Cross references. —

For constitutional provision as to protection of labor, see art. 1, § 22, Wyo. Const.

As to right of action for injuries in connection with mining operations, see art. 9, § 4, Wyo. Const.

For constitutional provisions concerning labor generally, see art. 19, Wyo. Const.

As to relationship of master and servant as sufficient cause for challenge in connection with jury duty, see § 1-11-203 .

As to parole to permit continuation of employment, see §§ 7-13-501 through 7-13-504 .

As to labor by prisoners generally, see chapter 16 of title 7.

As to preference for Wyoming contractors, labor, etc., generally, in connection with public works and contractors, see §§ 16-6-102 through 16-6-108 .

As to disputed labor claims in connection with public works contracts and contractor's bonds, see § 16-6-117 .

As to Wyoming Preference Act of 1971, see §§ 16-6-201 through 16-6-206 .

As to exemption of members of national guard from labor on the public highways, see § 19-9-401 .

As to preference with reference to employment of veterans in public departments or public works, see § 19-14-102 .

For provisions that employees are entitled to time off to vote, see § 22-2-111 .

As to interference with employees' political rights or threatening discharge for political involvements, see §§ 22-26-116 through 22-26-118 .

As to mechanics', materialmen's, and laborers' liens generally, see title 29.

For authority of public utilities to furnish transportation free of charge or at reduced rates to employees and former employees, etc., see § 37-3-105 .

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law §§ 29.03, 76.02D, 77.01, 77.02, 126.04D (Matthew Bender).

Chapter 1 General Provisions

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 1 et seq.; 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations § 1 et seq.

Loaned servant doctrine under Federal Employers' Liability or Safety Appliance Act, 1 ALR2d 302.

Existence of master-servant relation where operator is furnished with leased machine, 17 ALR2d 1388.

Right of employer to terminate contract because of employee's illness or physical incapacity, 21 ALR2d 1247.

Nonprofit charitable institutions as within operation of labor statutes, 26 ALR2d 1020.

Failure to furnish assistance to employee as affecting liability for injury or death, 36 ALR2d 8.

Employee's rights with respect to compensation or bonus where he continues in employer's service after expiration of contract for definite term; quantum meruit recovery, 53 ALR2d 384.

Employer's right of action against third person tortiously killing or injuring employee, 57 ALR2d 802.

Application and effect of “shop right rule” or license giving employer limited rights in employees' inventions and discoveries, 61 ALR2d 356.

Employer's damages for breach of employment contract by employee's terminating employment, 61 ALR2d 1008.

Master's liability for servant's injury or death caused in whole or in part by act of God, 62 ALR2d 796.

Master's duty to care for or to furnish medical aid to servant stricken by illness, 64 ALR2d 1108.

Mining grubstake agreements distinguished from employment contracts, 70 ALR2d 904.

Liability of master for injury or death of servant on master's premises where injury occurred outside working hours, 76 ALR2d 1215.

Liability for injury from overhead door, 83 ALR2d 743.

Enforceability, under statute of frauds provision as to contracts not to be performed within a year, of oral employment contract for more than one year but specifically made terminable upon death of either party, 88 ALR2d 701.

Effect of attempt to terminate employment upon shorter notice than that stipulated in contract, 96 ALR2d 272.

Provision in employment contract requiring written notice before instituting action, 4 ALR3d 439.

Validity of individual employment contract for specific term which contains provision that employee will perform if physically able, if health permits or the like, 7 ALR3d 898.

Employer's liability to employee for malpractice of physician supplied by employer, 16 ALR3d 564.

Employer's misrepresentations as to employee's or agent's future earnings as actionable fraud, 16 ALR3d 1311.

Liability for inducing employee not engaged for definite term to move to competitor, 24 ALR3d 821.

Measure of damages for fraudulently inducing employment contract, 24 ALR3d 1388.

Employer's misrepresentation as to prospect or duration of employment as actionable fraud, 24 ALR3d 1412.

Liability, under Federal Employers' Liability Act [45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.], for industrial or occupational poisoning, 30 ALR3d 735.

Judgment in action on express contract for labor or services as precluding, as a matter of res judicata, subsequent action on implied contract (quantum meruit) or vice versa, 35 ALR3d 874.

Rights and obligations under employer-employee suggestion plans, 40 ALR3d 1416.

Employer's liability for theft or disappearance of employee's property left at the place of employment, 46 ALR3d 1306.

Modern status as to duration of employment where contract specifies no term but fixes daily or longer compensation, 93 ALR3d 659.

Validity, construction and application of regulation regarding outside employment of governmental employees or officers, 94 ALR3d 1230.

Liability for interference with invalid or unenforceable contract, 96 ALR3d 1294.

Modern status of law regarding solicitation of business by or for attorney, 5 ALR4th 866.

Proper measure and elements of damages for misappropriation of trade secret, 11 ALR4th 12.

Validity and construction of statute prohibiting employers from suggesting or requiring polygraph or similar tests as condition of employment or continued employment, 23 ALR4th 187.

Right to discharge allegedly “at-will” employee as affected by employer's promulgation of employment policies as to discharge, 33 ALR4th 120.

Vacation pay rights of private employees not covered by collective labor contract, 33 ALR4th 264.

Validity and enforceability of provision that employer shall be liable for stipulated damages on breach of employment contract, 40 ALR4th 285.

Liability for discharge of at-will employee for refusal to submit to drug testing, 79 ALR4th 105.

Employer's state-law liability for withdrawing, or substantially altering, job offer for indefinite period before employee actually commences employment, 1 ALR5th 401.

Effectiveness of employer's disclaimer of representations in personnel manual or employee handbook altering at-will employment relationship, 17 ALR5th 1.

Employer's liability to employee or agent for injury or death resulting from assault or criminal attack by third person, 40 ALR5th 1.

Validity, construction, and application of regulations regarding outside employment of governmental employees or officers, 62 ALR5th 671.

Availability of private right of action under § 503 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USCS § 793), providing that certain federal contracts must contain provision requiring affirmative action to employ qualified handicapped individuals, 60 ALR Fed 329.

Applicability of doctrine of equitable estoppel to revocation of job appointment by agency of federal government, 73 ALR Fed 399.

When are separate business entities “joint employers” of same employees for purposes of application of federal labor laws, 73 ALR Fed 609.

30 C.J.S. Employer — Employee Relationship § 1 et seq.; 47B C.J.S. Internal Revenue §§ 579 to 584; 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 1 et seq.

§ 27-1-101. “Manufacturing establishment” defined; “person” defined.

Manufacturing establishments, as those words are used in this act [§§ 27-1-101 through 27-1-104 , 27-1-108 , 27-1-109 , 27-2-104 , 27-2-105 , 27-2-108 , 27-2-109 ], shall mean and include all smelters, oil refineries, cement works, mills of every kind, machine and repair shops, and in addition to the foregoing, any other kind or character of manufacturing establishment, of any nature or description whatsoever, wherein any natural product or other articles or materials of any kind, in a raw or unfinished or incomplete state or condition, are converted into a new or improved or different form. Wherever the expression occurs in this act in substantially the following words: “every person owning or operating any manufacturing establishment,” or where language similar to that is used, the word “person” in that connection shall be held and construed to mean any person or persons, partnership, corporation, receiver, trust, trustee, or any other person or combination of persons, either natural or artificial, by whatever name he or they may be called.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 8; C.S. 1920, § 268; R.S. 1931, § 109-1208; C.S. 1945, § 54-309; W.S. 1957, § 27-1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

The term “this act” as used in this section, apparently refers to Laws 1917, ch. 113, which appears as §§ 27-1-101 through 27-1-104 , 27-1-108 , 27-1-109 , 27-2-104 , 27-2-105 , 27-2-108 and 27-2-109 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Reasonableness of qualifications for Union Office under § 401(e) of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (29 U.S.C. § 481(e), 147 ALR Fed 389.

§ 27-1-102. Doors at public places to open outward; handrails on stairs; enforcement.

All doors leading into or to any manufacturing establishment, mills, workshops, offices, bakeries, laundries, stores, hotels, theaters, halls, or other buildings in which people are employed, shall be so constructed as to open outward, when practicable, and shall not be locked, bolted or fastened so as to prevent free egress during working hours. Proper and substantial handrails shall be provided on all stairways in manufacturing establishments, mills, workshops, offices, bakeries, laundries, stores, hotels, theaters, halls, and other buildings where people are employed or rooms are rented to the public. The department of workforce services shall have authority to enforce by due process of law, the provisions of this section, and other laws relating to fire escapes.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 6; C.S. 1920, § 266; R.S. 1931, § 109-1206; C.S. 1945, § 54-307; W.S. 1957, § 27-2; 2014 ch. 79, § 1, effective March 10, 2014.

The 2014 amendment, in the last sentence, substituted “The department of workforce services” for “And he.”

Laws 2014, ch. 79, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 10, 2014.

Editor's notes. —

The reference in the last sentence to “he” appears to be a reference to the commissioner of labor and statistics, as established in former § 27-2-101 . For present provisions relating to duties of department of employment, see § 27-2-104 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability for injuries in connection with revolving door on nonresidential premises, 93 ALR3d 132.

§ 27-1-103. Safety devices on elevators and machinery.

The openings of all hoistways, hatchways, elevators, well holes and stairways in manufacturing establishments, mills, workshops, bakeries, laundries, stores, hotels, theaters, halls, or any other kind of establishment where labor is employed, or machinery used, shall be protected by trapdoors, hatches, fences, automatic gates or other safeguards, and all due diligence shall be used to keep all such means of protection closed, except when it is necessary to have the same open for use when practicable. All machinery, in use in any mercantile, manufacturing, or any other establishment whatsoever where labor is employed, shall be equipped, with proper shifters for throwing on or off pulleys, loose pulleys and other such safeguards as may be deemed necessary by the department of workforce services for the proper safeguard of life and limb.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 7; C.S. 1920, § 267; R.S. 1931, § 109-1207; C.S. 1945, § 54-308; W.S. 1957, § 27-3; 2014 ch. 79, § 1, effective March 10, 2014.

The 2014 amendment, in the last sentence, substituted “department of workforce services” for “commissioner of labor.”

Laws 2014, ch. 79, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 10, 2014.

Editor's notes. —

The reference in the last sentence to the “commissioner of labor” was probably intended to be to the commissioner of labor and statistics, as established in former § 27-2-101 . For present provisions relating to duties of department of employment, see § 27-2-104 .

§ 27-1-104. Mines and interstate railroads exempt.

Nothing herein contained, as applied to inspection and application of safety devices, shall be construed to be applicable to coal and metalliferous mines and workshops connected therewith, nor to railroads engaged in interstate commerce and workshops connected therewith.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 17; C.S. 1920, § 277; R.S. 1931, § 109-1217; Laws 1933, ch. 116, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 54-318; W.S. 1957, § 27-4.

Cross references. —

As to safety regulations in mining operations generally, see §§ 30-2-101 through 30-3-509 .

As to railroads generally, see §§ 37-9-101 through 37-10-105 .

Repealing clauses. —

Section 18, ch. 113, Laws 1917, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith.

§ 27-1-105. Employees' contract releasing employer from personal injury liability void.

It shall be unlawful for any person, company or corporation to require of its servants or employees, as a condition of their employment or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby such person, company or corporation shall be released or discharged from liability or responsibility on account of personal injuries received by such servants or employees while in service of such person, company or corporation, by reason of the negligence of such person, company or corporation, or the agents or employees thereof, and such contracts shall be absolutely null and void.

History. Laws 1890-91, ch. 28, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 2522; C.S. 1910, § 3430; C.S. 1920, § 4306; R.S. 1931, § 63-123; C.S. 1945, § 54-901; W.S. 1957, § 27-5.

Cross references. —

For provision that agreements to waive, assign, etc., benefits under unemployment compensation shall be void and providing a penalty therefor, see §§ 27-3-319 and 27-3-701 .

For provision prohibiting contracts, rules, regulations, etc., restricting liability under worker's compensation law, see § 27-14-104(b).

For constitutional provision that no law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person, and providing that any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be void, see art. 10, § 4, Wyo. Const.

For provision prohibiting contracts exempting employer from liability for personal injuries, see art. 19, § 7, Wyo. Const.

Stipulation as to amount of benefits payable by employer heldvalid. —

A stipulation entered into between an employee and his employer settling the amount of worker's compensation benefits the employer would pay for the employee's injury was valid. In re Injury to Lea, 707 P.2d 754, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 592 (Wyo. 1985).

Agreement to submit disputes concerning injury and workers'compensation benefits to arbitration. —

Employee's agreement to submit disputes concerning injury and workers' compensation benefits to arbitration was not unenforceable under constitutional provision or statute, where there was no evidence that employer conditioned employment on employee's assent to any release of liability, and employer in fact accepted liability for employee's injuries through its workers' compensation plan. Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 1163, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14114 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1999).

Welder controlled by employer deemed employee, although designatedby document as independent contractor. —

Where claimant was a rig welder — meaning that he had a truck unit welder and hired out within the oil patch industry on an hourly basis for himself and his truck, which supplied all equipment required to perform general welding services —, he was engaged in some prefabrication and assembly completed in the general contractor's yard prior to field installation (after welding-skill testing by the owner) when injured, and the general contractor attempted to treat him differently than it did other employees with respect to federal income tax withholding, federal social security, unemployment, worker's compensation, health insurance and retirement plans, but in all other aspects he was subject to the same kind of control as any other employee, the trial court's decision that he was a covered employee was affirmed, although a document designated him as an independent contractor. Flint Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Richardson, 726 P.2d 511, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 624 (Wyo. 1986).

Applied in

Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 509 (Wyo. 1986).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes duress by employer or former employer vitiating employee's release of employer from claims arising out of employment, 30 ALR4th 294.

Landlord's tort liability to tenant for personal injury or property damage resulting from criminal conduct of employee, 38 ALR4th 240.

Apportionment of liability between landowners and assailants for injuries to crime victims, 54 ALR5th 379.

§ 27-1-106. Certain nonresident employers required to post bond; exceptions.

  1. All firms, corporations or employers of any kind who are nonresident employers and expect to pay wages in the state of Wyoming in excess of four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) in any month as a result of conducting business within Wyoming, are required to file with the director of the department of workforce services a surety bond or other security meeting the requirements of this section, approved by the director.
  2. The bond or other security required by subsection (a) of this section shall be in the amount of eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00) plus an additional two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) for each one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or fraction thereof that the expected wages in any month exceed four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) up to expected wages in any month of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00). For expected wages in any month that exceed twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00), the bond or other security amount shall be one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) for each additional one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or fraction thereof of expected wages.
  3. The bond or security  provided for in this section shall ensure:
    1. The payment of wages of employees working in the state;
    2. The payment of civil penalties the occupational health and safety commission may assess; and
    3. All other  payments or obligations of the nonresident employer required by:
      1. The Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act unless waived by the director pursuant to W.S. 27-14-302 ;
      2. Any other section under title 27 of Wyoming statutes or any department of workforce services rule or regulation.
  4. The nonresident employer shall post additional security before performing work under any new contract if the security previously posted under this section has expired.
  5. Upon application by a nonresident employer, the director may permit the withdrawal of any security if the employer has:
    1. Complied with the security requirements of this section and made all necessary payments for a period of two (2) years;
    2. Demonstrated that he has been a resident of the state for two (2) years and intends to remain a resident; or
    3. Acquired real property as a nonresident with an unencumbered value greater than or equal to the value of the bond or other security required by subsection (b) of this section.
  6. If the anticipated work has ceased before the expiration of twenty-four (24) months, or less than fifty percent (50%) of the largest work force is still working in Wyoming, the security deposited by the nonresident employer shall be forfeited and retained by the division in an amount equal to the reserved amounts for compensable injuries to the nonresident employer’s employees. Upon application by a nonresident employer, the division shall refund the amount not forfeited pursuant to this subsection except for any disbursements made under subsection (c) of this section.
  7. This section does not apply to charitable or religious organizations.

History. Laws 1957, ch. 221, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-6; Laws 1961, ch. 151, § 1; 1967, ch. 30, § 1; 1989, ch. 122, § 1; 1991, ch. 93, § 1; 1993, ch. 163, § 1; 2006, ch. 2, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; 2017 ch. 71, § 1, effective July 1, 2017; 2018 ch. 39, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

Cross references. —

As to nonresident employers with respect to worker's compensation law, see art. 3 of ch. 14 of this title.

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, added “unless waived by the director pursuant to W.S. 27-14-302 .” in (c)(ii).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a).

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (b), substituted “twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) plus an additional two thousand dollars ($2,000.00)” for “ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) plus an additional one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)”; added (c)(ii); renumbered former (c)(ii) as (c)(iii); added (c)(iii)(A) and (c)(iii)(B); and made related changes.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in (a), substituted “four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) in any month” for “ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) monthly or one hundred twenty thousand dollars ($120,000.00) annually” and deleted “and the attorney general” at the end; and in (b), substituted “eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00)” for “twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00),” “one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)” for “one hundred twenty thousand dollars ($120,000.00),” and “in any month exceed four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) up to expected wages in any month of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00)" for "wages exceed one hundred twenty thousand dollars (120,000.00)," and added the last sentence.

§ 27-1-107. Nonresident employers to post bond; penalty.

Any person or persons, corporation, agent, manager or employer who shall violate or fail to comply with any of the provisions of W.S. 27-1-106 shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall for each offense, be subject to a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or both.

History. Laws 1957, ch. 221,§ 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-7; Laws 1989, ch. 122, § 1; 2017 ch. 71, § 1, effective July 1, 2017.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, added “or fail to comply with” following “violate”, and substituted “one thousand dollars ($1000.00)” for “seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00).”

§ 27-1-108. Penalties generally.

Any person who violates or omits to comply with any of the provisions of this act, or any final order of the department of workforce services is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or both.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 16; C.S. 1920, § 276; R.S. 1931, § 109-1216; C.S. 1945, § 54-317; W.S. 1957, § 27-8; Laws 1989, ch. 122, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

The term “this act,” as used in this section, apparently refers to Laws 1917, ch. 113, which appears as §§ 27-1-101 through 27-1-104 , 27-1-108 , 27-1-109 , 27-2-104 , 27-2-105 , 27-2-108 and 27-2-109 .

§ 27-1-109. Prosecution of violations.

The district attorney for any county in this state shall, upon receipt of a verified complaint from the director of the department of workforce services or a final agency decision of the department of workforce services prosecute to termination before any court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state of Wyoming, actions or proceedings against any person or persons charged with violation of any of the provisions of this act, or any of the laws of this state enacted for the protection of employees.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 11; C.S. 1920, § 271; R.S. 1931, § 109-1211; C.S. 1945, § 54-312; W.S. 1957, § 27-9; Laws 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” twice.

§ 27-1-110. State rehabilitation council; membership; chairman.

  1. There is established a permanent council within the department of workforce services to be known as the Wyoming governor’s state rehabilitation council, to consist of:
    1. At least one (1) representative of the statewide independent living council;
    2. At least one (1) representative of a parent training and information center;
    3. At least one (1) representative of the client assistance program;
    4. At least one (1) vocational rehabilitative counselor;
    5. At least one (1) representative of community rehabilitation program service providers;
    6. Four (4) representatives of business, industry and labor;
    7. At least two (2) representatives of disability advocacy groups;
    8. At least two (2) current or former applicants of vocational rehabilitation services;
    9. The administrator of the division of vocational rehabilitation;
    10. At least one (1) representative of the department of education;
    11. At least one (1) representative of the state workforce investment board.
  2. The director of the department of workforce services shall be an ex officio, nonvoting member of the state rehabilitation council.
  3. A majority of council members shall be persons who are:
    1. Individuals with disabilities;
    2. Not employed by the division of vocational rehabilitation.
  4. One (1) of the members shall be elected chairman by the members of the council. The appointive members shall hold office for the term specified. The council shall be nonpartisan. The governor may remove any council member as provided in W.S. 9-1-202 .

History. Laws 1967, ch. 135, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-9.1; Laws 1987, ch. 175, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2010, ch. 65, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to education of the handicapped, see §§ 21-2-501 , 21-2-502 .

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, rewrote (a); and added (b) and (c).

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2010, ch. 65, § 2, provides:

“(a) It is the intention and direction of the legislature that:

“(i) All duties of the governor's office with respect to the Serve Wyoming, governor's council for employment and rehabilitation of the handicapped and the displaced worker and education programs be transferred to the department of workforce services;

“(ii) All unexpended funds not otherwise obligated and any other property, if any, of the governor's office exclusively dedicated to the Serve Wyoming, governor's council for employment and rehabilitation of the handicapped and the displaced worker and education programs be transferred to the department of workforce services;

“(iii) Any contract, agreement or obligation entered into or assumed by the governor's office with respect to the Serve Wyoming, governor's council for employment and rehabilitation of the handicapped and the displaced worker and education programs, if the execution or assumption was within the lawful powers of the governor's office, be assumed by the department of workforce services;

“(iv) Any policy adopted by the governor's office with respect to the Serve Wyoming, governor's council for employment and rehabilitation of the handicapped and the displaced worker and education programs remain in effect unaltered as policy of the department of workforce services until amended or repealed by the department of workforce services.”

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes handicap under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap, 82 ALR4th 26.

When must Employer offer qualified disabled employee or applicant opportunity to change employee's workplace or work at home as means of fulfilling reasonable accommodation requirement, 133 ALR Fed 521.

§ 27-1-111. Duties of council and department.

The department of workforce services, with advice of the council, shall carry on a continuing program to promote the employment of physically, mentally, emotionally and otherwise handicapped persons by creating statewide interest in the rehabilitation and employment of the handicapped and by obtaining and maintaining cooperation from all public and private groups and individuals in the field. The council shall work in cooperation with the president’s committee on employment of the handicapped in order to more effectively carry out the purposes of this act [§§ 27-1-110 through 27-1-112 ].

History. Laws 1967, ch. 135, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-9.2; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2010, ch. 65, § 1.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, substituted “department of workforce services” for “department of employment.”

§ 27-1-112. Authority of council to receive gifts, grants or donations.

The department of workforce services, on behalf of the council, is authorized to receive any gifts, grants or donations made for any of the purposes of its program.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 135, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-9.3; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2010, ch. 65, § 1.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, substituted “department of workforce services” for “department of employment.”

§ 27-1-113. Employer immunity for disclosure of certain employee information; rebuttal of presumption.

  1. An employer who discloses information about a former employee’s job performance to a prospective employer or to an employer of the former employee is presumed to be acting in good faith. Unless lack of good faith is shown by a preponderance of evidence, the employer is immune from civil liability for the disclosure or for the consequences resulting from the disclosure.
  2. For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, the presumption of good faith is rebutted upon a showing that the information disclosed by the former employer was knowingly false or deliberately misleading or was rendered with malicious purpose.

History. Laws 1996, ch. 108, § 1.

§ 27-1-114. Temporary employment fees.

  1. A temporary service contractor for temporary workers is not entitled to collect a fee from an employer for the permanent employment of a temporary worker placed by the temporary service contractor, unless the employer is notified in writing of the existence and the amount of the fee prior to the date of services being rendered by a temporary worker to the employer.
  2. For the purpose of this section “temporary service contractor” means any person, firm, association or corporation conducting a business that employs individuals directly for the purpose of furnishing services of the employed individuals on a temporary basis to others.

History. Laws 1996, ch. 9, § 1.

§ 27-1-115. State directory of new hires; requirements; exceptions; definitions.

  1. A department designated by the governor shall maintain a directory of new hires using information provided by employers in the state. The department shall use the information in the directory of new hires to:
    1. Provide information to the department of family services as necessary to:
      1. Locate individuals for purposes of establishing paternity and establishing, modifying and enforcing child support obligations;
      2. Notify employers of wage withholding orders.
    2. Provide information to the national directory of new hires; and
    3. Maintain information as necessary for the administration of employment security and worker’s compensation programs.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, each employer in the state shall furnish to the department of workforce services within twenty (20) days of hiring a new employee, or in the case of an employer transmitting reports magnetically or electronically, by two (2) monthly transmissions not less than twelve (12) days nor more than sixteen (16) days apart, a report that contains the name, address and social security number of the employee, the date services for remuneration were first performed by the employee and the name and address of, and identifying number assigned to, the employer under section 6109 of the Internal Revenue Code. The report shall be made on a W-4 form approved by the internal revenue service or, at the option of the employer, on an equivalent form approved by the department. The form may be transmitted by first class mail, electronically or magnetically in a format acceptable to the designated department.
  3. An employer that has employees who are employed in Wyoming and any other state and who transmits the report required under subsection (b) of this section by electronic or magnetic means may elect to submit the report to either state in accordance with federal law. Any department, agency or instrumentality of the federal government operating in the state may submit the report required under subsection (b) of this section to the national directory of new hires in accordance with federal law.
  4. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Employee” means an individual eighteen (18) years of age or older who is an employee within the meaning of chapter 24 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, but does not include an employee of a federal or state agency performing intelligence or counter-intelligence functions if the head of such agency has determined that reporting the information required by this section could endanger the safety of the individual or compromise an ongoing investigation or intelligence operation. If the federal government seeks to impose sanctions on Wyoming for failure to report new hires under eighteen (18) years of age, the department may include such individuals within the definition of employee for purposes of this section;
    2. “Employer” means as defined in section 3401(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and includes any governmental agency and any labor organization;
    3. “Newly hired employee” means an individual who has not previously been employed by the employer or was previously employed by the employer but has been separated from employment with that employer for at least sixty (60) days.
  5. In the event that the federal law requiring the state to maintain a directory of new hires is repealed, employers shall not be required to submit reports as provided by subsections (b) and (c) of this section. The state shall not thereafter maintain the directory of new hires required under subsection (a) of this section.

History. Laws 1998, ch. 25, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; ch. 47, § 1.

The 2012 amendments.—

The first 2012 amendment, by ch. 1, § 1, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in the first sentence of (b).

The second 2012 amendment, by ch. 47, § 1, effective July 1, 2012, inserted “the date services for remuneration were first performed by the employee” in (b); and added (d)(iii).

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been set out as reconciled by the legislative service office.

Editor's notes. —

Chapter 24 of the Internal Revenue Code is codified as 26 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.

27-1-116. Business relationship between franchisors and franchisees; business relationship between franchisors and employees of franchisees.

  1. Neither a franchisee nor a franchisee’s employee shall be deemed to be an employee of the franchisor for any purpose under this title, unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the franchisor and the franchisee.
  2. This section shall not apply to a voluntary agreement entered into between the United States department of labor and a franchisee.
  3. As used in this section, “franchisee” and “franchisor” have the same definitions as set out in 16 C.F.R. 436.1.

History. 2017 ch. 178, § 1, effective July 1, 2017.

Effective date. —

Laws 2017, ch. 178, § 2, makes the act effective July 1, 2017.

Chapter 2 Labor and Statistics

§§ 27-2-101 through 27-2-103. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1917, ch. 113, §§ 1 through 3, related to the commissioner of labor and statistics.

§ 27-2-104. Duties of department of workforce services.

  1. The department of workforce services shall:
    1. Enforce all laws enacted by the legislature of Wyoming, relating to labor, wages, hours of labor, and to the health, welfare, life and limb of the workers of this state;
    2. Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 2.
    3. Make necessary inspections of industrial establishments and buildings as provided by law;
    4. Make an inspection of all living accommodations provided for employees wherever employed, where the living accommodations are furnished as a part of the wages; and
    5. To promulgate reasonable rules.
  2. Repealed by Laws 2002, Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 4.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 4; 1919, ch. 31, § 2; C.S. 1920, § 264; R.S. 1931, § 109-1204; C.S. 1945, § 54-304; W.S. 1957, § 27-13; Laws 1973, ch. 215, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; ch. 71, § 1; 1999, ch. 43, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, §§ 1, 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 4; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in the introductory language of (a).

Scope of commissioner's power. —

The grant of power to the commissioner does not include jurisdiction to decide what wages are lawfully due in a disputed matter and override a contract of employment. McNeill v. Park County Sch. Dist., 635 P.2d 818, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 389 (Wyo. 1981) (decided prior to 1990 amendments).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Application of state law to age discrimination in employment, 96 ALR3d 195.

Application of state law to age discrimination in employment, 51 ALR5th 1.

§ 27-2-105. Report to governor; statistics and information required.

  1. The department of workforce services shall collect, classify, have printed and submit to the governor in its annual report the following statistics:
    1. The hours of labor and number of sex engaged in manual labor;
    2. The aggregate and average daily wages classified by sex and occupation;
    3. The number and character of accidents;
    4. The working conditions of all industrial establishments (including manufacturing establishments, hotels, stores, workshops, theaters, halls and other places where labor is employed);
    5. Other information relating to industrial, economic, social, educational, moral and sanitary conditions of the workers; and
    6. The results of its inspection of industrial establishments.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 5; C.S. 1920, § 265; R.S. 1931, § 109-1205; C.S. 1945, § 54-305; W.S. 1957, § 27-14; Laws 1973, ch. 215, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2006, ch. 114, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to duty of state board of health to investigate and report on health of workers and working conditions, see §§ 35-1-501 through 35-1-503 .

The 2006 amendment, added “and” at the end of (a)(v); and made a related change.

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in the introductory language of (a).

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§§ 27-2-106 and 27-2-107. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1957, ch. 221, §§ 1 and 2, related to the posting of bond by a nonresident employer.

§ 27-2-108. Right of entry.

The director of the department of workforce services may designate employees of the department who shall have power to enter any manufacturing establishment, mill, workshop, office, bakery, laundry, store, hotel, theater, hall, or any public or private works where labor is employed, rooms are rented to the public, or machinery is used, for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this act.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 9; C.S. 1920, § 269; R.S. 1931, § 109-1209; C.S. 1945, § 54-310; W.S. 1957, § 27-17; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

“This act,” referred to in this section, means Laws 1917, ch. 113, §§ 1 through 17, which appear as §§ 27-1-101 through 27-1-104 , 27-1-108 , 27-1-109 , 27-2-104 , 27-2-105 , 27-2-108 and 27-2-109 .

§ 27-2-109. Examination of witnesses.

  1. The director of the department of workforce services may designate employees of the department who shall have the power to administer oaths, to examine witnesses under oath, to compel the attendance of witnesses and the giving of testimony in any part of this state.
  2. through (f) Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3; ch. 71, § 2.
  3. Except as otherwise provided by law, final agency decisions of the department of workforce services with regard to chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of title 27, shall be issued only after an opportunity for hearing pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. Any party aggrieved by a final agency decision of the department of workforce services with regards to chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of title 27, shall have the right to appeal to district court pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.

History. Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 10; C.S. 1920, § 270; R.S. 1931, § 109-1210; C.S. 1945, § 54-311; W.S. 1957, § 27-18; Laws 1961, ch. 202, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, §§ 2, 3; ch. 71, § 1, 2; 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; 2017 ch. 41, § 1, effective July 1, 2017.

Cross references. —

As to officers authorized to administer oaths generally, see § 1-2-102 .

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a) and (g).

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in the middle of (g), substituted “department of workforce services” for “department of employment.”

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

§ 27-2-110. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1917, ch. 113, § 14, related to the salary of the commissioner of labor and statistics, and the deputy commissioner.

§ 27-2-111. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2002, Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 4.

This section, which derived from Laws 1933, Sp. Sess. ch. 24, § 1, designated the director of the department as its agent to implement the federal employment acts.

§ 27-2-112. Sale of office publications; exception.

The department of workforce services may sell any publication or other duplicated or printed material, other than the biennial report, which it prepares and which the public may desire to purchase.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 34, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-21.1; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to the reference to a biennial report, see § 27-2-105 . The department of employment is not required to file a biennial report, only an annual report.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

§ 27-2-113. Sale of office publications; limitation on charges.

The charges made by the department of workforce services shall not exceed the cost of materials, printing, duplication, packaging and postage.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 34, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-21.2; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

§ 27-2-114. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1965, ch. 34, § 3, related to the disposition of funds from the sale of office publications.

Chapter 3 Unemployment Compensation

Revision of chapter. —

Section 1, ch. 114, Laws 1983, revised this chapter, amending and renumbering §§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-205 as §§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 .

No detailed explanation of the changes made by the 1983 act has been attempted; but, where appropriate, historical citations to former provisions have been added to corresponding sections in this chapter, and annotations from cases decided under former provisions have been placed where it was felt they would be helpful.

See the tables of revised and renumbered sections in Volume 11 of the Wyoming Statutes Annotated.

For section providing that these provisions may be cited as the “Wyoming Employment Security Law,” see § 27-3-101 . For definition of “this act,” see § 27-3-102(a)(xxii).

Section 2, ch. 114, Laws 1983, relating to public policy, reads:

“(a) As a guide to the interpretation and application of the Wyoming Employment Security Law, the public policy of this state is as follows:

  1. Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals and welfare of the people of this state;
  2. Involuntary unemployment is a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate legislation to prevent its spread and lighten the burden which so often falls with force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires protection against this great hazard of our economic life. This can be provided by operating free public employment offices in affiliation with a nationwide system of employment services, by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment. In this way, the purchasing power can be maintained and the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance can be limited;
  3. The legislature declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the state require the enactment of this measure under the police power of the state for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves for the use and benefit of unemployed persons.”

    Section 3, ch. 114, Laws 1983, relating to cooperation with other states and the federal government, reads:

    “(a) The legislature declares its intention to provide for:

  1. Cooperation with the appropriate agencies of other states and of the federal government in carrying out the Wyoming Employment Security Law as part of a nationwide employment security program; and
  2. The means to meet requirements of 42 USCS §§ 501 through 503, 26 USCS § 3301 et seq., 29 USCS § 49 et seq., and 42 USCS § 601 et seq. in order to secure for this state and its citizens available grants and privileges.” Section 4, ch. 114, Laws 1983, relating to construction, reads: “The Wyoming Employment Security Law shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose to promote employment security by increasing opportunities for placement through the maintenance of a system of public employment offices and to provide for the payment of compensation to individuals with respect to their unemployment through the accumulation of reserves.” Application form. — The preprinted form used for submitting an application for benefits under The Wyoming Employment Security Law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-3-101 to 27-3-706 , is worded in terms that are simple, direct, and easily understood. Judge v. Dep't of Empl., 2002 WY 109, 50 P.3d 686, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2002).

Article 1. In General

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 1 et seq.

81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare §§ 52 to 70.

§ 27-3-101. Short title.

This act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ] is and may be cited as the “Wyoming Employment Security Law”.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 1; 1941, ch. 96, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 54-101; W.S. 1957, § 27-22; Laws 1971, ch. 253, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1.

Constitutionality. —

The Unemployment Compensation Act was held not unconstitutional for failure to include all employers on taxable list, particularly for exempting farmers and ranchers. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

The Unemployment Compensation Act was held not unconstitutional because it placed burden of providing economic security upon employers only, as distinction exists between employers and employees generally. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

The Unemployment Compensation Act did not violate art. 1, § 34, Wyo. Const., since the constitutional provision was satisfied by the statute applying uniformly within a class of persons, based on reasonable distinction, or objects of reasonable class, and operating the same in all parts of the state under the same circumstances. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

Provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act constituted a continuing appropriation for a specific purpose and were not in violation of art. 3, § 35, Wyo. Const.Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

General, not special, law. —

The Unemployment Compensation Act embraced a group of objects or class of subjects and was not, accordingly, a special, but is a general, law, unless exemption of certain employers made the classification unreasonable. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

Employment Security Law deemed in pari materia with Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen Act. — Ben Realty Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 416 P.2d 220, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1966).

History of earlier provisions. —

See Janssen v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 64 Wyo. 330, 192 P.2d 606, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1948).

Quoted in

Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n of Dep't of Emp., 845 P.2d 387, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

Bettcher v. Wyoming Dep't of Emp., 884 P.2d 635, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1994); Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999); Brock v. Wyo. ex rel. Wyo. Workforce Servs., Unemployment Ins. Div., 2017 WY 47, 394 P.3d 460, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2017).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Constitutionality, construction and application of provision of unemployment compensation act subjecting to its provisions an employer purchasing or succeeding to the business of another employer, 4 ALR2d 721.

Benefits where, during the base year, employee worked in different states for same employer, 9 ALR2d 646.

Unemployment compensation as affected by employee's or employer's removal from place of employment, 13 ALR2d 874; 21 ALR4th 317.

Declaratory relief with respect to unemployment compensation, 14 ALR2d 826.

Validity of governmental requirement of oath of allegiance or loyalty, 18 ALR2d 268.

Effect of vacation, holiday or payment in lieu of unemployment compensation, 30 ALR2d 366, 3 ALR4th 557, 14 ALR4th 1175.

Termination of employment as a result of union action or pursuant to union contract as “voluntary” for purposes of unemployment compensation benefits, 90 ALR2d 835.

Injured person's receipt of statutory disability unemployment benefits as affecting recovery against tortfeasor, 4 ALR3d 535.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment to become self-employed or to go into business for oneself as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 45 ALR5th 715.

What constitutes “agricultural” of “farm” labor within social security or unemployment compensation acts, 60 ALR5th 459.

§ 27-3-102. Definitions generally.

  1. Except as otherwise provided, as used in this act:
    1. “Base period” means the first four (4) of the last five (5) completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual’s benefit year or any other twelve (12) month period specified by commission regulation. A calendar quarter used in one (1) base period of a valid claim shall not be used in a subsequent base period. If a combined wage claim under W.S. 27-3-608 , the base period is as provided under law of the paying state;
    2. “Benefit” means a payment to an individual for unemployment under this act;
    3. “Benefit year” means:
      1. The fifty-two (52) consecutive calendar week period beginning the first week of a claim series established by the filing of a valid initial claim for benefits following the termination of any previously established benefit year; or
      2. The fifty-three (53) consecutive calendar week period beginning the first week of a claim series if filing a new valid claim results in the overlapping of any quarter of the base period of a previously filed claim; or
      3. If a combined wage claim under W.S. 27-3-608 , the benefit year is as provided under law of the paying state.
    4. “Calendar quarter” means a period of three (3) consecutive calendar months ending on March 31, June 30, September 30 or December 31;
    5. “Commission” means the unemployment insurance commission of Wyoming within the department of workforce services;
    6. “Contribution” means payments to the unemployment compensation fund required by this act including payments instead of contributions under W.S. 27-3-509 ;
    7. “Employing unit” means any individual or type of organization employing one (1) or more individuals in this state including any partnership, association, trust, estate, corporation, domestic or foreign insurance company or corporation, a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or a successor or the legal representative of a deceased person and including any limited liability corporation. Also, any individual or organization not previously subject to this act shall be an employing unit upon acquiring any entity already subject to this act. An individual performing services within this state for any employing unit maintaining two (2) or more separate places of business in the state is employed by a single employing unit. An individual employed to perform for or assist any agent or employee of an employing unit is employed by the employing unit whether hired or paid directly by the employing unit or by the agent or employee if the employing unit had actual or constructive knowledge of the work;
    8. “Employment office” means a free public employment office or branch operated by any state as part of a state controlled system of public employment offices or by a federal agency administering an unemployment compensation program or a system of free public employment offices;
    9. “Fund” means the unemployment compensation fund established by this act;
    10. “Hospital” means any institution, building or agency maintaining, furnishing or offering hospitalization of the sick and injured or chronic or convalescent care by individuals employed by the state or any political subdivision;
    11. “Institution of higher education” means any college or university in this state and any other public or nonprofit educational institution:
      1. Admitting as regular students only high school graduates or the recognized equivalent;
      2. Legally authorized to provide post secondary education in this state; and
      3. Providing an educational program for which a bachelor’s or higher degree is awarded or which is accepted as full credit toward this degree, providing a program of postgraduate or postdoctoral study or a training program preparing students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation.
    12. “Insured work” means employment for employers;
    13. “Nonprofit hospital” means any institution performing services specified by paragraph (x) of this subsection and organized and operated under W.S. 35-2-302(a)(vi) and authority of the state department of health;
    14. “State” means any of the fifty (50) states of the United States, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands;
    15. “Unemployment” means any week in which an individual performs no services and receives no wages or performs less than full-time work if wages payable for that week are less than his weekly benefit amount and are in accordance with regulations of the commission;
    16. “Valid claim” means a claim filed by an individual earning wages for insured work in amounts specified under W.S. 27-3-306(d) for which no misrepresentation is made of unemployment requirements of this act;
    17. “United States” used in a geographical sense means the fifty (50) states, the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands;
    18. “Wage” means remuneration payable for services from any source including commissions, bonuses and cash. The reasonable cash value of remuneration other than cash or check shall be prescribed by rule of the commission. To the extent the following are not considered wages under 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 through 3311, “wage” does not include:
      1. For purposes of W.S. 27-3-503 through 27-3-509 , remuneration greater than fifty-five percent (55%) of the statewide average annual wage calculated pursuant to W.S. 27-3-303(a) and rounded to the lowest one hundred dollars ($100.00), which is paid during any calendar year to an individual by each employer or a predecessor within any calendar year including employment under any other state unemployment compensation law unless the amount is subject to a federal tax against which credit may be taken for contributions paid into any state unemployment fund;
      2. Any premium paid by an employing unit under a plan, system or into a fund for insurance or annuities to provide an employee or class of employees retirement, sickness or accident disability, medical and hospitalization expenses for sickness or accident disability or death benefits if the employee cannot receive any part of this payment instead of the death benefit or any part of the premium if the benefit is insured and cannot assign or receive cash instead of the benefit upon withdrawal from or termination of the plan, system, policy or services with the employing unit;
      3. A payment by an employing unit not deducted from an employee’s remuneration for the tax imposed under 26 U.S.C. § 3101;
      4. Dismissal payments which the employing unit is not obligated to make;
      5. That portion of tips or gratuities not reportable under 26 U.S.C. § 3306(s);
      6. The value of any meals or lodging furnished by and for the convenience of the employer to the employee if the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer or in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept lodging on the business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment;
      7. Remuneration received by an employee as sick pay following a six (6) month continuous period of illness;
      8. Any benefit under a cafeteria plan specified by 26 U.S.C. § 125, excluding cash;
      9. Wages of a deceased worker paid to a beneficiary or estate following the calendar year of the worker’s death;
      10. Services received under any dependent care assistance program to the extent excluded from gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 129;
      11. Repealed by Laws 2010, ch. 66, § 2.
      12. Services or benefits received under any educational assistance program;
      13. Any benefit or other value received under an employee achievement award;
      14. The value of any qualified group legal services plan to the extent payments are excluded from gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 120;
      15. Costs of group term life insurance;
      16. Repealed by Laws 2010, ch. 66, § 2.
      17. Any moving expenses;
      18. Employer contributions to any qualified retirement and pension plan or individual retirement account and distributions from qualified retirement and pension plans and annuities under 26 U.S.C. § 403(b);
      19. Benefit payments under any supplemental unemployment compensation plan; and
      20. Any benefits paid under the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act or any other worker’s compensation law of another state.
    19. “Week” means a period of seven (7) consecutive calendar days beginning Sunday and the commission may by regulation prescribe that a week is within the benefit year which includes the greater part of that week;
    20. “Department” means the divisions within the department of workforce services established under W.S. 9-2-2002 which contain the principal operating units that administer the unemployment compensation program pursuant to the Social Security Act;
    21. “Casual labor” means service not within the normal course of business and for which the remuneration paid is less than fifty dollars ($50.00);
    22. “Erroneous payment” means a payment that, but for the failure by the employer or the employer’s agent to provide requested information with respect to the claim for unemployment compensation, would not have been made;
    23. “Pattern of failing” means repeated documented failure on the part of the employer or the agent of the employer to respond to a written request from the department for information relating to a claim for benefits, taking into consideration the number of instances of failure in relation to the total volume of requests by the department to the employer or the employer’s agent;
    24. “Misconduct connected with work” means an act of an employee which indicates an intentional disregard of the employer’s interests or the commonly accepted duties, obligations and responsibilities of an employee. “Misconduct connected with work” does not include:
      1. Ordinary negligence in isolated instances;
      2. Good faith errors in judgment or discretion;
      3. Inefficiency or failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity.
    25. “This act” means W.S. 27-3-101 through 27-3-811 .

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 2; 1939, ch. 121, § 1; ch. 124, §§ 1 to 7; 1941, ch. 96, § 2; 1943, ch. 58, §§ 1, 2; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1945, § 54-102; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 1, 2; 1953, ch. 111, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-23; Laws 1959, ch. 105, § 1; 1967, ch. 3, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; ch. 216, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 60, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 1; ch. 253, §§ 2 to 7; 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1, ch. 131, § 1; ch. 161, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1987, ch. 130, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 83, § 1; ch. 221, § 2; 1995, ch. 121, § 2; 1999, ch. 73, § 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 74, § 1; 2003, ch. 73, § 1; 2004, ch. 130, § 1; 2007, ch. 177, § 1; 2010, ch. 66, §§ 1, 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; 2013 ch. 133, § 1, effective July 1, 2013; 2014 ch. 101, § 1, effective July 1, 2014; 2021 ch. 20, § 2, effective February 9, 2021.

The 2004 amendment, in (a)(xxii), substituted “27-3-705” for “27-3-704.”

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a), deleted the last sentence in (xviii)(A), and substituted “27-3-706” for “27-3-705” in (xxii).

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in (a), repealed (a)(xviii)(M) and (a)(xviii)(R), pertaining to wages paid to disabled worker and loan repayment, and rewrote (a)(xxi), which formerly read: “ ‘Casual labor’ means service of less than two (2) consecutive weeks and not within the normal course of business.”

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a)(v) and (a)(xx).

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added present (a)(xxiv), and redesignated former (a)(xxiv) as (a)(xxv).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (a)(xxii) and (a)(xxiii) and redesignated former (a)(xxii) as (a)(xxiv).

The 2021 amendment, in (a), added "Except as otherwise provided," at the beginning and made a related change; and substituted "27-3-811" for "27-3-706" in (a)(xxv).

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subparagraph (a)(xviii)(I), (L) or (V) and no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Isolated incident of ordinary negligence was not misconduct.—

Former school principal was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits because there was not substantial evidence that the teacher engaged in misconduct. Even if the principal should not have left the school building and should have, instead, immediately pulled a student out of class and contacted a staff member to perform an assessment when a school counselor reported that the student appeared to be overly tired, the principal's action was, at most, ordinary negligence in an isolated instance or a good faith error in judgment or discretion. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. v. Kinneman, 2016 WY 79, 377 P.3d 776, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2016).

“Usual course of business.” —

Decisions dealing with liability under Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law are helpful in construing words “usual course of business” when used. Wyoming Unemployment Compensation Act. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1941).

Misconduct connected with work.—

Denial of an applicant's request for unemployment insurance benefits was appropriate because the applicant was fired for misconduct connected with the applicant's work in that the applicant intentionally disregarded the employer's interest and/or the applicant's commonly accepted duties. Although a supervisor informed the applicant of the importance of not mixing product when the applicant was hired as a fuel truck driver, and the applicant was trained in how to unload fuel, the applicant twice mixed product when employed for two months. Clark v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 WY 89, 378 P.3d 310, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2016).

Denial of applicant’s request for unemployment insurance benefits was appropriate because the applicant was discharged for misconduct connected with the applicant’s work as a police dispatcher in that the applicant disclosed documents containing confidential information to a city council member, who was not authorized to receive them. The applicant showed an intentional disregard for the city’s and police department’s interests in protecting confidential information and maintaining the chain of command to address reported policy violations. Mahoney v. City of Gillette, 2019 WY 28, 436 P.3d 444, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2019).

Term “account for” means to pay over the money to the person entitled thereto and stands in opposition to the right of appropriation to one's own use and benefit. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Great W. Hotel Management, 452 P.2d 211, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1969).

Back pay. —

Back pay should be considered a wage and, for purposes of the Wyoming Employment Security Law (WESA), an employee receiving back pay as a result of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) award, a judgment, an arbitration proceeding or a negotiated settlement following a period of separation from his or her employment, has received a wage. Bettcher v. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, 884 P.2d 635, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1994).

Tips are not wages. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Great W. Hotel Management, 452 P.2d 211, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1969).

But parties have right by explicit contract to agree that tips will be wages, and only when so contracting does the employer become entitled to have tips credited upon wages paid the employee. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Great W. Hotel Management, 452 P.2d 211, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1969).

Quoted in

Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Laramie Cabs, Inc., 700 P.2d 399, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 489 (Wyo. 1985); Wyo. Dep't of Empl. v. Jolley, Castillo, Drennon, Ltd., 2010 WY 48, 229 P.3d 955, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Apr. 22, 2010).

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Taxicab driver as employee of owner of cab or as independent contractor within social security and unemployment insurance statutes, 10 ALR2d 369.

Salesman on commission as within act, 29 ALR2d 751.

What constitutes “agricultural labor” or “farm labor,” within Social Security or Unemployment Compensation Acts, 53 ALR2d 406.

Insurance agents or salesmen as within coverage of social security or unemployment compensation acts, 39 ALR3d 872.

Part-time or intermittent workers as covered by or as eligible for benefits under state unemployment compensation act, 95 ALR3d 891.

§ 27-3-103. “Employer” defined; qualifications; employment services in other states included.

  1. As used in this act, “employer” means any employing unit:
    1. For whom a worker performs service as an employee;
    2. Acquiring the organization, business, trade or substantially all of the assets of an employer subject to this act at the time of acquisition;
    3. Electing coverage under this act pursuant to W.S. 27-3-502(d);
    4. Not otherwise qualifying as an employer under this section and liable for any federal tax on services employed against which credit may be taken for contribution payments into any state unemployment fund;
    5. Not otherwise qualifying as an employer under this section and as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 through 3311, is required to be an employer under this act;
    6. Employing services defined as employment under W.S. 27-3-105(a)(i), except as provided by paragraphs (viii) and (ix) of this subsection;
    7. Employing services defined as employment under W.S. 27-3-105(a)(ii), except as provided by subsection (b) of this section;
    8. Employing agricultural labor defined under W.S. 27-3-107 ;
    9. Employing domestic service defined under W.S. 27-3-107 (g); or
    10. That is an Indian tribe, as defined by section 3306 of the federal Unemployment Tax Act, for which service in employment, as defined by this act, is performed.
  2. Domestic service shall not be considered by the department in determining if an employing unit is an employer under paragraph (a)(i), (vi), (vii) or (viii) of this section. Agricultural labor shall not be considered by the department in determining if an employing unit is an employer under paragraph (a)(i), (vi), (vii) or (ix) of this section.
  3. Employment under this section shall include services performed entirely within another state pursuant to an agreement under W.S. 27-3-608(b) and otherwise qualifying as employment under this act.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 2; 1939, ch. 121, § 1; ch. 124, §§ 1 to 7; 1941, ch. 96, § 2; 1943, ch. 58, §§ 1, 2; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1945, § 54-102; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 1, 2; 1953, ch. 111, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-23; Laws 1959, ch. 105, § 1; 1967, ch. 3, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; ch. 216, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 60, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 1; ch. 253, §§ 2 to 7; 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-102 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1995, ch. 121, § 2; 2001, ch. 67, § 1; 2004, ch. 130, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (b), twice substituted “paragraph” for “paragraphs” and made stylistic changes.

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

Unemployment Tax Act. —

Section 3306 of the federal Unemployment Tax Act appears as 26 U.S.C. § 3306.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the meaning of “this act,” as used in this section, see § 27-3-102(a)(xxiv).

Employer-employee relationship. —

See notes under § 27-3-104 .

Quoted in

Wyo. Dep't of Empl. v. Jolley, Castillo, Drennon, Ltd., 2010 WY 48, 229 P.3d 955, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Apr. 22, 2010).

§ 27-3-104. “Employment” defined; generally; exceptions.

  1. As used in this act, “employment” means service:
    1. Performed by an employee defined under 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) including service in interstate commerce, except 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) does not apply;
    2. Subject to any federal tax against which credit may be taken for contribution payments into any state unemployment fund;
    3. Required to be employment under this act as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 through 3311; and
    4. Otherwise specified under W.S. 27-3-104 through 27-3-108 .
  2. An individual who performs service for wages is an employee for purposes of this act unless it is shown that the individual:
    1. Is free from control or direction over the details of the performance of services by contract and by fact;
    2. Repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 153, § 1.
    3. and (iv) Repealed by Laws 1995, ch. 121, § 3.
    4. Represents his services to the public as a self-employed individual or an independent contractor; and
    5. May substitute another individual to perform his services.
  3. As used in this act, “employment” does not include service performed by a person acting as a fiduciary, as that term is defined in W.S. 4-10-103(a)(vii), and receiving reasonable compensation for fiduciary services pursuant to the Uniform Trust Code or the Wyoming Probate Code.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 2; 1939, ch. 121, § 1; ch. 124, §§ 1 to 7; 1941, ch. 96, § 2; 1943, ch. 58, §§ 1, 2; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1945, § 54-102; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 1, 2; 1953, ch. 111, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-23; Laws 1959, ch. 105, § 1; 1967, ch. 3, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; ch. 216, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 60, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 1; ch. 253, §§ 2 to 7; 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-102 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1987, ch. 130, § 1; 1991, ch. 153, § 1; 1995, ch. 121, §§ 2, 3; 2014 ch. 107, § 1, effective July 1, 2014.

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added (c).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Test of employer-employee relationship is whether either of the parties possesses the right to terminate the services at will, without incurring liability to the other, an affirmative answer establishing the status of master and servant. Ben Realty Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 416 P.2d 220, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1966).

Where the trial court finds the relationship of employer and employee to exist, the supreme court will examine to ascertain if the finding is sustained by substantial evidence. Ben Realty Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 416 P.2d 220, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1966).

Wyoming Unemployment Insurance Commission (Commission) properly found that services provided by 16 flow testers for oil field services company were covered employment under the Wyoming Employment Security Law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-101 et seq., because there was a lack of sufficient evidence in the record which would have demonstrated any instance in which a flow tester represented himself as an independent contractor to the client oil companies. DC Prod. Serv. v. Wyo. Dep't of Empl., 2002 WY 142, 54 P.3d 768, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 2002).

Burden of proof. —

Wyoming Department of Unemployment Insurance Commission's decision that the partnership had payroll for services paid in Wyoming from 2004 through 2006 was supported by substantial evidence and the partnership failed to prove that its consultants were independent contractors, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-104(b). Wyo. Dep't of Empl. v. Jolley, Castillo, Drennon, Ltd., 2010 WY 48, 229 P.3d 955, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2010).

Relationship of independent contractor. —

Each case involving question whether or not relationship is that of independent contractor must be decided upon its own facts. Wyoming Unemployment Compensation Act. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1941).

One who deals with independent contractor is not required to pay unemployment compensation contributions under the law. Wyoming Unemployment Compensation Act. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1941).

Where leaders of orchestras employed, paid and controlled their associates without substantial interference from owner of cafe and bar in which orchestras played, leaders were “independent contractors” and owner was not liable for unemployment compensation to those employed by leaders. Wyoming Unemployment Compensation Act. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1941).

Following services indicated that individual worked as employee, rather than independent contractor: his employer visited him on the job site several times a day, gave direction as to the work in progress, interrupted work to take him to other job sites, and required him to work on many different projects each week. Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1984).

Real estate salesman may be either employee or independent contractor. —

The occupation of real estate salesman, insofar as the Unemployment Insurance Act was concerned, has been held to be one that may be classified as that of an employee or an independent contractor, depending upon the facts of the particular case. Ben Realty Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 416 P.2d 220, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1966).

Association of real estate salesmen with broker held to constitute “employment”. Ben Realty Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 416 P.2d 220, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1966).

Barbers. —

Where barber work was done by barbers in operator's shop on percentage basis, shop being licensed, leased and controlled by operator, who also controlled scope of work and supplied materials (but not tools), operator held liable for contributions under Unemployment Compensation Act. Tharp v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 57 Wyo. 486, 121 P.2d 172, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (1942).

Musicians. —

Where musicians playing in cafe or bar were free from control or direction by owner over their performances, supplied own instruments, except piano, and orchestra leader alone contracted with owner, latter held not liable under Wyoming Unemployment Compensation Act. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1941).

Taxicab drivers. —

Taxicab drivers who leased cabs from a taxicab service, which held city and state permits, furnished gas, oil and other supplies, carried liability insurance, paid license fees and maintained and furnished the capital to purchase the cabs and other equipment, in exchange for a percentage of the fares, were “employees” within the meaning of subsection (b). Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Laramie Cabs, 700 P.2d 399, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 489 (Wyo. 1985).

Housing consultant. —

The claimant, a housing consultant, was an employee within the meaning of the statute, notwithstanding that she filed a self-employed Form 1099 with the Internal Revenue Service, where she (1) conducted sales of manufactured homes, performed income analyses of prospective customers, and assisted customers in filling out credit applications, (2) was paid an hourly wage and also received a bonus based upon sales, (3) was not free from control or direction over the details of the performance of services, and (4) did not represent her services to the public as a self-employed individual or an independent contractor. Hat Six Homes, Inc. v. Department of Empl., 6 P.3d 1287, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 2000).

Misrepresentation. —

Claimant for unemployment compensation benefits was disqualified where he stated on his application that he did not work for wages, but rather, he rented his welding equipment and then operated it for free. Judge v. Dep't of Empl., 2002 WY 109, 50 P.3d 686, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2002).

Quoted in

Sierra Trading Post, Inc. v. Hinson, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 27 , 996 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 2000).

Law reviews. —

For note, “The Wyoming Real Estate Broker v. Employment Security Commission,” see 19 Wyo. L.J. 70 (1964).

§ 27-3-105. “Employment” defined; employment for state, and other organizations; exceptions.

  1. Employment under this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ] includes service performed for:
    1. This state, any of its political subdivisions, including service as an appointed official of any political subdivision, or for this state and any other state or its political subdivisions and this service is excluded from employment under 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 through 3311 solely by 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(7);
    2. A religious, charitable, educational or other organization if excluded from employment under 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 through 3311 solely by 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) and the organization employed four (4) or more individuals for part of one (1) day for twenty (20) weeks within the current or preceding calendar year; and
    3. An Indian tribe, as defined by section 3306 of the federal Unemployment Tax Act, if the service is excluded from employment, as defined by the federal Unemployment Tax Act, only because of the application of section 3306(c)(7) of that act and is not otherwise excluded from employment as defined by this act.
  2. Subsection (a) of this section does not include service performed:
    1. For a church or convention or association of churches;
    2. For an organization operated primarily for religious purposes and supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches;
    3. As an ordained, commissioned or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry;
    4. As a member of a religious order in the exercise of required duties of the order;
    5. As an elected official;
    6. As a member of a legislative body or the judiciary of the state or any political subdivision;
    7. As a member of the state national guard or air national guard;
    8. For a governmental agency as a temporary employee for fire, storm, snow, earthquake, flood or similar emergencies;
    9. By a major nontenured policymaking or advisory position pursuant to law or by a policymaking or advisory position not ordinarily requiring more than eight (8) hours of service per week;
    10. By an individual receiving rehabilitative services from a facility providing rehabilitation programs for individuals with impaired earning capacities because of age, physical or mental deficiencies or injury or providing remunerative work for individuals not readily absorbed into the labor market because of physical or mental deficiencies;
    11. By an individual receiving a wage as part of a work experience or workfare program assisted or financed by the federal government or any state or local government, except for those programs employing an individual in on-the-job training for which wages are wholly or partially paid by the employer;
    12. By an inmate of a state custodial or penal institution; or
    13. As an election official or election worker if the amount of remuneration received by the individual during the calendar year for services performed as an election official or election worker is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 2; 1939, ch. 121, § 1; ch. 124, §§ 1 to 7; 1941, ch. 96, § 2; 1943, ch. 58, §§ 1, 2; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1945, § 54-102; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 1, 2; 1953, ch. 111, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-23; Laws 1959, ch. 105, § 1; 1967, ch. 3, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; ch. 216, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 60, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 1; ch. 253, §§ 2 to 7; 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-102 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; ch. 161, § 2; 1987, ch. 130, § 1; 1998, ch. 55, § 1; 2001, ch. 67, § 1; 2004, ch. 130, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, made stylistic changes in (a)(i), (a)(ii), (b)(xi) and (b)(xii).

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

Employer-employee relationship. —

See notes under § 27-3-104 .

Unemployment Tax Act. —

Section 3306 of the federal Unemployment Tax Act appears as 26 U.S.C. § 3306.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 27-3-106. “Employment” defined; employment outside United States; exceptions; “American employer” defined; localized service specified.

  1. Employment under this act includes service performed outside the United States except in Canada and the Virgin Islands by a United States citizen for an American employer if:
    1. The employer’s principal place of business in the United States is located in this state;
    2. The employer has no place of business in the United States and is a resident of this state, a corporation organized under state law or a partnership or trust and the number of partners or trustees resident of this state is greater than the number of residents of any other state;
    3. The employer elected coverage under this act; or
    4. A claim for benefits based on this service is filed under this act and the employer failed to elect coverage in any state.
  2. As used in subsection (a) of this section, “American employer” means a:
    1. Resident of the United States;
    2. Partnership and two-thirds (2/3) or more of the partners are residents of the United States;
    3. Trust and the trustees are United States residents; or
    4. Corporation organized under federal or any state law.
  3. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, employment includes service performed in this state, both in and outside this state or in Canada if the service is:
    1. Localized in this state;
    2. Not localized in any state, a part of the service is performed in this state and the base of operations is located in this state or if the base of operations is not located in any state, the individual is a resident of this state; or
    3. Not subject to the law of any state or Canada and the service is directed or controlled from a location in this state.
  4. Service not covered under subsection (c) of this section, performed entirely outside this state and contributions are not required or paid under federal or any state law is employment under this act if the individual performing the service is a resident of this state and the department approves the election of the employing unit for coverage under this act.
  5. Service is localized within a state if it is performed entirely within the state or both within and outside the state if the service performed outside the state is incidental.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 2; 1939, ch. 121, § 1; ch. 124, §§ 1 to 7; 1941, ch. 96, § 2; 1943, ch. 58, §§ 1, 2; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1945, § 54-102; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 1, 2; 1953, ch. 111, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-23; Laws 1959, ch. 105, § 1; 1967, ch. 3, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; ch. 216, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 60, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 1; ch. 253, §§ 2 to 7; 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-102 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Employer-employee relationship. —

See notes under § 27-3-104 .

§ 27-3-107. “Agricultural labor” defined; “farm” defined; “crew leader” defined; when domestic services included; exception.

  1. As used in this section, “agricultural labor” means remunerated service performed:
    1. On a farm for any person involving cultivating the soil or raising or harvesting any agricultural or horticultural commodity including training and managing livestock, bees, poultry, wildlife or furbearing animals;
    2. For the owner, tenant or other operator of a farm involving the maintenance of the farm and any tools and equipment if the major part of the service is performed on the farm;
    3. For the operator of a farm in handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freezing, grading, storing, delivering to storage or market in its unmanufactured state or delivering to a carrier for transportation to market, any agricultural or horticultural commodity if the operator produced more than fifty percent (50%) of the commodity;
    4. For the operation or maintenance of ditches, canals, reservoirs or waterways used exclusively for supplying and storing water for farming purposes;
    5. In the production or harvesting of an agricultural commodity as defined under 12 U.S.C. § 1141j(g);
    6. For a group of farm operators or a cooperative organization of which the operators are members for services specified under paragraph (iii) of this subsection if the operators produced more than fifty percent (50%) of the commodity. This paragraph does not apply to service involving commercial canning, commercial freezing or any agricultural or horticultural commodity after delivery to a terminal market for distribution for consumption.
  2. As used in subsection (a) of this section, “farm” means stock, dairy, poultry, fruit and furbearing animal operations, truck farms, ranches, nurseries, ranges, orchards, greenhouses and other operations primarily engaged in the raising of agricultural or horticultural commodities.
  3. Agricultural labor is employment under this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ] if it is performed for a person who:
    1. Paid cash wages of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) or more during any calendar quarter in the current or preceding calendar year to individuals employed in agricultural labor; or
    2. Employed ten (10) or more individuals in agricultural labor for a part of one (1) day for twenty (20) calendar weeks within the current or preceding calendar year.
  4. For purposes of this section, any member of a crew furnished by a crew leader to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person is an employee of the crew leader if:
    1. The crew leader is certified under 29 U.S.C. 1801 through 1872; or
    2. Substantially all crew members operate or maintain tractors, mechanized harvesting or crop dusting equipment or other mechanized equipment provided by the crew leader; and
    3. The individual is not an employee of any other person under W.S. 27-3-104 through 27-3-108 .
  5. As used in this section, “crew leader” means an individual who:
    1. Furnishes individuals to perform agricultural labor for any other person;
    2. Pays for himself or for others the cash wages of individuals furnished by him for agricultural labor; and
    3. Has not entered into a written agreement with the other person designating the individuals as employees of that person.
  6. If an individual furnished by a crew leader to perform agricultural labor for another person is not an employee of the crew leader pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, the other person is the employer and shall pay cash wages of the individual equal to the amount paid by the crew leader for the service performed for that person.
  7. Employment under this act includes domestic service performed for a person in a private home, local college club or local chapter of a college fraternity or sorority for which cash wages of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or more are paid for any calendar quarter of the current or preceding calendar year.
  8. Service performed during any period in which exemptions from federal unemployment tax liability are provided for under 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(1)(B) including any amendments or extensions thereto, by an alien admitted to the United States to perform service in agricultural labor under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 through 1503, is exempt from this section.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 2; 1939, ch. 121, § 1; ch. 124, §§ 1 to 7; 1941, ch. 96, § 2; 1943, ch. 58, §§ 1, 2; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1945, § 54-102; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 1, 2; 1953, ch. 111, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-23; Laws 1959, ch. 105, § 1; 1967, ch. 3, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; ch. 216, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 60, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 1; ch. 253, §§ 2 to 7; 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-102 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; ch. 131, § 3; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 2006, ch. 114, § 1.

The 2006 amendment, substituted “12 U.S.C. § 1141j(g)” for “12 U.S.C. § 1141(g)” in (a)(v).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

Employer-employee relationship. —

See notes under § 27-3-104 .

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 27-3-108. Services excluded from scope of employment.

  1. Employment under this act does not include service performed:
    1. By an individual for his spouse or child or by a person under twenty-one (21) years of age for his parent or for a partnership consisting only of his parents;
    2. For the federal government or any federal agency exempt from this act by federal constitution, except service for those agencies otherwise required by law to contribute to any state unemployment compensation fund;
    3. For an employer or employee representative defined under 45 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. unless an agreement is in effect pursuant to W.S. 27-3-608 ;
    4. By an individual under the age of eighteen (18) or as a direct seller or independent contractor in the business of distributing or delivering newspapers or shopping news excluding the delivery or distribution at any point for further delivery or distribution but including directly related services such as soliciting customers and collecting receipts, provided:
      1. All or substantially all of the individual’s pay for the service, whether or not paid in cash, directly relates to sales or other output rather than to the number of hours worked; and
      2. The individual performs the service under a written contract with the newspaper or shopping news publisher which specifies that the individual will not be treated as an employee with respect to the services for federal tax purposes.
    5. As real estate activity under W.S. 33-28-102(b)(xlv) by a responsible broker, associate broker or salesperson licensed under the Real Estate License Act, W.S. 33-28-101 through 33-28-401 ;
    6. In the employ of a school, college or university by a student enrolled and regularly attending the school, college or university or by the spouse of a student if the spouse is informed at the time employed that employment is provided under a financial assistance program and the employment is not covered by unemployment compensation;
    7. By an individual enrolled in a full-time program of an educational institution combining academic instruction with work experience if the service is an integral part of the program and is certified by the institution to the employer. This paragraph does not apply to service performed in a program established for an employer or group of employers;
    8. By a hospital patient employed by the hospital;
    9. In a barber shop licensed under W.S. 33-7-108 or salon licensed under W.S. 33-12-127 if:
      1. Use of shop facilities by an individual performing services is contingent upon payment of a flat rate of compensation to the shop owner; and
      2. The individual performing services receives no compensation from the shop owner for services performed.
    10. By an individual who is the owner and operator of a motor vehicle which is leased or contracted with driver to a for-hire common or contract carrier. The owner-operator shall not be an employee for purposes of this act if he performs the service pursuant to a contract which provides that the owner-operator shall not be treated as an employee for purposes of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Social Security Act, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and income tax withholding at source;
    11. Services performed as casual labor;
    12. Repealed by Laws 2010, ch. 66, § 2.
    13. By a member of a limited liability company, unless the limited liability company elects coverage in accordance with W.S. 27-3-502(d).

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 2; 1939, ch. 121, § 1; ch. 124, §§ 1 to 7; 1941, ch. 96, § 2; 1943, ch. 58, §§ 1, 2; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 1, 2; C.S. 1945, § 54-102; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 1, 2; 1953, ch. 111, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-23; Laws 1959, ch. 105, § 1; 1967, ch. 3, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; ch. 216, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 60, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 1; ch. 253, §§ 2 to 7; 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-102 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 2; 1995, ch. 121, § 2; 1997, ch. 93, § 1; 2005, ch. 98, § 1; 2008, ch. 116, § 1; 2010, ch. 66, § 2; 2013 ch. 152, § 1, effective March 13, 2013; 2018 ch. 6, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in the introductory language in (a)(ix), substituted “salon” for “a beauty shop.”

The 2008 amendment, made a stylistic change.

Laws 2008, ch. 116, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 13, 2008.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, repealed (a)(xii), which read: “By a private duty nurse employed by a private party.”

The 2013 amendment, added “or as a direct seller or independent contractor in the business of” and added the ending language beginning “but including directly related services,” making a related change in (a)(iv); and added (a)(iv)(A) and (B).

Laws 2013, ch. 152, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 13, 2013.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, rewrote (a)(v), which read: “by a licensed real estate broker or salesman receiving as sole compensation a commission based on the sale or rental of real estate.”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Federal law. —

The Federal Insurance Contributions Act is codified as 26 U.S.C.S. § 3101 et seq.

The Social Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 301 et seq.

The Federal Unemployment Tax Act is codified as 26 U.S.C.S. § 3301 et seq.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-109. Amendment and repeal; vested rights denied.

The legislature reserves the right to amend, modify or repeal all or any part of the Wyoming Employment Security Law [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ] at any time. There is no vested private right of any kind under this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ].

History. Laws 1984, ch. 50, § 1.

Article 2. Fund Administration

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 7.

81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare §§ 467 to 474.

§ 27-3-201. Establishment and composition of unemployment compensation fund.

  1. The unemployment compensation fund is established and shall be administered by the department for purposes of this act.
  2. The fund shall consist of:
    1. Contributions collected under this act, excluding revenues for the employment support fund under W.S. 27-3-505(a);
    2. Funds received under 42 U.S.C. § 1321;
    3. Interest earned on the fund balance;
    4. Any property or securities acquired by the fund and any earnings of the acquired property or securities;
    5. Any other funds received for the fund from any other source; and
    6. Funds credited to Wyoming’s account in the unemployment trust fund pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1103.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 9; 1939, ch. 124, §§ 13, 14; 1941, ch. 96, § 8; C.S. 1945, § 54-109; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 27-31; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-111; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1997, ch. 168, § 2; 1999, ch. 159, § 2; 2003, ch. 123, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to definition of “contribution” with reference to unemployment compensation fund and as to definition of “fund,” see § 27-3-102 .

As to social security, see § 9-3-301 et seq.

As to depository provisions, see article 8 of chapter 4 of title 9.

As to authorized investments for public funds, see § 9-4-831 .

The 2003 amendment, effective January 1, 2004, deleted “any special reserve contribution rate imposed under W.S. 27-3-503(g) and” preceding “revenues” in (b)(i).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-202. Administration of fund.

  1. The department is the custodian of the fund and shall administer the fund and issue warrants upon the fund in accordance with the directions of the department or regulations of the commission. The state treasurer shall maintain a clearing account, an unemployment trust fund account and a benefit account separately within the fund as specified by the department.
  2. All funds payable to the fund shall be deposited by the department or its authorized representative in the clearing account, with receipt and acknowledgement submitted to the state treasurer. In addition, all funds collected from the employment support fund under W.S. 27-3-505(a) shall be deposited by the department in the clearing account, for clearance only, and shall not become a part of the fund. After clearance, funds collected for the employment support fund under W.S. 27-3-505(a) shall be deposited in the employment support fund created by W.S. 27-3-211 . Thereafter, refunds payable pursuant to W.S. 27-3-515 may be paid from the clearing account upon warrants issued by the state auditor under regulation of the commission. Remaining funds in the clearing account shall be immediately deposited with the United States secretary of the treasury in Wyoming’s account within the unemployment trust fund established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1104(e).
  3. The benefit account consists of all funds withdrawn from Wyoming’s account in the unemployment trust fund. Funds shall be withdrawn from Wyoming’s account only for the payment of benefits in accordance with regulations of the commission, except as provided by W.S. 27-3-204 . The department shall withdraw funds from the unemployment trust fund in amounts necessary to pay benefits for a reasonable future period. Withdrawals from the unemployment trust fund shall not exceed the balance of Wyoming’s account within the trust fund. Upon receipt, the department shall deposit the funds in the benefit account, with receipt and acknowledgement submitted to the state treasurer, and shall issue warrants for the payment of benefits from the benefit account. Any funds remaining unclaimed or unpaid in the benefit account after the expiration of the period for which they were withdrawn shall be deducted from estimates and used for the payment of benefits during succeeding periods or deposited with the United States secretary of the treasury in Wyoming’s account in the unemployment trust fund.
  4. Except as otherwise provided by this act, the department may deposit funds of the clearing and benefit accounts, under regulation of the commission and separate from other state funds, in an approved public depository in the manner provided by W.S. 9-4-801 through 9-4-815 . Any collateral pledged for this purpose shall be separate from collateral pledged to secure other state funds. All funds recovered from losses sustained by the fund shall be deposited into the fund. The department may request an examination of any return or report of a national banking association required by this act pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 3305(c).
  5. Warrants for payment of benefits and refunds from the benefit and clearing accounts shall be signed by the state auditor and the department or its authorized agent.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 9; 1939, ch. 124, §§ 13, 14; 1941, ch. 96, § 8; C.S. 1945, § 54-109; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 27-31; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-111; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1997, ch. 168, § 2; 1999, ch. 159, § 2; 2003, ch. 123, § 2; 2015 ch. 12, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.

The 2003 amendment, effective January 1, 2004, in (b), deleted “special reserve contribution rate imposed under W.S. 27-3-503(g) and from the” preceding “employment support fund” in the second sentence, and deleted the third sentence, pertaining to deposit of funds into the state unemployment insurance trust fund.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, substituted “department” for “state treasurer” in (a) and (d); in the second sentence in (a), substituted “The state treasurer” for “He” and added “as specified by the department”; in (b), deleted “with the state treasurer” following “representative” and added “with receipt and acknowledgement submitted to the state treasurer” and made a related change in the first sentence, and substituted “state auditor” for treasurer in the second sentence; in the third sentence in (c), substituted “department” for “treasurer” and inserted “with receipt and acknowledgement submitted to the state treasurer” and made a related change; deleted “by the treasurer” following “deposited” in the third sentence; and substituted “state auditor” for “treasurer” in (e).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Severability. —

Section 20, ch. 113, Laws 1937, reads: “If any provision of this act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this act, and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.”

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Emp. v. Secrest, 811 P.2d 733, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1991).

§ 27-3-203. Discontinuance or nonmaintenance of fund; disposition of assets.

If the unemployment trust fund is discontinued or Wyoming’s account is no longer maintained, the provisions of W.S. 27-3-201 and 27-3-202 relating to the unemployment trust fund are no longer effective. All funds, properties or securities of the Wyoming unemployment compensation fund shall be transferred to the state treasurer. The treasurer shall hold, invest, transfer, sell, deposit and release the funds, properties or securities in a manner approved by the commission in accordance with law and this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ]. Any investment shall allow sufficient conversion of fund assets for payment of benefits.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 9; 1939, ch. 124, §§ 13, 14; 1941, ch. 96, § 8; C.S. 1945, § 54-109; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 27-31; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-111; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-204. Withdrawal funds credited to federal unemployment trust fund.

  1. Funds credited to Wyoming’s account in the unemployment trust fund pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1103 may be withdrawn only for the payment of benefits and expenses for the administration of this act pursuant to this section except as provided by W.S. 27-3-208 and for the payment of expenses for the administration of public employment offices administered by the department of workforce services pursuant to W.S. 9-2-2601(e).
  2. Funds shall be withdrawn for administrative expenses by legislative appropriation. The appropriation shall:
    1. Specify the amounts and purposes for which the funds are appropriated;
    2. Limit the period in which the funds may be obligated to not more than two (2) years after the date of enactment; and
    3. Limit the amount which may be obligated to an amount which does not exceed the amount by which the amounts transferred to Wyoming’s account pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1103 exceed the aggregate of the amounts used by Wyoming pursuant to this act and charged against the amounts transferred to Wyoming’s account.
  3. Funds withdrawn for payment of administrative expenses pursuant to this section shall be deposited in the employment security administration account and shall remain a part of the unemployment fund until spent. The department shall maintain a separate record of the deposit, obligation, expenditure and return of funds deposited. Any funds deposited and not spent for purposes specified within the legislative appropriation or remaining at the expiration of the period specified by the appropriation shall be deposited with the United States secretary of the treasury in Wyoming’s account in the unemployment trust fund.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 9; 1939, ch. 124, §§ 13, 14; 1941, ch. 96, § 8; C.S. 1945, § 54-109; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 27-31; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-111; Laws 1981, ch. 110, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1992, ch. 11, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-205. Employment security administration account.

  1. The employment security administration account is established and shall be administered by the department. The department, with receipt and acknowledgement submitted to the state treasurer, may deposit funds within the account separate from other state funds in an approved public depository in accordance with W.S. 9-4-801 through 9-4-815 . Funds deposited into the account are available to the department for expenditure in accordance with this act and shall not be transferred to any other account. Account expenditures, except funds received pursuant to W.S. 27-3-204 , shall be only for the payment of necessary administrative expenses of this act as determined by the United States secretary of labor and for the establishment and maintenance of public employment offices pursuant to W.S. 9-2-2601(e). All funds deposited into the account pursuant to W.S. 27-3-204 shall remain a part of the unemployment compensation fund and shall be used in accordance with W.S. 27-3-204.
  2. The account shall consist of:
    1. Funds appropriated by the legislature, funds received under 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq. and other federal funds and funds received from any other source for purposes specified in this section;
    2. Federal funds and funds from any other state received as compensation for services or facilities supplied from the account;
    3. Funds from any surety bond, insurance policy or other source for losses sustained by the account including damage to equipment or supplies purchased by the account; and
    4. Any proceeds from the sale or disposition of equipment or supplies purchased by the account.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 13; 1939, ch. 124, § 17; 1941, ch. 96, § 12; 1943, ch. 58, § 8; C.S. 1945, § 54-113; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 12; 1957, ch. 88, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 27-35; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-115; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 3; 2005, ch. 231, § 1; 2015 ch. 12, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.

