identifies the officer.
    3. A person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $300.00.
    4. A person who violates subsection (b) of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $250.00.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 30 , § 4.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Obedience to and authority of enforcement officers, see §§ 1012 and 1013 of this title.

    Subchapter 3. Water Sports

    § 3381. Divers; flag required.

    1. As used in this section:
      1. “Diver” means any person who is wholly submerged in the waters of the State and is equipped with a face mask and snorkel or “underwater breathing apparatus.”
      2. “Divers-down flag” means a flag that is either square or rectangular, to approximately four units high by five units long, with a one-unit diagonal stripe.  The divers-down flag shall have a white diagonal stripe on a red background.  The stripe shall begin at the top staff-side of the flag and extend diagonally to the opposite lower corner.  The flag shall be free-flying and shall be removed when all divers are out of the water.  The minimum size shall be 12 by 12 inches.
    2. All divers shall prominently display a divers-down flag in the area in which the diving occurs, other than when diving in an area customarily used for swimming only.  Persons diving together as a group, in the same diving area, shall display at least one flag.
    3. A person who violates this section shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $100.00 for each violation.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 8, 1988; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 243.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined”.

    Chapter 31. All-Terrain Vehicles

    § 3501. Definitions.

    As used in this chapter:

    1. “All-terrain vehicle” or “ATV” means any nonhighway recreational vehicle, except snowmobiles, having not less than two low pressure tires (10 pounds per square inch, or less); not wider than 64 inches, with two-wheel ATVs having permanent, full-time power to both wheels; and having a dry weight of less than 2,500 pounds, when used for cross-country travel on trails or on any one of the following or a combination thereof: land, water, snow, ice, marsh, swampland, and natural terrain. An ATV on a public highway shall be considered a motor vehicle, as defined in section 4 of this title, only for the purposes of those offenses listed in subdivisions 2502(a)(1)(H), (N), (R), (U), (Y), (FF), (GG), (II), and (AAA); (2)(A) and (B); (3)(A), (B), (C), and (D); (4)(A) and (B); and (5) of this title and as provided in section 1201 of this title. An ATV does not include an electric personal assistive mobility device, a motor-assisted bicycle, or an electric bicycle.
    2. “Department” means the Department of Motor Vehicles unless otherwise stated.
    3. “Direct supervision” means that the supervisor shall be sufficiently close and able to control, by communicating visually or orally, the operation of an ATV by an operator under 16 years of age, taking into account the noise created by an ATV and protective headgear worn by the operator.
    4. “Farm” means a parcel or parcels of land owned, leased, or managed by a person and devoted primarily to farming.
    5. “Forestry operation” has the same meaning as in 10 V.S.A. § 2602 .
    6. “Secretary” means the Secretary of Natural Resources.
    7. “State lands” means land owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by the State.
    8. “VASA” means the Vermont ATV Sportsman’s Association, a statewide association of ATV clubs.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1987, No. 76 , § 18; 2001, No. 69 , § 9; 2001, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2003, No. 66 , § 217a; 2007, No. 184 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2009, No. 50 , § 82; 2015, No. 50 , § 25; 2019, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 24; 2021, No. 40 , § 8.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. In subdiv. (5), substituted “(AAA)” for “(ZZ)” to correct an incorrect cross-reference resulting from the relettering of 23 V.S.A. § 2502(a)(1) in 2009, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    —2013. In the introductory language, substituted “As used in” for “For the purpose of” to conform to V.S.A. style.

    Revision note—. In the introductory clause, substituted “chapter” for “subchapter” to correct an error in the reference.

    Editor’s note

    —2020. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2019 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 131 and 149, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2019 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 131 and 149 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (1): In the last sentence, substituted “does” for “shall” and added “, a motor-assisted bicycle, or an electric bicycle” following “electric personal assistive mobility device”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally by Act No. 131.

    Subdiv. (1): Act No. 149 substituted “not” for “no” preceding “less than two” and “2,500” for “1,700” in the first sentence of former subdiv. (5), now subdiv. (1).

    —2015. Subdiv. (5): Substituted “64 inches” for “60 inches” in the first sentence.

    —2009. Subdiv. (5): In the first sentence, substituted “two” for “three” before “low pressure” and inserted “with two-wheel ATVs having permanent, full-time power to both wheels” after “inches”; and made a minor punctuation change in the second sentence.

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (5): Inserted “having no less than three low pressure tires (10 pounds per square inch, or less), not wider than 60 inches, and having a dry weight of less than 1,700 pounds” in the first sentence.

    —2003. Subdiv. (5): Deleted “‘all-terrain vehicle”’ preceding “ATV” in two places and inserted “only for the purposes of those offenses listed in subdivisions 2502(a)(1)(H), (N), (R), (U), (Y), (FF), (GG), (II), and (ZZ); (2)(A) and (B); (3)(A), (B), (C), and (D); (4)(A), and (B) and (5) of this title and as provided in section 1201 of this title” following “this title”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (5): Added the third sentence.

    —2001. Subdiv. (5): Added the second sentence.

    —1987. Subdiv. (4): Substituted “agency of natural resources” for “agency of environmental conservation”.

    § 3502. Registration and Trail Access Decal (TAD) required; exceptions.

      1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, an individual shall not operate an ATV on the VASA Trail System, on State land designated by the Secretary pursuant to subdivision 3506(b)(4) of this title, or along any highway that is not adjacent to the property of the operator unless the ATV: (a) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, an individual shall not operate an ATV on the VASA Trail System, on State land designated by the Secretary pursuant to subdivision 3506(b)(4) of this title, or along any highway that is not adjacent to the property of the operator unless the ATV:
        1. is registered pursuant to this title or in accordance with subsection (e) of this section; and
        2. displays a valid VASA Trail Access Decal (TAD).
      2. Notwithstanding subdivision (1) of this subsection, neither registration nor display of a TAD is required to operate an ATV:
        1. on the property of the owner of the ATV;
        2. in a ski area, off the highway, for the purpose of grooming snow, maintenance, or in rescue operations;
        3. for official use by a federal, State, or municipal agency if the ATV is identified with the name or seal of the agency in a manner approved by the Commissioner;
        4. on privately owned land when the operator is specifically invited to do so by the owner of the property and carries the written consent of the owner.
        5. [Repealed.]
      3. Notwithstanding subdivision (1) of this subsection, an operator may operate an ATV without a TAD displayed if the operator possesses a completed TAD form processed electronically within the prior 10 days that is either printed out or displayed on a portable electronic device. Use of a portable electronic device to display a completed TAD form does not in itself constitute consent for an enforcement officer to access other contents of the device.
      4. Notwithstanding subdivision (1) of this subsection and subdivision 3506(b)(16) of this title, neither the display of a TAD nor the use of protective headgear is required to operate an ATV on frozen bodies of water as designated by the Agency of Natural Resources under the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 2607 .
    1. The provisions of section 305 of this title shall apply to a registration, except the registration of a vehicle registered under subsection 3504(b) of this title shall become void on the last day of February next following the date of issue.
    2. The possession of a valid TAD or registration of an ATV does not constitute a license to operate an ATV on public or private lands, even if temporarily while crossing the public or private lands.
    3. An ATV that does not comply with the provisions of this chapter shall not be registered by the Commissioner.
    4. An ATV owned by a person who is a resident of any other state or province shall be deemed to be properly registered for the purposes of this chapter if it is registered in accordance with the laws of the state or province in which its owner resides. An operator who is a resident of any other state or province shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter while operating an ATV within this State, including possessing a valid TAD in the same circumstances that a resident of this State is required to possess a valid TAD.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 2007, No. 76 , § 33b; 2009, No. 50 , § 80; 2015, No. 50 , § 26, eff. June 3, 2015; 2019, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 2019, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § G.113, eff. Oct. 2, 2020; 2021, No. 76 , § 36.

    History

    Revision note—

    In the introductory clause of subsec. (a), substituted “chapter” for “subchapter” to correct an error in the reference.

    In the first sentence of subsec. (b), substituted “subsection 3504(b) of this title” for “subsection 3204(b) of this title” to correct an error in the reference.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (a)(2)(E): Repealed.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Added.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally by Act No. 121.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Amended generally by Act No. 154.

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(5): Added.

    Subsec. (e): Deleted “but only to the extent that a similar exemption or privilege is granted under the laws of that state or province for all-terrain vehicles registered in this State by a resident of this State” following “resides”.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Inserted “and unless the all-terrain vehicle displays a valid Vermont ATV Sportsman’s Association (VASA) Trail Access Decal (TAD) when operating on a VASA trail” after “Vermont” and made a minor punctuation change.

    —2007. Subsec. (b): Substituted “The provisions of section 305 of this title shall apply to a registration” for “An all terrain vehicle registration shall become void two years from the first day of the month following the month of issue” at the beginning of the first sentence, and deleted the last sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “month following the month of issue” for “month of issue” in the first sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Electronic receipt to show registration, see § 305 of this title.

    Notification of change of name or address, see § 205 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Property.

    The term “property” within the purposes to be served by this section encompasses an easement. Northern Security Ins. Co., Inc. v. Rossitto, 171 Vt. 580, 762 A.2d 861, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 306 (2000) (mem.).

    § 3503. Transfer of registration.

    The registration of an all-terrain vehicle ends when the owner transfers title to another person. The former owner shall immediately return to the Commissioner the registration certificate and plate previously assigned to the transferred all-terrain vehicle with the date of sale, name, and residence of the new owner endorsed on the back of the certificate. When a person transfers the ownership of a registered all-terrain vehicle to another person, files a new application, and pays a fee of $12.00, he or she may have registered in his or her name another all-terrain vehicle for the remainder of the registration year without payment of any additional registration fee.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1995, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 51.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$12.00” for “$10.00”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “Transfer” for “Termination” in the section heading and “$10.00” for “$5.00” following “pays a fee of” in the third sentence.

    § 3504. Registration fees and plates.

    1. The registration fee for all-terrain vehicles other than as provided for in subsection (b) of this section is $45.00. Duplicate registration certificates may be obtained upon payment of $6.00 to the Department.
    2. Any person engaged in the business of selling or exchanging all-terrain vehicles, as defined in subdivision 4(8) of this title, shall register and obtain registration certificates and identifying number plates subject to rules that may be adopted by the Commissioner and to the requirements of chapter 7 of this title. A manufacturer of all-terrain vehicles may register and obtain registration certificates and identifying number plates under this section. Plates shall be valid for the following purposes only: testing; adjusting; demonstrating; temporary use of customers for a period not to exceed seven days; private business or pleasure use of the person or members of his or her immediate family; and use at fairs, shows, or races when no charge is made. Fees for registration and registration certificates shall be $62.00 for the first certificate issued to any person and $6.00 for any additional certificate issued to the same person within the current registration period. Fees for temporary number plates shall be $5.00 for each plate issued.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1989, No. 51 , § 48; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 31, eff. May 15, 2002; 2007, No. 76 , § 33c; 2015, No. 50 , § 5; 2015, No. 57 , § 30; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 52; 2019, No. 70 , § 8.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$45.00” for “$35.00” at the end of the first sentence.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$6.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$62.00” for “$45.00”, “$6.00” for “$5.00”, and “$5.00” for “$3.00”.

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Act No. 57 substituted “$35.00” for “$25.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Amended generally by Act No. 50.

    —2007. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$25.00” for “$35.00” at the end of the first sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$35.00” for “$25.00” in the first sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Inserted “or her” preceding “immediate family” in the first sentence and substituted “$45.00” for “$32.00” and “$5.00” for “$3.00” in the second sentence, and “$3.00” for “$2.00” in the third sentence.

    —1989. Subsec. (a): Substituted “$ 25.00” for “$ 20.00” in the first sentence and “$ 5.00” for “$ 2.00” in the second sentence.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$32.00” for “$25.00” preceding “for the first” in the second sentence and “$2.00” for “$1.00” in the third sentence.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Refund of fees paid, see §§ 207 and 327 of this title.

    § 3505. Equipment.

    1. All all-terrain vehicles shall be equipped with one or more headlights, a red rear light all in working order, and brakes in good mechanical condition and be equipped with an efficient muffler and such other equipment and devices as may be required to meet the noise level specifications of subsection (b) of this section, and if equipped with a windshield it shall be free from sharp or jagged edges.  Lights shall be on during operation from 30 minutes after sunset to 30 minutes before sunrise.
    2. Subject to regulation by rule of the Commissioner, any all-terrain vehicles shall be equipped with a muffler system and such other equipment or devices that reduce maximum machine operating noise to a noise level of not more than 82 decibels on the A scale at 50 feet, in a normal operating environment.
    3. No person shall sell or offer to sell within the State of Vermont an all-terrain vehicle unless it complies with the sound requirements specified in subsection (b) of this section.  No all-terrain vehicle shall be equipped in any manner that permits the operator to bypass the muffler system; no person shall sell or offer to sell at either wholesale or retail a replacement exhaust muffler system that will not meet or exceed the exhaust noise reduction capabilities of the all-terrain vehicle.  In addition, any person selling or offering to sell an all-terrain vehicle or replacement muffler system, whether at wholesale or retail, shall include in the specifications precise information concerning the designed maximum sound levels of the all-terrain vehicle or replacement muffler system.
    4. This section and section 3504 of this title shall not apply to any all-terrain vehicle entered into a racing contest sponsored by a racing or all-terrain vehicle organization or association during the period the all-terrain vehicle is actually participating in or practicing or preparing for a racing event at an area especially provided for the purpose.
    5. The provisions of section 1222 of this title shall not apply to any all-terrain vehicle registered pursuant to this chapter.
    6. Every all-terrain vehicle shall be equipped with a U.S. Forest Service qualified spark arrester.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

    History

    Revision note—

    In subsec. (d), substituted “section 3504 of this title” for “section 3204” to correct an error in the reference.

    In subsec. (e), substituted “chapter” for “subchapter” to correct an error in the reference.

    Amendments

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Added.

    § 3506. Operation; prohibited acts; financial responsibility; headgear.

    1. A person shall only operate an ATV, or permit an ATV owned by him or her or under his or her control to be operated, in accordance with this chapter.
    2. An ATV shall not be operated:
      1. Along a public highway except if one or more of the following applies:
        1. the highway has been opened to ATV travel by the legislative body of the municipality where the town highway is located or, for State highways, the Secretary of Transportation and is so posted;
        2. the ATV is being used for agricultural purposes and is operated not closer than three feet from the traveled portion of any highway for the purpose of traveling within the confines of the farm;
        3. the ATV is being use for forestry purposes and is operated not closer than three feet from the traveled portion of any highway for the purpose of traveling within the confines of the forestry operation; or
        4. the ATV is being used by an employee or agent of an electric transmission or distribution company subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commission under 30 V.S.A. § 203 for utility purposes, including safely accessing utility corridors, provided that the ATV shall be operated along the edge of the roadway and shall yield to other vehicles.
      2. Across a public highway except if all of the following conditions are met:
        1. the crossing is made at an angle of approximately 90 degrees to the direction of the highway and at a place where no obstruction prevents a quick and safe crossing;
        2. the operator brings the ATV to a complete stop before entering the traveled portion of the highway;
        3. the operator yields the right of way to motor vehicles and pedestrians using the highway;
        4. the operator is 12 years of age or older; and
        5. in the case of an operator under 16 years of age, the operator is under the direct supervision of an individual 18 years of age or older who does not have a suspended operator’s license or privilege to operate.
      3. On any privately owned land or privately owned body of water unless either:
        1. the operator is the owner or member of the immediate family of the owner of the land;
        2. the operator carries the written consent of the owner or lessee of the land or the land surrounding the privately owned body of water to operate an ATV in the specific area and during specific hours or days, or both, in which the operator is operating;
        3. the ATV displays a valid VASA Trail Access Decal (TAD) as required by subsection 3502(a) of this title that serves as proof that the ATV and its operator, by virtue of the TAD, are members of VASA and consent has been given orally or in writing to operate an ATV in the area where the operator is operating; or
        4. the owner of the land or the land surrounding the privately owned body of water designated the area for use by ATVs by posting the area in a manner approved by the Secretary to give reasonable notice that use is permitted.
      4. On any municipal lands unless opened to ATV travel by the legislative body of the municipality where the land is located or on any State lands, body of public water, or natural area established under the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 2607 unless designated by the Secretary for use by ATVs in rules adopted under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25.
      5. By an individual under 12 years of age unless he or she is wearing on his or her head protective headgear of a type approved by the Commissioner while operating the ATV or riding as a passenger on the ATV and either:
        1. he or she is on land owned by his or her parents, family, or guardian;
        2. he or she has written permission of the landowner or lessee; or
        3. he or she is under the direct supervision of an individual 18 years of age or older who does not have a suspended operator’s license or privilege to operate.
      6. In any manner that could reasonably be expected to harm, harass, drive, or pursue any wildlife.
      7. If the registration certificate or consent form and proof of insurance are not available for inspection, and the registration number, or plate of a size and type approved by the Commissioner, is not displayed on the ATV in a manner approved by the Commissioner.
      8. While the operator is under the influence of drugs or alcohol as defined by this title.
      9. In a careless or negligent manner that is inconsistent with the duty of ordinary care, so as to endanger an individual or property.
      10. Within a cemetery, public or private, as defined in 18 V.S.A. § 5302 .
      11. On limited access highways, rights-of-way, or approaches unless permitted by the Traffic Committee under section 1004 of this title. In no cases shall the use of ATVs be permitted on any portion of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways unless the Traffic Committee permits operation on these highways.
      12. On a sidewalk unless permitted by the legislative body of the municipality where the sidewalk is located.
      13. Without liability insurance as described in this subdivision. The owner or operator of an ATV shall not operate or permit the operation of an ATV at locations where the ATV must be registered in order to be lawfully operated under section 3502 of this title without having in effect a bond or a liability policy in the amounts of at least $25,000.00 for one individual and $50,000.00 for two or more individuals killed or injured and $10,000.00 for damages to property in any one crash. In lieu of a bond or liability policy, evidence of self-insurance in the amount of $115,000.00 must be filed with the Commissioner. Financial responsibility shall be maintained and evidenced in a form prescribed by the Commissioner, and persons who self-insure shall be subject to the provisions of subsection 801(c) of this title.
      14. While the operator’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle is suspended, unless operated at a location described in subdivision 3502(a)(2)(A) or (D) of this title.
      15. Outside the boundaries of trails established by the VASA Trail System unless such operation is specifically authorized pursuant to another provision of this chapter.
      16. At locations where the ATV must be registered in order to be lawfully operated under section 3502 of this title unless the operator and all passengers wear:
        1. properly secured protective headgear that is used as intended by the manufacturer of the headgear and conforms to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards contained in 49 C.F.R. § 571.218, as amended, and any applicable regulations promulgated by the U.S. Secretary of Transportation; or
        2. properly secured protective headgear that is used as intended by the manufacturer of the headgear and conforms to ASTM International or National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment safety standards, provided that the ATV is equipped with manufacturer-installed rollover protection and safety belts that have not been removed or modified in a way that reduces their effectiveness.
    3. No public or private landowner shall be liable for any property damage or personal injury sustained by any individual operating or riding as a passenger on an ATV or upon a vehicle or other device drawn by an ATV upon the public or private landowner’s property, whether or not the public or private landowner has given permission to use the land, unless the public or private landowner charges a cash fee to the operator or owner of the ATV for the use of the property or unless damage or injury is intentionally inflicted by the landowner.
    4. In addition to all other requirements, an ATV may not be operated:
      1. if equipped with an exhaust system with a cut out, bypass, or similar device; or
      2. with the spark arrester removed or modified, except for use in closed course competition events.
    5. In addition to all other requirements, an ATV may not be operated by an operator who is less than 18 years of age unless one of the following criteria is met:
      1. the operator is operating on property owned or leased by the operator or his or her parents or guardian;
      2. the operator is taking a prescribed safety education training course and operating under the direct supervision of a certified ATV safety instructor; or
      3. the operator holds an appropriate safety education certificate issued by this State or issued under the authority of another state or province of Canada.
    6. An individual who is required to hold an appropriate safety education certificate under the provisions of subsection (e) of this section shall exhibit the safety education certificate upon demand of a law enforcement officer having authority to enforce the provisions of this section.
    7. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1985, No. 8 ; 1991, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2009, No. 50 , § 81; 2013, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 72; 2017, No. 83 , § 156; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 27; 2019, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 244, 245; 2021, No. 76 , § 37.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crash” for “accident” in subdiv. (b)(13) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    References in text.

    The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, referred to in subdiv. (b)(11), was redesignated as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 101-427, and is codified as 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) .

    Revision note

    —2014. In subdivs. (b)(1) and (b)(12), substituted “selectboard” for “selectmen” in accordance with 2013, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 72.