Cross references. —

As to deposits and depositories generally, see § 9-4-801 et seq.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a), deleted “within the earmarked revenue fund” in the first sentence.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in (a), substituted “department” for “state treasurer” in the first sentence and inserted “department, with receipt and acknowledgement submitted to the state” in the second sentence.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

§ 27-3-206. Replacement of certain funds; how implemented; reports.

The state shall replace any federal funds received under 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., any funds granted to the state under 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq. and any funds of the state or any political subdivision which are matched by federal funds under 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq. and found by the federal government to be lost or spent for purposes other than or in amounts in excess of those amounts necessary for the administration of this act. Replacement of funds pursuant to this section shall be by legislative appropriation from the state general fund to the employment security administration account for expenditure as provided by W.S. 27-3-205 . The department shall report to the governor and the governor to the legislature through the report required under W.S. 9-2-1014 the amount required for the replacement.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 13; 1939, ch. 124, § 17; 1941, ch. 96, § 12; 1943, ch. 58, § 8; C.S. 1945, § 54-113; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 12; 1957, ch. 88, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 27-35; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-115; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1997, ch. 31, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-207. Employment security revenue account.

  1. The employment security revenue account is created as a separate account in the employment security administration account. Monies within the account may only be expended by legislative appropriation. The account shall be used:
    1. To replace any funds pursuant to W.S. 27-3-206 ;
    2. For necessary expenses of this act for which no federal funds are available provided the expenditures from the account are not substituted for federal funds which would otherwise be available; and
    3. Instead of federal funds requested but not received provided the account is reimbursed upon receipt of requested federal funds.
  2. Notwithstanding W.S. 27-3-201 , 27-3-202 and 27-3-205 , the employment security revenue account shall consist of:
    1. Interest collected under W.S. 27-3-510(a) and deposited in the clearing account, provided a sufficient balance is kept within the clearing account to pay interest refunds; and
    2. All federal funds accruing to the Wyoming unemployment trust fund with the United States secretary of the treasury under 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. which are for administrative purposes.
  3. Funds deposited in the Wyoming unemployment trust fund pursuant to paragraph (b)(ii) of this section may be withdrawn according to procedures established by the United States secretary of the treasury.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 13; 1939, ch. 124, § 17; 1941, ch. 96, § 12; 1943, ch. 58, § 8; C.S. 1945, § 54-113; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 12; 1957, ch. 88, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 27-35; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-115; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1987, ch. 238, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 164, § 1; 2005, ch. 231, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a), deleted “within the state trust and agency fund” in the first sentence.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

§ 27-3-208. Advances from federal unemployment trust fund.

  1. The governor may apply for and receive advances to the state of Wyoming from its account in the federal unemployment trust fund and shall be responsible for the advances in accordance with the conditions specified in Title XII [42 U.S.C. § 1321 et seq.] of the “Social Security Act”, as amended, in order to secure to Wyoming the advantages available under that title.
  2. Principal repayments shall only be made from federal revenues credited to or received by Wyoming under this act or interfund borrowing under section 5 of this act [Laws 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 5, as amended by Laws 1984, ch. 50, § 2] and repayments of interest, if any, shall only be made from revenues available by a legislative appropriation for that purpose or interfund borrowings under section 5 of this act [Laws 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 5, as amended by Laws 1984, ch. 50, § 2].

History. Laws 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

“Section 5 of this act,” as used in subsection (b), means Laws 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 5, as amended by Laws 1984, ch. 50, § 2, which reads:

“Upon periodic certification of inadequate revenues by the governor to the state treasurer, the state treasurer may utilize interfund loans from the budget reserve account created under W.S. 9-2-1012(e) in an amount not to exceed twenty million dollars ($20,000,000.00) and from the account created under W.S. 9-4-601(b)(ii) in an amount not to exceed six million dollars ($6,000,000.00) to the unemployment compensation fund or account as needed to repay revenues borrowed under W.S. 27-3-208 or to pay benefits payable through February 20, 1985, required under the Wyoming Employment Security Law which cannot be paid due to the insufficiency of any other revenues available to the Employment Security Commission excluding federal revenues under W.S. 27-3-208 . The loans shall bear no interest and shall be repaid at the time and in the manner prescribed by the legislature with the first payment to commence no later than July 1, 1985.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-209. State unemployment insurance trust fund established.

  1. There is established the state unemployment insurance trust fund. All state unemployment insurance contributions collected under W.S. 27-3-503 through 27-3-505 , less refunds, shall be deposited into the fund and held in trust for the sole and exclusive use of payment on unemployment insurance benefits. The state treasurer shall invest available revenues in the fund in accordance with law, and earnings from those investments shall be credited to the workforce development training fund established in W.S. 9-2-2604 .
  2. The director may determine when and in what amounts withdrawals from the state unemployment insurance trust fund for payment of benefits are necessary. Amounts withdrawn for payment of benefits shall be immediately forwarded to the secretary of the treasury of the United States of America to the credit of the state’s account in the unemployment trust fund.
  3. If the state unemployment insurance trust fund is dissolved, all money then in that fund, less earnings, shall be immediately transferred to the credit of the state’s account in the unemployment compensation fund, regardless of other provisions of law. Earnings from the state unemployment insurance trust fund shall be credited to the workforce development training fund established in W.S. 9-2-2604 . The governor may dissolve the state unemployment insurance trust fund if he finds it to be unnecessary based upon the solvency of the unemployment compensation fund and need for training for Wyoming workers.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 168, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 3.

§ 27-3-210. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2002, Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 4.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1997, ch. 168, § 1, established the workforce development training fund.

§ 27-3-211. Employment support fund established.

  1. There is established the employment support fund. Revenues allocated pursuant to W.S. 27-3-505(a) shall be credited to the employment support fund by the department, with receipt and acknowledgement submitted to the state treasurer. The state treasurer shall invest available revenues in the fund in accordance with law, and earnings from those investments shall be credited to the fund. Notwithstanding W.S. 9-2-1008 and 9-4-207 , the monies in the employment support fund shall not revert.
  2. Monies from the employment support fund shall be expended only upon appropriation by the legislature and shall be withdrawn solely for unemployment compensation benefits or administrative expenses to:
    1. Offset funding deficits for program administration under this act;
    2. Collect and administer the revenues collected under W.S. 27-3-505(a);
    3. Further support programs to strengthen unemployment fund solvency;
    4. Support employment office programs administered by the department of workforce services.
  3. The department shall report annually to the joint appropriations committee and the joint labor, health and social services interim committee not later than September 1 of each year on the status of the employment support fund, detailing fund expenditures and the fund’s current balance.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 159, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 3; 2015 ch. 12, § 1, effective July 1, 2015; 2022 ch. 22, § 1, effective March 9, 2022.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, inserted “department, with receipt and acknowledgement submitted to the” in the first sentence.

The 2022 amendment, in the last sentence of (a), added “Notwithstanding W.S. 9-2-1008 and 9-4-207 ,” deleted “to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year, except that any unappropriated amounts remaining in the fund at the end of any fiscal year shall be transferred by the state treasurer to the state unemployment insurance trust fund created pursuant to W.S. 27-3-209 ” at the end, made related changes; and added (c).

Laws 2022, ch. 22, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 9, 2022.

Article 3. Benefits

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation §§ 104 to 163.

47B C.J.S. Internal Revenue §§ 579 to 584; 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare §§ 140 to 174.

§ 27-3-301. Definitions.

  1. As used in this article:
    1. “Additional benefits” means benefits payable under state law to exhaustees due to high unemployment conditions or other special factors and totally financed by any state;
    2. “Applicable benefit year” means an individual’s most recent benefit year or an individual’s current benefit year if at the time of filing a claim for extended benefits his benefit year is unexpired only in the state in which filing;
    3. “Eligibility period” means those weeks in an individual’s benefit year beginning in an extended benefit period and if his benefit year ends within the extended benefit period, any weeks beginning in this period;
    4. “Extended benefits” means benefits payable to an individual under this article for weeks of unemployment in his eligibility period including benefits payable to federal employees and veterans under 5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq.;
    5. “Most recent benefit year” means the benefit year with the latest ending date for individuals filing a claim for extended benefits with unexpired benefit years in more than one (1) state or, if the benefit years have the same ending date, the benefit year in which the latest continued claim for regular benefits was filed;
    6. “Regular benefits” means benefits, excluding extended and additional benefits, payable to an individual under this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ] or any other state law including dependent’s allowances and benefits payable to federal employees or veterans under 5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq.;
    7. “State law” means the unemployment insurance law of any state approved by the United States secretary of labor under 26 U.S.C. § 3304.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 3; 1939, ch. 124, § 8; 1941, ch. 96, § 3; 1943, ch. 58, § 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1945, § 54-103; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 3; 1953, ch. 111, § 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-24; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-103 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 27-3-302. Payment; liability.

  1. Benefits provided by this article are payable from the unemployment compensation fund established by W.S. 27-3-201 . All benefits shall be paid through department offices in accordance with regulations of the commission.
  2. The department is liable for benefit payments only to the extent provided by this act and to the extent that funds are available within the fund.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, §§ 3, 21; 1939, ch. 124, § 8; 1941, ch. 96, § 3; 1943, ch. 58, § 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1945, §§ 54-103, 54-120; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 3; 1953, ch. 111, § 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 2; W.S. 1957, §§ 27-24, 27-41; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 27-3-103 , 27-3-121; Laws 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Constitutionality. —

The Unemployment Compensation Act, in taking money of employer and giving it to persons who have never been in his employ, serves a public purpose for welfare of all and does not violate art. 1, §§ 32 and 33, Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

Nature of benefits. —

Unemployment benefits do not constitute a gratuity but are a part of compensation or wages. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Vested right of applicant for unemployment compensation in mode and manner of computing benefits in effect at time of his discharge or loss of employment, 20 ALR2d 963.

Unemployment compensation as affected by vacation or payment in lieu thereof, 14 ALR4th 1175.

Offsetting unemployment benefits received against award for backpay in employment discrimination actions, 66 ALR Fed 880.

§ 27-3-303. Weekly amount; computation; payment.

  1. Subject to subsection (d) of this section, the weekly benefit amount for an eligible individual is four percent (4%) of his total wages payable for insured work in that quarter of his base period in which his wages were highest computed to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00). The amount shall not be more than the statewide weekly wage multiplied by fifty-five percent (55%) and computed to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00). The statewide weekly wage is the total wages reported by employers, excluding the limitation on the amount of wages subject to contributions under this act, for employment during the calendar year preceding June 1 divided by the product of fifty-two (52) times the twelve (12) month average of the number of employees in the pay period and rounded to the nearest cent. The statewide average annual wage is the total wages reported by employers, excluding the limitation on the amount of wages subject to contributions under this act, for employment during the calendar year preceding June 1 divided by the twelve (12) month average of the number of employees in the pay period and rounded to the nearest cent. The pay period reported by employers shall include the twelfth day of each month during the same year. The minimum and maximum weekly benefit paid under this subsection to any individual applies only to the benefit year beginning on or after July 1.
  2. Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 175, § 3.
  3. An eligible individual unemployed in any week shall be paid his weekly benefit for that week less any earnings payable to him for that week which exceeds fifty percent (50%) of his weekly benefit amount. The reported earnings and resulting payment shall be computed to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00).
  4. Effective April 1, 1984, and any other time thereafter, when the revenues in the fund excluding legislative appropriations and interfund borrowing are certified by the governor to be inadequate to pay the benefits computed as provided in subsection (a) of this section and inadequate to repay interfund or federal loans, the weekly benefit of any individual whose benefits computed under subsection (a) of this section would equal or exceed ninety dollars ($90.00) per week shall be reduced to eighty-five percent (85%) of that computed under subsection (a) of this section rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00). No individual receiving benefits of ninety dollars ($90.00) or more per week shall receive less than ninety dollars ($90.00) per week because of the reduction provided under this subsection. The reduced benefits shall continue until the governor and the state treasurer certify to the department that the fund is adequately solvent to pay the benefits computed under subsection (a) of this section. A reduction in an individual’s weekly benefit amount resulting from the imposition of this provision will not increase the number of full weeks of benefits to which the individual would otherwise have been entitled had the provision not been invoked. The amounts paid under this subsection shall be in complete satisfaction of a claimant’s rights and benefits under this act.
  5. Upon periodic certification by the governor to the state treasurer of inadequate revenues, the state treasurer may authorize interfund loans from the legislative stabilization reserve account for cumulative amounts not exceeding twenty million dollars ($20,000,000.00), to the unemployment compensation fund as needed to repay revenues borrowed pursuant to W.S. 27-3-208 or to pay benefits through January 1, 1995, which are not able to be paid due to the insufficiency of any available revenues except for those obtained through W.S. 27-3-208 . Loans pursuant to this subsection shall bear interest at the interest rate earned on pooled fund investments in the previous fiscal year and shall be repaid when the unemployment compensation fund is adequately solvent to repay the loans and to continue paying the benefit obligations.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, §§ 2, 3; 1939, ch. 121, § 1; ch. 124, §§ 1 to 8; 1941, ch. 96, §§ 2, 3; 1943, ch. 58, §§ 1 to 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 1 to 4; C.S. 1945, §§ 54-102, 54-103; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 1 to 3; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 1, 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 1, 2; W.S. 1957, §§ 27-23, 27-24; Laws 1959, ch. 105, § 1; 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1967, ch. 3, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; ch. 216, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 60, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, §§ 1, 2; ch. 253, §§ 2 to 8, 14; 1973, ch. 213, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 27-3-102 , 27-3-103 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1985, ch. 175, §§ 1, 3; 1987, ch. 130, § 1; 1988, ch. 51, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 83 § 1; 1993, ch. 19, § 1; 1999, ch. 73, § 2; 2003, ch. 73, § 1; 2018 ch. 62, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in (e), substituted “loans from the legislative stabilization reserve account for cumulative” for “loans from the permanent Wyoming mineral trust fund or any other available permanent fund not subject to interest earning trust obligations, for cumulative” in the first sentence and “shall bear interest at the interest rate earned on pooled fund investments in the previous fiscal year and shall” for “shall bear no interest and shall” in the last sentence.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 4 reads: “The legislature reserves the right to amend, modify or repeal all or any part of the Wyoming Employment Security Law at any time. There is no vested private right of any kind under that act.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Applied in

Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1984).

§ 27-3-304. Maximum payment.

Except as provided by W.S. 27-3-316 , the maximum amount of benefits payable to any eligible individual in a benefit year shall not exceed twenty-six (26) times his weekly benefit or thirty percent (30%) of his wages payable for insured work in his base period, whichever is less. This amount shall be computed to the next higher multiple of his weekly benefit.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 3; 1939, ch. 124, § 8; 1941, ch. 96, § 3; 1943, ch. 58, § 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1945, § 54-103; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 3; 1953, ch. 111, § 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-24; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-103 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1.

§ 27-3-305. Disclosure of child support obligations required; notification; amount withheld; payment; applicability of provisions.

  1. An individual filing a new claim for benefits payable under this act shall disclose if he owes child support obligations enforced pursuant to a plan described in 42 U.S.C. § 654 and approved under 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. If the individual owes child support obligations and is eligible for benefits, the department shall notify the state or local child support enforcement agency operating pursuant to a plan described in 42 U.S.C. § 654 and enforcing the obligation that the individual is eligible for benefits.
  2. The department shall withhold from benefits payable to an individual owing child support obligations enforced pursuant to a plan approved under 42 U.S.C. § 651, et seq.:
    1. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 186, § 3.
    2. The amount determined pursuant to an agreement under 42 U.S.C. § 654(19)(B)(i) and submitted to the department by the state or local child support enforcement agency.
    3. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 186, § 3.
  3. Any amount withheld under subsection (b) of this section shall be paid by the department to the appropriate state or local child support enforcement agency, treated as if paid to the individual as benefits under this act and as if paid by the individual to the state or local child support enforcement agency in satisfaction of his child support obligations.
  4. This section applies only if arrangements are made for reimbursement by the state or local child support enforcement agency for administrative costs incurred by the department attributable to child support obligations enforced by the agency and if the obligations are being enforced pursuant to a plan approved under 42 U.S.C. § 651, et seq.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 3; 1939, ch. 124, § 8; 1941, ch. 96, § 3; 1943, ch. 58, § 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1945, § 54-103; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 3; 1953, ch. 111, § 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-24; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-103 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1993, ch. 19, § 1; 2005, ch. 186, §§ 2, 3.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, repealed former (b)(i) and (b)(iii), allowing the department to withhold the amount specified by the individual and any amount otherwise required to be withheld from benefits payable under this act pursuant to legal process from benefits payable to an individual owing child support, and made stylistic changes.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 27-3-306. Eligibility requirements; waiver or amendment authorized; unemployed waiting period; registration and referral for suitable work.

  1. An unemployed individual is eligible for benefits under this article for any week if he:
    1. Registers for work with the department of workforce services and actively seeks work in accordance with regulations of the commission, unless he will be recalled to full-time work:
      1. By an employer who paid fifty percent (50%) or more of his base period wages;
      2. Within twelve (12) weeks by an employer.
    2. Files a benefit claim for that week in accordance with regulations of the commission;
    3. Is able and available for work;
    4. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 186, § 3.
    5. Earned wages for insured work in amounts specified by subsection (d) of this section;
    6. As a corporate officer, is unemployed, certifies unemployment and otherwise satisfies the requirements of this subsection;
    7. Continues to report to a department office in accordance with regulations of the commission; and
    8. Participates in reemployment services such as job search assistance services if the individual is determined to be likely to exhaust regular benefits and to require reemployment services pursuant to a profiling system established by the department, unless the department determines:
      1. The individual has completed reemployment services; or
      2. There is justifiable cause for the claimant’s failure to participate in these services.
  2. The commission may by regulation waive or amend the requirements of this section for individuals attached to regular work or other situations in which these requirements are inconsistent with this act. Regulations of the commission shall not conflict with W.S. 27-3-303 .
  3. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 186, § 3.
  4. To qualify under paragraph (a)(v) of this section, an individual shall have earned:
    1. Wages for insured work during his base period of not less than eight percent (8%) of the statewide average annual wage computed under W.S. 27-3-303(a) rounded to the lowest fifty dollars ($50.00);
    2. Repealed by Laws 1993, ch. 19, § 2.
    3. Wages for insured work of one and four-tenths (1.4) times the high quarter earnings in his base period; and
    4. Not less than eight (8) times the weekly benefit amount of his current claim for services after the beginning of the next preceding benefit year in which benefits were received. This paragraph applies only if the base period is the first four (4) of the last five (5) completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of the benefit year. Services under this paragraph must be performed in an employer-employee relationship but are not required to qualify as employment under W.S. 27-3-104 through 27-3-108 .
  5. The department of workforce services shall register and refer eligible benefit claimants under this article to suitable work meeting criteria prescribed by W.S. 27-3-312 for regular benefits and by W.S. 27-3-317(e) for extended benefits.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, §§ 3, 4; 1939, ch. 124, §§ 8, 9; 1941, ch. 96, §§ 3, 4; 1943, ch. 58, §§ 3, 4; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3 to 5; C.S. 1945, §§ 54-103, 54-104; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 3, 4; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 2, 3; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 2, 3; W.S. 1957, §§ 27-24, 27-25; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 4; 1967, ch. 175, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 11, 12, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 27-3-103 , 27-3-104 ; Laws 1980, ch. 24, § 1; 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1987, ch. 98, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1992, ch. 18, § 1; 1993, ch. 19, §§ 1, 2; 1995, ch. 13, § 1; 1996, ch. 66, § 1; 1999, ch. 73, § 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 74, § 1; ch. 100, § 3; 2003, ch. 73, § 1; 2005, ch. 186, § 3.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, repealed former (a)(iv), pertaining to eligibility of an individual unemployed for a waiting period of one week, and repealed former (c), clarifying eligibility under (a)(iv).

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2009, ch. 161, § 2 provides: “The department of employment, unemployment insurance division, shall maintain records regarding the number of individuals claiming and awarded benefits and the amount of benefits awarded to individuals under W.S. 27-3-306(a)(i)(D), created by section 1 of this act. Not later than December 31, 2010 and not later than each December 31 of each year thereafter that benefits are provided under W.S. 27-3-306(a)(i)(D), the department shall submit a report to the joint labor, health and social services interim committee, detailing the number of claimants and amounts awarded pursuant to W.S. 27-3-306(a)(i)(D).”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of the term “this act,” referred to in the first sentence in subsection (b), see § 27-3-102(a)(xxii).

Cited in

Bettcher v. Wyoming Dep't of Emp., 884 P.2d 635, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1994); Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Outside piece workers as within unemployment compensation act, 1 ALR2d 555.

Taxicab driver as employee of owner of cab, or independent contractor, within social security and unemployment insurance statutes, 10 ALR2d 369.

Leaving employment, or unavailability for particular job or duties, because of sickness or disability, as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 14 ALR2d 1308.

Right to unemployment compensation of claimant who refuses nonunion employment, 56 ALR2d 1015.

Right to unemployment compensation or social security benefits of one working on his own projects or activities, 65 ALR2d 1182.

Severance payments as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 93 ALR2d 1319.

Failure or delay with respect to filing or reporting requirements as ground for denial of unemployment compensation benefits, 97 ALR2d 752.

Eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts, 35 ALR3d 1129, 12 ALR4th 611.

Eligibility of employee laid off according to employer's mandatory retirement plan, 50 ALR3d 880.

Termination of employment because of pregnancy as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 51 ALR3d 254.

Alien's right to unemployment compensation benefits, 87 ALR3d 694.

Eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to comply with requirements as to dress, grooming, or hygiene, 88 ALR3d 150.

Eligibility as affected by claimant's insistence upon conditions not common or customary to particular employment, 88 ALR3d 1353.

Unemployment compensation: eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to accept employment at compensation less than that of previous job, 94 ALR3d 63.

Eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to work at reduced compensation, 95 ALR3d 449.

Part-time or intermittent workers as covered by or as eligible for benefits under state unemployment compensation act, 95 ALR3d 891.

Eligibility as affected by mental, nervous, or psychological disorder, 1 ALR4th 802.

Unemployment compensation: trucker as employee or independent contractor, 2 ALR4th 1219.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by claimant's receipt of holiday pay, 3 ALR4th 557.

Unemployment compensation as affected by vacation or payment in lieu thereof, 14 ALR4th 1175.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by employee's refusal to work in areas where smoking is permitted, 14 ALR4th 1234.

Unemployment compensation: eligibility where claimant leaves employment under circumstances interpreted as a firing by the claimant but as a voluntary quit by the employer, 80 ALR4th 7.

Private employee's loss of employment because of refusal to submit to drug test as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 86 ALR4th 309.

Unemployment compensation: Eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts for domestic or family reasons 2 ALR5th 475.

Unemployment compensation claimant's eligibility as affected by loss of, or failure to obtain, license, certificate or similar qualification for continued employment, 15 ALR5th 653.

Employee's control or ownership of corporation as precluding receipt of benefits under state unemployment compensation provisions, 23 ALR5th 176.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by claimant's voluntary separation or refusal to work alleging that the work is illegal or immoral, 41 ALR5th 123.

Leaving employment or unavailability for particular job or duties because of sickness or disability, as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 68 ALR5th 13.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation of employee who retires voluntarily, 75 ALR5th 339.

Determination of employer-employee relationship for social security contribution and unemployment tax purposes under § 3121(d)(2) of federal Insurance Contributions Act (26 USC § 3121(d)(2), § 3306(i) of federal Unemployment Tax Act (26 USC § 3306(i)), and implementing regulations, 37 ALR Fed 95.

Representation by attorney of social security benefit claimant in administrative proceeding, 59 ALR Fed 595.

§ 27-3-307. Eligibility when enrolled in approved training program; standards for training program approval.

  1. Notwithstanding W.S. 27-3-306(a)(i) and (iii) or 27-3-311(a)(ii) and (iii) or any federal law relating to availability for, active search for, failure to apply for or refusal to accept suitable work, an otherwise eligible individual is eligible for benefits for any week if he is:
    1. Enrolled in a training program approved by the department pursuant to subsection (b) of this section; or
    2. In training approved under federal law.
  2. Standards for training program approval under subsection (a) of this section are:
    1. Licensed or accredited by the appropriate agency;
    2. Preparation for job skills for occupations with good employment opportunities;
    3. Individual interest, aptitude and motivation determined necessary by the department to complete the course successfully;
    4. Regular class attendance, satisfactory progress in course work and individual compliance with other training requirements of the institution;
    5. Training is to prepare an individual for entry level or upgraded employment in a recognized skilled vocational or technical occupation and such training is designed to facilitate the learning of particular skills; and
    6. Current skills of the individual are obsolete or offer minimal employment opportunities.
  3. Notwithstanding W.S. 27-3-311(a)(i), an otherwise eligible individual is eligible for benefits in any week if he:
    1. Is in training approved under federal law; or
    2. Left work to enter approved training if the work is not suitable, as defined under federal law.
  4. Notwithstanding W.S. 27-3-306(a)(i) and (iii) or 27-3-311(a)(i) through (iii) or any federal law relating to availability for, active search for, failure to apply for or refusal to accept suitable work, an otherwise eligible individual is eligible for benefits for any week if he is not receiving wages or compensation while participating in training in an apprenticeship program approved by the department if he:
    1. Is attending instruction related to the program when the instruction does not exceed eight (8) weeks during the benefit year of the individual and the attendance in the instruction is required as a condition of the individual’s continued enrollment in the apprenticeship program;
    2. Provides the department with a copy of his apprenticeship agreement;
    3. Files claims in accordance with the rules of the department;
    4. Establishes to the satisfaction of the department that the training is an approved apprenticeship program; and
    5. Has his most recent employer approve his participation in the training.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 4; 1939, ch. 124, § 9; 1941, ch. 96, § 4; 1943, ch. 58, § 4; 1945, ch. 81, § 5; C.S. 1945, § 54-104; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 4; 1953, ch. 111, § 3; 1957, ch. 88, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-25; Laws 1963, ch. 121, § 4; 1967, ch. 175, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 11, 12; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-104 ; Laws 1980, ch. 24, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 83, § 1; 1999, ch. 73, § 2; 2003, ch. 73, § 1; 2005, ch. 186, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (d), substituted “and (iii)” for “(iii) and (iv).”

Requirements. —

District court properly upheld the Unemployment Insurance Commission’s denial of an employee’s request for unemployment benefits because he left work voluntarily after his employer could not accommodate his request for alternate hours or a new position to support his school schedule, and he did not qualify for the exception return “to approved training” where his enrollment in a nursing program absent the required determination did not meet the conditions of the statutory exception. Gerber v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2020 WY 90, 467 P.3d 153, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2020).

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 27-3-308. Services excluded for eligibility.

  1. An individual is not eligible for benefits based on service:
    1. In an instructional, research or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution for any week of unemployment beginning between two (2) successive academic years, two (2) regular terms whether or not successive or during a paid sabbatical leave and he has a reasonable assurance to perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution in the second academic year or term or end of the paid sabbatical leave;
    2. In any other capacity for any educational institution for weeks of unemployment beginning September 3, 1982, and thereafter for any week of unemployment beginning between two (2) successive academic years or terms if he is employed in the first academic year or term with a reasonable assurance for employment in the second year or term for any educational institution. If compensation is denied to any individual under this paragraph and he was not offered an opportunity to perform services for the educational institution for the second academic year or term, the individual is entitled to retroactive payment of compensation for each week he filed a timely claim for compensation but was denied compensation solely because of this paragraph;
    3. For training, preparing and participating in sporting or athletic events for any week of unemployment beginning between two (2) successive seasons or periods if he is employed in the first season or period with reasonable assurance of employment in the second season or period.
  2. With respect to any service described in paragraphs (a)(i) and (ii) of this section, benefits are not payable on the basis of services in any such capacities to any individual for any week which commences during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess if the individual performs the services in the period immediately before the vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform the services in the period immediately following the vacation period or holiday recess. With respect to any services described in paragraphs (a)(i) and (ii) of this section, and in this subsection, benefits shall not be payable on the basis of services in any such capacities as specified in paragraphs (a)(i) and (ii) of this section, and in this subsection, to any individual who performed the services in an educational institution while in the employ of an educational service agency and who has a reasonable assurance of continued employment with an educational service agency. For purposes of this subsection, “educational service agency” means a governmental agency or governmental entity which is established and operated exclusively for the purpose of providing the services to one (1) or more educational institutions. With respect to services to which W.S. 27-3-105(a)(i) and (ii) applies, if the services are provided to or on behalf of an educational institution, benefits shall not be payable under the same circumstances and subject to the same terms and conditions as described in paragraphs (a)(i) and (ii) of this section and this subsection.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 4; 1939, ch. 124, § 9; 1941, ch. 96, § 4; 1943, ch. 58, § 4; 1945, ch. 81, § 5; C.S. 1945, § 54-104; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 4; 1953, ch. 111, § 3; 1957, ch. 88, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-25; Laws 1963, ch. 121, § 4; 1967, ch. 175, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 11, 12; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-104 ; Laws 1980, ch. 24, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1986, ch. 56, § 1; 1988, ch. 51, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2.

§ 27-3-309. Eligibility of aliens; standard of proof required.

  1. Benefits shall not be payable on the basis of services performed by an alien unless the alien was lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States at the time the services were performed, was lawfully present for purposes of performing the services, or was permanently residing in the United States under color of law at the time the services were performed, pursuant to section 212(d)(5) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
  2. Information necessary to determine alien status for benefit eligibility shall be uniformly required of all benefit applicants. Determination of benefit eligibility under this section shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 4; 1939, ch. 124, § 9; 1941, ch. 96, § 4; 1943, ch. 58, § 4; 1945, ch. 81, § 5; C.S. 1945, § 54-104; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 4; 1953, ch. 111, § 3; 1957, ch. 88, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-25; Laws 1963, ch. 121, § 4; 1967, ch. 175, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 11, 12; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-104 ; Laws 1980, ch. 24, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1991, ch. 35, § 1.

§ 27-3-310. Eligibility after receiving worker's compensation.

Notwithstanding requirements for the base period and other compensation factors provided under this act, an individual receiving compensation under the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act [§ 27-14-101 et seq.] for a continuous period of sickness or injury resulting in temporary total disability and otherwise eligible for benefits under this article may preserve unused wage credits for the four (4) completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the date identified as the date of injury under the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act. Benefit rights shall not be preserved unless a benefit claim is filed within sixty (60) calendar days following the date notice is mailed to the claimant that he is no longer eligible to receive temporary total disability benefits pursuant to W.S. 27-14-404(c) and within the thirty-six (36) month period immediately following the date of injury.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 236, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-105 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1987, ch. 130, § 1; 1988, ch. 51, § 1; 1993, ch. 19, § 1; 1995, ch. 13, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-311. Disqualifications from entitlement; grounds; forfeiture.

  1. An individual shall be disqualified from benefit entitlement beginning with the effective date of an otherwise valid claim or the week during which the failure occurred, until he has been employed in an employee-employer relationship and has earned at least eight (8) times the weekly benefit amount of his current claim for services after that date, if the department finds that he:
    1. Left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause attributable directly to his employment, except:
      1. For bona fide medical reasons involving his health;
      2. If returning to approved training which meets the requirements of W.S. 27-3-307 ;
      3. If forced to leave the most recent work as a result of being a victim of documented domestic violence; or
      4. If unemployed as a result of relocation due to the transfer of the unemployed individual’s spouse, either within or outside the state, from which it is impractical to commute to the place of employment, and upon arrival at the new residence, the individual is in all respects able and available for suitable work and registers for work with the department of workforce services or an equivalent agency of another state where the individual is residing. To qualify under this subparagraph, the individual shall be married to a member of the United States armed forces whose relocation is the result of an assignment on active duty as defined in 10 U.S.C. 101(d)(1), active guard or reserve duty as defined in 10 U.S.C. 101(d)(6), active duty pursuant to title 10 of the United States Code, or training or other duty performed by a member of the army national guard of the United States or the air national guard of the United States under section 316, 502, 503, 504 or 505 of title 32 of the United States Code. Any benefits awarded under this subparagraph shall be noncharged benefits and shall not affect an employer’s experience rating account.
    2. Failed without good cause to apply for available suitable work;
    3. Failed without good cause to accept any offer of suitable work;
    4. Repealed by Laws 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 3.
    5. Following four (4) weeks of unemployment, failed to apply for or accept an offer of suitable work other than in his customary occupation offering at least fifty percent (50%) of the compensation of his previous insured work in his customary occupation; or
    6. Following twelve (12) weeks of unemployment, as a member of a labor organization fails to apply for or accept suitable nonunion work in his customary occupation.
    7. Repealed by Laws 2003, ch. 73, § 2.
  2. Repealed by Laws 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1993, ch. 19, § 2.
  4. Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 175, § 3.
  5. Any person who knowingly files a claim for benefits which contains a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact, as determined by the department, shall be disqualified from receiving benefits for a fifty-two (52) week period beginning the week in which the false statement or misrepresentation was made or beginning the week following the date that notice of the overpayment is mailed to the person who filed the claim.
  6. An individual shall be disqualified from benefit entitlement beginning with the effective date of an otherwise valid claim or the week during which the failure occurred, until he has been employed in an employee-employer relationship and has earned at least twelve (12) times the weekly benefit amount of his current claim for services after that date, if the department finds that he was discharged from his most recent work for misconduct connected with his work.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 5; 1939, ch. 124, § 10; 1941, ch. 96, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-105; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 5; 1953, ch. 111, § 4; 1957, ch. 88, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-26; Laws 1963, ch. 121, § 5; 1967, ch. 175, § 2; 1969, ch. 58, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, § 13; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-106 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, §§ 2, 3; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1985, ch. 175, §§ 1, 3; 1988, ch. 51, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1993, ch. 19, §§ 1, 2; 1995, ch. 13, § 1; 1999, ch. 73, § 2; 2003, ch. 73, §§ 1, 2; 2009, ch. 161, § 1; 2010, ch. 66, § 1; 2018 ch. 110, § 1, effective March 14, 2018.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added (a)(i)(D).

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in (e), inserted “beginning the week following,” and deleted “determination or decision” following “the overpayment.”

The 2018 amendment, in (a)(i)(D), deleted the last sentence, which read: “This subparagraph is repealed effective July 1, 2018.”

Laws 2018, ch. 110, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 14, 2018.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 4 reads: “The legislature reserves the right to amend, modify or repeal all or any part of the Wyoming Employment Security Law at any time. There is no vested private right of any kind under that act.”

Laws 2009, ch. 161, § 2 provides: “The department of employment, unemployment insurance division, shall maintain records regarding the number of individuals claiming and awarded benefits and the amount of benefits awarded to individuals under W.S. 27-3-306(a)(i)(D), created by section 1 of this act. Not later than December 31, 2010 and not later than each December 31 of each year thereafter that benefits are provided under W.S. 27-3-306(a)(i)(D), the department shall submit a report to the joint labor, health and social services interim committee, detailing the number of claimants and amounts awarded pursuant to W.S. 27-3-306(a)(i)(D).”

Approved training. —

District court properly upheld the Unemployment Insurance Commission’s denial of an employee’s request for unemployment benefits because he left work voluntarily after his employer could not accommodate his request for alternate hours or a new position to support his school schedule, and he did not qualify for the exception return “to approved training” where his enrollment in a nursing program absent the required determination did not meet the conditions of the statutory exception. Gerber v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2020 WY 90, 467 P.3d 153, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2020).

Misconduct connected with work.—

Denial of an applicant's request for unemployment insurance benefits was appropriate because the applicant was fired for misconduct connected with the applicant's work in that the applicant intentionally disregarded the employer's interest and/or the applicant's commonly accepted duties. Although a supervisor informed the applicant of the importance of not mixing product when the applicant was hired as a fuel truck driver, and the applicant was trained in how to unload fuel, the applicant twice mixed product when employed for two months. Clark v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 WY 89, 378 P.3d 310, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2016).

Denial of applicant’s request for unemployment insurance benefits was appropriate because the applicant was discharged for misconduct connected with the applicant’s work as a police dispatcher in that the applicant disclosed documents containing confidential information to a city council member, who was not authorized to receive them. The applicant showed an intentional disregard for the city’s and police department’s interests in protecting confidential information and maintaining the chain of command to address reported policy violations. Mahoney v. City of Gillette, 2019 WY 28, 436 P.3d 444, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2019).

Resignation effective at a future date. —

Unemployment insurance commission was required to follow its existing precedent concerning situations where employee gives a resignation notice effective at a future date, but employer terminates employee before that date is reached. Pette v. State ex rel. Department of Empl., 968 P.2d 952, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1998).

To show “good cause,” as that term is used in subsection (a), evidence presented must demonstrate such a cause as justifies an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed; the quitting must be for such a cause as would reasonably motivate, in a similar situation, the average able-bodied and qualified worker to give up his employment with its certain wage rewards in order to enter the ranks of the compensated unemployed. Sage Club v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 601 P.2d 1306, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 479 (Wyo. 1979).

Employee's conviction that his employer was erroneously withholding wages constituted “good cause” under subsection (a)(i). Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1984).

Unsafe place to work could constitute good cause for a voluntary work termination. Beddow v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 718 P.2d 12, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 530 (Wyo. 1986).

Employees had good cause to resign, where their employer had harassed them in retaliation for their support of a former co-employee following his discharge and his subsequent proceedings before the commission (now department), wherein he successfully sought unemployment benefits. Southwest Wyo. Rehabilitation Ctr. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 781 P.2d 918, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1989).

Unwelcome sexual advances constituted good cause. —

The claimant had good cause to leave her employment on the basis of unwelcome sexual advances by the president of the employer and the increasing number of violent episodes by the vice-president of the employer. Hat Six Homes, Inc. v. Department of Empl., 6 P.3d 1287, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 2000).

Statement of employee not misconduct. —

Unemployment insurance commission properly determined that statement of claimant was not an actual threat, and therefore did not constitute misconduct disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits. Wyoming Dep't of Empl., Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. SF Phosphates, Ltd., 976 P.2d 199, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1999).

No known obligation or responsibility shown. —

Unemployment benefits should have been awarded to a claimant because he did not commit misconduct in connection to an incident that arose while he was performing off-duty security work; there was no sheriff's department policy or procedure that specifically required photographs to be taken at the scene or that the claimant check on a victim's condition at a hospital. There had to be evidence of a known obligation or responsibility, as well as a willful and intentional failure to comply. State v. Laramie County (In re Ringrose), 2013 WY 68, 302 P.3d 900, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 2013).

Substantial evidence did not support a denial of an employee's unemployment insurance benefits claim because it was unreasonable to find the employee engaged in misconduct by chipping the motor fin on the employer's bike and installing a dented cylinder on a customer's bike, as the employer did not know of these acts when the employee was fired, so there was no evidence of a known obligation or responsibility and a willful and intentional failure to comply. Doggett v. Wyo. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2014 WY 119, 334 P.3d 1231, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 2014).

Refusal to submit to urine test not misconduct. —

An employee's refusal to submit to a urine test was not misconduct, where the employer's demand to the employee that he yield up a sample of his urine to their corporate physician for analysis or resign on the spot was unreasonable and where there was no established company policy requiring, as a condition of the employment, any submission to either random testing for intoxicants or such testing based upon a reasonable and particularized suspicion. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Western Gas Processors, 786 P.2d 866, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1990).

Refusal to take drug/alcohol test not misconduct. —

Refusal to take a drug/alcohol test which was not brought about in accordance with the employer's established policy is not “misconduct” which will disqualify that employee from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Risser & McMurry Co., 837 P.2d 686, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 1992).

Changes in work routine not “good cause.” —

As a general rule, changes in customary working conditions not involving deceit or wrongful conduct on the part of the employer are not a sufficient reason for an employee voluntarily to leave work. Sage Club v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 601 P.2d 1306, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 479 (Wyo. 1979).

Trivial changes in an employee's work routine do not constitute “good cause” to quit work and collect unemployment benefits. Sage Club v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 601 P.2d 1306, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 479 (Wyo. 1979).

Walking off job following confrontation, deemed “misconduct.” —

While showing up for work on one occasion with little rest after a night at a bar might not in itself constitute “misconduct,” walking off the job after being confronted by a senior employee about the effects of such behavior is misconduct. Roberts v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 745 P.2d 1355, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 552 (Wyo. 1987).

Unintended or accidental work-rule violation, with consequent discharge, does not constitute statutory misconduct for denial of unemployment-benefit payment. Safety Medical Servs. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 724 P.2d 468, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 609 (Wyo. 1986).

Employee who quits after minor, isolated altercation with fellow employee disqualified for benefits. —

The decision of the commission to disqualify an employee for benefits for voluntarily leaving his employment without good cause was supported by evidence that the employee was involved in a minor, isolated altercation with a fellow employee, was not injured, but quit his job. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Bryant, 704 P.2d 1311, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 546 (Wyo. 1985).

Employee blocking main entrance disqualified from benefits. —

An employee who blocks the main entrance to a mine site may be disqualified from benefit entitlement. Such conduct indicates a disregard for the mining company's interests and, therefore, amounts to misconduct under this section. Barker v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 791 P.2d 583, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1990).

Employer's pulling of time card precluded employee misconduct. —

Employer's “pulling” of employee's time card effectively terminated employee's employment and precluded an administrative finding that employee had voluntarily left without good cause, especially in light of additional evidence that employee had filled out a temporary absentee form in advance and had reacted in an abrupt manner with obscene language upon notification of his termination. Casper Iron & Metal v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n of Dep't of Employment, 845 P.2d 387, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1993).

Misrepresentation. —

Claimant for unemployment compensation benefits was disqualified under § 27-3-311(e) where the claimant stated on his application that he did not work for wages, but rather, he rented his welding equipment and then operated it for free. Judge v. Dep't of Empl., 2002 WY 109, 50 P.3d 686, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2002).

Claimant's testimony substantial evidence. —

Unemployment Insurance Commission's acceptance of claimant's testimony could have found such to be substantial evidence indicating that the claimant did not engage in misconduct such that he should be denied unemployment benefits. City of Casper v. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, Unemployment Ins. Div., 851 P.2d 1, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1993).

Failure to write report not misconduct. —

Unemployment benefits should have been awarded to a claimant because he did not commit misconduct under this section in connection to an incident that arose while he was performing off-duty security work since a sheriff's department policy did not establish a violation when the claimant did not write a report until ordered to do so. A violation occurred only if a report was not submitted by the last workday of the claimant's workweek. State v. Laramie County (In re Ringrose), 2013 WY 68, 302 P.3d 900, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 2013).

Isolated incident of ordinary negligence was not misconduct. —

Pursuant to review under Wyo. R. App. P. 12.09(a) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c), there was substantial evidence supporting a claimant's award of unemployment insurance benefits because irrelevant evidence of an alleged conspiracy was properly excluded under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-108(a) and claimant's conduct was determined to be ordinary negligence in an isolated instance and not misconduct under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-311(f). Further, the hearing officer complied with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-112(a) to provide the claimant's former employer with a fair and impartial hearing. Aspen Ridge Law Offices, P.C. v. Wyo. Dep't of Empl., 2006 WY 129, 143 P.3d 911, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2006).

Applied in

Sierra Trading Post, Inc. v. Hinson, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 27 , 996 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 2000).

Quoted in

Weidner v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 893 P.2d 706, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 906 P.2d 380, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1995); Nathan v. Am. Global Univ., 2005 WY 64, 113 P.3d 32, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (2005).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect on right to unemployment compensation benefits of receipt of subsistence allowance under Federal Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 21 ALR2d 1072.

Right to unemployment compensation of one working on own projects or activities, 65 ALR2d 1182.

Harassment or garnishment by employee's creditor as constituting misconduct connected with employment so as to disqualify employee for unemployment compensation, 86 ALR2d 1013.

Effect on right to state unemployment compensation benefits of receipt of payments under private supplemental unemployment benefit plans, 91 ALR2d 1211.

Employee's insubordination as barring unemployment compensation, 26 ALR3d 1333, 20 ALR4th 637.

Work-connected inefficiency or negligence as “misconduct” barring unemployment compensation, 26 ALR3d 1356.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by receipt of pension, 56 ALR3d 520.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by receipt of social security benefits, 56 ALR3d 552.

Eligibility of strikers to obtain public assistance, 57 ALR3d 1303.

Discharge for absenteeism or tardiness as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 58 ALR3d 674.

Eligibility of participants in sympathy strike or slowdown, 61 ALR3d 746.

Labor dispute disqualification as applicable to striking employee who is laid off subsequent to employment during strike period, 61 ALR3d 766.

Refusal of nonstriking employees to cross picket line as justifying denial of unemployment compensation benefits, 62 ALR3d 380.

Application of labor dispute disqualification for benefits to locked out employee, 62 ALR3d 437.

General principles pertaining to statutory disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits because of strike or labor dispute, 63 ALR3d 88.

Unemployment compensation: harassment or other mistreatment by employer or supervisor as “good cause” justifying abandonment of employment, 76 ALR3d 1089.

Use of vulgar or profane language as bar to claim for unemployment compensation, 92 ALR3d 106.

Eligibility as affected by refusal to accept employment at compensation less than that of previous job, 94 ALR3d 63.

Unemployment compensation: eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to work at reduced compensation, 95 ALR3d 449.

Eligibility as affected by mental, nervous, or psychological disorder, 1 ALR4th 802.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by claimant's receipt of holiday pay, 3 ALR4th 557.

Leaving or refusing employment for religious reasons as barring unemployment compensation, 12 ALR4th 611.

Leaving or refusing employment because of allergic reaction as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 12 ALR4th 629.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by employee's refusal to work in areas where smoking is permitted, 14 ALR4th 1234.

Right to unemployment compensation of one who quit job because not given enough work to keep busy, 15 ALR4th 256.

Employee's refusal to take lie detector test as barring unemployment compensation, 18 ALR4th 307.

Employee's act or threat of physical violence as bar to unemployment compensation, 20 ALR4th 637.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by voluntary resignation because of change of location of residence, 21 ALR4th 317.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by misrepresentation in original employment application, 23 ALR4th 1272.

Discharge from employment on ground of political views or conduct as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 29 ALR4th 287.

Unemployment compensation: termination of employment, known to be for a specific, limited duration, upon expiration of period, as voluntary, 30 ALR4th 1201.

Conduct or activities of employees during off-duty hours as misconduct barring unemployment compensation benefits, 35 ALR4th 691.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits of employee who attempts to withdraw resignation before leaving employment, 36 ALR4th 395.

Alcoholism or intoxication as ground for discharge justifying denial of unemployment compensation, 64 ALR4th 1151.

Unemployment compensation: burden of proof as to voluntariness of separation, 73 ALR4th 1093.

Employee's use of drugs or narcotics, or related problems, as affecting eligibility for unemployment compensation, 78 ALR4th 180.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation of employee who left employment based on belief that involuntary discharge was imminent, 79 ALR4th 528.

Unemployment compensation: eligibility where claimant leaves employment under circumstances interpreted as a firing by the claimant but as a voluntary quit by the employer, 80 ALR4th 7.

Private employee's loss of employment because of refusal to submit to drug test as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 86 ALR4th 309.

Validity, construction, and effect of state laws requiring payment of wages on resignation of employee immediately or within specified period, 11 ALR5th 715.

Unemployment compensation claimant's eligibility as affected by loss of, or failure to obtain, license, certificate or similar qualification for continued employment, 15 ALR5th 653.

Employee's control or ownership of corporation as precluding receipt of benefits under state unemployment compensation provisions, 23 ALR5th 176.

Right to unemployment compensation or social security benefits of teacher or other school employee, 33 ALR5th 643.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by claimant's voluntary separation or refusal to work alleging that the work is illegal or immoral, 41 ALR5th 123.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment to become self-employed or to go into business for oneself as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 45 ALR5th 715.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment in pursuit of other employment as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 46 ALR5th 659.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment in pursuit of education or to attend training as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 47 ALR5th 775.

Leaving employment or unavailability for particular job or duties because of sickness or disability, as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 68 ALR5th 13.

Work-related inefficiency, incompetence, or negligence as “misconduct” barring unemployment compensation, 95 ALR5th 329.

Use of employer's e-mail or internet system as misconduct precluding unemployment compensation, 106 ALR5th 297.

Unemployment compensation: Harassment or other mistreatment by coworker as “good cause” justifying abandonment of employment, 121 ALR 5th 467.

Conduct or activities of employees during off-duty hours as misconduct barring unemployment compensation benefits. 18 A.L.R.6th 195.

Eligibility for compensation as affected by voluntary resignation because of change of location of residence under statute conditioning benefits upon leaving for “good cause attributable to the employer”, 26 A.L.R.6th 111.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation as affected by voluntary resignation because of change of location of residence under statute denying benefits to certain claimants based on particular disqualifying motive for move or unavailability for, 27 A.L.R.6th 123.

Construction and application of Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 USC §§ 2001 et seq.) 154 ALR Fed 315.

§ 27-3-312. Determination of suitable work.

  1. In determining if work is suitable for purposes of W.S. 27-3-311(a), the department shall consider:
    1. The risk involved to an individual’s health, safety and morals;
    2. The individual’s physical fitness;
    3. The length of unemployment of the individual;
    4. The prospects for securing local employment in the individual’s customary occupation;
    5. The distance of available employment from the individual’s residence; and
    6. If the individual is capable of performing the work.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, work is not suitable if:
    1. It is available because of a strike, lockout or other labor dispute;
    2. The wages, hours or other conditions are substantially less favorable for the individual than those prevailing for similar work within the locality; or
    3. An individual is required to join a company union or resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization as a condition for employment.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 50, § 3.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 5; 1939, ch. 124, § 10; 1941, ch. 96, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-105; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 5; 1953, ch. 111, § 4; 1957, ch. 88, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-26; Laws 1963, ch. 121, § 5; 1967, ch. 175, § 2; 1969, ch. 58, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, § 13; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-106 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2; 1984, ch. 50, §§ 2, 3; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Unemployment compensation: Eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts for domestic or family reasons 2 ALR5th 475.

§ 27-3-313. Other grounds for disqualification.

  1. For any week with respect to which the following situations occur or payments have been or will be received, an individual shall be disqualified from benefit entitlement if:
    1. Total or part total unemployment for any week is due to work stoppage resulting from a labor dispute on the employment premises at which he was last employed. This paragraph does not apply if the department finds the individual is not participating in, financing or directly interested in the labor dispute and is not a member of a grade or class of workers with members employed on the premises and participating in, financing or directly interested in the dispute. If separate types of work commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each department is a separate premises under this paragraph;
    2. Repealed by Laws 2003, ch. 73, § 2.
    3. Unemployment benefits are applied for or received under law of another state or the federal government. This paragraph does not apply if the other state or the federal government determines the individual is not entitled to benefits or to benefits received under an agreement between this state and the federal government pursuant to law;
    4. Self-employed for profit in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business for more than three (3) days in any week or net earnings from self-employment are in excess of the weekly benefit amount. If net earnings computed to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00) are less than the weekly benefit amount, the individual is entitled to an amount reduced by the net earnings;
    5. Retirement annuities, pensions or other payments are received from a base period employer or any trust or fund contributed to by a base period employer, and the individual made no contribution to the annuity, pension or other payment. Lump sum payments of retirement annuities, pensions or other payments which are rolled over into other private funds and which are not deemed income by the internal revenue service shall not be deducted under this subsection. If the payments decreased to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00) are less than the weekly benefit amount otherwise due under this article, the individual is entitled to benefits in an amount reduced by the payments.
  2. Payments received under this section shall be allocated pursuant to the regulations of the commission.
  3. The individual shall be disqualified from benefit entitlement during any week for which the individual has filed a claim for benefits and remuneration is received as a severance payment, termination allowance, sick pay or earned vacation. If the remuneration decreased to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00) is less than the weekly benefit amount, the amount of the payment shall be deducted from the amount of benefits the individual would otherwise be entitled to receive during that week.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 5; 1939, ch. 124, § 10; 1941, ch. 96, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-105; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 5; 1953, ch. 111, § 4; 1957, ch. 88, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-26; Laws 1963, ch. 121, § 5; 1967, ch. 175, § 2; 1969, ch. 58, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, § 13; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-106 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 49, § 1; ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 83, § 1; 1992, ch. 86 § 1; 2003, ch. 73, §§ 1, 2.

“Work stoppage.” —

“Work stoppage” refers to a worker's decision to withhold his or her services. General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 906 P.2d 380, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1995).

The phrase “work stoppage,” as that phrase is used in subsection (a)(i) of this section, refers to a worker's decision to stop working as a result of a labor dispute. General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 906 P.2d 380, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1995).

Legislative intent was to include “lockout” within “work stoppage resulting from labor dispute” as provided in subsection (a)(i). Wilcoxson v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 741 P.2d 611, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 501 (Wyo. 1987), reh'g denied, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 522 (Wyo. Sept. 30, 1987).

Employee terminated during work stoppage. —

A claimant who is initially disqualified for unemployment benefits due to his participation in a work stoppage may become eligible for benefits despite the continuation of the work stoppage if the employee's relationship with the employer is terminated. Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

Severance pay. —

An individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits when an employer makes a severance payment. Bettcher v. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, 884 P.2d 635, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1994).

Employee unjustly fired may withdraw retirement contributions.—

The department should have granted unemployment benefits to a former employee fired without cause, and should not have offset these benefits against the employee's withdrawal of retirement contributions. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Secrest, 811 P.2d 733, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1991) (decided prior to 1992 amendment).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment to become self-employed or to go into business for oneself as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 45 ALR5th 715.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment in pursuit of other employment as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 46 ALR5th 659.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment in pursuit of education or to attend training as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 47 ALR5th 775.

§ 27-3-314. Extended benefit period; state “on” and “off” indicators; notice.

  1. An extended benefit period begins with the third week following a week in which there is a state “on” indicator and ends with the third week after the first week in which there is a state “off” indicator or the thirteenth consecutive week of the extended benefit period, whichever occurs later. An extended benefit period may not begin until the fourteenth week following the end of a prior extended benefit period.
  2. A state “on” indicator for a week exists if the insured unemployment rate under this act for that week and the preceding twelve (12) weeks is equal to or greater than one hundred twenty percent (120%) of the average rates for the corresponding thirteen (13) week period ending in each of the preceding two (2) calendar years and is equal to or greater than five percent (5%). A state “off” indicator for a week exists if either of the conditions for the existence of a state “on” indicator is not satisfied for that week and the preceding twelve (12) weeks. The insured unemployment rate under this subsection is the average weekly number of individuals filing unemployment claims for regular compensation in this state for the most recent thirteen (13) consecutive week period divided by the average monthly employment covered under this act for the first four (4) of the most recent six (6) completed calendar quarters ending before the end of the thirteen (13) week period. Computations required for the insured unemployment rate shall be made by the department in accordance with regulations of the United States secretary of labor.
  3. The department shall provide prior public notice of the beginning and the end of an extended benefit period within this state.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 3; 1939, ch. 124, § 8; 1941, ch. 96, § 3; 1943, ch. 58, § 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1945, § 54-103; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 3; 1953, ch. 111, § 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-24; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-103 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 27-3-315. When individual deemed exhaustee; matters excluded from determination of regular benefits.

  1. An individual is an exhaustee under this article for any week of unemployment in his eligibility period if he has:
    1. Received prior to that week all regular benefits available to him under this article or any other state law in his applicable benefit year which includes that week; or
    2. Prior to that week and after cancellation of part or all of his wage credits or reduction of part or all of his regular benefit rights, received all regular benefits available to him under this article or any other state law in his applicable benefit year which includes that week; or
    3. Insufficient wages, employment or both, his benefit year ended prior to that week and he is eligible for a new benefit year in any state which includes that week or, having established a new benefit year which includes that week, he is not eligible for regular benefits under W.S. 27-3-306(d) or similar provisions of other state laws meeting the requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(7); and
    4. No unemployment benefit or allowance rights under 45 U.S.C. § 351 et seq., 19 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. or other federal laws specified under regulation of the United States secretary of labor; and
    5. Not received or claimed unemployment benefits for that week under unemployment compensation laws of the Virgin Islands or Canada unless determined ineligible for these benefits.
  2. An individual shall have received all regular benefits under paragraphs (a)(i) and (ii) of this section regardless of:
    1. Any pending appeal for wages or employment not included in the original regular benefit amount for his current benefit year which may entitle him to additional regular benefits;
    2. Any seasonal provision of another state law disqualifying him from regular benefits for that week of unemployment although he may be entitled to future benefits in the next season or off-season in his applicable benefit year, and he is otherwise an exhaustee under this section for regular benefits under state law seasonal provisions during the season or off-season in which that week of unemployment occurs; or
    3. Any disqualification cancelling his wage credits or reducing all rights to regular benefits for his established benefit year.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 3; 1939, ch. 124, § 8; 1941, ch. 96, § 3; 1943, ch. 58, § 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1945, § 54-103; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 3; 1953, ch. 111, § 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-24; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-103 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1.

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 27-3-316. Applicability of regular claim and payment provisions to extended benefits; determination of amount.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this article and regulation of the commission, regular benefit claim and payment provisions of this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ] apply to extended benefits.
  2. An eligible individual’s weekly extended benefit amount for a week of total unemployment in his eligibility period is equal to his weekly benefit amount payable during the applicable benefit year except as hereafter provided:
    1. If the amount of extended benefits reimbursed by the federal government under the federal-state extended unemployment compensation act is reduced or increased, then an eligible claimant’s weekly and potential maximum extended benefit amount shall be similarly reduced or increased by an amount sufficient to assure that the federal government and the state of Wyoming share the cost on an equal basis. The reduced weekly extended benefit amount, if not a full dollar amount, shall be rounded to the next lower multiple of one dollar ($1.00);
    2. The provisions in W.S. 27-3-509(c) which determine the reimbursable rate of certain employers shall not be affected by paragraph (i) of this subsection.
  3. An eligible individual’s total extended benefit amount for his applicable benefit year is the lesser of:
    1. Fifty percent (50%) of his total amount of regular benefits under this article in the applicable benefit year; or
    2. Thirteen (13) times his weekly benefit amount under this article for a week of total unemployment in the applicable benefit year. A reduction in an eligible claimant’s weekly and potential maximum extended benefit amount, resulting from the application of paragraph (b)(i) of this section, will not increase the number of weeks of extended benefit entitlement beyond that specified in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this subsection.
  4. Notwithstanding any other provision of this act and if the benefit year of an individual ends within an extended benefit period, the remaining balance of extended benefits the individual is otherwise entitled to receive in that extended benefit period for unemployment beginning after the end of the benefit year shall be reduced by the product of the number of weeks he received an amount as trade readjustment allowances within that benefit year multiplied by his weekly extended benefit amount. Extended benefits shall not be reduced below zero by reason of this subsection.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 3; 1939, ch. 124, § 8; 1941, ch. 96, § 3; 1943, ch. 58, § 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1945, § 54-103; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 3; 1953, ch. 111, § 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-24; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-103 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1986, ch. 56, § 1.

Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act. —

The Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act, referred to in subsection (b)(i), appears as a note to 26 USCS § 3304.

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 27-3-317. Eligibility for extended benefits; exceptions; qualifications.

  1. An individual is eligible for extended benefits under this article for any week of unemployment in his eligibility period if for that week he qualifies as an exhaustee under W.S. 27-3-315 and meets regular benefit eligibility requirements of this article.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, an individual is not eligible for extended benefits for any week if, pursuant to an interstate claim filed in any state under the interstate benefit payment plan, no extended benefit period is effective that week for that state. This subsection does not apply to the first two (2) weeks that extended benefits are payable to an individual from his extended benefit account for that benefit year pursuant to an interstate claim filed under the interstate benefit payment plan.
  3. An individual not eligible for extended benefits because of failure to comply with the actively seeking work requirements of subsection (d) of this section shall be denied extended benefits until employed in an employee-employer relationship for four (4) weeks beginning the first day of the week following the week in which the failure occurred and wages of not less than four (4) times the extended weekly benefit amount are earned.
  4. For purposes of extended benefit eligibility, an individual is actively seeking work under W.S. 27-3-306(a)(iii) for any week if he:
    1. Has engaged in a systematic and sustained effort to obtain work during the week; and
    2. Furnishes the department with tangible evidence of his effort for that week.
  5. Notwithstanding W.S. 27-3-312(a), suitable work for extended benefit eligibility purposes shall pay gross average weekly wages for work within an individual’s capabilities that:
    1. Exceed the individual’s weekly benefit amount under W.S. 27-3-316(b) plus any supplemental unemployment benefits received under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(17)(D) for that week; and
    2. Are not less than the higher of the minimum wage pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) excluding any exemptions or the applicable state or local minimum wage.
  6. An individual shall not be denied extended benefits for failure to accept an offer of or apply for suitable work meeting the criteria of subsection (e) of this section if:
    1. It is not offered in writing or not listed with the state employment service; or
    2. The failure is not a denial of regular benefits under W.S. 27-3-312(a) to the extent the criteria of suitability are consistent with subsection (c) of this section; or
    3. He furnishes satisfactory evidence to the department of good employment prospects in his customary occupation within a reasonably short time, in which case the determination of suitable work shall be made in accordance with W.S. 27-3-312(a).
  7. An individual disqualified from benefit entitlement under W.S. 27-3-311 shall be denied extended benefits until requalified as follows:
    1. If disqualified from benefit entitlement under W.S. 27-3-311 (a)(i), (ii) or (iii), the individual shall be employed in an employee-employer relationship for not less than twelve (12) weeks, whether or not consecutive, following the date of disqualification and have earned wages of not less than twelve (12) times his weekly benefit amount for this employment; or
    2. If disqualified from benefit entitlement under W.S. 27-3-311(f), the individual shall be employed in an employee-employer relationship for not less than four (4) weeks, whether or not consecutive, following the date of disqualification and have earned wages of not less than four (4) times his weekly benefit amount for this employment; and
    3. In no event shall an individual receive extended benefits during a period in which he is disqualified from benefit entitlement.
  8. For purposes of extended benefit eligibility and notwithstanding W.S. 27-3-306(d)(iii), earned wages for insured work shall be at least one and five-tenths (1.5) times the high quarter earnings in his base period.
  9. Subsections (c) through (g) of this section shall not apply to weeks of unemployment beginning after March 6, 1993, and before January 1, 1995.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 3; 1939, ch. 124, § 8; 1941, ch. 96, § 3; 1943, ch. 58, § 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1945, § 54-103; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 3; 1953, ch. 111, § 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-24; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-103 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1988, ch. 51, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1993, ch. 60, § 1; 2004, ch. 130, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, in (g)(ii), substituted “27-3-311(f)” for “27-3-311(c).”

Laws 2004, ch. 130, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 19, 2004.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment in pursuit of other employment as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 46 ALR5th 659.

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment in pursuit of education or to attend training as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 47 ALR5th 775.

§ 27-3-318. Payment of benefits accrued by deceased.

The department may pay benefits accrued under this article by a deceased individual to his surviving spouse, children or parents without letters testamentary or letters of administration.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 3; 1939, ch. 124, § 8; 1941, ch. 96, § 3; 1943, ch. 58, § 3; 1945, ch. 81, §§ 3, 4; C.S. 1945, § 54-103; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 3; 1953, ch. 111, § 2; 1955, ch. 230, § 1; 1957, ch. 88, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-24; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 1 to 3; 1971, ch. 96, § 2; ch. 253, §§ 8, 14; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-103 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

§ 27-3-319. Waiver agreements void; exception; assignments void; exemption from levy.

  1. Except as provided by W.S. 27-3-305 , 27-3-320 and 27-3-321 , any agreement to waive, release or commute benefit rights or any other rights under this act is void and any agreement by any employed individual to pay any portion of an employer’s contribution required by this act is void.
  2. Except as provided by W.S. 27-3-305 , 27-3-320 and 27-3-321 , the assignment, transfer, pledge or encumbrance of benefit rights under this act is void.
  3. Benefit rights are exempt from levy, execution, attachment or other debt collection remedy. Benefits received by an individual under this act and not combined with other funds of the recipient are exempt from debt collection remedies except those incurred for necessities furnished to the individual, his spouse or dependents during his unemployment. A waiver of exemptions provided by this subsection is void.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 15; C.S. 1945, § 54-115; W.S. 1957, § 27-36; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-116; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1996, ch. 4, § 2; 1997, ch. 91, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Bankruptcy cases. —

Unpublished decision: Although unemployment compensation and benefits paid from an employer's retirement plan were exempt under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-3-319 and 1-20-110 , the taxes withheld from this income and refunded to the Chapter 7 debtor were not exempt. The taxes were withheld under 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 3402(p)(2) and 3405(c), and under § 3402(a)(1) were deemed to be a “tax.” 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1631.

Applied in

Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Laramie Cabs, Inc., 700 P.2d 399, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 489 (Wyo. 1985); Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes duress by employer or former employer vitiating employee's release of employer from claims arising out of employment, 30 ALR4th 294.

§ 27-3-320. Benefit withholding for federal income taxes; department notification; procedure; withholding status election.

  1. The department shall at the time of filing, advise an individual filing an initial claim for benefits payable under this act that:
    1. Benefits are subject to federal income tax;
    2. Estimated federal income tax payments are required by the federal internal revenue service;
    3. Effective January 1, 1997 and each year thereafter, federal income tax may be deducted and withheld from benefits at the amount specified by federal law upon election by the individual; and
    4. Previously elected federal income tax withholding status under this section may be changed once during any one (1) benefit year.
  2. Effective January 1, 1997 and each year thereafter and upon request by an individual filing an initial claim for benefits payable under this act, the department shall, subject to subsection (d) of this section, deduct and withhold federal income tax from benefits payable to the individual in the amount specified by federal law and in accordance with procedures specified by the United States department of labor and the internal revenue service. Amounts deducted and withheld pursuant to this section shall remain in the fund until transferred to the internal revenue service as payment of federal income tax.
  3. The department shall by rule and regulation establish procedures for administering this section and shall permit an individual to change his withholding status once during each benefit year.
  4. Amounts shall not be deducted and withheld under this section until amounts are deducted and withheld for any overpayment, child support obligation or any other amount required or allowed to be deducted and withheld under this act.

History. Laws 1996, ch. 4, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 27-3-321. Disclosure of supplemental nutrition assistance program overissuance required; notification; amount withheld; payment; applicability of provisions.

  1. An individual filing a new claim for unemployment compensation shall, at the time of filing such claim, disclose whether or not he owes an uncollected overissuance of supplemental nutrition assistance program benefits as defined in section 13(c)(1) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008. The department shall notify the department of family services of any individual who discloses that he owes an uncollected overissuance and who is determined to be eligible for unemployment compensation.
  2. The department shall deduct and withhold from any unemployment compensation payable to an individual who owes an uncollected overissuance of supplemental nutrition assistance benefits:
    1. The amount specified by the individual to the department to be deducted and withheld under this section;
    2. The amount determined pursuant to an agreement under section 13(c)(3)(A) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 and submitted to the department of family services; or
    3. Any amount otherwise required to be deducted and withheld from unemployment compensation pursuant to section 13(c)(3)(B) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, whichever is greater.
  3. Any amount deducted and withheld under this section shall be paid by the department to the department of family services.
  4. Any amount deducted and withheld under subsection (b) of this section shall for all purposes be treated as if it were paid to the individual as unemployment compensation and paid by the individual to the department of family services as repayment of the individual’s uncollected overissuance.
  5. For purposes of this section, the term “unemployment compensation” means any benefits payable under this act and any amounts payable by the department pursuant to an agreement under any federal law providing for compensation, assistance or allowances with respect to unemployment.
  6. This section applies only if arrangements have been made for reimbursement by the department of family services for the administrative costs incurred by the department under this section which are attributable to the repayment of uncollected overissuances to the department of family services.

History. Laws 1997, ch. 91, § 1; 2013 ch. 193, § 1, effective July 1, 2013.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in (a) and (b), substituted “supplemental nutrition assistance program benefits” for “food stamp coupons” and in (a), (b)(ii) and (b)(iii), substituted “Food and Nutrition Act of 2008” for “Food Stamp Act of 1977.”

Editor's notes. —

The Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 is codified as 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

Article 4. Benefit Claims

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

82 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare §§ 475 to 507.

§ 27-3-401. Filing notice and electronic communications.

  1. Benefit claims shall be filed in accordance with regulations of the commission.
  2. Employers shall post information on benefit rights in locations accessible to employed individuals. Copies of regulations and information on benefit rights shall be supplied by the department at no cost.
  3. A claimant or employer may elect to have determinations, decisions or notices transmitted electronically through an internet application approved by the department, in lieu of transmission through the regular mail. Once the election is made by the claimant or employer, any determination, decision or notice required to be mailed to that claimant or employer by this article may be transmitted instead through an internet application approved by the department. Upon the completion of every electronic transmission authorized by this subsection, the department shall provide to the claimant or employer an electronic acknowledgement specifying the date and time when the transmission was sent or received. Except as otherwise required by rules applicable to appeals to the courts of this state, determinations, decisions or notices transmitted by an approved electronic means may be appealed or protested by use of the same means. For the purpose of all relevant time limits established by this article, electronically transmitted information shall be deemed delivered on the date indicated on the acknowledgment required by this subsection, or if no acknowledgement exists, on the date the electronic delivery is initiated by the party sending the information.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 6; 1941, ch. 96, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-106; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-27; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 6-8; 1969, ch. 60, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-107 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2017 ch. 6, § 2, effective February 13, 2017.

The 2017 amendment added (c).

Laws 2017, ch. 6, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 13, 2017.

Inconsistent administrative provisions superseded. —

To the extent the provisions of this section (now article) are inconsistent with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (§ 16-3-101 et seq.), they are superseded. Sage Club v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 601 P.2d 1306, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 479 (Wyo. 1979).

Review of decisions. —

On appeals, the supreme court must review the decision of the district court and the employment security commission in the exact same light. Sage Club v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 601 P.2d 1306, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 479 (Wyo. 1979).

Decision conclusive upon failure to appeal. —

Where judicial review is granted by this section (now article), but no appeal is taken, the decision of the commission becomes conclusive. Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 598 P.2d 435, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 439 (Wyo. 1979).

Commission decision res judicata. —

The decision of the employment security commission that an employee was not discriminated against on account of her religious practices is a bar to relitigation of that issue before the fair employment commission under the doctrine of res judicata. Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 598 P.2d 435, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 439 (Wyo. 1979).

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Emp. v. Wyoming Restaurant Assocs., 859 P.2d 1281, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1993); Hat Six Homes, Inc. v. State, 6 P.3d 1287, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 2000); Koch v. Dep't of Empl., 2013 WY 12, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Jan 31, 2013).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Declaratory relief with respect to unemployment compensation, 14 ALR2d 826.

Repayment of unemployment compensation benefits erroneously paid, 90 ALR3d 987.

Unemployment compensation: eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to work at reduced compensation, 95 ALR3d 449.

Part-time or intermittent workers as covered by or as eligible for benefits under state unemployment compensation act, 95 ALR3d 891.

§ 27-3-402. Determination; generally; referral to special examiner; redetermination; notice; appeal.

  1. Determination of a claim filed pursuant to W.S. 27-3-401(a) shall be made promptly by a deputy designated by the department. If a claim is denied, the determination shall state the reasons for denial. Except as provided by subsection (c) of this section, a determination is final unless a party entitled to notice applies for redetermination or appeals the determination within twenty-eight (28) days after notice is mailed to his last known address of record.
  2. Repealed by Laws 1999, ch. 73, § 3.
  3. A monetary determination at the beginning of a benefit year shall specify if the claimant earned wages in amounts required by W.S. 27-3-306(d) and, if so, the first day of the benefit year, his weekly benefit amount and the maximum total amount of benefits payable for the benefit year. The deputy may reconsider a monetary determination if he finds an error in computation or identity, or discovers wages of the claimant relevant to but not considered in the determination. A monetary determination is final unless a party entitled to notice files a timely protest provided, however, that the department in its discretion may make a monetary redetermination at any time prior to the end of the benefit year whether or not a party has filed a timely protest.
  4. Notice of a determination shall be mailed promptly to the claimant at his last known address of record. Notice of a determination involving application of W.S. 27-3-308 , 27-3-311(a)(i) and (f) and 27-3-313(a)(i), together with reasons, shall be given to the last employing unit of the claimant at the last known address of record of the employing unit or, if the address is unavailable, the best available address. Notices shall be mailed to all base period employers at the address of record.
  5. The claimant or any other party entitled to notice of a determination may appeal the determination to an appeal tribunal. The appeal shall be filed with the tribunal within twenty-eight (28) days after notice is mailed to the last known address of record of the interested party.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 6; 1941, ch. 96, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-106; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-27; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 6 to 8; 1969, ch. 60, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-107 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1992, ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 4, § 2; 1999, ch. 73, §§ 2, 3; 2003, ch. 73, § 1; 2005, ch. 186, § 2; 2015 ch. 87, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, transferred the former third sentence in (a) to the beginning of (c); also in (c) deleted the former second sentence which read: “A deputy may reconsider a nonmonetary or chargeability determination if a party entitled to notice or the department files a protest in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date the determination was mailed, except for determinations of which the last employer was given notice as specified under subsection (d) of this section,” and rewrote the last sentence; and in (d), deleted “or a redetermination” in the first sentence and rewrote the last sentence as two sentences, requiring notice to be mailed to the last known address of record.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, substituted “twenty-eight (28) days” for “fifteen (15) days” in (a) and (e).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Subsection (c) grounds required for reconsideration. —

The employment security commission lacks authority to reconsider its own ruling in contested case when that ruling was made by the full commission at the final stage of intra-agency review, unless the grounds for reconsideration listed in subsection (c) are present. Decisions of the full commission sitting as an appellate tribunal are final unless a judicial appeal is taken to the district court by an unsuccessful party. Hupp v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1986).

Applied in

Gibson v. Wyoming Div. of Unemployment Ins., 907 P.2d 1306, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1995).

Quoted in

Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n of Dep't of Emp., 845 P.2d 387, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

Koch v. Dep't of Empl., 2013 WY 12, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Jan 31, 2013).

Law reviews. —

For article, Tyler J. Garrett, ‘Anatomy of a Wyoming Appeal: A Practitioner's Guide for Civil Cases’, see 16 Wyo. L. Rev. 139 (2016).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Unemployment compensation: leaving employment to become self-employed or to go into business for oneself as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 45 ALR5th 715.

§ 27-3-403. Determination; disputed claims; hearing; decision; notice.

  1. The commission shall appoint an impartial appeal tribunal to hear and decide disputed claims. The tribunal shall be a salaried examiner or a body consisting of three (3) members, one (1) a salaried examiner serving as chairman, one (1) a representative of employers and one (1) a representative of employees. The representatives of employers and employees shall serve at the pleasure of the commission and shall receive not more than ten dollars ($10.00) per day of service plus necessary expenses. No person shall serve or participate on behalf of the commission if he is an interested party to the proceeding. The commission may designate an alternate to serve in the absence or disqualification of a member of an appeal tribunal. The chairman shall act alone in the absence or disqualification of any member. A hearing shall not proceed unless the chairman is present.
  2. After providing interested parties notice of and reasonable opportunity for hearing, the appeal tribunal shall make findings and conclusions and shall render a decision to affirm, modify or reverse a determination. If an appeal involves a question of services performed by a claimant in employment or for an employer, the tribunal shall give special notice of the issue and the pendency of the appeal to the employing unit and to the commission. After notice, both are parties to the proceeding and shall be given opportunity to offer evidence bearing on the question.
  3. Notice of the tribunal’s decision shall be given promptly to the interested party by delivery or by mail to his last known address of record. The notice shall include a copy of the decision and the findings and conclusions in support of the decision. The decision is final unless further review is initiated pursuant to W.S. 27-3-404 .

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 6; 1941, ch. 96, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-106; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 5; W.S. 1957, §§ 27-27; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 6 to 8; 1969, ch. 60, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-107 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1.

Proof of mailing. —

The business custom and usage of the commission which would result in the mailing of a notice are sufficient to establish the fact of such mailing absent evidence to the contrary other than a bald statement that it was not received. Section 27-3-404(a) authorizes administrative review requested “within fifteen (15) days after notice is mailed or delivered.” Such authorization is just as mandatory and jurisdictional as is a timely filing of a petition for review of an administrative action by a district court. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Young, 713 P.2d 198, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 457 (Wyo. 1986).

Stated in

Hupp v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

Koch v. Dep't of Empl., 2013 WY 12, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Jan 31, 2013).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Propriety of telephone testimony or hearings in unemployment compensation proceedings, 90 ALR4th 532.

§ 27-3-404. Determination; review by commission; disposition; notice; reconsideration.

  1. The commission may within twenty-eight (28) days after notice is mailed or delivered:
    1. Review a decision of an appeal tribunal;
    2. Review a determination of a special examiner; or
    3. Grant an appeal from a decision upon application filed by any party entitled to notice. An appeal shall be granted if a decision is not unanimous or if a determination is not affirmed by the appeal tribunal.
  2. Upon review or appeal and based on evidence previously submitted or upon additional evidence it may direct be taken, the commission may affirm, modify or reverse the findings and conclusions of the appeal tribunal. Proceedings before an appeal tribunal may be removed to the commission or transferred to another tribunal. A proceeding removed to the commission prior to completion of the hearing shall be heard by the commission in accordance with requirements for tribunal proceedings.
  3. The commission shall promptly notify parties to a proceeding of its decision including findings and conclusions. The decision is final unless judicial review is initiated pursuant to this article. A denial of an appeal by the commission is subject to judicial review. Review shall be initiated within the prescribed time beginning from the date notice of the denial is mailed or delivered.
  4. Subject to limitations prescribed under W.S. 27-3-402(c), the commission may reconsider a determination provided by a final decision of an appeal tribunal and may apply to the tribunal for a revised decision.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 6; 1941, ch. 96, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-106; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-27; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 6 to 8; 1969, ch. 60, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-107 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1992, ch. 10, § 1; 2015 ch. 87, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in the introductory language of (a), substituted “twenty-eight (28) days” for “fifteen (15) days.”