    Editor’s note

    —2020. During the 2019 Adjourned Session, this section was amended in one conflicting way by two different acts. In this instance, only the amendment from Act No. 121, § 18 is reflected in the text of this section, however, and not the conflicting amendment from Act No. 131, § 244 as the stated purpose of Act No. 131 was to make only technical amendments and § 303 of the act specified that, to the extent that Act No. 131 may conflict with other acts of the same biennium, “the substantive changes in other acts shall take precedence over the technical changes of this act.”

    —1997. 1997, No. 55 , § 11a, eff. June 26, 1997, enacted language to be subsec. (g) in § 3507 of this title. However, in view of the subject matter of subsec. (g) and the subsec. designations present in this section and in § 3507 of this title, the subsec. was added to this section instead.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (b)(16): Amended generally.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally by Act No. 121.

    Subdiv. (b)(3)(B): Act No. 131 substituted “or” for “and/or” following “specific hours” and inserted “, or both” preceding “in which the operator”.

    Subdiv. (b)(4): Act No. 131 substituted “adopted” for “promulgated”.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “shall” for “may” following “person” and inserted “or her” following “him”.

    Subdiv. (b)(1): Amended generally.

    —2017. Subdiv. (b)(8): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating beverages” following “drugs or”.

    —2009. Subdiv. (b)(3)(B): Deleted “or proof that he or she is a member of a club or association to which consent has been given orally or in writing” after “operating” and added “the all-terrain vehicle displays a valid TAD decal as required by subsection 3502(a) of this title that serves as proof that the all-terrain vehicle and its operator, by virtue of the TAD, are members of a VASA-affiliated club to which such consent has been given orally or in writing to operate an all-terrain vehicle in the area in which the operator is operating” after “or.”

    —1997. Subsec. (g): Added.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Added subsecs. (d), (e), and (f).

    —1985. Subdiv. (b)(1): Added “except an all-terrain vehicle being used for agricultural purposes may be operated not closer than three feet from the traveled portion of any highway for the purpose of traveling within the confines of the farm” following “municipality”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving under the influence, see chapter 13, subchapter 13 of this title.

    § 3507. Enforcement; penalties and revocation of registration.

    1. A person who violates a provision of this chapter shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $300.00 for each offense unless otherwise provided by law.
    2. In addition to the fines provided in subsection (a) of this section, the Commissioner may suspend or revoke the registration of an all-terrain vehicle involved in a violation of this chapter.
    3. Law enforcement officers may conduct safety inspections on all-terrain vehicles stopped for other all-terrain vehicle law violations on the VASA Trail System. Safety inspections may also be conducted in a designated area by law enforcement officials. A designated area shall be warned solely by blue lights either on a stationary all-terrain vehicle parked on a trail or on a cruiser parked at a roadside trail crossing.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 26; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 246.

    History

    Revision note—

    At the end of the subsec. (b), substituted “chapter” for “subchapter” to correct an error in the reference.

    Editor’s note—

    1997, No. 55 , § 11a, eff. June 26, 1997, enacted language to be subsec. (g) of this section. However, in view of the subject matter of subsec. (g) and the subsec. designations present in § 3506 of this title and in this section, the subsec. was added to § 3506 of this title instead.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “assessed a civil penalty of” for “fined”.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Added “Enforcement” preceding “penalties”.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$300.00” for “$100.00” and added “unless otherwise provided by law” following “offense”.

    § 3508. Designated areas.

    The Secretary shall print a list of public lands and waters designated for use by all-terrain vehicles pursuant to subdivision 3506(b)(4) of this title and make the publication available to the public.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Revision note—

    Substituted “subdivision 3506(b)(4)” for “section 3206(b)(4)” to correct an error in the reference.

    § 3509. Defacing identifying numbers; signs.

    1. A person may not willfully change or attempt to change, or tamper with, obliterate, deface, or in any manner interfere with the original or assigned motor number or manufacturer’s serial number of any all-terrain vehicle.
    2. A person may not remove, deface, alter, or destroy trail signs, markers, or posters erected pursuant to this chapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Revision note—

    At the end of subsec. (b), substituted “chapter” for “subchapter” to correct an error in the reference.

    § 3510. Municipal ordinances.

    Municipalities shall have the power to adopt ordinances pursuant to 24 V.S.A. chapter 59 for the purpose of regulating the time, manner, and location or operation of all-terrain vehicles within their limits provided the ordinances do not controvert the provisions of this chapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Revision note—

    At the end of the section, substituted “chapter” for “subchapter” to correct an error in the reference.

    § 3511. Crashes; duty to stop and report.

    1. The operator of an all-terrain vehicle who has caused or is involved in a crash resulting in injury to any person or property, other than the all-terrain vehicle then under his or her control, shall immediately stop and render whatever assistance may be reasonably necessary.  He or she shall give his or her name, residence, registration number, and the name of the owner of the all-terrain vehicle to the party whose person or property is injured.
    2. The operator of an all-terrain vehicle involved in a crash resulting in death or injury to any person or damage to property, other than the all-terrain vehicle he or she is operating, in excess of $100.00, shall notify an enforcement officer immediately and file a report of the incident with the Commissioner within 72 hours, on forms prescribed by the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crashes” for “accidents” in the section heading and “a crash” for “an accident” in subsecs. (a) and (b) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Civil liability for emergency medical care, see 12 V.S.A. § 519 .

    Duty to stop and report accident, see §§ 1128 and 1129 of this title.

    Reports of accidents involving alcohol, see 20 V.S.A. § 1817 .

    § 3512. Attempting to elude a police officer.

    An operator of an all-terrain vehicle shall bring his or her vehicle to a stop when signalled to do so by an enforcement officer wearing identifying insignia or operating a law enforcement vehicle sounding a siren or displaying a flashing blue or blue and white signal lamp.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Attempting to elude enforcement officer, see § 1133 of this title.

    § 3513. Liability insurance; authority to contract for law enforcement services.

    1. Subsection (a) effective until July 1, 2023; see also subsection (a) effective July 1, 2023 set out below.

      The amount of 90 percent of the fees and penalties collected under this chapter, except interest, is allocated to the Agency of Natural Resources for use by the Vermont ATV Sportsman’s Association (VASA) for development and maintenance of a Statewide ATV Trail Program, for trail liability insurance, and to contract for law enforcement services with any constable, sheriff’s department, municipal police department, the Department of Public Safety, and the Department of Fish and Wildlife for purposes of trail compliance pursuant to this chapter. The Departments of Public Safety and of Fish and Wildlife are authorized to contract with VASA to provide these law enforcement services. The Agency of Natural Resources shall retain for its use up to $7,000.00 during each fiscal year to be used for administration of the State grant that supports this program.

      (a)

      Subsection (a) effective July 1, 2023; see also subsection (a) effective until July 1, 2023 set out above.

      The amount of 85 percent of the fees and penalties collected under this chapter, except interest, is allocated to the Agency of Natural Resources for use by the Vermont ATV Sportsman’s Association (VASA) for development and maintenance of a Statewide ATV Trail Program, for trail liability insurance, and to contract for law enforcement services with any constable, sheriff’s department, municipal police department, the Department of Public Safety, and the Department of Fish and Wildlife for purposes of trail compliance pursuant to this chapter. The Departments of Public Safety and of Fish and Wildlife are authorized to contract with VASA to provide these law enforcement services.

    2. The Secretary of Administration shall assist VASA with the procurement of trail liability and other related insurance.
    3. VASA shall purchase a trail liability insurance policy in the amount of $1,000,000.00. The State of Vermont shall be named an additional insured. The policy shall extend to all VASA-affiliated ATV clubs and their respective employees and agents to provide for trail liability coverage for development and maintenance of the Statewide ATV Trail Program.
    4. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize or create any cause of action to accrue or to be maintained against the State of Vermont.
    5. Any fees and penalties allocated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall not revert but shall be available until spent. Any accrued interest shall be deposited in the Transportation Fund.

    HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1999, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2005, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 82; 2009, No. 50 , § 79; 2013, No. 50 , § E.101.7; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 28; 2017, No. 158 (Adj. Sess.), § 29, eff. July 1, 2023; 2019, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § E.706, eff. Oct. 2, 2020.

    History

    Revision note—

    Substituted “chapter” for “subchapter” to correct an error in the reference.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Added last sentence.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 158, Sec. 28, substituted “90 percent” for “85 percent”, “chapter” for “subchapter” preceding “except interest”, and deleted “hereby” preceding “allocated” in the first sentence and deleted the former third sentence.

    Subsec. (a): Act No. 158, Sec. 29, substituted “85 percent” for “90 percent” in the first sentence, effective July 1, 2023.

    Subsec. (b): Act No. 158, Sec. 28, deleted “Office of the” preceding “Secretary of Administration”.

    —2013. Subsec. (b): Substituted “Office of the Secretary of Administration” for “department of buildings and general services”.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Deleted “on private property” after “program” in the first sentence.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “allocated” for “appropriated” following “hereby” in the first sentence of subsec. (a), and following “penalties” in subsec. (e).

    § 3514. Administration of chapter; rules.

    The Commissioner shall administer this chapter and shall adopt rules, prescribe forms and procedures for application and registration, consistent with this chapter as necessary to carry its provisions into effect.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    History

    Revision note—

    Substituted “this chapter” for “this subchapter” following “consistent with” to correct an error in the reference.

    § 3515. All-terrain safety education course; issuance of certificate.

    1. The Commissioner of Public Safety shall establish and oversee a program of examination and certification of all-terrain vehicle operators.  In order for an operator to be awarded a safety education certificate, he or she must submit evidence of successful completion of an all-terrain vehicle safety education course approved by the Commissioner and must successfully pass a written examination that shall test the applicant’s knowledge of safe all-terrain vehicle operating practices and the applicable laws of the State of Vermont.
    2. The Commissioner may approve any appropriate all-terrain vehicle safety education course, regardless of whether or not it includes hands-on instruction in operating the vehicle, if the course meets minimum standards established by the Commissioner.  An approved course shall include information about the appropriate use of helmets and the dangers of carrying a passenger.  Such courses offered by the manufacturers or distributors of all-terrain vehicles, by community organizations such as 4-H, or by others, may be approved.
    3. The Commissioner shall develop and make available a written examination appropriate for certification of all-terrain vehicle operators as required by this section.  In the discretion of the Commissioner, the examination may be administered by employees of the Department of Public Safety or by the persons who offer any approved all-terrain vehicle safety education course.
    4. No all-terrain vehicle safety education course that includes actual operation of the vehicle shall be approved unless adequate insurance coverage is provided.
    5. The instructors and persons providing an all-terrain vehicle safety education course approved by the Commissioner are exempt from compliance with the State’s driver training laws.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

    § 3516. Training fee.

    1. A person or organization conducting an approved all-terrain vehicle safety education course may charge a reasonable fee to persons completing the course, as appropriate and necessary to defray the expenses of providing the course.
    2. The Commissioner of Public Safety shall review and approve the maximum fee to be charged for any approved course prior to any fee being charged.
    3. A fee shall not be charged any person who is entitled to free training pursuant to the provisions of the consent decree, dated April 28, 1988, entered into by all-terrain vehicle manufacturers and the U.S. government.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 247.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “U.S.” for “United States”.

    § 3517. Distribution of safety education information.

    Dealers shall distribute safety education information, as may be made available by the Commissioner of Public Safety or the vehicle manufacturers or distributors, to all purchasers of all-terrain vehicles.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    § 3518. Applicability.

    The provisions of subsections 3506(e) and (f) and sections 3515 through 3517 of this title shall not apply to any two-wheeled vehicles, nor to four-wheeled vehicles having a dry weight in excess of 700 pounds.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    Chapter 33. Nonresident Violator Compact

    § 3551. Enactment of compact.

    The Nonresident Violator Compact, hereinafter called “the compact,” is hereby enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    History

    Revision note—

    Added section heading and substituted period for colon at end of section for purposes of conformity with V.S.A. style.

    § 3552. Declaration of policy and purpose—Article I.

    1. It is the policy of the party jurisdictions to:
      1. seek compliance with the laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles in each of the jurisdictions;
      2. allow motorists to accept a traffic citation for certain violations and proceed on their way without delay whether or not the motorist is a resident of the jurisdiction in which the citation was issued;
      3. extend cooperation to its fullest extent among the jurisdictions for obtaining compliance with the terms of a traffic citation issued in one jurisdiction to a resident of another jurisdiction;
      4. maximize effective utilization of law enforcement personnel and assist court systems in the efficient disposition of traffic violations.
    2. The purpose of this compact is to:
      1. provide a means through which the party jurisdictions may participate in a reciprocal program to effectuate the policies enumerated in paragraph (a) above in a uniform and orderly manner;
      2. provide for the fair and impartial treatment of traffic violators operating within party jurisdictions in recognition of the motorist’s right of due process and the sovereign status of a party jurisdiction.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    § 3553. Definitions—Article II.

    1. In the Nonresident Violator Compact, the following words have the meaning indicated, unless the context requires otherwise.
      1. “Citation” means any summons, ticket, or other official document issued by a police officer for a traffic violation containing an order which requires the motorist to respond. (b) (1) “Citation” means any summons, ticket, or other official document issued by a police officer for a traffic violation containing an order which requires the motorist to respond.
      2. “Collateral” means any cash or other security deposited to secure an appearance for trial, following the issuance by a police officer of a citation for a traffic violation.
      3. “Compliance” means the act of answering a citation, summons, or subpoena through appearance at court, a tribunal, and/or payment of fines and costs.
      4. “Court” means a court of law or traffic tribunal.
      5. “Driver’s license” means any license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle issued under the laws of the home jurisdiction.
      6. “Home jurisdiction” means the jurisdiction that issued the driver’s license of the traffic violator.
      7. “Issuing jurisdiction” means the jurisdiction in which the traffic citation was issued to the motorist.
      8. “Jurisdiction” means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
      9. “Motorist” means a driver of a motor vehicle operating in a party jurisdiction other than the home jurisdiction.
      10. “Personal recognizance” means an agreement by a motorist made at the time of issuance of the traffic citation that he or she will comply with the terms of that traffic citation.
      11. “Police officer” means any individual authorized by the party jurisdiction to issue a citation for a traffic violation.
      12. “Terms of the citation” means those options expressly stated upon the citation.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    § 3554. Procedure for issuing jurisdiction—Article III.

    1. When issuing a citation for a traffic violation, a police officer shall issue the citation to a motorist who possesses a driver’s license issued by a party jurisdiction and shall not, subject to the exceptions noted in paragraph (b) of this article, require the motorist to post collateral to secure appearance, if the officer receives the motorist’s personal recognizance that he or she will comply with the terms of the citation.
    2. Personal recognizance is acceptable only if not prohibited by law.  If mandatory appearance is required, it should take place immediately following issuance of the citation.
    3. Upon failure of a motorist to comply with the terms of a traffic citation, the appropriate official shall report the failure to comply to the licensing authority of the jurisdiction in which the traffic citation was issued.  The report shall be made in accordance with procedures specified by the issuing jurisdiction and shall contain information as specified in the Compact Manual as minimum requirements for effective processing by the home jurisdiction.
    4. Upon receipt of the report, the licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction shall transmit to the licensing authority in the home jurisdiction of the motorist, the information in a form and content as contained in the Compact Manual.
    5. The licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction need not suspend the privilege of a motorist for whom a report has been transmitted.
    6. The licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction shall not transmit a report on any violation if the date of transmission is more than six months after the date on which the traffic citation was issued.
    7. The licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction shall not transmit a report on any violation where the date of issuance of the citation predates the most recent of the effective dates of entry for the two jurisdictions affected.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    § 3555. Procedure for home jurisdiction—Article IV.

    1. Upon receipt of a report of a failure to comply from the licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction, the licensing authority of the home jurisdiction shall notify the motorist and initiate a suspension action, in accordance with the home jurisdiction’s procedures, to suspend the motorist’s driver’s license until satisfactory evidence of compliance with the terms of the traffic citation has been furnished to the home jurisdiction licensing authority.  Due process safeguards will be accorded.
    2. The licensing authority of the home jurisdiction shall maintain a record of actions taken and make reports to issuing jurisdictions as provided in the Compact Manual.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    § 3556. Applicability of other laws—Article V.

    Except as expressly required by provisions of this compact, nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect the right of any party jurisdiction to apply any of its other laws relating to license to drive to any person or circumstance, or to invalidate or prevent any driver license agreement or other cooperative arrangements between a party jurisdiction and a nonparty jurisdiction.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    § 3557. Compact administrator procedures—Article VI.

    1. For the purpose of administering the provisions of this compact and to serve as a governing body for the resolution of all matters relating to the operation of this compact, a Board of Compact Administrators is established.  The Board shall be composed of one representative from each party jurisdiction to be known as the compact administrator.  The compact administrator shall be appointed by the jurisdiction executive and will serve and be subject to removal in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction he or she represents.  A compact administrator may provide for the discharge of his or her duties and the performance of his or her functions as a board member by an alternate.  An alternate may not be entitled to serve unless written notification of his or her identity has been given to the Board.
    2. Each member of the Board of Compact Administrators shall be entitled to one vote.  No action of the Board shall be binding unless taken at a meeting at which a majority of the total number of votes on the Board are cast in favor.  Action by the Board shall be only at a meeting at which a majority of the party jurisdictions are represented.
    3. The Board shall elect annually, from its membership, a chairman and vice chairman.
    4. The Board shall adopt bylaws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this compact or the laws of a party jurisdiction, for the conduct of its business and shall have the power to amend and rescind its bylaws.
    5. The Board may accept for any of its purposes and functions under this compact any and all donations, and grants of money, equipment, supplies, materials, and services, conditional or otherwise, from any jurisdiction, the United States, or any other governmental agency, and may receive, utilize, and dispose of the same.
    6. The Board may contract with, or accept services or personnel from any governmental or intergovernmental agency, person, firm, or corporation, or any private nonprofit organization or institution.
    7. The Board shall formulate all necessary procedures and develop uniform forms and documents for administering the provisions of this compact.  All procedures and forms adopted pursuant to board action shall be contained in the Compact Manual.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    § 3558. Entry into compact and withdrawal—Article VII.

    1. This compact shall become effective when it has been adopted by at least two jurisdictions.
      1. Entry into the compact shall be made by a Resolution of Ratification executed by the authorized officials of the applying jurisdiction and submitted to the Chairman of the Board. (b) (1) Entry into the compact shall be made by a Resolution of Ratification executed by the authorized officials of the applying jurisdiction and submitted to the Chairman of the Board.
      2. The resolution shall be in a form and content as provided in the Compact Manual and shall include statements that in substance are as follows:

        (i) a citation of the authority by which the jurisdiction is empowered to become a party to this compact;

        (ii) agreement to comply with the terms and provisions of the compact;

        (iii) that compact entry is with all jurisdictions then party to the compact and with any jurisdiction that legally becomes a party to the compact.

      3. The effective date of entry shall be specified by the applying jurisdiction, but it shall not be less than 60 days after notice has been given by the Chairman of the Board of Compact Administrators or by the secretariat of the Board to each party jurisdiction that the resolution from the applying jurisdiction has been received.
    2. A party jurisdiction may withdraw from this compact by official written notice to the other party jurisdictions, but a withdrawal shall not take effect until 90 days after notice of withdrawal is given.  The notice shall be directed to the compact administrator of each member jurisdiction.  No withdrawal shall affect the validity of this compact as to the remaining party jurisdictions.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    § 3559. Exceptions—Article VIII.

    The provisions of this compact shall not apply to parking or standing violations, highway weight limit violations, and violations of law governing the transportation of hazardous materials.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Stopping, standing, and parking, see chapter 13, subchapter 10 of this title.

    Transportation of hazardous materials generally, see 5 V.S.A. chapter 28.

    Transportation of hazardous wastes, see 10 V.S.A. § 6607 .

    Weight regulations, see chapter 13, subchapter 15, article 1 of this title.

    § 3560. Amendments to the compact—Article IX.

    1. This compact may be amended from time to time.  Amendments shall be presented in resolution form to the Chairman of the Board of Compact Administrators and may be initiated by one or more party jurisdictions.
    2. Adoption of an amendment shall require endorsement of all party jurisdictions and shall become effective 30 days after the date of the last endorsement.
    3. Endorsement of an amendment shall only be by act of the General Assembly.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    § 3561. Construction and severability—Article X.

    This compact shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes stated herein. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the Constitution of any party jurisdiction or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government agency, person, or circumstance, the compact shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any jurisdiction party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining jurisdictions and in full force and effect as to the jurisdiction affected as to all severable matters.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    § 3562. Title—Article XI.