Reconsideration of ruling. —

The employment security commission lacks authority to reconsider its own ruling in contested case when that ruling was made by the full commission at the final stage of intra-agency review, unless the grounds for reconsideration listed in § 27-3-402(c) are present. Decisions of the full commission sitting as an appellate tribunal are final unless a judicial appeal is taken to the district court by an unsuccessful party. Hupp v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1986).

Proof of mailing. —

The business custom and usage of the commission which would result in the mailing of a notice are sufficient to establish the fact of such mailing absent evidence to the contrary other than a bald statement that it was not received. Subsection (a) authorizes administrative review requested “within fifteen (15) days after notice is mailed or delivered.” Such authorization is just as mandatory and jurisdictional as is a timely filing of a petition for review of an administrative action by a district court. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Young, 713 P.2d 198, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 457 (Wyo. 1986).

Unemployment Insurance Commission is final authority. —

The Unemployment Insurance Commission is the final agency adjudicating authority; the Commission's final decision is the decision to be reviewed by the district court under Rule 12 of Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, not those decisions which were made at intermediate stages in the process. City of Casper v. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, Unemployment Ins. Div., 851 P.2d 1, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1993).

Commission acted within its authority. —

Wyoming Department of Employment, Unemployment Insurance Commission acted within its authority under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-404(b) when it reviewed and reversed a hearing examiner's decision awarding an employee unemployment benefits; the record showed that the action proceeded through the agency review process as authorized by statute. Koch v. Dep't of Empl., 2013 WY 12, 294 P.3d 888, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 2013).

Quoted in

Barker v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 791 P.2d 583, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1990).

Stated in

State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. v. Kinneman, 2016 WY 79, 377 P.3d 776, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 2016).

§ 27-3-405. Conduct of hearing or appeal; consolidation of claims; record; witness expenses.

  1. A hearing or appeal before a tribunal under this article shall be conducted in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115 ].
  2. Hearings on claims by more than one (1) individual or on claims by an individual for two (2) or more weeks of unemployment may be consolidated for purposes of adjudication if there is substantially similar evidence and the examiner or tribunal with jurisdiction determines the consolidation is not prejudicial to any party.
  3. A record shall be kept of all testimony and proceedings before a special examiner or an appeal tribunal. Records shall be maintained under this subsection until final disposition of the matter.
  4. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to this act shall be reimbursed at a rate determined by the commission. The commission may refuse reimbursement to any employer who after notice fails to voluntarily appear for any determination of liability. Expenses of witnesses subpoenaed on behalf of the commission or any claimant are part of the expense of administering this act.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 6; 1941, ch. 96, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-106; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-27; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 6 to 8; 1969, ch. 60, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-107 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1.

Stated in

Hupp v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1986).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Propriety of telephone testimony or hearings in unemployment compensation proceedings, 90 ALR4th 532.

§ 27-3-406. Determinations deemed conclusive; matters of law binding; limiting actions.

  1. Except for reconsideration pursuant to W.S. 27-3-402(c) and 27-3-404(d), a right, fact or matter in issue adjudicated in a final determination, redetermination or decision on appeal under this article is conclusive for purposes of this act. Subject to appeal proceedings and judicial review and regardless of notice, a determination, redetermination or decision on benefit rights is not subject to collateral attack by an employing unit.
  2. Unless expressly or impliedly overruled by the commission or a court of competent jurisdiction, principles of law adjudicated under a final decision of the commission or an appeal tribunal are binding on the commission, a special examiner and an appeal tribunal in proceedings involving similar questions of law.
  3. Any determination, redetermination, finding of fact, conclusion of law, order, decision or final judgment entered or made by a deputy, appeal tribunal, special examiner, the department, the commission or a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to this act or the rules and regulations of the commission is binding only between the department and all adverse parties thereto, and is not binding, conclusive or admissible in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding between an individual and employing unit previously subject to this act, regardless of whether the prior action before the department or commission was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts.
  4. Any determination, finding of fact, conclusion of law, order, decision or final judgment, not made or entered by the department or commission, is not binding upon the department when administering this act except when the department or commission was a party to an action or proceeding brought in a court of competent jurisdiction of this state or of the United States.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 6; 1941, ch. 96, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-106; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-27; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 6 to 8; 1969, ch. 60, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-107 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1988, ch. 51, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Resignation effective at a future date. —

Unemployment insurance commission was required to follow its existing precedent concerning situations where employee gives a resignation notice effective at a future date, but employer terminates employee before that date is reached. Pette v. State ex rel. Department of Empl., 968 P.2d 952, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1998).

Cited in

Nelson v. Crimson Enters., Inc., 777 P.2d 73, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1989).

§ 27-3-407. Right to judicial review; appeal to supreme court; entry of order by commission.

  1. Any person aggrieved or adversely affected by a final decision under this act may obtain judicial review by filing a petition for review with the district court of jurisdiction. Review by the court shall be as provided by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115 ] and shall be given precedence over all other civil cases except those under the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act [§ 27-14-101 et seq.].
  2. A decision of the district court may be appealed to the supreme court. The appeal shall be taken in the same manner as other civil cases.
  3. Exceptions to the ruling of the commission and posting of bond are not required to initiate a proceeding for judicial review or to enter an appeal from the decision of the court. The commission shall enter an order in accordance with the court decision.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 6; 1941, ch. 96, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-106; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-27; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 6 to 8; 1969, ch. 60, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-107 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Payment under protest not required. —

This section provides for judicial review based upon the requirements of § 16-3-114 of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, — “aggrieved or adversely affected” — but does not specifically require payment under protest before obtaining judicial review. Wyoming Dep't of Employment v. Wyoming Restaurant Assocs., 859 P.2d 1281, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1993).

Applied in

Bettcher v. Wyoming Dep't of Emp., 884 P.2d 635, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1994).

Quoted in

Sellers v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 760 P.2d 394, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1988).

§ 27-3-408. Right of department and commission to notice and representation; fees; access to records.

  1. The department and commission shall be treated as one (1) party entitled to notice in any proceeding before a special examiner, an appeal tribunal or a court of appeal. In any proceeding for judicial review under W.S. 27-3-407 , the department and commission may be represented by a qualified attorney employed pursuant to W.S. 27-3-609 .
  2. A claimant shall not be assessed fees for proceedings under this act by the department, commission or the court. The claimant may be represented by counsel or other authorized agent at the claimant’s expense.
  3. Records of the department are open to inspection by the claimant, the employer or their legal representatives to the extent necessary to present or contest a claim or appeal in any proceeding under this act.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, §§ 6, 11; 1939, ch. 124, § 15; 1941, ch. 96, §§ 6, 10; C.S. 1945, §§ 54-106, 54-111; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 11; 1957, ch. 88, § 5; W.S. 1957, §§ 27-27, 27-33; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 6 to 8; 1967, ch. 71, § 1; 1969, ch. 60, § 2; 1973, ch. 215, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 27-3-107 , 27-3-113; Laws 1979, ch. 141, § 1; 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1988, ch. 51, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 83, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Absent statutory authority, courts cannot order commission to pay claimant's attorney's fees, and subsection (b), intending to protect the claimant against unreasonable attorney's fees, plainly provides that the court shall “approve” fees. To approve is not to order payment. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Swartz, 740 P.2d 401, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 481 (Wyo. 1987) (decided prior to 1991 amendment).

§ 27-3-409. Payment of benefits upon determination; repayment of overpaid benefits; penalty.

  1. Benefits shall be paid in accordance with a determination, redetermination or decision until modified or reversed by a subsequent or pending redetermination or decision. A proceeding for judicial review under this article shall not operate as a supersedeas or stay nor shall the commission or the court issue an injunction, supersedeas, stay or other writ or process suspending the payment of benefits. Except as provided in W.S. 27-3-506(e), if a determination, redetermination or decision is reversed or modified, an employer’s account shall not be charged for benefits paid under an erroneous determination and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the modifying or reversing redetermination or decision.
  2. An individual  receiving benefits under this act to which he is not entitled shall  be liable for and repay the benefit. Repayment of the benefits shall  be had by any combination of recoupment, recovery by civil action, offset through the treasury offset program of the  United States treasury, 26 U.S.C. Section 6402(f), or voluntary  reimbursement agreement:
    1. The department in its discretion, may recoup the benefit amount liable to be repaid by offsetting, without civil action, against future benefits payable to the individual under this act within five (5) years from the effective date of the claim resulting in the overpayment if the claim was not fraudulent. If the claim resulting in the overpayment was fraudulent, the five (5) year limit on recoupment shall not apply. The department shall waive recoupment if an individual is without fault in receiving the benefits and it defeats the purpose of this act or is against equity and good conscience as considered by the department in accordance with regulations of the commission;
    2. The department may also recover overpaid benefits from an individual by civil action brought in the name of the department;
    3. The department in its discretion, without civil action, may accept repayment of overpaid benefits by reimbursement from an individual pursuant to a payment schedule approved by the department.
  3. The department may recoup or recover overpayment of benefits to any individual under another state law if a state certifies to the department the facts involved, the overpaid individual is liable for repayment of benefits and the state requests the department to do so. Repayment either by recoupment or recovery shall be had pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. Repayment shall be equal to the amount of overpayment determined by the requesting state.
  4. Any overpayment of benefits fraudulently received shall be assessed a penalty equal to twenty percent (20%) of the amount of overpayment and an additional five percent (5%) penalty on the remaining unpaid balance at the end of every six (6) months. One-fourth (1/4) of the amounts collected pursuant to the initial penalty and all of the additional penalties shall be paid into the employment security revenue account and the department shall utilize those collected amounts for administrative costs of overpayment collection, fraud investigation, developing and providing educational programs for this act. Three-fourths (3/4) of the amounts collected pursuant to the initial penalty shall be paid into the unemployment trust fund account. Offset shall not be used to recover amounts due under this section.
  5. The department shall cancel the amount of overpayment or penalty due on any overpayment when:
    1. The individual is deceased with no estate or the estate is closed and all assets are distributed; or
    2. The individual is adjudicated insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction with no remaining assets.
  6. The department may cancel the amount of overpayments or penalty due on any overpayment after eight (8) years from the effective date of the claim resulting in the overpayment when:
    1. The individual cannot be located;
    2. The individual is totally unable to work; or
    3. The department’s records show the individual earned covered wages of less than one-half (1/2) the average weekly wage within Wyoming in the most recent calendar year.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 6; 1941, ch. 96, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-106; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-27; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 6 to 8; 1969, ch. 60, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-107 ; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 35, § 1; 1993, ch. 19, § 1; 2003, ch. 73, § 1; 2007, ch. 177, § 1; 2010, ch. 66, § 1; 2013 ch. 133, § 1, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 29, § 1, effective July 1, 2016.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (b)(i), inserted “if the claim was not fraudulent,” and inserted the second sentence; in (f), substituted “after the expiration of the time period described in paragraph (b)(i) of this section” for “five (5) years after the effective date of the claim resulting in an overpayment” in the introductory language, deleted “within the state of Wyoming” following “located” at the end of the sentence in (i).

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in the introductory language of (b), substituted “by any combination of” for “either by,” and “voluntary reimbursement agreement” for “both”; added (b)(iii); and in the introductory language of (f), substituted “eight (8) years from the effective date of the claim resulting in the overpayment” for “the expiration of the time period described in paragraph (b)(i) of this section.”

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added the exception in the third sentence of (a) and rewrote (d).

The 2016 amendment , effective July 1, 2016, inserted “, offset through the treasury offset program of the United States treasury, 26 U.S.C. Section 6402(f),” in (b).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Plain meaning of subsection (b)(i) is that absence of fault must be conjoined with findings that recoupment defeats the purpose of this chapter or is against equity and good conscience according to unemployment insurance commission regulations. Gibson v. Wyoming Div. of Unemployment Ins., 907 P.2d 1306, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1995) (decided prior to 2003 amendment).

Applied in

Wyoming Dep't of Emp. v. Banks, 854 P.2d 709, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1993).

Cited in

Wyoming Dep't of Empl. v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1999).

Article 5. Employer Contributions

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation §§ 19 to 42.

§ 27-3-501. Definitions.

  1. As used in this article:
    1. “Benefit ratio” means the quotient of total benefits charged to an employer’s account and paid during the preceding experience period divided by total taxable wages payable by the employer for that experience period excluding any portion of wages for which contributions were not paid as of July 31 of the preceding calendar year;
    2. “Experience period” means the thirty-six (36) consecutive month period or, in the case of a new employer not previously subject to this act the twenty-four (24) consecutive month period, ending June 30 of the preceding year;
    3. “Ineffectively charged benefits” means benefits charged to an employer’s experience rating account after benefits previously charged to his account qualified him for the maximum rate of contributions;
    4. “Noncharged benefits” means benefits not charged to an employer’s experience rating account pursuant to W.S. 27-3-504(e) and 27-3-608(b);
    5. “Nonprofit organization” means an organization defined by 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) and exempt from federal income tax under 26 U.S.C. 501(a);
    6. “Organization” means a hospital, institution of higher education, this state or any political subdivision, an Indian tribe as defined under section 3306 of the federal Unemployment Tax Act and a group of organizations established pursuant to regulations of the commission for purposes of joint accounts, employing services qualifying as employment under W.S. 27-3-105(a)(i);
    7. “Client” means any entity that utilizes one (1) or more workers that have been contracted for and supplied by a service supplier. The client has the right to control the manner and means of the workers performing services for it;
    8. “Service supplier” means any entity that is primarily engaged in the business of contracting with the client to provide one (1) or more workers to perform services for the client and performs all of the following functions:
      1. Assigns the worker to perform services for the client;
      2. Sets the rate of pay of the worker, whether or not through negotiations;
      3. Pays the worker directly;
      4. Retains the authority to assign or refuse to assign a worker to other clients if the worker is unacceptable to a specific client;
      5. Determines assignments of workers even though the worker may retain the right to refuse specific assignments;
      6. Negotiates with the client on matters of time, place, type of work, working conditions, quality and price of the service.
    9. “Temporary service contractor” means any individual, firm, association, partnership, limited liability company, corporation or other type of organization conducting a business that employs individuals directly for the purpose of furnishing services of the employed individuals on a temporary basis to others. “Temporary service contract” does not include a service supplier as defined in paragraph (viii) of this subsection;
    10. “Temporary worker” means a worker whose services are furnished to another employer on a temporary basis to substitute for a permanent employee on leave or to meet an emergency or short-term workload need. “Temporary worker” does not include a person working for a service supplier as defined in paragraph (viii) of this subsection;
    11. For purposes of W.S. 27-3-507 and 27-3-706 , “person” means an individual or entity, including any partnership, association, trust, estate, corporation, limited liability company, domestic or foreign insurance company or corporation, a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee, successor or the legal representative of a deceased person.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 7; 1939, ch. 124, § 11; 1943, ch. 58, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 7; C.S. 1945, § 54-107; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 6 to 9; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 5 to 7; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 6, 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-28; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 9, 10; 1965, ch. 186, § 1; 1967, ch. 215, § 2; 1969, ch. 59, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 9, 16; 1973, ch. 79, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; ch. 159, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-108 ; Laws 1979, ch. 51, § 1; ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; 1981, ch. 133, § 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 2001, ch. 67, § 1; 2005, ch. 186, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added (a)(ix) through (a)(xi).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Unemployment Tax Act. —

Section 3306 of the federal Unemployment Tax Act appears as 26 U.S.C. § 3306.

Tax imposed by Unemployment Compensation Act is an excise tax. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

Limitation on amount of tax. —

Since unemployment tax or charge imposed upon employers is imposed for specific ultimate purpose, it should be limited to amount reasonably sufficient, and sufficient only, to accomplish that purpose. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Incidence of unemployment compensation upon employer, where, during the base year, employee worked in different states for same employer, 9 ALR2d 646.

Service charges made by hotels or restaurants and later distributed to waiters or similar employees as “wages” upon which state unemployment taxes or contributions are required to be paid, 83 ALR2d 1024.

Liability of political party or its subdivision for contributions under unemployment compensation acts, 43 ALR3d 1351.

Repayment of unemployment compensation benefits erroneously paid, 90 ALR3d 987.

§ 27-3-502. Determination of employer and employment; election of coverage; records and reports; injunction; service suppliers.

  1. Upon its own motion or application of an employing unit and after notice and opportunity for hearing, the department may determine if an employing unit is an employer and if services performed for the employing unit qualify as employment. The department shall consider employment occurring during a ten (10) year period preceding the date of employer determination. A determination by the department is final as to the employing unit fifteen (15) days after mailing its findings and determination to the employing unit. The employing unit may appeal a determination in accordance with W.S. 27-3-506 .
  2. Except as provided by subsection (d) of this section, an employing unit qualifying as an employer within any year is subject to this act for that entire calendar year.
  3. An employer enumerated under this subsection may apply in writing to the department before January 31 for termination of coverage under this act for that calendar year. The department may waive the application filing requirement for good cause. Employers to which this subsection applies include:
    1. Repealed by Laws 1999, ch. 73, § 3.
    2. An agricultural employer paying wages of less than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) each quarter during the preceding calendar year or employing less than ten (10) workers on any day of twenty (20) or more different weeks within a calendar year;
    3. A domestic employer paying wages of less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in each quarter of the preceding calendar year;
    4. A nonprofit organization paying wages for less than four (4) individuals or for less than twenty (20) weeks in the preceding year.
  4. An employing unit not qualifying as an employer or for which services not qualifying as employment are performed may elect coverage under this act for a period of not less than two (2) years by filing written notice of its election with the department. If the department approves the election in writing, coverage is effective on the date of approval. Application for termination of coverage as an employer under this subsection shall be filed in writing with the department not less than thirty (30) days before January 1 of any year following the initial two (2) years of coverage and for termination of coverage of employment, not less than thirty (30) days after January 1. The department may terminate coverage under this subsection for good cause by giving notice to the employer.
  5. An employing unit shall maintain accurate employment records containing information prescribed by the commission. Records shall be open to inspection by and submitted to the department upon request. An employing unit shall submit reports on employees upon request of the department or an appeal tribunal.
  6. Any employing unit subject to this act shall not commence business or engage in work within this state without registering under this act and otherwise complying with this act. A prime or general contractor subcontracting any part of a contract shall require notification and compliance by any subcontractor under this subsection before awarding a contract or permitting a subcontractor to begin work. The state, a county, municipality or any other political subdivision shall require the prime or general contractor to register and comply with this act before authorizing the contractor to begin work under any public contract. The secretary of state shall report to the department the names and addresses of all business entities registering with that agency during the preceding month. The Wyoming department of transportation and the department of administration and information shall report to the department the names and addresses of business entities awarded a contract by that agency during the preceding month. Any employing unit failing to comply with this subsection or W.S. 27-3-510 (c) or (d) or delinquent for filing reports or paying contributions required under this act may be enjoined by the department from engaging or continuing in business subject to this act until required reports are filed or payments are made and the unit otherwise complies with this act. All costs of the action including a reasonable attorney fee shall be paid by the employing unit against which the injunction is sought. In addition to the penalties and remedies provided by W.S. 27-3-510 through 27-3-512 and 27-3-704 , the department may assess and collect an additional fee of up to three (3) times the amount of delinquent contributions payable under this act for any employing unit failing to comply with this subsection. This additional fee is part of the payment due for all purposes if an action is instituted under this subsection. If the employing unit is a subcontractor, the general contractor or the project owner may be held liable for payment of the contributions and any additional assessment due.
  7. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this act:
    1. A service supplier is the employing unit of the worker provided to the client and shall be liable to pay the contributions on wages paid by it to the worker performing services for the client;
    2. If an entity is not a service supplier as defined by W.S. 27-3-501(a)(viii) or if the client pays wages to the worker directly, then the client is the employing unit of the worker and shall be liable to pay the contributions on wages paid by it to the worker performing services for the client;
    3. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if an entity pays the worker and that entity is not the employing unit of the worker as determined herein, that entity is deemed the agent of the employing unit so determined;
    4. If the service supplier fails to pay all contributions or submit required reports which are due, then the client shall be jointly and severally liable for those which are attributable to wages for services performed for the client by the worker provided by the service supplier;
    5. The service supplier shall keep separate records, submit a list of all clients to the department on a quarterly basis and submit separate quarterly reports for each client;
    6. Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 177, § 2.
    7. A temporary service contractor is the employing unit of the temporary worker provided to an employer and shall be liable to pay the contributions on wages paid by the temporary service contractor to the temporary worker performing services for the employer.
  8. If an employing unit fails to comply with an injunction order issued under subsection (f) of this section, the department may file with the district court of the county in which the employing unit resides, conducts business or may be found, a verified application showing that the employing unit received notice of an injunction order and has failed to comply with its terms. Upon receipt of the department’s application, the court shall provide the employing unit with an opportunity for a hearing within twenty (20) days. Upon finding that the employing unit has violated the department’s injunction, the court may issue an order directing the employing unit, including any partners or corporate officers, to comply with the injunction order and may assess a fine of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per day for each day of violation. Any officer or director having at least twenty percent (20%) ownership interest of a corporate employing unit, who controls or supervises filing contribution reports or making payment contributions under this act and who willfully fails to file the reports or make required payments, may be held jointly and severally liable for the contributions and interest due from the employing unit. In any court proceeding for the enforcement of an injunction order, the department shall not be required to show that it lacks adequate legal remedy or is suffering irreparable harm due to the violation of the injunction order. Any employing unit failing to comply with an order of the court issued under this subsection may be cited for contempt.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, §§ 8, 11; 1939, ch. 124, §§ 12, 15; 1941, ch. 96, §§ 7, 10; 1943, ch. 58, § 6; 1945, ch. 81, § 8; C.S. 1945, §§ 54-108, 54-111; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 11; W.S. 1957, §§ 27-30, 27-33; Laws 1967, ch. 71, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, § 16; 1973, ch. 215, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 2; W.S. 1977, §§ 27-3-110, 27-3-113; Laws 1979, ch. 141, § 1; 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1987, ch. 130, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 174, § 2; ch. 241, § 3; 1993, ch. 76, § 1; 1995, ch. 121, § 2; 1999, ch. 73, §§ 2, 3; 2005, ch. 186, § 2; 2007, ch. 177, § 2.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added (g)(vii).

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, repealed former (g)(vi), which read: “If the service supplier fails to pay all contributions or submit required reports which are due, then the client shall be jointly and severally liable for those which are attributable to wages for services performed for the client by the worker provided by the service supplier.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Quoted in

Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Laramie Cabs, Inc., 700 P.2d 399, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 489 (Wyo. 1985); Wyo. Dep't of Empl. v. Jolley, Castillo, Drennon, Ltd., 2010 WY 48, 229 P.3d 955, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Apr. 22, 2010).

Stated in

Hupp v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1986).

Cited in

General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 902 P.2d 716, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1995).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of successor in business to experience or rating of predecessor for purpose of fixing rate of unemployment compensation contributions, 22 ALR2d 673.

§ 27-3-503. Payment; base rate; failure to pay; rate variations; benefit ratio; new employer rate; special reserve rate.

  1. Employment wage contributions imposed under this section are payable by employers subject to this act. Contributions shall be paid to the department for the fund in accordance with regulations of the commission and shall not be deducted from employee wages.
  2. Except as otherwise provided by law, the base rate of contributions assigned to any employer is eight and one-half percent (8.5%) for 1988 and each calendar year thereafter subject to rate variations under subsections (d) and (f) of this section in addition to the adjustment factors computed under W.S. 27-3-505 . Except as hereafter provided, a contributing employer failing to pay all contributions, interest and penalties or to submit all quarterly contribution reports due on his account or any account assumed under W.S. 27-3-507 on or before September 30 preceding the effective date of his assigned rate shall be assigned a delinquent rate which shall include a two percent (2%) tax rate increase in his base rate and shall also include in addition thereto the adjustment factors for the next calendar year beginning January 1. The delinquent rate shall not exceed the maximum assignable rate. The delinquent rate shall continue to be assigned through and including the calendar quarter in which the delinquent employer satisfies his delinquent account by paying all contributions, interest and penalties due and submitting all contribution reports due. Upon satisfaction of the delinquent account, the contributing employer shall be assigned the contribution rate otherwise applicable under this article beginning the next full calendar quarter. Provided however, that a delinquent employer shall pay an assigned delinquent rate for at least the first quarter even if the account is satisfied before January 1 of the new calendar year.
  3. Upon reviewing the account of a delinquent employer, the department may eliminate or reduce contributions payable due to the two percent (2%) delinquency tax rate increase imposed under subsection (b) of this section either upon a showing of good cause, or a finding that:
    1. The delinquency is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00);
    2. After notice of the changed rate, the employer protested his delinquency tax rate in writing to the department pursuant to W.S. 27-3-506(b);
    3. All delinquent amounts are paid by December 31 preceding the calendar year for which the delinquent rate has been assigned; and
    4. All delinquent wage records are submitted.
  4. Rate variations from the base rate of contributions based upon the employer’s benefit ratio shall be assigned to eligible employers each calendar year.
  5. Benefit ratios shall be computed for those employers whose accounts have been chargeable for benefits throughout the employer’s experience period. An employer’s benefit ratio shall be the contribution rate provided his rate is not more than eight and one-half percent (8.5%) in addition to the adjustment factors computed under W.S. 27-3-505 . Benefit ratios shall be computed to the fourth decimal on the basis of the experience period preceding the calculation date of the rate.
  6. Any new employer not previously subject to this act or having no established experience period shall pay contributions at a rate equal to the average rate of contributions paid by his major industrial classification for the calendar year preceding the year in which he first employed workers in this state in addition to the adjustment factors computed under W.S. 27-3-505 . In no case, however, will any new employer be assigned a rate of less than one percent (1%), plus the adjustment factors computed under W.S. 27-3-505 . This rate shall be adjusted annually and the rate shall remain in effect until the employer has established an experience period in accordance with this article. The commission shall by rule and regulation develop the major industrial classifications for the state and the department shall annually determine the contribution rate for each classification based upon contributions paid during the preceding calendar year.
  7. Repealed by Laws 2003, ch. 123, § 3.
  8. Any employer subject to this act solely due to having met the liability requirements under W.S. 27-3-105(a)(ii), 27-3-107(c) or (g) for the first time during the preceding calendar year shall be exempt from the delinquent rate provisions in subsection (b) of this section for the subsequent year, provided the employer has submitted all reports and contributions by April 30 of the subsequent year.
  9. Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, upon full satisfaction of an employer’s delinquent account and at the written request of the employer, the department may, for good cause shown, reduce or eliminate the additional amounts payable as a result of the two percent (2%) delinquency rate.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 7; 1939, ch. 124, § 11; 1943, ch. 58, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 7; C.S. 1945, § 54-107; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 6 to 9; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 5 to 7; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 6, 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-28; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 9, 10; 1965, ch. 186, § 1; 1967, ch. 215, § 2; 1969, ch. 59, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 9, 16; 1973, ch. 79, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; ch. 159, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-108 ; Laws 1979, ch. 51, § 1; ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; 1981, ch. 133, § 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 101, § 1; 1987, ch. 130, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1997, ch. 168, § 2; 2001, ch. 148, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 74, § 1; 2003, ch. 73, § 1; ch. 123, §§ 2, 3; 2005, ch. 72, § 1; 2007, ch. 177, § 1; 2017 ch. 102, § 1, effective July 1, 2017.

Cross references. —

As to the state unemployment insurance trust fund, see § 27-3-209 .

The 2003 amendment, effective January 1, 2004, in (b), (e) and (f) deleted “a special reserve contribution rate assigned under subsection (g) of this section and” or a variant; also in (b), rewrote the third sentence; and repealed former (g), pertaining to a special reserve rate.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added (j).

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (b), deleted the second sentence regarding the base rate for any employer for the 2003 calendar year; inserted “paying all contributions, interest and penalties due and,” and deleted “payments and” preceding “contribution reports due.”

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (c), substituted “the department may eliminate or reduce contributions payable due to the two percent (2%) delinquency tax rate increase imposed under subsection (b) of this section either upon a showing of good cause, or a finding” for “the department may collect up to double the tax due plus interest in lieu of the delinquency rate if it finds”; in (c)(i), substituted “the delinquency is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)” for “the delinquency and interest is less than two hundred dollars ($200.00)”; in (c)(iii), substituted “All delinquent amounts are paid” for “The delinquent contributions and interest are paid”; added (c)(iv); and made related changes.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Applied in

Wyoming Dep't of Emp. v. Wyoming Restaurant Assocs., 859 P.2d 1281, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1993); General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 902 P.2d 716, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1995).

Stated in

Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 454 (Wyo. 1986).

§ 27-3-504. Separate employer's accounts; charging of accounts; when accounts not charged.

  1. Separate accounts shall be maintained for each employer and benefits paid to an individual shall be charged to the account of his base period employer.
  2. If an individual is employed by two (2) or more employers during his base period, the base period employer’s account shall be charged an amount bearing the same ratio to total benefits paid to the individual as the amount of wages payable by the employer bears to total wages payable by all employers during the individual’s base period.
  3. Benefits paid to an individual by this state pursuant to a wage-combining arrangement under W.S. 27-3-608(b) and attributable in part to wages and employment covered by this act shall be charged in accordance with this section to the account of that individual’s base period employer. If, however, the benefits are paid by another state, the amount chargeable to employers in this state for whom the individual was previously employed, shall be the amount reimbursed by this state to the paying state. The amount chargeable to employers in this state shall be an amount bearing the same ratio of total wages payable by all employers in this state during the individual’s base period.
  4. If extended benefits are paid under W.S. 27-3-314 to an individual employed during his base period by an organization defined under W.S. 27-3-501(a)(vi) and the organization is subject to W.S. 27-3-503 , one-half (1/2) of the extended benefits attributable to employment by the organization shall be charged to its account.
  5. Benefits shall not be charged to an employer’s account if:
    1. They are paid in error;
    2. The individual receiving benefits voluntarily leaves work without good cause attributable to employment or was discharged from employment for misconduct in connection with this work, provided however, that chargeability of an employer’s account for benefits paid to a claimant in a particular benefit year shall be based solely on the last separation that occurred before the filing of the claimant’s claim for which the claimant is monetarily eligible and shall not be affected by a separation that occurs after the filing of the initial claim and during the benefit year;
    3. Repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 50, § 3.
    4. The base period employer provided part-time employment and during the individual’s current benefit year provides the same number of hours and wages provided during the base period. If the hours or wages are reduced during the current benefit year or the individual is terminated from part-time employment for reasons other than those specified under paragraph (ii) of this subsection, the employer’s account shall be charged pursuant to this section;
    5. They are paid for an extended benefit period pursuant to W.S. 27-3-314 , except as provided by subsection (d) of this section;
    6. An individual receives benefits under this act for unemployment resulting directly from a major disaster declared by the United States President under 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) and the individual is otherwise eligible for federal disaster unemployment assistance;
    7. The individual receiving benefits is enrolled in an approved program pursuant to W.S. 27-3-307 ;
    8. An individual receives benefits under this act for unemployment resulting directly from the reinstatement of another employee upon that employee’s completion of service in the uniformed services, as provided in W.S. 19-11-103(a)(ix) and 38 U.S.C. 4303(13).
  6. Repealed by Laws 1989, ch. 222, §§ 2, 3.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 7; 1939, ch. 124, § 11; 1943, ch. 58, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 7; C.S. 1945, § 54-107; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 6 to 9; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 5 to 7; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 6, 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-28; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 9, 10; 1965, ch. 186, § 1; 1967, ch. 215, § 2; 1969, ch. 59, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 9, 16; 1973, ch. 79, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; ch. 159, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-108 ; Laws 1979, ch. 51, § 1; ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; 1981, ch. 133, § 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, §§ 2, 3; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1987, ch. 130, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, §§ 2, 3; 1991, ch. 83, § 1; 1999, ch. 73, § 2; 2004, ch. 86, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to the state unemployment insurance trust fund, see § 27-3-209 .

As to employment support fund, see § 27-3-211 .

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, added (e)(viii).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Applicability. — Laws 2020, 1st Sp. Sess., Ch. 2, § 6, provides:“ (a) In addition to the list of benefits that shall not be charged to an employer's unemployment compensation account under W.S. 27-3-504(e), no benefits shall be charged to an employer's unemployment compensation account if the governor, by executive order outlining the basis for the order and with the adoption of adequate standards and safeguards to assure the continued actuarial soundness of the unemployment compensation fund, determines that the charges should not be charged due to circumstances related to the unique coronavirus COVID-19.

“(b) Notwithstanding contribution requirements under the Wyoming Employment Security Law, W.S. 27-3-101 through 27-3-706 , the department of workforce services may grant an employer that is current on its required contributions under the Wyoming Employment Security Law a delay in the payment of contributions. The department may promulgate rules to grant a delay in payment of contributions under this subsection for any duration that will maintain the solvency of the unemployment compensation program and to the extent that funding is made available through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, P.L. 116-136, or from any other available federal funds related to the COVID-19 emergency response, to offset the delayed contributions.”

Conditional offer. —

The worker never was employed by company for purposes of the Wyoming Employment Security Law because company stated unambiguously in its Drug and Alcohol Policy that it did not hire applicants who tested positively for drugs. Where the worker accepted the company's conditional offer, and submitted to the drug test, certainly with foreknowledge that the result would be positive, public policy should not permit the worker to claim the benefits of unemployment insurance. In re Sierra Trading Post, 996 P.2d 1144, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2000).

Quoted in

General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 902 P.2d 716, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1995).

Stated in

Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 454 (Wyo. 1986).

§ 27-3-505. Adjustment for noncharged and ineffectively charged benefits; adjustment for positive and negative fund balance; computations; exception; maximum rate.

  1. An adjustment factor for noncharged and ineffectively charged benefits shall be computed to the fourth decimal by dividing the total noncharged and ineffectively charged benefits to all employers’ experience rating accounts during the experience rating period ending June 30 by the total taxable wages payable during the experience period and added to the rate provided by W.S. 27-3-503 . The total taxable wages payable under this subsection shall not include wages payable by employers electing payments instead of contributions under W.S. 27-3-509 . Sixty percent (60%) of this adjustment factor shall be allocated to the unemployment compensation fund. Forty percent (40%) of this adjustment factor shall be allocated to the employment support fund created by W.S. 27-3-211 .
  2. If the fund balance on October 31 of the year immediately preceding the calendar year for which the contribution rate is being computed is less than three and one-half percent (3 1/2%) of the total payrolls reported to the department by September 30 for that year ending June 30, a positive fund balance adjustment factor shall be computed. The adjustment factor shall be computed annually to the fourth decimal by dividing the total reported taxable payrolls for the year ending June 30 of the year immediately preceding the calendar year for which the contribution rate is being computed, into a sum equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the difference between the amount in the fund on October 31 of the same year and five percent (5%) of the total payrolls for that year ending June 30. The adjustment factor shall be effective until the fund balance on October 31 of the year immediately preceding the effective date of the contribution rate equals three and one-half percent (3 1/2%) or more of the total payrolls for that year ending June 30. The department shall by rule and regulation establish an additional formula to apportion the positive fund balance adjustment factor between those employers whose accounts have incurred a benefit ratio, pursuant to W.S. 27-3-503(e), of zero (0) and those employers whose accounts have incurred a benefit ratio that is greater than zero (0). For purposes of the apportionment, those employers having no established experience period pursuant to W.S. 27-3-503(f) shall be treated the same as those employers whose accounts have incurred a benefit ratio that is greater than zero (0). The apportionment formula shall reflect:
    1. The proportion of contribution revenue received from each of the two (2) groups of employers during the previous calendar year;
    2. An additional surcharge for employers whose accounts have incurred a benefit ratio that is greater than zero (0).
  3. If the fund balance on October 31 of the year immediately preceding the calendar year for which the contribution rate is being computed exceeds four percent (4%) of the total payrolls reported to the department by September 30 for that year ending June 30, a negative fund balance adjustment factor shall be computed. The negative adjustment factor shall be computed annually to the fourth decimal by dividing the total reported taxable payrolls for the year ending June 30 of the year immediately preceding the calendar year for which the contribution rate is being computed, into a sum equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the difference between the amount in the fund as of October 31 of the same year and four percent (4%) of the total payrolls for that year ending June 30. The adjustment factor shall be effective until the fund balance on October 31 of the year immediately preceding the effective date of the contribution rate is equal to or less than four percent (4%) of the total payrolls for that year ending June 30.
  4. The adjustment factors computed pursuant to this section are separate from an employer’s experience rating, shall be algebraically added to the employer’s contribution rate and payable by each employer subject to this article. The adjustment factor computed under subsection (c) of this section shall be algebraically added only to the contribution rate of those employers eligible for an experience rating. The adjustment factors applied to an employer’s contribution rate shall not be less than zero (0).
  5. Repealed by Laws 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 3.
  6. For purposes of this section, the fund balance includes any amount credited to the state unemployment insurance trust fund pursuant to W.S. 27-3-202(b) but does not include any amount credited to Wyoming’s account in the unemployment trust fund pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1103 and appropriated for administrative expenses.
  7. Repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 50, § 3.
  8. Effective for the period beginning January 1, 1991, the adjustment factors computed under subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall not exceed one and five-tenths percent (1.5%) to be chargeable against employers.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 7; 1939, ch. 124, § 11; 1943, ch. 58, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 7; C.S. 1945, § 54-107; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 6 to 9; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 5 to 7; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 6, 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-28; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 9, 10; 1965, ch. 186, § 1; 1967, ch. 215, § 2; 1969, ch. 59, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 9, 16; 1973, ch. 79, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; ch. 159, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-108 ; Laws 1979, ch. 51, § 1; ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; 1981, ch. 133, § 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, §§ 2, 3; 1984, ch. 50, §§ 2, 3; 1990, ch. 50, § 1; ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 82, § 1; 1997, ch. 168, § 2; 1999, ch. 159, § 2; 2003, ch. 123, §§ 1, 2; 2007, ch. 144, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to the state unemployment insurance trust fund, see § 27-3-209 .

The 2003 amendment, effective January 1, 2004, substituted “Sixty percent (60 %)” for “Eighty percent (80 %)” and “Forty percent (40 %)” for “Twenty percent (20 %)” in (a); in (c) twice substituted “four percent (4 %)” for “five percent (5 %)” and substituted “contribution rate is equal to or less than four percent (4 %)” for “contribution rate is less than five percent (5 %) and more than four percent (4 %)”; and rewrote the final sentence in (d).

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (b), inserted the last sentence and added (i) and (ii).

§ 27-3-506. Notice of rates and charges; relief, review or redetermination.

  1. The department shall notify an employer of his contribution rate determined pursuant to this article and of total benefit charges to his account within a reasonable time after the close of each experience period. A base period employer shall be notified of the filing of all initial claims which may be charged to his account. Except as otherwise provided by the legislature and on or before January 1 of each year, the department shall notify each employer of his projected contributions payable under W.S. 27-3-503 and 27-3-505 for the ensuing calendar year. Notice under this section shall be by mail to the last known address of record.
  2. A determination of contribution rates by the department for any calendar year is binding upon the employer unless within thirty (30) days after notice is mailed, he files an application for review and redetermination in accordance with this section.
  3. An employer may apply in writing to the department within twenty-eight (28) days after the mailing or delivery of notice of benefits charged to his account for relief of benefit charges under W.S. 27-3-504(e)(i), (ii), (iv) or (viii). The application shall state the reasons for relief. Determinations of benefits not charged to an employer’s account and which are paid from the trust fund shall be recorded and shall specify the reasons therefor. The records are open to inspection by an employer or his legal representative.
  4. An employer may apply to the department for review of a decision or determination involving contribution liability, contribution rates or the charging of benefit payments under W.S. 27-3-509 . The application shall be in writing and shall state the reasons for review. The department, on behalf of the commission, shall notify the employer of its acceptance or denial of the application for review or of a redetermination by the commission. If the commission grants review, the employer shall be given opportunity for hearing in accordance with W.S. 27-3-401 through 27-3-409 to the extent not inconsistent with this article. An employer in any proceeding involving contribution rates or liability may not contest benefits paid and charged to his account in accordance with a determination, redetermination or decision pursuant to W.S. 27-3-401 through 27-3-409 unless he was not a party to the proceeding. A denial or redetermination is final unless within thirty (30) days after notice is mailed a petition for judicial review is filed in accordance with W.S. 27-3-407 .
  5. An employer’s account shall not be relieved of charges relating to a payment that was made erroneously from the unemployment compensation fund after July 1, 2013 if the department determines that:
    1. The erroneous payment was made because the employer, or the agent of the employer, was at fault for failing to respond timely or adequately to a written request, sent by United States mail or by electronic mail, from the department for information relating to the claim for benefits which resulted in the erroneous payment; and
    2. The employer or agent has established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to requests similar to those identified in paragraph (i) of this subsection.
  6. For purposes of subsection (e) of this section, “timely” means within fifteen (15) days after a notice or request is sent by United States mail or by electronic mail to the address of record of the employer or employer’s agent. The department shall acknowledge receipt of the requested information within fifteen (15) days, if requested by the employer or the employer’s agent. Acknowledgment shall be by United States mail or electronic mail.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, §§ 7, 11; 1939, ch. 124, §§ 11, 15; 1941, ch. 96, § 10; 1943, ch. 58, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 7; C.S. 1945, §§ 54-107, 54-111; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 6 to 9, 11; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 5 to 7; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 6, 7; W.S. 1957, §§ 27-28, 27-33; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 9, 10; 1965, ch. 186, § 1; 1967, ch. 71, § 1; ch. 215, § 2; 1969, ch. 59, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 9, 16; 1973, ch. 79, § 1; ch. 215, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; ch. 159, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 27-3-108 , 27-3-113; Laws 1979, ch. 51, § 1; ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; 1981, ch. 133, §§ 1, 2; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1995, ch. 13, § 1; 2004, ch. 86, § 1; 2013 ch. 133, § 1, effective July 1, 2013; 2015 ch. 87, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (c), substituted “(ii), (iv) or (viii)” for “(ii) or (iv).”

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (e) and (f).

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in the first sentence in (c), substituted “twenty-eight (28) days” for “fifteen (15) days”; and in (d), added “to the extent not inconsistent with this article” at the end of the fourth sentence.

Timely filing of rate determinations mandatory. —

Timely filing under subsection (b) of employer rate determinations is just as mandatory and jurisdictional as it is under § 27-3-404 . Thus, failure to timely file bars review. Wyoming Dep't of Employment v. Wyoming Restaurant Assocs., 859 P.2d 1281, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1993).

Payments not required before seeking judicial review. —

Neither this section nor § 27-3-515 requires that an employer make all delinquent payments in order to seek judicial review. Wyoming Dep't of Employment v. Wyoming Restaurant Assocs., 859 P.2d 1281, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1993).

Quoted in

Wyo. Dep't of Empl. v. Jolley, Castillo, Drennon, Ltd., 2010 WY 48, 229 P.3d 955, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Apr. 22, 2010).

Stated in

Hupp v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1986).

§ 27-3-507. Person acquiring trade of employing unit; transfer of experience and assignment of rates.

  1. A person acquiring the trade, organization, business or substantially all the assets of an employer subject to this act shall assume the employer’s account, benefit experience and contribution rate. If the acquiring person is an employer subject to this act, the department shall consolidate the separate accounts and benefit experience and shall determine the contribution rate of the acquiring person effective the first day of the calendar quarter following the date of acquisition. A delinquency rate shall be assumed by the acquiring person as provided in W.S. 27-3-503(b) when the acquiring person owned or controlled an interest in the transferring employer or if the acquiring person is a member of the immediate family of the transferring employer.
  2. The transfer of some or all of an employer’s workforce to another person shall be considered a transfer of trade or business when, as a result of the transfer, the transferring employer no longer performs trade or business with respect to the transferred workforce, and the trade or business is performed by the person to whom the workforce is transferred.
  3. If an employer transfers all or a portion of its trade or business to another employer and, at the time of the transfer, there is substantially common ownership, management or control of the two (2) employers, then the unemployment insurance experience attributable to the transferred trade or business shall be transferred to the employer to whom the business is transferred. The rates of both employers shall be recalculated and made effective the first day of the calendar quarter immediately following the date of the transfer of trade or business. Both employers may be given a delinquency rate as provided in W.S. 27-3-503(b) if applicable.
  4. If, following a transfer of experience under this section, the department determines that a substantial purpose of the transfer of the trade or business was to obtain a reduced liability for contributions, then the accounts of the employers involved shall be combined into a single account and a single rate assigned to the account.
  5. If a person is not an employer under this section at the time the person acquires the trade or business of an employer, the unemployment insurance experience of the acquired employer shall not be transferred to the person if the department finds that the person acquired the trade or business of the employer solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining a lower rate of contributions. Instead, the person shall be assigned the applicable new employer rate under W.S. 27-3-503(b). In determining whether the trade or business was acquired solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining a lower rate of contributions, the department shall use objective factors which may include the cost of acquiring the business, whether the person continued the business enterprise of the acquired business, how long the business enterprise was continued, or whether a substantial number of new employees were hired for performance of duties unrelated to the business activity conducted prior to acquisition.
  6. The department shall establish procedures to identify the transfer or acquisition of a business for purposes of this section and W.S. 27-3-706 .

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 7; 1939, ch. 124, § 11; 1943, ch. 58, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 7; C.S. 1945, § 54-107; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 6 to 9; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 5 to 7; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 6, 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-28; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 9, 10; 1965, ch. 186, § 1; 1967, ch. 215, § 2; 1969, ch. 59, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 9, 16; 1973, ch. 79, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; ch. 159, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-108 ; Laws 1979, ch. 51, § 1; ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; 1981, ch. 133, § 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 83, § 1; 1999, ch. 114, § 1; 2005, ch. 186, § 2; 2010, ch. 66, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote the section, prescribing the contribution rate upon transfer of a business.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in (a), inserted the present second sentence.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Suit for declaratory judgment was not properly brought where the plaintiff sought full review of the agency decision assigning the plaintiff, pursuant to this section, the delinquent account of an acquired employer, as opposed to seeking only the interpretation of this section. Wyomedia Corp. v. Division of Unemployment Ins. of Wyo. Dep't of Employment, 824 P.2d 564, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. Feb. 20, 1992).

Applied in

Wyoming Dep't of Emp. v. Wyoming Restaurant Assocs., 859 P.2d 1281, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1993).

Quoted in

General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 902 P.2d 716, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 27-3-508. Rates for joint ventures.

A joint venture composed of two (2) or more employers with accounts meeting the requirements of W.S. 27-3-503(b) and (c) shall apply in writing to the department within four (4) months after the date of formation of the joint venture for determination of a contribution rate. The department shall, upon receipt of application and pursuant to this article, assign a contribution rate based upon the benefit ratio computed on the consolidation of the separate accounts and benefit experiences of the employers for the experience period. The contribution rate shall be determined and assigned by the department to the joint venture each calendar year until its separate account and benefit experience qualify as an experience period.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 7; 1939, ch. 124, § 11; 1943, ch. 58, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 7; C.S. 1945, § 54-107; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 6 to 9; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 5 to 7; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 6, 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-28; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 9, 10; 1965, ch. 186, § 1; 1967, ch. 215, § 2; 1969, ch. 59, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 9, 16; 1973, ch. 79, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; ch. 159, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-108 ; Laws 1979, ch. 51, § 1; ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; 1981, ch. 133, § 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Quoted in

General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 902 P.2d 716, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 27-3-509. Election of substitute payments by certain organizations authorized; filing and liability period; billing; posting of security; exceptions.

  1. An organization or nonprofit organization defined by W.S. 27-3-501(a)(v) and (vi) and subject to this act may instead of paying contributions otherwise required by this article, elect to pay an amount determined pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. If an organization or nonprofit organization elects payment liability at the time it is determined an employer subject to this act, it shall file written notice of its election with the department not later than thirty (30) days following the date of determination. Liability for payments shall be at least one (1) year from the date of determination and shall continue until written notice is filed with the department terminating its election. Notice shall be filed not later than thirty (30) days before the beginning of the taxable year for which the termination is effective. An organization or nonprofit organization previously paying contributions under this act may file written notice of election for payment liability with the department not later than thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of any taxable year. The election shall not be changed for at least two (2) years from the effective date.
  2. The department may for good cause extend the required filing period for notice of election or termination and may permit an election to be retroactive to January 1 of the year in which the election is made. It shall notify an organization of its determination of employer status, the effective date of an election and a termination of election. Determinations are subject to reconsideration, appeal and review in accordance with W.S. 27-3-506 .
  3. At the end of each calendar quarter or other period determined by the department, the department shall bill each nonprofit organization electing payment liability under this section for an amount equal to the total amount of regular benefits plus one-half (1/2) of the amount of extended benefits paid during the quarter or other prescribed period attributable to employment in the nonprofit organization. An organization electing payment liability under this section shall be billed in a similar manner for an amount equal to the total amount of extended benefits attributable to employment by the organization during the billing period. Payment shall be made not later than thirty (30) days after the bill is mailed or delivered unless an application for review and redetermination is filed. Payments shall not be deducted from employee wages and if not paid when due, the employer is subject to interest under this article. The department shall notify each employer of transactions affecting its account and its right to review pursuant to W.S. 27-3-506 .
  4. The commission may by regulation require an employer electing payments under this section to post surety bonds or other securities.
  5. Noncharging provisions under W.S. 27-3-409(a) and 27-3-504(e) and the right to protest benefit charges under W.S. 27-3-506(c) do not apply to employers electing payments under this section.
  6. Any employer failing to make required payments under this section, including assessments of interest and penalties, within ninety (90) days after receipt of a bill, shall not be eligible for making payments under this section for the following tax year unless full payment is received by the department before the contribution rates for the next tax year are computed under this act, subject to the following:
    1. Any employer losing the option to make payments under this section because of late payments or nonpayment under this subsection shall have the option reinstated if after one (1) year, all contributions have been paid on a timely basis and no contributions, payments instead of contributions for paid benefits, penalties or interest remain outstanding;
    2. Failure of the tribe or any tribal unit to make payments required under this section including assessment of interest and penalties, after exhaustion of all collection efforts determined necessary by the department, shall exclude services performed for the tribe from employment for purposes of W.S. 27-3-105(a)(iii);
    3. Upon termination or reinstatement of any tribe or tribal unit under this section, the department shall notify the United States internal revenue service and the United States department of labor;
    4. Notice of payment and reporting delinquency to any Indian tribe or tribal unit under this subsection shall include information that failure to make full payment within the prescribed time:
      1. Imposes a tax liability upon the tribe under the federal Unemployment Tax Act;
      2. Eliminates eligibility of the tribe for election of payments under this section;
      3. May result in exclusion of the tribe as an employer under this act as defined by W.S. 27-3-103(a)(x) and the exclusion of services performed for the tribe from employment covered under this act pursuant to paragraph (ii) of this subsection.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 7; 1939, ch. 124, § 11; 1943, ch. 58, § 5; 1945, ch. 81, § 7; C.S. 1945, § 54-107; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 6 to 9; 1953, ch. 111, §§ 5 to 7; 1957, ch. 88, §§ 6, 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-28; Laws 1963, ch. 121, §§ 9, 10; 1965, ch. 186, § 1; 1967, ch. 215, § 2; 1969, ch. 59, § 1; 1971, ch. 253, §§ 9, 16; 1973, ch. 79, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; ch. 159, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-108 ; Laws 1979, ch. 51, § 1; ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; 1981, ch. 133, § 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2001, ch. 67, § 1; 2010, ch. 66, § 1.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in the introductory language of (f), substituted “Any employer failing” for “Any Indian tribe or tribal unit failing”; in (f)(i), substituted “Any employer losing” for “Any Indian tribe losing.”.

Unemployment Tax Act. —

The federal Unemployment Tax Act appears as 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-510. Delinquencies; interest to be charged; deposit; collection by civil action; jeopardy assessments; posting of bond; liability of corporate officers and directors.

  1. Contributions not paid on the date due shall bear interest of two percent (2%) per month or any fractional portion thereof from the due date until payment plus accrued interest is received by the department. Interest collected pursuant to this subsection shall be paid into the employment security revenue account.
  2. If after notice an employer defaults in any contribution or interest payment, the amount due shall be collected by civil action in the name of the department. An employer adjudged liable shall pay the costs of the action. Civil actions brought under this subsection shall be given preference over all other civil actions except petitions for judicial review under this act and cases under the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act [§ 27-14-101 et seq.].
  3. If an employer or employing unit neglects or refuses to submit reports and pay contributions or interest required by this act, discontinues business at any of its places of business or leaves this state without submitting reports and paying contributions or interest and the neglect, refusal, discontinuance or removal jeopardizes the fund or any rights to benefits, the department may make a jeopardy assessment against the employer or employing unit. The department shall immediately notify the employer of the assessment in writing by mail. The assessment is final unless the employer files a written protest of the assessment with the department within fifteen (15) days after mailing. An employer filing a protest may request a hearing before the commission in writing. After the hearing the department shall notify the employer of findings of the commission. If an assessment is made, it is final upon issuance of notice and the department shall collect the assessment of any delinquent contributions or interest.
  4. The department may require any employing unit which has been habitually delinquent in making contributions, filing returns or qualifying as required by this act to file a bond or other security with the department which will insure the payment of future contributions required by this act.
  5. Any officer or director having at least twenty percent (20%) ownership interest of a corporate employing unit and any manager of a limited liability company having at least twenty percent (20%) ownership interest of a limited liability company employing unit, who controls or supervises filing contribution reports or making payment contributions under this act and who fails to file the reports or make required payments, and the employing unit fails to pay the amounts due the department, is liable for the contributions or reimbursement including interest, penalties and costs. Liability under this subsection shall:
    1. Survive dissolution, reorganization, bankruptcy, receivership or assignment for the benefit of creditors of or by the corporate or limited liability company employing unit;
    2. Be initially determined by the department. The department’s determination is final unless the officer or director determined to be liable files a written appeal within fifteen (15) days after the date notice of the determination is mailed to his address or the address of the corporate or limited liability company employing unit. The burden of proof rests with the department and the appeal shall be conducted in the manner provided under W.S. 27-3-506 for appeals from employer liability determinations.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 14; 1939, ch. 124, § 18; 1941, ch. 96, § 13; C.S. 1945, § 54-114; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 27-29; Laws 1967, ch. 216, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-109 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1983, Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1987, ch. 130, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 83 § 1; 1993, ch. 76, § 1; 1997, ch. 93, § 1; 2010, ch. 66, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to the state unemployment insurance trust fund, see § 27-3-209 .

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in the introductory language of (e), substituted “and who fails” for “and who willfully fails.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Excuse for failure to file return within limitation provisions of Internal Revenue Code, 30 ALR2d 452.

Construction, application and effect, with respect to social security and unemployment compensation taxes, of statutes imposing penalties for tax evasion or default, 22 ALR3d 8.

§ 27-3-511. Delinquencies; lien; foreclosure; notice and hearing; satisfaction and release; remedies not exclusive.

  1. If contributions or interest under this act are not paid on the date due, the department may file a lien certificate verified under oath with the county clerk of the county in which the employer has his principal place of business and a copy with any other county. The certificate shall state the amount of the contributions and interest due, the name and last known address of the delinquent employer and that the department complied with computation and levy requirements for contributions and interest under this act. The county clerk shall number, file and index the certificate under employment security contributions’ liens and under chattel mortgages.
  2. The amount of contributions and interest due the department is a lien upon all real and personal property including motor vehicles owned or acquired by the employer. The lien is in effect from the time of filing the certificate and covers all property of the employer in any county in which filed. The department may initiate proceedings for foreclosure in district court within ten (10) years from the date of filing. After the date of filing, no person shall remove property subject to a lien under this section from the state.
  3. Before filing the certificate, the delinquent employer shall be given opportunity for hearing before the commission or its duly authorized representative. Notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be mailed at least fifteen (15) days prior to the hearing. If the delinquent employer or his representative fails to appear at the hearing or fails to establish to the satisfaction of the commission that contributions and interest are erroneous, the department may file the certificate. The certificate may be filed without opportunity for hearing if a delinquent employer is leaving the state with intent to default.
  4. If a lien is entered and the contributions are paid or found erroneous, the department shall file notice of satisfaction of the lien certificate with the county clerk of any county in which the lien is filed. The department may release any property from the lien or subordinate the lien if it determines contributions and interest are secured by a lien on other property or the collection of contributions and interest is not in jeopardy. The department shall certify release or subordination under this subsection.
  5. The remedies provided by this section are not exclusive.
  6. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the department may enter into installment payment agreements for delinquent tax and interest liabilities where repayment requirements are met and where payment in a lump sum would cause severe inconvenience to the taxpayer.
  7. For purposes of this section, “employer” includes those individuals described in W.S. 27-3-510(e) under the conditions described in that section.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 14; 1939, ch. 124, § 18; 1941, ch. 96, § 13; C.S. 1945, § 54-114; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 27-29; Laws 1967, ch. 216, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-109 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1999, ch. 73, § 2; 2010, ch. 66, § 1.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, added (f) and (g).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Priority of liens.—

Lien against real property created by a certificate of purchase for delinquent taxes was superior to any lien held by the State of Wyoming, Department of Workforce Services, for unpaid contributions and interest to the Wyoming unemployment compensation fund. Brock v. Wyo. ex rel. Wyo. Workforce Servs., Unemployment Ins. Div., 2017 WY 47, 394 P.3d 460, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 27-3-512. Priority over other claims under receivership.

If an employer’s assets are distributed by court order under receivership, assignment, adjudicated insolvency or other proceeding, contributions under this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ] shall have priority over all claims except taxes and claims for wages of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per claimant and earned within six (6) months before the proceeding. Priority of contributions in cases adjudicated under 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. shall be as provided by 11 U.S.C. § 507(a).

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 14; 1939, ch. 124, § 18; 1941, ch. 96, § 13; C.S. 1945, § 54-114; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 27-29; Laws 1967, ch. 216, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-109 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Priority of liens.—

Lien against real property created by a certificate of purchase for delinquent taxes was superior to any lien held by the State of Wyoming, Department of Workforce Services, for unpaid contributions and interest to the Wyoming unemployment compensation fund. Brock v. Wyo. ex rel. Wyo. Workforce Servs., Unemployment Ins. Div., 2017 WY 47, 394 P.3d 460, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 27-3-513. Prevention of collection prohibited.

A court shall not prevent the collection of any contributions under this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ].

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 14; 1939, ch. 124, § 18; 1941, ch. 96, § 13; C.S. 1945, § 54-114; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 27-29; Laws 1967, ch. 216, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-109 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-514. Action for recovery of payments under protest; procedure.

An employer paying contributions under protest may within six (6) months after payment initiate action for recovery against the department in a court of competent jurisdiction. The protest shall be verified and filed at the time payment is made and shall state the grounds for objection. Failure to initiate action within six (6) months is a waiver of recovery under this subsection. Review by the court is limited to the objections stated in the protest. If judgment is for the employer, the amount shall be credited to his account for contributions and interest due under this act. Any remaining balance shall be refunded to the employer from the clearing account.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 14; 1939, ch. 124, § 18; 1941, ch. 96, § 13; C.S. 1945, § 54-114; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 27-29; Laws 1967, ch. 216, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-109 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Payment of taxes under protest not required. —

The language used in this section does not require that an employer, appealing its tax rate determination, pay its delinquent taxes under protest before it can obtain judicial review. Instead, it simply provides a cause of action to an employer, who is paying taxes under protest, to seek recovery of those taxes. Wyoming Dep't of Employment v. Wyoming Restaurant Assocs., 859 P.2d 1281, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1993).

§ 27-3-515. Adjustment or refund for erroneous collection; reduction of contributions and interest in certain cases; recovery by department.

  1. An employer may apply to the commission or the commission may on its own motion provide for an adjustment of contributions or interest or for a refund if the adjustment cannot be made. This subsection applies only to payments made within three (3) years before the date of application or determination. Upon determination of an erroneous collection, the department shall grant an adjustment without interest for future contribution payments or if the adjustment cannot be made, refund the amount without interest from the fund.
  2. The department may upon its own motion or written application reduce or waive the amount of interest due under W.S. 27-3-510(a) if the collection of the full amount of interest is against equity and good conscience. If an employer is no longer subject to this act pursuant to W.S. 27-3-502 , the department may reduce or cancel the amount of contributions or interest due upon a determination based on findings entered into the record that the employer is:
    1. Adjudicated insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction with no remaining assets;
    2. Deceased with no estate or the estate is closed and all assets are distributed;
    3. A dissolved corporation with no remaining assets;
    4. Not found within three (3) years after the date of termination of coverage under this act and has no property located in the state; or
    5. Not capable of paying the total amount due within three (3) years after the date of termination of coverage under this act, has no property in the state and failure to accept a partial amount of the total as settlement may result in a substantial loss to the fund.
  3. Subsection (b) of this section does not prevent the department from collecting the balance of interest and contributions not paid if its action was based upon a misrepresentation or omission of facts or if amounts due under this act are collectible at a future date.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 14; 1939, ch. 124, § 18; 1941, ch. 96, § 13; C.S. 1945, § 54-114; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 27-29; Laws 1967, ch. 216, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-109 ; Laws 1981, ch. 133, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Payments not required before seeking judicial review. —

Neither § 27-3-506 nor this section requires that an employer make all delinquent payments in order to seek judicial review. Wyoming Dep't of Employment v. Wyoming Restaurant Assocs., 859 P.2d 1281, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1993).

§ 27-3-516. Incremental bond for impact industries.

  1. Any project in Wyoming with an estimated construction cost equal to or greater than the threshold construction cost defined by the industrial siting council pursuant to W.S. 35-12-102(a)(vii), a majority of which is planned to be completed or discontinued within a period of seven (7) years, and which will require the employment of at least two hundred fifty (250) people is subject to this section. After the project is initiated, each employing unit working on a project which meets the criteria specified under this section shall report annually to the department any change in contract bids within the state as may have been determined under subsection (b) of this section.
  2. If the department determines that the project is within the criteria stated by this section, it may assess and collect from the general or prime contractor or, in those situations where there is no general or prime contractor, the owner for whom the project is being constructed, on behalf of each employing unit, an additional amount of one-half percent (.5%) times the successful bid amount on the project awarded to each employing unit but not to exceed one-half percent (.5%) times the total amount allowed under all bids accepted under the project. The amount is in addition to any other contribution required by this act and shall be treated as incremental bond payments to insure payment for all benefits ultimately claimed. The payments are not contributions until the ultimate determination of liability is made under subsection (d) of this section. The department shall amend the amount assessed under this section in accordance with any increases in contract bids reported by an employing unit under subsection (a) of this section. An employing unit may be enjoined by the department from engaging or continuing in business until all payments required under this subsection are made.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1986, ch. 52, § 2.
  4. The amount collected under this section shall be credited to a separate account. Within one (1) year after completion or discontinuance of the project or after an employing unit completes its phase of the work, the department shall determine the total benefits paid to employees of the employing unit or units and if total contributions made by the units under W.S. 27-3-503 exceed total benefits paid to the employees of the units, the difference plus accrued interest shall be refunded to the appropriate general or prime contractor or the owner who paid the additional contribution under subsection (b) of this section but not exceeding the amount paid under this section plus accrued interest. The amount not refunded shall be credited to the unemployment compensation fund.
  5. Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 177 § 2.

History. Laws 1984, ch. 50, § 1; 1986, ch. 52, §§ 1, 2; 1987, ch. 103, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2005, ch. 231, § 1; 2007, ch. 177, §§ 1, 2; 2010, ch. 66, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (d), substituted “a separate account” for “an account within the trust and agency fund.”

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a), substituted “one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000.00)” for “twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000.00)”; and repealed (e), which read: “This section does not apply to any project for which bids are opened prior to March 20, 1984.”

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in (a), substituted “equal to or greater than the threshold construction cost defined by the industrial siting council pursuant to W.S. 35-12-102(a)(vii)” for “of at least one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000.00).”

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

§ 27-3-517. Electronic delivery of information.

Whenever this article requires any determination, decision or notice to be transmitted through the mail, the determination, decision or notice may be transmitted by an internet application approved by the department but only upon an election by the claimant or employer to receive the information by electronic transmission. Upon the completion of every electronic transmission authorized by this section, the department shall provide to the claimant or employer an electronic acknowledgement specifying the date and time when the transmission was sent or received. Except as otherwise required by rules applicable to appeals to the courts of this state, determinations, decisions or notices transmitted by an approved electronic means may be appealed or protested by use of the same means. For the purpose of all relevant time limits established by this article, electronically transmitted information shall be deemed delivered on the date indicated on the acknowledgment required by this section, or if no acknowledgement exists, on the date the electronic delivery is initiated by the party sending the information.

History. 2017 ch. 6, § 1, effective February 13, 2017.

Effective date. —

Laws 2017, ch. 6, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved Feb. 13, 2017.

Article 6. Administration

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare §§ 209 to 215.

§ 27-3-601. Unemployment insurance commission created; composition; terms; vacancies; salary; chairman; quorum; removal; office; seal.

  1. The unemployment insurance commission of Wyoming is created within the department of workforce services and shall consist of three (3) members serving a term of six (6) years each. Appointments, vacancies and expiration of terms shall be in accordance with W.S. 28-12-101 through 28-12-103 . A member shall not hold any state office or serve as an officer or on a committee of any political organization during the term of membership. No more than seventy-five percent (75%) of the members shall be of the same political party.
  2. Every two (2) years one (1) member shall be elected by the membership to serve as chairman. Two (2) members is a quorum. A vacancy does not prevent the remaining members from exercising powers of the commission. One (1) member shall not exercise powers if two (2) vacancies occur at the same time.
  3. Commission members shall receive a salary equal to the per diem paid to members of the Wyoming legislature under W.S. 28-5-101 for each day of actual service and when engaged in necessary travel plus necessary expenses.
  4. The governor may remove a commissioner as provided in W.S. 9-1-202 .
  5. The office of the commission shall be located in Casper, Wyoming and the commission shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, §§ 10, 11; 1939, ch. 124, § 15; 1941, ch. 96, §§ 9, 10; 1943, ch. 58, § 7; 1945, ch. 81, § 9; C.S. 1945, §§ 54-110, 54-111; Laws 1949, ch. 49, §§ 10, 11; 1953, ch. 118, § 1; 1957, ch. 226, § 4; W.S. 1957, §§ 27-32, 27-33; Laws 1961, ch. 148, § 40; 1963, ch. 46, § 2; 1965, ch. 115, § 41; 1967, ch. 71, § 1; ch. 181, § 21; 1969, ch. 168, § 18; 1973, ch. 215, § 1; W.S. 1977, §§ 27-3-112, 27-3-113; Laws 1979, ch. 17, § 2; ch. 141, § 1; 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1987, ch. 175, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; 2016 ch. 119, § 1, effective July 1, 2016.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a).

The 2016 amendment , effective July 1, 2016, substituted “seventy-five percent (75%) of the” for “two (2)” in the last sentence of (a).

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2016, ch. 119, § 2 states as follows: “Nothing in this act shall be deemed to affect the current term of any member of any authority, board, commission, committee or council. The governor shall make appointments in accordance with this act for any vacancy occurring on or after the effective date of this act.”

Stated in

Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1984); County Court Judges Ass'n v. Sidi, 752 P.2d 960 (Wyo. 1988).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity, construction, and effect of state laws requiring payment of wages on resignation of employee immediately or within specified period, 11 ALR5th 715.

§ 27-3-602. Powers and duties of unemployment insurance commission; personnel.

  1. The commission shall:
    1. Adopt rules necessary for the administration of this act by the department of workforce services and the department, in accordance with law, may make expenditures, require reports, make investigations and take other action it considers necessary;
    2. Determine its methods of procedure in accordance with this act;
    3. Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.
    4. Through the department, and if possible, provide a reserve against fund liability for future benefit payments in excess of contributions in accordance with accepted actuarial principles based on employment, business activity and other relevant factors;
    5. Through the department, recommend to the governor and the legislature a change in contribution or benefit rates when necessary to protect fund solvency;
    6. Define and prescribe by regulation necessary procedures for total unemployment and part total unemployment;
    7. Through the department, publish provisions of this act, rules and regulations, reports and other relevant material and furnish copies in accordance with W.S. 16-4-204 to any person upon application.
  2. The commission may adopt, amend or rescind rules and regulations after notice and public hearing in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§ 16-3-101 et seq.].
  3. In administering this act, the commission or any authorized representative of the department may administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify official acts, subpoena witnesses and require the production of books, papers or other records material to the administration of this act.
  4. If a subpoena issued to any person pursuant to subsection (c) of this section is disobeyed, the district court of the district in which the inquiry is conducted or the person is found, resides or conducts business shall, upon application by the commission or department, issue to the person refusing to obey the subpoena an order requiring the person to appear before the commission or department to produce evidence if ordered or to give evidence touching the matter in question. Any person failing to obey the court order may be punished by the court for contempt and upon conviction, shall be fined not less than two hundred dollars ($200.00), imprisoned not more than sixty (60) days, or both. Each day of violation is a separate offense.
  5. The privilege of self-incrimination is not a defense for violating subsection (c) of this section nor shall a person be incriminated for providing testimony or evidence under subsection (c) of this section except for perjury committed during testimony.
  6. The department of workforce services shall provide personnel necessary to administer this act in accordance with rules of the commission and determinations of the commission authorized by law. The commission shall not exercise supervisory authority over those personnel.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 11; 1939, ch. 124, § 15; 1941, ch. 96, § 10; C.S. 1945, § 54-111; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 11; W.S. 1957, § 27-33; Laws 1967, ch. 71, § 1; 1973, ch. 215, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-113; Laws 1979, ch. 141, § 1; 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, §§ 2, 3; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a)(i) and (f).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Civil rule superseded by regulations. —

The applicable statutes and regulations relating to actions against the department of employment supersede Rule 6(d), W.R.C.P. (additional time after service by mail). Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment Sec. Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1122, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1993).

Applied in

Hupp v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1986).

Stated in

Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1984).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Immunity and the Grand Jury,” see VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 629 (1973).

§ 27-3-603. Confidentiality of information.

Except as otherwise provided, information maintained pursuant to this act shall not be disclosed in a manner which reveals the identity of the employing unit or individual. The confidentiality limitations of this section do not apply to transfers of information between the divisions of the department of workforce services so long as the transfer of information is not restricted by federal law, rule or contract. Any employee who discloses information outside of the department in violation of federal or state law may be terminated without progressive discipline.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 11; 1939, ch. 124, § 15; 1941, ch. 96, § 10; C.S. 1945, § 54-111; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 11; W.S. 1957, § 27-33; Laws 1967, ch. 71, § 1; 1973, ch. 215, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-113; Laws 1979, ch. 141, § 1; 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1993, ch. 23, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Game warden can obtain unemployment insurance records. —

A game warden who complies with the strict requirements of obtaining a search warrant from a judge or a court commissioner can obtain confidential records of the division of unemployment insurance. Wyoming Dep't of Employment, Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Patrick, 818 P.2d 54, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1991).

§ 27-3-604. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws, 1937, ch. 113, §§ 10 and 11, related to the executive director of the employment security commission, and additional personnel.

§ 27-3-605. Responsibilities of department of workforce services.

  1. The department of workforce services shall administer the unemployment compensation program in this state.
  2. and (c) Repealed by Laws 2002, Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 4.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, §§ 10, 12; 1939, ch. 124, § 16; 1941, ch. 96, §§ 9, 11; 1943, ch. 58, § 7; 1945, ch. 81, § 9; C.S. 1945, §§ 54-110, 54-112; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 10; 1953, ch. 118, § 1; 1957, ch. 226, § 4; W.S. 1957, §§ 27-32, 27-34; Laws 1961, ch. 148, § 40; 1963, ch. 46, § 2; 1965, ch. 115, § 41; 1967, ch. 181, § 21; 1969, ch. 168, § 18; W.S. 1977, §§ 27-3-112, 27-3-114; Laws 1979, ch. 17, § 2; 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 4; 2005, ch. 186, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (a), substituted “shall administer the unemployment compensation program in this state” for “is the successor agency to the Wyoming state employment service division and the unemployment compensation division which previously existed under the commission. The department shall perform all functions previously performed by those divisions.”

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a).

§ 27-3-606. Department duties regarding unemployment and reemployment.

  1. and (b) Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 4, § 3.
  2. The department shall take appropriate steps to:
    1. through (iv) Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 186, § 3.
    2. Conduct and publish results of investigations and research studies.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 11; 1939, ch. 124, § 15; 1941, ch. 96, § 10; C.S. 1945, § 54-111; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 11; W.S. 1957, § 27-33; Laws 1967, ch. 71, § 1; 1973, ch. 215, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-113; Laws 1979, ch. 141, § 1; 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1996, ch. 4, §§ 2, 3; 2005, ch. 186, § 3.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, repealed former (c)(i) through (c)(iv), which provided that the duties of the department were to (1) reduce and prevent unemployment; (2) encourage and assist in the adoption of practical methods of vocational training, retraining and guidance; (3) investigate, recommend, advise and assist in the establishment and operation of public works reserves by the state and its political subdivisions to be used during business depression and unemployment; and (4) promote alternative reemployment of unemployed workers.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-607. Cooperation by department with federal, state and local agencies; disclosure and submission of specified information; limitations.

  1. The department shall:
    1. Cooperate with and report to the federal government pursuant to requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 902 et seq. and comply with federal regulations governing expenditures of funds paid to the state under 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.;
    2. Furnish upon request of any federal agency administering public works programs or public employment assistance, the name, address, ordinary occupation and employment status of benefit recipients and their right to future benefits under this act;
    3. Upon request, pursuant to contract and on a reimbursable basis, of any state or political subdivision, furnish wage information obtained pursuant to this act determined necessary by regulation of the United States health and human services department for determining eligibility or assistance under 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.;
    4. Upon request, pursuant to contract and on a reimbursable basis, disclose to officers or employees of any state or local child support enforcement agency operating pursuant to a plan described under 42 U.S.C. § 654 or to the federal parent locater service, any wage or unemployment compensation claim information obtained under this act for an identified individual;
    5. Upon request, pursuant to contract and on a reimbursable basis, disclose to officers and employees of the United States department of agriculture and any state supplemental nutrition assistance program agency defined under 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n)(1), any wage information obtained under this act for an identified individual, any record of application for or receipt of benefits and the amount received, his most recent home address and any refusal of an offer of employment and a description of this employment;
    6. Upon request, pursuant to contract and on a reimbursable basis, provide unemployment insurance benefit and wage information to the department of housing and urban development and to other public housing agencies. Such information shall be provided as required by the McKinney Homeless Act of 1988, section 904(c) and in a manner as prescribed by the secretary of labor;
    7. Disclose information contained in its records to the United States secretary of health and human services or his designee, as necessary for the purposes of the national directory of new hires established under section 453 of the Social Security Act. The requesting agency shall reimburse the department for the cost of furnishing this information. The department shall work in conjunction with other states to ensure that adequate safeguards exist at the federal level so that state information being provided under this section is not disclosed for any purpose, except as authorized by law;
    8. Upon request, pursuant to contract and on a reimbursable basis, disclose and furnish copies of records relating to the administration of this act to the railroad retirement board;
    9. Require any recipient of information disclosed under this subsection to comply with any safeguards necessary and specified in federal law to ensure that the information furnished shall be used only for the purposes authorized.
  2. A requesting agency shall agree that information obtained under paragraph (a)(iv) of this section be used only for establishing and collecting child support obligations from and locating individuals owing obligations enforced pursuant to a plan described under 42 U.S.C. § 654, and that information obtained under paragraph (a)(v) of this section be used only for determining the applicant’s eligibility for benefits or the amount of benefits under the supplemental nutrition assistance program. The agency shall also reimburse the department for the cost of furnishing this information. Requirements for confidentiality of information under this act and the penalties for improper disclosure apply to the use of this information by officers and employees of any child support or supplemental nutrition assistance program agency and the United States department of agriculture.
  3. The department may, on a reimbursable basis unless otherwise provided:
    1. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 186, § 3.
    2. Notwithstanding W.S. 27-3-603 and subject to regulations of the commission and pursuant to contract, disclose necessary information obtained from any employing unit or individual under this act and any determination of benefit rights to any state or federal agency administering Wagner-Peyser Act or federal Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act or subsequent similar enactments training services;
    3. Repealed by Laws 2005, ch. 186, § 3.
    4. Cooperate with any federal agency administering any unemployment compensation law;
    5. Allow access to information obtained pursuant to the administration of this act to the division of criminal investigation of the attorney general’s office, upon a written request by the director which demonstrates there is a reasonable basis to believe the health or safety of a person is in danger and the information may lead to the elimination of that danger;
    6. Allow the state auditor’s office and the division of worker’s compensation access to certain information obtained under this act limited to the name, address, social security identification number and other general information pertaining to benefit entitlement and employers. Disclosure of information under this paragraph is for purposes of comparing information of the department with that of a requesting state agency for the detection of improper or fraudulent claims or the determination of potential tax liability, for employer compliance with notification, registration, certification or qualification requirements or for the collection of amounts owed the department;
    7. Upon request, disclose information not otherwise restricted by law or contract to the bureau of labor statistics;
    8. Upon written request, disclose any information obtained under this act to director or agency head, or his designee or agent, in the executive branch of federal or state government to be used by the public official only for official business in connection with the administration of a law or in the enforcement of a law by that public official. The requesting agency shall reimburse the department for the cost of furnishing this information unless the cost is insignificant;
    9. Inform a project owner or contractor if his prime contractor or any subcontractor has notified the department and whether or not the prime contractor or any subcontractor is in compliance with this act;
    10. Pursuant to contract, disclose wage information on a nonreimbursable basis to the social security administration utilizing the unemployment insurance interstate inquiry system;
    11. Require any recipient of information disclosed under this subsection to comply with any safeguards necessary as specified in federal regulation to ensure that the information furnished shall be used only for the purposes authorized;
    12. Notwithstanding W.S. 27-3-603 and subject to regulations of the commission, disclose necessary information obtained from any employing unit or individual under this act and any determination of benefit rights to any state or federal agency administering unemployment compensation laws or federal tax laws and to the office of the United States bankruptcy trustee.
  4. The department may conduct and publish statistical analysis of payroll and employment of state agencies in the executive branch and of school districts, which may reveal the identity of state agency and school district employing units.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 11; 1939, ch. 124, § 15; 1941, ch. 96, § 10; C.S. 1945, § 54-111; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 11; W.S. 1957, § 27-33; Laws 1967, ch. 71, § 1; 1973, ch. 215, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-113; Laws 1979, ch. 141, § 1; 1981, ch. 133, § 1; 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1985, ch. 129, § 1; 1986, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 83, § 1; 1993, ch. 19, § 1; 1995, ch. 13, § 1; ch. 121, § 2; 1997, ch. 91, § 2; 1998, ch. 6, § 3; ch. 55, § 1; 2005, ch. 186, §§ 2, 3; 2010, ch. 66, § 1; 2012, ch. 101, § 1; 2013 ch. 193, § 1, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 40, § 1, effective March 4, 2016.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted “pursuant to contract and on a reimbursable basis” or a variant in (a)(iii) through (a)(vi); added (a)(viii), whose provisions were formerly contained in (c)(i); redesignated former (a)(viii) as (a)(ix); in the introductory language in (c), inserted “on a reimbursable basis unless otherwise provided”; repealed former (c)(i), pertaining to disclosure to the railroad retirement board; in (c)(ii), inserted “and pursuant to contract,” substituted “necessary information” for “information,” and substituted “Wagner-Peyser Act or Workforce Investment Act training services” for “public employment services, unemployment compensation laws or federal tax laws and to the office of the United States bankruptcy trustee”; repealed former (c)(iii), whose provisions were obsolete; rewrote (c)(vii), deleting provisions pertaining to officers and employees of the industrial siting administration and the Wyoming business council for economic development forecasting and economic development analysis; substituted “written request” for “request” in (c)(viii); added (c)(x) through (c)(xii); and made related and stylistic changes.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, added (d).

The 2012 amendment, in (d), inserted “and of school districts” and “and school district.”

Laws 2012, ch. 101 § 8, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 21, 2012.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, substituted “supplemental nutrition assistance program” for “food stamp” once in (a)(v) and twice in (b).

The 2016 amendment , substituted “federal Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act or subsequent similar enactments” for “Workforce Investment Act” in (c)(ii).

Laws 2016, ch. 40 § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8 of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 4, 2016.

Editor's notes. —

The McKinney Homeless Act of 1988, as amended, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq. The Wagner-Peyser Act is codified as 29 U.S.C. 49 et seq. The Workforce Investment Act is codified as 29 U.S.C. 2801 et seq.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Applied in

Wyoming Dep't of Emp. v. Patrick, 818 P.2d 54, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1991).

§ 27-3-608. Agreements by department with other states, federal government and foreign governments authorized.

  1. Notwithstanding W.S. 27-3-104 through 27-3-108 , the department may enter into arrangements with other states for services performed by an individual ordinarily performing services in more than one (1) state for a single employing unit. Subject to election by the employing unit and approval of the affected states, the arrangement may specify that service is performed entirely within the state in which:
    1. Any part of the individual’s services are performed;
    2. The employing unit maintains its principal place of business; or
    3. The individual has his residence.
  2. The department is also authorized to enter into agreements with other states or the federal government for wages or services entitled to benefits under the law of another state or the federal government to be wages for insured work under this act or under the law of another state or the federal government. The department shall participate in arrangements approved by the United States secretary of labor for the payment of compensation by combining an individual’s wages and employment covered under this act with those covered under the laws of other states which assure the prompt and full payment of compensation, apply the base period of a single state law to a claim involving the combination of wages and employment covered under two (2) or more state laws and avoid duplication of wages and employment. No arrangement under this subsection shall be entered into unless the participating state or federal agency agrees to reimburse the fund for the amount of benefits paid under this act for wages or services the department finds fair and reasonable. The department shall reimburse to other state or federal agencies a reasonable portion of benefits paid under their law.
  3. The department may make and receive reimbursements from or to the fund in accordance with arrangements pursuant to this section. For purposes of this act, reimbursements payable are benefits.
  4. To the extent authorized by federal law and constitution and agreements entered into between the federal government and foreign governments, the department may enter into or cooperate in agreements for facilities and services provided by a foreign government for use in receiving claims and paying benefits under this act or similar law of the foreign government.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 18; 1939, ch. 124, § 19; C.S. 1945, § 54-118; Laws 1949, ch. 49, § 14; W.S. 1957, § 27-39; Laws 1971, ch. 53, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-119; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-609. Legal representation in civil and criminal actions.

  1. In any civil action to enforce this act, the department may be represented by a qualified attorney employed by the department or by the attorney general at the request of the department.
  2. All criminal actions for violation of this act or any rules or regulations issued pursuant to this act shall be prosecuted by the attorney general or at his request and under his direction, by the district attorney for the county in which the prosecution is brought.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 17; C.S. 1945, § 54-117; W.S. 1957, § 27-38; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-118; Laws 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-610. Establishment of fee schedule and payment for certain services.

The department may charge a fee and require payment to recover the cost of services for photocopying, preparation of forms or other material in responding to inquiries to provide information not confidential by law, furnishing publications prepared by the department and any other services rendered by the department which are not directly related to the administration of this act. Such fees shall be deposited into the employment security administration account.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 222, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-611. Maintenance of records by department; procedures.

The department may maintain any or all of its records on a computer imaging system that maintains true and accurate copies or images of original documents. The department may destroy original documents after putting the documents in the computer imaging system. True and accurate copies generated by the computer imaging system shall be admissible in court or administrative hearings under the same conditions as the original document would be admissible.

History. Laws 1999, ch. 73, § 1.

Article 7. Penalties

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation §§ 223, 224.

§ 27-3-701. Financing of contributions or waiver of rights by employees.

No employer shall directly or indirectly make, require or accept any deduction from wages or payments by employees to finance contributions required by this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ] or require or accept any waiver of an employee’s right under this act. Any employer or his officer or agent violating this section shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), imprisoned for not more than six (6) months, or both. Each violation is a separate offense.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 15; C.S. 1945, § 54-115; W.S. 1957, § 27-36; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-116; Laws 1982, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 114, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-702. Obtaining benefits by fraud; disqualification of benefits; penalties.

  1. No person shall, for himself or any other person, knowingly make a false statement or misrepresentation or knowingly fail to disclose a material fact to obtain or increase benefits or other payments under this act or other state or federal law. Any person violating this section is guilty of:
    1. A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than ninety (90) days, or both, if the amount of benefits obtained in violation of this section is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00); or
    2. A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both, if the amount of benefits obtained under fraud is one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or greater.
  2. Upon conviction the court shall require the defendant to make restitution to the department in the amount of benefits or other payments improperly paid due to the defendant’s fraud. Each false statement, misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact is a separate offense. This section shall not preclude prosecution under any other applicable law.
  3. In addition to the penalties provided by this section, a person convicted under this section or any other applicable law shall be disqualified from receiving benefits in any week beginning within a two (2) year period immediately following conviction.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 16; 1941, ch. 96, § 14; C.S. 1945, § 54-116; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 10; W.S. 1957, § 27-37; Laws 1969, ch. 60, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-117; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1993, ch. 76, § 1; 2004, ch. 126, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in (a)(i) and (ii), substituted “one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)” for “five hundred dollars ($500.00).”

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

Cited in

Judge v. Dep't of Empl., 2002 WY 109, 50 P.3d 686, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Wyoming Criminal Code Revisited: Reflections after Fifteen Years,” see XXXIII Land and Water L. Rev. 523 (1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits, 80 ALR3d 1280.

§ 27-3-703. Fraud by employing unit; refusal to furnish reports; failure to make required payments; failure to comply with injunction order; penalties.

  1. No officer, agent or any other individual of an employing unit shall knowingly make a false statement or misrepresentation or knowingly fail to disclose a material fact with the intention of preventing or reducing the payment of benefits to any entitled individual, to avoid being subject to this act or to avoid or reduce any contribution or other payment required from an employing unit under this act, or willfully fail or refuse to make any contribution or other payment. Any such individual violating this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than ninety (90) days, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both. Each false statement, misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact is a separate offense.
  2. Any employing unit or if the employing unit is a corporation, any officer or director liable under W.S. 27-3-510(e), fraudulently failing to pay contributions required under this act for a period of two (2) or more consecutive calendar quarters or the total of which exceeds five hundred dollars ($500.00), is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.
  3. Any officer, agent or other individual of an employing unit who willfully refuses or fails to furnish any report or to produce or permit the inspection of records required by this act is guilty of a misdemeanor. Each day of any failure or refusal is a separate offense.
  4. Any employing unit failing to comply with a court order issued pursuant to W.S. 27-3-502(h), or any partner or corporate officer of the employing unit aiding or assisting the employing unit in not complying with the court order, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
  5. This section shall not preclude prosecution under any other applicable state law.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 16; 1941, ch. 96, § 14; C.S. 1945, § 54-116; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 10; W.S. 1957, § 27-37; Laws 1969, ch. 60, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-117; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1989, ch. 222, § 2; 1993, ch. 76, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-3-103 .

§ 27-3-704. General penalty.

Any person willfully violating this act or any order, rule or regulation under this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 ] for which no specific penalty is provided is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisoned not more than sixty (60) days, or both. Each day of violation is a separate offense.

History. Laws 1937, ch. 113, § 16; 1941, ch. 96, § 14; C.S. 1945, § 54-116; Laws 1957, ch. 88, § 10; W.S. 1957, § 27-37; Laws 1969, ch. 60, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1977, § 27-3-117; Laws 1983, ch. 114, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 2.

Cited in

Brock v. Wyo. ex rel. Wyo. Workforce Servs., Unemployment Ins. Div., 2017 WY 47, 394 P.3d 460, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 27-3-705. Improper filing of claims; penalties.

An individual who knowingly and with the intent to defraud allows or authorizes another person to sign the individual’s name or use his personal identification number to make or file a claim for benefits on the individual’s behalf is subject to the penalties prescribed in W.S. 27-3-311(e) and 27-3-702(a).

History. Laws 1999, ch. 73, § 1.

§ 27-3-706. Experience rating manipulation; penalties.

  1. A person who knowingly, or with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the true facts or the requirements of this act, violates or attempts to violate W.S. 27-3-507 or any other provision of this act related to determining the assignment of a contribution rate, or who knowingly advises another to violate the requirements of W.S. 27-3-507 or any other provision of this act related to determining the assignment of a contribution rate, shall be subject to the following penalties:
    1. A person who is an employer shall be assigned, for the rate year during which the noncompliance or misrepresentation occurred and for the following three (3) rate years, the highest rate assignable under W.S. 27-3-503 . If the person’s business is already at the highest rate for any year, or if the amount of increase in the person’s rate would be less than two percent (2%) for that year, then a penalty rate of two percent (2%) of taxable wages shall be imposed for that year. This penalty may exceed the maximum assignable rate;
    2. A person who is not an employer shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00). Funds received by the division under this paragraph shall be paid over to the state treasurer to be credited to the public school fund of the county in which the violation for which the penalty imposed occurred;
    3. In addition to the penalty imposed pursuant to paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this subsection, any violation or attempted violation of W.S. 27-3-507 or any other provision of this act related to determining the assignment of a contribution rate may be prosecuted as a felony punishable by a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both. The fine under this paragraph shall be paid over to the state treasurer to be credited to the public school fund of the county in which the violation for which the penalty imposed occurred.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 186, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2005, ch. 186, § 1, makes the act effective July 1, 2005.

Article 8. Short Time Compensation Program

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-801. Definitions.

  1. As used in this article:
    1. “Affected unit” means a specified plant, department, shift or other definable unit of an employer that includes two (2) or more employees to which an approved short time compensation plan applies;
    2. “Director” means the director of the department of workforce services or the director’s designee responsible for approving applications for participation in a short time compensation plan;
    3. “Health and retirement benefits” means employer provided health benefits and retirement benefits under a defined benefit pension plan as defined in section 414(j) of the Internal Revenue Code or contributions under a defined contribution plan defined in section 414(i) of the Internal Revenue Code that are incidents of employment in addition to the cash remuneration earned;
    4. “Short time compensation” means the unemployment benefits payable to employees in an affected unit under an approved short time compensation plan, as distinguished from the benefits otherwise payable under this act;
    5. “Short time compensation plan” means a plan submitted by an employer for approval by the director under which the employer requests the payment of short time compensation to employees in an affected unit of the employer to avert layoffs;
    6. “Unemployment compensation” means the benefits payable under this act other than short time compensation and includes any amounts payable pursuant to an agreement under any federal law providing for compensation, assistance or allowances with respect to unemployment;
    7. “Usual weekly hours of work” means the usual hours of work for full-time or part-time employees in the affected unit when that affected unit is operating on the unit’s regular basis, not to exceed forty (40) hours and not including hours of overtime work.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-802. Participation in the short time compensation program; director approval.

  1. An employer seeking to participate in the short time compensation program shall submit a signed written short time compensation plan in a form acceptable to the department for approval by the director. No plan shall be approved under this article unless the employer is in good standing with the department.
  2. The department shall develop an application form for an employer to request approval of a short time compensation plan and an approval process. The director may approve a short time compensation plan only if the plan:
    1. Describes the affected unit covered by the plan, including the number of full-time and part-time employees in the unit and the percentage of employees in the unit covered by the plan;
    2. Identifies each employee in the affected unit by name, social security number and any other information required by the director to identify the plan participants;
    3. Provides a description of how employees in the affected unit will be notified of the employer’s participation in the short time compensation plan, including how the employer will notify those employees in a collective bargaining unit as well as any employees in the affected unit who are not in a collective bargaining unit. If the employer is unable to provide advance notice to employees in the affected unit, the employer shall explain in the application why it is not feasible to provide the notice required under this paragraph;
    4. Identifies the usual weekly hours of work for the employer’s employees in the affected unit and the specific percentage by which the employees’ hours shall be reduced during all weeks covered by the plan. A short time compensation plan shall only be approved if the percentage by which the employees’ hours will be reduced is not less than ten percent (10%) and not more than sixty percent (60%). If the plan includes any week for which the employer regularly provides no work then the week shall be identified by the employer;
    5. Certifies that if the employer provides health and retirement benefits to any employee whose usual weekly hours of work are reduced under the short time compensation plan, the benefits will continue to be provided to employees participating in the short time compensation program under the same terms and conditions as though the usual weekly hours of work of such employee had not been reduced or to the same extent as other employees not participating in the short time compensation program. In addition, the following shall apply:
      1. For defined benefit retirement plans, the hours that are reduced under the short time compensation plan shall be credited for purposes of participation, vesting and accrual of benefits as though the usual weekly hours of work had not been reduced. The dollar amount of employer contributions to a defined contribution plan that are based on a percentage of compensation may be less due to the reduction in the employee’s compensation;
      2. A short time compensation plan may satisfy the certification requirement under this paragraph when a reduction in health and retirement benefits scheduled to occur during the duration of the plan will be applicable equally to employees who are not participating in the short time compensation program and to those employees who are participating.
    6. Certifies that the aggregate reduction in work hours is in lieu of layoffs. The plan shall include an estimate of the number of employees who would have been laid off in the absence of the short time compensation plan;
    7. Certifies that the employer agrees to furnish reports to the department relating to the administration of the plan and authorizes the department to access all records necessary for the director to assess a short time compensation plan for approval and to monitor and evaluate the administration of the plan. The employer shall also agree to follow any other directives necessary for the department to implement the plan and which are consistent with the requirements of this article;
    8. Certifies that the employer’s participation in the short time compensation plan and the plan’s implementation are consistent with the employer’s obligations under applicable federal and state laws;
    9. Certifies that the plan shall expire not later than the end of the twelfth full calendar month after the effective date of the plan;
    10. Satisfies any other requirements specified by the department that the United States secretary of labor determines to be appropriate for purposes of a short time compensation program.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-803. Approval of a short time compensation plan.

The director shall approve or deny a short time compensation plan submitted by an employer within thirty (30) days of receipt of the plan and promptly notify the employer of the decision. A decision denying a plan shall clearly identify the reasons for the denial. The director’s decision shall be final. An employer whose plan is not approved shall be allowed to submit another short time compensation plan for approval in accordance with rules specified by the commission.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-804. Effective date and duration of the short time compensation plan.

  1. An approved short time compensation plan shall be effective on the date that is mutually agreed upon by the employer and the director. The plan shall expire at the end of the twelfth full calendar month after the plan’s effective date or an earlier date proposed in the approved short time compensation plan. The effective date and expiration date of an approved plan shall be specified in a notice of approval provided to the employer by the department.
  2. If a short time compensation plan is revoked by the director under W.S. 27-3-806 , the plan shall terminate on the date specified in the director’s written order of revocation.
  3. An employer may terminate a short time compensation plan at any time upon written notice to the director as specified by rule of the commission. Upon receipt of such notice from the employer, the director shall promptly notify each employee of the affected unit of the termination date. An employer may submit a new application to participate in another short time compensation plan at any time after the expiration or termination of a previous plan.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-805. Modification of an approved short time compensation plan.

  1. An employer may request a substantial modification of an approved short time compensation plan by submitting a written request to the department. The request shall specify the proposed provisions to be modified and explain why the modification is appropriate. Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the director shall approve or deny in writing the proposed modification within twenty (20) days of receipt and promptly notify the employer.
  2. The director may approve a substantial modification request under subsection (a) of this section based on conditions that have changed since the short time compensation plan was originally approved provided that the modification is consistent with and supports the purposes for which the plan was initially approved. A modification shall not extend the expiration date of the original plan. If the director approves a substantial plan modification request, the effective date of the modification shall be included in the notice provided to the employer.
  3. An insubstantial plan modification shall not require director approval but the employer shall promptly report every change to the plan in writing to the director. If the director determines that the reported change is substantial, the department shall require the employer to submit a substantial plan modification request. The director may revoke an employer’s plan if the employer fails to meet the reporting requirement under this subsection.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-806. Revocation of short time compensation plan approval.

  1. The director may revoke approval of a short time compensation plan for good cause at any time including upon the request of any of the affected unit’s employees. Good cause shall include an employer’s failure to comply with the assurances and certifications given in the employer’s plan under W.S. 27-3-802 , unreasonable revision of productivity standards for an affected unit, conduct or occurrences tending to defeat the intent and effective operation of the short time compensation plan and violation of any criteria on which approval of the plan was based.
  2. Any revocation by the director of a short time compensation plan shall be provided to the employer in writing and shall specify the reasons for the revocation and the date the revocation is effective. A revocation under this section shall be subject to review under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.
  3. The department may periodically review the operation of short time compensation plans to assure that no good cause exists for revocation of approved plans.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-807. Eligibility for short time compensation benefits.

  1. An employee shall only be eligible to receive short time compensation with respect to any week if:
    1. The employee is monetarily eligible for unemployment compensation;
    2. The employee is not otherwise disqualified for unemployment compensation;
    3. During that week, the employee is employed as a member of an affected unit under an approved short time compensation plan that was approved prior to that week and the plan is in effect with respect to the week for which short time compensation is claimed.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this act relating to an employee’s availability for work and actively seeking work, the employee is eligible to receive shared work benefits for a week in which the employee is able to work and is available for additional hours of work or for full-time work with the employee’s short time compensation employer. Participating in training as approved by the department to enhance job skills or participating in employer-sponsored training or training funded under the federal Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act shall satisfy the requirements of this section.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an employee covered by a short time compensation plan is deemed unemployed in any week during the duration of such plan if the employee’s remuneration is reduced based on a reduction of the employee’s usual weekly hours of work under an approved short time compensation plan.
  4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an eligible employee shall not be denied short time compensation benefits because of any provision of this act that provides requirements concerning:
    1. Availability for work;
    2. Actively searching for work;
    3. Any refusal to apply for or accept work with an employer other than the participating employer whose plan is approved under this article.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-808. Benefits.

  1. The short time compensation weekly benefit amount available to employees under an approved plan shall be the product of the employee’s regular weekly unemployment compensation amount for a week of total unemployment multiplied by the percentage of reduction in the employee’s usual weekly hours of work.
  2. An employee may be eligible for short time compensation or unemployment compensation except no employee shall be:
    1. Eligible for combined benefits in any benefit year in an amount more than the maximum entitlement established for regular unemployment compensation;
    2. Paid short time compensation benefits for more than fifty-two (52) weeks under a short time compensation plan.
  3. The short time compensation paid to an employee shall be deducted from the maximum entitlement amount of regular unemployment compensation established for that employee’s benefit year.
  4. Provisions applicable to unemployment compensation claimants under this act shall apply to short time compensation claimants to the extent that they are not inconsistent with W.S. 27-3-801 through 27-3-810 . The department shall issue a monetary determination to any employee who files an initial claim for short time compensation benefits.
  5. Employees who work in an affected unit of a short time compensation employer and another employer during weeks covered by the approved short time compensation plan shall be subject to the following:
    1. If the combined hours of work in a week for both employers do not result in a reduction of at least ten percent (10%) of the usual weekly hours of work with the short time employer, the employee shall not be entitled to benefits under the short time compensation plan;
    2. If the combined hours of work for both employers results in a reduction equal to or greater than ten percent (10%) of the usual weekly hours of work for the short time compensation employer, the short time compensation benefit amount payable to the employee shall be reduced for that week in an amount determined by multiplying the weekly unemployment benefit amount for a week of total unemployment by the percentage by which the combined hours of work have been reduced by ten percent (10%) or more of the employee’s usual weekly hours of work. A week for which benefits are paid under this paragraph shall be reported as a week of short time compensation;
    3. If an employee worked the reduced percentage of the usual weekly hours of work for the short time compensation employer and is available for all his usual hours of work with the short time compensation employer and the employee did not work any hours for the other employer either because of the lack of work with that employer or because the employee is excused from work with the other employer, the employee shall be eligible for short time compensation for that week. The benefit amount for such week shall be calculated as provided in subsection (a) of this section.
  6. An employee who is not provided any work during a week by the short time compensation employer or any other employer and who is otherwise eligible for unemployment compensation shall be eligible for the amount of regular unemployment compensation to which they would otherwise be eligible.
  7. An employee who is not provided any work by the short time compensation employer during a week but who works for another employer and is otherwise eligible may be paid unemployment compensation for that week subject to the disqualifying income and other provisions applicable to claims for regular unemployment compensation.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-809. Charging short time compensation benefits.

Short time compensation shall be charged to employers’ experience rating accounts in the same manner as unemployment compensation is charged under this act. The department may relieve an employer of charges or not require reimbursement for short time compensation benefits if the benefits are subject to one hundred percent (100%) reimbursement by the federal government or as otherwise specified by law.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-810. Extended benefits.

An employee who has received all of the short time compensation or combined unemployment compensation and short time compensation available in a benefit year shall be considered an exhaustee for purposes of extended benefits as provided under W.S. 27-3-315 and if otherwise eligible under those provisions shall be eligible to receive extended benefits.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

§ 27-3-811. Reporting requirements.

Not later than November 1 of each year until November 1, 2026, the department shall report to the joint appropriations committee on the short time compensation program established pursuant to this article. The report shall describe the administration of the short time compensation program, the number of employers participating in the program and the amount of funds that have been expended by the department on the program.

History. 2021 ch. 20, § 1, effective February 9, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 20, § 6, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved February 9, 2021.

Chapter 4 Wages

Cross references. —

As to definition of “wage,” in connection with unemployment compensation, see § 27-3-102 .

As to salaries of state officers and employees and as to limitation on salaries not fixed by statute, see § 9-3-101 et seq.

For salary provisions applying to the various forms of cities, see §§ 15-3-205 , 15-4-105 and 15-4-202 .

As to maximum and minimum salaries for firemen and policemen, see § 15-5-106 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment §§ 77 to 118; 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations §§ 2561 to 2608.

Portal-to-Portal Act, 3 ALR2d 1097, 21 ALR2d 1327, Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 ALR Fed 607.

Running of statute of limitations against claim for services rendered over extended period under indefinite employment not fixing time of payment, 7 ALR2d 198.

What constitutes change of position by payee-servant so as to preclude recovery of payment made under mistake, 40 ALR2d 997.

Construction of “net profits,” “earnings” or the like, in provision for profit-sharing bonus of corporate employees, 49 ALR2d 1129.

Employee's right with respect to compensation where he continues in employer's service after termination of contract for definite term, 53 ALR2d 384.

Recovery back by employer of compensation paid to employee as result of mistake or the employee's fraud, 88 ALR2d 1437.

Garnishment of salary, wages or commissions where defendant debtor is indebted to garnishee-employer, 93 ALR2d 995.

Personal liability of servant or agent for advances or withdrawals in excess of commissions earned, bonus or share of profits, 32 ALR3d 802.

Rights and obligations under employer-employee suggestion plans, 40 ALR3d 1416.

Modern status as to duration of employment where contract specifies no term but fixes daily or longer compensation, 93 ALR3d 659.

Sufficiency of notice of modification in terms of compensation of at-will employee who continues performance to bind employee, 69 ALR4th 1145.

What contracts are subject to wage and hour requirements of Walsh-Healey Act (41 USC sec. 35), 2 ALR Fed 637.

Statute designed to prevent discrimination between male and female employees as regards wages, 7 ALR Fed 707.

Liquidated damages for violation of wage and hour provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 ALR Fed 607.

Determination of exempt status under overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USC §§ 207(a)(1), 213(a)(1)), of managerial employees who performed nonexempt work during strike, 60 ALR Fed 250.

Employee's protection under § 15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USC § 215(a)(3)), 101 ALR Fed 220.

30 C.J.S. Employer — Employee Relationship §§ 132 to 180.

Article 1. In General

§ 27-4-101. Semimonthly payments required; method of payment; agricultural operations exempt; payment in case of labor dispute or temporary layoff.

  1. Every person, firm or corporation, engaged in the operation of any railroad, mine, refinery, and work incidental to prospecting for, or the production of, oil and gas, or other factory, mill or workshop, within the state of Wyoming, shall, on or before the first day of each month, pay their employees the wages earned by them during the first half of the preceding month ending with the fifteenth day of the month, and on or before the fifteenth day of each month pay their employees the wages earned by them during the last half of the preceding month; provided, however, that if at any time of payment any employee shall be absent from his or her regular place of labor, and shall not receive his or her wages, at that time due and owing, through a duly authorized representative, he or she shall be entitled to payment at any time thereafter upon demand on the proper paymaster or at the place where wages are usually paid; provided, further, that if the first or the fifteenth of the month occurs on a day which is not a working day, that the last preceding working day shall be the payday, for all personnel who are regularly paid at one (1) location, provided, every employer shall establish and maintain regular paydays as herein provided and shall post and maintain copies of this law printed in plain type in at least two (2) conspicuous places where the notices can be seen by the employees.
  2. Every employer shall, at the time of each payment of wages, furnish each of his employees with a detachable part of the check, draft or voucher, paying the employees’ wages, giving an itemized statement in writing showing all deductions made from such wages. If the employer does not make his payroll payments in the aforementioned manner, then he shall provide such itemized statement on a slip attached to such payment. Nothing in W.S. 27-4-101 through 27-4-103 shall be construed to prohibit an employer from depositing wages due or to become due or an advance on wages to be earned, in an account in any bank, savings and loan association, credit union or other financial institution authorized by the United States or one (1) of the several states to receive deposits in the United States if the employee has voluntarily authorized such deposit.
  3. Agricultural operations shall be exempt from the provisions provided herein.
  4. When work of any employee is suspended as a result of a labor dispute, or when an employee for any reason whatsoever is temporarily laid off, the employer shall pay in full to such employee on the next regular payday, either through the regular pay channels or by mail if requested by the employee, wages earned to the time of suspension or layoff.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 73, § 1; C.S. 1920, § 4310; Laws 1923, ch. 36, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 63-114; C.S. 1945, § 54-601; Laws 1953, ch. 135, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-192; Laws 1959, ch. 183, § 1; 1973, ch. 99, § 1; 1975, ch. 100, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, § 1.

Cited in

Diamond B Servs. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 130, 120 P.3d 1031, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (2005).

§ 27-4-102. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1923, ch. 36, § 2, required semimonthly payment except on agreement of the parties.

§ 27-4-103. Semimonthly payments required; penalty.

Every person violating any of the provisions of this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than six (6) months, or by both fine and imprisonment.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 36, § 3; R.S. 1931, § 63-116; C.S. 1945, § 54-603; W.S. 1957, § 27-194; Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 1.

Repealing clauses. —

Section 4, ch. 36, Laws 1923, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith.

§ 27-4-104. Payment of employee quitting or discharged and suit for wages; generally.

  1. Whenever an employee quits service or is discharged, the employee shall be paid whatever wages are due him in lawful money of the United States of America, or by check or draft which can be cashed at a bank, no later than the employer’s usual practice on regularly scheduled payroll dates or at a time specified under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the employee. The employer may offset from any monies due the employee as wages, any sums due the employer from the employee which have been incurred by the employee during his employment. This section does not apply to the earnings of a sales agent employed on a commission basis and having custody of accounts, money or goods of his principal where the net amount due the agent may not be determinable except after an audit or verification of sales, accounts, funds or stocks.
  2. Whenever an employee who has quit, has been discharged from service, or because of action taken by the employer is prevented from working has cause to bring suit for wages earned and due, and shall establish in court the amount which is justly due, the court shall allow to the plaintiff interest on the past due wages at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date of discharge or termination or from the date when unpaid wages are required to be paid as specified in this act, together with a reasonable attorney fee and all costs of suit. Prosecution of a civil action to recover unpaid wages does not preclude prosecution under W.S. 27-4-105 .

History. Laws 1919, ch. 73, § 2; C.S. 1920, § 4311; R.S. 1931, § 63-125; Laws 1945, ch. 26, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 54-604; Laws 1947, ch. 35, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-195; Laws 1967, ch. 88, § 1; Laws 1981, ch. 137, § 1; 1990, ch. 71, § 1; 2015 ch. 129, § 1, effective March 4, 2015; 2017 ch. 11, § 1, effective February 14, 2017; 2020 ch. 140, § 1, effective March 24, 2020.

Cross references. —

As to collection of unpaid wages generally, see art. 5 of this chapter.

The 2015 amendment, in the second sentence in (a), substituted “no later than the employer's usual practice on regularly scheduled payroll dates” for “within five (5) working days of the date of termination of employment.”

Laws 2015, ch. 129, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 4, 2015.

The 2017 amendment, in (a), added “or at a time specified under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the employee.”

Laws 2017, ch. 11, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved Feb. 14, 2017.

The 2020 amendment, in (b), substituted a comma for “or,” added “, or because of action taken by the employer is prevented from working” in the beginning and added “or from the date when unpaid wages are required to be paid as specified in this act” at the end of the first sentence.

Laws 2020, ch. 140, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2020.

Construction. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-4-507 and 27-4-104(b), read in pari materia, synthesize the common purpose and intent regarding collection of unpaid wages; pursuant to § 27-4-507 an employer must fully pay the wages provided by contract, and pursuant to 27-4-104(b) an employee who establishes the amount of unpaid wages justly due is entitled to 18 percent interest, attorney fees, and all costs of suit. Jensen v. Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 2002 WY 173, 58 P.3d 322, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2002).

Since the legislature specifically directs the Wyoming Department of Employment to take claims under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-104 and does not limit its authority to subsection (a), the Department is authorized to make awards under subsection (b), as well. Diamond B Servs. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 130, 120 P.3d 1031, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. Nov. 2, 2005).

Unpaid wages due. —

Wyoming Department of Employment's grant to a former employee his claim for unpaid wages under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-4-507(b) and § 27-4-104(b), was proper because under he was an employee under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-501(a)(ii) as opposed to an independent contractor; there was no written contract, the employee did not bill the employer for his services, and the employer withheld tax deductions from employee's paychecks. Diamond B Servs. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 130, 120 P.3d 1031, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. Nov. 2, 2005).

Employer not entitled to offsets. —

In a former employee's claim for unpaid wages, the employer was not entitled to offsets under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-104(a) because fuel purchased by the employee with the employer's credit card could not have been purchased on the basis that it was required for employment if the employer insisted it did not authorize the purchase; the payoff of the employee's truck was made prior to the employer incorporating and thus the employment was with a different company at that time; and the employer's supplying the employee with license plates and auto parts did not constitute cash advances. Diamond B Servs. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 130, 120 P.3d 1031, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. Nov. 2, 2005).

Attorneys' fees are recoverable if there is specific statutory authority therefor. Schaefer v. Lampert Lumber Co., 591 P.2d 1225, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 382 (Wyo. 1979).

Relocation expenses deemed “wages.” —

The trial court did not err in awarding attorney's fees on the basis of the statutory construction that relocation expenses are a kind of employee benefit; the term “wages” as used within this section is the same as “wages” defined in § 27-4-501(a)(iii) and the defendant's reliance on the restrictive definition of “wages” in § 27-4-201(a)(i) was misplaced and not applicable to the situation. NL Indus. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1989).

No attorney fees for contract damages. —

Contract damages that the employee was seeking such as damages related to losses on the sale of the employee's homes and moving expenses after the employee resigned, did not qualify as wages in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-4-104 , and because it was pure speculation to consider that the contract damages awarded in the employee's favor were exclusively wages covered under § 27-4-104 , the employee was not entitled to an award of attorney fees. Jensen v. Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 2002 WY 173, 58 P.3d 322, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2002).

No attorney fees to defend separate suit. —

Where an employee filed a relocation claim, and where the employer undertook a litigative resolution by filing a Texas declaratory judgment action, the employee could not obtain attorney fees for the Texas proceeding, since this section does not include legal fees for the defense of a proceeding brought as a separate suit where the employee is a responding defendant. NL Indus. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1989).

Employee held not allowed to recover attorney's fees. —

See Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1984).

Interest not available where damages unliquidated. —

Where employee was awarded damages pursuant to employee's breach of employment contract cross-claim, the amount to which interest could be applied could not be calculated with a simple mathematical calculation; therefore, the claim of the employee was unliquidated because uncertainty still existed as to the exact amount of wages past due, and it was not an abuse of discretion to deny an award of interest to the employee in those circumstances. Jensen v. Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 2002 WY 173, 58 P.3d 322, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2002).

Quoted in

McNeill v. Park County School Dist. No. 1, McNeill v. Park County Sch. Dist., 635 P.2d 818, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 389 (Wyo. 1981)Mueller v. Zimmer, 2007 WY 195, 173 P.3d 361, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Dec. 11, 2007).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity, construction, and effect of state laws requiring payment of wages on discharge of employee immediately or within specified period, 18 ALR5th 577.

§ 27-4-105. Payment of employee quitting or discharged and suit for wages; penalty.

Every person, firm or corporation willfully violating any of the provisions of W.S. 27-4-104 is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500.00) nor more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) for each offense.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 73, § 3; C.S. 1920, § 4312; R.S. 1931, § 63-126; C.S. 1945, § 54-605; W.S. 1957, § 27-196; Laws 1981, ch. 173, § 1; 1990, ch. 71, § 1.

Repealing clauses. —

Section 4, ch. 73, Laws 1919, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith.

Quoted in

McNeill v. Park County School Dist. No. 1, McNeill v. Park County Sch. Dist., 635 P.2d 818, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 389 (Wyo. 1981).

Cited in

NL Indus., Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1989).

§ 27-4-106. Assignment of certain accounts and prosecution of certain suits prohibited; generally.

It is hereby declared unlawful for any creditor or other holder of any evidence of debt, book account, or claim of any name or nature against any laborer, servant, clerk or other employee of any corporation, firm or individual in this state for the purpose below stated, to sell, assign, transfer, or by any means dispose of any such claim, book account, bill or debt of any name or nature whatever, to any person or persons, firm, corporation or institution, or to institute elsewhere than in this state or prosecute any suit or action for any such claim or debt against any such laborer, servant, clerk or employee, by any process seeking to seize, attach or garnish the wages of such person or persons earned within sixty (60) days prior to the commencement of such proceedings for the purpose of avoiding the effect of the laws of the state of Wyoming concerning exemptions.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 47, § 1; R.S. 1899, § 2516; C.S. 1910, § 3424; C.S. 1920, § 4300; R.S. 1931, § 63-119; C.S. 1945, § 54-606; W.S. 1957, § 27-197.

§ 27-4-107. Assignment of certain accounts and prosecution of certain suits prohibited; aiding violation deemed unlawful.

It is hereby declared unlawful for any person or persons to aid, assist, abet or counsel a violation of W.S. 27-4-106 for any purpose whatever.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 47, § 2; R.S. 1899, § 2517; C.S. 1910, § 3425; C.S. 1920, § 4301; R.S. 1931, § 63-120; C.S. 1945, § 54-607; W.S. 1957, § 27-198.

§ 27-4-108. Assignment of certain accounts and prosecution of certain suits prohibited; prima facie evidence.

In any proceeding, civil or criminal, growing out of a breach of W.S. 27-4-106 and 27-4-107 , proof of the institution of a suit or service of garnishment summons by any persons, firm or individual in any court of any state or territory other than this state, to seize by process of garnishment or otherwise, any of the wages of such persons as defined in section 1 of this act [§ 27-4-106 ] shall be deemed prima facie evidence of an evasion of the laws of the state of Wyoming, and a breach of the provisions of W.S. 27-4-106 through 27-4-109 on the part of the creditor or resident in Wyoming causing the same to be done.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 47, § 3; R.S. 1899, § 2518; C.S. 1910, § 3426; C.S. 1920, § 4302; R.S. 1931, § 63-121; C.S. 1945, § 54-608; W.S. 1957, § 27-199.

§ 27-4-109. Assignment of certain accounts and prosecution of certain suits prohibited; liability and penalty for unlawful assignment.

Any person, firm, company, corporation, or business institution guilty of a violation of W.S. 27-4-106 and 27-4-107 shall be liable to the party so injured for the amount of the debt sold, assigned, transferred, garnisheed, or sued upon, with all costs and expenses, and a reasonable attorney’s fee to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state, and shall further be liable by prosecution to punishment by a fine not exceeding the sum of one hundred dollars ($100.00) and costs of prosecution.

History. Laws 1895, ch. 47, § 4; R.S. 1899, § 2519; C.S. 1910, § 3427; C.S. 1920, § 4303; R.S. 1931, § 63-122; C.S. 1945, § 54-609; W.S. 1957, § 27-200.

§ 27-4-110. Assignments of wages; acceptance by employer; filing.

No assignment of, or order for, wages to be earned in the future to secure a loan of less than two hundred dollars ($200.00) shall be valid against an employer of the person making said assignment or order until said assignment or order is accepted in writing by the employer, and said assignment or order and the acceptance of the same have been filed and recorded with the clerk of the city or town where the party making said assignment or order resides, if a resident of this state, or in which he is employed, if not a resident of the commonwealth.

History. Laws 1909, ch. 120, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 3432; C.S. 1920, § 4349; R.S. 1931, § 8-101; C.S. 1945, § 54-610; W.S. 1957, § 27-201.

Cross references. —

For section providing that assignment of unemployment compensation benefits shall be void, see § 27-3-319 .

As to assignment of claims for unpaid wages to the commissioner of labor and statistics for collection, see §§ 27-4-502 and 27-4-504 .

§ 27-4-111. Assignments of wages; consent of marital spouse required.

No assignment of or order for, wages to be earned in the future shall be valid, when made by a married individual, unless the written consent of the spouse to the assignment is attached thereto.

History. Laws 1909, ch. 120, § 2; C.S. 1910, § 3433; C.S. 1920, § 4350; R.S. 1931, § 8-102; C.S. 1945, § 54-611; W.S. 1957, § 27-202; 2001, ch. 162, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to rights and liabilities of married persons generally, see §§ 20-1-201 and 20-1-202 .

§ 27-4-112. Assignments of wages; certain banks exempt from assignment provisions.

National banks and all banking institutions which are under the supervision of the bank examiner shall be exempt from the provisions of this act [§§ 27-4-110 through 27-4-112 ].

History. Laws 1909, ch. 120, § 3; C.S. 1910, § 3434; C.S. 1920, § 4351; R.S. 1931, § 8-103; C.S. 1945, § 54-612; W.S. 1957, § 27-203.

Repealing clauses. —

Section 4, ch. 120, Laws 1909, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith.

§ 27-4-113. Contracts for alien labor; when unenforceable.

No contract made for labor or services with any alien or foreigner previous to the time that such alien or foreigner may come into the state shall be enforced within this state for any period after six (6) months from the date of such contract.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 37, § 1; R.S. 1887, § 1075; R.S. 1899, § 2520; C.S. 1910, § 3428; C.S. 1920, § 4304; R.S. 1931, § 63-117; C.S. 1945, § 54-613; W.S. 1957, § 27-204.

Cross references. —

For constitutional provision relative to rights of aliens, see art. 1, § 29, Wyo. Const.

For provision that no person not a citizen of the United States, or who has not declared his intention to become such, shall be employed in connection with public works, see art. 19, § 3, Wyo. Const.

§ 27-4-114. Contracts for alien labor; measure of recovery; defenses.

Any alien or foreigner who shall hereafter perform labor or services for any person or persons, company or corporation within this state, shall be entitled to recover from such person or persons, company or corporation, a reasonable compensation for such labor or services, notwithstanding such person or persons, company or corporation may have paid any other party or parties for the same; and in actions for the price of such labor or services, no defense shall be admitted to the effect that the defendant or defendants had contracted with other parties who had, or pretended to have, power or authority to hire out the labor or services of such party or parties, or to receive the pay or price for such labor or services.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 37, § 2; R.S. 1887, § 1076; R.S. 1899, § 2521; C.S. 1910, § 3429; C.S. 1920, § 4305; R.S. 1931, § 63-118; C.S. 1945, § 54-614; W.S. 1957, § 27-205.

§ 27-4-115. Contracts for alien labor; third party receiving pay for alien's labor prohibited.

Any person, whether he or she acts for himself or herself, or as agent, attorney or employee for another or others, who shall, in pursuance of, or by virtue of, any contract made with any alien or foreigner, made before such alien or foreigner came into this state, receive or offer to receive any money, pay or remuneration for the labor or services of any alien or foreigner, excepting the person so performing such labor or services, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined in a sum not less than five hundred dollars ($500.00), and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), and imprisoned in the county jail for not less than three (3) nor more than twelve (12) months, for each and every offense.

History. C.L. 1876, ch. 37, § 3; R.S. 1887, § 1077; R.S. 1899, § 5125; C.S. 1910, § 5976; C.S. 1920, § 7272; R.S. 1931, § 32-822; C.S. 1945, § 54-615; W.S. 1957, § 27-206.

§ 27-4-116. Employee not liable for dishonored check; penalty.

  1. No employer shall withhold money from an employee’s wages for accepting a check on behalf of the employer which is not paid because the check is dishonored unless:
    1. The employer has provided written instructions as to procedures for accepting checks and the employee fails to follow the procedures; or
    2. The employer reasonably believes that the employee has been a party to a fraud or other wrongdoing in taking a dishonored check.
  2. Every employer who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00).

History. Laws 1989, ch. 143, § 1.

Article 2. Minimum Wages

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations §§ 2553 to 2591.

Employee training time as exempt from minimum wage and overtime requirements of Fair Labor Standards Act, 80 ALR Fed 246.

What constitutes “amusement or recreational establishment” within meaning of seasonal amusement exemption from Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USC § 213(a)(3)), 88 ALR Fed 880.

30 C.J.S. Employer - Employee Relationship §§ 132 to 180; 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue §§ 12, 362.

§ 27-4-201. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act [§§ 27-4-201 through 27-4-204 ]:
    1. “Wage” means compensation due to an employee by reason of his employment;
    2. “Employ” includes to suffer or to permit to work;
    3. “Employer” includes any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee;
    4. “Employee” includes any individual employed by an employer but shall not include:
      1. Any individual employed in agriculture;
      2. Any individual employed in domestic service in or about a private home;
      3. Any individual employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity;
      4. Any individual employed by the United States, or by the state or any political subdivision thereof;
      5. Any individual engaged in the activities of an educational, charitable, religious, or nonprofit organization where the employer-employee relationship does not, in fact, exist or where the services rendered to such organization are on a voluntary basis;
      6. Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 1, § 2.
      7. Any individual employed as an outside salesman whose compensation is solely commission on sales;
      8. Any individual whose employment is driving an ambulance or other vehicle from time to time as necessity requires but who is on call at any time;
      9. Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 1, § 2.
    5. In this act, “shall” is used in an imperative sense and “may” is used in a permissive sense;
    6. “Occupation” means any occupation, service, trade, business, industry, or branch or group of industries or employment or class of employment in which individuals are gainfully employed.

History. Laws 1955, ch. 121, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-207; Laws 1971, ch. 201, § 1; 2001, ch. 1, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subparagraph (a)(iv)(I) or subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Section is of similar import to Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062, as amended, 29 USCS § 206, and, therefore, the pronouncements of federal courts when construing and applying the congressional act merit careful attention. Padilla v. Henning Hotel Co., 78 Wyo. 144, 319 P.2d 874, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1958).

Employees whose hours not controlled cannot claim minimum hourly wage. —

Where the employee is not directed or controlled by an employer who prescribes the hours of work, their number, or the manner or nature of services required, it would offend reason to hold such employees may say they worked 24 hours or any other excessive number of hours each day and then claim a minimum per hour wage. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Trial court's award of “wages” held not to mean Wage-Hour Law applied. —

Although the trial court termed its allowance as “wages,” that terminology does not necessarily mean that the amount awarded was computed on the basis of hourly wage, or that the nature of the employment was in a capacity covered by the Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Tips as wages. —

In the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, tips are not wages. Padilla v. Henning Hotel Co., 78 Wyo. 144, 319 P.2d 874, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1958).

A contract entered into prior to the effective date of the statute and not made in contemplation thereof, stating that the employee would receive “the stipulated monthly salary, plus such tips as the employee might receive from others,” did not make tips a part of the wages required to be paid by the statute. Padilla v. Henning Hotel Co., 78 Wyo. 144, 319 P.2d 874, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1958).

Employees held to be administrators or executives. —

The fact that accounting was made to the employers of receipts and disbursements does not alter the fact that the employees' management and operation of the business was administrative and, in part at least, executive, in that they had exercised powers of decision — when to work, how to work — and many other related activities. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1963).

Cited in

NL Indus., Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1989).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of minimum wage statutes relating to private employment, 30 ALR2d 1219.

Delegation of judicial power by minimum wage statutes relating to private employment, 39 ALR2d 756.

Who is employed in “professional capacity” within exemption, under 29 USC § 213(a)(1), from minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 77 ALR Fed 681.

Employer's duty to furnish wage information to employees' representative under National Labor Relations Act, 112 ALR Fed 81.

Who is employed in “executive capacity” within exemption, under 29 USCS § 213(A)(1), from minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USCS §§ 201 et seq.), 131 ALR Fed 1.

What constitutes “preschool” for purposes of § 3(S)(1)(B) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USCS § 203(S)(1)(B)), providing that preschools are subject to wage and hour provisions of act, 131 ALR Fed 207.

Who is “employee employed in agriculture” and therefore exempt from overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act by § 13 (b)(12) of Act (29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12)), 162 ALR Fed 575.

Validity and construction of domestic service provisions of fair labor standards act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.), 165 ALR Fed 163.

§ 27-4-202. Minimum wage rates.

  1. Every employer shall pay to each of his or her employees wages at a rate of not less than five dollars and fifteen cents ($5.15) per hour.
  2. Effective April 1, 2001 and thereafter, all employers who employ tipped employees shall not pay less than two dollars and thirteen cents ($2.13) per hour to his tipped employees. Provided further, if the wage paid by the employer combined with the tips received by the employee during a given pay period does not equal at least the applicable minimum wage as prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, the employer shall pay the difference to the tipped employee. For the purposes of this act, all “tip” employees shall furnish monthly to their respective employers the daily record of tips required to be kept by “tip” employees under the laws of the United States and upon the forms prescribed by the internal revenue service of the United States treasury department. The daily record of tips shall constitute prima facie proof of the amount of tips received by the employee. Proof of a customary tipping percentage of sales or service shall also be an admissible form of proof of the amount of tips. A “tip” employee is one who customarily and regularly receives more than thirty dollars ($30.00) a month in tips.
  3. In lieu of the rate prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, any employer may pay any employee who has not attained the age of twenty (20) years a wage which is not less than four dollars and twenty-five cents ($4.25) per hour during the first ninety (90) consecutive days after the employee is initially employed by the employer. No employer may take any action to displace employees, including partial displacements such as reduction in hours, wages or employment benefits for purposes of hiring individuals at the wage authorized in this subsection.

History. Laws 1955, ch. 121, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-208; Laws 1965, ch. 97, § 1; 1967, ch. 164, § 1; 1971, ch. 201, § 2; 2001, ch. 1, § 1.

Cross references. —

For section declaring it unlawful for an employer to pay wages lower than that agreed upon with employee, or to fail to pay fringe benefits agreed upon, see § 27-4-507 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Who is executive, administrator, supervisor or the like, under exemption for such employees from state minimum wage and overtime pay statutes, 85 ALR4th 519.

§ 27-4-203. Record of work of employees required.

Every employer subject to this act [§§ 27-4-201 through 27-4-204 ] shall make, and keep for a period of not less than two (2) years in or about the premises wherein any employee is employed, a record of the name, address and occupation of each of his employees, the rate of pay, and the amount paid each pay period to each such employee, the hours worked each day and each work week by such employee.

History. Laws 1955, ch. 121, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-209.

§ 27-4-204. Liability for unpaid minimum wage; suit for collection.

  1. Any employer who shall pay to any employee wages at a rate less than that prescribed in the foregoing section [§ 27-4-202 ] shall be liable in a civil action, to the employee in the amount of his or her unpaid minimum wage, and the aggrieved employee may bring a civil action for enforcement of this act [§§ 27-4-201 through 27-4-204 ] and the recovery of his or her unpaid wages together with reasonable attorney fees and the costs of the action.
  2. and (c) Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 71, § 2.

History. Laws 1955, ch. 121, § 4; 1957, ch. 139, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-210; Laws 1965, ch. 97, § 2; 1967, ch. 164, § 2; 1971, ch. 201, § 3; 1981, Sp. Sess., ch. 22, § 1; 1990, ch. 71, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to assignment of claim to commissioner for collection, see § 27-4-504 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Employer's duty to furnish wage information to employees' representative under National Labor Relations Act, 112 ALR Fed 81.

Article 3. Equal Pay

Cross references. —

As to employment of women and children generally, see chapter 6 of this title.

For constitutional provisions granting equal political rights to both males and females, see art. 1, § 3 and art. 6, § 1, Wyo. Const.

§ 27-4-301. Definitions.

  1. “Employee” means any individual employed by an employer.
  2. “Employer” includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.
  3. “Employ” includes to suffer or permit to work.
  4. “Occupation” includes any industry, trade, business or branch thereof, or any employment or class of employment.
  5. “Director” means the director of the department of workforce services or his designee who is authorized to administer W.S. 27-4-301 through 27-4-304 .
  6. “Person” includes one (1) or more individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy or receivers.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 150, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.1; Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (e).

§ 27-4-302. Prohibition on paying employees less for same work.

  1. No employer shall discriminate, within the same establishment in which the employees are employed, between employees on the basis of gender by paying wages to employees at a rate less than the rate at which the employer pays wages to employees of the opposite gender for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where the payment is made pursuant to:
    1. A seniority system;
    2. A merit system;
    3. A system which measures earning by quantity or quality of production; or
    4. A differential based on any other factor other than gender.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 150, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.2; Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Wage differentials as violative of those provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.), which prohibit sex discrimination in employment, 62 ALR Fed 33.

§ 27-4-303. Liability of employer generally; liquidated damages; individual and group actions; assignment of claim.

  1. An employer who violates the provisions of W.S. 27-4-302 shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid wages, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one (1) or more employees for and in behalf of the employee or the employees and other employees similarly situated, and no agreement by the employee to work for less than the wage to which the employee is entitled under this act shall be a defense to any action.
  2. Upon receipt of a written claim by any employee of a violation of this act, the director shall process, investigate and determine the validity of the claim. The director shall have power to join various claims against the same employer in one (1) claim. If either the employer or employee is aggrieved by the director’s determination, the aggrieved party may request a fair hearing. The aggrieved party must file a written request for hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt of the director’s determination. Upon receipt of a timely submitted request for hearing, the director shall appoint an independent hearing officer to conduct the fair hearing between the employer and employee. The fair hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The hearing officer’s determination shall constitute the director’s final agency action. Upon a finding by the hearing officer that the claim is valid, the director shall order the employer to pay the amount of wages due plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Where the employer failed to appeal an adverse determination to the district court and failed to comply with the director’s order, the director shall refer the matter to the appropriate county attorney for enforcement of the director’s order.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 150, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.3; Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 1.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

§ 27-4-304. Penalty for violations.

Any employer who willfully violates any provision of this act, or who discharges or in any other manner discriminates against any employee because the employee has made any complaint to his employer, the director or any other person, or instituted, or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this act, or has testified or is about to testify in the proceedings, shall, upon conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.

History. Laws 1959, ch. 150, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.4; Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2019 ch. 20, § 1, effective July 1, 2019.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, added "by a court of competent jurisdiction," after "conviction" and substituted "more than five hundred dollars ($500.00)," for "less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00), nor more than two hundred dollars ($200.00)" and "not more than six (6) months, or both." for "not less than ten (10) days nor more than one hundred eighty (180) days, or by both the fine and imprisonment. Each day a violation continues shall constitute a separate offense".

Article 4. Prevailing Wages

Cross references. —

As to programs for the employment of inmates by private employer, see § 25-13-101 et seq.

§ 27-4-401. Short title.

This act [§§ 27-4-401 through 27-4-413 ] may be known and may be cited as the Wyoming Prevailing Wage Act of 1967.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.5.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 27-4-402(a)(xi).

§ 27-4-402. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Construction” includes construction, reconstruction, improvement, enlargement, alteration or repair of any public improvement fairly estimated to cost one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) or more;
    2. “Director” shall mean the director of the department or his designee;
    3. “Prevailing hourly rate of wages” means the wages paid generally to and the associated customary and usual fringe benefit costs paid on behalf of workers engaged in work of a similar character;
    4. Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 145, § 2.
    5. “Maintenance work” means the repair, but not the replacement, of existing facilities when the size, type or extent of the existing facilities is not thereby changed or increased;
    6. “Public body” means the state of Wyoming or any officer, board or commission of the state;
    7. “Public works” means all fixed works constructed for public use, whether or not done under public supervision or direction, or paid for wholly or in part out of public funds or assessment of property owners or rights users;
    8. “Workmen” means laborers, workmen and mechanics employed directly upon the actual construction site by contractors or subcontractors or the public body;
    9. “Locality” for public heavy, highway projects and public building projects means the following districts wherein the physical work is performed:
      1. For federal highway and construction projects:
        1. The entire state of Wyoming excluding any area defined as a metropolitan statistical area pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3504(e)(3) and 31 U.S.C. 1104(d);
        2. Any area defined as a metropolitan statistical area pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3504(e)(3) and 31 U.S.C. 1104(d).
      2. For state only heavy and highway projects, the entire state of Wyoming;
      3. For public building projects, the entire state of Wyoming.
    10. “Department” means the department of workforce services;
    11. “This act” means W.S. 27-4-401 through 27-4-413 .

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.6; Laws 1979, ch. 109, § 1; 1987, ch. 6, § 1; 1995, ch. 50, § 1; 1999, ch. 164, § 1; 2001, ch. 145, §§ 1, 2; 2007, ch. 109, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in (a), substituted “one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00)” for “twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00)” in (i); rewrote (ix)(A) through (C).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a)(x).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 27-4-403. Prevailing hourly wage on public works projects; transportation of materials; exception for trainees.

  1. Except as provided by subsection (c) of this section, not less than the prevailing hourly rate of wages for work of a similar character in the locality in which the work is performed, shall be paid to all workmen employed by or on behalf of any public body engaged in the construction of public works, exclusive of maintenance work. Only such workmen as are directly employed in actual construction work on the site of the building or construction job shall be deemed to be employed on public works.
  2. When the hauling of materials or equipment includes some phase of construction other than the mere transportation to the site of the construction, workmen engaged in the dual capacity shall be deemed employed directly on public works when such work shall be more than incidental to the regular duties of the hauling.
  3. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, an employee employed pursuant to and registered in a training or an apprenticeship program approved by the United States department of labor or a training program approved by the department of transportation and the federal highway administration, except where specified by registered or approved training or apprenticeship programs, shall be paid as follows:
    1. During the first half of the training period, at a rate not less than sixty percent (60%) of the appropriate minimum journeyman’s wage rate specified within the employment contract;
    2. During the period commencing upon completion of the first half of the training program and ending upon completion of seventy-five percent (75%) of the program, at a rate not less than seventy-five percent (75%) of the appropriate minimum journeyman’s wage rate specified within the employment contract;
    3. During the remaining portion and until completion of the training program, at a rate not less than ninety percent (90%) of the appropriate minimum journeyman’s wage rate specified within the employment contract.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.7; 1995, ch. 50, § 1.

§ 27-4-404. Director to investigate complaints; rules and regulations.

Upon complaint of violation of this act or upon reasonable suspicion that a violation of this act has occurred, the director shall investigate, and shall institute actions for penalties herein prescribed when proven violations are considered by him to be intentional and willful in nature. The director may establish rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the purposes of this act.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.8; Laws 2001, ch. 145, § 1; 2007, ch. 109, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, inserted “or upon reasonable suspicion that a violation of this act has occurred.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 27-4-402(a)(xi).

§ 27-4-405. Duty of public authority to ascertain wage rate for public works; requirement as to call for bids.

  1. Before any public body awards a contract for public works, it shall obtain from the department the prevailing hourly rate of wages in the locality in which the work is to be performed, for each craft or type of workman needed to execute the contract or project. The public body shall specify in the resolution or ordinance and in the call for bids for the contract, what the prevailing hourly rate of wages in the locality is for each craft or type of workman needed to execute the contract, and it shall be mandatory upon the contractor to whom the contract is awarded and upon any subcontractor under him, to pay not less than the specified rates to all workmen employed by them in the execution of the contract. The public body awarding the contract shall cause to be inserted in the contract a stipulation to the effect that not less than the prevailing hourly rate of wages as determined by the department pursuant to W.S. 27-4-406 , or determined by the court on review, shall be paid to all workmen performing work under the contract. It shall also require in all the contractor’s bonds that the contractor include such provision as will guarantee the faithful performance of the prevailing hourly wage clause as provided by the contract. The finding of the department specifying the prevailing hourly rate of wages in accordance with this subsection, shall be final for all purposes of the contract then being considered, unless reviewed under the provisions of this act. A public body doing public works directly shall comply with the prevailing hourly rate of wages portion of this subsection for each craft or type of workman so employed. In reviewing bids for public works contracts, the public body shall only award a bid preference in the percentage specified in W.S. 16-6-102(a) to any prospective contractor who participated, as certified by the department, in the department’s wage survey for the period applicable to the contract being awarded.
  2. In determining prevailing hourly wage rates, the department shall ascertain and consider the applicable hourly wage rates established by collective bargaining agreements, if any, such hourly wage rates as are paid generally within the locality and the most current department hourly wage survey as adjusted in W.S. 27-4-406 .

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.9; Laws 1994, ch. 74, § 1; 2001, ch. 145, § 1; 2007, ch. 109, § 1.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, added the last sentence in (a).

§ 27-4-406. Wage rate to be filed with director and mailed to employers and certain employees.

  1. The department shall annually determine the prevailing hourly rate of wages within the state for all occupations, crafts or type of workers expected to be required for public works in the state. In carrying out this subsection, the department shall:
    1. Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 109, § 2.
    2. Provide for a moving average wage adjustment as defined in rules and regulations of the department;
    3. Customize a survey for the construction trades.
  2. Upon determining the prevailing hourly rate of wages under subsection (a) of this section, the department shall provide notice of its determination to:
    1. The general public by publication in a newspaper of general circulation within each locality for which a prevailing wage rate is determined; and
    2. Each state agency and, upon written request, to any employer or other person. Notice under this paragraph shall be made promptly by certified mail.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.10; Laws 2001, ch. 145, § 1; 2007, ch. 109, § 2.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, repealed former (a)(i), which read: “Utilize the most recent payroll data as submitted by employers or employee organizations for purposes of reporting payroll and making contributions under the Wyoming Employment Security Law.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 27-4-402(a)(xi).

§ 27-4-407. Objection to rates filed; hearing; ruling; judicial review.

  1. At any time within fifteen (15) days after publication and notification of wage determinations under W.S. 27-4-406 , any affected person may object in writing to the determination or part thereof by filing a written notice with the director, stating the specific grounds of the objection. The written objection shall be a public record and available for inspection by any person who may be affected.
  2. Within ten (10) days of the receipt of the objection, the director shall set a date for a hearing on the objection. The date for the hearing shall be within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the objection. Written notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be given to the objectors at least five (5) days prior to the date set for the hearing.
  3. The director may hear each written objection separately or consolidate for hearing any two (2) or more written objections. At the hearing the department shall introduce in evidence the methodology it used and any other facts which were considered at the time of the original determination which formed the basis for its determination. The department or any objectors thereafter may introduce evidence which is material to the issues. In no case shall the department be required to disclose any payroll data or survey data which was used in making a determination under W.S. 27-4-406 which can be used to identify any individual employer.
  4. Within ten (10) days of the conclusion of the hearing, the director shall rule on the written objections and make a final determination as the evidence warrants. Immediately upon a final determination, the director shall serve a certified copy upon on all parties to the proceedings by personal service or by registered mail.
  5. The final decision of the director of the prevailing wages in the locality shall be subject to review in accordance with the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. All proceedings in any district court affecting a determination of the director shall have priority in hearing and determination over all other civil proceedings pending in the court, except election contests.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.11; Laws 2001, ch. 145, § 1.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

§ 27-4-408. Director's finding final unless reviewed; payments in excess of prevailing rate not prohibited; hours of work not limited.

The findings of the director ascertaining and declaring the prevailing hourly rate of wages shall be final for the locality, unless reviewed as provided by law. Nothing in this act, however, shall be construed to prohibit the payment to any workman employed on any public work of a sum exceeding the prevailing hourly rate of wages. Nothing in this act shall be construed to limit the hours of work which may be performed by any workman in any particular period of time.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.12; Laws 2001, ch. 145, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 27-4-402(a)(xi).

§ 27-4-409. Hearing procedure.

The procedure before the director for hearing of objections shall be as provided in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.13; Laws 2001, ch. 145, § 1; 2019 ch. 186, § 1, effective July 1, 2019.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted "Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act" for "Wyoming Administrative Procedure."

§ 27-4-410. Records of contractors.

The contractor and each subcontractor or the officer of the public body in charge of the project shall keep an accurate record showing the names and occupations of all workmen employed by them, in connection with the public work, and showing also the actual wages paid to each of the workmen, which record shall be open at all reasonable hours to the inspection of the director or the public body awarding the contract, its officers and agents.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 10; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.14; Laws 2001, ch. 145, § 1.

§ 27-4-411. Workman's right to recover difference in wages.

Any workman who shall be paid for his services a sum less than the stipulated rates for work done under the contract, shall have a right of action for whatever difference there may be between the amount so paid and the rates provided by the contract, and shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney fee if successful.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 11; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.15.

§ 27-4-412. Penalty for violations.

Any officer, agent or representative of any public body who willfully violates, or omits to comply with any of the provisions of this act [§§ 27-4-401 through 27-4-413 ], and any contractor or subcontractor, or agent or representative thereof, doing public work who intentionally or willfully neglects to keep an accurate record of the names, occupation and actual wages paid to each workman employed by him, in connection with the public work, or who intentionally or willfully refuses to allow access to same at any reasonable hour to any person authorized to inspect same under this act, or who intentionally or willfully has failed to pay the prevailing hourly rate of wages, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment when convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction.

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 12; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.16.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 27-4-402(a)(xi).

§ 27-4-413. Inapplicability and exemptions.

The provisions of W.S. 27-4-401 through 27-4-413 , are not applicable where in conflict with federal statutes, rules or regulations relating to prevailing wage determinations. All work and labor performed by prisoners, patients and other inmates of state penal, correctional and charitable institutions and city or county jails, are exempt from the provisions of this act [§§ 27-4-401 through 27-4-413 ]. All work and labor performed by workmen regularly employed by the public body are exempt from the provisions of W.S. 27-4-401 through 27-4-413 if the cost of construction does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00).

History. Laws 1967, ch. 184, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.17; Laws 1979, ch. 109, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 27-4-402(a)(xi).

Article 5. Collection of Unpaid Wages

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Settlement of back wage claims under § 16(b, c) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USC § 216(b), (c)), 65 ALR Fed 698.

§ 27-4-501. Definitions.

  1. Whenever used in this act:
    1. “Employer” means any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, corporation, labor organization, the administrator or executor of the estate of a deceased individual, or the receiver, trustee, or successor of any of the same, employing any person;
    2. “Employee” means any person who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee;
    3. “Wages” means compensation, including fringe benefits, for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission, or other basis, but does not include the value of vacation leave accrued at the date of termination if the written policies of the employer provide that accrued vacation is forfeited upon termination of employment and the written policies are acknowledged in writing by the employee;
    4. “Department” means the department of workforce services;
    5. “This act” means W.S. 27-4-501 through 27-4-508 .

History. Laws 1971, ch. 156, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.18; Laws 1990, ch. 71, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; 2013 ch. 67, § 1, effective July 1, 2013.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a)(iv).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added “, but does not include the value of vacation leave accrued at the date of termination if the written policies of the employer provide that accrued vacation is forfeited upon termination of employment and the written policies are acknowledged in writing by the employee;” in (a)(iii).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Employee as opposed to independent contractor. —

Wyoming Department of Employment's grant to a former employee his claim for unpaid wages under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-4-507(b) and § 27-4-104(b), was proper because he was an employee under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-501(a)(ii) as opposed to an independent contractor; there was no written contract, the employee did not bill the employer for his services, and the employer withheld tax deductions from employee's paychecks. Diamond B Servs. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 130, 120 P.3d 1031, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. Nov. 2, 2005).

Court did not err in awarding attorney fees to employee under § 27-4-104(b) since relocation cost reimbursement is a fringe benefit in accord with subsection (a)(iii) of this section. NL Indus. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1989).

§ 27-4-502. Claims for unpaid wages; anti-retaliation.

  1. The department is hereby empowered to take claims for unpaid wages under the provisions of W.S. 27-4-101 and 27-4-104 . The department in taking a claim for unpaid wages as provided for in this act is not to exceed the maximum amount specified in section 507(a)(4) of title 11, United States Code for claims arising out of bankruptcy or two (2) months wages for any claims not arising out of bankruptcy, per employee per wage claim.
  2. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer to discharge, harass, discipline or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee filed a claim for unpaid wages or made any other complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this act or testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this act. Any employer who violates the provisions of this subsection shall be liable for legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this act including continued employment, reinstatement, promotion and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 156, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.19; Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2020 ch. 140, § 1, effective March 24, 2020.

Cross references. —

As to assignments of wages generally, see § 27-4-110 et seq.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see 27-4-501(a)(v).

The 2020 amendment, added designation (a); in (a), substituted “the maximum amount specified in section 507(a)(4) of title 11, United States Code for claims arising out of bankruptcy” for “the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00),” substituted “for any claims not arising out of bankruptcy” for “, whichever is the greater”; and added (b).

Laws 2020, ch. 140, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2020.

Construction with 27-4-104 . —

Since the legislature specifically directs the Wyoming Department of Employment to take claims under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-104 and does not limit its authority to subsection (a), the Department is authorized to make awards under subsection (b), as well. Diamond B Servs. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 130, 120 P.3d 1031, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. Nov. 2, 2005).

Provision does not limit claims. —

Wyoming Department of Employment had authority to consider a former employee's claim for unpaid wages because Wyo. Stat. § 27-4-502 does not limit the claims the Department can hear; it simply limits the amount it can award for each claim. Diamond B Servs. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 130, 120 P.3d 1031, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. Nov. 2, 2005).

§ 27-4-503. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1971, ch. 156, § 3, related to jurisdiction to pursue claims under the act.

§ 27-4-504. Investigation and determination of unpaid wage claims; hearing; orders; collection of unpaid wages.

  1. Upon receipt of a written claim for unpaid wages, the department shall process, investigate and determine the validity of the claim.
  2. If either the employer or employee is aggrieved by the department’s determination, the aggrieved party may request a fair hearing. The aggrieved party must file a written request for hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt of the department’s determination. Upon receipt of a timely submitted request for hearing, the director shall appoint an independent hearing officer to conduct the fair hearing between the employer and employee. The fair hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The hearing officer’s determination shall constitute the director’s final agency action.
  3. Upon a finding by the hearing officer that the unpaid wage claim is valid and either the time for judicial review has passed or the decision has been affirmed by final judicial review, the department shall order the employer to pay the amount of unpaid wages due. The department’s order is not appealable or subject to judicial review. The department shall, with the assistance of the county attorney, initiate legal proceedings to collect the unpaid wages in the court having jurisdiction based on the total amount of unpaid wages due.
  4. An employer’s failure to comply with a department’s order is punishable by a civil fine not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200.00) for each day the employer fails to comply with the order.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 156, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.21; Laws 1981, ch. 137, § 1; 1990, ch. 71, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2020 ch. 140, § 1, effective March 24, 2020.

The 2020 amendment, in (c), added “in the court having jurisdiction based on the total amount of unpaid wages due” at the end.

Laws 2020, ch. 140, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2020.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

§ 27-4-505. County attorney to assist in collection of unpaid wages.

In suits commenced under this act where the employer failed to comply with the department’s order to pay the unpaid wages due, the department shall refer the matter to the appropriate county attorney for enforcement of the department’s order.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 156, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.22; Laws 1981, ch. 137, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see § 27-4-501(a)(v).

§ 27-4-506. Limitation on attempts to make payment of wages collected; unclaimed wages.

The department shall attempt for a period of not less than four (4) months from the date of the collection, to make payments of wages collected under this act to the persons entitled to the wages. Wages collected by the department which remain unclaimed for a period of more than four (4) months from the date of collection, shall be unclaimed property for purposes of W.S. 34-24-101 through 34-24-140 .

History. Laws 1971, ch. 156, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.23; Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in this section, see 27-4-501(a)(v).

§ 27-4-507. Tips and gratuities; unlawful to pay lower wage than that agreed upon; unlawful to fraudulently fail to pay fringe benefits agreed upon.

  1. Tips and gratuities received by an employee or employees shall be the sole property of such employee or employees and not payable in whole or in part to the employer or any other person.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any employer to pay to any employee a lower wage, salary, or compensation than that provided for or agreed upon by (1) a collective bargaining agreement; (2) a contract between the employer and employee. In no event shall a collective bargaining agreement or a contract provide for compensation lower than any applicable existing statute of this state.
  3. Whenever an employer has agreed with any employee or his agent to provide or make payments to a health or welfare fund, pension fund, vacation plan, apprenticeship program, or other such employment benefits, it shall be unlawful for said employer to willfully, or with intent to defraud, fail to make the payments required by the terms of any such agreement.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 156, § 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.24.

Cross references. —

As to minimum wages with respect to “tip employees,” see § 27-4-202 .

Construction. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-4-507 and 27-4-104(b), read in pari materia, synthesize the common purpose and intent regarding collection of unpaid wages; pursuant to § 27-4-507 an employer must fully pay the wages provided by contract, and pursuant to 27-4-104(b) an employee who establishes the amount of unpaid wages justly due is entitled to 18 percent interest, attorney fees, and all costs of suit. Jensen v. Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 2002 WY 173, 58 P.3d 322, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2002).

Unpaid wages due. —

Wyoming Department of Employment's grant to a former employee his claim for unpaid wages under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-4-507(b) and § 27-4-104(b), was proper because under he was an employee under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-501(a)(ii) as opposed to an independent contractor; there was no written contract, the employee did not bill the employer for his services, and the employer withheld tax deductions from employee's paychecks. Diamond B Servs. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 130, 120 P.3d 1031, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. Nov. 2, 2005).

§ 27-4-508. Agreements for reciprocal enforcement; of claim to another state.

  1. The department is hereby empowered to enter into agreements with agencies of other states or the federal government for the reciprocal enforcement and collection of wage claims if those states have a statute authorizing the same.
  2. In the event the department has taken a wage claim for collection and the employer against which the claim has been filed has moved to another state, the department may refer the claim with the written approval of the employee to the proper agency of the other state for collection, provided that there is in existence at the time a reciprocal agreement with the state for the collection of claims. The department is also authorized to accept claims from other states for collection of wages from employers who have removed to Wyoming.

History. Laws 1971, ch. 156, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 27-210.25; Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 1.

Chapter 5 Hours of Labor

Cross references. —

As to hours of labor for children, see § 27-6-110 .

For constitutional provision as to hours of labor, see art. 19, § 2, Wyo. Const.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations §§ 2625, 2636, 2637.

Who is employed in “professional capacity” within exemption, under 29 USC § 213(a)(1), from minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 77 ALR Fed 681.

What constitutes “amusement or recreational establishment” within meaning of seasonal amusement exemption from Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USC § 213(a)(3)), 88 ALR Fed 880.

Employee's protection under § 15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USC § 215(a)(3)), 101 ALR Fed 220.

§ 27-5-101. State and county employees; overtime compensation.

  1. The period of employment of state and county employees is eight (8) hours per day and forty (40) hours per week which constitute a lawful day’s and week’s work respectively.
  2. Except for employees whose maximum salary is remitted by statute, any state or county employee may be compensated at a rate one and one-half (1 1/2) times their regular compensation for each hour of service required to be performed in excess of eight (8) hours per day and forty (40) hours per week. If overtime compensation is paid pursuant to this section, no additional benefits, including compensatory time off, shall be allowed to the employee receiving the overtime compensation.
  3. Overtime compensation may only be authorized by the appropriate employing governing body subject to the following:
    1. For employees of the executive branch of state government, pursuant to rules and regulations of the human resources division of the department of administration and information. The human resources division shall specify what employees may receive overtime compensation, may require notification of an intent to pay overtime compensation preceding rendering of the additional services, and may prescribe any other limitations deemed desirable;
    2. For employees of the legislative branch of state government, pursuant to rules and regulations of the management council of the legislative service office or resolution of the legislature;
    3. For employees of the judicial branch of state government, pursuant to rules and regulations of the Wyoming supreme court;
    4. For county employees, pursuant to rules and regulations of the respective boards of county commissioners.

History. Laws 1974, ch. 4, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-211.1; Laws 1991, ch. 29, § 3; 1997, ch. 178, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to salaries of certain state officers and employees, see § 9-3-101 .

Editor's notes. —

Section 3, ch. 4, Laws 1974, reads as follows: “This act operates prospectively only and does not permit overtime compensation for services rendered prior to July 1, 1974. This act shall not apply to any employee covered by the provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended.”

No additional money for county employees required to work 40hours per week. —

Employees of the county assessor, employed as full-time employees, enjoying all the benefits of full-time employees as opposed to part-time employees, and paid as full-time employees for eight hours work per day, although they worked only seven hours a day, were not required to be paid additional money for the extra 20 hours per month they were now required to work. All that had really occurred was that the taxpayers were finally receiving the work that they have been paying for — that is, a 40-hour work week. Greub v. Frith, 717 P.2d 323, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 522 (Wyo. 1986).

County to authorize overtime pay for emergencies. —

There is no foundation in this section on which to construct a claim for additional compensation where: (1) the employee voluntarily enters into an agreement to work more than eight hours a day and 40 hours a week; or (2) the county has not established rules and regulations governing authorization of overtime pay for emergency services. Cyr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 780 P.2d 986, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 1989).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and construction of domestic service provisions of fair labor standards act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.), 165 ALR Fed 163.

§ 27-5-102. Working day; mines generally.

  1. The lawful working day in all underground mines is eight (8) hours per day, except:
    1. In case of emergency;
    2. By mutual agreement between an employer and employee or employees’ representative for a longer period of employment, but not to exceed sixteen (16) hours in any twenty-four (24) hour period.

History. Laws 1909, ch. 17, § 1; C.S. 1910, § 3499; C.S. 1920, § 4422; Laws 1931, ch. 73, § 62; R.S. 1931, § 63-103; C.S. 1945, § 54-802; W.S. 1957, § 27-212; Laws 1979, ch. 87, § 2.

Cross references. —

For constitutional provision that eight hours actual work shall constitute a lawful day's work in all mines, see art. 19, § 2, Wyo. Const.

As to mines, and oil and gas wells generally, see title 30.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Construction of act. —

Section 3, ch. 87, Laws 1979, reads: “Nothing in this act may be construed so as to alter the provisions of any collective bargaining contract.”

§§ 27-5-103 through 27-5-107. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 87, § 4.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1880-91, ch. 83, §§ 2 through 4, and Laws 1909, ch. 17, §§ 2 and 3, related to the working day in certain mining work.

§ 27-5-108. Punitive action prohibited; penalty.

Any employer who takes or threatens punitive action against any employee who refuses to work more than eight (8) hours in any twenty-four (24) hour period, except as provided by W.S. 27-5-102 , is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to the penalty provided by W.S. 27-5-110 .

History. Laws 1979, ch. 87, § 1.

§ 27-5-109. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Emergency” means any condition which, if not corrected immediately, will jeopardize:
      1. Human life; or
      2. Property.
    2. “Employer” means any owner, lessee, agent, operator or manager of any underground mine;
    3. “Punitive action” means to discharge, suspend or reprimand or threaten to discharge, suspend or reprimand, or diminish or threaten to diminish in any way any person’s position or salary for refusing to work more than eight (8) hours in any twenty-four (24) hour period, in other than an emergency situation;
    4. “Working day” means eight (8) hours of employment in any twenty-four (24) hour period;
    5. “This act” means W.S. 27-5-102 , 27-5-108 , 27-5-109 and 27-5-110 .

History. Laws 1979, ch. 87, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 27-5-110. Penalties.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act [§§ 27-5-102 , 27-5-108 , 27-5-109 and 27-5-110 ] is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, for each offense, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.

History. Laws 1979, ch. 87, § 1.

Construction of act. —

Section 3, ch. 87, Laws 1979, reads: “Nothing in this act may be construed so as to alter the provisions of any collective bargaining contract.”