    This compact shall be known as the Nonresident Violator Compact of 1977, as amended.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 84 , § 1.

    Chapter 35. International Registration Plan

    History

    Extensions. 2019, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 36(a) and (d) provide: “(a) Notwithstanding any provision of 23 V.S.A. § 312 , 457, 458, 3702, or 3703 to the contrary, all International Registration Plan trip permits and temporary authorizations, temporary registration certificates, and temporary number plates shall be valid for 90 days from the date of issuance.

    “(d) Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214 , subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall take effect retroactively on March 20, 2020 and continue in effect until the termination of the state of emergency declared by the Governor as a result of COVID-19.”

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Registration required, see § 301 of this title.

    § 3700. Definition; mail.

    As used in this chapter, “mail,” “mails,” “mailing,” and “mailed” mean any method of delivery authorized by the Commissioner, which shall include by hand, U.S. mail, and electronic transmission.

    HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. July 13, 2020.

    § 3701. International Registration Plan.

    1. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is authorized to enter into reciprocal agreements or plans on behalf of the State of Vermont with the appropriate authorities of any of the states of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any state or province of any country providing for the registration of commercial vehicles on an apportionment or allocation basis, and may, in the exercise of this authority, enter into and become a member of the International Registration Plan.  Any such reciprocal agreement or Plan may provide for but shall not be limited to the following:
      1. full reciprocity in accordance with such agreement or Plan for commercial vehicles not based in Vermont, operated solely in interstate commerce and of specified types or gross weights, in exchange for equivalent reciprocity for Vermont based commercial vehicles;
      2. reciprocal exchange of audits of records of the owners of such commercial vehicles by the states participating in such agreement or Plan;
      3. any other matters that would facilitate the administration of such agreement or Plan, including exchange of information for audits, enforcement activities, and collection and disbursement of proportional registration fees for other jurisdictions in the case of Vermont based commercial vehicles.
    2. Any reciprocity agreement, arrangement, or declaration relating to commercial vehicles in effect between this State and any jurisdiction not a party to such reciprocal agreement or Plan, or that relates to any matters not covered in such reciprocal agreement or Plan, shall continue in force and effect until specifically amended or revoked as provided by law.
    3. At such time as the State of Vermont may enter into and become a member of the International Registration Plan pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the provisions of said Plan that are concerned with the registration of any vehicle or the fees that relate to any such registration shall control whenever any provision of law conflicts with any provision of said Plan.

    HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 124 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3702. Trip permit.

    Any vehicle registered in a jurisdiction other than Vermont that is eligible for apportioned registration under the International Registration Plan that is not apportioned with Vermont must obtain a trip permit prior to entering this State. The fee for the permit shall be $15.00. The permits shall be valid for a period of 72 hours and shall allow both interstate and intrastate operation. Trip permits must be kept with the vehicle while being operated.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 111 , § 7.

    § 3703. Temporary authorization.

    Any International Registration Plan registrant based in this State may apply by mail and be issued temporary authorization to operate a vehicle not in the registrant’s fleet for a period not to exceed 45 days for a fee of $15.00. Any person to whom temporary authorization is issued shall submit an application by mail for permanent registration for the vehicle covered by the temporary authorization within 10 days of the date of its issuance. Failure to submit an application within the 10-day period may result in the suspension of the temporary authorization. The temporary authorization shall be kept with the vehicle while being operated.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 111 , § 8; amended 1989, No. 84 , § 7; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “by mail” in the first and second sentences.

    —1989. Added the fourth sentence.

    § 3704. Permit for empty weight.

    For a fee of $20.00, a permit may be issued to an owner-operator for a registered gross weight not in excess of the empty weight of the vehicle as provided for in Article IX(c) of the International Registration Plan for a period of 20 days. The permit shall be kept with the vehicle while being operated.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 111 , § 9; amended 1989, No. 84 , § 8.

    History

    Amendments

    —1989. Added the second sentence.

    § 3705. Collection of apportioned registration; credits and refunds.

    1. The Commissioner shall postpone the collection of apportioned registration fees until the fees have been computed and any credit available pursuant to subsection 3020(a) of this title applied.
    2. The Commissioner shall mail notice of any fees due to the registrant, and payment of these fees must be received within 15 days of the date of the notice.
    3. Upon receipt of the proper fees, or after determining that no fees are owed due to credits available pursuant to subsection 3020(a) of this title, the Commissioner shall issue the necessary identification plates and cab cards.
    4. If the Commissioner determines that a fee required by this chapter was paid more than once, has been erroneously collected or computed, or for which the State was without power to impose, the excess amount paid or collected shall be credited to the account of the registrant maintained pursuant to subsection 3020(a) of this title and the registrant shall be notified of the date and amount of the credit by mail.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 21, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 3706. License suspension or revocation.

    The Commissioner may suspend or revoke the license, the right to operate any vehicle, and any registrations of a person who fails to comply with any provisions of the International Registration Plan of this chapter or any rule adopted pursuant to this chapter. The suspension or revocation shall be effective upon not less than 15 days’ notice unless within those 15 days the registrant mails a written request for a hearing to show cause why the suspension or revocation should not be effective.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. July 13, 2020.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “days’ ” for “days” and “mails a written request for” for “shall request in writing” in the second sentence.

    Chapter 36. Titling of Vessels, Snowmobiles, and All-Terrain Vehicles

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Added “Snowmobiles and All-Terrain Vehicles” to the chapter title.

    § 3801. Definitions.

    Except when the context otherwise requires, as used in this chapter:

    1. “All-terrain vehicle” or “ATV” means any nonhighway recreational vehicle, except snowmobiles, motor-assisted bicycles, or electric bicycles, when used for cross-country travel on trails or on any one of the following or a combination thereof: land, water, snow, ice, marsh, swampland, and natural terrain.
    2. “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
    3. “Dealer” means any person who engages in whole or in part in the business of buying, selling, or exchanging new and unused vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles, or used vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles, or any combination, either outright or on conditional sale, bailment, lease, chattel mortgage, or otherwise, and who has an established place of business for sale, trade, and display of vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles. A yacht broker is a dealer.
    4. “Identification number” means the numbers and letters, if any, on a vessel designated by the Commissioner for the purpose of identifying the vessel.
    5. “Lienholder” means a person holding a security interest in a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.
    6. “Manufacturer” means any person engaged in the business of manufacturing or importing new and unused vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles for the purpose of sale or trade.
    7. “Manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate of origin” means the original written instrument or document required to be executed and delivered by the manufacturer to his or her agent or dealer, or a person purchasing direct from the manufacturer, certifying the origin of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.
    8. [Repealed.]
    9. “Operate” means to navigate or otherwise use a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.
    10. “Operator” means the person who operates or has charge of the navigation or use of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.
    11. “Owner” means a person, other than a lienholder, having property in or title to a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle. The term includes a person entitled to use or possess a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle subject to an interest in another person, which is reserved or created by agreement and secures payment or performance of an obligation, but does not include a lessee under a lease not intended as security.
    12. “Security agreement” means a written agreement that reserves or creates a security interest.
    13. “Security interest” means an interest in a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle reserved or created by agreement and that secures payment or performance of an obligation. The term includes the interest of a lessor under a lease intended as security. The term also includes a nonpossessory attachment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction within this State. The term also includes liens obtained by the Commissioner of Taxes pursuant to the provisions of Title 32. A security interest is “perfected” when it is valid against third parties generally, subject only to specific statutory exceptions.
    14. “Serial number” means the numbers and letters designated by the snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle manufacturer for the purpose of identifying a snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle.
    15. “Snowmobile” means a self-propelled vehicle intended for off-road travel primarily on snow, having a curb weight of not more than 453.59 kg (1,000 lbs.), driven by track or tracks in contact with the snow and steered by a ski or skis in contact with the snow.
    16. “State” means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a province of the Dominion of Canada.
    17. “State of principal use” means the state on whose land, waters, snow, ice, marsh, swampland, or natural terrain a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is used or to be used most during a calendar year.
    18. “Use” means to operate, navigate, or employ a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle. A vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is in use whenever it is upon land, water, snow, ice, marsh, swampland, or natural terrain.
    19. “Vessel” means every description of watercraft capable of being used as a means of transportation on water that is equipped with machinery capable of propelling the watercraft, whether or not such machinery is the principal source of propulsion, but shall not include a watercraft that has a valid marine document issued by U.S. Customs and Border Protection or any successor federal agency.
    20. “Title or certificate of title” means a written instrument or document that certifies ownership of a vessel and is issued by the Commissioner or equivalent official of another jurisdiction.
    21. “Secure assignment of title” means a form prescribed by the Commissioner that must be used to transfer ownership of a titled vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle if all space for assignments upon the title itself has been used.
    22. “Salvage dealer” means any person who, in a single year, purchases or in any manner acquires at a minimum three vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles as salvage or who scraps, dismantles, or destroys at a minimum three vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles in a single year.
    23. “Rebuilt vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle” means a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle upon which a salvage certificate of title, parts-only certificate, or other document indicating the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is not sold for reregistration purposes, has been issued and which has been rebuilt and restored for operation.
    24. “Salvaged vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle” means a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle that has been scrapped, dismantled, destroyed, or declared a total loss by an insurance company.
    25. “Totaled vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle” means a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle that has been declared a total loss by an insurance company.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2009, No. 39 , § 12; 2019, No. 14 , § 65, eff. April 30, 2019; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 248; 2021, No. 20 , § 257; 2021, No. 40 , § 9; 2021, No. 76 , § 22.

    History

    Editor’s note

    —2021. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of three amendments. During the 2021 session, this section was amended three times, by Act Nos. 20, 40, and 76, resulting in three versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2021 session, the text of Act Nos. 20, 40, and 76 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (1): Act No. 40 inserted “, motor-assisted bicycles, or electric bicycles”.

    Subdiv. (8): Repealed by Act No. 76.

    Subdiv. (11): Act Nos. 20 and 76 inserted “which is” preceding “reserved”; and Act No. 20 substituted “secures payment or performance” for “securing payment of performance” and deleted “it” preceding “does not include”.

    Subdiv. (19): Amended generally by Act No. 76.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (8): Inserted “successor” preceding “federal agency” and deleted “successor thereto” thereafter.

    —2019. Subdiv. (8): Substituted “that” for “which” following “vessel”, and “U.S. Customs and Border Protection” for “the Bureau of Customs of the United States government”.

    —2009. Subdivs. (22)-(25): Added.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Added new subdiv. (1), redesignated former subdivs. (1)-(12), as subdivs. (2)-(13), added new subdivs. (14) and (15), redesignated former subdivs. (13)-(18) as subdivs. (16)-(21), inserted “, snowmobiles or all-terrain vehicles” following “vessels” and “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” throughout the section except in present subdiv. (19), substituted “any combination” for “both” in present subdiv. (3), added “land,” preceding “water” and “, snow, ice, marsh, swampland or natural terrain” thereafter in present subdivs. (17) and (18), and deleted “the” following “whenever it is upon” in present subdiv. (18).

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Added subdivs. (17) and (18).

    § 3802. Fees.

    1. The Commissioner shall be paid the following fees:
      1. for filing an application for a first certificate of title, $22.00;
      2. for each security interest noted upon a certificate of title, $11.00;
      3. for a certificate of title after a transfer, $22.00;
      4. for each assignment of a security interest noted upon a certificate of title, $11.00;
      5. for a duplicate certificate of title, $22.00;
      6. for an ordinary certificate of title issued upon surrender of a distinctive certificate, $22.00;
      7. for filing a notice of security interest, $11.00;
      8. for a certificate of search of the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles for each vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle searched against, $22.00;
      9. for filing an assignment of a security interest, $11.00;
      10. for a certificate of clear title after the security interest or interests have been released, $22.00;
      11. for a corrected certificate of title, $22.00.
    2. If an application, certificate of title, or other document required to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner under any provision of this chapter is not delivered to the Commissioner within 10 days from the time it is required to be mailed or delivered, the Commissioner shall collect, as a penalty, an amount equal to the fee required for the transaction.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 32, eff. May 15, 2002; 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2001, No. 143 (Adj. Sess.), § 68; 2005, No. 72 , § 13; 2009, No. 50 , § 54; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 22; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 53.

    History

    Editor’s note

    —2002. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of three amendments. During the 2002 legislative session, this section was amended three times, by Act Nos. 102, 107, and 143, resulting in three versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2002 session, the text of Act Nos. 102, 107, and 143 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivs. (a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(8), (a)(10), and (a)(11): Substituted “$22.00” for “$20.00”.

    Subdivs. (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(7), and (a)(9): Substituted “$11.00” for “$10.00”.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Changed fees throughout.

    —2009. Subdivs. (a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(10), and (a)(11): Substituted “$19.00” for “$15.00”.

    Subdivs. (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(7), and (a)(9): Substituted “$9.00” for “$7.00”.

    —2005. Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “$15.00” for “$10.00”.

    Subdivs. (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(7), and (a)(9): Substituted “$7.00” for “$6.00”.

    Subdivs. (a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(10), and (a)(11): Substituted “$15.00” for “$9.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(6): Substituted “15.00” for “$6.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(8): Substituted “$20.00” for “$13.00”.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Act No. 102 substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subdivs. (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), (a)(7), and (a)(9): Act No. 102 substituted “$6.00” for “$3.00”.

    Subdivs. (a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(10), and (a)(11): Act No. 102 substituted “$9.00” for “$5.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(8): Act Nos. 102 and 143 substituted “$13.00” for “$7.00”.

    Act No. 107 added “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel”.

    § 3803. Power and duties of Commissioner.

    1. The Commissioner shall prescribe and provide suitable forms of applications, certificates of title, notices of security interests, and all other notices and forms necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
    2. The Commissioner may:
      1. make necessary investigations to procure information required to carry out the provisions of this chapter;
      2. adopt and enforce reasonable rules to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Procedure for adoption of administrative rules, see 3 V.S.A. part 1, chapter 25.

    § 3804. Hearing.

    A person aggrieved by the Commissioner’s act or omission to act by the Commissioner under this chapter is entitled, upon request, to a hearing in accordance with section 105 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    History

    Revision note—

    At the end of the section, substituted “ 23 V.S.A. § 105 ” for “ 23 V.S.A. § 105 (e) ” to correct an error in the reference.

    § 3805. Appeal.

    A person aggrieved by the Commissioner’s act or omission to act by the Commissioner under this chapter may appeal to the Superior Court for Washington County in the same manner as is provided for in other civil actions.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Appeals from decisions of governmental agencies, see V.R.C.P. 74.

    § 3806. Certificate of origin.

    1. When a new vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is delivered in this State by the manufacturer to his or her agent or his or her franchised dealer, the manufacturer shall execute and deliver to his or her agent or his or her franchised dealer a certificate of origin in the form prescribed by the Commissioner.
    2. No person shall bring into this State any new vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle unless he or she has possession of the certificate of origin as prescribed by the Commissioner.
    3. The certificate of origin shall contain:
      1. for a vessel:
        1. the manufacturer’s hull identification number of the vessel;
        2. the name of the manufacturer;
        3. the make of the vessel;
        4. the model year;
        5. a description of the construction materials;
        6. the type of model; and
        7. the length of the vessel.
      2. for a snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle:
        1. the manufacturer’s serial number;
        2. the name of the manufacturer;
        3. the make of the snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle;
        4. the model year; and
        5. the type of model.
    4. When a new vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is sold in this State, the manufacturer, his or her agent, or his or her franchised dealer shall execute and deliver to the purchaser, in case of an absolute sale, assignment of the certificate of origin or if other than absolute sale, assignment of the certificate of origin subject to contract, signed or executed by the manufacturer, his or her agent, or his or her dealer, with the genuine names and business or residence addresses of both stated on the certificate, and certified to have been executed with full knowledge of the contents and with the consent of both purchaser and seller. For good cause shown, the Commissioner may accept any other satisfactory evidence of the information required in a certificate of origin pursuant to this section.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 249.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): In the last sentence, deleted “above required” preceding “information” and inserted “required in a certificate of origin pursuant to this section” thereafter.

    —2001 (Adj. Session). Inserted “snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” in subsecs. (a), (b), and (d), and rewrote subsec. (c).

    § 3807. Exempted vessels, snowmobiles, and all-terrain vehicles.

    No certificate of title need be obtained for:

    1. any vessel under 16 feet in length;
    2. any snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle of a model year prior to 2004 or that is more than 15 years old;
    3. any vessel that is a canoe, kayak, or similar watercraft designed to be manually propelled or equipped with a motor not to exceed 10 horsepower;
    4. a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle owned by the United States, unless it is registered in this State;
    5. a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle owned by a manufacturer or dealer and held for sale;
    6. a vessel owned by a nonresident of this State and not required by law to be registered in this State;
    7. a vessel regularly engaged in the interstate transportation of persons or property for which a currently effective certificate of title has been issued in another state;
    8. any snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle owned by a nonresident of this State whose state of residence does not require a certificate of title for any such snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle;
    9. any snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle owned by a nonresident of this State whose state of residence does require a certificate of title for any such snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle and the title has been issued or applied for;
    10. any vessels that are more than 15 years old.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2007, No. 19 , § 7; 2011, No. 46 , § 12.

    History

    Amendments

    —2011. Subdiv. (2): Inserted “or that is more than 15 years old” following “2004”.

    —2007. Subdiv. (2): Deleted “any vessel of a model year prior to 1989, or” preceding “any snowmobile”.

    Subdiv. (10): Added.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Added “snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles” in the section heading, “or any snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle of a model year prior to 2004” in subdiv. (2), inserted “snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” in subdivs. (4) and (5), and added subdivs. (8) and (9).

    § 3808. Application for certificate.

    1. The application for the first certificate of title of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle in this State shall be made by the owner to the Commissioner on the form the Commissioner prescribes and shall contain:
      1. the name, residence, and mail address of the owner;
      2. a description of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, including information required by subsection 3806(c) of this title if these data exist, and an indication whether the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is new or used;
      3. the date of purchase by the applicant; the name and address of the person from whom the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle was acquired; the names and addresses of any lienholders in the order of their priority and the dates of their security agreements; and, if a new vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, the manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate of origin; and
      4. any further information the Commissioner reasonably requires to identify the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle and to enable him or her to determine whether the owner is entitled to a certificate of title and to determine the existence or nonexistence of security interests in the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.
      5. [Repealed.]
    2. If the application refers to a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle purchased from a dealer, it shall contain the name and address of any lienholder holding a security interest created or reserved at the time of the sale and the date of his or her security agreement and be signed by the dealer as well as the owner, and the dealer shall promptly mail or deliver the application to the Commissioner.
    3. If the application refers to a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle last previously registered in another state or country, the application shall contain or be accompanied by:
      1. any certificate of title issued by the other state or country; and
      2. any other information and documents the Commissioner reasonably requires to establish the ownership of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle and the existence or nonexistence of security interests in it.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2011, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

    History

    Amendments

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “information required by subsection 3806(c) of this title” for “its make, model, identification number, construction materials, length, and” preceding “whether” and inserted “the vessel, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle is” thereafter in subdiv. (a)(2), and inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” and “, snowmobiles or all-terrain vehicles” following “vessels” throughout the section.

    § 3809. Commissioner to check identification number.

    The Commissioner, upon receiving application for a first certificate of title, shall check the identification number of the vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles shown in the application against the records of vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles required to be maintained by section 3810 of this title and against the record of stolen and converted vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles required to be maintained by section 3831 of this title.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobiles or all-terrain vehicles” following “vessels” in three places.

    § 3810. Issuance of certificate; records.

    1. The Commissioner shall file each application received and, when satisfied as to its genuineness and regularity and that the applicant is entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title, shall issue a certificate of title of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.
      1. The Commissioner shall maintain at his or her central office a record of all certificates of title issued by him or her: (b) (1) The Commissioner shall maintain at his or her central office a record of all certificates of title issued by him or her:
        1. under a distinctive title number assigned to the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle;
        2. under the identification number of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle;
        3. alphabetically, under the name of the owner; and, in the discretion of the Commissioner, by any other method he or she determines.
      2. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2011, No. 46 , § 21.

    History

    Revision note

    —2007. Redesignated the subdivs. in subsec. (b), including the designation of the introductory sentence as (b)(1) and the final sentence of the subsec. as subdiv. (b)(2).

    Amendments

    —2011. Subdiv. (b)(2): Repealed.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” in subsec. (a) and subdivs. (b)(1) and (2).

    § 3811. Information on certificate.

    1. Each certificate of title issued by the Commissioner shall contain:
      1. The date issued.
      2. The name and address of the owner.
      3. The names and addresses of any lienholders, in the order of priority as shown on the application or, if the application is based on a certificate of title, as shown on the certificate; however, no more than two lienholders may appear on a certificate. In the event that there are more than two lienholders on the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, the certificate of title shall contain an appropriate legend as determined by the Commissioner.
      4. The title number assigned to the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.
      5. A description of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle including, so far as the following data exist:
        1. its make, model, identification, or serial number;
        2. for a vessel, its construction materials and length, whether new or used;
        3. if a new vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, the date of the first sale of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle for use.
      6. Any other data the Commissioner prescribes.
    2. Unless a bond is filed as provided in subdivision 3813(2) of this title, a distinctive certificate of title shall be issued for a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle last previously registered in another state or country the laws of which do not require that lienholders be named on a certificate of title to perfect their security interests, or for which a title had not been issued by such other state or country. The certificate shall contain an appropriate legend as determined by the Commissioner and may contain any other information the Commissioner prescribes. If no notice of a security interest in the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is received by the Commissioner within four months from the issuance of the distinctive certificate of title, he or she shall, upon application and surrender of the distinctive certificate, issue a certificate of title in ordinary form.
    3. The certificate of title shall contain forms for assignment and warranty of title by the owner and for assignment and warranty of title by a dealer, and may contain forms for applications for a certificate of title by a transferee, the naming of a lienholder, and the assignment or release of the security interest of a lienholder.
    4. A certificate of title issued by the Commissioner is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it.
    5. A certificate of title for a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is not subject to garnishment, attachment, execution, or other judicial process, but this subsection does not prevent a lawful levy upon the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 50 , § 20.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(3): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (b): Rewrote the second sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Rewrote subsec. (a)(5), added “or for which a title had not been issued by such other state or country” in the first sentence of subsec. (b), and inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” throughout the section.

    § 3812. Mailing certificate.

    The certificate of title shall be mailed or personally delivered, upon proper identification of the individual, to the first lienholder named in it or, if none, to the owner.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3813. Withholding of certificate; bond required.

    If the Commissioner is not satisfied as to the ownership of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle or that there are no undisclosed security interests in it, the Commissioner may register the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, but shall either:

    1. withhold issuance of a certificate of title until the applicant presents documents reasonably sufficient to satisfy the Commissioner as to the applicant’s ownership of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle and that there are no undisclosed security interests in it; or
    2. as a condition of issuing a certificate of title, require the applicant to file with the Commissioner a bond in the form prescribed by the Commissioner and executed by the applicant, and either accompanied by the deposit of cash with the Commissioner or also executed by a person authorized to conduct a surety business in this State. The bond shall be in an amount equal to one and one-half times the value of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle as determined by the Commissioner and conditioned to indemnify any prior owner and lienholder and any subsequent purchaser of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle or person acquiring any security interest in it, and their respective successors in interest, against any expense, loss, or damage, including reasonable attorney’s fees, by reason of the issuance of the certificate of title of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle or on account of any defect in or undisclosed security interest upon the right, title, and interest of the applicant in and to the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle. Any such interested person has a right of action to recover on the bond for any breach of its conditions, but the aggregate liability of the surety to all persons shall not exceed the amount of the bond. The bond, and any deposit accompanying it, shall be returned at the end of three years or earlier if the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is no longer registered in this State and the currently valid certificate of title is surrendered to the Commissioner, unless the Commissioner has been notified of the pendency of an action to recover on the bond.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 250.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (2): Substituted “earlier” for “prior thereto” in the last sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” throughout the section.

    § 3814. Refusal of certificate.

    The Commissioner shall refuse issuance of a certificate of title if any required fee is not paid or if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that:

    1. the applicant is not the owner of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle;
    2. the application contains a false or fraudulent statement; or
    3. the applicant fails to furnish required information or documents or any additional information the Commissioner reasonably requires.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (1): Added “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel”.

    § 3815. Duplicate certificate.

    1. If a certificate is lost, stolen, mutilated, or destroyed or becomes illegible, the first lienholder or, if none, the owner or legal representative of the owner named in the certificate, as shown by the records of the Commissioner, shall promptly make application for and may obtain a duplicate upon furnishing information satisfactory to the Commissioner. It shall be mailed to the first lienholder named in it or, if none, to the owner.
    2. A person recovering an original certificate of title for which a duplicate has been issued shall promptly surrender the original certificate to the Commissioner.
    3. When a duplicate certificate of title is issued, the Commissioner shall cause the original certificate of title for that vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle to be revoked.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2015, No. 50 , § 21.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Deleted the former second sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel”.

    § 3816. Transfer of interest in vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.

    1. If an owner transfers his or her interest in a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, other than by the creation of a security interest, he or she shall, at the time of delivery of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, execute an assignment and warranty of title to the transferee in the space provided on the certificate or as the Commissioner prescribes, and cause the certificate and assignment to be mailed or delivered to the transferee or to the Commissioner. Where title to a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is in the name of more than one person, the nature of the ownership must be indicated by one of the following on the certificate of title:
      1. TEN ENT (tenants by the entirety);
      2. JTEN (joint tenants);
      3. TEN COM (tenants in common); or
      4. PTNRS (partners).
    2. Upon request of the owner or transferee, a lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall, unless the transfer was a breach of his or her security agreement, either deliver the certificate to the transferee for delivery to the Commissioner or, upon receipt from the transferee of the owner’s assignment, the transferee’s application for a new certificate, and the required fee, mail or deliver them to the Commissioner.  The delivery of the certificate does not affect the rights of the lienholder under his or her security agreement.
    3. If a security interest is reserved or created at the time of the transfer, the certificate of title shall be retained by or delivered to the person who becomes the lienholder, and the parties shall comply with the provisions of section 3824 of this title.
    4. Except as provided in section 3817 of this title and as between the parties, a transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of this section and section 3819 of this title have been complied with; however, an owner who has delivered possession of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle to the transferee and has complied with the provisions of this section and section 3819 of this title requiring action by him or her is not liable as owner for any damages thereafter resulting from operation of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.
      1. Pursuant to the provisions of 14 V.S.A. § 313 , whenever the estate of an individual who dies intestate consists principally of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, the surviving spouse shall be deemed to be the owner of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle and title to the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle shall automatically pass to the surviving spouse. Upon request, the Department shall register and title the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle in the name of the surviving spouse, and no fee shall be assessed. (e) (1) Pursuant to the provisions of 14 V.S.A. § 313 , whenever the estate of an individual who dies intestate consists principally of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, the surviving spouse shall be deemed to be the owner of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle and title to the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle shall automatically pass to the surviving spouse. Upon request, the Department shall register and title the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle in the name of the surviving spouse, and no fee shall be assessed.
      2. Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, and except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, whenever the estate of an individual consists in whole or in part of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, and the person’s will or other testamentary document does not specifically address disposition of the same, the surviving spouse shall be deemed to be the owner and title to the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle shall automatically pass to the surviving spouse. Upon request, the Department shall register and title the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle in the name of the surviving spouse, and no fee shall be assessed.
      3. This subsection shall not apply if the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is titled in the name of one or more persons other than the decedent and the surviving spouse.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2009, No. 55 , § 7; 2017, No. 71 , § 17.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subsec. (d), substituted “to” for “of” preceding “the transferee” to correct a grammatical error.

    Amendments

    —2017. Section heading: Added “, Snowmobile, or All-Terrain Vehicle”.

    Subsec. (e): Amended generally.

    —2009. Subsec. (e): Substituted “313” for “403a” in the first sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” throughout subsecs. (a), (d), and (e), and substituted “pursuant to the provisions of 14 V.S.A. § 403a ” for “notwithstanding other provisions of the law” in the first sentence of subsec. (e).

    § 3817. Resale by dealer.

    If a dealer buys a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle and holds it for resale and obtains the certificate of title from the owner or the lienholder within 10 days after receiving the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, the certificate need not be sent to the Commissioner. When the dealer transfers the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle to a person, other than by the creation of a security interest, he or she shall simultaneously execute the assignment and warranty of title by filling in the spaces on the certificate of title or as prescribed by the Commissioner. The certificate shall be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner with the transferee’s application for a new certificate.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

    § 3818. Involuntary transfers.

    1. If the interest of an owner in a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle passes to another person, other than by voluntary transfer, the transferee shall, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, promptly mail or deliver to the Commissioner the last certificate of title, if available, proof of the transfer, and his or her application for a new certificate in the form the Commissioner prescribes.
    2. If the interest of the owner is terminated or the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is sold under a security agreement by a lienholder named in the certificate of title, the transferee shall promptly mail or deliver to the Commissioner the last certificate of title, his or her application for a new certificate in the form the Commissioner prescribes, and an affidavit, made by or on behalf of the lienholder, that the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle was repossessed and that the interest of the owner was lawfully terminated or sold pursuant to the terms of the security agreement. If the lienholder succeeds to the interest of the owner and holds the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle for resale, he or she need not secure a new certificate of title but, upon transfer to another person, shall promptly mail or deliver to the transferee or to the Commissioner the certificate, affidavit, and other documents required to be sent to the Commissioner by the transferee.
    3. A person holding a certificate of title whose interest in the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle has been extinguished or transferred other than by voluntary transfer shall mail or deliver the certificate to the Commissioner upon request of the Commissioner. The delivery of the certificate pursuant to the request of the Commissioner does not affect the rights of the person surrendering the certificate, and the action of the Commissioner in issuing a new certificate of title is not conclusive upon the rights of an owner or lienholder named in the old certificate.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 251.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Deleted “as provided herein” following “title” in the last sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” in subsec. (a), in three places in subsec. (b), and in subsec. (c).

    § 3819. Fee to accompany applications.

    1. An application for a certificate of title shall be accompanied by the required fee when mailed or delivered to the Commissioner.
    2. An application for the naming of a lienholder or his or her assignee on a certificate of title shall be accompanied by the required fee when mailed or delivered to the Commissioner.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3820. Issuance of new certificate.

    1. The Commissioner, upon receipt of a properly assigned certificate of title, with an application for a new certificate of title, the required fee, and any other documents required by law, shall issue a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee as owner and mail to the first lienholder named in it or, if none, to the owner.
    2. The Commissioner, upon receipt of an application for a new certificate of title by a transferee other than by voluntary transfer, with proof of the transfer, the required fee, and any other documents required by law, shall issue a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee as owner. If the outstanding certificate of title is not delivered to him or her, the Commissioner shall make demand from the holder.
    3. The Commissioner shall file and retain every surrendered certificate of title for five years. The file shall be maintained so as to permit the tracing of title of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle designated.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2011, No. 46 , § 22.

    History

    Amendments

    —2011. Subsec. (c): Deleted the former third sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” in subsec. (c).

    § 3821. Suspension or revocation of certificate.

    1. The Commissioner shall suspend or revoke a certificate of title, upon notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard in accordance with section 3804 of this chapter, if he or she finds:
      1. the certificate of title was fraudulently procured or erroneously issued; or
      2. the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle has been scrapped, dismantled, or destroyed.
    2. Suspension or revocation of a certificate of title does not, in itself, affect the validity of a security interest noted on it.
    3. When the Commissioner suspends or revokes a certificate of title, the owner or person in possession of it shall, immediately upon receiving notice of the suspension or revocation, mail or deliver the certificate to the Commissioner.
    4. The Commissioner may seize and impound any certificate of title which has been suspended or revoked.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(2): Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel”.

    § 3822. Certain liens and security interests not affected.

    This chapter does not apply to or affect:

    1. a lien given by statute or rule of law to a supplier of services or materials for the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle;
    2. a lien given by statute to the United States, this State, or any political subdivision of this State;
    3. a security interest in a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle created by a manufacturer or dealer who holds the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle for sale, but a buyer in the ordinary course of trade from the manufacturer or dealer takes free of the security interest.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 18.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” in subdiv. (1) and in two places in subdiv. (3).

    § 3823. Perfecting security interest.

    1. Unless excepted by section 3822 of this title, a security interest in a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle of a type for which a certificate of title is required is not valid against creditors of the owner or subsequent transferees or lienholders of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle unless perfected as provided in this chapter.
    2. A security interest is perfected by the delivery to the Commissioner of the existing certificate of title, if any, an application for a certificate of title containing the name and address of the lienholder and the date of his or her security agreement, and the required fee.  It is perfected as of the time of its creation if delivery is completed within 20 days thereafter, otherwise as of the time of the delivery.
    3. If a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is subject to a security interest when brought into this State, the validity of the security interest is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle was when the security interest attached, subject to the following:
      1. If the parties understood at the time the security interest attached that the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle would be kept in this State and it was brought into this State within 30 days thereafter for purposes other than transportation through this State, the validity of the security interest in this State is determined by the law of this State.
      2. If the security interest was perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle was when the security interest attached, the following rules apply:
        1. If the name of the lienholder is shown on an existing certificate of title issued by that jurisdiction, his or her security interest continues perfected in this State.
        2. If the name of the lienholder is not shown on an existing certificate of title issued by that jurisdiction, the security interest continues perfected in this State for four months after a first certificate of title of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is issued in this State, and also thereafter if, within the four-month period, it is perfected in this State. The security interest may also be perfected in this State after the expiration of the four-month period; in that case perfection dates from the time of perfection in this State.
      3. If the security interest was not perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle was when the security interest attached, it may be perfected in this State; in that case, perfection dates from the time of perfection in this State.
      4. A security interest may be perfected under subdivision (2)(B) or subdivision (3) of this subsection either as provided in subsection (b) of this section or by the lienholder delivering to the Commissioner a notice of security interest in the form the Commissioner prescribes and the required fee.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 19.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” in two places in subsec. (a) and throughout subsec. (c).

    § 3824. Duties on creation of security interest.

    If an owner creates a security interest in a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle:

    1. The owner shall immediately execute the application, in the space provided on the certificate of title or on a separate form the Commissioner prescribes, to name the lienholder on the certificate, showing the name and address of the lienholder and the date of his or her security agreement, and cause the certificate, the application, and the required fee to be delivered to the lienholder.
    2. The lienholder shall immediately cause the certificate, the application, and the required fee to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner.
    3. Upon request of the owner or subordinate lienholder, a lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall either mail or deliver the certificate to the subordinate lienholder for delivery to the Commissioner or, upon receipt from the subordinate lienholder of the owner’s application and the required fee, mail or deliver them to the Commissioner with the certificate. The delivery of the certificate does not affect the rights of the first lienholder under his or her security agreement.
    4. Upon receipt of the certificate of title, the application, and the required fee, the Commissioner shall either endorse the certificate or issue a new certificate containing the name and address of the new lienholder, and mail the certificate to the first lienholder named in it.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 20.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Added “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” in the introductory paragraph.

    § 3825. Assignment of security interest.

    1. A lienholder may assign, absolutely or otherwise, his or her security interest in the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle to a person other than the owner without affecting the interest of the owner or the validity of the security interest, but any person without notice of the assignment is protected in dealing with the lienholder as the holder of the security interest and the lienholder remains liable for any obligations as lienholder until the assignee is named as lienholder on the certificate.
    2. The assignee may, but need not to perfect the assignment, have the certificate of title endorsed or issued with the assignee named as lienholder, upon delivering to the Commissioner the certificate and an assignment by the lienholder named in the certificate in the form the Commissioner prescribes.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj Sess.), § 21.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel”.

    § 3826. Release of security interest.

    1. Upon the satisfaction of a security interest in a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle for which the certificate of title is in the possession of the lienholder, he or she shall, within 10 days after demand and, in any event, within 30 days, execute a release of his or her security interest, in the space provided on the certificate or as the Commissioner prescribes, and mail or deliver the certificate and release to the next lienholder named, or, if none, to the owner or any person who delivers to the lienholder an authorization from the owner to receive the certificate. The owner, other than a dealer holding the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle for resale, shall promptly cause the certificate and release to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner, who shall release the lienholder’s rights on the certificate or issue a new certificate.
    2. Upon the satisfaction of a security interest in a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle for which the certificate of title is in the possession of a prior lienholder, the lienholder whose security interest is satisfied shall within 10 days after demand and, in any event, within 30 days execute a release in the form the Commissioner prescribes and deliver the release to the owner or any person who delivers to the lienholder an authorization from the owner to receive it. The lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall either deliver the certificate to the owner, or the person authorized by him or her, for delivery to the Commissioner or, upon receipt of the release, mail or deliver it with the certificate to the Commissioner, who shall release the subordinate lienholder’s rights on the certificate or issue a new certificate.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 22.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” in two places in subsec. (a) and in subsec. (b), and substituted “10 days” for “ten days” in the first sentence of subsec. (a) and in the first sentence of subsec. (b).

    § 3827. Lienholder to furnish information.

    A lienholder named in a certificate of title shall, upon written request of the owner or of another lienholder named on the certificate, disclose any pertinent information as to his or her security agreement and the indebtedness secured by it.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3828. Method of perfecting security interest exclusive.

    The method provided in this chapter of perfecting and giving notice of security interests subject to this chapter is exclusive. Security interests subject to this chapter are exempted from the provisions of law that otherwise require or relate to the filing of instruments creating or evidencing security interests.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 3829. Altering, forging, or counterfeiting certificates.

    1. No person shall with fraudulent intent:
      1. alter, forge, or counterfeit a certificate of title;
      2. alter or forge an assignment of a certificate of title, or an assignment or release of a security interest, on a certificate of title or a form the Commissioner prescribes;
      3. possess or use a certificate of title knowing it to have been altered, forged, or counterfeited; or
      4. use a false or fictitious name or address, or make a material false statement, or fail to disclose a security interest, or conceal any other material fact, in an application for a certificate of title or a duplicate certificate of title.
    2. A person convicted under this section shall be fined not less than $500.00 nor more than $5,000.00 or be imprisoned for not less than one year or for more than five years, or both.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

    History

    Revision note

    —2007. Designated undesignated paragraphs as subsecs. (a) and (b). In subsec. (a), in the introductory phrase, substituted “No person shall” for “A person who” and made corresponding grammatical changes. In subsec. (b), added the introductory phrase “A person convicted under this section”.

    Amendments

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (4): Inserted “or a duplicate certificate of title” preceding “shall be fined” and substituted “$5000.00” for “$1,000.00” preceding “or be imprisoned”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Counterfeiting, fraud, and misuse, see § 203 of this title.

    Forgery and counterfeiting of documents, see 13 V.S.A. § 1801 .

    § 3830. Other offenses.

    1. No person shall:
      1. with fraudulent intent, permit another, not otherwise entitled, to use or have possession of a certificate of title;
      2. willfully fail to mail or deliver a certificate of title or application to the Commissioner within 10 days after the time required by this chapter;
      3. willfully fail to deliver to his or her transferee a certificate of title within 10 days after the time required by this chapter; or
      4. willfully violate any provision of this chapter, except as provided in section 3829 of this title.
    2. A person convicted under this section shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 252.

    History

    Revision note

    —2014. The changes referenced in the 2007 revision note were not fully implemented in the 2007 republication on Title 23. Instead of substituting “No person shall” for “A person who,” the 2007 republication replaced the latter with “No person who”. The 2014 republication of Title 23 substituted “No person shall” for “No person who” and made corresponding grammatical changes.

    —2007. Designated undesignated paragraphs as subsecs. (a) and (b). In subsec. (a), in the introductory phrase, substituted “No person shall” for “A person who” and made corresponding grammatical changes. In subsec. (b), added the introductory phrase “A person convicted under this section”.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Inserted “otherwise” preceding “entitled” and deleted “thereto” thereafter.

    —1991 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “$1,000.00” for “$500.00” preceding “or imprisoned” and “one year” for “six months” preceding “or both” near the end of the section.

    § 3831. Report of theft; recovery of unclaimed vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.

    1. An enforcement officer, sheriff, or constable who learns of the theft of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle not since recovered, or of the recovery of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle whose theft or conversion he or she knows or has reason to believe has been reported to the Commissioner, shall forthwith report the theft or recovery to the Commissioner.
    2. An owner or a lienholder may report the theft of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, or its conversion if a crime, to the Commissioner, but the Commissioner may disregard the report of a conversion unless a warrant has been issued for the arrest of a person charged with the conversion. A person who has reported the theft or conversion of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle shall, forthwith after learning of its recovery, report the recovery to the Commissioner.
    3. An operator of a place of business for garaging, repairing, parking, or storing vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles for the public, in which a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle remains unclaimed for a period of 30 days, shall, within five days after the expiration of that period, report the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle as unclaimed, to the Commissioner. A vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle left by its owner whose name and address are known to the operator or his or her employee is not considered unclaimed. A person who fails to report a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle as unclaimed in accordance with this subsection forfeits all claims and liens for its garaging, parking, or storing and shall be fined not more than $25.00 for each day his or her failure to report continues.
    4. The Commissioner shall maintain and appropriately index weekly, any cumulative public records of stolen, converted, recovered, and unclaimed vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles reported to him or her pursuant to this section. The Commissioner may make and distribute copies of the weekly records so maintained to enforcement officers upon request without fee and to others for the fee, if any, the Commissioner prescribes.
    5. The Commissioner may suspend the registration of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle whose theft or conversion is reported to him or her pursuant to this section. Until the Commissioner learns of its recovery or that the report of its theft or conversion was erroneous, he or she shall not issue a certificate of title for the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 23.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel” in the section heading and throughout the section and inserted “, snowmobiles or all-terrain vehicles” following “vessels” in the first sentence of subsec. (c) and the first sentence of subsec. (d).