Chapter 6 Employment of Women and Children

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

48A Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations §§ 2653 to 2671.

§§ 27-6-101 through 27-6-106. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 8, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1901, ch. 33, § 1, 2, Laws 1923, ch. 62, § 1, 3, 4, 6, and Laws 1937, ch. 30, § 1, related to employment of women and children.

§ 27-6-107. Children; proof of age required; prohibited employment.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to employ, permit or allow any child under the age of fourteen (14) years to work at any gainful occupation except farm, domestic or lawn and yard service. To ensure that a child is of proper age to be employed under this section, every person, firm or corporation employing a child under sixteen (16) years of age shall procure and have on file where the child is employed, a form of proof of age as required under W.S. 27-6-108 ; provided however that under no circumstances shall any child under sixteen (16) years of age be employed in any occupation listed in W.S. 27-6-112 or in any occupation declared by the department of workforce services to be hazardous for children under sixteen (16) years of age.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 48, § 4; R.S. 1931, § 20-305; C.S. 1945, § 58-304; W.S. 1957, § 27-225; Laws 1963, ch. 181, § 7; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1997, ch. 182, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” near the end.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Lawn mowing by minors as violation of child labor statutes, 56 ALR3d 1166.

§ 27-6-108. Children; proof of age required; inspection and form.

  1. The proof of age required by W.S. 27-6-107 shall be made available for inspection by any official charged with the enforcement of laws regulating the employment of minors. The acceptable forms of proof of age include the following:
    1. A duly attested birth certificate;
    2. A properly prepared immigration and naturalization form I-9 showing the age of the child; or
    3. Any other document showing the age of the child as approved by the department of workforce services.
  2. and (c) Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 182, § 2.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 48, § 5; R.S. 1931, § 20-306; C.S. 1945, § 58-305; W.S. 1957, § 27-226; Laws 1963, ch. 181, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1997, ch. 182, §§ 1, 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a)(iii).

§ 27-6-109. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 182, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1923, ch. 48, § 6, related to enforcement of laws regulating the employment of minors.

§ 27-6-110. Children; hours of labor.

  1. No child under sixteen (16) years of age shall be employed, permitted or suffered to work at any gainful occupation except farm or domestic service, for more than eight (8) hours in any twelve (12) hour period, or before the hour of five (5:00) o’clock a.m. or after the hour of ten (10:00) o’clock p.m. on nights followed by a school day, or after the hour of twelve (12:00) midnight on days which are not followed by a school day.
  2. Provided however that children between the ages of fourteen (14) and sixteen (16) years who are not enrolled in school may be employed at any gainful occupation for an eight (8) hour period between the hours of five (5:00) a.m. and twelve (12:00) midnight of any one (1) day.

History. Laws 1915, ch. 77, § 4; C.S. 1920, § 3881; Laws 1923, ch. 48, § 3; R.S. 1931, § 20-304; C.S. 1945, § 58-303; W.S. 1957, § 27-228; Laws 1963, ch. 181, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to hours of labor generally, see chapter 5 of this title.

§ 27-6-111. Children; employment during school prohibited.

No child under the age of sixteen (16) who is enrolled in any private or public school in the state of Wyoming shall be employed, permitted, or suffered to work at any occupation or service during the time that the classes of said school in which the said child is enrolled are in session.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 48, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 20-301; C.S. 1945, § 58-301; W.S. 1957, § 27-229; Laws 1963, ch. 181, § 4.

Cross references. —

As to compulsory attendance of children, see §§ 21-4-101 through 21-4-107 .

§ 27-6-112. Children; prohibition of employment in certain occupations.

  1. No child under sixteen (16) years of age shall be employed, permitted, or allowed to work at, in, or in connection with any of the following occupations, or at any of the following kinds of work except for the purpose of instruction in the public schools:
    1. The operation of or working on heavy construction equipment;
    2. Employment requiring contact with or exposure to explosives or dangerous chemicals; or in any other occupation declared by the department of workforce services as hazardous, for the employment of children under sixteen (16) years of age.
  2. The department of workforce services is hereby authorized to declare any occupation hazardous for the employment of children under sixteen (16) years of age.

History. Laws 1915, ch. 77, § 3; C.S. 1920, § 3880; Laws 1923, ch. 48, § 2; 1925, ch. 11, § 1; R.S. 1931, § 20-303; C.S. 1945, § 58-302; W.S. 1957, § 27-230; Laws 1959, ch. 133, § 1; 1963, ch. 181, § 5; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1997, ch. 182, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a)(ii) and (b).

Where employment lawful, worker's compensation sole remedy.—

Where neither this section nor § 27-6-107 of the child labor statutes made the work in which the minor was engaged at the time of his death an unlawful or illegal employment, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law (now Worker's Compensation Act) were the only remedy available to the minor's personal representative. Hart v. Blair, 378 P.2d 677, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1963) (decided prior to the 1963 amendments to this section and § 27-6-107 ).

Although federal law may have prohibited the type of employment sixteen-year-old was engaged in when injured, he was a “legally employed minor” under Wyoming law, and therefore worker's compensation provided his exclusive remedy. Maser v. L. & H. Welding & Mach. Co., 1 P.3d 642, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 27-6-113. Children; penalty for violations.

  1. Any person employing any child or children in violation of the provisions of this chapter, or any child, subject hereto, who willfully and intentionally violates the provisions of this chapter, or any person who permits a violation, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than one hundred (100) days, or both.
  2. Nothing in this chapter applies to or prevents a child under fourteen (14) years of age to be employed in a nonhazardous occupation outside of school hours by his parents, grandparents or legal guardian, or by a business owned by his parents, grandparents or legal guardian.

History. Laws 1923, ch. 48, § 7; R.S. 1931, § 20-308; C.S. 1945, § 58-307; W.S. 1957, § 27-231; Laws 1963, ch. 181, § 6; 1997, ch. 182, § 1; 2019 ch. 137, § 1, effective July 1, 2019.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted "chapter" for "act" throughout; in (a), substituted "is guilty" for "shall be deemed guilty," "punished by a fine of" for "fined," "imprisonment for" for "or imprisoned in the county jail," and deleted "in the discretion of the court" at the end.

Repealing clauses. —

Section 8, ch. 48, Laws 1923, repealed all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith.

§ 27-6-114. Employment of children under 16 in amusement, immoral or dangerous pursuits forbidden; exceptions.

  1. It is unlawful for any person having the care, custody or control of any child under the age of sixteen (16) years to:
    1. Exhibit, use or employ that child:
      1. As an actor or performer in any concert hall or room where alcoholic liquors and malt beverages are sold or given away except as provided in subsection (b) of this section;
      2. For any illegal or immoral purpose;
      3. For any business or in any place, situation, exhibition or vocation injurious to the morals, health or safety of the child.
    2. Cause, procure or encourage a child to engage in any practice specified in paragraph (a)(i) of this subsection.
  2. Nothing in this section applies to or prevents:
    1. The employment or use of any child as:
      1. A singer or musician in any church, school or academy;
      2. A dishwasher, busboy or delivery person in a place where alcoholic liquors and malt beverages are sold.
    2. The teaching or learning of the science or practice of music;
    3. The physical development of a child’s body in any respectable gymnasium or natatorium;
    4. Children from taking part in amateur entertainments or theatricals for charity, or not for profit, in schools, churches, settlement houses or boys’ or girls’ clubs.

History. Laws 1915, ch. 77, § 2; C.S. 1920, § 3879; R.S. 1931, § 20-302; C.S. 1945, § 58-308; W.S. 1957, § 27-232.

Cross references. —

As to unlawful selling of liquor to minor, see §§ 12-5-502 and 12-6-101 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes or ordinances regulating sexual performance by child, 42 ALR5th 291.

§ 27-6-115. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 8, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1915, ch. 77, § 5, related to seats for girls.

§ 27-6-116. Penalties for violations of certain provisions. [Repealed]

History. Laws 1915, ch. 77, § 6; C.S. 1920, § 3883; R.S. 1931, § 20-310; C.S. 1945, § 58-310; W.S. 1957, § 27-234; repealed by 2019 ch. 137, § 2, effective July 1, 2019.

Chapter 7 Labor Unions; Disputes and Injunctions; Right to Work

Cross references. —

For provision requiring legislature to provide for voluntary submission of differences to arbitrators, see art. 19, § 8, Wyo. Const.

As to Uniform Arbitration Act, see §§ 1-36-101 through 1-36-119 .

Applied in

Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 527 (Wyo. 1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations §§ 1748 to 1767; 1823 to 2071.

Collective bargaining agreement as restricting right to strike or picket, 2 ALR2d 1278.

Merit increase in wages as subject of collective bargaining or unfair labor practices, 3 ALR2d 997.

Inviting or soliciting return of striking employees to work as unfair labor practice, 4 ALR2d 1356.

Legality of, and injunction against, peaceful picketing as affected by employer's lack of opportunity to negotiate with union or employees, 11 ALR2d 1069.

Picketing of place of business by persons not employed therein, 11 ALR2d 1274.

Severability of provisions in collective bargaining labor contracts, 14 ALR2d 846.

Right of third party in area picketed during labor dispute, who has no connection with the dispute, to relief against such picketing, 15 ALR2d 1396.

Construction and effect of termination in automatic renewal provisions in collective bargaining agreements, 17 ALR2d 754.

Validity of governmental requirement of oath of allegiance or loyalty, 18 ALR2d 268.

Right of individual employee to enforce collective labor agreement against employer, 18 ALR2d 352.

Spontaneous or informal activity of employees as that of “labor organization” or as “concerted activities” within protection of Labor Relations Act, 19 ALR2d 566, 75 ALR Fed 262.

Matters arbitrable under arbitration provisions of collective labor contract, 24 ALR2d 752.

Nonprofit charitable institutions as within operation of labor statutes, 26 ALR2d 1020.

Liability of labor organization for inducing breach of contract, 26 ALR2d 1227.

Construction and effect of vacation pay clause in collective labor agreement, 30 ALR2d 351.

Right of labor union to strike, picket, or impose boycott to compel payment by employer of fine or other penalty, 32 ALR2d 342.

State's power to enjoin violation of collective labor contract as affected by Federal Labor Relations Acts, 32 ALR2d 829.

State court's power to enjoin picketing by illegal means as affected by Labor Management Relations Act, 32 ALR2d 1026.

Validity and construction of statutes regulating or prohibiting coercive action by labor unions in jurisdictional disputes, 33 ALR2d 340.

Picketing, by employees of a plant where labor dispute exists, at another plant of employer where there is no labor dispute, as unfair labor practice, 37 ALR2d 687.

Construction and effect of severance or dismissal pay provisions of collective labor agreement, 40 ALR2d 1044.

Unfair labor practices: discrimination between union members and nonmembers as to wage increases, vacations and the like, 41 ALR2d 654.

Continuance or termination of labor union's status or authority as bargaining agent, 42 ALR2d 1415.

Discontinuance of previous employee benefits not covered in collective bargaining agreement as unfair labor practice, 45 ALR2d 689.

National Labor Relations Act: sit-down strike, violence or similar misconduct during strike affecting employer's right to discharge employee or employee's right to be reinstated after strike, 45 ALR2d 887.

Rights and remedies of workmen blacklisted by labor union, 46 ALR2d 1124.

Blacklisting of workman by labor union as unfair labor practice, 46 ALR2d 1124.

Construction and effect of holiday-pay clause in collective labor agreement, 47 ALR2d 1034.

Eviction of employee or threat thereof from housing furnished by employer as constituting unlawful coercion or unfair labor practice, 48 ALR2d 995.

Constitutionality of statutes providing for arbitration of labor disputes, 55 ALR2d 432.

Discharge or retirement of employee because of age or physical disability as within provision of collective bargaining contract limiting employer's right to discharge employees, 56 ALR2d 991.

Substitution of independent contractor for employees as violation of collective labor contract, 57 ALR2d 1399.

Stock purchase or stock bonus plan as within provision of federal labor relations acts requiring employer to bargain collectively, 58 ALR2d 843.

Liability of labor union members for wrongful suspension or expulsion of member, 74 ALR2d 783.

Refusal of union to bargain with particular agent or representative selected by employer as unfair labor practice under National Labor Management Relations Act, 78 ALR2d 768.

Exhaustion of remedies within labor union as condition of resort to civil courts by expelled or suspended member, 87 ALR2d 1099.

Performance or breach of seniority provisions in labor relations agreements, 90 ALR2d 975.

Provision forbidding making membership in labor organization a condition to employment, 92 ALR2d 598.

Duty of furnishing information to employee representatives, under National Labor Relations Acts, 2 ALR3d 880.

Effect of alleged misstatements or misrepresentations in campaign literature, material or leaflets on validity of representation election, 3 ALR3d 889.

Removal of all or part of operation to new location as unfair labor practice, 5 ALR3d 733.

Employer's decision to have work done by independent contractors rather than by employees as unfair labor practice, 6 ALR3d 1148.

Manner of marking ballot as affecting validity of employee's vote in elections under Labor Relations Acts, 11 ALR3d 818.

Combination of separate plants or units of same employer as single bargaining unit, 12 ALR3d 787.

Multi-employer group as appropriate bargaining unit under Labor Relations Act, 12 ALR3d 805.

Union's representations concerning initiation fees or dues as affecting its status as bargaining representative, 13 ALR3d 990.

Discontinuance or suspension by employer of all or part of his operations or lockout of employees as unfair labor practice, 20 ALR3d 403.

Constitutionality of statute regulating employment agencies, 20 ALR3d 599.

Request or demand for, or refusal of, transcription or recording of bargaining sessions or grievance negotiations as unfair labor practice, 24 ALR3d 706.

Right of exclusion of applicants for membership, 33 ALR3d 1305.

Power of court to resubmit matter to arbitrators for correction or clarification, because of ambiguity or error in, or omission from, arbitration award, 37 ALR3d 200.

Bargainable or negotiable issues in state public employment labor relations, 84 ALR3d 242.

Damage liability of state or local public employee's union or union officials for lawful work stoppage, 84 ALR3d 336.

Determination as to good faith in abolition of public officer or employment subject to civil service or merit system, 87 ALR3d 1165.

Union security arrangements in state public employment, 95 ALR3d 1102.

Who are supervisors for purposes of bargaining-unit determinations in state public employment labor relations, 96 ALR3d 723.

Discharge from private employment on ground of political views or conduct, 29 ALR4th 287.

Failure to pursue or exhaust remedies under union contract as affecting employee's right of state civil action for retaliatory discharge, 32 ALR4th 350.

State criminal prosecutions of union officer or member for specific physical threats to employer's property or person, in connection with labor dispute, 43 ALR4th 1141.

Rights of state and municipal public employees in grievance proceedings, 46 ALR4th 912.

Procedural rights of union members in union disciplinary proceedings — modern state cases, 79 ALR4th 941.

Liability for breach of employment severance agreement, 27 ALR5th 1.

Appeal to racial or religious prejudice or feeling as affecting validity of representation election under National Labor Relations Act, 5 ALR Fed 867.

Arbitration agreement or other private contract as precluding filing of unfair labor practice charges with National Labor Relations Board, 6 ALR Fed 272.

Actions against unions for inducing strikes and secondary boycotts, 7 ALR Fed 767.

Interference with wearing union insignia as unfair labor practice, 11 ALR Fed 26.

Settlement of unfair labor practice cases, 14 ALR Fed 25.

Propriety of including, in bargaining unit, employees acting in confidential capacity or possessing confidential information, 23 ALR Fed 756.

Forbidding access to employer's property as unfair labor practice, 26 ALR Fed 427.

Notice proposing “modification” rather than “termination” of labor contract as sufficient to prevent automatic extension or renewal of contract, 57 ALR Fed 393.

Hospital house staff physicians as “employees” under § 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 152(3)), and therefore subject to provisions of act, as amended, 57 ALR Fed 608.

Employer's right to withdraw from multi-employer bargaining unit after the commencement of bargaining negotiations, 65 ALR Fed 18.

Union's discriminatory operation of exclusive hiring held as unfair labor practice under § 8(b) of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 158(b)), 73 ALR Fed 171.

Employee committee or similar group as “labor organization” under the National Labor Relations Act (29 USC §§ 151 et seq.), 75 ALR Fed 262.

Damages for mental distress as recoverable in action against employer under § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act (29 USC § 185) or under § 502 of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 USC § 1132), 77 ALR Fed 181.

What constitutes impairment of proposed intervenor's interest to support intervention as matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in labor actions, 77 ALR Fed 201.

Requirements for obtaining court approval of rejection of collective bargaining agreement by debtor in possession or trustee in bankruptcy under 11 USC § 1113(b) and (c), 89 ALR Fed 299.

Pre-emption, by § 301(a) of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 USC § 185(a)), of employee's state-law action for infliction of emotional distress, 101 ALR Fed 395.

Suits by union members against union officers under 29 USC § 501(b), 114 ALR Fed 417.

Increase, or promise of increase, or withholding of increase, of wages as unfair labor practice under National Labor Relations Act, 137 ALR Fed 333.

“Mass discharge” of employees as evidence of unfair labor practice under §§ 9(a)(1) and (3) of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 158(a)(1), (3)), 137 ALR Fed 445.

Job placement of returning strikers as unfair labor practice under § 158(a) of National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a), 145 ALR Fed 619.

51 C.J.S. Labor Relations §§ 148 to 216; 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations §§ 263 to 327.

§ 27-7-101. Policy of state; organized labor permitted.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Wyoming that workers have the right to organize for the purpose of protecting the freedom of labor, and of bargaining collectively with employers of labor for acceptable terms and conditions of employment, and that in the exercise of the aforesaid rights, workers should be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents in any concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 37, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 54-501; W.S. 1957, § 27-239.

Cross references. —

For constitutional provision providing for the protection of labor, see art. 1, § 22, Wyo. Const.

Right to join union implies right not to join union. —

This section does not specifically state that persons are entitled to choose whether to join a union or not. But that is implied therein, since the right to join a labor union implies the right not to join one. Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance Local, 70 Wyo. 165, 246 P.2d 778, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1952).

Applies only to private industry. —

Generally statutes governing labor relations between employers and employees are construed only to apply to private industry. Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1975).

University of Wyoming not authorized to bargain collectively. —

This section, which recognizes the right of labor to bargain collectively with employers of labor, does not authorize the University of Wyoming to collectively bargain with its employees. Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1975).

Nor are municipalities. —

Had the legislative intent been that municipalities be forced to engage in collective bargaining the legislature would have been explicit in their language. Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1975).

Jurisdiction of state court to grant injunctive relief against mass picketing. —

Where defendant union and its members had no right to engage in mass picketing and, in picketing, make threats, use abusive language, prohibit entrance to the premises to customers of plaintiffs, inflict property damage or obstruct the highways, state court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Buckman v. UMW, Local 7247, 80 Wyo. 199, 339 P.2d 398, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 28 .

Utterances of teacher in behalf of union activities were protected by United States and Wyoming constitutions. Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1976).

And were not grounds for nonrenewal of contract. —

Where there was no proof that the statements made by a teacher in pursuit of his union activities were made “with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity” and there was no proof that his published statements have impeded the performance of his teaching duties or in any way disrupted the functions of the school, the criticized publications furnished no cause or grounds for failure to renew the teacher's employment contract. Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1976).

Quoted in

State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

Law reviews. —

See comment, “The Right of Wyoming State and Municipal Employees to Organize, Receive Exclusive Recognition, and Bargain Collectively,” see V Land & Water L. Rev. 605 (1970).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Who are employees forbidden to strike under state enactments or state common-law rules prohibiting strikes by public employees or stated classes of public employees, 22 ALR4th 1103.

What statute of limitations applies to state law action by public sector employee for breach of union’s duty of fair representation, 12 ALR5th 950.

Right of public defenders to join collective bargaining unit, 108 ALR5th 241.

Charity-sponsored work programs for handicapped persons as subject to provisions of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC §§ 141 et seq.), 68 ALR Fed 905.

Collective bargaining agreement as restricting right to engage in concerted activities, other than striking or picketing, under § 7 of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 157), 69 ALR Fed 812.

Propriety, under § 10(c) of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 160(c)) authorizing affirmative action by NLRB as remedy for unfair labor practices, of order granting union access to company facilities, 71 ALR Fed 631.

What constitutes restraint or coercion of employer in selection of representative for collective bargaining or adjustment of grievances, designated as unfair labor practices under § 8(b)(1)(B) of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 158(b)(1)(B)), 72 ALR Fed 330.

Employer's right, under § 8(a)(1) of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 158(a)(1)), to ask employee whether employee intends to participate in strike, 72 ALR Fed 818.

When is subsequent business operation bound by existing collective bargaining agreement between labor union and predecessor employer, 88 ALR Fed 89.

Employer's duty to furnish information regarding financial status to employees' representative under National Labor Relations Act, 106 ALR Fed 694.

Construction of provision of 29 USC § 481(c) that unions and their officers shall “refrain from discrimination in favor of or against any candidate (for union office) with respect to use of lists of members”, 113 ALR Fed 389.

Increase, or promise of increase, or withholding of increase, of wages as unfair labor practice under National Labor Relations Act, 137 ALR Fed 333.

“Mass discharge” of employees as evidence of unfair labor practice under §§ 9(a)(1) and (3) of National Labor Relations Act (29 USCS § 158(a)(1), (3)), 137 ALR Fed 445.

Construction of Freedom of Speech and Assembly Provisions of § 101 (a)(2) of Labor—Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 USCS § 411(a)(2)), Included in Bill of Rights of Member of Labor Organization. 143 ALR Fed 1.

§ 27-7-102. Issuance of injunctions limited by public policy.

No court of the state of Wyoming shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 37, § 2; C.S. 1945, § 54-502; W.S. 1957, § 27-240.

§ 27-7-103. Acts not subject to be enjoined.

  1. No court of the state of Wyoming shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
    1. Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment;
    2. Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer organization;
    3. Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or other moneys or things of value;
    4. By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of the United States or of any state;
    5. Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence;
    6. Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute;
    7. Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts heretofore specified;
    8. Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified; and
    9. Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 37, § 3; 1937, ch. 15, § 1; C.S. 1945, § 54-503; W.S. 1957, § 27-241.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Quoted in

Logan v. Stannard, 439 P.2d 24, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1968).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Collective bargaining agreement as restricting right to engage in concerted activities, other than striking or picketing, under § 7 of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 157), 69 ALR Fed 812.

§ 27-7-104. Unlawful combination or conspiracy not grounds for injunction.

No court of the state of Wyoming shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts enumerated in W.S. 27-7-103 .

History. Laws 1933, ch. 37, § 4; C.S. 1945, § 54-504; W.S. 1957, § 27-242.

§ 27-7-105. Hearing prerequisite for injunction; temporary restraining orders.

No court of the state of Wyoming shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered. Provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prevent any such court from issuing a temporary restraining order in accordance with the code of civil procedure, but any such restraining order shall provide that a hearing for a temporary injunction shall be held not later than three (3) days after the granting of such restraining order, and such restraining order shall not be effective beyond the date of such hearing for a temporary injunction.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 37, § 5; C.S. 1945, § 54-505; W.S. 1957, § 27-243.

Cross references. —

As to temporary restraining orders, see § 1-28-102 and Rule 65(b), W.R.C.P.

Cited in

Garber v. UMW, 524 P.2d 578, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 217 (Wyo. 1974).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Refusal of NLRB to file unfair labor practice complaint as subject to review in independent suit in federal district court, 69 ALR Fed 870.

§ 27-7-106. Injunction to include only specific acts.

Every restraining order or injunction granted in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall include only a prohibition of such specific act or acts as may be expressly complained of in the petition filed in such case and sustained by competent evidence adduced in open court.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 37, § 7; C.S. 1945, § 54-507; W.S. 1957, § 27-244.

Repealing clauses. —

Section 8, ch. 37, Laws 1933, repealed all acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of that act.

§ 27-7-107. Limitation on liability of officers, members or organizations.

No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the state of Wyoming for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.

History. Laws 1933, ch. 37, § 6; C.S. 1945, § 54-506; W.S. 1957, § 27-245.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability, under statute, of labor union or its membership for torts committed in connection with primary labor activities — state cases, 85 ALR4th 979.

What statute of limitations applies to state law action by public sector employee for breach of union’s duty of fair representation, 12 ALR5th 950.

Construction of provision of 29 USC § 481(c) that unions and their officers shall “refrain from discrimination in favor of or against any candidate (for union office) with respect to use of lists of members”, 113 ALR Fed 389.

§ 27-7-108. Right to work; definitions.

  1. The term “labor organization” means any organization, or any agency or employee representation committee, plan or arrangement, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
  2. The term “person” shall include a corporation, association, company, firm or labor organization, as well as a natural person.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 39, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-245.1.

Law reviews. —

For note, “Right to Work: Prohibition of Expression or Coercion,” see 17 Wyo. L.J. 214 (1963).

For comment, “The Right of Wyoming State and Municipal Employees to Organize, Receive Exclusive Recognition, and Bargain Collectively,” see V Land & Water L. Rev. 605 (1970).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Employee committee or similar group as “labor organization” under the National Labor Relations Act (29 USC §§ 151 et seq.), 75 ALR Fed 262.

Validity, construction, and application of state right-to-work provisions, 105 ALR5th 243.

§ 27-7-109. Right to work; membership in labor organization not required.

No person is required to become or remain a member of any labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 39, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-245.2.

Sections 27-7-109 through 27-7-111 deal fully with the conditions of employment enumerated in the title to ch. 39, Laws 1963. Local 415 of Int'l Elec. Workers v. Hansen, 400 P.2d 531, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1965).

And they are in keeping with the provisions of the federal Labor Management Relations Act (1947), § 14(b), 29 USCS § 164(b) (1958), as interpreted by the United States supreme court. Local 415 of Int'l Elec. Workers v. Hansen, 400 P.2d 531, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1965).

Cited in

General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 906 P.2d 380, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 27-7-110. Right to work; abstention from membership in labor organization not required.

No person is required to abstain or refrain from membership in any labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 39, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-245.3.

Cross references. —

See notes to § 27-7-109 .

§ 27-7-111. Right to work; payment or nonpayment of dues not required.

No person is required to pay or refrain from paying any dues, fees, or other charges of any kind to any labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 39, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-245.4.

Cross references. —

See notes to § 27-7-109 .

§ 27-7-112. Right to work; connection with or approval by labor organization not required.

No person is required to have any connection with, or be recommended or approved by, or be cleared through, any labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 39, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-245.5.

This section is unconstitutional. —

See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hansen, 400 P.2d 531, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1965).

This section goes beyond mere implementation of §§ 27-7-109 through 27-7-111 , by clear and unequivocal language. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hansen, 400 P.2d 531, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1965).

And is separable from those sections. —

See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hansen, 400 P.2d 531, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1965).

As it impinges on area covered by federal statute. —

The legislature demonstrated a clear intent and purpose by this section to set apart from the processes of collective bargaining, upon matters protected by the Labor Management Relations Act (1947), those employees who were not members of a union. That, of course, could not be done. Any such attempt is to impinge upon an area that is not open to the states under the provisions of Labor Management Relations Act (1947), § 14(b), 29 USCS § 164(b) (1958). International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hansen, 400 P.2d 531, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1965).

§ 27-7-113. Right to work; misdemeanor to impose or try to impose prohibited requirements; civil liability.

Any person who directly or indirectly places upon any other person any requirement or compulsion prohibited by this act [§§ 27-7-108 through 27-7-115 ], or who makes any agreement written or oral, express or implied, to do so, or who engages in any lockout, layoff, strike, work stoppage, slow down, picketing, boycott or other action or conduct, a purpose or effect of which is to impose upon any person, directly or indirectly, any requirement or compulsion prohibited by this act, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall also be liable in damages to any person injured thereby.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 39, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 27-245.6.

§ 27-7-114. Right to work; injunction against prohibited conduct.

Any person injured or threatened with injury by any action or conduct prohibited by this act [§§ 27-7-108 through 27-7-115 ] shall, notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, be entitled to injunctive relief therefrom.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 39, § 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-245.7.

§ 27-7-115. Right to work; penalties.

Any person convicted of a misdemeanor, as defined in this act [§§ 27-7-108 through 27-7-115 ], shall be punished by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed six (6) months, or both.

History. Laws 1963, ch. 39, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 27-245.8.

Cited in

General Chem. Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 906 P.2d 380, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1995).

Chapter 8 Employment Offices and Agencies

Cross references. —

As to definition of “employment office,” in connection with employment compensation, see § 27-3-102(a)(viii).

As to state employment service, see § 27-3-605 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Agencies § 1 et seq.

§ 27-8-101. Licenses required; fees; posting.

No person, firm or corporation shall open, operate or maintain in this state any employment office or agency for the purpose of furnishing employers with persons seeking employment at manual labor or in clerical, industrial, commercial or business pursuits, or for the purpose of securing employment for such described persons, or where a fee, commission or other consideration is charged or exacted or received from applicants either for employment or for help, without first obtaining a license for the same from the department of workforce services. The uniform fee for such license in cities of five thousand (5,000) inhabitants and over shall be twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per annum, and in cities containing less than five thousand inhabitants, ten dollars ($10.00) per annum. Every license shall contain a designation of the city, street and number of the building in which such office or agency is conducted, and such license together with a copy of this act shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each and every employment agency.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 1; C.S. 1920, § 3463; R.S. 1931, § 65-401; C.S. 1945, § 54-401; W.S. 1957, § 27-246; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

Cross references. —

For licensing provisions generally, see chapter 1 of title 33.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” at the end of the first sentence.

§ 27-8-102. Termination and cost of license.

All licenses issued after this act [§§ 27-8-101 through 27-8-111 ] takes effect shall terminate on the thirty-first day of December of each year, and shall be paid for at the rate per year established in this act; provided, however, that no license for any fractional part of the year shall be issued for any sum less than one-third of the full annual rate, and that fractional months shall be counted as full months in every case.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 2; C.S. 1920, § 3464; R.S. 1931, § 65-402; C.S. 1945, § 54-402; W.S. 1957, § 27-247.

§ 27-8-103. Bond of licensee.

The department of workforce services shall require with each application for a license a bond in the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) with one (1) or more sureties to be approved by the department, and conditioned that the obligors will not violate any of the duties, terms, conditions, provisions or requirements of this act, or of other laws germane hereto. For any violation of the conditions of said bond, the department is authorized to commence and prosecute an action or actions on said bond or bonds in the name of the state of Wyoming, through the attorney general or other proper prosecuting officer.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 3; C.S. 1920, § 3465; R.S. 1931, § 65-403; C.S. 1945, § 54-403; W.S. 1957, § 27-248; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

§ 27-8-104. Revocation of license; complaint; hearing.

Whenever a written complaint shall be filed with the department of workforce services stating that any party so licensed as aforesaid, shall have violated any of the provisions of this act, the department shall give to said licensee notice of such complaint and appoint a day for a hearing thereon. If after a full and fair hearing, the department finds that the party licensed has violated any of the provisions of this act, the department is authorized to revoke the license theretofore issued to said party.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 4; C.S. 1920, § 3466; R.S. 1931, § 65-404; C.S. 1945, § 54-404; W.S. 1957, § 27-249; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

§ 27-8-105. Licensed agencies to maintain registers.

It shall be the duty of every licensed agency to keep a register in which shall be entered with dates the name and address of every person who shall make application for help or servants, and the name and nature of such employment for which such help shall be wanted. Such register shall, at all reasonable hours be kept open to the inspection and examination of the department of workforce services.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 5; C.S. 1920, § 3467; R.S. 1931, § 65-405; C.S. 1945, § 54-405; W.S. 1957, § 27-250; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

§ 27-8-106. Registration fee.

Where a registration fee is charged for receiving or filing application for employment of help, such fee shall in no case exceed the sum of one dollar ($1.00), unless the salary or wages to be paid shall be more than three dollars ($3.00) per day, in which case a fee of not more than two dollars ($2.00) may be charged. A duplicate receipt shall be given for such fee, (one (1) copy to be kept by the employee and the other by the employer) in which receipt there shall be stated the name and address of the applicant, the date of such application, the amount of the fee, and the nature of the work to be done or the situation to be procured. In the event that the said applicant shall not obtain a situation or employment through such licensed agency, then after the expiration of three (3) days from the time of registration such licensed agency shall repay and return to such applicant, upon demand being made therefor, the full amount of the fee paid or deposited by said applicant to such licensed agency.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 6; C.S. 1920, § 3468; R.S. 1931, § 65-406; C.S. 1945, § 54-406; W.S. 1957, § 27-251.

§ 27-8-107. Fraudulent notices or advertisements, and false information or promises prohibited.

No licensed agency shall publish or cause to be published any false or fraudulent notice or advertisement, or give any false information or make any false promise concerning or relating to work or employment to anyone who shall apply for employment, and no licensed agency shall make any false entry in the register to be kept as herein provided.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 7; C.S. 1920, § 3469; R.S. 1931, § 65-407; C.S. 1945, § 54-407; W.S. 1957, § 27-252.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of employment agency for personal injury or property damage suffered by employer from acts of referred employee, or by employee from acts of referred employer, 41 ALR4th 531.

§ 27-8-108. Duty of department to file complaints of violations; duty to enforce.

It shall be the duty of the department of workforce services, when informed of any violation of this act, to file complaint of such violation with the attorney general or with the district attorney for the county in which such violation is alleged to have occurred and it shall be the duty of the official informed to institute proceedings for the enforcement of the penalties.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 8; C.S. 1920, § 3470; R.S. 1931, § 65-408; C.S. 1945, § 54-408; W.S. 1957, § 27-253; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

§ 27-8-109. Department of workforce services to account.

All money or monies received from fees under this act shall be forthwith accounted for by the department of workforce services and turned over to the state treasurer, taking the state treasurer’s receipt for the same. Such monies shall become a part of the state general fund.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 10; C.S. 1920, § 3472; R.S. 1931, § 65-410; C.S. 1945, § 54-410; W.S. 1957, § 27-254; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

Cross references. —

For duty of commissioners of department of revenue and taxation to coordinate the collection of licenses and fees, see § 39-11-102 .

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

§ 27-8-110. Free employment bureaus and university placement services excepted.

Free employment bureaus and placement services of the University of Wyoming now or hereafter organized or established in this state, are not subject to this act [§§ 27-8-101 through 27-8-111 ].

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 11; C.S. 1920, § 3473; R.S. 1931, § 65-411; C.S. 1945, § 54-411; W.S. 1957, § 27-255; Laws 1981, ch. 58, § 1.

§ 27-8-111. Penalty.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this act [§§ 27-8-101 through 27-8-111 ] shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment as the court may direct.

History. Laws 1919, ch. 59, § 9; C.S. 1920, § 3471; R.S. 1931, § 65-409; C.S. 1945, § 54-409; W.S. 1957, § 27-256.

Chapter 9 Fair Employment Practices

Employee's remedy for a discriminatory discharge was under this chapter and not as a court-imposed separate tort action premised on public policy. Allen v. Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 479 (Wyo. 1985), overruled in part, Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 17, 105 P.3d 1079, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2005).

Non-discriminatory reasons as pretext for handicap discrimination.—

Employer violated the Act where although the employer demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for hiring the new branch manager, under a burden of going forward with the evidence, the employee ultimately established that the employer's explanations of why the new branch manager was more qualified were simply a pretext for handicap discrimination. World Mart v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1993).

Only unconditional offer tolls liability for back pay. —

Only employer's unconditional offer of reinstatement would have tolled employer's liability for back pay to employee who was subject of discrimination, and where employer's offer was clearly contingent on employees withdrawal of his handicap discrimination claims, the employer's liability for back pay was not tolled. World Mart v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1993).

Deduction of unemployment benefits. —

Refusal of the hearing officer to deduct employee's unemployment benefits from the back pay award was based on the majority rule and did not result in making employee “more whole” than he would have been if he had not been the victim of a handicap discrimination. World Mart v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1993).

Arbitration not required. —

Neither the collective bargaining agreement nor the Railway Labor Act required arbitration of plaintiff's individual statutory claims for sexual harassment and hostile working conditions. Bintner v. Burlington N., 857 F. Supp. 1484, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10628 (D. Wyo. 1994).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Sally Forth into Court — Procedures for the Sexual Harassment Case,” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 501 (1987).

For casenote, “Employment Discrimination — The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine and its Effect on Recovery in Employment Discrimination Claims. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S. Ct. 879, 130 L. Ed. 2d 852, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699 (1995),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 663 (1996)

For article, “Wyoming Employment Law,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 775 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d Wrongful Discharge § 1 et seq.

Liability for discharging at-will employee for refusing to participate in, or for disclosing, unlawful or unethical acts of employer or co-employees, 9 ALR4th 329.

Failure to pursue or exhaust remedies under union contract as affecting employee's right of state civil action for retaliatory discharge, 32 ALR4th 350.

Recovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim, 32 ALR4th 1221.

Damages recoverable for wrongful discharge of at-will employee, 44 ALR4th 1131.

Liability of employer, supervisor or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress, 52 ALR4th 853.

Accommodation requirement under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap, 76 ALR4th 310.

Liability for discharge of at-will employee for refusal to submit to drug testing, 79 ALR4th 105.

Discrimination “because of handicap” or “on the basis of handicap” under state statutes prohibiting job discrimination on account of handicap, 81 ALR4th 144.

In-house counsel's right to maintain action for wrongful discharge, 16 ALR5th 239.

When statute of limitations commences to run as to cause of action for wrongful discharge, 19 ALR5th 439.

Pre-emption of wrongful discharge cause of action by civil rights laws, 21 ALR5th 1.

After-acquired evidence of employee's misconduct as barring or limiting recovery in action for wrongful discharge, 34 ALR5th 699.

Liability for discharge of employee from private employment on ground of political views or conduct, 38 ALR5th 39.

Application of state law to age discrimination in employment, 51 ALR5th 1.

Workers' compensation as precluding employee's suit against employer for sexual harassment in the workplace, 51 ALR5th 163.

Negligent discharge of employee, 53 ALR5th 219.

Compensability of specially equipped van or vehicle under workers' compensation statutes, 63 ALR5th 163.

What will be deemed a “written interpretation or opinion of the commission” which employer can assert as defense under § 713(b) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (42 USC § 2000e-12(b)(1)), 54 ALR Fed 868.

Admiralty: recovery for retaliatory discharge of at-will maritime employee, 62 ALR Fed 790.

Dismissal of, or other adverse personnel action relating to, public employee for political patronage reasons as violative of first amendment, 70 ALR Fed 371.

Who is “qualified” handicapped person protected from employment discrimination under Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC §§ 701 et seq.) and regulations promulgated thereunder, 80 ALR Fed 830.

Effect of mixed or dual motives in actions under title VII (equal employment opportunities subchapter) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.), 83 ALR Fed 268.

Nature and burden of proof in title VII action alleging favoritism in promotion of job assignment due to sexual or romantic relationship between supervisor and another, 86 ALR Fed 230.

Prohibition or limitation on display of signs by employees as unfair labor practice, 86 ALR Fed 321.

Recording of collective bargaining or grievance proceeding as unfair labor practice, 86 ALR Fed 844.

Employee's protection under § 15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USC § 215(a)(3)), 101 ALR Fed 220.

When does adverse employment decision based on person's foreign accent constitute national origin discrimination in violation of title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e et seq.), 104 ALR Fed 816.

Protection of debtor from acts of discrimination by private entity under § 525(b) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USC § 525(b)), 105 ALR Fed 555.

Damages for allegedly wrongful interference with employment rights as received “on account of personal injuries,” so as to be excludible from income tax under 26 USC § 104(a)(2), 106 ALR Fed 321.

Period of time covered by back pay award under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.), 137 ALR Fed 1.

Increase, or promise of increase, or withholding of increase, of wages as unfair labor practice under National Labor Relations Act, 137 ALR Fed 333.

“Mass discharge” of employees as evidence of unfair labor practice under §§ 9(a)(1) and (3) of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 158(a)(1), (3)), 137 ALR Fed 445.

Who is “employer” within meaning of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 USC § 621 et seq.), 137 ALR Fed 551.

Factors or conditions in employment discrimination cases said to justify increase in attorney's fees awarded under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-5(k), 140 ALR Fed 301.

Who is “qualified individual” under Americans With Disabilities Act provisions defining, and extending protection against employment discrimination to qualified individual with disability (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a)), 146 ALR Fed 1.

To what extent are federal entities subject to suit under § 504(a) of Rehabilitation Act (42 U.S.C. § 794(a)), which prohibits any program or activity conducted by any executive agency or the postal service from discriminating on basis of disability, 146 ALR Fed 319.

Additions to back pay awards under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), 146 ALR Fed 403.

What constitutes reverse or majority race or national origin discrimination violative of federal constitution or statutes — private employment cases 150 ALR Fed 1.

Punitive damages in actions for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 1981a; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), 150 ALR Fed 601.

What constitutes racial harassment in employment violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), 156 ALR Fed 1.

When is supervisor's hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) imputable to employer, 157 ALR Fed 1.

§ 27-9-101. Short title.

This article may be known and may be cited as the “Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act of 1965.”

History. Laws 1965, ch. 170, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-257.

Purpose. —

The title to the Fair Employment Practices Act, which reads in part “An act for the establishment of a Wyoming Fair Employment Commission for the investigation and determination of discriminatory and unfair employment practices against persons otherwise qualified because of sex, race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry …,” gives every indication that its purpose is to prevent discriminating practices against females in all employments when they are qualified to hold a position. And where there is a manifest legislative intent that a subsequent general statute shall have universal application, it repeals by implication earlier laws dealing with only a small part of the same subject. Longacre v. State, 448 P.2d 832, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1968).

Provisions have no application to appointment of deputy sheriff. Pfister v. Niobrara County, 557 P.2d 735, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1976).

Cited in

Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 17, 105 P.3d 1079, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (2005).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Employment Discrimination in Wyoming: A New Legal Frontier,” see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 487 (1977).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Same-sex sexual harassment under state antidiscrimination laws, 73 ALR5th 1.

Visual impairment as handicap or disability under state employment discrimination law, 77 ALR5th 595.

Individual liability of supervisors, managers, officers or co-employees for discriminatory actions under state 83 ALR5th 1.

Effect of prior state court judgment upon action in Federal District Court for unlawful employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.), 51 ALR Fed 829.

Who has “participated” in investigation, proceeding, or hearing and is thereby protected from retaliation under § 704(a) of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000E-3(a)), 149 ALR Fed 431.

Factors or conditions in employment discrimination cases said to justify decrease in attorney's fees awarded under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-5(k)), 151 ALR Fed 77.

Award of compensatory damages under 42 USC § 1981a for violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 154 ALR Fed 347.

Construction and application of § 102(d) of Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)) pertaining to medical examinations and inquiries, 159 ALR Fed 89.

Propriety of treating separate entities as one for determining number of employees required by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) for action against “employer,” 160 ALR Fed 441.

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — private employment cases, 162 ALR Fed 273.

Action under Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.), to remedy alleged harassment or hostile work environment, 162 ALR Fed 603.

Liability of employer, under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) for sexual harassment of employee by customer, client, or patron, 163 ALR Fed 445.

What constitutes employment discrimination by public entity in violation of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, 164 ALR Fed 433.

§ 27-9-102. Definitions. [Effective until July 1, 2022]

  1. “Court” shall mean the district court in and for the judicial district of the state of Wyoming in which the asserted unfair employment practice occurred, or, if said court be not in session at that time, then any judge of said court.
  2. “Employer” shall mean the state of Wyoming or any political subdivision or board, commission, department, institution or school district thereof, and every other person employing two (2) or more employees within the state; but it does not mean religious organizations or associations.
  3. “Unfair employment practice” shall mean those practices specified as discriminatory or unfair in W.S. 27-9-105 .
  4. As used in W.S. 27-9-101 through 27-9-106 , “department” means the department of workforce services and the term “director” means the director of the department or his designee who is authorized to administer W.S. 27-9-101 through 27-9-106 .

History. Laws 1965, ch. 170, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-258; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 45, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; 2022 ch. 86, § 2, effective July 1, 2022.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (d).

The 2022 amendment, effective July 1, 2022, added the last sentence in (b).

Cited in

Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 17, 105 P.3d 1079, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (2005).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Sex discrimination in law enforcement and corrections employment, 53 ALR Fed 31.

Validity, construction and application of provisions of § 702 of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-1) exempting activities of religious organizations from operation of title VII equal employment opportunity provisions, 67 ALR Fed 874.

Meaning of term “employer” as defined in § 701(b) of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 USC § 2000e(b)), 69 ALR Fed 191.

Who is “employee” within meaning of Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC §§ 621-634), 69 ALR Fed 700.

Who is “employee,” as defined in § 701(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e(f), 72 ALR Fed 522.

Who, other than specifically excluded persons, is “employee” under § 4(a)(1) of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 USC § 623(a)(1)), 125 ALR Fed 273.

Who is “employer” within meaning of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 USC § 621 et seq.), 137 ALR Fed 551.

Propriety of treating separate entities as one for determining number of employees required by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) for action against “employer,” 160 ALR Fed 441.

§ 27-9-102. Definitions. [Effective July 1, 2022]

  1. “Court” shall mean the district court in and for the judicial district of the state of Wyoming in which the asserted unfair employment practice occurred, or, if said court be not in session at that time, then any judge of said court.
  2. “Employer” shall mean the state of Wyoming or any political subdivision or board, commission, department, institution or school district thereof, and every other person employing two (2) or more employees within the state; but it does not mean religious organizations or associations. “Employer” shall include those divisions of the Wyoming military department that are authorized by federal authority.
  3. “Unfair employment practice” shall mean those practices specified as discriminatory or unfair in W.S. 27-9-105 .
  4. As used in W.S. 27-9-101 through 27-9-106 , “department” means the department of workforce services and the term “director” means the director of the department or his designee who is authorized to administer W.S. 27-9-101 through 27-9-106 .

History. Laws 1965, ch. 170, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-258; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 45, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; 2022 ch. 86, § 2, effective July 1, 2022.

§ 27-9-103. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to department of employment being the successor agency to the Wyoming fair employment commission, see § 27-9-102(d).

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws, 1965, ch. 170, § 3, related to the creation of the fair employment commission.

§ 27-9-104. Powers and duties of department of employment. [Effective until July 1, 2022]

  1. The department shall have the following powers and duties:
    1. To call upon any state agency, institution, or employee, for advice, counsel, and assistance in the enforcement of this article;
    2. To adopt, publish, amend, and rescind regulations consistent with and for the enforcement of this article;
    3. To receive, investigate, and determine the validity of complaints alleging discrimination in employment or the existence of a discriminatory or unfair employment practice;
    4. Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 2.
    5. For the purposes of all investigations the department shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any books, papers, documents or records which the department deems relevant or material to the inquiry;
    6. In case of disobedience to a subpoena the department may invoke the aid of any district court in the state in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of court;
    7. To enter into agreements, exchange information and otherwise assist the equal employment opportunity commission, and to accept from the equal employment opportunity commission reimbursement for services rendered.
  2. The department shall contract with an independent hearing officer to conduct any hearing under W.S. 27-9-101 through 27-9-106 .

History. Laws 1965, ch. 170, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-260; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2001, ch. 162, §§ 1, 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 45, § 1; 2003, ch. 186, § 1; 2022 ch. 86, § 2, effective July 1, 2022.

Cross references. —

As to a subpoena duces tecum, see Rules 30(b) and 34, W.R.C.P.

As to subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or for the production of documentary evidence, see Rule 45, W.R.C.P.

The 2022 amendment, effective July 1, 2022, in (a)(v), added “counseling, mediation or,” substituted “that” for “which,” added “or determination”; and added (a)(viii).

Applied in

Pfister v. Niobrara County, 557 P.2d 735, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1976).

Cited in

World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1993); Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 17, 105 P.3d 1079, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (2005).

§ 27-9-104. Powers and duties of department of employment. [Effective July 1, 2022]

  1. The department shall have the following powers and duties:
    1. To call upon any state agency, institution, or employee, for advice, counsel, and assistance in the enforcement of this article;
    2. To adopt, publish, amend, and rescind regulations consistent with and for the enforcement of this article;
    3. To receive, investigate, and determine the validity of complaints alleging discrimination in employment or the existence of a discriminatory or unfair employment practice;
    4. Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 2.
    5. For the purposes of all counseling, mediation or investigations the department shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any books, papers, documents or records that the department deems relevant or material to the inquiry or determination;
    6. In case of disobedience to a subpoena the department may invoke the aid of any district court in the state in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of court;
    7. To enter into agreements, exchange information and otherwise assist the equal employment opportunity commission, and to accept from the equal employment opportunity commission reimbursement for services rendered;
    8. To enter into agreements, exchange information and otherwise assist the Wyoming military department to counsel, mediate, investigate and determine claims by members of the Wyoming national guard and employees of the military department. As used in this paragraph, “claims” means claims under this chapter or claims under the federal laws enforced by the equal employment opportunity commission, as applicable. The department shall promulgate rules that coordinate with the military department rules promulgated under W.S. 19-7-103(b)(xxv) to accomplish the powers and duties in this paragraph and W.S. 19-7-103(b)(xxv), consistent with equal employment opportunity commission rules and requirements and federal law.
  2. The department shall contract with an independent hearing officer to conduct any hearing under W.S. 27-9-101 through 27-9-106 .

History. Laws 1965, ch. 170, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-260; Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2001, ch. 162, §§ 1, 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 45, § 1; 2003, ch. 186, § 1; 2022 ch. 86, § 2, effective July 1, 2022.

§ 27-9-105. Discriminatory and unfair employment practices enumerated; limitations.

  1. It is a discriminatory or unfair employment practice:
    1. For an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate in matters of compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment against, a qualified disabled person or any person otherwise qualified, because of age, sex, race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry or pregnancy;
    2. For a person, an employment agency, a labor organization, or its employees or members, to discriminate in matters of employment or membership against any person, otherwise qualified, because of age, sex, race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry or pregnancy, or a qualified disabled person;
    3. For an employer to reduce the wage of any employee to comply with this chapter;
    4. For an employer to require as a condition of employment that any employee or prospective employee use or refrain from using tobacco products outside the course of his employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any person in matters of compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment on the basis of use or nonuse of tobacco products outside the course of his employment unless it is a bona fide occupational qualification that a person not use tobacco products outside the workplace. Nothing within this paragraph shall prohibit an employer from offering, imposing or having in effect a health, disability or life insurance policy distinguishing between employees for type or price of coverage based upon the use or nonuse of tobacco products if:
      1. Differential rates assessed employees reflect an actual differential cost to the employer; and
      2. Employers provide written notice to employees setting forth the differential rates imposed by insurance carriers.
  2. The prohibitions against discrimination based on age in this section apply only to persons at least forty (40) years of age.
  3. It is not a discriminatory practice for an employer, employment agency or labor organization to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit involuntary retirement of any individual protected under this chapter because of age. Involuntary retirement is not prohibited if permitted under Title 29, United States Code § 631(c).
  4. As used in this section “qualified disabled person” means a disabled person who is capable of performing a particular job, or who would be capable of performing a particular job with reasonable accommodation to his disability.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 170, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-261; Laws 1984, ch. 7, § 1; 1985, ch. 5, § 1; 1992, ch. 81, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, § 1; 2003, ch. 188, § 1; 2007, ch. 175, § 1.

Source. —

Subsection (a)(iv), inserted in 1992, is based on a Rhode Island statute.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, substituted “ancestry or pregnancy” for “or ancestry” in (a)(i) and (ii).

Provisions plain and unambiguous, containing no exceptions.—

The Fair Employment Practices Act is plain and unambiguous. It contains no exceptions. It clearly makes it unlawful for an employer to: (1) refuse to hire any person otherwise qualified because of sex; (2) discharge any person otherwise qualified because of sex; (3) promote or demote any person otherwise qualified because of sex; or (4) discriminate in matters of compensation against any person otherwise qualified because of sex. Longacre v. State, 448 P.2d 832, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1968).

Provisions have no application to appointment of deputy sheriff. Pfister v. Niobrara County, 557 P.2d 735, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1976).

Commission has no independent judgment as to qualifications.—

While neither the supreme court nor the district court, in examining the action of the Wyoming fair employment commission, should make an independent judgment on the facts presented to the commission, similarly the commission was not empowered to exercise an independent judgment as to the merits and qualifications of the applicants for a teaching position with a county school district. Shenefield v. Sheridan County Sch. Dist., 544 P.2d 870, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1976).

Discretionary power of school board as to qualifications. —

The Wyoming fair employment commission had before it no substantial evidence indicating discrimination against complainant because of her sex and the decision made by the school board to hire the male teacher was within its discretionary power to determine the qualifications of prospective teachers in light of its own special problems. Shenefield v. Sheridan County Sch. Dist., 544 P.2d 870, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1976).

Selection of one more able to assist in conduct of school's athletic programs cannot be considered sex discrimination. Shenefield v. Sheridan County Sch. Dist., 544 P.2d 870, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1976).

Nor is selection of less qualified and less costly teacher.—

If it turns out that for reasons of economy one applicant for a teaching position can fulfill the needs of the district at a cost substantially less than another applicant, even though the rejected applicant may on paper possess the greater qualifications, a selection of the less expensive teacher cannot be said by any board or court to have been the result of discrimination on the basis of sex. Shenefield v. Sheridan County Sch. Dist., 544 P.2d 870, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1976).

Sexual harassment suit unsuccessful. —

Plaintiff's public policy tort claim under this section for constructive discharge from municipal police office for sexual harassment was properly dismissed because plaintiff's emotional injuries were otherwise compensated under Wyoming's worker's compensation laws, and a separate legal remedy was available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS § 2000e-2(a)(1). Ball v. City of Cheyenne, 845 F. Supp. 803, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19315 (D. Wyo. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 54 F.3d 664, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15055 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1995).

Decision res judicata. —

The decision of the employment security commission that an employee was not discriminated against on account of her religious practices is a bar to relitigation of that issue before the fair employment commission under the doctrine of res judicata. Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 598 P.2d 435, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 439 (Wyo. 1979).

Summary judgment. —

Hearing officer properly granted the employer summary judgment in the 59-year-old employee's age discrimination action arising out of his termination, where evidence failed to counter a supervisor's assertions that at times the employee could not be found at work when he was scheduled to be there and did not change his behavior after being specifically instructed to do so. The employee failed to show that the employer's reason for terminating him was pretextual because, other than the employee's assertion that the supervisor made a discriminatory statement early on in the supervisor's tenure, the employee provided no details about the context or timing of the supervisor's ageist comments, and none of the employee's submissions indicated that the supervisor's remarks were made in connection with his discharge. Rollins v. Wyo. Tribune-Eagle, 2007 WY 28, 152 P.3d 367, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2007).

Claim preclusion. —

Plaintiff former employee's suit against defendant former employer for constructive discharge based on gender discrimination and retaliation under 42 USCS § 2000e-2 and this section, was barred, under the doctrine of claim preclusion, by the former employee's prior suit for equal pay under the Equal Pay Act of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USCS § 206(d) and 42 USCS 1983, as the second suit arose from the same employment relationship and constituted the same transaction or series of transactions for claim preclusion purposes. Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep't of Empl. Div. of Labor Stds., 314 F.3d 501, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 27263 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826, 124 S. Ct. 181, 157 L. Ed. 2d 48, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6099 (U.S. 2003).

Cited in

Martinez v. State, 218 F.3d 1133, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17319 (10th Cir. 2000); Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 17, 105 P.3d 1079, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (2005); Apodaca v. Safeway, Inc., 2015 WY 51, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Mar. 31, 2015).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Introduction for Lawyers and Judges,” see XXIX Land & Water L. Rev. 175 (1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What businesses or establishments falling within state civil rights statute provisions prohibiting discrimination, 87 ALR2d 120.

Recovery of damages for emotional distress resulting from discrimination because of sex or marital status, 61 ALR3d 944.

Recovery of damages as remedy for wrongful discrimination under state or local civil rights provisions, 85 ALR3d 351.

Application of state law to sex discrimination in employment, 87 ALR3d 93.

What constitutes unfair labor practice under state public employee relations acts, 9 ALR4th 20.

Modern status of rule that employer may discharge at will employee for any reason, 12 ALR4th 544, 32 ALR4th 1221, 33 ALR4th 120.

On-the-job sexual harassment as violation of state civil rights law, 18 ALR4th 328.

What constitutes employment discrimination on basis of “marital status” for purposes of state civil rights laws, 44 ALR4th 1044.

Discipline or discharge for sexual conduct as violative of state fair employment laws, 47 ALR4th 863.

Handicap as job disqualification under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap, 78 ALR4th 265.

What constitutes handicap under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap, 82 ALR4th 26.

Effectiveness of employer's disclaimer of representations in personnel manual or employee handbook altering at-will employment relationship, 17 ALR5th 1.

Judicial construction and application of state legislation prohibiting religious discrimination in employment, 37 ALR5th 349.

Application of state law to age discrimination in employment, 51 ALR5th 1.

Workers' compensation as precluding employee's suit against employer for sexual harassment in the workplace, 51 ALR5th 163.

Visual impairment as handicap or disability under state employment discrimination law, 77 ALR5th 595.

Availability and scope of punitive damages under state employment discrimination law, 81 ALR5th 367.

Validity, construction, and application of state enactment, order, or regulation expressly prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, 82 ALR5th 1.

Individual liability of supervisors, managers, officers or co-employees for discriminatory actions under state Civil Rights Act, 83 ALR5th 1.

When is supervisor's or coemployee's hostile environment sexual harassment imputable to employer under state law, 94 ALR5th 1.

Discrimination against pregnant employee as violation of state fair employment laws, 99 ALR5th 1.

What constitutes substantial limitation on major life activity of working for purposes of state civil rights acts, 102 ALR5th 1.

Necessity of, and what constitutes, employer's reasonable accommodation of employee's religious preference under state law, 107 ALR5th 623.

Liability of Employer, Supervisor, or Manager for Intentionally or Recklessly Causing Employee Emotional Distress - Ethnic, Racial, or Religious Harassment or Discrimination. 19 A.L.R.6th 1.

Liability of Employer, Supervisor, or Manager for Intentionally or Recklessly Causing Employee Emotional Distress - Sexual Harassment, Sexual Discrimination, or Accusations Concerning Sexual Conduct or Orientation. 20 A.L.R.6th 1.

Sex discrimination in law enforcement and corrections employment, 53 ALR Fed 31.

Effect of broadcaster's employment practices on renewal of broadcaster's radio license, 56 ALR Fed 49.

Proving that discharge was because of age for purposes of Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC § 621 et seq.), 58 ALR Fed 94.

Liability under title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.) of employer, as successor employer, for discriminatory employment practices of predecessor, 67 ALR Fed 806.

Disparate impact test for sex discrimination in employment under title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.), 68 ALR Fed 19.

Meaning of term “employer” as defined in § 701(b) of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 USC § 2000e(b)), 69 ALR Fed 191.

Who is “employee” within meaning of Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC §§ 621-634), 69 ALR Fed 700.

“Bona fide employee benefit plan” exception to general prohibition of age discrimination in employment (29 USC § 623(f)(2)), 70 ALR Fed 110.

Pre-emption of state fair employment laws under provisions of § 514 of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 USC § 1144), 72 ALR Fed 489.

Who is “employee,” as defined in § 701(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e(f), 72 ALR Fed 522.

Discoverability and admissibility of plaintiff's past sexual behavior in Title VII sexual harassment action, 73 ALR Fed 748.

When is work environment intimidating, hostile or offensive, so as to constitute sexual harassment in violation of title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.), 78 ALR Fed 252.

Actions under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC §§ 621-634) challenging hiring or retirement practices in law enforcement employment, 79 ALR Fed 373.

Actionability, under federal and state antidiscrimination legislation, of foreign employer's discriminating in favor of foreign workers in hiring and other employment matters, 84 ALR Fed 114.

Circumstances which warrant finding of constructive discharge in cases under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC § 621 et seq.), 93 ALR Fed 10.

Who is “individual with handicaps” under Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC § 701 et seq.), 97 ALR Fed 40.

What statute of limitations applies in actions under § 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC § 794), 120 ALR Fed 621.

What constitutes reasonable accommodation of otherwise qualified employee or applicant who is disabled by drug or alcohol addiction, 122 ALR Fed 111.

Sex discrimination in job assignment or transfer as violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e et seq.), 123 ALR Fed 1.

When must specialized equipment or other workplace modifications be provided to qualified disabled employee or applicant as reasonable accommodation, 125 ALR Fed 629.

Employee's retention of benefits received in consideration of promise not to enforce claims under Age Discrimination in Employment Act as ratification of otherwise invalid or voidable waiver under § 7(f)(1) of act (29 USC § 626(f)(1)), 128 ALR Fed 577.

Increase, or promise of increase, or withholding of increase, of wages as unfair labor practice under National Labor Relations Act, 137 ALR Fed 333.

“Mass discharge” of employees as evidence of unfair labor practice under §§ 9(a)(1) and (3) of National Labor Relations Act (29 USC § 158(a)(1), (3)), 137 ALR Fed 445.

Who is “employer” within meaning of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 USC § 621 et seq.), 137 ALR Fed 551.

Factors or conditions in employment discrimination cases said to justify increase in attorney's fees awarded under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-5(k), 140 ALR Fed 301.

What constitutes substantial limitation on major life activity of working for purposes of Americans with Disabilities Act (42 USC §§ 12101-12213), 141 ALR Fed 603.

When does job restructuring constitute reasonable accommodation of qualified disabled employee or applicant?, 142 ALR Fed 311.

Conduct of plaintiff as defense in action for employment discrimination based on sexual harassment under federal civil rights statutes, 145 ALR Fed 459.

What constitutes religious harassment in employment in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), 149 ALR Fed 405.

Punitive damages in actions for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), 150 ALR Fed 601.

Factors or conditions in employment discrimination cases said to justify decrease in attorney's fees awarded under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-5(k)), 151 ALR Fed 77.

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — public employment cases, 153 ALR Fed 609.

Award of compensatory damages under 42 USC § 1981a for violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 154 ALR Fed 347.

What constitutes direct evidence of age discrimination in action under age discrimination in employment act (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.) — Post-Price Waterhouse cases 155 ALR Fed 283.

What constitutes racial harassment in employment violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), 156 ALR Fed 1.

When is supervisor's hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) imputable to employer, 157 ALR Fed 1.

Construction and application of § 102(d) of Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)) pertaining to medical examinations and inquiries, 159 ALR Fed 89.

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — private employment cases, 162 ALR Fed 273.

Action under Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.), to remedy alleged harassment or hostile work environment, 162 ALR Fed 603.

Liability of employer, under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) for sexual harassment of employee by customer, client, or patron, 163 ALR Fed 445.

What constitutes “willful violation” under age discrimination in employment act (29 U.S.C. §§ 626 et seq.) entitling victim to liquidated damages, 165 ALR Fed 1.

Can “at-will” employee bring action for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 165 ALR Fed 143.

Preemption of state law wrongful discharge claim, not arising from whistleblowing, by § 541(a) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)), 176 ALR Fed 433.

“Bona fide employee benefit plan” exception to general prohibition of Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2)(B)) as applied to plans other than early retirement incentive plans, 184 ALR Fed 1.

Disparate impact claims under Age Discrimination Act of 1967, §§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq., 186 ALR Fed 1.

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 52.06 (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-9-106. Filing of complaint; determination; appeal for hearing.

  1. Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or unfair employment practice may, personally or through his attorney, make, sign and file with the department within six (6) months of the alleged violation a verified, written complaint in duplicate which shall state the name and address of the person, employer, employment agency or labor organization alleged to have committed the discriminatory or unfair employment practice, and which shall set forth the particulars of the claim and contain other information as shall be required by the department. The department shall investigate to determine the validity of the charges and issue a determination thereupon.
  2. through (j) Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 2.
  3. If the employer, employment agency, labor organization or employee is aggrieved by the department’s determination, the aggrieved party may request a fair hearing. The fair hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.
  4. The department shall issue an order within fourteen (14) days of the decision being rendered, requiring the employer, employment agency or labor organization to comply with the hearing officer’s decision. If the employer, employment agency or labor organization does not timely appeal or comply with the order within thirty (30) days, the department may petition the appropriate district court for enforcement of the order.
  5. Where the hearing officer determines that the employer, employment agency or labor organization has engaged in any discriminatory or unfair employment practice as defined in this chapter, the hearing officer’s decision may:
    1. Require the employer, employment agency or labor organization to cease and desist from the discriminatory or unfair practice;
    2. Require remedial action which may include hiring, retaining, reinstating or upgrading of employees, referring of applications for employment by a respondent employment agency or the restoration to membership by a respondent labor organization;
    3. Require the posting of notices, the making of reports as to the manner of compliance and any other relief that the hearing officer deems necessary and appropriate to make the complainant whole; or
    4. Require the employer, employment agency or labor organization to pay backpay or front pay.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 170, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 27-262; Laws 1979, ch. 137, § 1; 2001, ch. 162, §§ 1, 2; 2003, ch. 186, § 1; 2005, ch. 95, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “six (6) months” for “ninety (90) days” in (a).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

Administrative procedures must be followed. —

Because discrimination based on “sex” or “gender” under the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-101 et seq., includes sexual harassment, the employee was required to follow administrative procedures provided in the FEPA and exhaust her administrative remedies rather than pursue a tort action for retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy. Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 17, 105 P.3d 1079, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2005).

Cited in

Apodaca v. Safeway, Inc., 2015 WY 51, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Mar. 31, 2015).

Applied in

World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1993).

Stated in

Shenefield v. Sheridan County Sch. Dist., 544 P.2d 870, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1976).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Damages recoverable for wrongful discharge of at-will employee, 44 ALR4th 1131.

Damages and other relief under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap, 78 ALR4th 435.

Availability and scope of punitive damages under state employment discrimination law, 81 ALR5th 367.

Effect of prior state court judgment upon action in Federal District Court for unlawful employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.), 51 ALR Fed 829.

When will federal government employee be excused from 30-day limitation period, established by equal employment opportunity commission regulation (29 CFR § 1613.214-(a)(1)(i)), for bringing matters relating to employment discrimination to attention of equal employment opportunity counselor, 57 ALR Fed 116.

Effect on employment discrimination action of failure of equal employment opportunity commission to timely serve defendant with notice of charges as required by § 706(b) and (e) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-5(b) and (e)), 57 ALR Fed 565.

Apportionment among defendants of monetary awards to plaintiffs in suit under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e et seq.), 58 ALR Fed 363.

Backpay as recoverable in action for refusal to hire in violation of 42 USC § 1983, 58 ALR Fed 667.

Sufficiency of notice to equal employment opportunity commission charging violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC §§ 621 et seq.), 72 ALR Fed 10.

Typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to class representative in class action based on unlawful discrimination, 74 ALR Fed 42.

Award of “front pay” under § 7 of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 USC § 626), 74 ALR Fed 745.

What constitutes impairment of proposed intervenor's interest to support intervention as matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in employment discrimination actions, 74 ALR Fed 895.

Right of complainant, under 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1), to appointment of attorney in employment discrimination action, 75 ALR Fed 369.

Damages for mental distress as recoverable in action against employer under § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act (29 USC § 185) or under § 502 of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 USC § 1132), 77 ALR Fed 181.

Allowance of interest on award of attorney's fee under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-5(k)), 77 ALR Fed 272.

Action under title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.) as precluding action under 42 USC § 1983 for employment discrimination by state or local government, 78 ALR Fed 492.

Reinstatement as remedy for discriminatory discharge or demotion under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC §§ 621 et seq.), 78 ALR Fed 575.

Preemption of state-law wrongful discharge claim, not arising from whistleblowing, by § 301(a) of Labor-Management Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a)), 184 ALR Fed 241.

§§ 27-9-107 and 27-9-108. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

These sections, which derived from Laws 1965, ch. 170, §§ 7 and 8, related to judicial review and enforcement of the commission's decisions and appeal from a district court's decision to the supreme court.

Chapter 10 Collective Bargaining for Fire Fighters

Cross references. —

For constitutional provision requiring legislature to provide for voluntary submission of differences to arbitrators, see art. 19, § 8, Wyo. Const.

As to civil service for fire and police departments in cities and towns, see §§ 15-5-101 through 15-5-122 .

§ 27-10-101. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act [§§ 27-10-101 through 27-10-109 ] the following terms shall, unless the context requires a different interpretation, have the following meanings:
    1. The term “fire fighters” shall mean the paid members of any regularly constituted fire department in any city, town or county within the state;
    2. The term “corporate authorities” shall mean the council, commission or other proper officials of any city, town or county, whose duty or duties it is to establish wages, salaries, rates of pay, working conditions, and other conditions of employment of fire fighters.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 197, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-265.

Cross references. —

As to cities and towns generally, see title 15.

As to counties generally, see title 18.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Provisions are constitutional. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

Term “corporate authorities,” as used in this chapter, means those municipal officers who are either directly elected by the inhabitants of the municipality or are appointed in some mode to which they (the inhabitants) have given their consent. Nation v. State, 518 P.2d 931, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1974).

The term “corporate authorities,” as used in this section and § 27-10-104 , does not include persons appointed by the mayor, when such persons have not been elected and have not been appointed pursuant to a statute authorizing the appointment. Nation v. State, 518 P.2d 931, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1974).

“Fire fighters.”—

Unions were not properly constituted bargaining units under the Wyoming Collective Bargaining for Fire Fighters Act because (1) volunteer and pool firefighters did not participate in choosing the unions, (2) volunteer and pool firefighters were paid members of their respective departments statutorily entitled to collectively bargain, (3) statutory “context” language in the definition of fire fighters was construed narrowly and not as an improper invitation for courts to define who may unionize, and (4) the legislature intended a collective bargaining agent to represent all department members, including volunteer and pool fire fighters. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters Local Union No. 5058 v. Gillette/Wright/Campbell Cty. Fire Prot. Joint Powers Bd., 2018 WY 75, 421 P.3d 1059, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2018).

Term “corporate authorities.” —

City's mayor and/or single council member could not negotiate with a firefighters' union because the mayor and/or single council member were not “corporate authorities,” with wage setting authority, so city council was required to negotiate with the union. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local Union No. 279 v. City of Cheyenne, 2013 WY 157, 316 P.3d 1162, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2013).

City cannot challenge legality of provisions. —

A city, as a creature of the legislature, may question the interpretation of this chapter, but it cannot challenge its legality. The appropriate remedy is the presentation of its grievance to the forum that is responsible for it. If the policy is wrong, the legislature will no doubt correct it. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local v. Kingham, 420 P.2d 254, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1966).

Cited in

Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyo., 531 P.2d 884, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1975); Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1986).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Right of Wyoming State and Municipal Employees to Organize, Receive Exclusive Recognition, and Bargain Collectively,” see V Land & Water L. Rev. 605 (1970).

§ 27-10-102. Right to collective bargaining and representation by bargaining agent.

The fire fighters in any city, town or county shall have the right to bargain collectively with their respective cities, towns or counties and to be represented by a bargaining agent in such collective bargaining as to wages, rates of pay, working conditions and all other terms and conditions of employment.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 197, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-266.

“Fire fighters.”—

Unions were not properly constituted bargaining units under the Wyoming Collective Bargaining for Fire Fighters Act because (1) volunteer and pool firefighters did not participate in choosing the unions, (2) volunteer and pool firefighters were paid members of their respective departments statutorily entitled to collectively bargain, (3) statutory “context” language in the definition of fire fighters was construed narrowly and not as an improper invitation for courts to define who may unionize, and (4) the legislature intended a collective bargaining agent to represent all department members, including volunteer and pool fire fighters. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters Local Union No. 5058 v. Gillette/Wright/Campbell Cty. Fire Prot. Joint Powers Bd., 2018 WY 75, 421 P.3d 1059, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2018).

Quoted in

Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1986).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Who are employees forbidden to strike under state enactments or state common-law rules prohibiting strikes by public employees or stated classes of public employees, 22 ALR4th 1103.

First amendment protection for publicly employed firefighters subjected to discharge, transfer or discipline because of speech, 106 ALR Fed 396.

§ 27-10-103. Selection of exclusive bargaining agent by majority; withdrawal of agent by majority.

The organization selected by the majority of the fire fighters in any city, town or county shall be recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all of the members of the department, unless and until recognition of such bargaining agent is withdrawn by vote of a majority of the fire fighters.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 197, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-267.

Quoted in

Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1986).

"Fire fighters."

Unions were not properly constituted bargaining units under the Wyoming Collective Bargaining for Fire Fighters Act because (1) volunteer and pool firefighters did not participate in choosing the unions, (2) volunteer and pool firefighters were paid members of their respective departments statutorily entitled to collectively bargain, (3) statutory “context” language in the definition of fire fighters was construed narrowly and not as an improper invitation for courts to define who may unionize, and (4) the legislature intended a collective bargaining agent to represent all department members, including volunteer and pool fire fighters. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters Local Union No. 5058 v. Gillette/Wright/Campbell Cty. Fire Prot. Joint Powers Bd., 2018 WY 75, 421 P.3d 1059, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2018).

§ 27-10-104. Obligation of city, town or county to meet with agent after written notice; written contract of agreement.

It shall be the obligation of the city, town or county, through its corporate authorities, to meet and confer in good faith with the representative or representatives of the bargaining agent within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice from said bargaining agent of the request for a meeting for collective bargaining purposes. This obligation shall include the duty to cause any agreement resulting from negotiations to be reduced to a written contract, provided that no such contract shall exceed the term of two (2) years.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 197, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-268; Laws 2001, ch. 120, § 1.

Term “corporate authorities.” —

City's mayor and/or single council member could not negotiate with a firefighters' union because the mayor and/or single council member were not “corporate authorities,” with wage setting authority, so city council was required to negotiate with the union. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local Union No. 279 v. City of Cheyenne, 2013 WY 157, 316 P.3d 1162, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2013).

No party can enforce agreement where negotiations were not conducted by “corporate authorities.” The legislature has mandated that negotiations with representatives of the bargaining agent of the city's fire fighters be by the “corporate authorities” of the city, town or county; i.e., by the mayor, city manager, or members of the council of a city or town, and by the county commissioners of a county. Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1986).

Term “corporate authorities,” as used in this chapter, means those municipal officers who are either directly elected by the inhabitants of the municipality or are appointed in some mode to which they (the inhabitants) have given their consent. Nation v. State, 518 P.2d 931, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1974).

The term “corporate authorities,” as used in § 27-10-101 and this section, does not include persons appointed by the mayor, when such persons have not been elected and have not been appointed pursuant to a statute authorizing the appointment. Nation v. State, 518 P.2d 931, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1974).

§ 27-10-105. When issues to be submitted to arbitration.

In the event that the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities are unable, within thirty (30) days from and including the date of their first meeting, to reach an agreement on a contract, any and all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 197, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-269.

Quoted in

Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1986).

§ 27-10-106. Selection of arbitrators.

Within five (5) days from the expiration of the thirty (30) day period referred to in W.S. 27-10-105 , the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities shall each select and name one (1) arbitrator and shall immediately thereafter notify each other in writing of the name and address of the person so selected. The two (2) arbitrators so selected and named shall, within ten (10) days from and after the expiration of the five (5) day period hereinbefore mentioned, agree upon and select and name a third arbitrator. If on the expiration of the period allowed therefor the arbitrators are unable to agree upon the selection of a third arbitrator, a district judge of the judicial district within which the city is located, shall select him upon request in writing from either the bargaining agent or the corporate authorities. The third arbitrator, whether selected as a result of agreement between the two (2) arbitrators previously selected, or selected by a district judge, shall act as chairman of the arbitration board.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 197, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 27-270.

Quoted in

Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1986).

§ 27-10-107. Arbitration procedure.

Arbitration shall proceed pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act [§§ 1-36-101 through 1-36-119 ].

History. Laws 1965, ch. 197, § 7; W.S. 1957, § 27-271.

Quoted in

Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1986).

§ 27-10-108. Collective bargaining contract; duration of contract.

Any agreements actually negotiated between the bargaining agent and the corporate authorities either before, or within thirty (30) days after arbitration, shall constitute the collective bargaining contract governing fire fighters and said city, town or county for the period stated therein provided that term of such contract shall not exceed two (2) years.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 197, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 27-272; Laws 2001, ch. 120, § 1.

Quoted in

Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1986).

§ 27-10-109. Notice of request for bargaining prior to day on which money can be appropriated.

Whenever wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of money by any city, town or county are included as matter of collective bargaining conducted under the provisions of this act [§§ 27-10-101 through 27-10-109 ], it is the obligation of the bargaining agent to serve written notice of request for collective bargaining on the corporate authorities at least one hundred twenty (120) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the city, town or county to cover the contract period which is the subject of the collective bargaining procedure.

History. Laws 1965, ch. 197, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 27-273.

Quoted in

Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1986).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Right of Wyoming State and Municipal Employees to Organize, Receive Exclusive Recognition, and Bargain Collectively,” see V Land & Water L. Rev. 605 (1970).

Chapter 11 Occupational Health and Safety

Cross references. —

For constitutional provision as to protection of labor, see art. 1, § 22, Wyo. Const.

For safety regulations pertaining to mines and oil and gas wells generally, see title 30.

As to industrial health service, see §§ 35-1-501 through 35-1-503 .

For safety regulations with respect to public utilities generally, see title 37.

Work-related nature of employee's injuries not altered by violationsof business conduct requirements. —

Violations of legal requirements relative to the conduct of a business, should such exist, do not alter the work-related nature of the employee's injuries, and the employee is entitled to the benefit, subject to the restrictions, of the worker's compensation laws. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, 641 P.2d 1247, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1982).

Employment not rendered unlawful by statutory violations. —

The existence of Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) violations does not render otherwise lawful employment unlawful. McKennan v. Wyoming Sawmills, 816 P.2d 1303, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1991).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Products liability: sufficiency of proof of injuries resulting from “second collision,” 9 ALR4th 494.

Employer's tort liability to worker for concealing workplace hazard or nature or extent of injury, 9 ALR4th 778.

Employer's liability for injury to babysitter in home or similar premises, 29 ALR4th 304.

Liability of employer with regard to inherently dangerous work for injuries to employees of independent contractor, 34 ALR4th 914.

Duty and liability of subcontractor to employee of another contractor using equipment or apparatus of former, 55 ALR4th 725.