    § 3832. False report.

    A person who knowingly makes a false report of the theft or conversion of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle to an enforcement officer or to the Commissioner shall be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2001, No. 107 (Adj. Sess.), § 24.

    History

    Amendments

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted “, snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle” following “vessel”.

    § 3833. Dismantling or destruction of vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles.

    1. Except for vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles for which no certificate of title is required pursuant to section 3807 of this title, any person who purchases or in any manner acquires a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle as salvage who scraps, dismantles, or destroys a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, or any insurance company or representative of an insurance company who declares a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle to be a total loss, shall make application for a salvage certificate of title within 15 days of the time the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is purchased or otherwise acquired as salvage, scrapped, dismantled, or destroyed, or declared a total loss.  The application shall be accompanied by:
      1. any certificate of title; and
      2. any other information or documents that the Commissioner may reasonably require to establish ownership of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle and the existence or nonexistence of any security interest in the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.
    2. When a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is destroyed by crushing for scrap, the person causing the destruction shall immediately mail or deliver to the Commissioner the certificate of title, if any, endorsed “crushed” and signed by the person, accompanied by the original plate showing the original identification number.  The plate shall not be removed until such time as the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is crushed.
    3. This section shall not apply to, and salvage certificates shall not be required for, unrecovered stolen vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles or vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles stolen and recovered in an undamaged condition, provided that the original vessel, snowmobile, or all terrain vehicle identification number plate has not been removed, altered, or destroyed, and the number on the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is identical with that on the original title certificate.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 39 , § 7.

    § 3834. Issuance of salvage title.

    The Commissioner shall file and maintain in the manner provided in section 3010 of this title each application received and when satisfied as to its genuineness and regularity and that the applicant is entitled to the issuance of a salvage certificate of title, shall issue a salvage certificate of title to the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 39 , § 8.

    § 3835. Salvaged, totaled, and rebuilt vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles.

    1. If a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle upon which a salvage certificate of title, a parts-only certificate, or other document indicating the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle is not sold for reregistration purposes has been or should have been issued by the Commissioner or by any other jurisdiction or person, or if a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle that has been declared totaled is rebuilt and restored for operation, the owner shall not apply for a certificate of title or registration, and none shall be issued, until the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle has been inspected by the Commissioner or his or her authorized representative. The inspection of the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle shall be conducted in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner and shall include verification of the identification number and bills of sale or titles for major component parts used to rebuild the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle. When necessary, a new identification number shall be attached to the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle as provided by section 2003 of this title. Any new title issued for these vessels, snowmobiles, or all-terrain vehicles shall contain the legend “rebuilt.”
    2. Any person who sells, trades, or offers for sale or trade to a prospective purchaser any interest in a salvaged, salvaged and rebuilt, or totaled vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle shall disclose the fact that the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle has been salvaged, salvaged and rebuilt, or totaled both orally and in writing before a sale, trade, or transfer is made. Written disclosure that the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle has been salvaged, salvaged and rebuilt, or totaled, in addition to being disclosed on the certificate of title as required by this subchapter, shall also be conspicuously disclosed on any bill of sale, transfer, purchase, or other agreement.
    3. Failure of the seller to provide the notices required by this section shall result in the seller being required, at the option of the buyer, to refund to the buyer the purchase price, including taxes, license fees, and similar governmental charges.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 39 , § 9; amended 2015, No. 50 , § 22.

    History

    Amendments

    —2015. Subsec. (a): Deleted the comma following “Commissioner”, substituted “, or if” for “or both,” preceding “a vessel” in the first sentence, and deleted “vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle” following “rebuilt” in the last sentence.

    § 3836. Records; inspection.

    1. Each person who purchases or in any manner acquires a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle as salvage shall keep and maintain for a period of not less than five years such records as may be prescribed by the Commissioner that are reasonably necessary to substantiate the information contained in the application required by sections 3833 and 3835 of this title. These records shall include parts and accessories obtained and used for the repair or rebuilding, or both, of a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle, and such financial records that will allow the Commissioner to determine if the person qualifies to become or remain licensed as a “salvage dealer.”
    2. The Commissioner, or his or her agents, may inspect and examine the books, records, premises, and vehicles on the premises of any salvage dealer during the usual business hours of the day to verify the truth and accuracy of any information furnished in connection with the provisions of this section and section 3833 of this chapter.
    3. Any salvage dealer who in any manner receives a vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle that does not have a plate attached to the vessel, snowmobile, or all-terrain vehicle bearing the vehicle identification number shall notify the Commissioner in writing that such a vessel, snowmobile, or all terrain vehicle has been received within seven days.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 39 , § 10; amended 2021, No. 76 , § 32.

    History

    References in text.

    In subsec. (a), the reference to sections 3840 and 3842 is to sections that do not exist. The correct reference is likely to sections 3833 and 3835 of this title.

    Revision note

    —2020. In subsec. (b), substituted “this section and section 3833 of this chapter” for “sections 3833 and this section of this chapter” for consistency with V.S.A. style.

    —2013. In subsec. (a), deleted “, but are not limited to” following “include” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (a): Substituted “3833 and 3835” for “3840 and 3842” following “sections”.

    § 3837. Penalty.

    1. A person who violates any provision of section 3836 of this chapter shall be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.
    2. A person who violates section 3833 or 3835 of this chapter shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

    HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 39 , § 11.

    Chapter 37. Driver License Compact

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Operator’s licenses generally, see chapter 9, subchapter 1 of this title.

    ANNOTATIONS

    Application.

    Where plaintiff was convicted for out-of-state instance of DUI subsequent to enactment of Driver License Compact and to amendment of statute to allow out-of-state convictions to be used to calculate subsequent convictions for purposes of license suspension and revocation, fact that newly enacted and amended statutes were applied to add out-of-state conviction to previous Vermont conviction did not constitute impermissible ex post facto application of statutes; statutory amendments would have had no impact on plaintiff absent a new act by him (the out-of-state conviction) which triggered the new rule. Erno v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 156 Vt. 62, 587 A.2d 409, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 12 (1991).

    Construction.

    Construing the Driver License Compact and statute requiring Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to give persons notice and opportunity to be heard prior to revocation or suspension of a Vermont operator’s license based on out-of-state convictions, the statutes are best harmonized by giving effect to the provisions of each; therefore, notice and opportunity to be heard are required prior to such revocations or suspensions. Erno v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 156 Vt. 62, 587 A.2d 409, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 12 (1991).

    § 3901. The compact.

    The Driver License Compact, hereinafter called “the compact,” is entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining, in the form substantially as follows.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 62 , § 1.

    § 3902. Findings and declaration of policy—Article I.

    1. The party states find that:
      1. the safety of their highways is materially affected by the degree of compliance with state and local laws relating to the operation of motor vehicles;
      2. violation of state law or municipal ordinances is evidence that the violator engages in conduct that is likely to endanger the safety of persons and property;
      3. the continuance in force of a license to drive is predicated upon compliance with laws and ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles, in whichever jurisdiction the vehicle is operated.
    2. It is the policy of each of the party states to:
      1. promote compliance with the laws, ordinances, and administrative rules relating to the operation of motor vehicles by their operators in each of the jurisdictions where operators drive motor vehicles;
      2. make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility for licensure more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws, ordinances, and administrative rules as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license by reason of which the licensee is authorized or permitted to operate a motor vehicle in any of the party states.

    § 3903. Definitions—Article II.

    As used in this compact:

    1. “Conviction” means a conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle that is prohibited by state law, municipal ordinance, or administrative rule; or a forfeiture of bail, bond, or other security deposited to secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any such offense, and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority.
    2. “Executive head” means the governor.
    3. “Home state” means the state that has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.
    4. “Licensing authority” means the commissioner of the department of motor vehicles.
    5. “State” means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 62 , § 1.

    § 3904. Reports of conviction—Article III.

    The licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee. The report shall clearly identify the person convicted; describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code, or ordinance violated; identify the court in which action was taken; indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered, or the security; and shall include any special findings made in connection with the report.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 62 , § 1.

    § 3905. Effect of conviction—Article IV.

    1. The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension, revocation, or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III of this compact, as it would if the conduct had occurred in the home state, in the case of convictions for:
      1. manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;
      2. driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or narcotic drug, or under the influence of any other drug to a degree that renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle;
      3. any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;
      4. failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another.
    2. As to other convictions, reported pursuant to Article III, the licensing authority in the home state shall give such effect to the conduct as is provided by the laws of the home state.
    3. If the laws of a party state do not provide for offenses or violations described in precisely the words employed in subsection (a) of this Article, the party state shall construe the descriptions appearing in subsection (a) of this section as being applicable to and identifying those offenses or violations of a substantially similar nature, and the laws of the party state shall contain such provisions as may be necessary to ensure that full effect is given to this Article.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 62 , § 1; amended 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4).

    History

    References in text.

    Article III of the compact, referred to in the introductory paragraph of subsec. (a) and in subsec. (b), is codified as § 3904 of this title.

    Amendments

    —2017. Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “influence of”.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Driving under the influence, see chapter 13, subchapter 13 of this title.

    Duty to stop following an accident, see § 1128 of this title.

    Negligent and grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle, see § 1091 of this title.

    § 3906. Applications for new licenses—Article V.

    Upon application for a license to drive, the licensing authority in a party state shall determine whether the applicant has ever held, or is the holder of, a license to drive issued by any other party state. The licensing authority in the state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if:

    1. the applicant has held a license, but the same has been suspended by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if the suspension period has not terminated;
    2. the applicant has held a license, but it has been revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation; and if the revocation has not terminated, except that after the expiration of one year from the date the license was revoked, the person may make application for a new license if permitted by law.  The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to the applicant if after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to the person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways;
    3. the applicant is the holder of a license to drive issued by another party state and currently in force unless the applicant surrenders the license.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 62 , § 1.

    § 3907. Applicability of other laws—Article VI.

    Except as expressly required by provisions of this compact, nothing contained in the compact shall be construed to affect the rights of any party state to apply any of its other laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance, nor to invalidate or prevent any driver license agreement or other cooperative arrangement between a party state and a nonparty state.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 62 , § 1.

    § 3908. Compact administrator; interchange of information—Article VII.

    1. The head of the licensing authority of each party state shall be the administrator of this compact for his or her state. The administrators acting jointly, shall have the power to formulate all necessary and proper procedures for the exchange of information under this compact.  The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall furnish to the appropriate authorities of any other party state, any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the administration of Articles III, IV, and V of this compact.  The Commissioner shall not be entitled to any additional compensation on account of his or her service as administrator, but shall be entitled to expenses incurred in connection with his or her duties and responsibilities as administrator, in the same manner as for expenses incurred in connection with any other duties or responsibilities of his or her office or employment.
    2. The administrators of each state shall furnish to the administrator of each other party state any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the administration of this compact.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 62 , § 1.

    History

    References in text.

    Article III of the compact, referred to at the end of the third sentence of subsec. (a), is codified as § 3904 of this title.

    Article IV of the compact, referred to at the end of the third sentence of subsec. (a), is codified as § 3905 of this title.

    Article V of the compact, referred to at the end of the third sentence of subsec. (a), is codified as § 3906 of this title.

    § 3909. Entry into force; withdrawal—Article VIII.

    1. This compact shall become effective as to any state when it has been enacted into law.
    2. Any party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a repealing statute, but no withdrawal shall take effect until six months after the executive head of the withdrawing state has given notice of the withdrawal to the executive heads of all other party states.  No withdrawal shall affect the validity or applicability by the licensing authorities of states remaining party to the compact of any report of conviction occurring prior to the withdrawal.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 62 , § 1.

    § 3910. Construction and severability—Article IX.

    This compact shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this compact shall be severable; and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder to this compact and the applicability to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any party state, the compact shall remain in effect as to the remaining states and in effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

    HISTORY: Added 1987, No. 62 , § 1.

    Chapter 39. Commercial Driver’s License Act

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Chapter heading: 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254 substituted “Driver’s” for “Driver”.

    § 4101. Short title.

    This chapter may be cited as the Commercial Driver’s License Act.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Driver’s” for “Driver”.

    § 4102. Statement of intent and purpose.

    The purpose of this chapter is to implement 49 U.S.C. Chapter 313, as may be amended, and the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Title XII of Pub. L. No. 99-570, as amended, and reduce or prevent commercial motor vehicle crashes, fatalities, and injuries by permitting commercial drivers to hold only one license, disqualifying commercial drivers who have committed certain criminal or other offenses or serious traffic violations, and strengthening licensing and testing standards. This chapter is a remedial law and shall be liberally construed to promote the public health, safety, and welfare. To the extent that this chapter conflicts with general operator licensing provisions, this chapter prevails. Where this chapter is silent, the general operator licensing provisions apply.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, amended 1991, No. 88 , § 3, eff. April 1, 1992; 2013, No. 20 , § 1.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “crashes” for “accidents” in the first sentence in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    References in text.

    Title XII of Pub. L. No. 99-570, the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, referred to in this section, is codified as 49 U.S.C. §§ 31104, 31301-31317.

    Amendments

    —2013. Inserted “49 U.S.C. ch. 313, as may be amended, and” following “implement” and substituted “, Title XII of Pub. L. No. 99-570, as amended,” for “(Title XII of Pub. Law 99-570)”.

    —1991. Inserted “disqualifying commercial drivers who have committed certain criminal or other offenses, or serious traffic violations” following “license” in the first sentence.

    § 4103. Definitions.

    As used in this chapter:

    1. “Commercial driver’s license” means a license issued in accordance with the requirements of this chapter to an individual that authorizes the individual to drive a class of commercial motor vehicle.
    2. “Commercial Driver’s License Information System” means the information system established pursuant to federal law to serve as a clearinghouse for locating information related to the licensing and identification of commercial motor vehicle drivers.
    3. “Commercial learner’s permit” means a permit issued pursuant to sections 4108 and 4110 of this title.
      1. “Commercial motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle designed or used to transport passengers or property that: (4) (A) “Commercial motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle designed or used to transport passengers or property that:
        1. has either a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of at least 26,001 or more pounds or such lesser rating as determined by federal regulation;
        2. is designed to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver; or
        3. is transporting hazardous materials and is required to be placarded in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 172, subpart F.
      2. “Commercial motor vehicle” shall not include:
        1. authorized emergency vehicles as defined in section 4 of this title;
        2. motor homes as defined in 32 V.S.A. § 8902(11) and trailer coaches as defined in subdivision 4(41) of this title; however, this exemption shall only apply to vehicles used strictly for recreational, noncommercial purposes;
        3. equipment owned or operated by the U.S. Department of Defense, including the National Guard, and operated by noncivilian personnel or by National Guard military technicians (civilians who are required to wear military uniforms) and active duty U.S. Coast Guard personnel;
        4. farm vehicles, which are vehicles:
          1. controlled and operated by a farmer;
          2. used to transport either agricultural products, farm machinery, farm supplies or both to or from a farm;
          3. not used in the operations of a common or contract motor carrier; and
          4. used within 150 miles of the farm.
        5. [Repealed.]
    4. “Disqualification” means:
      1. the suspension, revocation, cancellation, or withdrawal by a state of an individual’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle;
      2. a determination by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, under the rules of practice for motor carrier safety contained in 49 C.F.R. Part 386, that an individual is no longer qualified to operate commercial motor vehicles under 49 C.F.R. Part 391; or
      3. the loss of qualification that automatically follows a testing refusal or conviction of an offense listed in 49 C.F.R. § 383.51.
    5. “Driver” means any individual who drives, operates, or is in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle on a public highway or who is required to hold a commercial driver’s license.
    6. “Employer” means any person, including the United States, a state, or a political subdivision of a state, who owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle or assigns an individual to drive a commercial motor vehicle.
    7. “Foreign jurisdiction” means any jurisdiction other than a state of the United States.
    8. “Gross vehicle weight rating” means the value specified by the manufacturer or manufacturers as the maximum loaded weight of a single or a combination vehicle. The gross vehicle weight rating of a combination vehicle is the gross vehicle weight rating of the power unit plus the gross vehicle weight rating of the towed unit or units.
    9. “Hazardous materials” means any material that has been designated as hazardous under 49 U.S.C. § 5103 and is required to be placarded under subpart F of 49 C.F.R. Part 172 or any quantity of a material listed as a select agent or toxin in 42 C.F.R. Part 73.
    10. “Nonresident CDL” means a commercial driver’s license issued by a state to an individual who resides in a foreign jurisdiction.
    11. [Repealed.]
    12. “State” means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Republic of Mexico, and any Canadian province.
    13. “United States” means the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
    14. “Conviction” means an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or a determination by a judge or hearing officer that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal, an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person’s appearance in court, the payment of a fine or court cost, or violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated.  Conviction shall also mean a plea of guilty or nolo contendere that has been accepted by the court.
    15. “Serious traffic violation” means a conviction when operating a commercial motor vehicle or, if applicable, when operating a noncommercial motor vehicle when the conviction results in the revocation, cancellation, or suspension of the operator’s license or operating privilege, of:
      1. Excessive speeding, involving a single charge of any speed 15 miles per hour or more, above the posted speed limit.
      2. Negligent or reckless driving, as defined in section 1091 of this title.
      3. Improper traffic lane changes, as defined in section 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, or 1038 of this title.
      4. Following the vehicle ahead too closely, as defined in section 1039 of this title.
      5. A violation of any state law or local ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than a parking violation, arising in connection with a crash or collision resulting in death to any individual.
      6. Operating a commercial motor vehicle without obtaining a commercial driver’s license.
      7. Operating a commercial motor vehicle without a commercial driver’s license in the driver’s possession. However, no person may be found to have committed this violation if he or she provides proof to the enforcement officer who issued the traffic complaint that the individual held a commercial driver’s license valid on the date the complaint was issued.
      8. Operating a commercial motor vehicle without the proper class of commercial driver’s license or endorsements, or both.
      9. Texting while driving a commercial motor vehicle in violation of section 4125 of this chapter or section 1099 of this title.
      10. Using a handheld mobile telephone while driving a commercial motor vehicle in violation of section 4125 of this chapter.
    16. “Tank vehicle” means any commercial motor vehicle that is designed to transport any liquid or gaseous materials within a tank or tanks having an individual rated capacity of more than 119 gallons and an aggregate rated capacity of 1,000 gallons or more that is either permanently or temporarily attached to the vehicle or the chassis. A commercial motor vehicle transporting an empty storage container tank, not designed for transportation, with a rated capacity of 1,000 gallons or more that is temporarily attached to a flatbed trailer is not a tank vehicle.
    17. “Out-of-service order” means a declaration by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration or an authorized enforcement officer of a federal, state, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Canadian, Mexican, or local jurisdiction, that a driver, or a commercial motor vehicle, or a school bus, or a motor carrier operation, is out of service.
    18. “Imminent hazard” means the existence of a condition that presents a substantial likelihood that death, serious illness, severe personal injury, or a substantial endangerment to health, property, or the environment may occur before the reasonably foreseeable completion date of a formal proceeding begun to lessen the risk of that death, illness, injury, or endangerment.
    19. “Medical examiner” means:
      1. For medical examinations conducted before May 21, 2014, or before such later date as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) may prescribe, a person who is licensed, certified, or registered in accordance with applicable state laws and rules to perform physical examinations. A “medical examiner” may include a doctor of medicine, osteopathic physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse, or chiropractic physician.
      2. For medical examinations conducted on and after May 21, 2014, or on or after such later date as the FMCSA may prescribe, an individual certified by the FMCSA and listed on the National Registry of Certified Medical Examiners.
    20. A person’s state of domicile is that state where a person has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home and physical residence and to which he or she has the intention of returning whenever he or she is absent.
    21. “Mobile telephone” means a mobile communication device that falls under or uses any commercial mobile radio service, as defined under 47 C.F.R. § 20.3. “Mobile telephone” does not include two-way or Citizens Band Radio services.
    22. “Texting” means manually entering alphanumeric text into, or reading text from, an electronic device. “Texting” includes short message service, e-mailing, instant messaging, a command or request to access a World Wide Web page, pressing more than a single button to initiate or terminate a voice communication using a mobile telephone, or engaging in any other form of electronic text retrieval or entry, for present or future communication. “Texting” does not include:
      1. inputting, selecting, or reading information on a global positioning system or navigation system;
      2. pressing a single button to initiate or terminate a voice communication using a mobile telephone; or
      3. using a device capable of performing multiple functions, including fleet management systems, dispatching devices, smart phones, citizens band radios, and music players for a purpose that is not otherwise prohibited in this chapter.
    23. “Use a hand-held mobile telephone” means:
      1. using at least one hand to hold a mobile telephone to conduct a voice communication;
      2. dialing or answering a mobile telephone by pressing more than a single button; or
      3. reaching for a mobile telephone in a manner that requires a driver to maneuver so that he or she is no longer in a seated driving position and restrained by a seat belt that is installed in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 393.93 and adjusted in accordance with the vehicle manufacturer’s instructions.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 88 , § 4; 1991, No. 88 , §§ 5, 7, eff. June 26, 1991; 1991, No. 88, §§ 6, 8, eff. April 1, 1992; 1995, No. 84 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2, eff. Oct. 1, 1996; 1997, No. 32 , § 6; 2005, No. 37 , §§ 2, 3; 2005, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 24; 2015, No. 47 , § 51; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2021, No. 76 , § 27.

    History

    Revision note

    —2021. Substituted “a crash” for “an accident” in subdiv. (16)(E) in accordance with 2021, No. 76 , § 23.

    Amendments—

    Subdiv. (16)(E): Substituted “state” for “State” preceding “law or local ordinance”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally by Act No. 131.

    Subdiv. (4): Amended generally by Act No. 149.

    —2015. Subdiv. (16)(I): Added “a commercial motor vehicle” following “Texting while driving”.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (16): Deleted the comma following “commercial motor vehicle” and inserted “, if applicable,” preceding “when operating”.

    Subdiv. (16)(J): Added.

    —2013. Subdiv. (3): Substituted “learner’s permit” for “driver instruction” and “sections 4108 and 4110” for “subsection 4108(e)”.

    Subdiv. (16)(I): Added.

    Subdiv. (17): Amended generally.

    Subdivs. (20)-(24): Added.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (4)(B)(iii): Deleted “military” preceding “equipment”.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (4)(B)(iii): Made minor changes to subdiv. (B) designations and redesignated subdiv. (4)(D) as subdiv. (4)(B) and added the “or by National Guard military technicians (civilians who are required to wear military uniforms) and active duty U.S. Coast Guard personnel”.

    Subdiv. (9): Deleted “or registered gross weight, whichever is greater” following “combination vehicle”.

    Subdiv. (10): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (12): Deleted.

    Subdiv. (18): Substituted “Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration” for “Federal Highway Administration” and “out of service” for “out-of-service” and made minor changes in punctuation.

    —2005. Subdiv. (5): Deleted “withdrawal of the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle” following “means” and added subdivs. (A)-(C).

    Subdiv. (16): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (19): Added.

    —1997. Subdiv. (18): Inserted “or a school bus” following “commercial motor vehicle”.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (13): Inserted “, territory or possession” preceding “of the United States” and deleted “and” thereafter and added “, the Republic of Mexico and any Canadian province” at the end of the subdiv.

    Subdiv. (18): Added.

    —1991. Subdiv. (4)(D)(ii): Act No. 88, § 4, added “and trailer coaches as defined in section 4(41) of this title; however, this exemption shall only apply to vehicles used strictly for recreational, noncommercial purposes” following “Title 32”.

    Subdiv. (4)(D)(v): Repealed by Act No. 88, § 5.

    Subdiv. (5): Act No. 88, § 6, deleted “by a state other than Vermont” following “vehicle”.

    Subdiv. (12): Act No. 88, § 7, deleted “in a state other than Vermont” following “vehicle”.

    Subdiv. (15): Added by Act No. 88, § 8.

    Subdiv. (16): Added by Act No. 88, § 8.

    Subdiv. (17): Added by Act No. 88, § 8.

    § 4104. Limitation on number of driver’s licenses.

    No individual who drives a commercial motor vehicle shall have more than one driver’s license.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “individual” for “person” and “driver’s” for “driver”.

    § 4105. Notification required by driver.

    1. Notification of convictions.   The driver of a commercial motor vehicle shall notify the State and employers of convictions as follows:
      1. The State.   Any driver of a commercial motor vehicle holding a driver’s license issued by this State who is convicted of violating any state law or local ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic control in any other state or federal, provincial, territorial, or municipal laws of Canada, other than parking violations, shall notify the Commissioner in the manner specified by the Commissioner within 30 days after the date of conviction.
      2. Employers.   Any driver of a commercial motor vehicle holding a driver’s license issued by this State who is convicted of violating any state law or local ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic control in this or any other state or federal, provincial, territorial, or municipal laws of Canada, other than parking violations, shall notify his or her employer in writing of the conviction within 30 days after the date of conviction.
    2. Notification of suspensions, revocations, and cancellations.   A driver whose driver’s license is suspended, revoked, or cancelled by any state; who loses the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle in any state for any period; or who is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for any period shall notify his or her employer of that fact before the end of the business day following the day the driver received notice of that fact.
    3. Notification of previous employment.
      1. Any individual who applies to be a commercial motor vehicle driver must provide the employer, at the time of the application, with the following information for the 10 years preceding the date of application:
        1. a list of the names and addresses of the applicant’s previous employers for which the applicant was a driver of a commercial motor vehicle;
        2. the dates between which the applicant drove for each employer; and
        3. the reason for leaving that employer.
      2. The applicant must certify that all information furnished is true and complete. An employer may require an applicant to provide additional information.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254; 2021, No. 20 , § 258.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “driver’s” for “driver” preceding “license” throughout the section.

    Subsec. (a): Added subsec. heading.

    Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “after” for “of” following “30 days”.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “after” for “of” following “30 days”.

    Subsec. (c): Substituted “individual” for “person”.

    § 4106. Employer responsibilities.

    1. Each employer shall require the applicant to provide the information specified in subsection 4105(c) of this title.
    2. No employer may knowingly allow, permit, or authorize a driver to drive a commercial motor vehicle during any period:
      1. in which the driver has a driver’s license suspended, revoked, or cancelled by a state or has lost the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle in a state, or has been disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle; or
      2. in which the driver has more than one driver’s license.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “driver’s” for “driver” preceding “license” in subdivs. (b)(1) and (b)(2).

    § 4107. Commercial driver’s license required.

    1. Except when driving under a commercial learner’s permit and accompanied by the holder of a commercial driver’s license valid for the vehicle being driven, no individual may drive a commercial motor vehicle on the highways of this State unless the following conditions are met:
      1. the individual holds a commercial driver’s license;
      2. the individual is in immediate possession of the license; and
      3. the license has the applicable endorsements valid for the vehicle the individual is driving.
    2. No individual may drive a commercial motor vehicle while his or her driving privilege is suspended, revoked, or cancelled; while subject to a disqualification; or in violation of an out-of-service order.
      1. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, employees of farm-related service industries shall be exempt from the knowledge and skills tests required under this chapter and shall be issued restricted commercial driver’s licenses as long as the applicants meet the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 383, as amended, and upon payment of the appropriate fee. (c) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, employees of farm-related service industries shall be exempt from the knowledge and skills tests required under this chapter and shall be issued restricted commercial driver’s licenses as long as the applicants meet the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 383, as amended, and upon payment of the appropriate fee.
      2. “Farm-related service industries” shall include farm retail outlets and suppliers, agri-chemical businesses, custom harvesters, and livestock feeders.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1993, No. 9 , § 2, eff. April 23, 1993; 2005, No. 37 , § 4; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 253, 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Substituted “learner’s” for “driver instruction” preceding “permit” and deleted “the person” following “unless”.

    Subdivs. (a)(1) and (a)(2): Inserted “the person” at the beginning of the subdivs.

    —2005. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

    —1993. Subsec. (c): Added.

    § 4108. Commercial driver’s license, commercial learner’s permit qualification standards.

    1. Before issuing a commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit, the Commissioner shall request the applicant’s complete operating record from any state in which the applicant was previously licensed to operate any type of motor vehicle in the past 10 years and conduct a check of the applicant’s operating record by querying the National Driver Register established under 49 U.S.C. § 30302 and the Commercial Driver’s License Information System established under 49 U.S.C. § 31309 to determine if:
      1. the applicant has already been issued a commercial driver’s license;
      2. the applicant’s commercial driver’s license has been suspended, revoked, or canceled; or
      3. the applicant has been convicted of any offense listed in 49 U.S.C. § 30304(a) (3).
    2. The Commissioner shall not issue a commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit to any individual:
        1. Under 21 years of age in the case of commercial driver’s licenses, except that individuals 18 years of age or older may obtain a commercial driver’s license that restricts the driver to operation solely within this State. (1) (A) Under 21 years of age in the case of commercial driver’s licenses, except that individuals 18 years of age or older may obtain a commercial driver’s license that restricts the driver to operation solely within this State.
        2. Under 18 years of age in the case of commercial learner’s permits.
      1. Who, within three years of the license application and for initial applicants only, has been convicted of an offense listed in subsection 4116(a) of this title or a comparable offense in any jurisdiction, or convicted of an offense listed in 49 U.S.C. § 30304(a) (3) in any jurisdiction.
      2. Unless Vermont is the state of domicile of the individual and the individual has passed a knowledge and skills test for driving a commercial motor vehicle that complies with minimum federal standards established by federal regulation enumerated in 49 C.F.R. Part 383, subparts F, G, and H, as may be amended, and has satisfied all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 380 and 49 U.S.C. Chapter 313, as may be amended, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, Title XII (Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986), as may be amended, in addition to other requirements imposed by State law or federal regulation. The tests shall be prescribed and conducted by the Commissioner.
    3. The Commissioner may authorize a person, including an agency of this or another state, an employer, a private driver training facility, or other private institution, or a department, agency, or instrumentality of local government, to administer the skills test specified by this section, provided:
      1. the test is the same as would otherwise be administered by the State; and
      2. the third party has entered into an agreement with this State that complies with requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 383.75.
    4. At the discretion of the Commissioner, the knowledge test and the skills test required under 49 C.F.R. §§ 383.113 and 383.133, as amended, and the tests required for a passenger endorsement or a tank vehicle endorsement or a hazardous materials endorsement under 49 C.F.R. § 383.117, 383.119, or 383.121, as amended, may be waived for a commercial motor vehicle driver with military commercial motor vehicle experience who is currently licensed at the time of his or her application for a commercial driver’s license, if the test is substituted with an applicant’s driving record in combination with the driving experience specified in this subsection. The Commissioner shall impose conditions and limitations to restrict the applicants from whom alternative requirements for the skills test may be accepted. Such conditions shall include the following:
      1. the applicant must certify that, during the two-year period immediately prior to applying for a commercial driver’s license, he or she:
        1. has not had more than one license in addition to a military license;
        2. has not had any license suspended, revoked, or cancelled;
        3. has not had any convictions for any type of motor vehicle for the disqualifying offenses specified in subsection 4116(a) of this title;
        4. has not had more than one conviction for any type of motor vehicle for serious traffic violations specified in subdivision 4103(16) of this title; and
        5. has not had any conviction for a violation, other than a parking violation, of military, state, or local law relating to motor vehicle traffic control arising in connection with any crash, and has no record of a crash in which he or she was at fault; and
      2. the applicant must provide evidence and certify that he or she:
        1. is regularly employed or was regularly employed within the last 12 months in a military position requiring operation of a commercial motor vehicle;
        2. was exempted from the commercial driver license requirements in 49 C.F.R. § 383.3(c); and
        3. was operating for at least the two years immediately preceding discharge from the military a vehicle representative of the commercial motor vehicle the driver applicant operates or expects to operate.
    5. Obtaining a commercial learner’s permit is a precondition to the initial issuance of a commercial driver’s license. The issuance of a commercial learner’s permit also is a precondition to the upgrade of a commercial driver’s license if the upgrade requires a skills test. A permit may be issued to an individual who holds a valid Vermont driver’s license who has passed the vision and written tests required for the class of license authorizing the operation of the type of vehicle for which the permit application is being made. A commercial learner’s permit holder is not eligible to take the commercial driver’s license skills test in the first 14 days after initial issuance of the commercial learner’s permit. A permit shall be issued for a period of one year, and only one renewal or reissuance of a commercial learner’s permit may be granted within a two-year period.
    6. The fee for a knowledge test and the fee for a skills test shall each be $32.00. The fee for an endorsement test shall be $14.00. In the event that an applicant fails a test three times, he or she may not take the test again for at least six months. A fee of $24.00 shall be paid by the applicant before he or she may schedule a skills test. If an applicant does not appear for the scheduled skills test, the $24.00 scheduling fee is forfeited, unless the applicant has given the Department of Motor Vehicles at least 48 hours’ notice of cancellation of the test. If the applicant appears for the skills test, the $24.00 scheduling fee for that test will be used as part of the test fee. Use of an interpreter is prohibited during the administration of the knowledge or skills tests.
    7. A commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit may not be issued to an individual while the individual is subject to a disqualification from driving a commercial motor vehicle or while the individual’s driver’s license is suspended, revoked, or cancelled in any state. A driver’s license may not be issued to an individual who has a commercial driver’s license issued by any state unless the individual first surrenders all driver’s licenses issued by any state, which licenses shall be returned to the issuing states for cancellation.
    8. An individual shall be entitled to take the test for a commercial driver’s license unless his or her driver’s license is, at the time of the requested test, suspended, revoked, cancelled, or disqualified in any other state.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 88 , § 9; 1995, No. 47 , § 15, eff. April 20, 1995; 1999, No. 110 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. June 8, 2004; 2009, No. 108 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. July 1, 2011; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 23; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2015, No. 50 , § 27, eff. June 3, 2015; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 54; 2017, No. 113 (Adj. Sess.), § 154; 2019, No. 60 , §§ 5, 6; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254; 2021, No. 76 , §§ 25, 31.

    History

    References in text.

    Title XII of Pub. L. No. 99-570, referred to in subsec. (b), is codified as 49 U.S.C. §§ 31104, 31301-31317.

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (b)(3): Amended generally.

    Subdiv. (d)(1)(E): Substituted “crash” for “traffic accident” and “a crash” for “an accident”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2019. Subsec. (d): Inserted “knowledge test and the” preceding “skills test required”, and substituted “49 C.F.R. §§ 383.113 and 383.133, as amended, and the tests required for a passenger endorsement or a tank vehicle endorsement or a hazardous material endorsement under 49 C.F.R. §§ 383.117, 383.119, or 383.121, as amended,” for “49 C.F.R. §§ 383.113”.

    Subsec. (e): Substituted “one year” for “six months” in the last sentence.

    —2017 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (f): Substituted “skills” for “skill” preceding “test” in four places throughout the subsec.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1)(A): Substituted “Under 21 years of age” for “Under the age of 21”.

    Subdiv. (b)(1)(B): Substituted “Under 18 years of age” for “Under the age of 18”.

    Subsec. (f): Amended generally.

    —2015. Subdiv. (d)(2): Substituted “12 months” for “90 days”.

    —2013. Section amended generally.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (f): Substituted “$35.00” for “$30.00” and “$30.00” for “$25.00” in the first sentence, and “$13.00” for “$10.00” at the end of the second sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Amended subsecs. (a) and (b) generally.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (e)(2): Deleted “which shall include the additional fee for a photograph established pursuant to section 610b of this title” following “fee of $12.00” in the first sentence, and substituted “reissuance” for “re-issuance” in the second sentence.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (e)(1): Substituted “a valid driver’s license from any jurisdiction who” for “a valid Class B, C, or D driver license who”.

    —1995. Subsec. (f): Added the third through sixth sentences.

    —1991. Subdiv. (e)(2): Added “for a fee of $12.00 which shall include the additional fee for a photograph established pursuant to section 610b of this title” following “months” in the first sentence.

    § 4109. Nondomiciled commercial driver’s license; nondomiciled commercial learner’s permit.

    1. The Commissioner may issue a nondomiciled commercial driver’s license or a nondomiciled commercial learner’s permit to an individual domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction if the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrator has determined that the commercial motor vehicle testing and licensing standards in the foreign jurisdiction do not meet the testing standards established in 49 C.F.R. Part 383. In addition, the Commissioner may issue a nondomiciled commercial driver’s license or a nondomiciled commercial learner’s permit to an individual domiciled in a state while that state is prohibited from issuing commercial driver’s licenses in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 384.405. The word “nondomiciled” must appear on the face of the nondomiciled commercial driver’s license or nondomiciled commercial learner’s permit. An applicant shall surrender any nondomiciled commercial driver’s license or nondomiciled commercial learner’s permit issued by another state. Prior to issuing a nondomiciled commercial driver’s license or nondomiciled commercial learner’s permit, the Commissioner shall establish the practical capability of revoking or suspending the nondomiciled commercial driver’s license or nondomiciled commercial learner’s permit.
    2. An applicant domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction must provide an unexpired employment authorization document (EAD) issued by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services or an unexpired foreign passport accompanied by an approved I-94 form documenting the applicant’s most recent admittance into the United States. No proof of domicile is required.
    3. An applicant for a nondomiciled commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit is not required to surrender his or her foreign license.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2005, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “driver’s” for “driver” preceding “license” throughout the section.

    Subsec. (a): Substituted “an individual” for “a person” in the second sentence.

    —2013. Rewrote the section heading and amended section generally.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Added the second sentence.

    § 4110. Application for commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit.

    1. The application for a commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit shall include the following:
      1. The full name and current mailing and residential address of the applicant.
      2. A physical description of the applicant, including sex, height, and weight.
      3. The applicant’s date of birth and proof of age.
      4. The applicant’s Social Security number, unless the application is for a nondomiciled commercial driver’s license or a nondomiciled commercial learner’s permit. The Commissioner must verify the name, date of birth, and Social Security number provided by the applicant with the information on file with the Social Security Administration. A commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license may not be issued, renewed, or upgraded if data in the Social Security Administration database does not match the data provided by the applicant.
      5. The applicant’s signature, as well as a space for the applicant to request that a “veteran” designation be placed on a commercial driver’s license. An applicant who requests a veteran designation shall provide a Department of Defense Form 214 or other proof of veteran status specified by the Commissioner.
      6. Certifications that:
        1. One of the following categories applies to the applicant:
          1. Non-excepted interstate.   He or she operates or expects to operate in interstate commerce, is both subject to and meets the qualification requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 391, and is required to obtain a medical examiner’s certificate under 49 C.F.R. § 391.45.
          2. Excepted interstate.   He or she operates or expects to operate in interstate commerce, but engages exclusively in transportation or operations excepted under 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(f), 391.2, 391.68, or 398.3 from all or parts of the qualification requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 391 and therefore is not required to obtain a medical examiner’s certificate by 49 C.F.R. § 391.45.
          3. Non-excepted intrastate.   He or she operates only in intrastate commerce and therefore is subject to state driver qualification requirements.
          4. Excepted intrastate.   He or she operates only in intrastate commerce, but engages exclusively in transportation or operations excepted from all or parts of the State’s driver qualification requirements.
        2. The motor vehicle in which the applicant’s skills test will be taken is representative of the type of motor vehicle that the applicant operates or expects to operate.
        3. The applicant is not subject to any disqualification under 49 C.F.R. § 383.51, or any license suspension, revocation, or cancellation under the law of any jurisdiction.
        4. The applicant does not have a driver’s license from more than one state or jurisdiction.
        5. For initial applicants only, the applicant has not been convicted of an offense listed in subsection 4116(a) of this title or a comparable offense in any jurisdiction, or an offense listed in 49 U.S.C. § 30304(a) (3) in any jurisdiction within three years of the license application.
      7. Any other information required by the Commissioner, including the names of all states where the applicant has been licensed to operate any type of motor vehicle during the previous 10 years.
      8. The proper fee.
        1. The four-year fee for a commercial driver’s license shall be $90.00. The two-year fee shall be $60.00. In those instances where the applicant surrenders a valid Vermont Class D license, the total fees due shall be reduced by:
          1. one-quarter of the four-year fee established by section 601 of this title for each remaining full year of validity; or
          2. one-half of the two-year fee paid for each remaining full year of validity.
        2. The fee for a commercial learner’s permit is $15.00.
      9. Proof of citizenship or lawful permanent residency as specified in Table 1 of 49 C.F.R. § 383.71.
      10. Proof of compliance with the Transportation Security Administration requirements codified in 49 C.F.R. Part 1572 if the applicant is applying for a hazardous materials endorsement. A lawful permanent resident of the United States requesting a hazardous materials endorsement must additionally provide his or her U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services alien registration number.
      11. For an applicant who certifies that he or she will operate commercial motor vehicles in non-excepted interstate commerce, an original or a copy of a certificate prepared by a medical examiner. Certification status or “certified” will be posted in the Commercial Driver’s License Information System driver record for the driver.
    2. When a licensee or permittee changes his or her name, mailing address, or residence or in the case of the loss, mutilation, or destruction of a license or permit, the licensee or permittee shall forthwith notify the Commissioner and apply in person for a duplicate license or permit in the same manner as set forth in subsection (a) of this section. The fee for a duplicate license or permit shall be $15.00.
    3. An individual for whom Vermont has been his or her state of domicile for more than 30 days shall not drive a commercial motor vehicle under the authority of a commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit issued by another jurisdiction.
    4. [Repealed.]