Employer's liability to employee for failure to provide work environment free from tobacco smoke, 63 ALR4th 1021.

Tort liability for window washer's injury or death, 69 ALR4th 207.

Scope of inspection under § 80(f) of Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 USC § 657(f)) providing for request for inspection by employee or representative of employee, 54 ALR Fed 474.

Employee misconduct as defense to citation, issued pursuant to provisions of Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 USC §§ 651 et seq.), arising out of alleged violation of standards resulting in death or personal injury of employee, 59 ALR Fed 395.

Pre-emptive effect of Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 USC §§ 651 — 678) and standards issued thereunder, 88 ALR Fed 833.

What constitutes appropriate relief for retaliatory discharge under § 11(c) of Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) (29 USCS § 660(c)), 134 ALR Fed 629.

When has employer “repeatedly” violated Occupational Safety and Health Act within meaning of § 17(a) of Act (29 USC § 666(a)), 151 ALR Fed 1.

What constitutes “willful” violation for purposes of §§ 17(a) or (e) of Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. § 666(a) or § 666(e)), 161 ALR Fed 561.

§ 27-11-101. Short title.

This act [§§ 27-11-101 through 27-11-114 ] shall be known and may be cited as the “Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Act.”

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 1; W.S. 1957, § 27-274.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to throughout this section, see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

Prohibited action. —

Threatening an immediate family member with termination in retaliation for the good faith exercise of an employee of any rights under the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Act is a form of discrimination and prohibited under this statute. McLean v. Hyland Enters., 2001 WY 111, 34 P.3d 1262, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2001).

§ 27-11-102. Declaration of policy.

  1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Wyoming, that the primary purposes of this act [§§ 27-11-101 through 27-11-114 ] are:
    1. That the prevention of accidents and occupational diseases and abiding by rules and regulations are the responsibility of both the employer and the employee;
    2. To help and assist employers and employees in accident and occupational disease prevention through educational means, which shall be made available to all industries, businesses, employees, employee groups and associations;
    3. The commission shall furnish consultant services on development of safety programs, procedures and training services for employees, supervisors and groups;
    4. Commission members and its employees shall be neutral in labor management relations in carrying out the provisions of this act;
    5. Enforcement shall be used only to obtain compliance with the act and the rules and regulations established by the commission;
    6. It is also the purpose of this act to include everyone who works in private or public employment or is self-employed; except that in the case of self-employed persons in agriculture, its purpose shall be limited to education.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 27-275; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 1.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to throughout this section, see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

Burden of proof. —

Substantial evidence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) supported the issuance of a citation and assessment of penalties against an employer under the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Act statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-11-102 , because the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Commission proved a violation based on evidence of inadequate safety precautions, employee training, and supervision and the employer did not establish its affirmative defense of employee misconduct as it did not do everything in its power to ensure compliance with the law. Three Sons, LLC v. Wyo. Occupational Health & Safety Comm'n OSHA, 2007 WY 93, 160 P.3d 58, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 2007).

Although the agency has the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that a violation of the Wyoming Health and Safety Act occurred, it is reasonable for the burden to shift, upon presentation by the Wyoming Health and Safety Commission of a prima facie case, to the employer to prove the affirmative defense of misconduct. Three Sons, LLC v. Wyo. Occupational Health & Safety Comm'n OSHA, 2007 WY 93, 160 P.3d 58, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 2007).

§ 27-11-103. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Commission” means the occupational health and safety commission;
    2. “Department” means the department of workforce services of the state of Wyoming;
    3. “Employee” means a person permitted to work by an employer in employment;
    4. “Employer” means any individual or organization including the state and all its political subdivisions, which has in its employ one (1) or more individuals performing services for it in employment;
    5. “Employment” means all services for pay under a contract of hire;
    6. “Party” means each person or agency named or admitted as a party or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party;
    7. “Person” means an individual, governmental agency, partnership, association, corporation, business, trust, receiver, trustee, legal representative or successor to any of the foregoing;
    8. “Place of employment” means plant, premises, or any other place where directed by the employer or about which an employee is permitted to work;
    9. “This act” means W.S. 27-11-101 through 27-11-114 .

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 3; W.S. 1957, § 27-276; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 1; 1983, ch. 172, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2017 ch. 41, § 1, effective July 1, 2017.

Cross references. —

As to duties of department of employment, see § 27-2-104 .

As to the occupational health and safety commission, see § 27-11-104 .

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a)(ii), substituted “department of workforce services” for “department of employment.”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

When has employer “repeatedly” violated Occupational Safety and Health Act within meaning of § 17(a) of Act (29 USC § 666(a)), 151 ALR Fed 1.

Who is “employer” for purposes of Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 USCA §§ 651 et seq.) 153 ALR Fed 303.

What constitutes “willful” violation for purposes of §§ 17(a) or (e) of Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. § 666(a) or § 666(e)), 161 ALR Fed 561.

§ 27-11-104. Occupational health and safety commission; generally.

  1. There is hereby created an occupational health and safety commission, hereinafter referred to as the “commission,” which shall be composed of seven (7) members comprised of one (1) from the general field of employees or employee organizations; one (1) from the general field of business or industry; one (1) medical doctor; and four (4) from the public at large who shall all be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate without regard to political affiliation. The commission members shall choose the commission chairman annually.
  2. The governor may remove any commission member as provided in W.S. 9-1-202 .
  3. The terms of the members shall be for six (6) years, except that of the initially appointed members: one (1) from the field of business, and one (1) from the field of labor shall serve six (6) years and one (1) medical doctor who shall serve for a term of six (6) years; and four (4) members from the public at large, one (1) to serve a term of two (2) years, one (1) to serve a term of three (3) years and one (1) to serve a term of four (4) years and one (1) to serve a term of five (5) years. The terms of the members shall terminate on the last day of February of the sixth year after their appointment, except as initially appointed. The governor shall appoint a member to fill a vacancy in accordance with W.S. 28-12-101 .
  4. The commission shall hold at least four (4) regular meetings per year at such time and place as the chairman shall specify. Special meetings may be called by the chairman, and special meetings must be called by the chairman upon a written request by four (4) or more members. Four (4) members shall constitute a quorum. Rules, regulations and variances shall not be devised, formulated, adopted, amended or repealed except by majority vote of the entire membership of the commission. All other matters shall be decided by a majority vote of those in attendance and constituting a quorum.
  5. Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.
  6. No member of the commission nor any member of any advisory committees hereinafter referred to, not otherwise in full-time employment of the state, shall receive any salary but shall receive the same per diem, mileage and expense allowance while attending and traveling to and from meetings as officers or employees of the state are allowed.
  7. The commission shall contract with an independent hearing officer to hear all contests of notice of violation, proposed penalty or abatement periods for violations, as written in the notice of violation received by the employer. The hearing officer shall be a qualified member of the bar of Wyoming and may not be an employee of the office of the attorney general or the department or a member of the commission:
    1. The employer shall have the right to contest the alleged violation, abatement period or proposed penalty for violation as written in the notice of violation;
    2. The employee or the employee representative shall have the right to contest the abatement period as stated in the notice of violation and to participate in any hearings concerning such abatement period;
    3. The hearing shall be held as soon after receiving the letter of contest and in a city as near the site of occurrence as is practicable;
    4. All hearings shall be conducted pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115 ]. The hearing officers have the powers specified in W.S. 16-3-112(b). The hearing officer shall make written findings of fact and conclusions of law in each contested case;
    5. The hearing officer shall recommend a decision to the commission. The decision of the commission is the final administrative decision. A party adversely affected by a decision of the commission may appeal to the district court in the county where the violation allegedly occurred.
  8. Effective July 1, 1979, appointments and terms of commission members shall be in accordance with W.S. 28-12-101 through 28-12-103 .

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 4; W.S. 1957, § 27-277; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 1; 1979, ch. 17, § 2; 1983, ch. 172, § 1; 1987, ch. 175, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 3.

Cross references. —

As to per diem and travel expenses of state officers, see §§ 9-3-102 and 9-3-103 .

§ 27-11-105. Occupational health and safety commission; powers and duties of commission and department.

  1. The department, in consultation with the commission, has the powers and is hereby charged with the duties:
    1. Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, §§ 2, 3.
    2. To develop and formulate, a comprehensive program for the prevention, control and abatement of unsafe and unhealthy working conditions and to direct state agencies and their staffs to compile statistics, do research, do investigation and any other duties where practical, possible and not inconsistent with the purposes of this act;
    3. To assure that all agencies and their staffs shall comply with directives of the commission in regard to occupational health and safety;
    4. To cooperate, as specified in W.S. 27-2-105 and in section 24(a) of Public Law 91-596 [29 U.S.C. § 673(a)] in the collection, compilation and analysis of data relative to the occurrence of occupational injuries and illnesses;
    5. To compile statistics and to require such reports as may be needed to aid in accomplishing this purpose;
    6. To do research on the causes and methods of preventing occupational diseases and accidents;
    7. To promote accident prevention and occupational disease prevention programs and to provide consultative and educational assistance;
    8. and (ix) Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, §§ 2, 3.
    9. To select or give emphasis to those areas and segments of the business and industrial community which need the concentrated attention and assistance of the commission and its employees;
    10. Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, §§ 2, 3.
    11. To enter into agreements with agencies of the United States government for assistance, cooperation and enforcement of safety laws and to accept funds from such federal agencies for the purpose of carrying out any of the provisions of this act;
    12. through (xv) Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, §§ 2, 3.
    13. To institute or cause to be instituted appropriate civil or criminal actions to enforce the provisions of this act and the rules and regulations promulgated under this act.
  2. The commission has the following powers and duties:
    1. To prescribe rules of practice and procedure;
    2. To promulgate, devise, formulate, adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations and to appoint advisory committees equally composed of employers and employees from the industries involved to assist and advise the commission:
      1. All rules and regulations shall be reviewed as needed and revised as necessary. Such review would be under the same procedures as the original establishment of the rules and regulations;
      2. The standards set by rule and regulation by the commission shall take into consideration recognized and accepted national codes, recognized industrial standards or similar, in whole or in part, but shall not be limited exclusively to these;
      3. The rules and regulations shall not be more stringent than corresponding federal rules and regulations. If there are no corresponding federal rules or regulations the commission may adopt applicable state rules and regulations.
    3. To exempt from coverage under this act any trade or business when the commission deems federal or other authority is adequate and dual or overlapping authority would result. If any trade or business is exempted under this section the commission shall file a detailed report with the governor showing the reasons for such exemption together with an affirmance by the federal or other authority that the coverage is adequate;
    4. To require that any rules and regulations of the commission be a part of construction, maintenance or servicing contracts or other contracts as the commission may determine;
    5. To consider and grant in accordance with and subject to the terms and limitations provided in W.S. 27-11-111 , variances from standards, rules and regulations promulgated under this act;
    6. To require the employer to be charged with the following duties:
      1. Each employer shall furnish to his employees, a place of employment and employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or that are likely to cause death or serious physical harm;
      2. Each employer shall comply with occupational safety and health standards, rules, regulations and orders issued pursuant to this act.
    7. To require the employee to be charged with the following duty, each employee shall comply with occupational safety and health standards and all rules, regulations and orders issued pursuant to this act which are applicable to his own actions and conduct.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 27-278; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 1; 1980, ch. 23, § 1; 1989, ch. 139, § 2; 1990, ch, 63, §§ 2, 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to throughout this section, see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

Employee's duties not applicable to third party. —

Subsection (b)(vi)(A) does not apply in a negligence case between an employer and a third party, such as a contractor who is injured by touching an electric company's high voltage lines. Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Wyo. 1993).

Quoted in

McLean v. Hyland Enters., Inc., 2001 WY 111, 34 P.3d 1262, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2001).

§ 27-11-106. Enforcement and administration.

  1. The department shall enforce and administer this act and the rules, regulations and orders promulgated and issued under this act. The commission shall have authority to hold hearings for the promulgation of rules and regulations in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. In any case that goes uncontested the commission may after opportunity to show cause, enter an order of final disposition which may be enforced by any district court.
  2. If an imminent danger to health or safety exists, whether it is in a specific industry where rules and regulations are in effect or not, the commission or any employee of the department so authorized is hereby empowered to direct the person where such imminent danger to health and safety exists to cease operations immediately in order to eliminate such danger to health or safety. If such person does not cease operations so as to eliminate such danger, the commission, its chairman, or any employee of the department so authorized, may, with the concurrence of the attorney general, bring a civil suit in the name of the state in the district court of the county where such danger exists, or in the United States district court for Wyoming (if it otherwise has jurisdiction), to restrain such person from continuing such operations where an imminent danger to health or safety exists.
  3. In contested cases where no appeal has been taken from the decision of the commission within the time provided for such an appeal, the commission shall adopt the decision and order the department and employer to act in accordance with the decision. Any state district court may enforce commission orders issued in that county after a hearing where no appeal has been taken. The United States district court for Wyoming (if it otherwise has jurisdiction) may also enforce any commission order.
  4. Any suit, action or appeal involving this act or rule, regulation or order of the commission, shall be advanced for trial and determined as expeditiously as feasible and no postponement or continuance shall be granted unless deemed imperative by the court.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 6; W.S. 1957, § 27-279; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 1; 1983, ch. 172, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to twice in the first sentence in subsection (a), see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Economic feasibility as factor affecting validity of, or obligation of compliance with, standards established under Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 USC §§ 651 et seq.), 68 ALR Fed 732.

§ 27-11-107. Penalty.

  1. Any employer willfully and knowingly violating any of the provisions of this act [§§ 27-11-101 through 27-11-114 ], any health and safety standards, rules or regulations promulgated under this act or any existing rule or regulation governing the conditions of employment promulgated by the commission, which causes death of an employee, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) or by imprisonment of not more than six (6) months or both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of the same person, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or by both.
  2. Any employer  willfully and knowingly violating any of the provisions of this act,  any safety and health standards, rules or regulations promulgated  under this act or any existing rule or regulation governing the conditions  of employment promulgated by the commission may be assessed a civil  penalty in an  amount determined by the commission pursuant to subsection (j) of  this section for each violation.
  3. Any employer  violating any provision of this act, any health and safety standards  or rules and regulations promulgated under this act or any existing  rule or regulation governing the conditions of employment promulgated  by the commission, the violation specifically determined to be of  a serious nature, shall be assessed a civil penalty in an  amount determined by the commission pursuant to subsection (j) of  this section.
  4. Any employer  violating any provision of this act, any health and safety standards  or rules and regulations promulgated under this act or any existing  rule or regulation governing the conditions of employment promulgated  by the commission, the violation determined not to be of a serious  nature, may be assessed a civil penalty in an amount determined by the commission  pursuant to subsection (j) of this section for each  offense as noted in the notice of violation.
  5. Whoever knowingly makes any false statement, representation or certification in any application, record, report, plan or other document filed or required to be maintained pursuant to this act, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.
  6. Any employer  who violates any of the posting requirements, as prescribed under  the provisions of this act, may be assessed a civil penalty in an amount determined by the commission  pursuant to subsection (j) of this section for each  violation.
  7. Any employer  who fails to correct a violation for which a notice of violation has  been issued, which notice of violation is not contested or appealed  under W.S. 27-11-104 and 27-11-106 , initiated  by the employer, may be assessed a civil penalty in an amount determined by the commission  pursuant to subsection (j) of this section for each  day the failure or violation continues.
  8. Payment of all fines and penalties imposed under this section shall be made to the county treasurer of the county in which the violation occurs to be credited to the county school fund.
  9. Unless otherwise specified in this section, the commission  shall through rule and regulation set the civil penalty amounts to  be imposed under subsections (b) through (d), (f) and (g) of this  section. The amount of the civil penalty shall be no greater than  the corresponding federal penalty for the specified violation as promulgated  under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666,  and shall include any adjustments made to the penalty under the Federal  Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015,  28 U.S.C. § 2461.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 7; 1973, ch. 169, § 2; 1980, ch. 23, § 1; 1983, ch. 172, § 1; 1992, ch. 85, § 1; 2016 ch. 66, § 1, effective July 1, 2016.

The 2016 amendment , effective July 1, 2016, at the end of (b), substituted “in an amount determined by the commission pursuant to subsection (j) of this section for each violation” for “of not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) nor more than seventy thousand dollars ($70,000.00) for each violation, provided that a lesser penalty may be imposed by the commission”; substituted “in an amount determined by the commission pursuant to subsection (j) of this section” for “of not more than seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00) for the violation” in the last sentence of (c), (d), and (g); substituted "in an amount determined by the commission pursuant to subsection (j) of this section" for “of up to seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00)” in the last sentence of (f); and added (j).

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2016, ch. 66, § 3 states as follows: “Section 2 of this act is effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution.”

Stated in

McLean v. Hyland Enters., Inc., 2001 WY 111, 34 P.3d 1262, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2001).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Employee misconduct as defense to citation, issued pursuant to provisions of Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 USC §§ 651 et seq.), arising out of alleged violation of standards resulting in death or personal injury of employee, 59 ALR Fed 395.

§ 27-11-108. Right of entry and inspection; consultation with employees; penalty for giving advance notice.

  1. Any department authorized employee or representative of the department may enter and inspect any property, premises or place, except private residences where persons are employed, at any reasonable time to investigate health and safety conditions and compliance with safety and health laws, rules and regulations. No person conducting an inspection under this subsection shall unreasonably interfere with the operations, business or work of any employer or employee. At the opening conference, immediately before an inspection commences, the department shall notify employers in writing of their right to refuse its employees entry to investigate health and safety conditions unless the employees have a warrant issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
  2. A representative or representatives of the employer and a representative or representatives authorized by the employees shall be given an opportunity to accompany any duly authorized employee or representative of the department before or during the physical inspection of any workplace for the purpose of aiding such inspection. Where there is no authorized employee representative, any duly authorized employee or representative of the department shall consult with a reasonable number of employees concerning matters of safety and health.
  3. Any person who gives advance notice of any inspection, investigation or response to a complaint to be conducted under the authority, and for the purpose of enforcement of this act, without the consent of the department shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or both.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 8; W.S. 1957, § 27-281; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 1; 1983, ch. 172, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to in subsection (c), see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

§ 27-11-109. Investigation of violations; proceedings; confidentiality of trade secrets.

  1. The commission or chairman, in their discretion, may make such public or private investigations as they deem necessary to determine whether any person or employer has violated, or is about to violate, any provision of this act, or any rules, regulation, or order hereunder, or to aid in the enforcement of this act, or in the prescribing of rules and regulations hereunder, may require or permit any person to file a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as they determine, as to all the facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated and may publish information concerning any violation of this act, rule, regulation or order hereunder.
  2. For the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under this act any member of the commission or any officer designated by the chairman may administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, and compel their attendance, take evidence and require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, agreements, or other documents or records, which the commission or its chairman deem relevant or material to the inquiry.
  3. In case of contumacy by or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, any Wyoming district court, upon application by the commission or its chairman, may issue to the person an order requiring him to appear before the commission or the officer designated by them, to produce documentary evidence if so ordered, or to give evidence touching the matter under investigation or in question. Failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of court.
  4. When the commission or the department shall discover or have reason to believe that any provision of the employment health and safety laws or any rule is being violated, written notice shall be served upon the person violating the same to comply with the notice within a reasonable time, to be fixed in the notice, which notice shall specify the time to be not more than thirty (30) days, except that such time may be extended for good cause shown. The notice shall specify the violation and shall be posted at or near the site of violation for a period of three (3) days or until the violation is abated, whichever is longer:
    1. In fixing the time in such notice and any extension of time, consideration shall be given to the nature of the failure or defect constituting the violation, the probable danger thereof, and the probable length of time and amount of labor required to correct the violation;
    2. If the violation continues after the expiration of the period of time fixed in the notice, including any such extension of time, enforcement in this type of case will be sought by the commission or by the department by filing a complaint and seeking a cease and desist order in the district court;
    3. Proposed penalty amounts shall be clearly stated as part of the notice of violation, but shall be a separate document which need not be posted with the notice of violation;
    4. Nothing in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this subsection shall be applicable to W.S. 27-11-106(b).
  5. No employer shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any notice of complaint or has instituted, or caused to be instituted, any proceeding under or related to this act or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others any right afforded by this act.
  6. All information reported or likewise obtained by the department in connection with any inspection or investigation under this act which contains or which might reveal a trade secret shall be considered as confidential for the purpose of this act: except that such information may be disclosed to other representatives of the department concerned with carrying out this act or when relevant in any proceedings as required under this act. In any such proceedings, the department, the commission, the review board or the court shall issue orders as may be appropriate to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 9; W.S. 1957, § 27-282; Laws 1973, ch. 169, §§ 1, 3; 1990, ch. 63, § 2.

Cross references. —

As to officers authorized to administer oaths generally, see § 1-2-102 .

As to subpoena duces tecum, see Rules 30(b) and 34, W.R.C.P.

As to subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or for the production of documentary evidence, see Rule 45, W.R.C.P.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to throughout subsections (a), (e) and (f), see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

Quoted in

McLean v. Hyland Enters., Inc., 2001 WY 111, 34 P.3d 1262, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2001).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability for discharge of at-will employee for in-plant complaints or efforts relating to working conditions affecting health or safety, 35 ALR4th 1031.

Liability for retaliation against at-will employee for public complaints or efforts relating to health or safety, 75 ALR4th 13.

Pre-emption by workers' compensation statute of employee's remedy under state “whistleblower” statute, 20 ALR5th 677.

Who are “public employers” or “public employees” within the meaning of state whistleblower protection acts, 90 ALR5th 687.

Employee misconduct as defense to citation, issued pursuant to provisions of Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 USC §§ 651 et seq.), arising out of alleged violation of standards resulting in death or personal injury of employee, 59 ALR Fed 395.

Federal preemption of whistleblower's state-law action for wrongful retaliation, 99 ALR Fed 775.

Who has “participated” in investigation, proceeding, or hearing and is thereby protected from retaliation under § 704(a) of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000E-3(a)), 149 ALR Fed 431.

§ 27-11-110. Injunction; bond; effect on sovereign immunity.

Whenever it appears to the commission that any person has engaged or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this act [§§ 27-11-101 through 27-11-114 ], or any rule, regulation, or order hereunder, the commission, its chairman, or any person so authorized by the commission may bring an action in the name of the state in the district court of any county in which the violation occurred or where it appears a violation may occur to enjoin the acts or practices to enforce compliance with this act, rule or regulation or order hereunder. Upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted. This action shall not exempt the person so enjoined from penalty, as provided in W.S. 27-11-107 , or from enforcement of any other section of the act. The court may not require the commission, its chairman, or any person authorized to bring such action, to post a bond for more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), and the state of Wyoming does hereby waive sovereign immunity up to and including the amount of the bond the court requires posted in each suit but in no event shall such waiver be more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) for liability incurred due to wrongfully causing a court to order a person to cease operating his business pursuant to this act.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 10; W.S. 1957, § 27-283; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to injunctions generally, see §§ 1-28-101 through 1-28-111 and Rule 65, W.R.C.P.

As to temporary restraining order, see § 1-28-102 and Rule 65(b), W.R.C.P.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to throughout this section, see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

Stated in

McLean v. Hyland Enters., Inc., 2001 WY 111, 34 P.3d 1262, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2001).

Cited in

Diamond Surface, Inc. v. Cleveland, 963 P.2d 996, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of employee to injunction preventing employer from exposing employee to tobacco smoke in workplace, 37 ALR4th 480.

Admissibility of evidence obtained by unconstitutional search in proceedings under Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 USC §§ 651 et seq.), 67 ALR Fed 724.

§ 27-11-111. Variances.

  1. Any person affected by this act [§§ 27-11-101 through 27-11-114 ] may request a variance to any standard, rule or regulation promulgated under this act.
  2. The commission or department shall be empowered to issue a temporary variance when the employer establishes that:
    1. He is unable to comply with the standard, rule or regulation because of unavailability of professional or technical personnel or of materials and equipment needed to come into compliance;
    2. He has taken all available steps to safeguard his employees against the hazards covered by the standard, rule or regulation;
    3. He has an effective program for coming into compliance with the standard, rule or regulation as quickly as practical; and
    4. He has advised his employees of his request for the variance.
  3. A variance may be granted when it shall be determined, after opportunity for an inspection and a hearing, that the employer requesting the variance has demonstrated by a sufficient amount of evidence that the conditions, practices, means, methods, operations or processes used or proposed to be used by the employer will provide employment and a place of employment to his employees which are as safe and healthful as those which would prevail if he complied with the standard, rule or regulation.
  4. Procedures for the issuing of a variance are set by rule as provided in W.S. 27-11-105 .

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 11; W.S. 1957, § 27-284; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to throughout this section, see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

§ 27-11-112. Investigation of health and safety charges and complaints.

The department of workforce services shall investigate charges and complaints of violation of the laws of this state with respect to health and safety and any order, rules, or regulations of the commission made in connection therewith and report them to the commission.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 12; W.S. 1957, § 27-285; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 1; 1983, ch. 172, § 1; 1989, ch. 139, § 2; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to the state personnel division, see § 9-2-1019 .

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment.”

§ 27-11-113. Physical examination of employees; religious exemption.

Any employer may require an employee to submit to a physical examination before employment or at any time during employment, and shall provide for a physical examination, as deemed necessary, due to exposure or contact with hazards or environmental conditions which may be detrimental to the health of the employee. Nothing in this or any other provision of this act [§§ 27-11-101 through 27-11-114 ] shall be deemed to authorize or require medical examination, immunization or treatment for those who object thereto on religious grounds, except where such is necessary for the protection of the health or safety of others. The results of such examinations shall be furnished only to the department, the employer and, upon request, to the employee and the employee’s physician. The employer shall pay for such examination.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 13; W.S. 1957, § 27-286; Laws 1973, ch. 169, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to throughout this section, see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

§ 27-11-114. Limitations.

  1. Nothing in this act [§§ 27-11-101 through 27-11-114 ] shall:
    1. Limit or restrict the present jurisdiction or authority of the public service commission except employee safety and occupational health;
    2. Supersede or limit the present authority for making rules and regulations pertaining to coal mines;
    3. Affect the rules and regulations now in force until the commission shall adopt rules and regulations pertaining to noncoal mines and until the same shall become effective;
    4. Affect the appointment of the state mine inspector and deputy mine inspectors;
    5. Affect the powers and duties of the state mine inspector and deputy mine inspectors as to their present powers and duties until July 1, 1970.

History. Laws 1969, ch. 199, § 14; W.S. 1957, § 27-287.

Cross references. —

As to mines and mining generally, see title 30.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act,” referred to throughout this section, see § 27-11-103(a)(ix).

Chapter 12 Worker's Compensation [Repealed]

§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-805. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Revision of title. —

Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3, revised this title by repealing and recreating former §§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-805 as present §§ 27-14-101 through 27-14-804 . For tables showing revised and renumbered sections, see Volume 11 of the Wyoming Statutes Annotated.

Chapter 13 Displaced Worker Education and Training

§ 27-13-101. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Demand occupation” means an occupation in a labor market area in which the director determines that work opportunities are available and that there is not a surplus of qualified applicants;
    2. “Director” means the director of the division;
    3. “Displaced workers” means:
      1. Those workers unemployed due to plant closures or substantial plant layoffs;
      2. Workers eligible for retraining under the federal trade adjustment assistance act;
      3. Unemployed workers otherwise affected by economic or industrial changes which have resulted in loss or reduction of their employment opportunities, as determined by the director.
    4. “Division” means the department of workforce services;
    5. “Local education or training agency” means:
      1. A board of trustees of a school district;
      2. A public or private educational institution or agency having administrative control and direction of a vocational education program;
      3. A board of a community college district; or
      4. A board of cooperative educational services.
    6. “Program” means:
      1. “Occupational transfer programs and retraining services” including:
        1. Services necessary to assist displaced workers in identifying those skills they possess which are transferable to other related demand occupations;
        2. Education and training activities necessary to prepare displaced workers for occupations to which their preexisting skills are readily transferable.
      2. “Education and training program” including a course or program of instruction which:
        1. Relates to an occupation or skill for which there are, or are expected to be in the immediate future, reasonable employment opportunities in the labor market area or areas in the state in which the participating individual intends to seek work and for which there is not a surplus of workers with requisite skills in that area, as determined by the director;
        2. Ordinarily can be completed within one (1) year and is intended for the primary purpose of enabling participants to obtain immediate employment in a demand occupation. The training shall not be primarily intended to meet the requirements of any degree from a college, community college or university.
    7. “This act” means W.S. 27-13-101 through 27-13-103 .

History. Laws 1983, ch. 128, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 2010, ch. 65, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to the state planning coordinator, see § 9-1-207 .

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in (a)(iv), substituted “department of workforce services” for “department of employment.”

Editor's notes. —

The reference to the federal trade adjustment assistance act, in subsection (a)(iii)(B), apparently means Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, which relates to relief from injury caused by import competition. See 19 U.S.C. § 2271 et seq.

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Quoted in

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, 26 P.3d 1029, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 2001).

§ 27-13-102. Powers and duties; rules and regulations.

  1. The division shall, in conjunction with the department of education, the business council, the department of workforce services, the workforce development council, the University of Wyoming and the community college commission, establish and maintain a plan to implement the occupational transfer and retraining programs and services for displaced workers created under this act. The plan shall designate:
    1. Responsibilities of state agencies in administering this act;
    2. Procedures for coordination between the state and local agencies and existing employment, training, education and other occupationally related activities and resources in the state;
    3. Procedures to encourage involvement on the part of labor, management, local government and local education and training agencies in the establishment, operation and ongoing direction of programs to assist displaced workers.
  2. The division shall:
    1. Identify statutes, rules and regulations which inhibit the implementation of programs under this act; and
    2. Recommend modifications to or waivers of statutes, rules and regulations to permit design of cost-effective programs under this act;
    3. Repealed by Laws 2014, ch. 7, §  3.
  3. The director may enter into contracts and agreements with local education or training agencies to implement this act.
  4. The governor, in consultation with the director, may promulgate reasonable rules and regulations to implement this act.

History. Laws 1983, ch. 128, § 1; 1997, ch. 31, § 2; 2008, ch. 44, § 1; 2010, ch. 65, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; 2014 ch. 7, §§ 2, 3, effective July 1, 2014.

The 2008 amendment, deleted “joint labor, health and social services interim committee and the” following “Annually report to the” in (b)(iii).

Laws 2008, ch. 44, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 5, 2008.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in the introductory language of (a), substituted “business council, the department of employment, the workforce development council” for “department of economic planning and development, the office of the commissioner of labor, the employment security commission.”

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a).

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, in (b)(i), added “and” at the end; and repealed former (b)(iii), which read: “Annually report to the joint appropriations interim committee regarding programs under this act.”

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2008, ch. 44, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act”, referred to in this section, see § 27-13-101(a)(vii).

§ 27-13-103. Programs; funding.

  1. Programs established under this act shall be funded to the maximum extent feasible through existing federal, state and local resources, both public and private. The plan required under W.S. 27-13-102(a) shall include an estimate of funds available from sources other than from the state.
  2. The division may, to the extent funded by the legislature, establish and maintain programs under this act.

History. Laws 1983, ch. 128, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “this act”, referred to in this section, see § 27-13-101(a)(vii).

Chapter 14 Worker's Compensation

Revision of title. —

Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3, revised this title by repealing and recreating former §§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-805 as present §§ 27-14-101 through 27-14-804 .

No detailed explanation of the changes made by Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, has been attempted, but, where appropriate, annotations to cases decided under former provisions have been placed under comparable sections where it was felt they would be helpful. For tables of revised and renumbered sections, see Volume 11 of the Wyoming Statutes Annotated.

Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 5, provides: “Notwithstanding provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act in effect prior to July 1, 1987, and upon receipt of a court order for payment of medical and hospital care expenses of an injured employee and subject to agreement between the division and the hospital or health care provider, the division may partially reduce the amount ordered by the court without prior approval of the court or the employer for purposes of expediting payment. Any reduction in payment shall be reported after the fact to the employer, employee and the clerk of district court. If contested by the employer or employee, no reduction under this section shall be valid unless subsequent court approval is obtained.”

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2009, ch. 156, § 2 provides: “There is appropriated fifty-five thousand dollars ($55,000.00) from the worker's compensation account established by W.S. 27-14-701(a) and forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000.00) from the highway fund for one (1) full-time position which is authorized to the office of administrative hearings. These appropriations shall be for the period beginning with the effective date of this act and ending June 30, 2010. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this appropriation shall not be transferred or expended for any other purpose and any unexpended, unobligated funds remaining from this appropriation shall revert as provided by law on June 30, 2010. The position shall be included in the office's 2011-2012 standard biennial budget request and the funding shall be included in the department of employment's and department of transportation's standard biennial budgets.”

Laws 2009, ch. 156, § 3 provides: “There is appropriated twenty-seven thousand five hundred dollars ($27,500.00) from the worker's compensation account established by W.S. 27-14-701(a) and twenty-two thousand five hundred dollars ($22,500.00) from the highway fund for the cost of investigating the acquisition of a case management system capable of accepting and receiving electronic filings and which includes a time management system. No part of this appropriation shall be expended until after the chief information officer has reviewed the proposed expenditure of these funds and the governor has determined the expenditure is appropriate. This appropriation shall not be transferred or expended for any other purpose and any unexpended, unobligated funds remaining from this appropriation shall revert as provided by law on June 30, 2010.”

Law reviews. —

For article, “Wyoming's New Comparative Fault Statute,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 509 (1996)

For article, “Administrative Law: Rulemaking and Contested Case Practice in Wyoming,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 685 (1996)

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d Worker's Compensation § 1 et seq.

Presumption or inference that accidental death of employee engaged in occupation of manufacturing or processing arose out of and in course of employment, 47 ALR5th 801.

Workers' compensation as precluding employee's suit against employer for sexual harassment in the workplace, 51 ALR5th 163.

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 1 et seq.

Article 1. Generally

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

81 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 1 et seq.

Compensability of specially equipped van or vehicle under workers' compensation statutes, 63 ALR5th 163.

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 1 et seq.

§ 27-14-101. Short title; statement of intent.

  1. This act may be cited as the “Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act”.
  2. It is the intent of the legislature in creating the Wyoming worker’s compensation division that the laws administered by it to provide a worker’s benefit system be interpreted to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled workers at a reasonable cost to the employers who are subject to the Worker’s Compensation Act. It is the specific intent of the legislature that benefit claims cases be decided on their merits and that the common law rule of “liberal construction” based on the supposed “remedial” basis of workers’ benefits legislation shall not apply in these cases. The worker’s benefit system in Wyoming is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike. Accordingly, the legislature declares that the Worker’s Compensation Act is not remedial in any sense and is not to be given a broad liberal construction in favor of any party.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1994, ch. 86, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

For the definition of “[T]his act,” referred to in this section, see § 27-14-102(a)(xxvii).

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 4, effective January 1, 1997, provides: “Except as provided by W.S. 27-14-802(d) and (e) as amended under section 1 of this act, effective January 1, 1997, all duties and responsibilities of the clerks of district court under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act shall be transferred to the worker's compensation division within the department of employment. The division shall identify and notify the clerks of court of those active worker's compensation case files to be transferred to the division. All other worker's compensation case files shall be retained by the clerks of court in accordance with file retention policies in effect for other district court cases.”

Legislative intent. —

The clear language of the Worker's Compensation Act demonstrates that the act is to assure quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled workers at a reasonable cost to employers. Streeter v. Amerequip Corp., 968 F. Supp. 624, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9464 (D. Wyo. 1997).

Contrary to the employee's assertion, there was nothing in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-101(b) indicating that the legislature intended that procedural deficiencies be overlooked simply because the claimant appeared to meet the definition of temporary total disability. Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 152, 243 P.3d 953, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2010).

Worker's Compensation Act is legislative embodiment of compromise between employers and employees who recognized the need for a new system to compensate employees for employment-related injuries. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, 641 P.2d 1247, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1982).

While the courts may no longer interpret worker's compensation statutes in favor of coverage, the supreme court will interpret them in a way that gives effect to the legislative intent and preserves the historic compromise between workers and employees. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Summers (In re Summers), 987 P.2d 153, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1999).

Liberal construction. —

The Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act should be interpreted with reasonable liberality, that the benefits that were intended be accomplished. In re McConnell, 45 Wyo. 289, 18 P.2d 629, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1933); Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1978).

The Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law of this state should be liberally and reasonably construed to protect persons suffering casualties in industry and to avoid incongruous results. In re Pope, 54 Wyo. 266, 91 P.2d 58, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1939); Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1942); Wright v. Wyoming State Training Sch., 71 Wyo. 173, 255 P.2d 211, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1953); Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1983).

Workmen's (now worker's) compensation cases should be liberally construed so that where reasonably possible the industry and not the individual workman should, to a large extent, bear burdens of accidents suffered within it. Christensen v. Sikora, 57 Wyo. 57, 112 P.2d 557, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (1941); In re Gimlin, 403 P.2d 178, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 1965).

The language of this chapter should receive a liberal construction. Lichty v. Lichty Constr. Co., 69 Wyo. 411, 243 P.2d 151, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1952).

The Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law should be liberally construed in favor of the workman. Claim of Carey, 74 Wyo. 37, 283 P.2d 1005, 1955 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1955).

The Worker's Compensation Law should be liberally construed where reasonably possible so that industry and not the individual worker should bear the burden of injuries suffered under its coverage. Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 566 P.2d 219, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 268 (Wyo. 1977).

Worker's compensation laws are to be interpreted and applied with reasonable liberality so that the purposes for which the law was enacted may be accomplished, and, where possible, the industry and not the individual should bear the burdens of accidents suffered. Jim's Water Serv. v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 376 (Wyo. 1979), limited, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

The 1994 amendment to the statute, which rejected the rule of liberal construction, did not apply to a case involving a claim for benefits arising from an injury which occurred in 1989. Collicott v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Collicott), 2001 WY 35, 20 P.3d 1077, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 2001).

Question as to constitutionality of worker's compensation statute could only be appropriately considered through declaratory judgment action, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.12. Shryack v. Carr Constr. Co., 3 P.3d 850, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 2000).

Court will not disregard principles of appellate practice inso doing. —

The Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law will be liberally construed, but the supreme court will not disregard principles of appellate practice in so doing. In re Corey, 65 Wyo. 301, 200 P.2d 333, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1948).

And rule should not be extended for benefit of counsel in providingattorney's fees. —

That the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law should be construed liberally in favor of the workman is a holding clearly for the benefit of the workman and should not be extended for the benefit of counsel in providing attorney's fees, unless such allowance can be related directly to the benefit of the workman. Williams v. Northern Dev. Co., 425 P.2d 594, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1967).

But no authority to extend law to injuries not within legislativelanguage. —

The supreme court is not free under the guise of liberal construction to extend the beneficial purposes of the compensation law to injuries that do not reasonably fall within the language employed by the legislature. Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 566 P.2d 219, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 268 (Wyo. 1977).

In the usual workmen's compensation case, the law should be liberally construed in favor of an award. However, such a policy does not give the supreme court carte blanche authority to ignore clear statutory provisions and under the guise of construction extend the beneficent purpose of the law to a disease or injury that does not fall reasonably within the reach of legislative language. Olson v. Federal Am. Partners, 567 P.2d 710, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1977).

Under the guise of liberal construction, the court cannot extend the beneficient purpose of compensation law to injuries which do not reasonably fall within the language of the statute. Deloges v. State, 750 P.2d 1329, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1988).

No jurisdiction by Mississippi court. —

Under the correct application of Wyoming law, which the Mississippi court acknowledged was applicable, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim for benefits under the Routh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1998), reh'g denied, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. Feb. 17, 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 814, 119 S. Ct. 49, 142 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4815 (U.S. 1998).

Termination for inability to work not violative of public policy.—

Although it is violative of public policy to discharge an employee for exercising his rights under this chapter, there is a distinction between a termination for the exercise by the worker of his rights and a termination for the inability to do the work, even if such inability is caused by an accident requiring the exercise of worker's compensation rights. Lankford v. True Ranches, 822 P.2d 868, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1991).

Trial court is not required to invoke inferences favorable to claimant in order to fill in the gaps in the proof designed to establish his entitlement to compensation. The rule in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence is that favorable inferences are drawn only from the prevailing party's evidence. Nickerson v. State, 740 P.2d 399, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 482 (Wyo. 1987).

Rule of liberality is not to be related to the evidence offered. Olson v. Federal Am. Partners, 567 P.2d 710, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1977).

Burden of proof. —

The Worker's Compensation Act is liberally construed in favor of the employee, but the burden is on the claimant to prove the facts required for claim allowance, and the decision of the trial court will be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. Hampton v. All Field Serv., 726 P.2d 98, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 622 (Wyo. 1986).

The Worker's Compensation Act should be liberally construed in favor of the workman when possible, but, nevertheless, the workman has the burden of proof of the injury of compensability, and the trial court's compensation decision will be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. Tate v. Colling Prod. Serv., 726 P.2d 100, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 620 (Wyo. 1986).

As a result of societal factors motivating the electorate to adopt art. 10, § 4, Wyo. Const., and the legislature to provide comprehensive legislation, there has been invoked a basic tenet that the Worker's Compensation Law must be construed with reasonable liberality to protect persons suffering casualties in industry and to avoid incongruous results. However the employee must prove all of the essential facts required for claim allowance and the decision of the trial court will be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. Flint Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Richardson, 726 P.2d 511, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 624 (Wyo. 1986).

Equitable estoppel. —

Equitable estoppel arises and is permitted under the Worker's Compensation Act; the language eliminating the liberal construction rule and mandating the quick and efficient delivery of benefits in § 27-14-101(b) does not operate to change the application of equitable estoppel under the Appleby v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 84, 47 P.3d 613, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 2002).

Prima facie case of retaliatory discharge not established.—

An employee failed to meet her evidentiary burden in establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge because the mere proximity between the filing of her worker's compensation claim and her subsequent discharge was not persuasive in light of evidence advanced by the employer of claim-preceding periods of permitted leave, effects to accommodate for physical problems, and the employee's inability to perform her assignments. Cardwell v. American Linen Supply, 843 P.2d 596, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1992).

No unreasonable classification. —

The Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act is not based on unreasonable classification. Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 43 Wyo. 108, 299 P. 284, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (1931), citing art. 1, § 34, Wyo. Const.

Limited liability accident insurance. —

Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act was not intended to give compensation as damages, but is in nature of accident insurance, a compromise between employers and employees, whereby in exchange for limited liability employer pays some claims where in the past no liability existed. Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1942).

The Wyoming Compensation Act is in the nature of accident insurance and is not intended to give compensation as damages. Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1974).

Legislature is proper source of all changes in the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law and not the courts. Christensen v. Sikora, 57 Wyo. 57, 112 P.2d 557, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (1941).

And it has the power to attach conditions to the payments to be made under the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law of this state even though a condition affects an amount recovered from a third party. Brown v. State, 79 Wyo. 355, 334 P.2d 502, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1959).

Temporary absence from state. —

Act held applicable to injuries to workmen employed in the state while temporarily out of its limits. Baldwin v. Byrne, 53 Wyo. 519, 86 P.2d 1095, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (1939).

Provisions in force at time of injury govern. State ex rel. Director, Worker's Compensation Div. v. Tallman, 589 P.2d 835, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 346 (Wyo. 1979).

When cause of action begins. —

In a worker's compensation case, a “cause of action” exists in favor of an employee at the time he receives an injury arising out of an industrial accident occurring during the course of his employment. State ex rel. Director, Worker's Compensation Div. v. Tallman, 589 P.2d 835, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 346 (Wyo. 1979).

Injuries within scope of employment are compensable. —

Trial court erred when it affirmed a decision denying workers' compensation benefits after an employer refused to reimburse its injured employee for travel expenses after the employee had been injured in a car accident where the trip to deliver a truck belonging to the employer, a truck driving school, was clearly within the scope of employment and it was obvious that the denial of reimbursement for the return trip was solely motivated by the employer's desire to exclude the employee from receiving worker's compensation benefits. Lloyd v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2004 WY 85, 93 P.3d 1001, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2004).

Previously existing condition. —

Repair of claimants preexisting arteriovenous malformation was not compensable under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act. Haynes v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 962 P.2d 876, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 1998).

Applied in

SOS Staffing Servs., Inc. v. Fields, 2002 WY 141, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 154 , 54 P.3d 761 (Wyo. 2002); Ball v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 128, 239 P.3d 621, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Sept. 22, 2010).

Quoted in

Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998); Carson v. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 WY 42, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Mar 31, 2014); Hildebrant v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 WY 41, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Mar. 24, 2015).

Stated in

Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1995).

Cited in

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1997); Medical Commission. French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1998); Moller v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 702, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 211 (Wyo. 2000); Stuarte v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 551 (D. Wyo. 2001); Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (2004); Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 7, 105 P.3d 101, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (2005); In re Worker's Compensation Claim v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2006 WY 65, 135 P.3d 568, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. May 31, 2006).

Law reviews. —

For note on 50 years of workmen's compensation, see 16 Wyo. L.J. 26 (1961).

For comment on Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1974), see X Land & Water L. Rev. 263 (1975).

For article, “The Wyoming Uninsured Motorist Act: A Regulatory Reconciliation of Mandated Coverages with the Standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement,” see XI Land & Water L. Rev. 213 (1976).

For note, “Fixing Liability in Occupational Disease Cases,” see XIII Land & Water L. Rev. 1051 (1978).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Insurance carrier's liability for part of employer's liability attributable to violation of law or other misconduct on his part, 1 ALR2d 407.

Application for, or award, denial or acceptance of, compensation under state workmen's compensation act as precluding action under Federal Employers' Liability Act by one engaged in interstate commerce within that act, 6 ALR2d 581.

Voluntary payment of compensation under statute of one state as bar to claim, or ground for reduction of claim, of compensation under statute of another state, 8 ALR2d 628.

Waiver and estoppel in regard to insurer's denial of renewal of policy, 85 ALR2d 1410.

Application for, or receipt of, unemployment compensation benefits as affecting claim for workmen's compensation, 96 ALR2d 941.

Handling, preparing, presenting or trying workmen's compensation claims or cases as practice of law, 2 ALR3d 724.

Provision for indemnifying insurer against, or reimbursing it for, liability which it may incur to persons injured in policy under workmen's compensation act, 29 ALR3d 291.

Insured's receipt of or right to workmen's compensation benefits as affecting recovery under accident, hospital or medical expense policy, 40 ALR3d 1012.

Homeowners' or personal liability insurance as providing coverage for liability under workmen's compensation laws, 41 ALR3d 1306.

Mental disorders as compensable under workmen's compensation acts, 97 ALR3d 161.

Modern status of effect of state workmen's compensation act on right of third-person tortfeasor to contribution or indemnity from employer of injured or killed workman, 100 ALR3d 350.

Industrial accidents involving conveyor belts or systems, 2 ALR4th 262.

Recovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim, 32 ALR4th 1221.

Liability of employer, supervisor or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress, 52 ALR4th 853.

Workers' compensation: effect of allegation that injury was caused by, or occurred during course of, worker's illegal conduct, 73 ALR4th 270.

Workers' compensation: compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 ALR4th 110.

Presumption or inference that accidental death of employee engaged in occupation of manufacturing or processing arose out of and in course of employment, 47 ALR5th 801.

Handling, preparing, presenting, or trying workers' compensation claims or cases as practice of law, 58 ALR5th 449.

Workers' compensation: availability, rate, or method of calculation of interest on attorney's fees or penalties, 79 ALR5th 201.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as a result of sudden emotional stimuli involving personnel action, 82 ALR5th 149.

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 130.08D (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-14-102. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Artificial replacement” means the addition of an artificial part to the human body which replaces a part lost, damaged or in need of correction, excluding any personal item, artificial heart, automobile or the remodeling of an automobile or other physical structure or any item of furniture except as provided by rule and regulation of the division. If a wheelchair is approved by the division for use during impairment or disability, “artificial replacement” may include necessary cost effective physical structures such as ramps, automobile devices or remodeling, bars and rails, and other necessary equipment or devices aiding the body during impairment or disability, subject to the following criteria:
      1. A physical structure for which artificial replacement is claimed shall be the primary residence of the claimant;
      2. Only one (1) automobile at a time shall be eligible for devices or remodeling under this paragraph.
    2. “Ascertainable loss” means that point in time in which it is apparent that permanent physical impairment has resulted from a compensable injury, the extent of the physical impairment due to the injury can be determined and the physical impairment will not substantially improve or deteriorate because of the injury;
    3. “Child” means any unmarried minor or physically or mentally incapacitated individual receiving court ordered support or substantially all of his financial support from the employee at the time of injury or death of the employee and includes an adopted child, stepchild, posthumous child or acknowledged illegitimate child but does not include a parent or spouse of the employee;
    4. “Delinquent payment” means any payment required of an employer under this act which is not paid within thirty (30) days after the date due as specified by this act;
    5. “Administrator” means the administrator of the division;
    6. “Division” means the worker’s compensation division within the department of workforce services;
    7. “Employee” means any person engaged in any extra hazardous employment under any appointment, contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, and includes student learners engaged in any extra hazardous employment, legally employed minors, aliens authorized to work by the United States department of justice, office of citizenship and immigration services, and aliens whom the employer reasonably believes, at the date of hire and the date of injury based upon documentation in the employer’s possession, to be authorized to work by the United States department of justice, office of citizenship and immigration services. “Employee” does not include:
      1. Any individual whose employment is determined to be casual labor;
      2. A sole proprietor or a partner of a business partnership unless coverage is elected pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(k);
      3. An officer of a corporation unless coverage is elected pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(k);
      4. Any individual engaged as an independent contractor;
      5. A spouse or dependent of an employer living in the employer’s household;
      6. A professional athlete, except as provided in W.S. 27-14-108(q);
      7. An employee of a private household;
      8. A private duty nurse engaged by a private party;
      9. An employee of the federal government;
      10. Any volunteer unless covered pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(e);
      11. Any adult or juvenile prisoner or probationer unless covered pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(d)(ix);
      12. [Effective until January 2, 2023] An elected public official or an appointed member of any governmental board or commission, except for a duly elected or appointed county officer; (N) [Effective January 2, 2023] An elected public official or an appointed member of any governmental board or commission, except for a duly elected or appointed county officer or a member of the legislature;
      13. The owner and operator of a motor vehicle which is leased or contracted with driver to a for-hire common or contract carrier. The owner-operator shall not be an employee for purposes of this act if he performs the service pursuant to a contract which provides that the owner-operator shall not be treated as an employee for purposes of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Social Security Act, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and income tax withholding at source;
      14. A member of a limited liability company unless coverage is elected pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(k);
      15. A foster parent providing foster care services for the department of family services or for a certified child placement agency;
      16. An individual providing child day care or babysitting services, whose wages are subsidized or paid in whole or in part by the Wyoming department of family services. This exclusion from coverage does not exclude from coverage an individual providing child day care or babysitting services as an employee of any individual or entity other than the Wyoming department of family services;
      17. A responsible broker, associate broker or salesperson licensed under the Real Estate License Act, W.S. 33-28-101 through 33-28-401 , who receives compensation for the services identified in W.S. 33-28-102(b)(xlv). The receipt of additional compensation for the performance of other real estate related services shall not negate this exemption.
    8. “Employee” means any person engaged in any extra hazardous employment under any appointment, contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, and includes student learners engaged in any extra hazardous employment, legally employed minors, aliens authorized to work by the United States department of justice, office of citizenship and immigration services, and aliens whom the employer reasonably believes, at the date of hire and the date of injury based upon documentation in the employer’s possession, to be authorized to work by the United States department of justice, office of citizenship and immigration services. “Employee” does not include:
      1. Repealed by Laws 1999, ch. 46, § 2.
      2. The governmental entity for which recipients of public assistance perform work if that work does not otherwise establish a covered employer and employee relationship;
      3. The governmental entity for which volunteers perform the specified volunteer activities under W.S. 27-14-108(e);
      4. The governmental entity for which prisoners and probationers work or perform community service under W.S. 27-14-108(d)(ix) or (xv);
      5. An owner-operator of a mine at which any mine rescue operation or training occurs;
      6. A temporary service contractor for a temporary worker;
      7. Any person, contractor, firm, association or corporation otherwise qualifying under this paragraph as an employer and who utilizes the services of a worker furnished by another contractor, joint employer, firm, association, person or corporation other than a temporary service contractor, joint employer, independent contractor or owner and operator excluded as an employee under subparagraph (a)(vii)(O) of this section;
      8. Any employer otherwise qualifying under this paragraph as an employer and participating in a school-to-work program approved by the department of workforce services, any local school district board of trustees, community college district board of trustees or the department of education, and the employer previously elected coverage in writing pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(m);
      9. Any corporation, limited liability company, partnership or sole proprietorship electing coverage pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(k), whether or not the corporation, limited liability company, partnership or sole proprietorship has other employees covered by this act;
      10. A collective group of county governments or county governmental entities as specified under W.S. 27-14-109 .
    9. “Gross earnings” means remuneration payable for services from any source including commissions, bonuses and cash and excluding tips and gratuities. The reasonable cash value of remuneration other than cash or check shall be prescribed by rule and regulation of the division. To the extent the following are not considered wages under 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 through 3311, “gross earnings” does not include:
      1. Any premium paid by an employer under a plan, system or into a fund for insurance or annuities to provide an employee or class of employees retirement, sickness or accident disability, medical and hospitalization expenses for sickness or accident disability or death benefits if the employee cannot receive any part of this payment instead of the death benefit or any part of the premium if the benefit is insured and cannot assign or receive cash instead of the benefit upon withdrawal from or termination of the plan, system, policy or services with the employer;
      2. A payment by an employer not deducted from an employee’s remuneration for the tax imposed under 26 U.S.C. § 3101;
      3. Any dismissal payment which the employer is not obligated to make;
      4. The value of any meals or lodging furnished by and for the convenience of the employer to the employee if the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer or in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept lodging on the business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment;
      5. Remuneration received by an employee as sick pay following a six (6) month continuous period of illness;
      6. Any benefit received under a cafeteria plan specified by 26 U.S.C. § 125, excluding cash;
      7. Wages of a deceased worker paid to a beneficiary or estate following the calendar year of the worker’s death;
      8. Services received under any dependent care assistance program to the extent excluded from gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 129;
      9. Wages paid to a disabled worker during the year following the year in which he became entitled to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act;
      10. Services or benefits received under any educational assistance program;
      11. Any benefit or other value received under an employee achievement award;
      12. The value of any qualified group legal services plan to the extent payments are excludable from gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 120;
      13. Costs of group term-life insurance;
      14. Any loan repayment which is repaid at interest rates below established market rates;
      15. Any moving expenses;
      16. Employer contributions to any qualified retirement or pension plan or individual retirement account and distributions from qualified retirement and pension plans and annuities under 26 U.S.C. § 403(b);
      17. Benefit payments under any supplemental unemployment compensation plan; and
      18. Any benefits paid under this act or any other worker’s compensation law of another state.
    10. “Health care provider” means doctor of medicine, chiropractic or osteopathy, dentist, optometrist, podiatrist, psychologist or advanced practitioner of nursing, acting within the scope of his license, licensed to practice in this state or in good standing in his home state;
    11. “Injury” means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the employer’s business requires an employee’s presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. “Injury” does not include:
      1. Any illness or communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the illness or disease is increased by the nature of the employment. For the period beginning January 1, 2020 through March 31, 2022 unless otherwise extended by the legislature, if any employee in an employment sector for which coverage is provided by this act is infected with the COVID-19 Coronavirus, it shall be presumed that the risk of contracting the illness or disease was increased by the nature of the employment;
      2. Injury caused by:
        1. The fact the employee is intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled substance, or both, except any prescribed drug taken as directed by an authorized health care provider. The division shall define “intoxicated” and “under the influence of a controlled substance” for purposes of this subparagraph in its rules and regulations; or
        2. The employee’s willful intention to injure or kill himself or another.
      3. Injury due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee;
      4. Any injury sustained during travel to or from employment unless the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the employer;
      5. Any injury sustained by the prisoner during or any harm resulting from any illegal activity engaged in by prisoners held under custody;
      6. Any injury or condition preexisting at the time of employment with the employer against whom a claim is made;
      7. Any injury resulting primarily from the natural aging process or from the normal activities of day-to-day living, as established by medical evidence supported by objective findings;
      8. Any injury sustained while engaged in recreational or social events under circumstances where an employee was under no duty to attend and where the injury did not result from the performance of tasks related to the employee’s normal job duties or as specifically instructed to be performed by the employer; or
      9. Any mental injury unless it is:
        1. Caused by a compensable physical injury, it occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with, the physical injury and it is established by clear and convincing evidence, which shall include a diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist, licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner meeting criteria established in the most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association. In no event shall benefits for a compensable mental injury under this subdivision be paid for more than thirty-six (36) months after an injured employee’s physical injury has healed to the point that it is not reasonably expected to substantially improve;or
        2. Experienced by a first responder and established by clear and convincing evidence, which shall include a diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist, licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner meeting criteria established in the most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association. The mental injury shall not be considered a compensable injury if the mental injury is directly attributed to disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, termination or similar action taken by an employer. In no event shall any disability benefit for a compensable mental injury under this subdivision extend more than thirty-six (36) months beyond the diagnosis of a compensable injury.
    12. “Medical and hospital care” when provided by a health care provider means any reasonable and necessary first aid, medical, surgical or hospital service, medical and surgical supplies, apparatus, essential and adequate artificial replacement, body aid during impairment, disability or treatment of an employee pursuant to this act including the repair or replacement of any preexisting artificial replacement, hearing aid, prescription eyeglass lens, eyeglass frame, contact lens or dentures if the device is damaged or destroyed in an accident and any other health services or products authorized by rules and regulations of the division. “Medical and hospital care” does not include any personal item, automobile or the remodeling of an automobile or other physical structure, public or private health club, weight loss center or aid, experimental medical or surgical procedure, item of furniture or vitamin and food supplement except as provided under rule and regulation of the division and paragraph (a)(i) of this section for impairments or disabilities requiring the use of wheelchairs;
    13. “Nonresident employer” means:
      1. An individual who was not domiciled in Wyoming for at least twelve (12) months prior to commencing operations in the state; or
      2. A partnership or other association if any member does not qualify under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; or
      3. A corporation in which more than three-fourths (3/4) of the capital stock is owned by individuals who do not qualify under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; and
      4. A person who uses or employs covered individuals in Wyoming and who has not been a continuous contributor under this act for twelve (12) months preceding the use or employment.
    14. “Payroll” means “gross earnings” as defined under paragraph (a)(ix) of this section;
    15. “Permanent partial disability” means the economic loss to an injured employee, measured as provided under W.S. 27-14-405 (j), resulting from a permanent physical impairment;
    16. “Permanent total disability” means the loss of use of the body as a whole or any permanent injury certified under W.S. 27-14-406 , which permanently incapacitates the employee from performing work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training;
    17. “Spouse” means any individual legally married to an employee at the time of injury or death;
    18. “Temporary total disability” means that period of time an employee is temporarily and totally incapacitated from performing employment at any gainful employment or occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training. The period of temporary total disability terminates at the time the employee completely recovers or qualifies for benefits under W.S. 27-14-405 or 27-14-406 ;
    19. “Joint employer” means any person, firm, corporation or other entity which employs joint employees, is associated by ownership, commonly managed or controlled and contributes to the worker’s compensation account as required by this act;
    20. “Employer making contributions required by this act” means the employee’s employer and any joint employer when the employer or any joint employer reports the employee’s wages to the division on an account or through a consolidated worker’s compensation account and contributions are made to the account as required by this act;
    21. “Joint employee” means any person:
      1. Who has an express or implied contract for employment with more than one (1) joint employer at the same time;
      2. Whose work is controlled by more than one (1) joint employer; and
      3. Who is engaged in the performance of work for more than one (1) joint employer.
    22. “Consolidated Wyoming worker’s compensation account” means an account maintained by the Wyoming workers’ compensation division to which an employer reports the wages of its employees and joint employees for its own account and the account of its joint employers, pursuant to which contributions are made to the account as required by this act;
    23. “Independent contractor” means an individual who performs services for another individual or entity and:
      1. Is free from control or direction over the details of the performance of services by contract and by fact;
      2. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 117, § 2.
      3. Represents his services to the public as a self-employed individual or an independent contractor; and
      4. May substitute another person to perform his services.
    24. “Casual labor” means service of less than two (2) consecutive weeks and not within the normal course of business;
    25. “Temporary service contractor” means any person, firm, association or corporation conducting a business that employs individuals directly for the purpose of furnishing services of the employed individuals on a temporary basis to others;
    26. “Temporary worker” means a worker whose services are furnished to another employer on a temporary basis to substitute for a permanent employee on leave or to meet an emergency or short-term workload;
    27. “This act” means W.S. 27-14-101 through 27-14-806 ;
    28. “State employee” means any individual entering into service of or working under an employment contract with any agency of the state of Wyoming for which compensation is paid or which qualifies the individual to participate in the state retirement account. Effective on and after July 1, 2002, “state employee” shall include the University of Wyoming;
    29. “Professional athlete” means an individual who receives payment from a team owner for competing on a baseball, basketball, football, hockey or soccer team having its principal place of business in Wyoming;
    30. For purposes of W.S. 27-14-207 and 27-14-806 , “person” means as defined in W.S. 8-1-102 ;
    31. “First responder” means a peace officer or an employee who is employed or volunteers as a firefighter, search and rescue personnel or ambulance personnel;
    32. [Effective January 2, 2023] “Member of the legislature” means a duly elected or appointed member of the Wyoming legislature commencing when the member’s term begins if elected or upon being sworn into office if appointed and until such time as the member’s seat is vacated as provided in W.S. 22-18-101 or the member’s term ends;
    33. “Student learner” means a person between the ages of sixteen (16) years and eighteen (18) years who is currently enrolled in a Wyoming school district, community college or technical school and who enters into a student training agreement with an employer pursuant to a student learner agreement between the employer and the student learner’s school district. For purposes of this act, a student learner shall be considered an employee under paragraph (vii) of this subsection;
    34. “Student learner agreement” means an agreement between a Wyoming school district, community college or technical school and an employer that:
      1. Authorizes an employer to provide vocational training and work experience to student learners;
      2. Provides for the student learner to receive course credit from the school district, community college or technical school for completing the vocational training or both course credit and compensation from the employer;
      3. Specifies terms and conditions for any student learner who is not eighteen (18) years of age in accordance with federal law and regulation concerning the performance of certain particularly hazardous work as defined by federal regulation;
      4. Authorizes the student learner to be covered under the worker’s compensation program established under this act.
    35. “Student training agreement” means an agreement entered into between an employer and a student of a school district, community college or technical school with a student learner agreement with the employer and that specifies the terms and conditions included in the student learner agreement and that is subject to the provisions of W.S. 27-14-110 . For students under the age of eighteen (18), a student training agreement shall be signed by the student’s parent or guardian unless the student is an emancipated minor under W.S. 14-1-201 through 14-1-206 .

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1987, ch. 31, § 1; ch. 94, § 1; 1989, ch. 29, § 1; ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 7, § 1; ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 88, § 1; ch. 140, § 1; ch. 241, § 3; 1993, ch. 113, § 1; ch. 216, § 1; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 1995, ch. 121, § 2; ch. 205, § 1; 1996, ch. 82, § 1; 1997, ch. 93, § 1; ch. 177, § 1; 1998, ch. 54, § 1; ch. 117, § 2; 1999, ch. 46, § 2; ch. 194, § 1; 2001, ch. 132, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 10, § 1; ch. 100, § 3; 2003, ch. 44, § 1; ch. 97, § 1; ch. 138, § 1; 2005, ch. 185, § 2; ch; 2009, ch. 156, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; ch. 98, § 1; 2014 ch. 22, § 1, effective July 1, 2014; 2015 ch. 133, § 1, effective July 1, 2015; 2017 ch. 89, § 2, effective July 1, 2017; 2018 ch. 6, § 1, effective July 1, 2018; 2020 ch. 156, § 1, effective January 2, 2023; 2020 ch. 160, § 1, effective July 1, 2020; 2020, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 1; 2021 ch. 118, § 2, effective April 6, 2021; 2021 ch. 160, § 2, effective July 1, 2021.

The 2005 amendments. —

The first 2005 amendment, by ch. 185, § 2, effective July 1, 2005, in (a)(vii), substituted “office of citizenship and immigration services” for “immigration and naturalization service”; and inserted “and aliens whom the employer reasonably believes, at the date of hire and the date of injury based upon documentation in the employer's possession, to be authorized to work by the United States department of justice, office of citizenship and immigration services”; in (a)(xi)(B)(I), inserted the second sentence, and added (a)(xxx).

The second 2005 amendment, by ch. 231, § 1, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “account” for “fund” in (a)(xx), (a)(xxii), and (a)(xxviii).

See conflicting legislation note. This section is set out above incorporating changes made by both 2005 acts.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (a)(vii)(B), inserted “unless coverage is elected pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(k)” at the end.

The 2012 amendments. —

The first 2012 amendment, by ch. 1, § 1, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (a)(vi).

The second 2012 amendment, substituted “27-14-806” for “27-14-805” in (a)(xxvii).

Laws 2012, ch. 98 § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 15, 2012.

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, in (a)(viii), inserted “or (k)”; and added (a)(viii)(J).

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in (a)(vii)(N), substituted “appointed county officer” for “appointed sheriff or county coroner.”

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a)(viii), added (K).

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added (a)(vii)(S).

The 2020 amendments. —

The first 2020 amendment, by ch. 156, § 1, effective January 2, 2023, in (a)(vii)(N) added “or a member of the legislature” at the end; and added (a)(xxxii).

The second 2020 amendment, by ch. 160, § 1, effective July 1, 2020, redesignated (a)(xi)(J) as the introductory language of (a)(xi)(J) and (a)(xi)(J)(I); in (a)(xi)(J)(I) added “or psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner” following “psychologist,” substituted “mental injury under this subdivision be paid” for “mental injury be paid” and “thirty-six (36) months” for “six (6) months,” and made related changes; added (a)(xi)(J)(II) and made related changes; and added (a)(xxxi).

The third 2020 amendment, by 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 1, in (a)(xi)(A), added the last sentence.

Laws 2020, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 7 makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved May 20, 2020.

This section is set out as reconciled by the Wyoming legislative service office.

The 2021 amendments. —

The first 2021 amendment, by ch. 118, § 2, substituted "March 31, 2022 unless otherwise extended by the legislature" for "December 30, 2020" in (a)(xi)(A).

Laws 2021, ch. 118, § 4, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved April 6, 2021.

The second 2021 amendment, by ch. 160, § 2, effective July 1, 2021, added "student learners engaged in any extra hazardous employment," in (a)(vii); and added (a)(xxxiii) through (a)(xxxv).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subparagraph (a)(vii)(I), (a)(vii)(L), (a)(ix)(I), (a)(ix)(L), or (a)(xi)(I) or subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

U.S. Code. —

The Federal Insurance Contributions Act is codified at 26 U.S.C. 3301 et. seq. The Social Security Act is codified throughout article 42 of the United States Code. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act is codified at 26 U.S.C. 3301 et. seq.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

Laws 2005, ch. 98, § 3, provides: “Any other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

1. Scope.

2. Course.

I.General Consideration.

Constitutionality. —

Denying coverage for mental injury while compensating physical injury does not violate equal protection guarantees because the classifications bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective, namely, the economic concerns and burdens associated with mental injury. Pinkerton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 250, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 1997).

Section should be reasonably and liberally construed. —

This section is to be reasonably and liberally construed to protect persons suffering injuries in stated types of industry. In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1947); Pease v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 453 P.2d 887, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1969).

Authority of administrative agencies. —

Neither the district court nor the Wyoming Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute; however, the right to pursue the constitutionality of the statute under which the agency acted is preserved in W.R.A.P. 12.12, via a declaratory judgment action. Thus a declaratory judgment was the proper course of action for the employee, an illegal alien who was denied benefits and who challenged the constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii), to proceed. Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

To place burden of accident on industry rather than on workman. —

A construction should be adopted for this section that where reasonably possible the industry and not the individual workman should, to a large extent, bear the burdens of accidents suffered within. In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1947).

However, courts are not free under the guise of construction to extend the beneficent purpose of the law to injuries that do not reasonably fall within the reach of the language used. Pease v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 453 P.2d 887, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1969).

In order for death to be compensable, the initial injury must be the direct cause of the employee's death. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1997), limited, Fisher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safey & Compensation Division (In re Fisher), 2008 WY 89, 189 P.3d 866, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2008).

Governing law. —

In absence of a specific legislative directive to apply federal law, state law applies to define parameters of worker's compensation coverage. Maser v. L. & H. Welding & Mach. Co., 1 P.3d 642, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2000).

Applicability. —

Although federal law may have prohibited the type of employment sixteen-year-old was engaged in when injured, he was a legally employed minor under Wyoming law, and therefore worker's compensation provided his exclusive remedy. Maser v. L. & H. Welding & Mach. Co., 1 P.3d 642, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2000).

Employee's account of events not credible. —

Where there were numerous inconsistencies in the employee's report and he gave an improbable account of the events surrounding the alleged incident, the employee was not credible and he did not show his injury arose out of and in the course of his duties as a flagger for the employer. Everheart v. S & L Indus. (In re Everheart), 957 P.2d 847, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1998).

Legislative history should be consulted. —

The legislative history of this section should be consulted as an aid in interpreting it, since, in construing statutes, the intention of the law making body which enacted them is to be ascertained as nearly as possible. Lichty v. Lichty Constr. Co., 69 Wyo. 411, 243 P.2d 151, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1952).

Medical and hospital care. —

By expressly excluding personal items from the definition of medical and hospital care unless the workers' compensation division chooses to promulgate rules authorizing their purchase and reimbursement, the legislature has plainly evidenced an intent that the division control purchases of personal items. Dietz & Assoc's. v. State (ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div.), 12 P.3d 702, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 211 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, McCallister v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2019 WY 47, 440 P.3d 1078, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2019).

Subsection (a)(xii), which authorizes the workers' compensation division to promulgate rules for the purpose of redefining personal items as medical and hospital care, does not extend to authorize the division to impose a ninety-day time requirement without qualification. Dietz & Assoc's. v. State (ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div.), 12 P.3d 702, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 211 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, McCallister v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2019 WY 47, 440 P.3d 1078, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2019).

Substantial evidence supported the denial of payment for an MRI, because the treatment to appellant's back was not related to the original work injury to his tailbone and was not considered reasonable and necessary medical care pursuant to this section. Although appellant's doctor requested authorization for an MRI to rule out the possibility of a disc herniation, there was no indication in the doctor's notes that he believed a disc herniation was caused by the injury to appellant's tailbone. In re Worker's Comp. Claim v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 74, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (May 25, 2012).

Burden of proof for “temporary total disability.” —

In a worker's compensation case involving “temporary total disability,” the employer did not have the burden of proving that a job offered to the injured employee was one which was suitable and one which the employee could perform. The shifting of the burden of proof under the “odd-lot doctrine” as to the suitability of offered employment was inapplicable, as the employee failed to prove she was so handicapped as to be unemployable in a well-known branch of the labor market. Leonard v. McDonalds of Jackson Hole, 746 P.2d 1261, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 557 (Wyo. 1987).

Definition of “child” was intended by legislature to make substantial dependency the test of eligibility and to eliminate the confusion and dispute existing before regarding stepchildren, adoption, legitimacy, lineage and alienage. Jim's Water Serv. v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 376 (Wyo. 1979), limited, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

Dependency deemed question of fact. —

Whether any individual is substantially dependent upon another is a question of fact not to be disturbed by the supreme court when substantial evidence exists to support that finding. Jim's Water Serv. v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 376 (Wyo. 1979), limited, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

Hearing examiner must consider all the evidence of causation. —

A claimant seeking workers' compensation benefits is not precluded from meeting his burden of proof merely because the state of medical science cannot identify the specific cause of his injury; in such a case, the hearing examiner must consider all of the evidence relevant to the issue of causation. Murray v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 993 P.2d 327, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1999).

Hearing examiner's award overruled. —

The fact that claimant was killed when she was returning from a doctor's appointment for an injury she sustained while she was working did not translate to a finding that the injury caused her death, and the hearing examiner's award of worker's compensation benefits to the survivors was not in accordance with the State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1997), limited, Fisher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safey & Compensation Division (In re Fisher), 2008 WY 89, 189 P.3d 866, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2008).

Burden of proof. —

Where the final determination notified defendant/claimant that causation of his current shoulder impingement was at issue, it was defendant/claimant's burden to prove that his continuing shoulder problems were caused by his work-related injury and not by his pre-existing conditions. Snyder v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 957 P.2d 289, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1998).

Claimant met his burden of proof. —

Where the employee presented uncontradicted testimony that his injury occurred while he was at work, and that his return to that environment would endanger his health, he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury was compensable. Murray v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 993 P.2d 327, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1999).

Claimant failed to sustain burden. —

The hearing examiner's determination that the claimant failed to prove a work-related material aggravation of a congenital condition was a reasonable conclusion from the facts presented. Frazier v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 997 P.2d 487, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2000).

Substantial evidence supported the decision to uphold the denial of payment for medical services related to appellant's cervical spine, because she did not prove a compensable injury under this section. The medical evidence did not suggest that any imperfections in appellant's cervical spine were caused by her fall at work. Price v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2011 WY 160, 266 P.3d 940, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Dec. 8, 2011).

Claimant's assertion that the Office of Administrative Hearings erred by failing to properly apply the second compensable injury rule failed, as the claimant did not direct the supreme court to any evidence showing that the injury to his left groin, lower abdomen, leg and knee contributed to his back problems. Guerrero v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 WY 88, 352 P.3d 262, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2015).

Workers' Safety and Compensation Division failed to sustain burden. —

Record irrefutably established that degree of claimant's obvious impairment, coupled with his mental capacity, education, training, and age, placed him prima facie in the odd lot category, and thus burden of proof shifted to employer to show that light work of a special nature which the employee could perform, but which was not generally available and in fact was available to the employee; here, Workers' Safety and Compensation Division failed in its burden of proof, not the claimant. Nagle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Nagle), 2008 WY 99, 190 P.3d 159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2008).

Neck injury not work-related compensable injury. —

A state training school employee who, as she was leaving her home to return a performance evaluation to her employer, tripped on a nail which was protruding from the floor of her porch and fell, aggravating her prior back injury, and also injuring her neck, was not acting within the scope of her employment, as she was not in a place her employer required her to be, or in or about her employer's premises. Also, although the employee contended that her neck injury was compensable because her work-related back injury caused that injury (she claimed that she tripped on the nail and injured her neck because the back injury caused her to drag her feet and because the back injury was her reason for hand delivering the evaluation), there was sufficient evidence to find that her neck injury resulted from the condition of the house and not from her prior medical treatment or prior medical condition. Bearden v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 868 P.2d 268, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1994), overruled in part, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1997).

Applied in

Quoted in

Swasso v. State ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div., 751 P.2d 887, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1988); State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Ohnstad, 802 P.2d 865, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1990); Allen v. Natrona County Sch. Dist. No. One, 811 P.2d 1, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1994), overruled in part on other grounds, Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2002); Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 931 P.2d 234, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1997); Adams v. State, ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 975 P.2d 17, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 22 ; Dan's Supermarket v. Pate, 2001 WY 104, 33 P.3d 1121, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 2001); Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2002); Hicks v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 11, 105 P.3d 462, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (2005); Phillips v. TIC-The Industrial Co. of Wyoming, Inc. (In re Phillips) 2005 WY 40, 109 P.3d 520, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (2005); Birch v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Feb 27, 2014).

Cited in

Forni v. Pathfinder Mines, 834 P.2d 688, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1992); State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1994); Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman's Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 1996); Shassetz v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 920 P.2d 1246, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1996); Sell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. (In re Sell), 7 P.3d 1, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2000); Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, 19 P.3d 500, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2001); Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, 109 P.3d 887, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (2005); Carabajal v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2005 WY 119, 119 P.3d 947, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (2005); State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 57, 248 P.3d 1155, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Mar. 30, 2011); Picozzi v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2013 WY 86, 304 P.3d 977, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Jul 16, 2013); Porter v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 69, 396 P.3d 999, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For a comment, “Assaults by Fellow Employees in Workmen's Compensation Cases,” see 7 Wyo. L.J. 207.

For article, “Industrial Siting Legislation: The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and Siting Act — Advance or Retreat?” see XI Land & Water L. Rev. 27 (1976).

For case note, “Workmen's Compensation — A Confusing Double Standard for Mental Injuries. Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1984),” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 287 (1985).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — Using the Exclusive Remedy Provision as a Shield for an Employer's Intentional Acts Against Employees. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 330 (Wyo. 1984),” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 603 (1986).

For comment, “Wyoming Fetal Rights—Why the Abortion ‘Albatross’ Is a Bird of a Different Color: The Case for Fetal-Federalism,” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 627 (1993).

For article, “Workers' Compensation for Mental Stress Claims in Wyoming,” see XXIX Land & Water L. Rev. 145 (1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli — Compensability under particular circumstances, 107 ALR5th 441.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Compensability under particular circumstances, 108 ALR5th 1.

Status of gasoline and oil distributor or dealer under workmen's compensation act as agent, employee or independent contractor or dealer, 83 ALR2d 1282.

Mental disorders as compensable under workmen's compensation acts, 97 ALR3d 161.

Liability of successive employers for disease or condition allegedly attributable to successive employments, 34 ALR4th 958.

Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as compensable, 52 ALR4th 731.

Workers' compensation: student athlete as “employee” of college or university providing scholarship or similar financial assistance, 58 ALR4th 1259.

Workers' compensation: injuries incurred during labor activity, 61 ALR4th 196.

Workers' compensation: injuries incurred while traveling to or from work with employer's receipts, 63 ALR4th 253.

Ownership interest in employer business as affecting status as employee for workers' compensation purposes, 78 ALR4th 973.

Workers' Compensation: Coverage of injury occurring in parking lot provided by employer, while employee was going to or coming from work, 4 ALR5th 443.

Workers' Compensation: Coverage of injury occurring between workplace and parking lot provided by employer, while employee is going to or coming from work, 4 ALR5th 585.

Workers' Compensation: Compensability of injury during tryout, employment test, or similar activity designed to determine employability, 8 ALR5th 798.

Right to workers' compensation for injuries suffered after termination of employment, 10 ALR5th 245.