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 88 , § 10; 1995, No. 81 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2001, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 33, eff. May 15, 2002; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 14; 2005, No. 37 , § 5; 2005, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 39; 2009, No. 108 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. July 1, 2011; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2011, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 24; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2013, No. 57 , § 30; 2015, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), § 55; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Editor’s note

    —2010. The text of this section is based on the harmonization of two amendments. During the 2009 Adjourned Session, this section was amended twice, by Act Nos. 108 and 152, resulting in two versions of this section. In order to reflect all of the changes enacted by the Legislature during the 2009 Adjourned Session, the text of Act Nos. 108 and 152 was merged to arrive at a single version of this section. The changes that each of the amendments made are described in the amendment notes set out below.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(8)(A): Substituted “$90.00” for “$75.00” and “$60.00” for “$50.00”.

    Subdiv. (a)(8)(B): Substituted “$15.00” for “$12.00”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$15.00” for “$13.00”.

    —2013. Act No. 20 amended section generally.

    Act No. 57 added “as well as a space for the applicant to request that a ‘veteran’ designation be placed on a commercial driver license” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

    —2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (b): Substituted “$13.00” for “$10.00” at the end of the sentence.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(6)(C): Act Nos. 108 and 152 substituted “section 383.51” for “part 385.51” and Act No. 108 substituted “under the law of any jurisdiction” for “under state law” and deleted “and” at the end of the subdiv.

    Subdiv. (D): Act No. 108 added “; and” at the end of the subdiv.

    Subdiv. (E): Added by Act No. 108.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(8): Substituted “$75.00” for “$65.00” and “$50.00” for “$45.00”.

    —2005. Subdiv. (6): Substituted “that” for “including those required by 49 C.F.R. part 383.71(a)” and added subdivs. (A) through (D).

    Subdiv. (7): Inserted “including, but not limited to the names of all states where the applicant has been licensed to operate any type of motor vehicle during the previous ten years” following “commissioner”.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(8): Substituted “four-year fee shall be $65.00” for “quadrennial fee shall be $60.00” in the first sentence, substituted “two-year fee shall be $45.00” for “biennial fee shall be $40.00” in the second sentence, deleted the former third sentence, substituted “four-year fee” for “quadrennial fee” preceding “established” and substituted “section 601” for “section 608” preceding “of this title” in subdiv. (a)(8)(A), and substituted “two-year fee paid” for “biennial fee established by section 608 of this title” in subdiv. (a)(8)(B).

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00 which shall include the additional fee for a photograph established pursuant to section 610b of this” following “shall be” in the second sentence.

    —2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “$10.00” for “$5.00” in the second sentence.

    —1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(8): Substituted “$60.00” for “$90.00” in the first sentence and “$40.00” for “$60.00” in the second sentence.

    —1991. Subsec. (b): Inserted “or permittee” following “licensee” and “or permit” following “license” wherever they appeared.

    § 4110a. Non-excepted interstate or intrastate status; certified medical status.

    1. On or before January 30, 2014, every individual who holds a commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license shall provide the Commissioner the certification required under subdivision 4110(a)(6)(A) of this title.
    2. On or before January 30, 2014, existing holders of a commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license who certify to non-excepted interstate driving operations shall provide the Commissioner with an original or a copy of a current medical examiner’s certificate. Certification status of “certified” will be posted on the Commercial Driver’s License Information System driver record for the driver. Failure to provide the Commissioner a current medical examiner’s certificate will result in the posting of “not-certified” status to the Commercial Driver’s License Information System driver record for the driver, and a commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license downgrade shall be initiated.
    3. To maintain a medical certification status of “certified,” the holder of a commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit who certifies that he or she will operate commercial motor vehicles in non-excepted interstate commerce must provide the State an original or copy of each subsequently issued medical examiner’s certificate required under 49 C.F.R. Part 391.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 20 , § 1; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “driver’s” for “driver” preceding “license” throughout the section.

    Subsec. (a): Substituted “individual” for “person” and “title” for “chapter”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “shall” for “will” in the last sentence.

    § 4111. Commercial driver’s license.

    1. Contents of license.   A commercial driver’s license shall be marked “commercial driver’s license” or “CDL” and shall be, to the maximum extent practicable, tamper proof and shall include the following information:
      1. The name and residential address of the individual.
      2. The individual’s color photograph or imaged likeness. An individual issued a license under this subsection may renew the license not earlier than six months prior to its expiration date. In such case, the prior license document shall be surrendered. The renewed license shall be effective from the date of issuance to the end of the period for which it is renewed.
      3. A physical description of the individual, including sex, height, and weight.
      4. Date of birth.
      5. Any number or identifier deemed appropriate by the Commissioner.
      6. The individual’s signature.
      7. The class or type of commercial motor vehicle or vehicles that the individual is authorized to drive together with any endorsements or restrictions.
      8. The name of this State.
      9. The dates between which the license is valid.
      10. [Repealed.]
      11. An indicator that a licensee has executed a document that serves as an anatomical gift pursuant to section 618a of this title.
      12. A veteran designation if a veteran, as defined in 38 U.S.C. § 101(2), requests the designation and provides proof of veteran status as specified in subdivision 4110(a)(5) of this title, and if the Office of Veterans Affairs confirms his or her status as an honorably discharged veteran or a veteran discharged under honorable conditions.
    2. Classifications, endorsements, and restrictions.   Driver’s licenses may be issued with the following classifications, endorsements, and restrictions:
      1. Licensees may drive all vehicles in the class for which the license is issued and all lesser classes of vehicles, except those requiring special endorsements.
        1. Class A—Any combination of vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 pounds or more, provided the gross vehicle weight rating of the vehicle being towed is in excess of 10,000 pounds.
        2. Class B—Any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 pounds or more, and any such vehicle towing a vehicle not in excess of 10,000 pounds.
        3. Class C—Any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than 26,001 pounds or any such vehicle towing a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating not in excess of 10,000 pounds comprising:
          1. vehicles designed to transport 16 or more passengers, including the driver; and
          2. vehicles used in the transportation of hazardous materials which requires the vehicle to be placarded under 49 C.F.R., part 172, subpart F.
        4. Class D—Any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than 26,001 pounds or any such vehicle towing a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating not in excess of 10,000 pounds, except vehicles included in Class C or vehicles that require a special endorsement unless the proper endorsement appears on the license. Class D licenses shall not be commercial driver’s licenses.
      2. Licenses may be issued with appropriate endorsements and restrictions noted thereon. The Commissioner shall determine the manner of notation.
    3. [Repealed.]
    4. Within 10 days after issuing a commercial driver’s license, the Commissioner shall notify the Commercial Driver’s License Information System of that fact, providing all information required to ensure identification of the individual.
    5. The commercial driver’s license shall expire in the same manner as set by section 601 of this title.
    6. When applying for renewal of a commercial driver’s license, the applicant shall complete the application form required by section 4110 of this title, providing updated information and required certifications. If the applicant wishes to retain a hazardous materials endorsement, the written test for a hazardous materials endorsement must be taken and passed. In addition, the applicant must successfully complete the security threat assessment required by 49 C.F.R. Part 1572. Within 15 days after an adverse initial or final determination of threat assessment being served by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration, the applicant’s hazardous materials endorsement shall be revoked or denied.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1993, No. 122 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2003, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 15; 2005, No. 37 , § 6; 2005, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 41; 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2009, No. 39 , § 15; 2009, No. 108 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. July 1, 2011; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. July 1, 2011; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2013, No. 57 , § 31; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Act No. 57 deleted “, but not be limited to” following “include” in subsec. (a) and added subdiv. (a)(12).

    Subdiv. (b)(2): Amended generally by Act No. 20.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subdiv. (a)(2): Amended generally by Act No. 152.

    Subsec. (c): Repealed by Act No. 108.

    Subsec. (f): Act No. 152 added the last sentence.

    —2009. Subsec. (a): Substituted “driver’s” for “driver” after the first reference of “commercial” in the first sentence and added subdiv. (a)(11).

    —2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(10): Repealed in accordance with 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 41 and 2007, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Made a minor change in punctuation in the introductory paragraph, and substituted “air brakes when the person either fails the air brake component of the knowledge test or performs the skills test in a vehicle not equipped with air brakes” for “airbrakes” in subdiv. (b)(2)(B).

    —2005. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

    Subsec. (f): Added the last sentence.

    —2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “contain the following: The commercial driver license shall” preceding “be marked” in the introductory language, redesignated former subdivs. (a)(A)-(a)(J) as present subdivs. (a)(1)-(a)(10), added “or imaged likeness” at the end of the first sentence of subdiv. (a)(2), and added the second and third sentences of subdiv. (a)(2).

    —1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(J): Added.

    § 4111a. Commercial learner’s permit.

    1. Contents of permit.   A commercial learner’s permit shall contain the following:
      1. the prominent statement that the permit is a “Commercial Learner’s Permit,” except as specified in subsection 4109(a) of this title, and that it is not valid unless accompanied by a valid Vermont operator’s license;
      2. the full name, signature, and residential address in Vermont of the permit holder;
      3. physical and other information to identify and describe the permit holder, including the month, day, and year of birth; sex; and height;
      4. the permit holder’s State license number;
      5. an indication that the State of Vermont issued the permit;
      6. the date of issuance and the date of expiration of the permit;
      7. the group or groups of commercial motor vehicles that the permit holder is authorized to operate, indicated as follows:
        1. A for Combination Vehicle;
        2. B for Heavy Straight Vehicle;
        3. C for Small Vehicle;
      8. the endorsements for which the permit holder has qualified, if any, indicated as required under 49 C.F.R. § 383.153(b)(2)(viii); and
      9. the restrictions placed on the permit holder, if any, indicated as follows:
        1. P for No passengers in commercial motor vehicle bus;
        2. X for No cargo in commercial motor vehicle tank vehicle;
        3. L for a No Air brake equipped commercial motor vehicle;
        4. V for medical variance;
        5. M for No Class A passenger vehicle;
        6. N for No Class A and B passenger vehicle;
        7. K for Intrastate only;
        8. Any additional restrictions that apply to the commercial learner’s permit driving privilege.
    2. Classifications, endorsements, and restrictions.
      1. The holder of a commercial learner’s permit may not operate a commercial motor vehicle transporting hazardous materials.
      2. The holder of a commercial learner’s permit may, unless otherwise disqualified, drive a commercial motor vehicle on a highway only when accompanied by the holder of a commercial driver’s license valid for the type of vehicle driven who occupies a seat beside the individual or, in the case of a vehicle designed to transport more than 15 passengers, who occupies a seat directly behind or in the first row behind the driver and who directly observes and supervises the commercial learner’s permit holder for the purpose of giving instruction in driving the commercial motor vehicle.
        1. A commercial learner’s permit holder with a passenger endorsement must have taken and passed the passenger endorsement knowledge test. A commercial learner’s permit holder with a passenger endorsement is prohibited from operating a commercial motor vehicle carrying passengers, other than federal or state auditors and inspectors, test examiners, other trainees, and the commercial driver’s license holder accompanying the commercial learner’s permit holder as prescribed in subdivision (2) of this subsection. The passenger endorsement must be class specific. (3) (A) A commercial learner’s permit holder with a passenger endorsement must have taken and passed the passenger endorsement knowledge test. A commercial learner’s permit holder with a passenger endorsement is prohibited from operating a commercial motor vehicle carrying passengers, other than federal or state auditors and inspectors, test examiners, other trainees, and the commercial driver’s license holder accompanying the commercial learner’s permit holder as prescribed in subdivision (2) of this subsection. The passenger endorsement must be class specific.
        2. A commercial learner’s permit holder with a school bus endorsement must have taken and passed the school bus endorsement knowledge test. A commercial learner’s permit holder with a school bus endorsement is prohibited from operating a school bus with passengers other than federal or state auditors and inspectors, test examiners, other trainees, and the commercial driver’s license holder accompanying the commercial learner’s permit holder as prescribed in subdivision (2) of this subsection.
        3. A commercial learner’s permit holder with a tank vehicle endorsement must have taken and passed the tank vehicle endorsement knowledge test. A commercial learner’s permit holder with a tank vehicle endorsement may only operate an empty tank vehicle and is prohibited from operating any tank vehicle that previously contained hazardous materials that has not been purged of any residue.
        4. All other federal endorsements are prohibited on a commercial learner’s permit.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 20 , § 1; amended 2015, No. 47 , § 52; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “permit holder” for “person to whom the permit is issued”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Substituted “permit holder” for “person” and made punctuation changes.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “driver’s” for “driver” preceding “license” throughout and deleted the heading for subdiv. (b)(3).

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(5): Substituted “an indication that the State of Vermont” for “the name of the state that”.

    § 4112. Records notification.

    1. After suspending, revoking, or disqualifying an individual from holding a commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit, the Commissioner shall update his or her records to reflect that action within 10 days. After suspending, revoking, or disqualifying a nonresident commercial driver’s privileges, the Commissioner shall notify the licensing authority of the state that issued the commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit within 10 days.
    2. When the Commissioner receives a request for an operating record of an individual currently or previously licensed in Vermont, the Commissioner shall provide the information within 30 days.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 88 , § 11, eff. April 1, 1992; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “an individual” for “a person” twice, “driver’s” for “driver” twice, and “that” for “which.”

    —2013. Inserted “or commercial learner’s permit” following “license” in the first sentence, and substituted “learner’s permit” for “driver certificate” following “commercial” in the second sentence in subsec. (a).

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

    —1991. Substituted a comma for “or” preceding “revoking” and inserted “or disqualifying a person from holding” thereafter in the first sentence, substituted a comma for “or” preceding “revoking” and inserted “or disqualifying” thereafter in the second sentence.

    § 4113. Notification of traffic convictions.

    When an individual who holds a commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit issued by another state is convicted in this State of any violation of State law or local ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than parking violations, in any type of vehicle, the Commissioner shall notify the driver’s licensing authority in the licensing state of the conviction within 10 days.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2005, No. 37 , § 7; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “an individual” for “a person” and “driver’s” for “driver” twice.

    —2013. Inserted “or commercial learner’s permit” following “license”.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “10 days” for “30 days”.

    —2005. Substituted “When a person who holds a commercial driver license issued by another state is convicted in this state of” for “Within ten days after receiving a report of the conviction of any nonresident holder of a commercial driver license for” and “in any type of vehicle” for “committed in a commercial motor vehicle” and inserted “within 30 days” following “conviction”.

    § 4114. Agreements.

    The Commissioner may enter into or make agreements, arrangements, or declarations to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

    § 4115. Reciprocity.

    1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, an individual may drive a commercial motor vehicle in this State if the individual has a valid commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit issued by any state of the United States, any province or territory of Canada in accordance with the minimum federal standards for the issuance of commercial motor vehicle driver’s licenses, or the Licensia Federal de Conductor issued by the Republic of Mexico if the individual’s license or permit is not suspended, revoked, or canceled and if the individual is not disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle or subject to an out-of-service order.
    2. The Commissioner shall give all out-of-state convictions full faith and credit and treat them for sanctioning purposes under this chapter as if they occurred in this State.
    3. The Commissioner shall record disqualifications and convictions received from other jurisdictions regarding Vermont operators.

    HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1997, No. 55 , § 9, eff. June 26, 1997; 2005, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “an individual” for “a person”, “individual” for “person” twice, “individual’s” for “person’s”, and “driver’s” for “driver” twice.

    —2013. Subsec. (a): Inserted “or commercial learner’s permit” following “license” and “or permit” preceding “is not suspended”.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “United States, any province” for “United States or province” and “or the Licensia Federal de Conductor issued by the Republic of Mexico” for “or commercial driver licenses issued by states in the Republic of Mexico”.

    Subsec. (c): Added.

    —1997. Subsec. (a): Inserted “or commercial driver licenses issued by states in the Republic of Mexico” following “vehicle driver licenses” and substituted “canceled” for “cancelled” following “revoked or”.

    § 4116. Disqualification.

    1. Disqualification for one year; first violation.   An individual shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of one year if convicted of a first violation of:
      1. operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle on a highway with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more or under the influence, as defined in section 1218 of this title;
      2. failure to stop, as defined in section 1128 of this title;
      3. using a motor vehicle in the commission of any offense under state or federal law that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
      4. refusal to submit to a test to determine the operator’s alcohol concentration, as provided in section 1205, 1218, or 1219 of this title;
      5. operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more or under the influence of alcohol or other substance, as defined in section 1201 of this title;
      6. operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway when the person is under the influence of any other drug or under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug as provided in section 1201 of this title;
      7. operating or attempting to operate a commercial motor vehicle while the license is revoked, suspended, cancelled, or disqualified; or
      8. operating a commercial motor vehicle in a negligent manner resulting in a fatal injury.
    2. Disqualification for three years; transportation of a hazardous material.   An individual shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for three years if convicted of a violation listed in subsection (a) of this section, if the violation occurred while transporting a hazardous material required to be placarded.
    3. Disqualification for life.   An individual shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for life if convicted of:
      1. two or more separate violations listed in subsection (a) of this section arising from two or more separate occurrences;
      2. any offense under state or federal law that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year involving the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of a regulated drug or possession with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a regulated drug where the person used a motor vehicle in the commission of the offense; or
      3. a felony involving an act or practice of severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11), where the person used a motor vehicle in the commission of the offense.
    4. Disqualification for 60 or 120 days; serious traffic violation.   An individual shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of 60 days if convicted of two serious traffic violations, or 120 days if convicted of a third or subsequent serious traffic violation, arising from separate incidents occurring within a three-year period. A disqualification for 120 days shall be consecutive to any previous disqualification.
    5. Disqualification for convictions involving a railroad-highway grade crossing violation.
      1. An individual shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of 60 days if the driver is convicted of a first violation of a railroad-highway grade crossing violation.
      2. An individual shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of 120 days if, during any three-year period, the driver is convicted of a second railroad-highway grade crossing violation in a separate incident.
      3. An individual shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of one year if, during any three-year period, the driver is convicted of a third or subsequent railroad-highway grade crossing violation in separate incidents.
    6. Surrender of license.   An individual who is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle shall surrender the individual’s Vermont commercial driver’s license not later than the effective date of the disqualification. Upon receipt of the individual’s commercial driver’s license, a Class D license shall be issued, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.
    7. Rulemaking.   The Commissioner shall adopt rules establishing guidelines, including conditions, under which a disqualification for life under this section, except for a disqualification issued pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) or (c)(3) of this section, may be reduced to a period of not less than 10 years.
    8. -(j) [Repealed.]

      (k) Concurrent disqualification. An individual shall be disqualified for a term concurrent with any disqualification or suspension issued by the administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 88 , § 12, eff. April 1, 1992; amended 2003, No. 26 , § 5; 2005, No. 37 , § 8; 2005, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 6, 7; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2013, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 25; 2015, No. 47 , § 53; 2017, No. 83 , § 161(4); 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 25, eff. July 13, 2020; 2021, No. 20 , § 259; 2021, No. 76 , §§ 28, 29.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (a)(3): Act No. 76 substituted “state” for “State” preceding “or federal law”.

    Subdiv. (c)(2): Act No. 76 substituted “state” for “State” preceding “or federal law”.

    Subsec. (f): Act No. 20 substituted “the individual’s” for “his or her” and “driver’s” for “driver.”

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2017. Subdiv. (a)(5): Substituted “alcohol” for “intoxicating liquor” following “influence of”.

    —2015. Subdiv. (a)(6): Deleted “to a degree which renders the person incapable of driving safely” following “influence of alcohol and any other drug”.

    Subsec. (d): Deleted “or if convicted of two violations of subsection 4125(c) of this chapter” following “two serious traffic violations” and deleted “or if convicted of a third or subsequent violation of subsection 4125(c) of this chapter” following “third or subsequent serious traffic violation”.