Workers' Compensation: Coverage of employee's injury or death from exposure to the elements—Modern cases, 20 ALR5th 346.

Workers' Compensation: Lyme disease, 22 ALR5th 246.

Validity, construction and application of workers' compensation provisions relating to nonresident alien dependents, 28 ALR5th 547.

Workers' compensation: law enforcement officer's recovery for injury sustained during exercise or physical recreation activities, 44 ALR5th 569.

Violation of employment rule as barring claim for workers' compensation, 61 ALR5th 375.

Employee's injuries sustained in use of employer's restroom as covered by workers' compensation, 80 ALR5th 417.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered as result of sudden stimuli involving nonpersonnel action, 83 ALR5th 103.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of sudden stimuli involving nonpersonnel action — Compensability under particular circumstances, 84 ALR5th 249.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions, 97 ALR5th 1.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions and requisites of, and factors affecting,109 ALR5th 161.

Award of workers' compensation benefits to professional athletes, 112 ALR5th 365.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Compensability of particular physical injuries or illness,112 ALR5th 509.

Compensability under occupational disease statutes of emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli,113 ALR5th 115.

Application of workers' compensation laws to illegal aliens,121 ALR 5th 523.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli-Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions, 122 ALR 5th 653.

II.Employment.
A.In General.

Workmen's Compensation Law relates to rights and obligations of employer to employees (now Worker's Compensation Act). American Sur. Co. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 238 F. Supp. 850, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7516 (D. Wyo. 1965).

But not to purely contractual obligations. —

The Workmen's Compensation Law (now Worker's Compensation Act) has no application to the purely contractual obligations owing by the subcontractor to the prime contractor. American Surety Co. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 238 F. Supp. 850, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7516 (D. Wyo. 1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 412, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5134 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1966).

An employer's business may be covered as to some phases by workmen's (now worker's) compensation, and not covered as to other phases. In re Gimlin, 403 P.2d 178, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 1965); Rocky Mountain Tank & Steel Co. v. Rager, 423 P.2d 645, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1967).

Test of employment. —

An outstanding test as to whether a person is a servant of an employer or not depends on whether the employer has or has not retained the right of control over the party whose status is in question. If he has retained such right of control, the party is generally regarded as a servant. As phases of control or right of control may be mentioned the factors: the place where the work is to be performed, the scope of the work and the control of the premises where the work is required to be done. Tauer v. Williams, 69 Wyo. 388, 242 P.2d 518, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1952).

Managing partner deemed “employer.” —

A partner retaining his right of management is in an employment relationship with partnership employees and, consequently, is an “employer” under the worker's compensation law. Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1990).

A partnership employee who has received worker's compensation benefits for a work-related injury may not maintain a tort action against an individual partner who manages the partnership's day-to-day operations under a contract with the partnership. The managing partner is an employer for purposes of the immunity provisions of the worker's compensation law. Pool v. Dravo Coal Co., 788 P.2d 1146, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1990).

Where employer retains the right of control over the party, the latter is regarded as a “servant.” Fox Park Timber Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1938).

Contract of employment induced by false or fraudulent representations void. —

A contract of employment induced by false or fraudulent representations, not going to the factum of the contract, is voidable and not void and therefore, the relationship of employer and employee exists and compensation will be allowed for injuries sustained during such employment unless there is a causal connection between the injury and the misrepresentation. Long v. Big Horn Constr. Co., 75 Wyo. 276, 295 P.2d 750, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1956).

Deceased held not acting either as an employee of town or impressed in town's service as member of posse comitatus. —

See In re Maffei, 80 Wyo. 117, 338 P.2d 818, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1959).

Elements of joint employment by affiliated corporations are: (1) express or implied contract of employment with both employers; (2) simultaneous control of both employers; and (3) the advancing of both employers' interests. Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. Sept. 20, 1988).

B.Employee.

“Employee,” as used in subsection (a)(vii), includes corporate officers. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1981).

Corporate officers were correctly classified as coemployees where the officers worked for and were salaried by the corporation, because they were in service to the corporation and were definitely more than casual employees, and even though their duties were primarily clerical, they were engaged in the usual trade or business of the employer. Makinen v. PM P.C., 893 P.2d 1149, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1995), overruled, Terex Corp. v. Hough, 2002 WY 112, 50 P.3d 317, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2002).

Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act does not define the term payable, but looking to its dictionary definition, the Supreme Court of Wyoming finds that it means the amount that may, can, or must be paid. Knight v. Estate of McCoy, 2015 WY 9, 341 P.3d 412, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2015).

Director of corporation was an “employee” under this section, and thus was not liable for co-employee's injuries. Franks v. Olson, 975 P.2d 588, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1999).

Members of partnership not “employees.” —

Members of a partnership, the business of which was classified as extrahazardous, were not “employees” as that term was defined in this section and, therefore, were not entitled to compensation for injuries received while they were actually subjected to the hazards of the business. Hays v. State, 768 P.2d 11, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1989), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Worker's Compensation Act does not unconstitutionally discriminate between partners and corporate officers. A partner is an employer and employee, whereas an officer is simply an employee; a rational basis exists, therefore, for the disparate treatment afforded under the act to partners as opposed to corporate officers. Hays v. State, 768 P.2d 11, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1989), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Rail cutter was an “employee” despite a contract provision that the company was not to control or direct the details, manner or means of the work since it appeared the employment relationship could be terminated at any time; a co-worker testified that the company's supervisor was indeed the boss; and the company paid worker's compensation for its employees. In re Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 599 (Wyo. 1986).

Temporary employee. —

Where an employee was hired through a staffing firm as a temporary employee, the employer was not the temporary worker's employer and thus the temporary worker was not entitled to immunity from liability for a co-employee's injuries sustained in an accident within the scope of employment for the same employer. SOS Staffing Servs. v. Fields, 2002 WY 141, 54 P.3d 761, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 2002).

Claimant sought suitable work. —

Permanent partial disability benefits were properly awarded to a claimant because substantial evidence supported hearing examiner's determination that claimant sought suitable work pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(iii) where claimant had registered with the Wyoming Job Network and could describe a number of potential employers whom he had contacted. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. v. Baldwin (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Baldwin), 2008 WY 125, 196 P.3d 1087, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2008).

Vicarious liability of temporary staffing firm. —

Staffing firm did not retain control of a worker's employment activities while hired out as a temporary worker for the employer and was not, therefore, vicariously liable for injuries caused by the temporary worker. SOS Staffing Servs. v. Fields, 2002 WY 141, 54 P.3d 761, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 2002).

Unauthorized alien. —

An alien who is not authorized to work by the United States department of justice, immigration and naturalization service is not an “employee” under (a)(vii), and thus is excluded from workers compensation coverage. Felix v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 986 P.2d 161, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1999).

When finding if an employer reasonably believed an employee was authorized to work in the United States when the employee was hired and injured, an incomplete I-9 document did not bar such a belief because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) did not incorporate federal requirements for documents an employer had to possess when hiring an alien or detailing how the forms had to be completed or when and how the forms had to be inspected, so the question was simply if documents the employer possessed supported such a belief. Worker's Comp. Claim of Gonzalez v. Reiman Corp., 2015 WY 134, 357 P.3d 1157, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2015).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) does not incorporate federal requirements that dictate what documents an employer must possess when hiring an alien, nor does the statute incorporate federal requirements detailing how those forms must be completed and when and how inspections of those documents must occur, so the question the statute imposes for a fact finder is simply whether the documents in the employer's possession, whatever those might be, support the employer's reasonable belief, both at the time of hiring and injury, that the injured employee is legally authorized to work in the United States. Worker's Comp. Claim of Gonzalez v. Reiman Corp., 2015 WY 134, 357 P.3d 1157, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2015).

When considering whether an employer has a reasonable belief that an employee is authorized to work in the United States, by its plain terms, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) does not impose an obligation on an employer to inspect the documents in the employer's possession upon rehiring the employee. Worker's Comp. Claim of Gonzalez v. Reiman Corp., 2015 WY 134, 357 P.3d 1157, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2015).

Employer had a reasonable belief that an employee was authorized to work in the United States when the employee was injured because the employer possessed (1) documents presented when the employer first hired the employee, (2) a later I-9 listing numbers from the employee's social security and permanent resident cards, and (3) W-2 forms for the years the employee worked for the employer. Worker's Comp. Claim of Gonzalez v. Reiman Corp., 2015 WY 134, 357 P.3d 1157, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2015).

C.Independent Contractor.

Person may be independent contractor in some work and employee in other work for same employer, and right to compensation arises only when worker is injured while engaged in work in which he was employee. Burnett v. Roberts, 57 Wyo. 511, 121 P.2d 896, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1942).

Effect of inclusion on corporate payroll. —

The fact that a corporation reported claimant to the workmen's compensation department as being on its payroll is inconsistent with the contention that claimant was an independent contractor rather than an employee. In re Reed, 444 P.2d 329, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1968).

Service contract. —

Fact that workman is not required to haul any definite quantity or for any definite time indicates contract for service only, rather than “independent contractor” relationship, as affecting right to workmen's (now worker's) compensation. Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 56 Wyo. 537, 111 P.2d 132, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1941).

Finding as to employee status. —

Evidence examined and found to support claimant's contention that deceased was an employee and not an independent contractor, and entitled to compensation, even though employer had not contributed to insurance fund on his account. Fox Park Timber Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1938).

D.Casual Employment.

Casual employment defined. —

Casual employment as used in Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act means incidental, casual and not regular employment. In re Lamont, 48 Wyo. 56, 41 P.2d 497, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1935).

Individual case determination. —

Whether employee's work is casual or for purpose of employer's trade or business, within this section, defining workman, depends on facts of individual case. In re Karos, 34 Wyo. 357, 243 P. 593, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1926).

The casual nature of employment does not leave the workman outside the law, unless it appears also that the employment was not for the purpose of the employer's trade or business. In re Pope, 54 Wyo. 266, 91 P.2d 58, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1939).

To avoid award on ground that employment was casual, it must also be found as a matter of law that employment was not for purpose of the employer's trade or business. In re Pope, 54 Wyo. 266, 91 P.2d 58, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1939).

Casual employee within law. —

A house mover's employee, driving a tractor, was a workman, within the worker's compensation law, even though the employment was casual. In re Karos, 34 Wyo. 357, 243 P. 593, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1926).

Casual employee not within law. —

A workman employed by the hour on a special painting job in a building wherein his employer operated a hotel was a casual employee and was not entitled to benefits for injuries received under Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act. Lamont v. Intermountain Realty Co., 48 Wyo. 56, 41 P.2d 497, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (1935).

Duration of employment. —

Even though his employment was for short time only, employee injured in installing fixtures of a particular type used in employer's “self-service” stores, as authorized by its charter, was “a workman” and entitled to compensation. In re Pope, 54 Wyo. 266, 91 P.2d 58, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1939).

E.Scope and Course of Employment.
  1. Scope.

    Scope of employment. —

    An act may be done in the scope of employment though it in part served purposes of the workman. Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 56 Wyo. 537, 111 P.2d 132, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1941).

    Injuries within scope of employment are compensable. —

    Trial court erred when it affirmed a decision denying workers' compensation benefits after an employer refused to reimburse its injured employee for travel expenses after the employee had been injured in a car accident where the trip to deliver a truck belonging to the employer, a truck driving school, was clearly within the scope of employment and it was obvious that the denial of reimbursement for the return trip was solely motivated by the employer's desire to exclude the employee from receiving worker's compensation benefits. Lloyd v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2004 WY 85, 93 P.3d 1001, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2004).

    Where culpable negligence of workman took him outside scope of employment and made him at time of injury an intruder or trespasser, his widow could not recover compensation for his resulting death. Hamilton v. Swigart Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1943).

    Violating work restriction as outside employment's scope. —

    An employee can be found to have acted outside the “scope of employment” by violating a work restriction when the following elements are shown: (1) the employer expressly and carefully informs the employee that she must not perform a specific task or tasks while in his employ; (2) the employee knows and understands the specific restriction imposed; (3) the employer does not knowingly continue to accept the benefit of a violation of the restriction by the employee; and, (4) the injury for which benefits are claimed arises out of conduct that clearly violates the specific restriction. In re Smith, 762 P.2d 1193, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1988).

    Employee sleeping on floor held not within scope of employment. —

    See Richard v. George Noland Drilling Co., 79 Wyo. 124, 331 P.2d 836, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1958).

    A claimant in an advanced state of intoxication may abandon his employment by making himself incapable of engaging in his duties. Richard v. George Noland Drilling Co., 79 Wyo. 124, 331 P.2d 836, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1958).

    Employee returning home after quitting not within scope of employment. —

    Deceased, killed in an automobile accident while returning to his home in Wyoming after quitting work as a rail cutter in Colorado, was not within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. In re Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 599 (Wyo. 1986).

    Injury incurred while traveling to employer-provided campsite not covered. —

    Claimant injured while traveling to campsite lodging provided by the employer after clocking out of work was not acting within the scope of employment since there was no requirement that the claimant stay at the worksite, and thus he was not entitled to benefits. Berg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 23, 106 P.3d 867, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2005).

    Negligence within scope. —

    An award should be payable in case of third person's negligence, when that negligence is one of well known hazards of the business within the reasonable scope of a named employment. Baldwin v. Byrne, 53 Wyo. 519, 86 P.2d 1095, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (1939).

    Officer and director of company injured while performing workman's task. —

    Where an officer and director of a corporation was fatally injured while performing a workman's task as an employee of the company, receiving wages as such upon which the workmen's compensation department collected fees, he was held not to have been “one holding an official position” within the meaning of an exception to the definition of “workman” in § 72-106, W.C.S. 1945, and his widow was entitled to recover her proper award under this chapter. Lichty v. Lichty Constr. Co., 69 Wyo. 411, 243 P.2d 151, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1952).

    Claimant was a home office clerical employee rather than a local store clerk, where she was advised that her duties at the local store grand opening would include popping popcorn, rolling cotton candy, warming pizzas and greeting customers, and she was not told she would have to any of the usual work of a store clerk, which also involved the sale of gasoline. Mini Mart v. Wordinger, 719 P.2d 206, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 550 (Wyo. 1986).

    Injuries resulting from supervisor's sexually offensive behavior “arose out of employment.” —

    See Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, 687 P.2d 885, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 330 (Wyo. 1984).

    Employer becomes beneficiary where employee transports supplies. —

    The employer became the beneficiary where had claimant not transported the tools, equipment and supplies in the pickup, it would have been necessary for him to turn off the haul road and drive to the ranch house and he would have entered the scope of employment as soon as he picked up the tools at the ranch house. In re Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 597 (Wyo. 1986).

    Surgery not related to workplace injury. —

    Finding that an employee's surgery, in which his left testicle was removed, was not related to his workplace injury under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) was supported by substantial evidence because the treatment providers who examined him during the hours and days immediately following his injury could not identify any abnormalities in his testicles. Beall v. Sky Blue Enters. (In re Beall), 2012 WY 38, 271 P.3d 1022, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2012).

  2. Course.

    “Scope of their employment” not distinguished from “course of employment.” —

    For purposes of the Worker's Compensation Law, “scope of their employment,” as it appears in former § 27-12-103(a) (now § 27-14-104(a)), granting a fellow employee immunity from suit, and “course of employment,” as it appears in former § 27-12-102 (a)(xii) (now subsection (a)(xi)) of this section), defining compensable injuries, should not be distinguished in meaning. Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1982).

    Course of employment. —

    Workman returning from vacation by way of Casper resumed his employment in Casper by receiving there from his employer two barrels of oil for transportation, and his fatal injury in collision on way home was in “course of his employment.” Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 56 Wyo. 537, 111 P.2d 132, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1941).

    A claimant was injured in the course of employment where her injury, which resulted from escalating horseplay initiated by a coworker, was the product of her coworker's frolic and not her own, and occurred while she was attempting to further her employer's business objectives. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1996).

    Where employee fell in the parking lot of his employer two and one-half to three hours after ending his work shift, employee's injury did not occur “in the course of his employment” and was not a compensable injury under subsection (a)(xi). Haagensen v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1997).

    Where county 4-H program coordinator was involved in motor vehicle accident while transporting steers to be slaughtered and graded, her injuries were sustained in course of her employment, notwithstanding fact that steers belonged to her sons and were being transported in her own truck and trailer, since she would not have made trip had it not been for educational benefits to be gained by members of her program from grading of beef in question. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1999).

    Whether worker working on personal project is in course of employment must be decided on its particular and unique set of facts. If there is a reasonable relationship between the project being performed and the employee's job, then the trier of fact may be able to find a nexus between the injury and the course of employment. Stuckey v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1995).

    Inflating tires not related to seasonal irrigation. —

    There was no evidence that inflating tires was reasonably related to the claimant's duties as a seasonal irrigator for the parks department. Stuckey v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1995).

    Injuries may occur on or off premises of employer. In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1977).

    In either case, injury is compensable if it arises out of and in course of employment. In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1977).

    Premises rule. —

    Where employee failed to prove the elements of the premises rule as set out in Archuleta v. Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1990), he did not benefit from a rebuttable presumption that his injury was causally connected to his employment. Haagensen v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1997).

    When causal connection exists. —

    A causal connection between the injury and the employment is supplied when there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment. In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1977).

    In a worker's compensation claim, because the harm complained of must arise out of and in the course of employment, a nexus must exist between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment; existence of such a nexus depends on a reasonable relationship between the project being performed and the claimant's job. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1996).

    Injury during time of rest. —

    The question of responsibility under the Workmen's Compensation Law (now Worker's Compensation Act) for injury during times of rest and the like is one which is indeed difficult and cannot be categorically resolved; but in general it is said that acts necessary to the life, comfort or convenience of an employee while at work are incidental to the service, and an injury occurring while in the performance of such acts may be compensable. Of course, this principle can be applied only restrictively and in the light of facts and circumstances arising in any given instance. Rocky Mountain Tank & Steel Co. v. Rager, 423 P.2d 645, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1967).

    Where employer furnished claimant with free transportation to and from his home as an incident of the contract of employment and for the mutual advantage of both, the injuries suffered by claimant in an accident during such transportation were compensable under the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act, since, under the facts, the injuries were sustained during the course of the employment relationship. In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1947).

    Injury incurred while going to or coming from employment covered. —

    The fact that it is undisputed that lodging in Casper was authorized by the employer, the University of Wyoming, for its employees engaged in a highway research project, and the workmen were entitled to charge the employer for the time spent in travel to and from work, makes it abundantly clear that, absent any deviation, the employment relationship would extend during travel to and from work. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dep't v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1968).

    Injury incurred while going to or coming from employment not covered. —

    This section merely put in statutory form the ruling of the courts that the mere fact that the employee is going to or coming from the duties of his employment, nothing else appearing, would not entitle him to be regarded as coming within the terms of the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act when he suffers injuries during such going or coming. In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1947).

    This court subscribes to the almost universal rule that generally injuries sustained by an employee who is “going to or coming from” the duties of his employment are not covered by workmen's compensation. In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1977).

    Injury incurred while going to or coming from employment not covered. —

    Decision by the Office of Administrative Hearings that an employer's per diem payments to a worker of $60 per day, that was based on the distance in miles the worker lived from his worksite, did not constitute “reimburse[ment] for travel expenses” within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record as a whole because, under the express terms of the union contract establishing the per diem allowance, the per diem allowance did not include pay for travel time or mileage. Thus, the worker could not recover worker's compensation coverage for injuries sustained in an accident while he was driving his motorcycle to work. Bilyeu v. State (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2012 WY 141, 287 P.3d 773, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2012).

    Where benefits denied. —

    Employee was not entitled to worker's compensation benefits for chiropractic treatment in 2010 based on a workplace fall in 2002 because the evidence failed to show that the employee's 2010 condition was directly related to the back injuries suffered in 2002 and thus was an injury within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi). Rogers v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 117, 284 P.3d 815, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2012).

    But exception may arise. —

    When other circumstances are injected such as where the employer himself as a part of the employment arrangement supplies transportation to and from the place where the duties of the employee actually commence, an exception to the general rule arises and a different result ensues. In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1977).

    Ordinarily an employee is not within the course of employment when he is injured going to or coming from work. However, when an employer supplies transportation or pays to defray travel expenses, the coming-and-going rule does not apply and workers injured while traveling directly to or from work are considered to be within the course of their employment. In re Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1983).

    Neutral-risk principle. —

    If the employee, in the course of employment, engages in an utterly perplexing act for which no personal or employment motive can be deciphered, the neutral-risk principle should control and the employment connection supplied by the presence of the act within the course of employment should tip the scale in favor of compensability. Richard v. State, 831 P.2d 244, 835 P.2d 365, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1992).

    Presumption that on-premises injury connected to employment. —

    A nurse's aide, who was injured when she slipped and fell while walking to her employer's parking lot after work, was entitled to the presumption raised by the premises rule that her accident was causally connected to her employment. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Miller, 787 P.2d 89, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1990).

    A school custodian, who was fatally injured while attempting to exit a snow-covered school parking lot, was entitled to a presumption that the injury resulting in his death arose out of the course of his employment. Archuleta v. Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1990).

    Unexplained death assumption. —

    Where an employee worked a seven-day week at a remote well site and his phone arrangement with his employers was unsatisfactory, it was reasonable, applying the unexplained death rule, to presume that the employee was traveling at least in significant part within the course and scope of his employment when he was killed. Where an employee has no fixed place or time of work, the unexplained-death assumptions apply as long as there is some evidence that the employee continued in his course of employment. Richard v. State, 831 P.2d 244, 835 P.2d 365, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1992).

    Presence or absence of employer control over employees during transportation is certainly a factor to be considered, but it is not decisive. In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1977).

    Where extra compensation intended to defray travel expenses. —

    Injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident which occurred while claimants were en route to the site of their employment, a coal mine located in open country some 50 miles southeast of Gillette, Wyo., arose out of and in the course of employment where the claimants were receiving extra compensation intended to defray travel expenses. In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1977).

    But any time an employee receives subsistence pay, he is not automatically entitled to coverage under the worker's compensation laws; the employer or the worker must intend it to be used to pay or actually use it to defray travel expenses. In re Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1983).

    Abandonment of employment relationship. —

    There may be circumstances in some cases which would make it necessary to say as a matter of law that there was a complete abandonment of the employment relationship. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dep't v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1968).

    A side trip lasting approximately 3 hours at nighttime when further work was not expected, would not require the trier as a matter of law to infer that the employees had abandoned their employment. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dep't v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1968).

    But employee may recover for injury after resuming authorized travel. —

    However, when the diversionary trip is completed and the employee has returned to his original route, he is again covered by the act; and, if injured after resuming his authorized travel, he may recover. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dep't v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1968).

    No recovery for injury during unauthorized side trip. —

    Courts have often applied the rule that, when an employee is covered by a compensation act, an unauthorized side trip for personal reasons usually precludes a recovery for an injury during the side trip. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dep't v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1968).

    Question of fact. —

    Whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment is a question for the trier of fact in a worker's compensation case; there must be some substantial competent evidence to warrant the trier of fact drawing such an inference. In re Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1983).

    And burden is on worker to prove that his injury arose in the course of employment. In re Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 277 (Wyo. 1983).

    Burden of proof not met. —

    Denial of workers' compensation benefits was appropriate because the Medical Commission did not act unreasonably or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in rejecting the opinion of a worker's medical expert and in concluding that the worker failed to meet the worker's burden of proving that the worker's work injury, in which the worker suffered an inguinal hernia, caused the worker's subsequently discovered need for spinal surgery. Boyce v. State (In re Boyce), 2017 WY 99, 402 P.3d 393, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2017).

    While claimant sufficiently substantiated that he had incurred back injury, he failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that back injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. See Bagshaw v. Circle H Oilfield Serv., 753 P.2d 1044, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1988).

    The claimant did not meet his burden of proving that he was injured in the course of his employment when he bent down to pick up a pack of cigarettes, in light of the fact that he had previous back injuries which could not be separate from his current injury. Cabral v. Caspar Bldg. Sys., 920 P.2d 268, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 1996).

    Where one co-worker had no recollection of stepping on a waitress' foot and a second co-worker had no recollection that the waitress had banged her knee on a swinging door allegedly opened by that worker, and neither co-worker witnessed the waitress placing her leg on a restaurant chair to massage her knee, the hearing examiner's determination that the waitress had failed to prove her knee injury was work-related was reasonable. Carrillo v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 987 P.2d 690, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1999).

    Employee claiming workers' compensation benefits for an ankle injury failed to prove that the injury was work-related where employee did not mention the injury to his supervisor and did not appear to be limping, employee went to the emergency room the next day after participating in other activities after work and the next morning, and where employee failed to report the injury to his employer within 72 hours or to the division within 10 days pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a). Bush v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2008 WY 117, 193 P.3d 260, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2008).

    Maintaining physical fitness. —

    Undoubtedly, certain activities, such as maintaining physical fitness in a job that requires a lot of physical exertion, would enhance an employee's performance of his job and benefit his employer. However, if an employer does not require its employees to engage in such activities as a condition of employment, then those activities cannot be in the course of employment. Cronk v. City of Cody, 897 P.2d 476, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1995).

    Off-duty police officer. —

    Where there was no evidence in the record that the police department required its officers to use gym facility located in same building as police department or even to work out, and all of the evidence was that there were no such requirements and that the use of the gym was totally voluntary on the part of any officer, off-duty officer injured in gym was not in a place his employer required him to be; therefore, officer was not in the course of his employment. Cronk v. City of Cody, 897 P.2d 476, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1995).

    Skating rink accident did not result in compensable injury. —

    Substantial evidence supported the denial of workers' compensation benefits under this section because a benefits claimant was not required to attend a fund raising activity in her off time; a person who required the claimant to attend had no supervisory control over the claimant. The facts showed that the claimant, who worked during the weekdays, broke her leg at a skating rink on a Saturday while attending a fundraiser held by parents. Wright v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2007 WY 101, 160 P.3d 1129, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2007).

    Denial of payment of dental bills was in error. —

    Hearing officer's denial of the payment of the claimant's dental bills was in error, where the claimant proved that his prior work-related injury substantially combined with his preexisting periodontal disease and necessitated the instant dental treatment. The surgeon did not opine that the pain was more associated with the periodontal disease than the work-related injury and it was clear that the pain was associated with both. Ramos v. Wyo. Workers' Safety And Comp., 2007 WY 85, 158 P.3d 670, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (May 22, 2007).

    Travel not compensable. —

    Benefits claimant was not entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits from injuries suffered in a bus accident, where the claimant was not being transported on a vehicle of his employer, since he was merely permitted to ride on a mine bus to his security job. The contract between the employer and the mine stated that permission to ride the bus could have been revoked at any time. Quinn v. Securitas Sec. Servs., 2007 WY 91, 158 P.3d 711, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2007).

    Recreational activities. —

    Primary focus in cases involving recreational activities is whether an employee is in a place her employer requires her to be and whether the employee is engaging in an activity which her employer requires as a condition of her employment. Wright v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2007 WY 101, 160 P.3d 1129, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2007).

    When decedent and his co-employee took a vehicle off the ranch, consumed beer, and then engaged in combat resulting in decedent's death, the incident did not arise out of his employment, but fit within the exception to “injury” found in this section for injuries incurred while engaged in recreational or social events. His death was not compensable. Gomez v. State (In re Gomez), 2010 WY 67, 231 P.3d 902, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2010).

    Off-duty skiing instructor. —

    A ski instructor, on duty but not giving a lesson, was engaged in recreational activity when he was injured while skiing and thus not entitled to workers' compensation benefits; even though keeping in good physical condition, maintaining good skills as a skier, and knowing the snow conditions might enhance his performance, the employer did not require such as a condition of employment. DeWall v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 960 P.2d 502, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 1998).

    Horseback riding accident. —

    Radio station sales representative injured in weekend horseback riding accident at a client's place of business was not injured in course of her employment, and benefits were properly denied. Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 977 P.2d 682, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1999).

III.Injury.

Term “injury” as used in Worker's Compensation Act means compensable injury and is not used in the sense of the occurrence of an industrial accident giving rise to or causing the compensable injury. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1978).

Illness or communicable disease exclusion.—

Office of Administrative Hearing’s decision applying the illness or communicable disease exclusion was arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, and not in accordance with law where the claimant sought benefits for the wound to his knuckle, the employer had misidentified the injury as an infection and necrotizing fasciitis, and there was no evidence that the knuckle wound was an illness or a contagious disease. In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Vinson, 2020 WY 126, 473 P.3d 299, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2020).

“Accident” and “injury” not synonymous. —

It would do violence to the Worker's Compensation Act to interpret it in a way that inferred an “accident” and an “injury” identical in meaning. It is true that an accident frequently, perhaps usually, at the exact time of its happening, produces a compensable injury, but that is not always so. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1978).

III.Termination of temporary total disability benefits.—

Medical Commission's determination that an employee's temporary total disability (TTD) benefits were properly terminated on the ground that she reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) was supported by substantial evidence because it properly accepted the conclusion of the Division's experts; the Commission properly rejected the testimony of the employee's surgeon because the surgeon misunderstood, or did not agree with, the meanings of MMI, ascertainable loss, and TTD under Wyoming law. Morris v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 119, 403 P.3d 980, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2017).

Causation not shown.—

Medical Commission's decision that an employee's injury was not work-related was supported by the record because the employee failed to meet her burden of proof on causation; the employee's right knee pain was not immediately and directly or naturally and probably the result of her work-related injury to her spine. Morris v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 119, 403 P.3d 980, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2017).

Lung disease not injury. —

Trial court properly upheld the denial of workers' compensation benefits to an employee because while a hearing officer did not expressly consider the factors in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a), such consideration was not necessary because a physician refuted that the employee had a work-related lung disease under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) from working as a pipe-fitter and welder for 25 years. Robinson v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2009 WY 47, 204 P.3d 987, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Apr. 2, 2009).

Claimant's work injuries combined with the claimant's preexisting continuing chronic obstructive pulmonary disease from cigarette smoking to create the need for treatment because the evidence was clear that the claimant's respiratory functioning was materially aggravated and that the claimant's dependence on oxygen and other respiratory therapies was materially increased following a work related accident in which the claimant lost a limb. Vandre v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workers' Comp. Div. (In re Vandre), 2015 WY 52, 346 P.3d 946, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 2015).

The compensation act makes no distinction between healthy or diseased employees. Exploration Drilling Co. v. Guthrie, 370 P.2d 362, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1962).

“Normal activities of day-to-day living.” —

Phrase “normal activities of day-to-day living,” in definition of “injury,” did not include activities of employee over which employer had right to control the details, and therefore hearing examiner correctly ruled that back injury sustained by nurse, while bending over a cart to obtain medication for a patient, was not excluded from workers' compensation coverage. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Sparks, 973 P.2d 507, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1999).

Employee's injury to her back while exiting her work vehicle was not a “normal activity of day-to-day living,” and it was thus not properly excluded from workers' compensation coverage. Sellers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 979 P.2d 959, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1999).

The day-to-day living exclusion did not apply to a knee injury sustained by a food server with a pre-existing knee condition who twisted her body while carrying glasses; although the worker's compensation division presented evidence that twisting is an activity of daily living, the division failed to meet its burden of offering any right-of-control evidence establishing that the worker injured her knee while engaged in an activity beyond her employer's control. Keck v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 985 P.2d 430, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1999).

Claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his herniated disc was the direct result of a previous work-related injury to his lumbar spine; despite the claimant's contention that cumulative trauma “would be anything but normal aging,” the court held that § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) made an exception not only for injuries due primarily to normal aging, but also for those due primarily to the normal activities of day-to-day living, and noted that the neurosurgeon who testified at the claimant's hearing had described claimant's cumulative trauma as “just day to day life” and “the work from daily living.” Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2002 WY 90, 48 P.3d 1057, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2002).

Constitutionality of day-to-day living exclusion. —

Since the worker failed to challenge the constitutionality of subsection (a)(xi)(G) before the worker's compensation medical commission, the supreme court declined to rule on whether the day-to-day living exclusion violates Wyo Const., art. 10, § 4. Keck v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 985 P.2d 430, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1999).

An award is made for an injury which is a hazard of the employment, and this hazard applies to the particular employee in his condition of health; it is not necessarily that hazard which might apply to a healthy or average employee. Exploration Drilling Co. v. Guthrie, 370 P.2d 362, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1962).

Compensation is not made to rest under the law upon condition of health of employee or upon his freedom from liability to injury through constitutional weakness or latent tendency, but award is made for an injury which is a hazard of the employment. In re Scrogham, 52 Wyo. 232, 73 P.2d 300, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1937).

The right of compensation does not rest on the condition and health of the employee or his freedom from liability to injury through constitutional weakness or latent tendency, but the hazard of the employment acting upon the particular employee in his then state of health is compensated without distinction between employees as regards their state of health. Wright v. Wyoming State Training Sch., 71 Wyo. 173, 255 P.2d 211, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1953).

Surviving spouse entitled to receive death benefits. —

Where work-related injuries rendered decedent a paraplegic who died 12 years later from smoke inhalation after a fire at his home because his paraplegia rendered him unable to cough with sufficient force to expel mucus from his lungs, the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division erred by finding that decedent did not die as a result of a work-related injury within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi); supreme court of Wyoming held that his surviving spouse was entitled to receive death benefits. Fisher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safey & Compensation Division (In re Fisher), 2008 WY 89, 189 P.3d 866, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2008).

Employee, who died from injuries suffered in a work-related car accident, did not forfeit all right to death benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-407 , when he refused to allow the use of blood products because, given his critical injuries and the extended period of time that it took to get to the hospital, the acceptance of the transfusion of blood products could not be deemed to be reasonably essential to the employee's survival. Williams v. State. Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Compensation Claim), 2009 WY 57, 205 P.3d 1024, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Apr. 21, 2009).

Compensation is not made to rest upon the condition of health of the employee or upon his freedom from liability to injury through a constitutional weakness or latent tendency. Exploration Drilling Co. v. Guthrie, 370 P.2d 362, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1962).

Nor upon whether weakness was due to disease or existed from birth. —

It matters not, as far as the right to compensation is concerned, whether the weakness or liability to injury has come about by disease or existed from birth. Exploration Drilling Co. v. Guthrie, 370 P.2d 362, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1962).

Preexisting injury. —

Employee's own testimony along with past medical records and treating physician's report supported the denial of benefits for employee's back injury on the grounds that it was a preexisting injury. Jaqua v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 873 P.2d 1219, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 1994).

A preexisting injury may present a compensable claim if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the disability for which compensation is sought. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Fisher (In re Fisher), 914 P.2d 1224, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 1996), reh'g denied, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. May 7, 1996).

Evidence that the employee's shallow socket made dislocation of his shoulder more likely before it was injured supported the hearing examiner's finding that his shoulder injury was not a material aggravation of a preexisting condition that was caused by his employment. Bright v. Pipeline, 960 P.2d 1009, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1998).

Employee has burden of proving that work-related injury materially aggravated her pre-existing injury, resulting in a compensable injury. Brees v. Gulley Enters., Inc., 6 P.3d 128, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2000).

Expert medical testimony, notes in several doctors' records, medical testing, and reports supported a hearing examiner's determination that the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome was not work-related but was a pre-existing condition, and that his work aggravated, accelerated, or combined with his carpal tunnel syndrome to produce a compensable injury. Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Payne, 2001 WY 49, 23 P.3d 38, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 2001).

Claimant's failure to disclose his complete medical history undercut the credibility of claimant's medical expert who testified that, based upon the claimant's medical history, the claimant's recent work-related incident aggravated a preexisting injury; rather, the testimony of the examining orthopedic surgeon, that the claimant's condition following the recent incident was due to his preexisting injury within the meaning of § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F), was the more credible testimony Franks v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Franks), 2002 WY 77, 46 P.3d 876, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (Wyo. 2002).

Substantial evidence supported a hearing examiner's award of workers' compensation benefits to a claimant for the material aggravation of a pre-existing injury to his knee under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) after a mine accident where: (1) the claimant experienced a clicking in his knee and then a constant pain that he had not experienced prior to the accident within a month of the accident; (2) the treating physician testified consistently, unequivocally, and to a reasonable degree of medical probability that while the accident did not appear to accelerate the degenerative changes that existed in the claimant's knee at the time of the accident, the accident caused an aggravation of the pre-existing condition; and (3) the hearing examiner was in the best position to judge the expert witnesses and their opinions.Salas v. General Chem., 2003 WY 79, 71 P.3d 708, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2003).

Although evidence showed that the claimant had back degeneration before beginning his employment with defendant employer and although he performed repetitive heavy lifting in the foundry industry beginning in 1976 that would have hastened the degenerative process, where the record established that the claimant did not experience severe enough pain in the cervical and lumbar spine to seek medical assistance until November 1994, approximately eight months after he had been employed by the defendant, and subsequently continued to experience severe back problems when he remained employed there, the record supported a determination that the claimant's work for the defendant actually caused his back injuries, or at least contributed in a material degree to the aggravation of his preexisting degenerative back condition. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Parrish, 2004 WY 144, 100 P.3d 1244, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2004).

In the context of a preexisting condition, expert testimony containing the words “materially and substantially” is not required; therefore, compensation benefits should have been awarded where medical testimony established that a preexisting foot condition deteriorated due to employment as a housekeeping supervisor. Boyce v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 9, 105 P.3d 451, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 2005).

Claimant's discharge from physical therapy and her admission that she had been pain free for several months thereafter supported the finding that her initial injury had been resolved; thus, the hearing examiner could have reasonably concluded that claimant failed to establish a causal connection between her current medical problems and her prior work injury. Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 148, 123 P.3d 143, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Wyo. 2005).

Wyoming Medical Commission properly determined that a workers' compensation claimant's injury was a material aggravation of a preexisting condition and rated his impairment at 23 percent; the Commission did not apportion the rating between the claimant's preexisting condition and the work-related injury, concluding that apportionment was not authorized under Wyoming law.State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Faulkner, 2007 WY 31, 152 P.3d 394, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2007).

Where appellant had a long history of a seizure disorder and two of the three doctors who examined him did not state that his brachial plexopathy was work-related, the medical evidence did not show that he suffered a work-related injury under this section. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the decision to deny him workers' compensation benefits. Dutcher v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 10, 223 P.3d 559, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Feb. 4, 2010).

After appellant was injured in the course and scope of his employment on December 12, 2005, the employer paid for his medical treatment for a short period of time, but fired him because he was unable to work, due to his injury, and then discontinued making such payments on his behalf. When appellant filed for worker's compensation benefits in mid-2006, appellant's self-report of injury was inconsistent with medical evidence showing that he suffered a 2001 back injury; therefore, substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's conclusion that appellant's back injury was a preexisting condition not related to his work-related injury. Alphin v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 39, 228 P.3d 61, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Apr. 1, 2010).

Order denying an employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits for a 2008 total knee replacement was not erroneous because the knee replacement was related to the employee's preexisting knee condition under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) and was not compensable; the employee suffered from a significant preexisting knee condition prior to the employee's 2006 work-related incident. Kenyon v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 14, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Feb. 2, 2011).

Hearing examiner's decision to give the claimant's treating physician's opinion little weight was supported by substantial evidence because the physician based his opinion on an incomplete medical history, he was not aware that the claimant had complained of back pain and sought medical attention prior to the 2006 injury, and had been diagnosed with lumbar spine degenerative disease. The physician did not address how the claimant's preexisted degenerative condition might have affected his need for the fusion surgery, nor did he provide a detailed explanation as to why he reached the conclusion that the claimant's back condition was caused by the 2006 work injury. Torres v. State (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2011 WY 93, 253 P.3d 175, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2011).

When appellant had injured her shoulder in a car accident, a doctor's testimony that it was possible that an infraspinatus tear shown on an MRI more than 20 years later was caused by her work activities was not sufficient medical proof to show that it was not attributable to her preexisting condition under this section. Because the doctor did not have a correct understanding of appellant's work activities or what she was doing when at work when the injury occurred, the hearing examiner was not bound by his expert opinion. Middlemass v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 118, 259 P.3d 1161, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2011).

Because claimant did not seek medical attention for his lower back for almost 25 years after his work related injuries, the hearing examiner's conclusion that claimant did not meet his burden of proving that his back surgery was the result of his work related injuries was supported by substantial evidence. Even assuming claimant's 1984/1985 work related injuries aggravated his preexisting congenital spinal defect for purposes of this section, he failed to establish his 2008-2009 back condition was a second compensable injury. Davenport v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 6, 268 P.3d 1038, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2012).

Permanent partial disability. —

Substantial evidence supported a finding that a workers' compensation claimant was unable to return to work at a job paying at least 95% of what he was earning prior to his work injury as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h) for permanent partial disability benefits because the claimant asserted that he was unable to drive based on the limited range of motion in his neck and a physical therapist confirmed that the claimant's coordination and timing were slow. Mahaffey v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 45, 249 P.3d 234, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Mar. 11, 2011).

Burden on worker to show lack of preexisting condition. —

The core element of a worker's burden of proof is to show a compensable injury. Thus, it was up to the worker to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the worker's neck injury was a compensable, work-related injury and not the result of a preexisting condition. Corman v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Corman), 909 P.2d 966, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1996).

Simply because an employee has a preexisting condition which makes him/her susceptible to an injury does not obviate the requirement that the injury be work related; a claimant must still prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the injury was work related and not the consequence of any preexisting conditions. Fortier v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Fortier), 910 P.2d 1356, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1996).

Worker's Compensation Division erred in denying coverage to a worker, where the worker's work-related injuries did materially aggravate his Kienbock's disease, leading directly to his need for surgery. The worker's injuries signified acute trauma rather than the natural progression of a preexisting condition, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102 . Langberg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2009 WY 39, 203 P.3d 1098, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 2009).

Where claimant was able to work for three years after a non-work related automobile accident in 1999, the overwhelming weight of the evidence supported a finding that a 2003 work-related fall aggravated a preexisting condition; several months later, claimant was sent home and never returned to work. The district court erred by finding that the work-related injury did not aggravate a preexisting condition. Montoya v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Montoya), 2009 WY 32, 203 P.3d 1083, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2009).

Causal relation between age and injury did not preclude compensation. —

The trial court's finding that a causal relation existed between the employee's advanced age and the permanent ill effects claimed by the employee as growing out of his injury had no bearing upon the employee's right to compensation provided it was determined that there was no causal relation between his age and the accident itself. Long v. Big Horn Constr. Co., 75 Wyo. 276, 295 P.2d 750, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1956).

“Injury” occurs under the statutory definition when the nexus test has been satisfied, regardless of whether it takes place on or off the employer's premises. In re Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 597 (Wyo. 1986).

Necessary causal connection supplied when nexus between injury and aspect of employment. —

In order for former § 27-12-102(a)(xii) (now subsection (a)(xi) of this section) to be complied with, there need only be a causal connection between the injury and the course of employment, and such a causal connection is supplied when there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment. Parker v. Energy Dev. Co., 691 P.2d 981, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 350 (Wyo. 1984).

Evidence sufficient to support work-related injury. —

Although the evidence was conflicting, it was nevertheless sufficient to establish that the claimant sustained a work-related injury, as defined in subsection (a)(xi). Claimant was working for his employer when he began experiencing neck pain, he reported the neck pain to his supervisor, and an MRI found two herniated discs, which an expert witness stated were typically seen after lifting heavy objects and especially with overhead lifting. The testimony was corroborated by witnesses, and his treating physician stated in a written response to questions that the injury was not usually seen from raking leaves as the state workers' compensation division claimed. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Armijo (In re Armijo), 2004 WY 116, 99 P.3d 445, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2004).

Triggering event. —

There was substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding that the claimant failed to prove that a workplace accident caused her fibromyalgia where a physician testified that the accident was a triggering event, but that the claimant might have been predisposed to develop fibromyalgia and might have developed it from another type of episode if the workplace accident had not occurred. Hanks v. City of Casper (In re Hanks), 2001 WY 4, 16 P.3d 710, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2001).

Reasonable medical probability is all that is required. —

Where the only medical testimony in the context of reasonable medical probability was to the effect that claimant was asymptomatic prior to the 1995 back injury and the bulge in his back was the product of the 1995 injury, and where the medical testimony tied the 1997 herniation to the 1995 accident by a reasonable medical probability, there was nothing in the record that would justify a different finding by the hearing examiner than those already made with respect to the testimony establishing the relationship between the 1995 injury and the 1997 surgery. Pino v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Compensation Div. (In re Pino), 996 P.2d 679, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2000).

Surgery for back injury was reasonable and necessary. —

Trial court erred in upholding the denial of workers' compensation benefits for an employee's back surgery because the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division failed to demonstrate that the treatment the employee received was not reasonable and medically necessary under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xii); the employee's back problems stemmed from a work-related injury, and under a settlement agreement, the Division was obligated to pay for reasonable and medically necessary treatment incidental to that injury. Lane-Walter v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 52, 250 P.3d 513, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 2011).

Contact with blood. —

Coming into contact with unidentified blood in course of employment was not a covered injury under Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, and therefore division was not required to award, as a benefit, cost of blood tests pursued as a precautionary diagnostic measure. Williams v. State ex rel. State Workers' Comp. Div., 2 P.3d 543, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 2000).

Emotional condition. —

Substantial evidence supported hearing examiner's decision that employee's symptoms came from an emotional condition rather than from a work-related physical injury, where her symptoms were totally inconsistent with a thoracic spine injury. Gonzales v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 970 P.2d 865, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1998).

Psychological injury. —

Subparagraph (a)(xi)(J) does not violate the equal protection clauses of either the Wyoming constitution or the federal constitution. Frantz v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 932 P.2d 750, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1997), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

The distinction within the workers' compensation scheme between physically injured workers and workers with stress-related mental injuries is rationally related to the state's goal of efficiently and fairly distributing benefits while cutting costs for employers. Frantz v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 932 P.2d 750, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1997), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Employee failed to meet her burden of proof to establish a psychological injury arising out her chronic pain above and beyond the eight percent impairment originally awarded. Bohren v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 883 P.2d 355, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1994).

Benefits were improperly denied to a claimant who proved that her depression was caused by a compensable physical injury but failed to have her diagnosing, licensed psychologist state aloud that the diagnosis was based upon the criteria of the most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-IV), where the psychologist's evaluation, which was an exhibit in the record, identified the DSM-IV. Sechrist v. State ex rel. State Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2001 WY 45, 23 P.3d 1138, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 2001).

Substantial evidence, including expert testimony from numerous doctors, supported the Medical Commission's determination that the psychiatric aid's disability was purely psychological and not caused by a compensable physical injury and thus, the Medical Commission did not err as a matter of law in determining it did not have statutory authority to award permanent total disability benefits. Hathaway v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 WY 12, 317 P.3d 590, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 2014).

Emotional injury not caused by compensable physical injury does not bar tort claim. —

Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act, specifically Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J), did not bar the employee's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in a case where the employee endured extremely derogatory name calling by his supervisor, as well as enduring the supervisor exposing himself to the employee while they were alone in the lower shop and an attempt by the supervisor to rub his genitals against the employee. The type of injury incurred was emotional injury not caused by compensable physical injury. Sisco v. Fabrication Techs., 350 F. Supp. 2d 932, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26377 (D. Wyo. 2004).

A physical trauma which causes a nervous injury is compensable. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, 687 P.2d 885, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 330 (Wyo. 1984).

Post-traumatic stress disorder compensable. —

An over-the-road truck driver suffered a compensable injury where he was involved in two noninjury accidents on icy roads within three months, which accidents caused the driver to develop post-traumatic stress disorder. Johnson v. State, 798 P.2d 323, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 1990).

Nontraumatically caused mental injury is compensable if it results from a situation or condition in employment that is of greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental stresses and tensions all employees usually experience. Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1984).

A worker seeking compensation for nontraumatic mental injury must show that the injury was caused by workplace stress of greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other workers employed in the same or similar jobs. The “other workers” can be those employed by the same employer or by different employers. Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 454 (Wyo. 1986).

Where the claimant presented testimony which described in some detail his mental injury and workplace stress and which attributed these to specific incidents at work, but he did not introduce any comparative-stress evidence, given the total absence of evidence of usual workplace stress, the district court did not err in granting the employer's motion to dismiss. Pittser v. Natrona County Rd. & Bridge, 740 P.2d 402, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 483 (Wyo. 1987).

The definition of “injury” in subsection (a)(xi) includes nontraumatic mental injuries when they result from a situation or condition in employment that is of greater magnitude than the day-to-day stresses and tensions all employees usually experience. Such injuries occurring as the result of a physical injury arising out of employment can be compensable. Hohnholt v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 784 P.2d 233, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1989).

Suicide compensable. —

A suicide is compensable following a serious work related injury where the injury and its consequences directly result in the loss of normal judgment and domination by a disturbance of the mind which causes the worker's suicide. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ramsey, 839 P.2d 936, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1992).

Attempted suicide compensable. —

Claimant provided clear and convincing evidence that his self-inflicted gunshot wound was a direct and proximate result of his compensable work-related injuries and the hearing examiner's decision where both the claimant's treating physician and a licensed clinical psychologist stated that the claimant's compensable injury caused pain and depression that led to the suicide attempt, and that the depressions presented with adequate symptoms to stand alone as a DSM-IV diagnosis. Brierley v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2002 WY 121, 52 P.3d 564, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2002).

Effect of amendment eliminating coverage for certain mental disorders. —

Statutory change to subsection (a)(xi)(J) eliminating coverage for mental disorders not caused by physical injury did not apply to the claim of a plant supervisor who was diagnosed with a work-related panic disorder before the amendment took effect. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Summers (In re Summers), 987 P.2d 153, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1999).

Sexually offensive language and behavior by supervisor. —

Verbal sexual abuse and offensive manners of supervisor created an employment condition characterized by pressures and tensions beyond those usually experienced by employees. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, 687 P.2d 885, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 330 (Wyo. 1984).

Allergic reaction. —

In a claim for benefits for an allergic reaction, there was substantial evidence supporting the hearing examiner's determination that the employee's claim was governed by § 27-14-102 rather than § 27-14-603 , the section relating to an injury that incurred over a substantial period of time. Murray v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 993 P.2d 327, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1999).

Cardiac conditions can be compensable injuries. Creek v. Hulett, 657 P.2d 353, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 273 (Wyo. 1983).

Coronary condition, not work related, not compensable. —

Where a claimant's unknown and potentially life threatening coronary artery condition was initially discovered when he was examined for surgery for a work related hernia, the costs of by-pass heart surgery were not compensable, even though such surgery was required before a hernia operation could be safely pursued. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Girardot, 807 P.2d 926, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1991).

Allergic reactions to substances in work environment. —

A claimant was diagnosed as suffering from allergic reactions to substances in his work environment and was treated with salves and lotions through 1984, when a doctor suggested to him that he change work to alleviate some of his symptoms. In 1986, he again sought medical advice, and was ordered to quit working. The district court properly found that the first specific medical enjoinder that the claimant received ordering him to end his job occurred in 1986, and his claim was timely under § 27-14-502(a), was not barred under § 27-14-407 , and was not the result of the claimant's own negligence. In re Meredith, 743 P.2d 874, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 515 (Wyo. 1987).

Intoxication is affirmative defense. —

In Wyoming it is an affirmative defense to a claim for workers' compensation benefits that the employee's injury was caused by intoxication; the burden is on the employer or the division to prove that the employee's injury was caused by intoxication. Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 911 P.2d 1054, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1996).

Example of contemplated injury. —

Where there was evidence of an accident to the employee which resulted in his seeking medical treatment immediately and ultimately resulted in a severely disabling injury, an injury as defined in this section occurred. Amax Coal Co. v. Haynie, 592 P.2d 693, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 381 (Wyo. 1979).

Pre-existing injury. —

Odd-lot doctrine was applicable to worker seeking disability benefits, and he met his burden, by showing that he was permanently incapacitated from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he was reasonably suited by experience and training, and the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division failed to present any evidence that some special work of a light or sedentary nature was actually available to him in the geographic area in which he lived. Vaughan v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 2002 WY 131, 53 P.3d 559, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2002).

Workers' compensation claimant was properly denied permanent total disability benefits under the ‘odd lot’ doctrine after the court concluded that the claimant's inability to continue in his previous employment or obtain work was not attributable to the claimant's workplace injuries and that the Medical Commission correctly applied the odd lot doctrine. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Pickens (In re Pickens), 2006 WY 54, 134 P.3d 1231, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2006).

Medical commission failed to look at the case under the strictures of the odd lot doctrine as presented in the applicable case law, but rather took a very narrow view of what constituted “permanent total disability” and largely disregarded claimant's evidence and the burden of proof that largely fell to the Workers' Safety and Compensation Division and employer. Nagle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Nagle), 2008 WY 99, 190 P.3d 159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2008).

Although a workers' compensation claimant sustained a serious lumbar injury that had not been medically resolved, for which he continued to receive treatment, and his injury prevented him from returning to the type of work he had done all of his life, the claimant was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the odd lot doctrine or Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xvi) because three doctors stated that the claimant was capable of gainful employment with restrictions and a vocational evaluator concluded claimant could find work in his geographic area in jobs such as cashier, rental clerk, telemarketer, desk clerk and customer representative. Moss v. State, 2010 WY 66, 232 P.3d 1, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2010).

Worker was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the odd lot doctrine because the worker did not meet the worker's burden to show (1) the worker engaged in a reasonable job search, or (2) a job search would have been futile, given functional capacity evaluations in the record. In re Worker's Comp. Claim of McIntosh v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2013 WY 135, 311 P.3d 608, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2013).

Denial of workers' compensation benefits to the employee was improper under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-406 and 27-14-102(a)(xvi) because he established a prima facie case under the odd lot doctrine when he showed he could not return to his former employment and the combination of his psychological and physical conditions precluded alternative employment. The burden thereafter shifted to the Division to show that light work of a special nature, which the employee could perform, was available and it failed to meet its burden. McMasters v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 32, 271 P.3d 422, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 2012), McMasters v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 32, 271 P.3d 422, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 2012).

Denial of workers' compensation benefits to the employee was improper under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-406 and 27-14-102(a)(xvi) because he established a prima facie case under the odd lot doctrine when he showed he could not return to his former employment and the combination of his psychological and physical conditions precluded alternative employment. The burden thereafter shifted to the Division to show that light work of a special nature, which the employee could perform, was available and it failed to meet its burden. McMasters v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 32, 271 P.3d 422, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Mar. 2, 2012).

Substantial evidence supported a hearing examiner's conclusion that a claimant's headaches were not causally related to the claimant's workplace injury in Wyoming from years earlier, when the claimant hurt the claimant's back while lifting a patient from a wheel chair, for which the claimant received temporary total disability benefits in Wyoming. The claimant suffered an intervening workplace injury to the claimant's head, when a tin pan fell on the claimant's head, for which the claimant received a worker's compensation settlement in Nebraska. Landwehr v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 WY 25, 318 P.3d 813, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2014).

Substantial evidence supported a hearing examiner's findings that a worker was not an independent contractor, because the employer controlled the details of her performance of services beyond that required by state or federal regulation, the worker was required to keep track of her hours on time sheets, she did not represent her services to the public as a self-employed individual or an independent contractor, and she did not have the ability to select a substitute to perform her services. Circle C Res., Inc. v. Kobielusz (In re Kobielusz), 2014 WY 35, 320 P.3d 213, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2014).

Causation not proven based on speculative testimony and questionable work history. —

The district court — which was in a better position to judge the demeanor, truth and veracity of the witnesses and which weighed the testimony of the claimant's expert medical witness, which amounted to speculation, and the other witnesses testifying at the trial — could reasonably have found against the claimant on the causation element of his injury, especially when based on a questionable work history given by the claimant. In re Injury to Potter, 715 P.2d 214, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 499 (Wyo. 1986).

Where the claimant presented testimony which described in some detail his mental injury and workplace stress and which attributed these to specific incidents at work, but he did not introduce any comparative-stress evidence, given the total absence of evidence of usual workplace stress, the district court did not err in granting the employer's motion to dismiss. Leonard v. McDonalds of Jackson Hole, 746 P.2d 1261, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 557 (Wyo. 1987). See, also, Pittser v. Natrona County Rd. & Bridge, 740 P.2d 402, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 483 (Wyo. 1987).

Causation not shown.—

There was no error in the hearing examiner declining to find causation, given that the event alleged to have caused the worker's injury was arguably not established, the report of the claimed injury was arguably delayed, and there was a medical opinion that only hinted at causation on the basis of an incomplete medical history; the medical expert's letter provided no indication as to how the worker's back changes could be distinguished from those that occurred due to normal aging in a 48-year-old man who made his living doing hard physical labor. Rogers v. Russell Constr. Co., 2016 WY 80, 376 P.3d 1172, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 2016).

Causation not proven by employee's testimony. —

Although the claimant's treating physician testified that the claimant's injury was work-related, the basis for the medical testimony was information provided by the claimant, and the evidence showed that the claimant's testimony that her injury was work-related was not credible. Kuntz-Dexter v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 101, 49 P.3d 190, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 2002).

Causal relationship between surgery and work incident. —

Hearing examiner's determination that the claimant failed to prove a causal relationship between the fusion surgery and the 2006 work incident was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence because the medical evidence was not entirely consistent with the claimant's contention that he did not injury his back until he slipped on ice on his employer's parking lot in 2006. Torres v. State (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2011 WY 93, 253 P.3d 175, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2011).

Travel expense. —

Free accommodations offered by an employer for the convenience of its employees did not constitute a “travel expense” within the meaning of that term as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D). Berg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 23, 106 P.3d 867, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2005).

Compensability of second injury. —

Supreme court of Wyoming expressly rejects the “quasi-course of employment” theory of recovery; in order for a second injury to be compensable, the original compensable injury must itself be the direct cause of the subsequent injury for purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi). Fisher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safey & Compensation Division (In re Fisher), 2008 WY 89, 189 P.3d 866, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2008).

Injury not compensable. —

Employee was not entitled to worker's compensation benefits where the employee did not prove that the injury occurred within the scope and course of employment pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102 and that the injury occurred over a substantial period of time pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a); the physician, who treated the employee for years, linked the ailment to things other than work, and the employee's medical witness's testimony was properly given little weight because the witness was not given complete and accurate information from the employee. Robbins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2003 WY 29, 64 P.3d 729, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2003).

District court properly affirmed a hearing examiner's decision denying a workers' compensation claimant benefits because the sum total of the claimant's evidence was that he was at work, suffered some sort of seizure or blackout, and fell striking his head on the ground; the claimant made no argument, and a review of the record disclosed no evidence, that any condition of his employment was the cause of his injury. In the absence of that evidence, the claimant failed to establish that his injury ‘arose out of’ his employment; accordingly, the hearing examiner correctly concluded that the claimant had failed to carry his burden and establish that he suffered a compensable injury. In re Worker's Compensation Claim v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2006 WY 65, 135 P.3d 568, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 2006).

Employee's workers' compensation claim was properly denied because the employee did not show the employee suffered a compensable injury, as the employee did not show (1) the injuries for which the employee sought compensation were caused by a work-related accident, or (2) the denial of the employee's claim was arbitrary and capricious. Eaton v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 WY 107, 356 P.3d 765, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2015).

Claimant failed to prove a causal link between his original work injury and the onset of the osteoarthritis in his hip because the medical reports were undercut by repeated findings of exaggerated responses and symptom magnification; also, nearly twenty years transpired between the original accident and the diagnosis of hip osteoarthritis. Little v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 WY 100, 308 P.3d 832, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Aug 22, 2013).

Claimant was not entitled to medical treatment for avascular necrosis (AVN) because testimony from a doctor who performed an independent medical evaluation of the claimant supported the finding that the claimant's slip and fall accident at work did not cause the AVN in the claimant's right hip. The treating physician only speculated that the claimant had suffered subluxation resulting in AVN, while the doctor provided comprehensive evidence to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the fall did not cause the AVN. Stevens v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 WY 153, 338 P.3d 921, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 2014).

Denial of benefits was an abuse of discretion. —

Evidence did not support division's denial of worker's compensation benefits for a back injury on grounds of a preexisting condition, the natural aging process, or normal activities of day-to-day living. Ikenberry v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Ikenberry), 5 P.3d 799, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2000).

Compensability of second injury. —

Denial of workers' compensation benefits was appropriate because the claimant's second shoulder surgery was not compensable as there was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the condition giving rise to the claimant's second shoulder surgery was related, under the second compensable injury rule, to the claimant's prior work injury or the claimant's initial shoulder surgery for that injury. Price v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workers' Comp. Div., 2017 WY 16, 388 P.3d 786, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 2017).

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law (Matthew Bender) §§ 2.07, 3.01, 7.04D, 34.01, 36.03D, 55.03D, 56.04, 56.04D, 56.06, 66.02, 66.03, 130.06D.

Am Jur 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Recovery of Workers' Compensation for Acts of Terrorism. 20 A.L.R.6th 729.

Right to Workers' Compensation for Physical Injury or Illness Suffered by Claimant as Result of Sudden Mental Stimuli - Compensability of Particular Injuries and Illnesses. 20 A.L.R.6th 641.

§ 27-14-103. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 190, § 2.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3, related to extrahazardous occupations.

This section was purportedly amended by Laws 1991, ch. 161, § 3 and Laws 1991, ch. 221, § 2, but those amendments were not given effect due to the repeal of this section by Laws 1991, ch. 190, § 2.

§ 27-14-104. Exclusive remedy as to employer; nonliability of co-employees; no relief from liability; rights as to delinquent or noncontributing employer.

  1. The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee including any joint employee, and his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer and any joint employer making contributions required by this act, or their employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured employee, but do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any other person.
  2. No contract, rule, regulation or device shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability created by this act except as otherwise provided by this act.
  3. This act does not limit or affect any right or action by any employee and his dependents against an employer for injuries received while employed by the employer when the employer at the time of the injuries has not qualified under this act for the coverage of his eligible employees, or having qualified, has not paid the required premium on an injured employee’s earnings within thirty (30) days of the date due. When an employee’s employment starts within the same month as the injury, the status of delinquency or not contributing shall not apply until after the regular payroll reporting date.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1993, ch. 47, § 1; 1995, ch. 205, § 1.

Cross references. —

For general provision that contracts exempting employer from liability shall be void, see § 27-1-105 .

As to action against third party liable for damages for injury, see § 27-14-105 .

For constitutional provision that damages for personal injuries or death shall not be limited, see art. 10, § 4, Wyo. Const.

For provision prohibiting contracts exempting employer from liability for personal injuries, see art. 19, § 7, Wyo. Const.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Constitutionality. —

The provision for extrahazardous employment herein was not unreasonable classification under art. 1, § 34, Wyo. Const.Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 43 Wyo. 108, 299 P. 284, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1931).

Subsection (a) is constitutional. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1982).

A rational basis exists for treating the employer differently from his employees with respect to the extent of immunity under subsection (a). Mauch v. Stanley Structures, 641 P.2d 1247, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1982); Parker v. Energy Dev. Co., 691 P.2d 981, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 350 (Wyo. 1984).

This section, which extends the immunity of employers to co-employees acting within the scope of their employment, is unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection because it infringes the fundamental right of access to the courts. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).

The district court erred in its dismissal order of plaintiff's wrongful death action against her deceased husband's co-employees because the retroactive application of Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992) to this section renders its statutory grant of co-employee absolute immunity unconstitutional. McKennan v. Newman, 843 P.2d 602, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1992) (decided prior to the 1993 amendment).

This section, which, under the Wyoming worker's compensation scheme, granted immunity from suits by co-employees to employees who were acting within the scope of their employment, is unconstitutional because it violated the Wyoming Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992) (decided prior to the 1993 amendment).

Liability of co-employee for intentional, unreasonable, act.—

While two co-employee supervisors were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on employee’s injury claim because the employee failed to establish any genuine issues of material fact as to whether the supervisors willfully disregarded the need to act despite awareness that a machine could cause serious injury or death, a third co-employee supervisor was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the facts as to whether the supervisor’s inaction was willful or merely inadvertent were in genuine dispute and were to be decided by a jury. Ramirez v. Brown, 2020 WY 79, 466 P.3d 285, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 2020).

Worker's compensation laws were enacted as a form of industrial insurance for victims of industrial accidents, regardless of any fault or breach of duty on the part of the employer. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1982).

Construction. —

Concept of willful and wanton misconduct has essentially the same legal effect as the language “intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a). Formisano v. Gaston, 2011 WY 8, 246 P.3d 286, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2011).

Subsection (a) limits actions brought by surviving relatives or administratrix of deceased's estate. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, 641 P.2d 1247, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1982).

Immunity from suit exists for employer contributing to worker's compensation fund without regard to negligence, whether culpable or ordinary. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, 641 P.2d 1247, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1982).

“Contract for hire” unnecessary for “employer” status. —

The existence of a “contract for hire” is not a necessary prerequisite to a defendant's status as an “employer” for purposes of workers' compensation immunity. In the absence of a joint employment dispute, an employee who agrees to be “employed” without a contract but is mistaken about the identity of his actual employer is not necessarily prejudiced, but must affirmatively demonstrate either that the employee suffered harm because of being mistaken about the identity of his employer, or that his mistake about the employer's identity was due to bad faith or fraud by the employer. Clark v. Industrial Co., 818 P.2d 626, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1991).

Contributing employer's immunity is absolute regardless of whether its behavior amounted to culpable negligence or an intentional tort. Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. Apr. 26, 1988).

Section does not limit or affect right of action against unqualified employer. —

The clear import of this section is that, when an employer is not qualified under this chapter at the time of injury to an employee, the employer has no immunity. Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1989).

Immunity not available to noncontributing parent company. —

Immunity from suit based on worker's compensation laws is not available to the parent company (of the subsidiary corporation-employer) that does not contribute to the fund. Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 742 P.2d 198, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1987).

A parent corporation, as not being an employer contributing to the fund, may be liable in tort if it exercises operational control of activities of its subsidiary. Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. Apr. 26, 1988).

Single employer paying through joint account entitled to immunity. —

A single employer that makes its payments to the worker's compensation fund through a joint account entered into with other affiliated business entities is considered to have made its contributions as required by law and is entitled to the immunity set forth in this chapter. Lankford v. True Ranches, 822 P.2d 868, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1991).

Immunity from suit does not include federal civil rights action. —

The exclusive remedy of the state workers' compensation statutes does not bar recovery against an employer under 42 USCS § 1983, the federal civil rights statute. Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23413 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S. Ct. 85, 78 L. Ed. 2d 94, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1117 (U.S. 1983).

The exclusive nature of the remedy is between employee and employer. —

Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. American Surety Co., 365 F.2d 412, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5134 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1966).

As a general proposition, the exclusive remedy of the Wyoming workmen's (now worker's) compensation laws is the only remedy available unless the employment was unlawful or illegal. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1975), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

Covered employer absolutely immune from all common-law tort remedies. —

Where an employee's injury occurs in a work-related situation and is in all other respects compensable, the employer is absolutely immune from all common-law tort remedies arising out of the injury to or death of the employee — including causes of action for intentional tort or culpable negligence. Parker v. Energy Dev. Co., 691 P.2d 981, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 350 (Wyo. 1984).

Settlement not to relieve employer from liability. —

A settlement between an employer and an injured employee will not relieve the former from liability under the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 3261 (10th Cir. 1958).

Abolition of tort actions not due process violation. —

Abolishing actions by an injured miner against his employer for negligence does not constitute a taking of property without due process of law. Jackson v. Dravo Corp., 603 F.2d 156, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 12565 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1979).

As benefits replace tort action. —

An injured miner whose employer has complied with the Wyoming law regarding worker's compensation does not have an independent cause of action against his employer as compensation benefits take the place thereof. Jackson v. Dravo Corp., 603 F.2d 156, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 12565 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1979).

Immunity provisions in Worker's Compensation Act must be narrowly construed. Bence v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 13, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1981).

No immunity for surety who reimburses employer for worker's compensation payments. —

A surety, guarantor or general contractor who has contracted to reimburse an employer, who actually makes the worker's compensation payments, is not granted “statutory employer” immunity from tort liability by this section. Bence v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 13, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1981).

When employee protected from tort action by fellow employee. —

A supervising or managing coemployee is protected from tort action by his fellow employee if he is acting within the scope of his employment and is not culpably negligent. Abeyta v. Hensley, 595 P.2d 71, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 412 (Wyo. 1979) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).

Degree of negligence for claims against co-employees. —

For claims accruing between July 1, 1987, and February 18, 1993, culpable negligence is the degree of negligence that an injured employee must prove against a co-employee in an action to recovery damages for personal injury suffered in a work-related accident. Copp v. Redmond, 858 P.2d 1125, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 1993).

Culpable negligence of coemployee involves more than unreasonable conduct; it requires the element of willfulness. Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1988) (decided under former § 27-12-103).

Culpable negligence involves more than unreasonable conduct; it involves willfulness, and when a party fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact on this element, summary judgment is appropriate. Calkins v. Boydston, 796 P.2d 452, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1990) (decided under former § 27-12-103).

Liability of co-employee for intentional, unreasonable, act. —

There was no genuine issue of material fact where the plaintiff presented nothing in the record that sufficed to demonstrate the plaintiff's co-employee intentionally committed an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1995).

Defendant's admitted negligence in falling asleep while driving plaintiff home from work did not rise to the level of misconduct envisioned by the exception to immunity in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a); even assuming that some of the late hours of work could have been avoided by defendant, defendant's conduct did not meet the test for co-employee liability. Formisano v. Gaston, 2011 WY 8, 246 P.3d 286, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2011).

Intentional disregard of danger. —

In a case in which plaintiff was injured while in a manrider that was being raised up in order to open a storm gate and release a tugger line, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's co-employees. No evidence was presented showing that the co-employees had knowledge of, and intentionally disregarded, the danger associated with using the manrider to open the storm gate. Van Patten v. Gipson, 2011 WY 98, 253 P.3d 505, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2011).

Exclusivity provision did not bar co-employee liability action. —

While plaintiff employee was working to build a residence, he and a coworker got onto a wooden platform fitted with guardrails; when the man-basket came apart, plaintiff received serious injuries. After plaintiff obtained benefits from the Wyoming Worker's Compensation fund, he was permitted under an exception to this section to file a co-employee liability action against defendants, the company's owner, the general construction superintendent, and the project superintendent; after the first trial resulted in mistrial, the jury rendered a verdict for defendants. Dollarhide v. Bancroft, 2010 WY 126, 239 P.3d 1168, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 2010).

Failure to correct hazard not culpable negligence. —

A situation in which a supervisory co-employee has knowledge of a hazardous condition and fails to correct it, although certainly sufficient to indicate ordinary negligence, is not sufficient to satisfy the much more stringent test of culpable negligence. Cockburn v. Terra Resources, 794 P.2d 1334, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1990) (decided under former § 27-12-103).

Summary judgment appropriate where no direct supervisory control. —

Summary judgment for defendant in personal injury action brought by defendant's coemployee was appropriate where defendant did not have direct supervisory control over plaintiff, but had only a general duty to supervise and maintain a safe workplace; defendant did not possess the state of mind required to show culpable negligence, that approaching intent to do harm. Morris v. Smith, 837 P.2d 679, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1992) (decided under prior law).

Officer not sued where co-employee culpably negligent. —

The exclusive remedy provisions barred a miner's action against the mine manager and mine supervisors while genuine issues of fact existed as to whether other co-employees were culpably negligent and could be held liable for damages. Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1989) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).

When employee may sue corporate officer coemployee. —

These provisions do not bar an injured employee from bringing an action against a coemployee who is also a corporate officer, if that coemployee was culpably negligent and he owed the plaintiff a duty of care. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1981) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).

Individual partner immune from suit. —

An individual partner enjoys the same immunity as the partnership from a suit by an injured partnership employee who has received worker's compensation benefits through the partnership's contribution. Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1990).

A partnership employee who has received worker's compensation benefits for a work-related injury may not maintain a tort action against an individual partner who manages the partnership's day-to-day operations under a contract with the partnership. The managing partner is an employer for purposes of the immunity provisions of the worker's compensation law. Pool v. Dravo Coal Co., 788 P.2d 1146, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1990).

Injured governmental employee covered by worker's compensation precluded from suing government in tort. —

It is only in those situations where an injured governmental employee-plaintiff is covered by worker's compensation that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the worker's compensation laws preclude a direct action in tort against the employer-governmental entity. The Worker's Compensation Act and the waiver-of-immunity provisions of the Governmental Claims Act do, however, permit the injured governmental employee to structure a claim against his or her coemployee provided the claimant can prove culpable negligence. Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

State not vicariously liable by reason of culpable negligence of coemployee. —

Insofar as the estate of a state employee, killed in an automobile mishap in the scope of his employment by reason of the culpable negligence of a coemployee, sought to hold the state vicariously liable, the estate failed by reasons of the exclusive-remedy provisions of the worker's compensation law. Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 697 P.2d 606, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

But negligent coemployee may sue for indemnification, even though receiving worker's compensation benefits. —

The worker's compensation exclusive-remedy constitutional and statutory provisions did not deny standing to a state employee, held liable for his culpably negligent acts while acting within the scope of his employment, to bring suit against the state under § 1-39-104 for indemnification, even though the employee was receiving benefits from the worker's compensation fund. Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 697 P.2d 606, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 701 P.2d 1139, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1985).

Test for determining whether exclusive remedy provisions of act operate to prevent actions against covered employers for intentional acts of employees is whether or not the claimed injury would be compensable under the act. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, 687 P.2d 885, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 330 (Wyo. 1984).

Showing of culpable negligence will defeat worker's claim. —

Svoboda v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 599 P.2d 1342, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 450 (Wyo. 1979) (decided under former § 27-12-103).

Culpable negligence is “willful and serious misconduct.” —

In order to prove that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, one must demonstrate that he acted with a state of mind that approaches intent to do harm. Stundon v. Sterling, 736 P.2d 317, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 441 (Wyo. 1987) (decided under former § 27-12-103).

In a case in which plaintiff sued his co-employees after he was injured while working as entry level floorman on a drilling rig, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the co-employees, where no genuine issues of material fact existed on the claim that the co-employees acted willfully and wantonly. No evidence was presented showing that any of the co-employees intentionally acted to cause plaintiff physical harm. Van Patten v. Gipson, 2011 WY 98, 253 P.3d 505, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2011).

But willful, wanton misconduct of coemployee is not negligence. —

Damages resulting from willful and wanton misconduct of a culpably negligent coemployee are not damages for negligence. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1981) (decided under former § 27-12-103).

Concept of willful and wanton misconduct has essentially the same legal effect as the language “intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a). Formisano v. Gaston, 2011 WY 8, 246 P.3d 286, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2011).

Knowledge of dangerous condition is willful and wanton misconduct. —

In an miner's workplace injury suit against the supervisors following the severance of his foot by an unguarded sheave wheel, the court erred by granting the supervisors' motion for summary judgment because there were factual issues concerning the supervisors' knowledge of the general risks posed by working in the shuttle belt area, of which the sheave wheel was a part. Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, 67 P.3d 627, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2003).

Plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to a supervisor's knowledge of a dangerous condition and whether the supervisor acted intentionally in disregard of known risks. The evidence was sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of the supervisor. Herrera v. Phillipps, 2014 WY 118, 334 P.3d 1225, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2014).

Violation of safety regulations not culpable negligence. —

In a wrongful death action alleging that the defendants were liable as culpably negligent coemployees for the death of the deceased, who died while cleaning a “frac tank,” the plaintiff relied heavily on violations of OSHA regulations concerning safety training and equipment. While these asserted violations constituted evidence of ordinary negligence, they did not demonstrate a state of mind consistent with culpable negligence, which requires knowledge or obviousness of a high probability of harm. Although both defendants were generally aware of a possibility of harm from tank fumes, there was no evidence to suggest that either man knew the degree of danger presented by the particular tank in which the deceased died. Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1988) (decided under former § 27-12-103).

Summary judgment appropriate for culpable negligence issue. —

Summary judgment is appropriate when a party fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the element of culpable negligence. Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 643 (Wyo. 1986) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).

Wrongful death action precluded. —

Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act provided exclusive remedy for death of employee killed in mining accident, and therefore survivors and personal representative could not maintain wrongful death action against mining operator, despite allegations of negligence and safety violations by operator. Anderson v. Solvay Minerals, Inc., 3 P.3d 236, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, Collins v. COP Wyo., LLC, 2016 WY 18, 366 P.3d 521, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2016).

Employer immunity under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act barred a wrongful death action against the employer where an affidavit established that the employer was the decedent's employer and had paid into the worker's compensation fund for the decedent's coverage. Knight v. Estate of McCoy, 2015 WY 9, 341 P.3d 412, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2015).

Fact that the employer stopped payment on the decedent's paycheck had no effect on the preclusive effect of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act where the decedent's representative failed to show that the decedent was not properly reported on the employer's payroll. Knight v. Estate of McCoy, 2015 WY 9, 341 P.3d 412, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2015).

Intoxication places employee outside scope of employment. —

An allegation of intoxication while on the job is another way of saying that the worker, while in such condition, is outside the scope of his employment. Svoboda v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 599 P.2d 1342, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 450 (Wyo. 1979).

Work-related nature of employee's injuries not altered by violations of business conduct requirements. —

Violations of legal requirements relative to the conduct of a business, should such exist, do not alter the work-related nature of the employee's injuries, and the employee is entitled to the benefit and subject to the restrictions of the worker's compensation laws. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, 641 P.2d 1247, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1982).

Employment not rendered unlawful by safety violations. —

The existence of Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) violations under chapter 11 of this title does not render otherwise lawful employment unlawful. McKennan v. Wyoming Sawmills, 816 P.2d 1303, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1991).

No connection with pension plans. —

Neither art. 10, § 4, Wyo. Const., nor this section have any connection with pension plans and were irrelevant where an employee's long-term disability payments pursuant to an insurance contract were reduced by a sum equal to the workmen's compensation award given to the employee. Bunney v. Standard Oil Co., 571 P.2d 981, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 302 (Wyo. 1977).

Owner is generally not liable for injury to employees of independent contractor, absent control over work details or the supervision of employees. Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1988) (decided under former § 27-12-103).

Worker's compensation not bar to third-party indemnity claims. —

Because a third-party claim for indemnity is not based on the employee's injury, rather it is based on — “by reason of” — “on account of” — the alleged breach of an independent duty owed by the employer to the third party, and because third parties, seeking indemnity, received no benefits from passage of the worker's compensation provisions, these provisions do not bar third-party claims for indemnity. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Serv., 586 P.2d 1220, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 244 (Wyo. 1978).