    —2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (k): Deleted “pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 383.52” following “Administration”.

    —2013. Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (d): Added the last sentence.

    Subsec. (k): Inserted “or suspension” following “disqualification” and substituted “section 383.52” for “part 383.52”.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (g): Added “except for a disqualification issued pursuant to subsection (e) of this section” preceding “may be reduced”.

    Subsec. (k): Added.

    —2005. Subdiv. (a)(1): Made a minor change in punctuation.

    Subdiv. (a)(2): Deleted “if the accident involved a commercial motor vehicle” following “title”.

    Subdiv. (a)(3): Deleted “commercial” preceding “motor”.

    Subdiv. (a)(4): Inserted “1205” preceding “1218” and made minor changes in punctuation.

    Subdivs. (a)(5)-(a)(8): Added.

    Subsec. (e): Deleted “commercial” preceding “motor”.

    —2003. Subsecs. (h)-(j): Added.

    CROSS REFERENCES

    Penalties for operation of commercial motor vehicle after disqualification from holding license, see § 677 of this title.

    § 4116a. Suspension of operating privilege.

    1. An individual’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Vermont shall be suspended for one year if:
      1. the individual is convicted of a first violation of operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle on a highway with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more, or under the influence, as defined in section 1218 of this title; and
      2. the individual’s commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit is issued by a state or country that does not have a reciprocity agreement with the State of Vermont for the disqualification of commercial driver’s licenses or permits under section 4115 of this title.
    2. An individual’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Vermont shall be suspended for three years if the individual is convicted of violating subsection (a) of this section, and the violation occurred while the individual was transporting a hazardous material required to be placarded.
    3. An individual’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Vermont shall be suspended for life if the individual is convicted a second time of violating subsection (a) of this section, and both convictions arise out of separate occurrences.
    4. An individual’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Vermont shall be suspended for 60 days if the individual is convicted of two serious traffic violations, or for 120 days if the individual is convicted of three serious traffic violations, arising from separate incidents occurring within a three-year period.
    5. An individual’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Vermont shall be suspended for life if the individual uses a commercial motor vehicle in the commission of any offense under state or federal law that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, involving the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of a regulated drug, or possession with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a regulated drug, and for which the individual was convicted.

    HISTORY: Added 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 26; amended 2013, No. 20 , § 1; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254; 2021, No. 76 , § 30.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subsec. (e): Substituted “state” for “State” preceding “or federal law”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    —2013. Subdiv. (a)(2): Inserted “or commercial learner’s permit” following “commercial driver license” and inserted “or permits” preceding “under section 4115”.

    § 4117. Suspensions and disqualifications to run concurrently.

    A suspension of an individual’s operating privilege or license and a disqualification imposed under section 4116 of this title, imposed for the same violation, shall run concurrently.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 88 , § 15, eff. April 1, 1992; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “an individual’s” for “a person’s” preceding “operating privilege”.

    § 4118. Effective date of disqualification; hearing.

    1. A disqualification from driving a commercial motor vehicle shall be effective on not less than 10 days’ notice.
    2. If requested, a hearing on the disqualification shall be conducted under sections 105-107 of this title. Except as provided in subsection 4124(a) or 4124(c) of this chapter, the scope of the hearing shall be limited to verification of the conviction.
    3. A person aggrieved by a decision resulting from a hearing under this section may have the decision reviewed on the record under Rule 75 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure. The review shall be to the Washington Superior Court or, in the discretion of the licensee, to the Superior Court in the county the licensee resides or has a principal place of business.

    HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 88 , § 16, eff. April 1, 1992; amended 2013, No. 20 , § 1.

    History

    Amendments

    —2013. Subsec. (b): Substituted “Except as provided in subsection 4124(a) or 4124(c) of this chapter, the” for “The” at the beginning of the second sentence.

    § 4119. Compliance with out-of-service order; disqualification from operation of vehicle.

    1. No individual shall operate a commercial motor vehicle in violation of an out-of-service order.
    2. Any individual convicted of violating an out-of-service order shall be disqualified as follows except as provided in subsection (c) of this section:
      1. An individual shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of 180 days if convicted of a first violation of an out-of-service order.
      2. An individual shall be disqualified for a period of two years if convicted of a second violation of an out-of-service order during any 10-year period, arising from separate incidents.
      3. An individual shall be disqualified for a period of three years if convicted of a third or subsequent violation of an out-of-service order during any 10-year period, arising from separate incidents.
    3. Any individual convicted of violating an out-of-service order while transporting hazardous materials or while operating a commercial motor vehicle designed or used to transport 16 or more passengers, including the driver, shall be disqualified as follows:
      1. An individual shall be disqualified for a period of 180 days if convicted of a first violation of an out-of-service order.
      2. An individual shall be disqualified for a period of three years if convicted of a second or subsequent violation of an out-of-service order during any 10-year period, arising from separate incidents.

    HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 84 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Oct. 1, 1996; amended 2003, No. 26 , § 6; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Revision note

    —2020. In subsecs. (b) and (c), substituted “of” for “for” preceding “violating” to correct a grammatical error.

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “individual” for “person” and “An individual” for “A person” throughout the section.

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Added “compliance with out-of-service order;” in the section heading; added new subsec. (a) and redesignated former subsecs. (a) and (b) as new subsecs. (b) and (c), and made related changes; and in subdiv. (b)(1), substituted “180 days” for “90 days”, in subdiv. (b)(2), substituted “two years” for “one year”, and in subsec. (c), substituted “16 or more” for “15 or more”.

    —2003. Subdiv. (b)(2): Substituted “three” for “two” preceding “years”.

    § 4120. Penalties.

    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any driver who violates or fails to comply with an out-of-service order is subject to a penalty for a first conviction or for a second or subsequent conviction at the applicable minimum level set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 383.53(b)(1), in addition to disqualification under this chapter.
    2. Any employer who violates an out-of-service order, or who knowingly requires or permits a driver to violate or fail to comply with an out-of-service order, is subject to a penalty for a first conviction or for a second or subsequent conviction at the applicable minimum level set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 383.53(b)(2).
    3. The fine imposed for a speeding violation of a commercial motor vehicle operating in excess of 15 miles per hour over the legally posted speed limit on any State or town highway shall be one and one-half times the fine imposed for a speeding violation in other vehicles.

    HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 84 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Oct. 1, 1996; amended 1999, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 23; 2005, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2009, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    History

    Amendments

    —2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (a): Substituted “for a first conviction or for a second or subsequent conviction at the applicable minimum level set forth in 49 C.F.R. section 383.53(b)(1)” for “of $1,500.00”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “for a first conviction or for a second or subsequent conviction at the applicable minimum level set forth in 49 C.F.R. section 383.53(b)(2)” for “of $4,000.00”.

    —2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “$1,500.00” for “$1,000.00”.

    Subsec. (b): Substituted “$4,000.00” for “$2,500.00”.

    —1999 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (c): Added.

    § 4121. Applicants for school bus endorsements.

    1. An applicant for a school bus endorsement shall satisfy the following requirements:
      1. Pass the knowledge and skills test for obtaining a passenger vehicle endorsement.
      2. Have knowledge covering the following topics, at minimum:
        1. Loading and unloading children, including the safe operation of stop signal devices, external mirror systems, flashing lights, and other warning and passenger safety devices required for school buses by State or federal law or regulation.
        2. Emergency exits and procedures for safely evacuating passengers in an emergency.
        3. State and federal laws and regulations related to traversing safely highway rail grade crossings.
        4. A skills test in a school bus of the same vehicle group as the applicant will operate. As used in this subdivision (a)(2)(D), “school bus” may include a “multifunction school activity bus” as defined in section 1287 of this title.
    2. On or before September 30, 2005, the Department of Motor Vehicles may waive the skills test required in subdivision (a)(1) of this section for an applicant who:
      1. is currently licensed, has experience operating a school bus, and has a good operating record;
      2. certifies, and whose certification is verified by the Department, that, during the two-year period immediately prior to applying for the school bus endorsement, the applicant:
        1. held a valid commercial driver’s license with a passenger endorsement to operate a school bus representative of the group the applicant will be operating;
        2. has not had his or her operator’s license or commercial driver’s license suspended, revoked, or cancelled or been disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle;
        3. has not been convicted of any offense that would require disqualification under section 4116 of this title or 49 C.F.R. § 383.51(b);
        4. has not had more than one conviction for a serious traffic violation, as defined in section 4103 of this title, while operating any type of motor vehicle;
        5. has not had any conviction for a violation of state or local law relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than a parking violation, arising in connection with any crash;
        6. has not been convicted of any motor vehicle traffic violation that resulted in a crash; and
        7. has been regularly employed as a school bus driver, has operated a school bus representative of the group the applicant seeks to operate, and provides evidence of such employment.

    HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 37 , § 10; amended 2015, No. 50 , § 10; 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254; 2021, No. 76 , § 26.

    History

    Amendments

    —2021. Subdiv. (b)(2)(E): Substituted “crash” for “traffic accident”.

    Subdiv. (b)(2)(F): Substituted “a crash” for “an accident”.

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “of Motor Vehicles” following “Department” in the introductory language and substituted “driver’s” for “driver” in subdivs. (b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B).

    —2015. Added the second sentence in subdiv. (a)(2)(D).

    § 4122. Deferring imposition of sentence.

    No judge or court may utilize the provisions of 13 V.S.A. § 7041 or any other program to defer imposition of sentence or judgment if the defendant holds a commercial driver’s license or was operating a commercial motor vehicle when the violation occurred and is charged with violating any State or local traffic law other than a parking violation.

    HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 37 , § 11; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “driver’s” for “driver”.

    § 4123. Penalty for authorizing railroad crossing violations.

    Any employer who knowingly requires or permits a driver to operate a commercial motor vehicle in violation of section 1076 of this title is subject to a penalty of not more than $4,000.00.

    HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 166 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

    § 4124. Penalties for fraud; action upon suspected fraud.

    1. If from the check of an applicant’s license status and record prior to issuing a commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license or at any time after the commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license is issued the Commissioner determines that the applicant or holder has knowingly falsified any information, documentation, or certifications required under this chapter, the Commissioner shall give the applicant or holder notice of his or her findings and an opportunity to show cause why the application, commercial learner’s permit, or commercial driver’s license should not be disqualified for a period of 60 consecutive days. The disqualification shall be effective 10 days after the notice is sent unless the applicant or holder requests a hearing. If after a hearing the Commissioner determines that the applicant or holder has knowingly falsified any information, documentation, or certifications required under this chapter, the Commissioner shall disqualify for a period of 60 consecutive days the individual’s commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license, his or her pending application, or his or her privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle.
    2. An individual convicted of fraud related to the issuance of a commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license who seeks to renew, transfer, or upgrade the fraudulently obtained commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license shall be disqualified for one year. The disqualification shall be recorded in the individual’s driving record.
    3. If the Commissioner receives credible information that a commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license holder is suspected but has not been convicted of fraud related to the issuance of his or her commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license, the Commissioner shall require the holder to retake the skills or knowledge test, or both, and send the holder notice of the same. Within 30 days after notice is sent, the holder shall make an appointment or otherwise schedule to take the next available test. If the holder fails to make an appointment within 30 days, the Commissioner shall disqualify his or her commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license. If the holder fails either the knowledge or skills test or does not take the test, the Commissioner shall disqualify his or her commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license. Once a holder’s commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license has been disqualified, he or she must reapply for a commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license under the procedures applicable to all commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license applicants.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 20 , § 1; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

    § 4125. Texting violations; handheld mobile telephone violations.

    1. Definitions.   As used in this section, “driving” means operating a commercial motor vehicle on a public highway, including while temporarily stationary because of traffic, a traffic control device, or other momentary delays. “Driving” does not include operating a commercial motor vehicle with or without the motor running when the operator has moved the vehicle to the side of or off a highway and has halted in a location where the vehicle can safely remain stationary.
    2. General prohibition on texting.
      1. No operator shall engage in texting while driving a commercial motor vehicle.
      2. Texting while driving is permissible by operators of a commercial motor vehicle when necessary to communicate with law enforcement officials or other emergency services.
      3. No person may be issued traffic complaints alleging a violation of this section and a violation of section 1099 of this title from the same incident.
    3. General prohibition on use of handheld mobile telephones.
      1. No operator shall use a handheld mobile telephone while driving a commercial motor vehicle.
      2. Use of a handheld mobile telephone is permissible by operators of a commercial motor vehicle when necessary to communicate with law enforcement officials or other emergency services.
    4. Motor carriers.
      1. A motor carrier shall not allow or require its drivers to engage in texting while driving a commercial motor vehicle.
      2. A motor carrier shall not allow or require its drivers to use a handheld mobile telephone while driving a commercial motor vehicle.

    HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 20 , § 1; amended 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 254.

    History

    Amendments

    —2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted the headings for subdivs. (b)(1) and (b)(2) and added heading for subsec. (b).

    Subsec. (c): Deleted the headings for subdivs. (c)(1) and (c)(2) and added heading for subsec. (c).

    Subsec. (d): Substituted “carriers” for “Carriers” in the subsec. heading.

    Chapter 41. Automated Vehicle Testing

    History

    Automated vehicle testing implementation. 2019, No. 60 , § 18(c) provides: “(c) The Agency of Transportation may adopt rules to implement the provisions of 23 V.S.A. chapter 41 as added in Sec. 16 of this act.”

    § 4201. Short title.

    This chapter may be cited as the Automated Vehicle Testing Act.

    HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 60 , § 16.

    § 4202. Definitions.

    As used in this chapter:

    1. “Automated driving system” means the hardware and software that are collectively capable of performing the entire dynamic driving task on a sustained basis within its operational design domain, if any, including achieving a minimal risk condition, without any intervention or supervision by a conventional human driver, where applicable.
    2. “Automated vehicle” means a motor vehicle that is equipped with an automated driving system.
    3. “Automated vehicle tester” or “tester” means an individual, company, public agency, or other organization that is testing automated vehicles on public highways in this State pursuant to this chapter including an automated vehicle manufacturer, municipal or State agency, institution of higher education, fleet service provider, or automotive equipment or technology provider.
    4. “Conventional human driver” means an individual who manually engages in-vehicle braking, accelerating, steering, and transmission gear selection input devices in order to operate a vehicle.
    5. “Dynamic driving task” means all the real-time operational and tactical functions required to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic within its specific operational design domain, if any, excluding the strategic functions such as trip scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints.
    6. “Highly automated vehicle” means a vehicle equipped with an automated driving system capable of performing all aspects of the dynamic driving task within its operational design domain, if any, including achieving a minimal risk condition, without any intervention or supervision by a conventional human driver.
    7. “Manufacturer” means an individual or company that designs, produces, or constructs vehicles or equipment. Manufacturers include original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), multiple and final stage manufacturers, individuals or companies making changes to a completed vehicle before first retail sale or deployment (upfitters), and modifiers (individuals or companies making changes to existing vehicles after first retail sale or deployment).
    8. “Minimal risk condition” means a condition in which an automated vehicle operating without a human driver, upon experiencing a failure of its automated driving system that renders the automated vehicle unable to perform the dynamic driving task, achieves a reasonably safe state that may include bringing the automated vehicle to a complete stop.
    9. “Operational design domain” means a description of the specific domain or domains in which an automated driving system is designed to properly operate, including types of roadways, ranges of speed, weather, time of day, and environmental conditions.
    10. “Operator” means an individual employed by or under contract with an automated vehicle tester who has successfully completed the tester’s training on safe driving and the capabilities and limitations of the automated vehicle and automated driving system, can take immediate manual or remote control of the automated vehicle being tested, is 21 years of age or older, and holds an operator’s license for the class of vehicle being tested.
    11. “Public highway” means a State or municipal highway as defined in 19 V.S.A. § 1(12) .

    HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 60 , § 16.

    § 4203. Testing of automated vehicles on public highways.

    1. An automated vehicle shall not be operated on public highways for testing until the Traffic Committee as defined in 19 V.S.A. § 1(24) approves a permit application for automated vehicle testers that defines the scope and operational design domain for the test and demonstrates the ability of the automated vehicle tester to comply with the requirements of this section.
    2. Prior to approving a permit application, the Traffic Committee shall conduct a hearing to provide for comments from the public. Legislative bodies of the municipalities where an automated vehicle will be tested shall be notified by the Traffic Committee 60 calendar days prior to the Traffic Committee hearing when the geographic scope of the test includes State highways or Class 1, 2, 3, or 4 town highways, as classified pursuant to 19 V.S.A. § 302 , within the geographic boundaries of the municipality.
    3. The Traffic Committee is authorized to approve the testing of automated vehicles on:
      1. All State highways and Class 1 town highways.
      2. Class 2, 3, and 4 town highways within the geographic boundaries of municipalities that have preapproved testing of automated vehicles on Class 2, 3, and 4 town highways within the geographic boundaries of the municipality as of the date the permit application for automated vehicle testing is filed. A municipality may immediately revoke its preapproval of automated vehicle testing by notifying the Secretary of Transportation in writing that it no longer wishes to allow testing of automated vehicles on Class 2, 3, and 4 town highways within the geographic boundaries of the municipality.
    4. The Agency of Transportation’s Automated Vehicle Testing Guide shall include a list of municipalities that have preapproved testing of automated vehicles and shall update the Automated Vehicle Testing Guide within 10 business days after a municipality notifies the Secretary of Transportation in writing that it now wishes to allow testing of automated vehicles on Class 2, 3, and 4 town highways within the geographic boundaries of the municipality or no longer wishes to allow testing of automated vehicles on Class 2, 3, and 4 town highways within the geographic boundaries of the municipality.
    5. The Traffic Committee has the sole authority to approve specific test permit applications. Municipal approval of specific testing permits is not required. Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(2) of this section, after a test permit has been approved by the Traffic Committee, all modifications to the operational design domain or other permit conditions, including changes affecting town highways in a preapproved testing municipality, requires approval by the Traffic Committee.
    6. Before a test commences, the Traffic Committee shall make approved automated vehicle test permits readily available to law enforcement and municipalities within the geographic scope of the operational design domain designated in the permit.
    7. The automated vehicle tester shall submit a report to the Traffic Committee annually, until all testing ceases, summarizing results and observations related to safety, traffic operations, interaction with roadway infrastructure, comments from the public, and any other relevant matters.
    8. An automated vehicle tester shall not test an automated vehicle on a public highway unless:
      1. The operator is:
        1. seated in the driver’s seat of the automated vehicle;
        2. monitoring the operation of the automated vehicle; and
        3. capable of taking immediate manual control of such automated vehicle.
      2. The automated vehicle tester:
        1. registers each automated vehicle to be tested with the Commissioner pursuant to chapter 7 of this title;
        2. submits to the Commissioner, in a manner and form directed by the Commissioner, proof of liability insurance, self-insurance, or a surety bond of at least five million dollars for damages by reason of bodily injury, death, or property damage caused by an automated vehicle while engaged in automated vehicle testing;
        3. has established and enforces a zero-tolerance policy for drug and alcohol use by operators while engaged in automated vehicle testing. The policy shall include provisions for investigations of alleged policy violations and the suspension of drivers under investigation; and
        4. has conducted background checks for all operators pursuant to section 751 of this title, which may be inspected by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or designee pursuant to section 752 of this title.
      3. The operator and automated vehicle tester:
        1. comply with applicable standards established by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regarding the testing of automated vehicles or are capable of providing proof of exemptions or waivers to such standards;
        2. report to the Agency of Transportation and the applicable law enforcement agency within 72 hours after any motor vehicle crash involving the testing of the automated vehicle that results in personal injury or property damage; and
        3. satisfy any other requirements and permit conditions as determined by the Traffic Committee as necessary to ensure the safe operation of such automated vehicles.
          1. An automated vehicle testing permit may be voided and invalidated for the trip by a law enforcement officer who determines there is a violation of any condition specified in the terms of the automated vehicle test permit or that the continuation of the trip would be unsafe.

            (j) An automated vehicle testing permit may be suspended or revoked by the Traffic Committee if, after the opportunity for a hearing, the Traffic Committee determines that there is a violation of any condition or conditions specified in the terms of the automated vehicle test permit that warrants the suspension or revocation of the testing permit or that the continuation of the testing would be unsafe.

            (k) Operating or testing in violation of a suspension or revocation order shall be a traffic violation for which there shall be a penalty of not more than $1,000.00.

            ( l ) Test vehicles must be capable of operating in compliance with applicable traffic and motor vehicle laws of this State, subject to this subchapter.

            (m) An individual shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of an automated vehicle being tested on a public highway when the individual’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.02 or more.

            (n) An automated vehicle being tested on a public highway shall be clearly identifiable by the public.

    HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 60 , § 16.