Notwithstanding the immunity provided by this chapter, an employer that is otherwise protected by workers' compensation statutes against a claim resulting from injury of its employee can, nevertheless, contract away that protection and agree to indemnify a third-party against the claim. Nelson v. McAdams, Roux & Assocs., 688 F. Supp. 1502, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6401 (D. Wyo. 1988).

Worker's compensation immunity does not bar third-party claims based upon implied indemnity. Gainsco Ins. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 2002 WY 122, 53 P.3d 1051, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2002).

“Scope of their employment” not distinguished from “course of employment.” —

For purposes of the Worker's Compensation Law, “scope of their employment,” as it appears in subsection (a) of this section, granting a fellow employee immunity from suit, and “course of employment,” as it appears in § 27-14-102(a)(xi), defining “injury,” should not be distinguished in meaning. Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1982).

Fellow employee immune from suit. —

A worker who is reimbursed for driving fellow employees to and from work is within the scope of his employment and, without a showing of culpable negligence, is immune, under subsection (a), from suit by those fellow employees following an automobile accident which occurred while the workers were on their way home from their place of employment. Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1982).

Supervisor who instructed a worker to continue operating a roof bolting machine that had a steering problem was entitled to co-employee immunity when the worker inadvertently drove under unbolted mine ceiling and was struck by falling rock; the worker had not said that the machine was unsafe to operate, and the evidence did not show intentional or reckless disregard for the worker's safety. Loredo v. Solvay Am., Inc., 2009 WY 93, 212 P.3d 614, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2009).

Immunity from suit on ground that company is statutory employer is affirmative defense. —

See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1973).

As to recovery against coemployee under former law, see Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1974); Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1975), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

Negligent supervision requires knowledge of employee's actions. —

Culpability cannot be assessed against a supervisor or co-employee, from the injured employee's negligence in self-protection on disregard of work standards, in the absence of the defendant's actual knowledge or opportunity to correct by supervision. Smith v. Ensley, 752 P.2d 1374, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1988) (decided under facts existing under prior law).

Employer liable for discharging employee with claim. —

An employee, injured in the course of his employment, has a cause of action against his employer for retaliatory discharge based upon a violation of the state's public policy, where the employer discharges the employee as a result of the employee's worker's compensation claim and the employee is not covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 776 P.2d 752, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1989).

Grace period for contributions begins with next regular reporting date after injury. —

Where an employee was injured in the month immediately subsequent to the month of hire and prior to the reporting date for the month of hire, the calculation of the three-month grace period allowed by former § 27-12-103(c) for the late payment of contributions began with the next regular reporting date after the injury. As the employer paid the premiums for wages the employee earned in his month of hire well within this three-months' period, plus statutory penalties, he had to be considered as “contributing” to the fund, was not delinquent, and was therefore immune to suit. Mauler v. Titus, 697 P.2d 303, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 465 (Wyo. 1985).

Consolidated account for affiliated corporations required division approval. —

Under the pre-1986 provisions, affiliated corporations could report their payroll and pay their premiums under a single consolidated account. However, such an arrangement required the express approval and knowledge of the division to qualify as “contributing as required by this act,” as required by former § 27-12-103. Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. Sept. 20, 1988).

Derivative claims. —

Claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, filed by survivors of employee killed in mining accident, was derivative of claim under Worker's Compensation Act and thus was properly dismissed. Anderson v. Solvay Minerals, Inc., 3 P.3d 236, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, Collins v. COP Wyo., LLC, 2016 WY 18, 366 P.3d 521, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2016).

Applied in

Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 511 (Wyo. 1987); SOS Staffing Servs., Inc. v. Fields, 2002 WY 141, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 154 , 54 P.3d 761 (Wyo. 2002).

Cited in

Northwinds of Wyo., Inc. v. Phillips Petro. Co., 779 P.2d 753, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 1989); Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1989); Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 1989); Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 1994); Boyd v. Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1996); Streeter v. Amerequip Corp., 968 F. Supp. 624, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9464 (D. Wyo. 1997); Franks v. Olson, 975 P.2d 588, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1999); Terex Corp. v. Hough, 2002 WY 112, 50 P.3d 317, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2002); Circle C Res., Inc. v. Kobielusz (In re Kobielusz), 2014 WY 35, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Mar 11, 2014).

Stated in

Stuart v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25246, 271 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For article “Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming — Part II,” see VII Land & Water L. Rev. 617 (1972).

For comment “Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors,” see IX Land & Water L. Rev. 589 (1974).

For case note, “Exclusivity Provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act as a Bar to Third-Party Actions Against Employers, Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, 586 P.2d 1220, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 244 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 587 (1979).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — Constitutionality of Wyoming's Co-employee Immunity Statute under Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution.Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 355 (1983).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — Using the Exclusive Remedy Provision as a Shield for an Employer's Intentional Acts Against Employees. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 330 (Wyo. 1984),” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 603 (1986).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

For casenote, “Employment Discrimination — The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine and its Effect on Recovery in Employment Discrimination Claims. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S. Ct. 879, 130 L. Ed. 2d 852, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699 (1995),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 663 (1996).

For article, “Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act: An Update,” see XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. 249 (1998).

For article, “Reinstating Wyoming’s Joint and Several Liability Paradigm: Protecting Wyoming’s Workforce, Their Families And The Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Fund From Uncompensated Injuries And Deaths”, see 8 Wyo. L. Rev. 87 (2008).

ARTICLE: Damned if You do, Damned if You Don't: A Contextual Analysis of Co-Employee Liability and Wyoming Workers' Compensation Subrogation, 16 Wyo. L. Rev. 415 (2016).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Liability of owner or operator of golf course or his insurer for injuries to caddies, 82 ALR2d 1183.

Right of employee to maintain common-law action for negligence against workmen's compensation insurance carrier, 93 ALR2d 598.

Right to maintain action against fellow employee for injury or death covered by workmen's compensation, 21 ALR3d 845.

Right to maintain malpractice suit against injured employee's attending physician notwithstanding receipt of workmen's compensation award, 28 ALR3d 1066.

Workmen's compensation provision as precluding employee's action against employer for fraud, false imprisonment, defamation or the like, 46 ALR3d 1279.

What conduct is willful, intentional or deliberate within workmen's compensation act provision authorizing tort action for such conduct, 96 ALR3d 1064.

Employer's right of action for loss of services or the like against third person tortiously killing or injuring employee, 4 ALR4th 504.

Workmen's compensation act as furnishing exclusive remedy for employee injured by product manufactured, sold, or distributed by employer, 9 ALR4th 873.

“Dual capacity doctrine” as basis for employee's recovery from employer in tort, 23 ALR4th 1151.

Workers' compensation immunity as extending to one owning controlling interest in employer corporation, 30 ALR4th 948.

Workers' compensation law as precluding employee's suit against employer for third person's criminal attack, 49 ALR4th 926.

Workers' compensation act as precluding tort action for injury to or death of employee's unborn child, 55 ALR4th 792.

Willful, wanton or reckless conduct of coemployee as ground of liability despite bar of workers' compensation law, 57 ALR4th 888.

“Dual capacity doctrine” as basis for employee's recovery for medical malpractice from company medical personnel, 73 ALR4th 115.

Workers' compensation: third-party tort liability of corporate officer to injured workers, 76 ALR4th 365.

Right to workers' compensation for injuries suffered after termination of employment, 10 ALR5th 245.

Workers' compensation: tips or gratuities as factor in determining amount of compensation, 16 ALR5th 191.

Pre-emption by workers' compensation statute of employee's remedy under state “whistleblower” statute, 20 ALR5th 677.

Scope of provision in liability policy issued to municipal corporation or similar governmental body limiting coverage to injuries arising out of construction, maintenance or repair work, 30 ALR5th 699.

Workers' compensation as precluding employee's suit against employer for sexual harassment in the workplace, 51 ALR5th 163.

Who are “public employers” or “public employees” within the meaning of state whistleblower protection acts, 90 ALR5th 687.

Contractual waiver of exclusivity of workers' compensation remedy, 117 ALR5th 441.

Postaccident conduct by employer, employer's insurer, or employer's employees in relation to workers' compensation claim as waiving, or estopping employer from asserting, exclusivity otherwise afforded by workers' compensation statute, 120 ALR 5th 513.

Right to workers' compensation for injury suffered at worker's home where home is claimed as “work situs”, 4 A.L.R.6th 57.

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 111.03D (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-14-105. Action against third party; notice; subrogation; legal representation; payment under reservation of rights; actions by department.

  1. If an employee covered by this act receives an injury under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages, the employee if engaged in work for his employer at the time of the injury is not deprived of any compensation to which he is entitled under this act. He may also pursue his remedy at law against the third party or the coemployee to the extent permitted by W.S. 27-14-104(a). Except as provided by subsections (b), (e) and (f) of this section, if the employee recovers from the third party or the coemployee in any manner including judgment, compromise, settlement or release, the state is entitled to be reimbursed for all payments made, or to be made, to or on behalf of the employee under this act but not to exceed one-third (1/3) of the total proceeds of the recovery without regard to the types of damages alleged in the third-party action. Any recovery by the state shall be reduced pro rata for attorney fees and costs in the same proportion as the employee is liable for fees and costs. All money received by the state under this section shall be credited to the worker’s compensation account and considered in computing the employer’s experience rating.
  2. The director and the attorney general shall be served by certified mail return receipt requested with a copy of the complaint filed in any suit initiated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Service of the complaint on the director and attorney general is a jurisdictional requirement in order to maintain the suit. The director and the attorney general shall be notified in writing by certified mail return receipt requested of any judgment, compromise, settlement or release entered into by an employee. Before offering settlement to an employee, a third party or its insurer shall notify the state of the proposed settlement and give the state fifteen (15) days after receipt of such notice in which to object. If notice of proposed settlement is not provided, the state is entitled to initiate an independent action against the third party or its insurer for all payments made to and any amount reserved for or on behalf of the employee under this act. If there is a settlement, compromise or release entered into by the parties in claims against a person other than the employer, the attorney general representing the director shall be made a party in all such negotiations for settlement, compromise or release. The attorney general and the director, for purposes of facilitating compromise and settlement, may in a proper case authorize acceptance by the state of less than the state’s claim for reimbursement. The proceeds of any judgment, settlement, compromise or release are encumbered by a continuing lien in favor of the state to the extent of the total amount of the state’s claim for reimbursement under this section and for all current and future benefits under this act. The lien shall remain in effect until the state is paid the amount authorized under this section. In addition the person paying the settlement remains liable to the state for the state’s claim unless the state through the attorney general signs the release prior to payment of an agreed settlement.
  3. If the injury causes the death of the employee, the rights and remedies in this section inure to and the obligations are binding upon the personal representative of the deceased employee for the benefit of his dependents.
  4. Any attorney who fails to notify the director and attorney general of any settlement or fails to ensure the state receives its share of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment under subsection (a) of this section shall be reported to the grievance committee of the Wyoming state bar.
  5. At any time before the statute of limitation bars an employee or his estate from commencing a claim for personal injury or wrongful death, and upon the unsolicited written request of the employee or estate, the department may commence such an action on behalf of the employee or his estate. From any amounts recovered under this subsection, the state is entitled to an amount equal to all sums awarded as benefits to the employee or his estate and all anticipated future medical costs. Any excess recovery shall be paid to the injured employee or his estate.
  6. The department or employer shall have an additional six (6) month limitation period beyond the date on which the employee or his estate is barred under the statute of limitations from commencing a claim for personal injury or wrongful death, in which to commence such an action on behalf of the employee or his estate. From any amounts recovered under this subsection, the state is entitled to an amount equal to all sums awarded as benefits to the employee or his estate, all anticipated future medical costs and all costs of litigation. Any excess recovery shall be paid to the injured employee or his estate.
  7. For purposes of subsections (e) and (f) of this section, nothing in this section prohibits any third party from reimbursing the worker’s compensation account for medical or temporary total disability costs without prejudice prior to any judgment, settlement or release.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1995, ch. 183, § 1; 2009, ch. 156, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (a), added the second-to-last sentence.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Legislative intent. —

This section is designed to protect the state's lien rights in the event of settlement or judgment in favor of the injured worker in actions involving third parties or others. Streeter v. Amerequip Corp., 968 F. Supp. 624, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9464 (D. Wyo. 1997).

The legislature has the power to attach conditions to the payments to be made under the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law even though a condition affects an amount recovered from a third party. Brown v. State, 79 Wyo. 355, 334 P.2d 502, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1959); Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. McIntosh, 557 P.2d 743, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 229 (Wyo. 1976); Stephenson v. Mitchell, 569 P.2d 95, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1977).

The matter of the workmen's compensation schedule is one for the legislature, not the courts. Stephenson v. Mitchell, 569 P.2d 95, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1977).

Meaning of recovery generally. —

What is meant by recovery? This harks back to the phrase “in the event that such employee recovered from such [third] person.” It cannot mean the amount paid to the employee from the former industrial accident fund nor can it mean the amount restored to the former industrial accident fund as a result of a proceeding. The cost of recovery is necessarily the cost incident to the recovery of a judgment in or settlement of a damage action or claim against the third party, for it is only in such an action in which any such cost as 331/3 percent would be involved, and the limitation that not to exceed 331/3 percent of the recovery be deducted from that amount means that 331/3 percent of the amount recovered is the maximum amount which may in any event be deducted from the amounts paid to or on behalf of the employee by the former industrial accident fund rather than that 331/3 percent of the amount paid from the former industrial accident fund be deducted from such payments. Brown v. State, 79 Wyo. 355, 334 P.2d 502, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1959).

Meaning of recovery costs to be deducted. —

The costs to be deducted from payments made to the employee shall not exceed 331/3 percent of the amount recovered. This does not mean that in all cases there should be a flat deduction of the whole 331/3 percent, but is a limitation of the amount which the court may deduct. Brown v. State, 79 Wyo. 355, 334 P.2d 502, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1959).

Cost of “recovery or collection” includes attorney's fees. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. McIntosh, 557 P.2d 743, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 229 (Wyo. 1976).

No attorney's lien against sums to be refunded to state. —

An attorney, under the general attorneys' lien statute, § 29-1-102 , cannot enforce his lien against those sums set aside by statute out of third-party damages which the legislature, in this section, has specifically mandated will be refunded to the state. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. McIntosh, 557 P.2d 743, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 229 (Wyo. 1976); Stephenson v. Mitchell, 569 P.2d 95, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1977).

Since the state may not be a party to actions which seek to recover damages from negligent third persons, the state is not, therefore, subrogated to the rights of the injured employee in any such litigation. For this reason there cannot be an express or an implied contract requiring the state to pay the employee's attorney's fees for collecting the money which, under the statute, must be reimbursed to the state as refund for benefits paid. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. McIntosh, 557 P.2d 743, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 229 (Wyo. 1976).

The industrial accident fund, administered by the state workmen's compensation department, could not be charged attorney's fees by an employee coming under the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act making a successful recovery in a third-party action under the provisions of former § 27-54, Stephenson v. Mitchell, 569 P.2d 95, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1977).

Employee not entitled to double recovery. —

See Jackson v. Wyoming State Treas. ex. rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't, 521 P.2d 571, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 196 (Wyo. 1974).

According to this section, the employee cannot (within the limits hereafter mentioned) receive the benefit of the amount of compensation allowed to him twice — once from the former industrial accident fund and again from a third person, although he may retain any amount recovered from a third person over and above the amount of compensation allowed him by the state from the former industrial accident fund after subtracting therefrom the amounts authorized therefor as the former industrial accident fund's share of the costs of the recovery from the third party. Brown v. State, 79 Wyo. 355, 334 P.2d 502, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1959).

Settlement with third party construed as not barring compensation.—

In an action by the state for reimbursement from an employee for the amount paid by a third party to the employee, a demurrer by the state to the employee's answer should have been overruled where the answer set out the words of the settlement with the third party, which on its face showed that it ran both to the employee and his wife and that payment was received from the third party for injuries for which the employee had not received compensation. State ex rel. Morgan v. Moravetz, 78 Wyo. 100, 319 P.2d 527, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1957).

Wrongful death benefits subject to reimbursement. —

Wrongful death benefits received by the wife of a deceased worker in a suit initiated after benefits were received under this chapter were subject to the reimbursement and lien provisions of this section and were not protected by the wrongful death provision of § 1-38-102 , which shields wrongful death proceeds passing to surviving relatives from the “debts of the decedent.” West v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 822 P.2d 1269, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1991) (decided under former § 27-12-104).

Third person's negligence. —

Award should be payable in case of a third person's negligence, when that negligence is one of well known hazards of the business within the reasonable scope of a named employment. Baldwin v. Byrne, 53 Wyo. 519, 86 P.2d 1095, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (1939).

Former § 27-54 not unconstitutional. —

Former § 27-54, W.S. 1957, under which it was held that the state industrial accident fund would not share the expense of attorney's fees in third-party recovery by an injured workman, was not in violation of art. X, § 4, Wyo. Const., authorizing the creation of workmen's compensation. Stephenson v. Mitchell, 569 P.2d 95, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1977).

As to right of recovery against coemployee under former law, see Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1974); Fraley v. Worthington, 385 F. Supp. 605, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11856 (D. Wyo. 1974).

Indemnity contract entered into between employer and contractorenforceable by contractor. —

A contract entered into between an employer and a contractor, pertaining to a well for oil or gas, which provided that the employer would indemnify the contractor for all loss it might sustain as a result of the employer's work under the contract except such loss as might be caused by the sole negligence of the contractor, was enforceable by the contractor, who was sued by the employer's employee — who suffered injury during the course of his employment and was granted worker's compensation — against the employer, to the extent of any damage suffered because of the sole or concurrent negligence of the employer. Cities Serv. Co. v. Northern Prod. Co., 705 P.2d 321, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 543 (Wyo. 1985).

Jurisdictional requirement of service. —

“Maintain” in § 27-14-105(b) means that the suit may be filed, but it may not be continued toward judgment until the Wyoming Attorney General and the Director of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division have been served. Terex Corp. v. Hough, 2002 WY 112, 50 P.3d 317, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2002), reh'g denied, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. Aug. 13, 2002).

Service of a copy of the complaint on the Wyoming Attorney General and the Director of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division under § 27-14-105(b) may be made within 60 days of the filing of the complaint and to the extent Makinen v. PM P.C., 893 P.2d 1149, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1995), overruled, Terex Corp. v. Hough, 2002 WY 112, 50 P.3d 317, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2002).

Compliance. —

Failure of an injured employee who had received benefits under the state's worker's compensation laws to comply with the notice and service requirements of this section when filing a diversity suit against a manufacturer in district court did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction; the state was not prejudiced by the employee's failure, and the employee subsequently took steps to comply and amended her complaint to include allegations of compliance, to which the defendant responded. Streeter v. Amerequip Corp., 968 F. Supp. 624, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9464 (D. Wyo. 1997).

Where public employee did not serve copies of her personal injury complaint on the state attorney general or the director of the department of employment in the manner required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b) , the complaint was barred by the statute of limitation, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105 because service was not perfected until after expiration of the four year statute of limitations. However, the savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118 , applied to allow the employee to refile the action. Haney v. Cribbs, 2006 WY 158, 148 P.3d 1118, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 2006).

Applied in

Boyd v. Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 198 (Wyo. 1999); Knight v. Estate of McCoy, 2015 WY 9, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Jan. 14, 2015).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Wyoming Uninsured Motorist Act: A Regulatory Reconcilation of Mandated Coverages with the Standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement,” see XI Land & Water L. Rev. 213 (1976).

For case note, “Exclusivity Provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act as a Bar to Third-Party Actions Against Employers, Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, 586 P.2d 1220, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 244 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 587 (1979).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — Constitutionality of Wyoming's Co-employee Immunity Statute under Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution.Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 355 (1983).

For article, “Reinstating Wyoming’s Joint and Several Liability Paradigm: Protecting Wyoming’s Workforce, Their Families And The Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Fund From Uncompensated Injuries And Deaths”, see 8 Wyo. L. Rev. 87 (2008).

ARTICLE: Damned if You do, Damned if You Don't: A Contextual Analysis of Co-Employee Liability and Wyoming Workers' Compensation Subrogation, 16 Wyo. L. Rev. 415 (2016).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Modern status of effect of state workmen's compensation act on right of third-person tortfeasor to contribution or indemnity from employer of injured or killed workman, 100 ALR3d 350.

Employer's right of action for loss of services or the like against third person tortiously killing or injuring employee, 4 ALR4th 504.

Workers' compensation immunity as extending to one owning controlling interest in employer corporation, 30 ALR4th 948.

Liability of employer with regard to inherently dangerous work for injuries to employees of independent contractor, 34 ALR4th 914.

Right of health or accident insurer to intervene in workers' compensation proceeding to recover benefits previously paid to claimant or beneficiary, 38 ALR4th 355.

Third-party tortfeasor's right to have damages recovered by employee reduced by amount of employee's workers' compensation benefits, 43 ALR4th 849.

Willful, wanton or reckless conduct of coemployee as ground of liability despite bar of workers' compensation law, 57 ALR4th 888.

Prejudicial effect of bringing to jury's attention fact that plaintiff in personal injury or death action is entitled to workers' compensation benefits, 69 ALR4th 131.

“Dual capacity doctrine” as basis for employee's recovery for medical malpractice from company medical personnel, 73 ALR4th 115.

Workers' compensation: third-party tort liability of corporate officer to injured workers, 76 ALR4th 365.

Right of workers' compensation insurer or employer paying to a workers' compensation fund, on the compensable death of an employee with no dependents, to indemnity or subrogation from proceeds of wrongful death action brought against third-party tortfeasor, 7 ALR5th 969.

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 116.01D (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-14-106. Minor employee to be free of any legal disability.

A minor shall be deemed free of any legal disability for the purposes of this act and no other person has any cause of action or right to compensation for his injury except as expressly provided in this act.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Workers' compensation statute as barring illegally employed minor's tort action, 77 ALR4th 844.

Right of workers' compensation insurer or employer paying to a workers' compensation fund, on the compensable death of an employee with no dependents, to indemnity or subrogation from proceeds of wrongful death action brought against third-party tortfeasor, 7 ALR5th 969.

§ 27-14-107. [Repealed.]

Repealed by Laws 1995, ch. 121, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

This section, which derived from Laws 1990, ch. 90, § 1, related to the determination of filing dates and time periods.

§ 27-14-108. Extrahazardous industries, employments, occupations; enumeration; definitions; optional coverage.

  1. This act applies to the following, which shall be deemed extrahazardous employment:
    1. Repealed by Laws 2002, ch. 30, § 2.
    2. Regardless of individual occupation, all workers employed in the following sectors, subsectors, industry groups and industries, as each is defined in the most recent edition of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) manual:
      1. Agriculture, sector 11:
        1. Subsector 113, forestry and logging:
          1. Industry group 1133, logging.
          2. Industry group 4226, chemical and allied products, wholesale;
          3. Industry group 4227, petroleum and petroleum products, wholesale;
          4. Industry group 4228, beer, wine, and distilled alcoholic beverages, wholesale;
          5. Industry group 4229, miscellaneous nondurable goods, wholesale.
      2. Mining, sector 21;
      3. Utilities, sector 22;
      4. Construction, sector 23;
      5. Manufacturing, sector 31-33;
      6. Wholesale trade, sector 42:
        1. Subsector 422, wholesale trade, nondurable goods:

          (1) Industry group 4225, farm product raw materials, wholesale;

      7. Retail trade, sector 44-45:
        1. Subsector 441, motor vehicle and parts dealer;
        2. Subsector 444, building materials and garden equipment and supplies:

          (1) Industry group 4441, building materials and supplies dealers:

          a. NAICS industry 44419, other building materials.

        3. Subsector 445, food and beverage stores:

          (1) Industry group 4452, specialty food stores:

          a. NAICS industry 44521, meat markets;

          b. NAICS industry 44522, fish and seafood markets;

          c. NAICS industry 44529, other specialty stores.

        4. Subsector 447, gasoline stations;
        5. Subsector 454, nonstore retailers:

          (1) Industry group 4543, direct selling establishments:

          a. NAICS industry 45431, fuel dealers.

      8. Transportation and warehousing, sector 48-49:
        1. Subsector 481, air transportation;
        2. Subsector 484, truck transportation;
        3. Subsector 485, urban transit systems;
        4. Subsector 486, pipeline transportation;
        5. Subsector 491, postal service;
        6. Subsector 492, couriers and messengers;
        7. Subsector 493, warehousing and storage.
      9. Information, sector 51:
        1. Subsector 511, publishing industries:

          (1) Industry group 5111, newspaper, periodical, book and database publishers.

      10. Real estate and rental and leasing, sector 53:
        1. Subsector 531, real estate:

          (1) Industry group 5311, lessors of real estate.

        2. Subsector 532, rental and leasing services:

          (1) Industry group 5321, automotive equipment rental and leasing.

      11. Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, sector 56:
        1. Subsector 561, administrative and support services:

          (1) Industry group 5616, investigation, guard and armored car services;

          (2) Industry group 5617, services to buildings and dwellings.

        2. Subsector 562, waste management and remediation services.
      12. Educational services, sector 61:
        1. Subsector 611, educational services:

          (1) Industry group 6116, other schools and instruction:

          a. NAICS industry 61161, fine arts schools;

          b. NAICS industry 61162, sports and recreation instruction;

          c. NAICS industry 61169, all other schools and instruction:

          i. United States NAICS industry 611692, automobile driving schools.

      13. Health care and social services, sector 62:
        1. Subsector 621, ambulatory health care services;
        2. Subsector 622, hospitals;
        3. Subsector 623, nursing and residential care facilities;
        4. Subsector 624, social assistance:

          (1) Industry group 6241, individual and family services;

          (2) Industry group 6242, community food and housing, and emergency and other relief services;

          (3) Industry group 6243, vocational rehabilitation services.

      14. Except as provided under subsection (o) of this section, arts, entertainment and recreation, sector 71;
      15. Accommodation and food services, sector 72;
      16. Other services (except public administration), sector 81:
        1. Subsector 811, repair and maintenance;
        2. Subsector 812, personal and laundry services:

          (1) Industry group 8123, dry-cleaning and laundry services;

          (2) Industry group 8129, other personal services:

          a. NAICS industry 81291, pet care (except veterinary services).

      17. Public administration, sector 92:
        1. Subsector 922, justice, public order and safety activities:

          (1) Industry group 9221, justice, public order and safety activities:

          a. NAICS industry 92212, police protection;

          b. NAICS industry 92214, correctional institutions;

          c. NAICS industry 92215, fire protection, including firefighters while performing under the direction of a duly authorized officer in charge and engaged in competition at employer sanctioned training events, construction, maintenance or improvement of equipment or facilities utilized in fire protection activities, fundraising, civic affairs or other similar authorized activities.

        2. Subsector 923, administration of human resource programs:

          (1) Industry group 9231, administration of human resource programs:

          a. NAICS industry 92312, administration of public health programs;

          b. NAICS industry 92313, administration of human resource programs (except education, public health and veterans’ affairs programs);

          c. NAICS industry 92314, administration of veterans’ affairs.

        3. Subsector 924, administration of environmental quality programs.
  2. Repealed by Laws 1992, ch. 33, § 2.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 71, § 2; 1995, ch. 121, § 3.
  4. This act applies to governmental entities engaged in an industrial classification listed under subsection (a) of this section and to employees of governmental entities engaged in or employed as the following:
    1. Janitors, groundskeepers and maintenance workers;
    2. Federal programs which require coverage for their participants;
    3. State employees and effective until June 30, 2002, employees of the University of Wyoming while traveling in the performance of their duties;
    4. and (v) Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 132, § 2.
    5. Casual employees engaged in fighting forest or grass fires when employed by a governmental entity;
    6. Applicants or recipients of general welfare or relief who are employed by a governmental entity;
    7. Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 132, § 2.
    8. All adult and juvenile prisoners and probationers when performing work pursuant to law or court order;
    9. Diagnostic and analytical laboratory employees;
    10. Hazardous substance workers;
    11. Power equipment operators;
    12. Motor delivery drivers;
    13. Workshop employees;
    14. Persons performing community service pursuant to a criminal sentencing order or a diversion agreement entered into with a prosecuting authority, if the governing body of the jurisdiction for whom the service is performed has made a prior written election of coverage for the community service work;
    15. Public school  educational assistants who provide services to special education students while working directly with special education students and certified special education teachers and related services providers  as defined by 34 C.F.R. 300.18 and 300.156 and W.S. 21-2-802 and 21-7-303 who provide services to eligible students while working directly with eligible students;
    16. County coroners and deputy county coroners;
    17. Fire protection, including firefighters while performing under the direction of a duly authorized officer in charge and engaged in competition at employer sanctioned training events, construction, maintenance or improvement of equipment or facilities utilized in the fire protection activities, fundraising, civic affairs or similar authorized activities;
    18. [Effective January 2, 2023] A member of the legislature while engaged in an activity or traveling to or from an activity in the member’s official capacity as a member of the legislature.
  5. Specifically enumerated volunteers to whom this act applies are:
    1. Firefighters while:
      1. Firefighting;
      2. Performing rescue work;
      3. Participating in a hazardous material response;
      4. Responding to any other situation where the health or safety of the public is at risk;
      5. Training for the activities enumerated in subparagraphs (A) through (D) and (F) of this paragraph, including while engaged in competition at employer sanctioned training events;
      6. Constructing, maintaining or improving equipment or facilities utilized in the activities enumerated in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of this paragraph; or
      7. Performing under the direction of a duly authorized officer in charge and engaged in fundraising, civic affairs or other similar authorized activities.
    2. Search and rescue personnel;
    3. Law enforcement personnel;
    4. Search pilots;
    5. Mine rescue workers;
    6. Ambulance personnel;
    7. Hazardous substance workers;
    8. Emergency management agency personnel;
    9. Elected county or local officials volunteering to perform governmental services on behalf of the jurisdiction to which they are elected, where the services are outside of the elected officials’ regular duties, if the governing body of the jurisdiction has made a prior written election of coverage for the volunteer work;
    10. Volunteers working on projects approved by the Wyoming game and fish commission or the Wyoming department of state parks and cultural resources;
    11. Law enforcement aides while:
      1. Conducting patrols, reporting suspicious activities or controlling traffic and crowds on an authorized work schedule agreed to by and within the jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency to which the volunteer service is provided;
      2. Training under the auspices of a law enforcement agency.
  6. As used in this section:
    1. Repealed by Laws 1992, ch. 33, § 2.
    2. “Diagnostic and analytical laboratory employees” means all laboratory personnel handling or analyzing or otherwise exposed to infections, chemical or biological hazardous materials or employed in a laboratory in which infections, chemical or biological hazardous materials are handled or stored;
    3. Repealed by Laws 1999, ch. 46, § 2.
    4. “Workshop” means any location where power driven machinery is used and manual labor is exercised by way of trade or gain or otherwise incidental to the process of making, altering, repairing, printing or ornamenting, finishing or adapting for sale or otherwise any article or part of article, over which location the employer of the person working at the location has the right of access or control. Workshop includes any location where power machinery is being used and manual labor is exercised for recycling, crushing, incinerating, disposal or otherwise altering any article including but not limited to, paper products, metal, glass, rubber and plastic, over which location the employer of the person working at the location has the right of access or control. A workshop does not include any location on which only office fans, typewriters, adding machines, calculators, computers, dictaphones or other similar equipment driven by electric motors are operated which are sufficiently protected not to constitute a hazard to employees;
    5. Repealed by Laws 1992, ch. 33, § 2.
    6. “Power equipment operator” means any worker who operates power machinery;
    7. “Mine rescue team” means mine rescue workers and the employers of the workers performing actual rescue operations or training rescue operations at any underground mine pursuant to the consent of the owner of the mine and the employers of the members of the team. Mine rescue team members while engaged in mine rescue operations and training, shall be considered employees of the employer at whose mine they engage in mine rescue work;
    8. “Hazardous substance” means those substances designated or enumerated within the notification of hazardous waste activity publication of the federal environmental protection agency;
    9. “Hazardous substance worker” means a trained employee or volunteer involved with performing emergency response and post emergency response operations for the release or substantial threat of release of hazardous substances;
    10. “Eligible student” means a student with  behavioral, emotional, cognitive, learning, physical or health disabilities  who requires educational services to be provided outside of the regular  classroom because the use of supplementary aids and services cannot  be achieved satisfactorily in the regular classroom.
  7. This act does not apply to the following:
    1. through (iii) Repealed by Laws 1995, ch. 121, § 3.
    2. Repealed by Laws 2006, ch. 2, § 2.
    3. through (ix) Repealed by Laws 1995, ch. 121, § 3.
    4. Those individuals excluded as an employee under W.S. 27-14-102(a)(vii)(A) through (O).
  8. Repealed by Laws 2002, ch. 30, § 2.
  9. Any employee not enumerated under subsections (a) through (g) of this section or not employed in an extrahazardous employment enumerated under this section may be covered and subject to the provisions of this act and his employment shall be treated as if extrahazardous for purposes of this act, if his employer elects to obtain coverage under this act and makes payments as required by this act. An employer electing coverage pursuant to this subsection may only elect to cover all his employees. An employer may withdraw coverage elected under this subsection at any time if the elected coverage has been in effect for at least two (2) years and the employer is current on all contributions and payments required under this act.
  10. Any corporation, limited liability company, partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to obtain coverage under this act for any or all of its corporate officers, limited liability company members, partners in a partnership or sole proprietor by notifying the division in writing of its election upon initial registration with the division, or thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of a calendar quarter. Any employer electing coverage pursuant to this subsection shall, if it has other employees, simultaneously elect coverage for its employees, as provided in subsection (j) of this section, if those employees are not already covered under this act. Notwithstanding subsection (j) of this section, an employer shall not withdraw coverage at any time during the subsequent eight (8) calendar quarters. Application for termination of coverage under this subsection shall be filed in writing with the division. Termination of coverage shall be effective the first day of the month following the division’s receipt of the notice of termination which shall specify whether the termination is for the officers, members and partners or for the officers, members, partners and all electively covered employees.
  11. Any employer may elect to obtain coverage under this act for school-to-work participants engaging in program activities at his place of business in accordance with rules and regulations of the division.
  12. Repealed by Laws 2002, ch. 10, § 2.
  13. Notwithstanding subparagraph (a)(ii)(P) of this section and upon request of an employer, the department may exclude employment from coverage under this act if it determines the primary source of revenue of the employer’s business is derived from operations classified under subparagraph (a)(ii)(P) of this section and any of the following industries:
    1. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, sector 11:
      1. Subsector 111, crop production;
      2. Subsector 112, animal production;
      3. Subsector 113, forestry and logging:
        1. Industry group 1131, timber tract operations;
        2. Industry group 1132, forest nurseries and gathering of forest products.
      4. Subsector 115, support activities for agriculture and forestry.
  14. Any university of the state of Wyoming or any community college, school district or private or parochial school or college may elect to obtain coverage under this act for any person who may at any time be receiving training under any work or job training program for the purpose of training or learning trades or occupations. The bona fide student so placed shall be deemed an employee of the respective university, community college, school district or private or parochial school or college sponsoring the training or rehabilitation program.
  15. A team owner shall obtain coverage under this act for professional athletes as defined in W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xxix). For the purpose of determining employer contributions under this act, all professional athletes for whom coverage is obtained are deemed to be paid, for each month during which competition or team practice is held, the average monthly wage most recently computed pursuant to W.S. 27-14-802(b). Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the division shall classify professional athletes covered under this subsection under NAICS industry code number 711211, sports teams and clubs, and shall keep that classification separate for rate making purposes.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 190, § 1; 1992, ch. 33, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 122, § 1; ch. 216, § 1; 1995, ch. 121, §§ 2, 3; ch. 197, § 1; 1996, ch. 71, §§ 1, 2; ch. 74, § 2; ch. 82, § 1; 1997, ch. 67, § 1; ch. 93, § 1; ch. 137, § 1; ch. 193, § 2; 1997, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 501; 1998, ch. 54, § 1; 1999, ch. 32, § 1; ch. 46, § 2; ch. 97, § 1; 2000, ch. 32, § 1; 2001, ch. 132, §§ 1, 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 10, §§ 1, 2; ch. 30, §§ 1, 2; 2003, ch. 97, § 1; 2006, ch. 2, § 2; 2009, ch. 156, § 1; 2010, ch. 112, § 1; 2011, ch. 7, § 1; 2014 ch. 22, § 1, effective July 1, 2014; 2015 ch. 117, § 1, effective July 1, 2015; 2018 ch. 137, § 1, effective July 1, 2018; 2020 ch. 156, § 1, effective January 2, 2023; 2020 ch. 160, § 1, effective July 1, 2020.

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, repealed (g)(iv), pertaining to employers with itinerant business operations without fixed base of operations in Wyoming.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (k), in the first sentence, substituted “partnership or sole proprietorship” for “employing individuals covered pursuant to subsections (a) or (j) of this section”, inserted “any or all of” preceding “its corporate officers”, inserted “partners in a partnership or sole proprietor” following “limited liability company members”, deleted “electing to cover any or all of its officers or members and” preceding “notifying the division”, added the second sentence, deleted “not less than thirty (30) days before any calendar quarter following the initial eight (8) calendar quarters of coverage” from the end of the third sentence, and added the fourth sentence.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, rewrote (a)(ii)(S)(I)(1)c, which formerly read: “NAICS industry 92215, fire protection”; added (d)(xviii); in (e), added “including while engaged in competition at employer sanctioned training events” in (e)(i)(E), added (e)(i)(G), and made related changes.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in (e)(x), inserted “or the Wyoming department of state parks and cultural resources.”

The 2014 amendment, in (k), inserted “if it has other employees” following “subsection shall” in the second sentence.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in (d)(xvi), added the language following “services to special education students.”

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in (d)(xvi), inserted “while working directly with special education students” following “special education students” and substituted “students while working directly with eligible students” for “students with behavioral, emotional, cognitive, learning, physical or health disabilities that require educational services to be provided outside of the regular classroom because the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily in the regular classroom”; and added (f)(x).

The 2020 amendment, effective January 2, 2023, added (d)(xix).

Editor’s notes. —

Laws 1992, ch. 33, § 1, purportedly also amended subsection (f)(v). This amendment was not given effect due to the repeal of this subsection by Laws 1992, ch. 33, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Constitutionality. —

The state had a legitimate interest in and rational basis for creating the statutory classification that exempts mobile home parks from mandatory workers' compensation coverage. Gonzales v. Grass Valley Mobile Home Park, 933 P.2d 484, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1997), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Applicability. —

As a general rule, if the employer does not engage in extrahazardous activities, then whether an individual employee's activities are hazardous in nature is not material. Gonzales v. Grass Valley Mobile Home Park, 933 P.2d 484, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1997), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-108 and Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, the employer's Wyoming operations were properly assigned a code based on its primary business, and the distribution center was not entitled to its own classification separate from the employer's retail stores; this coding was not extrahazardous and the workers were not entitled to benefits because the employer was not engaged in extrahazardous business activities and did not elect to contribute to the state workers' compensation fund. Araguz v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 148, 262 P.3d 1263, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Oct. 28, 2011).

Coverage of state employees. —

Appointed member of state livestock board was a state employee within meaning of Workers' Compensation Act, and he was injured while traveling in the performance of his duties where he was involved in an automobile accident while traveling to attend a regularly scheduled board meeting. Sell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. (In re Sell), 7 P.3d 1, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2000).

Because workers' compensation statute did not define “state employee,” court elected to use ordinary and obvious definition of “public employee” found in Wyoming Governmental Claims Act for purposes of the applicability of this section. Sell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. (In re Sell), 7 P.3d 1, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2000).

Coverage of corporate officers. —

A claimant's corporate officer coverage was not withdrawn by his employer's failure to return to the worker's compensation division an affidavit affirming the claimant's exposure to hazards; however, the corporation did withdraw officer coverage when it stopped listing the claimant as a corporate officer on its monthly reports filed pursuant to § 27-14-202(a), and when it stopped submitting a premium for his coverage at the same time. Newton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 922 P.2d 863, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, 109 P.3d 887, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (2005).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Workmen's compensation: injury while crossing or walking along railroad or street railway tracks, going to or from work, as arising out of and in the course of employment, 50 ALR2d 363.

Suicide as compensable under workmen's compensation act, 15 ALR3d 616.

Workmen's compensation: injury or death due to storms, 42 ALR3d 385.

Workmen's compensation: injury sustained while attending employer-sponsored social affair as arising out of and in the course of employment, 47 ALR3d 566.

Compensation for injury by firearms at rifle range, shooting gallery, military exercise, etc., 49 ALR3d 762.

Master and servant: employer's liability for injury caused by food or drink purchased by employee in plant facilities, 50 ALR3d 505.

Industrial accidents involving conveyor belts or systems, 2 ALR4th 262.

Eligibility for workers' compensation as affected by claimant's misrepresentation of health or physical condition at time of hiring, 12 ALR5th 658.

Workers' compensation: coverage of employee's injury or death from exposure to the elements—Modern cases, 20 ALR5th 346.

Workers' compensation: law enforcement officer's recovery for injury sustained during exercise or physical recreation activities, 44 ALR5th 569.

Presumption or inference that accidental death of employee engaged in occupation of manufacturing or processing arose out of and in course of employment, 47 ALR5th 801.

§ 27-14-109. Collective system for county governments or county governmental entities.

The division, upon application, may allow county governments or county governmental entities to establish a collective system to report payroll, pay premiums, process injury reports, manage claims and provide other services required under this chapter for the employees of the county governments or county governmental entities. The division shall adopt rules and regulations to implement this section.

History. 2017 ch. 89, § 1, effective July 1, 2017.

Effective date. —

Laws 2017, ch. 89, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2017.

§ 27-14-110. Student learner agreements.

  1. A Wyoming school district, community college or technical school and an employer may enter into a student learner agreement for the purposes of providing student learners vocational work and training opportunities and for student learners to earn course credit from the school district, community college or technical school, compensation from the employer, or both. A copy of any student learner agreement entered into under this section shall be submitted by the employer to the division.
  2. A student learner may enter into a student training agreement with an employer to complete work or vocational training at the employer’s business for course credit from the school district, community college or technical school, compensation from the employer, or both. A copy of any student training agreement entered into under this section shall be submitted by the employer to the division.
  3. The employer shall notify the division if:
    1. A student learner agreement is terminated or extended with a school district, community college or technical school, and if terminated, the date of termination;
    2. A student training agreement is extended or terminated, and if terminated, the date of termination.
  4. An employer may enter into student learner agreements with more than one (1) Wyoming school district, community college or technical school, provided that the employer shall enter into separate student learner agreements with each school district, community college or technical school.
  5. The division shall create and maintain standard student learner agreements and student training agreements for use by employers, student learners, school districts, community colleges and technical schools. The standard agreements shall be maintained on the department’s website and provided to employers, students, school districts, community colleges and technical schools.
  6. A student learner who enters into a student training agreement with an employer who has a valid and current student learner agreement with the student learner’s school district, community college or technical school shall be covered under the worker’s compensation program established in this act. Each employer shall pay the premiums charged for each student learner as required under this act. The division shall account for student learners in calculating benefits charged to an employer’s experience rating account under this act.
  7. The division shall establish rules and regulations necessary for the implementation of this section.

History. 2021 ch. 160, § 1, effective July 1, 2021.

Effective date. —

Laws 2021, ch. 160, § 4, makes the act effective July 1, 2021.

Article 2. Premiums and Rates

§ 27-14-201. Rates and classifications; rate surcharge.

  1. The worker’s compensation program shall be neither more nor less than self-supporting. Employments affected by this act shall be divided by the division into classes, whose rates may be readjusted annually as the division actuarially determines. Any employer may contest his classification as determined by the division following the contested case provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act except that the division shall carry the burden of proving that the classification is correct. Information shall be kept of the amounts collected and expended in each class for actuarially determining rates, but for payment of compensation, the worker’s compensation account shall be one and indivisible.
  2. If it is determined at any time and in any manner that a determination by the division of an industrial or employment classification is incorrect, premiums under any corrected classification shall be charged only from the date of change in classification. This subsection shall not apply to any employer’s categorization of an employee’s gross earnings to an industrial or employment classification.
  3. Upon compliance with the rate making provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and written approval by the governor, the division shall determine the hazards of the different classes of employments and fix the premiums therefor at the lowest rate consistent with maintenance of an actuarially sound worker’s compensation account and the creation of actuarially sound surplus and reserves, and for such purpose shall adopt a system of rating in such a manner as to take account of the peculiar hazard of each risk, mathematically and equally based on actual costs to the program in terms of number and extent of injuries and deaths, and shall use consultants or rating organizations as it determines necessary. The department shall submit an annual report with respect to proposed annual rate adjustments under this section to the joint labor, health and social services interim committee no later than October 1 of the year preceding the implementation of the rate adjustment. The total annual rate adjustment for any employment classification under this section is subject to the following limitations:
    1. and (ii) Repealed by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 3.
    2. and (iv) Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 117, § 2.
    3. For the calendar year commencing January 1, 1999 and each calendar year thereafter, any increase in the base rate for each employment classification shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the base rate imposed for that employment classification during the immediately preceding year;
    4. To compensate for the difference between revenues generated under base rate adjustment limitations imposed under paragraph (c)(v) of this section and revenues which would have been generated if base rates had been adjusted without limitations, the division may limit base rate decreases for any employment classification by not more than fifty percent (50%) of the actuarially determined decrease;
    5. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 117, § 2.
    6. In determining rates under this section for employers specified under W.S. 27-14-108(a)(ii)(G)(I), the division shall base the rates on one (1) rate classification for sales personnel and one (1) rate classification for all other personnel other than clerical;
    7. Notwithstanding paragraph (v) of this subsection, for the calendar year beginning January 1, 2003, rates shall be adjusted to reflect the reclassification of industry codes in accordance with the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) manual, but in no case shall the base premium rate for any classification for the calendar year beginning January 1, 2003 exceed one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the lowest base rate assigned to any employer in that classification under the standard industrial classification manual for the preceding year.
  4. In addition, the plan of rating shall use an experience rating system based on three (3) years claim experience, or as much thereof as is available, for employers enrolled under it. This system shall reward employers with a better than average claim experience, penalize employers with a worse than average claim experience and may provide for premium volume discount so long as the account remains actuarially sound. Discounts from or penalties added to base employment classification rates because of claim experience shall not exceed sixty-five percent (65%) for rates through calendar year 2016 and shall not exceed eighty-five percent (85%) for rates beginning with calendar year 2017. An employer who is current on premium payments required by this act may apply to the division for a determination of experience modification rating chargeability for an injury to the employer’s employee. The division’s determination of chargeability shall be reviewable as provided in W.S. 27-14-601(k)(iii) and (iv). If the division, by a preponderance of the evidence, determines that an employee’s injury was primarily caused by a third party, the injury shall not be charged to the employer’s account. The employer shall bear the burden of proof in any action brought by the employer for a chargeability determination. If an employer’s account is determined to be unchargeable under this subsection, the employer’s account shall not be further credited upon recovery from a third party by the division. The division shall by rule and regulation establish necessary procedures for a determination of chargeability. Any determination by the division regarding causation of an injury pursuant to this subsection shall be used only for ratemaking purposes and shall not be admissible in any civil litigation regarding the injury.
  5. The division in fixing rates shall provide for the costs of benefits and the expenses of administering the worker’s compensation account allowed by law, subject to the following:
    1. The account shall be one (1) account but shall include provision for all expenses allowed by this act, loss adjustment expenses and unpaid losses, including:
      1. Case reserves;
      2. Future development on known claims;
      3. Reopened claims reserve;
      4. Claims incurred but not reported;
      5. Claims incurred and reported but not yet recorded;
      6. An actuarially reasonable contingency margin to reflect the uncertainty inherent in estimates of unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses.
    2. The account shall be fully reserved on or before December 31, 2013;
    3. The division shall annually obtain a report from a qualified actuary rendering an opinion regarding the reasonableness of the booked loss and loss adjustment expense reserve and carried contingency reserve;
    4. The division shall provide the opinion required by paragraph (iii) of this subsection to the joint labor, health and social services interim committee, or its successor, by November 1 of each year;
    5. For purposes of calculating reserves, future liabilities shall be discounted to present value using a discount factor selected by the division. The discount factor selected by the division and the reason for its selection shall be included in the annual report to the joint labor, health and social services interim committee or its successor;
    6. The collection through premiums of any deficiency in reserves and surpluses that exceeds five percent (5%) of the fund balance shall be averaged over a ten (10) year period;
    7. For purposes of this section:
      1. “Fully reserved” means that the workers’ compensation account established by W.S. 27-14-701 has, in the opinion of a qualified actuary, funds sufficient on a discounted basis to provide for all unpaid loss and loss adjustment expenses as well as an actuarially appropriate provision for adverse contingencies;
      2. “Qualified actuary” means a person who is a fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society or who has been approved as qualified for signing casualty loss reserve opinions by the Casualty Practice Council of the American Academy of Actuaries.
  6. The division is given full power and authority to annually determine premium rates and classifications according to the standards set forth under subsections (b), (c) and (d) of this section provided that no change in the classification or rates prescribed shall be effective until thirty (30) days after the date of the order making the change.
  7. Policies or statements of coverage may be issued to each covered employer. The division shall collect all costs in certifying coverage under this act from the person requesting the certification except for one (1) policy or statement of coverage which may be issued to the employer at no charge.
  8. Approximate rates applicable to each employer pursuant to this section shall be annually provided to the employer by October 1.
  9. All data and formulas used by the division, including the employment classification base rate and claim experience rating, to determine rates for an employer shall be made available to the employer upon request of the employer.
  10. Repealed by Laws 1989, ch. 149, § 3; 1994, ch. 86, § 3.
  11. Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 94, § 2.
  12. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 117, § 2.
  13. The division shall in accordance with its rules and regulations, grant a discount to rates established under this section in an amount not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the base rate for the employment classification of any employer if the employer complies with a safety program approved by the division and a discount in an amount not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the base rate for the employment classification if the employer complies with a drug and alcohol testing program approved by the division and a discount in an amount not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the base rate for the employment classification if the employer complies with a health and safety consultation program developed by the department of workforce services in consultation with the occupational health and safety commission. In no instance shall the sum total of discounts under this subsection exceed thirty percent (30%) of the base rate for the employment classification for the employer. The discount for the health and safety consultation program shall only remain in effect for three (3) years after the employer is certified to be in compliance with the health and safety consultation program recommendations. In determining safety program approval, drug and alcohol program approval, health and safety consultation program approval and the total discount granted under this subsection, the division shall consider:
    1. The probability the program will reduce the number of accidents and the probable savings which may be realized from the reduction;
    2. Relevant experience, if any, depicting actual reduction in accidents and actual savings which is compared to an industry standard;
    3. The adequacy and accuracy of determining participation in the program and the eligibility for a discount by individual employers;
    4. The administrative costs incurred by the division in implementing a rate discount for an applicable employment classification;
    5. Whether the employer adopts and enforces policies establishing a drug-free workplace which may include an employee assistance program to assist employees with alcohol or other drug problems. The division shall follow rules adopted by the department of workforce services in consultation with the department of health for the effective implementation of this paragraph. Rules adopted pursuant to this paragraph shall not impose on any employer the requirement to pay the costs of treatment or any other intervention. Employers enrolled in a safety discount program under this paragraph shall have one (1) year from the effective date of those rules within which to come into compliance.
  14. Repealed by Laws 1998, ch. 117, § 2.
  15. The division may, in accordance with its rules and regulations, grant a premium credit to rates established under this section if it is determined by a qualified actuary retained by the division that the fund will remain fully reserved after the premium credit is granted and implemented. If the division determines to grant a premium credit, the percentage of credit allowed for the rate year shall be the same for all employers qualified pursuant to paragraph (iii) of this subsection. The following provisions shall also apply to the premium credit program:
    1. The premium credit can only be used to offset premiums, and in no case can the premium be redeemed by an employer for cash;
    2. Any premium credits shall expire as provided by law. If no law provides for the expiration of credits, credits shall expire as determined by the division;
    3. The premium credit, if granted, shall only be given to those employers who paid premiums during the preceding year and whose accounts are current on all amounts owed under the act, including premiums, case cost liability and penalties.
  16. In an industrial classification with less than twelve (12) employers in which a single employer contributes greater than fifty percent (50%) of the total premium in that classification, the director of the department of workforce services, with the concurrence of the governor, may adjust the base rate for the employer established pursuant to this section, not to exceed twenty-five percent (25%) subject to the following:
    1. An affected employer submits a written application to the division in the format prescribed by the division after October 1 and before December 31 of the year preceding the year in which the adjustment will be made;
    2. The affected employer’s experience modification rating is lower than the average for the employer’s industrial classification;
    3. The director determines that the employer has been adversely affected due to the distribution of premiums within the industrial classification; and
    4. The employer is contributing less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the total premium of the industrial classification.
  17. Any loss of premium due to an adjustment pursuant to subsection (r) of this section shall be distributed among all rate classes in the annual base rate adjustment in the year subsequent to the year in which the adjustment was made.
  18. The division may, in accordance with its rules and regulations, create and implement a premium deductible program. The following provisions shall apply to the premium deductible program:
    1. Participating employers shall sign a contract with the division, clearly identifying the terms of the program;
    2. Participating employers shall be assigned a reduced industry base rate for premium calculation purposes. The industry base rate reduction shall be determined in a manner that reflects the dollar amount of the deductible and is consistent with an actuarially sound workers’ compensation account;
    3. Participating employers shall be financially stable and in good standing with the division;
    4. Participating employers shall report all work injuries within the timeframes specified in W.S. 27-14-506 ;
    5. Participating employers failing to meet the requirements of the premium deductible program shall have their premium base rate reinstated at the full industry base rate, retroactive to the reporting period in which the employer first became noncompliant. Employers whose premium base rate is reinstated at the full industry base rate under this paragraph shall not be re-eligible for the premium deductible program for a minimum of eight (8) calendar quarters;
    6. Participation in the premium deductible program cannot be transferred to a successor employer nor can it be incorporated as part of a merger among employing units.
  19. No compensable injury related to COVID-19 that occurs during the period beginning January 1, 2020 and ending March 31, 2022 for which coverage is provided under this act and for which a claim was filed on or before March 31, 2023 shall be chargeable to an employer’s experience rating under this section.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1987, ch. 94, § 2; 1989, ch. 149, §§ 1, 3; 1991, ch. 219, § 1; 1994, ch. 86, §§ 2, 3; 1995, ch. 121, § 2; 1996, ch. 71, § 1; 1998, ch. 117, §§ 1, 2; 1999, ch. 184, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 30, § 1; ch. 81, § 2; 2003, ch. 185, § 1; 2005, ch. 60, § 1; ch. 231, § 1; 2006, ch. 1, § 1; 2008, ch. 116, § 1; 2009, ch. 156, § 1; ch. 169, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; 2013 ch. 88, § 1, effective July 1, 2013; 2015 ch. 16, § 1, effective July 1, 2015; 2017 ch. 128, § 1, effective July 1, 2017; 2020, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 1; 2022 ch. 16, § 1, effective March 8, 2022.

Cross references. —

For provisions pertaining to compliance checks, see § 12-6-103 .

The 2005 amendments. —

The first 2005 amendment, by ch. 60, § 1, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote (e) to extend the deadline for the workers' compensation account to be fully funded, clarify reserve and surplus requirements for the fund, and provide for discounting of reserves.

The second 2005 amendment, by ch. 231, § 1, substituted “account” for “fund” in the second sentence in (d).

See the conflicting legislation note. This section is set out above incorporating changes made by both 2005 acts.

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, rewrote the introductory language of (o) by adding the discount amount, and inserting “drug and alcohol program approval.”

The 2008 amendment, made stylistic changes.

Laws 2008, ch. 116, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 13, 2008.

The 2009 amendments. —

The first 2009 amendment, by Laws 2009, ch. 156, § 1, effective July 1, 2009, in the introductory language of (q), substituted “if it is determined by a qualified actuary retained by the division that the fund will remain fully reserved after the premium credit is granted and implemented. If the division determines to grant a premium credit, the percentage of credit allowed for the rate year shall be the same for all employers qualified pursuant to paragraph (iii) of this subsection” for “in an amount not to exceed fifty percent (50%) of the investment earnings after inflation on reserves for the prior rate year. Of the total amount of premium credit distribution established by the division, fifty percent (50%) shall be distributed to all employers who made premium payments to the fund in the preceding year and fifty percent (50%) shall be distributed to employers whose accident frequency and injury severity in the preceding year was less than that of the industry classification under which the employer is classified. The fifty percent (50%) distribution to all employers who made premium payments shall be made on the basis of each employer's annual premium payment as compared to total premium payments made by all employers in the year preceding the year in which the premium credit was issued”; and added (q)(iii).

The second 2009 amendment, by Laws 2009, ch. 169, § 1, in (e)(vii)(A), substituted “27-14-701” for “27-14-101.”

Laws 2009, ch. 169, § 5(b), makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 11, 2009.

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (o)(v) and (r).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, substituted “shall” for “may” at the beginning of (o); and added “and a discount in an amount not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the base rate for the employment classification if the employer complies with a health and safety consultation program developed by the department of workforce services in consultation with the occupational health and safety commission. In no instance shall the sum total of discounts under this subsection exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the base rate for the employment classification for the employer. The discount for the health and safety consultation program shall only remain in effect for three (3) years after the employer is certified to be in compliance with the health and safety consultation program recommendations” following “the division”; and added “, health and safety consultation program approval” following “program approval” in (o).

The 2015 amendments. — The first 2015 amendment, by ch. 16, § 1, effective July 1, 2015, in (d), added “for rates through calendar year 2016 and shall not exceed eighty-five percent (85%) for rates beginning with calendar year 2017” in the third sentence.

The second 2015 amendment, by ch. 184, § 1, effective July 1, 2015, in (d), eliminated the fourth sentence and added the last seven sentences.

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (o), substituted “ten percent (10%)” for “five percent (5%)” in the first sentence, and substituted “thirty percent (30%)” for “twenty-five percent (25%)” in the second sentence.

The 2020 amendment, in (q)(i), deleted the first sentence which read “The premium credit to an employer may be applied only against premiums due in the year in which the credit was issued,” rewrote (q)(ii) which read “Any premium credits unclaimed at the end of the year shall expire,” and added (u).

Laws 2020, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 7 makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved May 20, 2020.

The 2022 amendment, in (u), added “compensable” preceding “injury,” “that occurs during the period beginning January 1, 2020 and ending March 31, 2022” following “COVID-19,” substituted “March 31, 2023” for “December 30, 2020” and deleted the former second sentence, which read, “The division shall estimate the cost to the fund of an injury subject to this subsection and shall deposit into the fund or dedicate within the fund the amount of the estimated cost but only to the extent federal monies are available for that purpose from the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, P.L. 116-136, or from any other available federal monies related to the COVID-19 emergency response.”

Laws 2022, ch. 16, § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Approved March 8, 2022.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

see note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

Applicability. — Laws 2020, 1st Sp. Sess., Ch. 2, § 5, provides: “(a) Pursuant to W.S. 27-14-201(q), and in addition to the premium credit provided by 2020 Wyoming Session Laws, Chapter 146, Section 1, Enrolled Act No. 49, the department of workforce services shall establish a premium credit for any employer who has made all required worker's compensation payments for the period beginning January 1, 2019 and ending December 31, 2019. To qualify for the credit, an employer shall be in good standing with the worker's compensation division within the department of workforce services for all required worker's compensation payments by June 15, 2020. Premium credits granted under this section shall become effective on July 1, 2020 and may be used for premium reporting periods from July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021. Any unused credit will expire June 30, 2021.

“(b) Notwithstanding premium payment requirements under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, W.S. 27 14 101 through 27-14-806 , the department of workforce services may grant an employer that is current on its required premium payments under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act a delay in the payment of premiums after applying any premium credits granted under subsection (a) of this section. The department may promulgate rules to grant a delay in premium payments under this subsection for any duration that will maintain the solvency of the workers compensation program and to the extent that funding is made available through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, P.L. 116-136, or from any other available federal funds related to the COVID-19 emergency response, to offset the delayed premiums.”

Remedy for improper charging of experience rating. —

While an employer asserted that it was not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard before worker compensation benefits were paid to an injured employee, a hearing officer did not have the authority, pursuant to § 27-14-603(e), to remedy the situation by ordering the division to charge benefits to an industrial class as a whole rather than a single employer. Section 27-14-603(e) is not ambiguous and clearly instructs the division, not the office of administrative hearings, to charge benefits against the industrial classification in only one specific situation: where the series of injuries which entitles the employee to benefits does not permit determination of which single employer is to be charged. An adequate remedy for employers who allege division mistakes cause the employer's experience rating to be improperly charged is to petition the division to remove any charges from its experience rating which arose as a result of the division's own neglect, mistake or inadvertence, pursuant to this section. Olsten Temporary Servs. v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Nyquist), 870 P.2d 360, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1994).

Stated in

Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1988).

§ 27-14-202. Premium payments; payroll reports; department authority to establish joint reporting; remedies for incorrect earnings categorizations by employers.

  1. Except as provided under subsection (e) of this section, each employer shall forward to the division on forms provided by the division, a true copy of the payroll of his employees engaged in extrahazardous employment during the current calendar month or quarterly reporting period, certified and affirmed by himself or a person having knowledge of the payrolls under penalty of perjury. Payroll reports and monthly payments under this act shall be submitted on or before the last day of the month following the month in which the earnings are paid, unless otherwise provided by rule and regulation of the division.
  2. The director may permit an employer to file payroll reports for quarterly payroll periods ending March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31 if the diligence of prior reporting payment of premium and other factors warrant. The privilege of quarterly reporting may be revoked by the division if an employer is delinquent in reporting or making payments in accordance with this act. Upon notice of revocation, the employer shall file payroll reports on a monthly basis. Quarterly payroll reports shall be filed and payments made on or before the last day of the month following the quarterly periods.
  3. An employer shall notify the director at the time he ceases to employ individuals in covered employment.
  4. Any employer or joint employer contributing as required by this act and employing employees or joint employees covered under this act that would qualify as separate classifications, may elect to report gross earnings of the covered entities under one (1) consolidated Wyoming worker’s compensation account. A payroll report submitted pursuant to this subsection shall classify the employer’s payroll under separate industrial classifications specified under W.S. 27-14-108 . Any employer electing to report under a consolidated account shall provide written notice to the division of its intent. The election shall remain in effect for one (1) year or until withdrawn in writing, whichever occurs later. Any employer or joint employer contributing as required by this act and employing employees or joint employees covered by this act who elects to report the payrolls under one (1) consolidated account pursuant to this subsection shall be treated as a single employer for all purposes of this act with the exception of determining the experience rating pursuant to W.S. 27-14-201(d) and the premium tax credit pursuant to W.S. 27-14-201(q).
  5. Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, an employer may elect to submit payroll reports and make premium payments in advance pursuant to rule and regulation of the division. In its rules and regulations established under this subsection, the division shall provide for adjustment of premium payments for any fiscal year in accordance with overpayments or underpayments made during the preceding fiscal year.
  6. Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section and commencing January 1, 1994, governmental entity employers shall make payments for rates established by the division under W.S. 27-14-201 for any calendar year commencing on July 1 of that calendar year and ending June 30 of the immediately succeeding calendar year. For purposes of this subsection “governmental entity employer” includes state, county, municipal, school district, community college, university and special district employers.
  7. The department of workforce services shall by rule and regulation establish a joint payroll reporting system for the purposes of the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act and Wyoming Employment Security Law. Nothing in this subsection shall require the department to provide a joint payroll reporting system to all qualifying employers.
  8. An employer’s categorization in its payroll reports of an employee’s gross earnings to the appropriate industrial or employment classification shall be in accordance with division rules and regulations. If the division finds any employee gross earnings to be incorrectly categorized to an industrial or employment classification, the division shall within a one (1) year period beginning with the current rate year and including the previous rate year, credit or debit the employer’s account for the overpayment or underpayment as appropriate. The division shall waive any underpayment amount, interest, penalties or claim reimbursements if the incorrect employee gross earnings categorization was caused by reliance on a written determination of the division and the employer provided full and truthful disclosure of all pertinent information in requesting a determination or if the employer makes a good faith error in categorization. The division may waive any interest, penalties or claim reimbursement caused by an underpayment due to an otherwise incorrect employee gross earning categorization of an employee’s earnings in any other case if it determines there are sufficient extraordinary circumstances which warrant a waiver. If an employer’s account has been debited pursuant to this subsection, the employer shall not be considered contributing as required by this act if he does not pay the underpayment within thirty (30) days of his account being debited or within thirty (30) days of completion of any appeals of the determination of an underpayment, whichever occurs later.
  9. The division, on or about the fifteenth of the month following the due date, shall send a written notice of delinquency to an employer failing to submit a report as required by this section. An employer failing to submit a report required by this section within thirty (30) days of the date due shall, in addition to any delinquent premium penalty pursuant to W.S. 27-14-203 , be assessed a penalty of one hundred dollars ($100.00) for each delinquent report.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 29, § 1; ch. 30, § 1; ch. 226, § 1; 1993, ch. 96, § 1; 1995, ch. 121, § 2; ch. 205, § 1; 1998, ch. 117, § 1; 1999, ch. 150, § 1; 2006, ch. 2, § 1; 2009, ch. 90, § 2; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to perjury in judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings, see § 6-5-301 .

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, added (j).

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, deleted “which budget upon a fiscal year basis beginning on July 1” following “special district employers” in the last sentence of (f).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (g).

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2009, ch. 90, § 4 provides: “It is the intent of this act to impose a fiscal year of July 1 through June 30 on all governmental entities in this state, including all agencies, boards, commissions, institutions, instrumentalities, political subdivisions and special districts, no matter how formed, unless specifically exempted or otherwise authorized by law. The intent of this act is to repeal any noncodified provision which conflicts with the provisions of this act, including but not limited to earlier adopted government reorganization acts. Any entity required to change its current fiscal year of operation may elect to extend its current fiscal year or shorten its current fiscal year and commence its next fiscal year on July 1, 2009 or July 1, 2010, as it finds most convenient and efficient for its circumstances.”

There is no subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Constitutionality. —

A former provision requiring employers to contribute to common fund for compensation of injuries to workmen, irrespective of whether such injuries were caused by employer's negligence, was held not to violate the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution as a deprivation of property without due process of law. Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 1918 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1918).

Payment in nature of tax. —

Compensation awards differ from ordinary debts of corporation, being an obligation imposed by law arising from relationship existing between employer and employee, and they are in the nature of a tax. State ex rel. Christensen v. Nugget Coal Co., 60 Wyo. 51, 144 P.2d 944, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1944).

Not in nature of insurance premiums. —

Each employer shall pay, as nearly as possible, amount paid out of industrial accident fund as compensation to or on behalf of his own employees and payments made are not in nature of insurance premiums. State ex rel. Christensen v. Nugget Coal Co., 60 Wyo. 51, 144 P.2d 944, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1944).

Limited liability accident insurance. —

Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act was not intended to give compensation as damages, but is in nature of accident insurance, a compromise between employers and employed whereby in exchange for limited liability employer pays some claims where in past no liability existed. Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1942).

Monthly payroll reports. —

A worker's compensation claimant's corporate officer coverage was not withdrawn by his employer's failure to return to the worker's compensation division an affidavit affirming the claimant's exposure to hazards; however, the corporation did withdraw officer coverage when it stopped listing the claimant as a corporate officer on its monthly reports filed pursuant to subsection (a), and when it stopped submitting a premium for his coverage at the same time. Newton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 922 P.2d 863, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1996).

Consolidated account for affiliated corporations required division approval. —

Under the pre-1986 provisions, affiliated corporations could report their payrolls and pay their premiums under a single consolidated account. However, such an arrangement required the express approval and knowledge of the division to qualify as “contributing as required by this act,” as required by former § 27-12-103 (see now § 27-14-104 ). Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. Sept. 20, 1988).

Single employer paying through joint account entitled to immunity. —

A single employer that makes its payments to the worker's compensation fund through a joint account entered into with other affiliated business entities is considered to have made its contributions as required by law and is entitled to the immunity set forth in this chapter. Lankford v. True Ranches, 822 P.2d 868, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1991).

Cited in

Knight v. Estate of McCoy, 2015 WY 9, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Jan. 14, 2015).

Stated in

State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 WY 111, 384 P.3d 267, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2016).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Crediting employer or insurance carrier with earnings of employee reemployed or continued in employment, after injury, 84 ALR2d 1108.

§ 27-14-203. Failure of employer to make payments; interest; lien; injunction; nonexclusive remedies.

  1. Any employer not applying for coverage of eligible employees or, after obtaining coverage under this act, any employer failing, neglecting or refusing to make payments required by this act within thirty (30) days of the date due and against whom any injured employee is held entitled to worker’s compensation benefits is liable to the state for an amount equal to all awards, both paid and reserved entered for payment to or for the employee under this act. If the employer fails, neglects or refuses to satisfy his liability within the thirty (30) day period, the amount may be recovered by civil action in the name of the director. The entry of final order by the division or hearing examiner approving and allowing an award of compensation is prima facie proof of the liability of an employer failing to comply with this act.
  2. Repealed by Laws 1993, ch. 176, § 2.
  3. Premiums not paid on or before the date due shall bear interest of one percent (1%) per month or any fractional portion thereof from the due date until payment plus accrued interest is received by the division. The interest is part of the payment due for all purposes if suit is instituted as provided in this act.
  4. If premiums, liabilities pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, interest and penalties provided by this section are not paid within thirty (30) days of the date due and following notice by the division to the employer of the remedies authorized under this section, and the consequences of these remedies the attorney general may bring suit in the name of the state for the collection of all delinquent payments, liabilities pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, interest and penalties. If a judgment is rendered in favor of the state, the judgment shall be for the amount of the premiums, liabilities pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, interest and penalties together with costs.
  5. If payments under this act are not paid on or before the date due and following notice under subsection (d) of this section, the director may file a lien with the county clerk of the county in which the employer has his principal place of business and a copy with any other county. The amount due is a lien upon all real and personal property of the employer and is in effect from the time of filing and covers all property of the employer in any county in which filed. The director shall file notice of satisfaction of the lien with the county clerk if payments are collected or found erroneous and may release any property from the lien or subordinate the lien if he determines payments are secured by a lien on other property or the collection of payments are not in jeopardy.
  6. Any employer employing any person in any covered employment who, following notice by the division of the remedies authorized under this section, fails to apply for coverage under this act or, after obtaining coverage under this act, fails to make payments within thirty (30) days of the date due, may be enjoined in an action instituted by the director from engaging or continuing in a business covered by this act. Operations may, in whole or in part, be enjoined until required payments are made and the employer complies with this act. The director is not required to give bond in the action.
  7. Remedies provided by this act are cumulative and are not exclusive.
  8. If judgment is rendered in favor of the employer in any action under this section, he shall be entitled to recover all his costs including a reasonable attorney’s fee from the division. This recovery shall not affect the employer’s experience rating.
  9. The division may enter into an installment payment agreement with a delinquent employer where payment in a lump sum would cause severe inconvenience to the employer, provided that:
    1. The agreement shall be agreed upon within thirty (30) days of the notice provided pursuant to subsection (d) of this section;
    2. The term of the installment payment agreement shall not exceed twelve (12) months; and
    3. Prospective liabilities which are reasonably expected to accrue during the term of the installment payment agreement may be included in the installment payment agreement.
  10. No additional interest, penalties or other liabilities authorized under this section shall accrue to the employer for the employer’s delinquencies if the employer has entered into an installment payment agreement pursuant to subsection (j) of this section and is in compliance with the terms of the agreement. The employer’s relief from liability provided pursuant to W.S. 27-14-104(a) shall remain in effect while the employer is in compliance with the agreement, provided that the employer has no further delinquencies under this section. If an employer fails to comply with the terms of its installment payment agreement, all premiums, liabilities pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, interest and penalties provided by this section shall be applied as of the original delinquency date minus any payments made and the division may exercise any remaining remedies authorized under this act.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1993, ch. 176, § 2; 1995, ch. 205, § 1; 2006, ch. 2, § 1; 2007, ch. 195, § 1; 2017 ch. 100, § 1, effective July 1, 2017.

Cross references. —

As to punishment for an employer who makes a false statement in his or her payroll report, see § 27-14-510 .

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, deleted “or fifty dollars ($50.00) per month, whichever amount is greater” in (c).

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, inserted “both paid and reserved” in (a); in (d), inserted variations of “liabilities pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, interests and penalties provided by this section” twice, and inserted “all.”

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a), substituted “the amount may be recovered” for “the amount shall be recovered”; in (c), substituted “one percent (1%)” for “two percent (2%)”; in (d), substituted “the attorney general may bring suit” for “the attorney general shall immediately bring suit” and “the judgment shall be for the amount of the premiums, liabilities pursuant to subsection (a) of this sections, interest and penalties” for “the judgment shall be for double the amount of the payroll payment provided by this act”; in (f), substituted “may be enjoined in an action” for “shall be enjoined in an action” and “operations may, in whole or in part, be enjoined” for “operations shall be enjoined”; and added (j) and (k).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Cited in

Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, 109 P.3d 887, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (2005).

Quoted in

State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 WY 111, 384 P.3d 267, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2016).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Tort liability of worker's compensation insurer for wrongful delay or refusal to make payments due, 8 ALR4th 902.

§ 27-14-204. Coverage of out-of-state injuries; filing.

  1. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 177, § 2.
  2. The payment or award of benefits under the worker’s compensation law of another state to an employee or his dependents otherwise entitled on account of the injury or death to the benefits of this act is not a bar to a claim for benefits under this act if a claim under this act is filed within the time limits set forth in W.S. 27-14-503 . If compensation is paid or awarded under this act, the total amounts of medical and related income and death benefits paid or awarded under another worker’s compensation law shall be credited against the total corresponding medical and related income and death benefits due under this act.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1989, ch. 29, §§ 1, 2.
  4. Any employee injured outside of the state of Wyoming and coming under the provisions of this section shall file his application for compensation with the division.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 29, §§ 1, 2; 1992, ch. 79, § 1; 1993, ch. 113, § 1; 1996, ch. 82, § 1; 1997, ch. 177, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Notice. —

The plaintiff had sufficient notice that the workers' compensation division would rely upon the provisions of subsection (a) of this section where although the division did not specifically cite this section, the language of the determinations was sufficiently similar to the statutory language of subsection (a) to put the plaintiff on notice of the provision as in issue and the parties actions at the hearing, i.e. counsel for both parties focused on whether the plaintiff was a Wyoming employee, was indicative that the plaintiff had notice that the plaintiff's right to extraterritorial benefits pursuant to subsection (a) would be at issue. Gneiting v. State ex rel. State Workers' Compensation Div., 897 P.2d 1306, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1995).

Evidence. —

The worker's compensation division showed by a preponderance of the evidence that an employee was permanently assigned outside of the state. B-F Drilling v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 942 P.2d 392, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1997).

Estoppel. —

The worker's compensation division was not estopped from denying coverage for an employee's injury by afterwards accepting premium payments for the employee. B-F Drilling v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 942 P.2d 392, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1997).

Applied in

Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1988).

§ 27-14-205. State contributions; presumed pay of specified employees.

  1. State agencies shall administer this act as an employer with respect to its employees including filing payroll reports and submitting premium payments for those employees engaged in extrahazardous employment and covered under this act. Each state agency having officers or employees subject to this act shall file payroll reports and submit premium payments as required by this act. Premium payments for coverage of any employee employed under a federally funded program administered by an agency may be made from available federal funds.
  2. For the purpose of determining employer contributions under this act, all school-to-work participants for which coverage has been elected under W.S. 27-14-108(m), all persons receiving training under any work or job training program for which coverage has been elected under W.S. 27-14-108(p), all volunteers covered under this act, mine rescue team members, recipients of any welfare program performing work for a governmental entity, federal programs which require coverage for their participants, prisoners and probationers under W.S. 27-14-108(d)(ix) and persons performing community service pursuant to a criminal sentencing order, or a diversion agreement entered into with a prosecuting authority, under W.S. 27-14-108(d)(xv), are deemed to be paid for each month of active service, an amount established by rule and regulation of the division based upon the cost of the specific employment category to the worker’s compensation account. This amount shall be established solely as a basis for determining employer contributions and is not binding upon any employer as an actual required salary for any volunteer or other individual enumerated under this subsection.
  3. For purposes of determining employer contributions under this act for officers of a corporation or members of a limited liability company electing coverage under W.S. 27-14-108(k), rates shall be applied for each officer or member covered under this act against the statewide average wage for the preceding twelve (12) month period as determined under W.S. 27-14-802(b).
  4. Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, a school district or community college district may make payroll reports and payments on behalf of any employer electing coverage for school-to-work participants under W.S. 27-14-108(m). If a school or community college district elects to make payments under this subsection, the district shall continue to make reports and payments for the duration of participation by the school-to-work participant with that employer.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1987, ch. 94, § 1; 1989, ch. 161, § 1; ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 25, § 1; 1993, ch. 122, § 1; ch. 216, § 1; 1996, ch. 82, § 1; 1997, ch. 93, § 1; 1999, ch. 46, § 1; 2000, ch. 32, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 10, § 1; 2018 ch. 29, § 1, effective March 9, 2018.

The 2018 amendment, in (b), deleted the last sentence, which read: “The division shall report any anticipated deficiencies in contributions due to this subsection to the legislature on or before January 15 of each year.”

Laws 2018, ch. 29, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 9, 2018.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

§ 27-14-206. Public contract work; coverage procedure; responsibility on private contracts.

  1. If the state, county, University of Wyoming, community college district, school district, special district or municipality engages in work in which employees are employed for wages and if the work is being done by contract, the payroll of the prime or general contractor or subcontractor shall be the basis of computation for the payroll assessment. The required payments shall be subject to the provisions of this act and the state, the county, university, community college district, school district, special district or municipality, shall be entitled to collect from the prime or general contractor the full amount payable under this act unless the subcontractor primarily liable for the payment of premiums has paid the premiums as provided for in this act.
  2. The prime or general contractor shall secure certification when a contract is awarded or before permitting a subcontractor to begin work, that the subcontractor has in good standing an account under this act that covers all coverable employees in the employ of the subcontractor.
  3. The state, county, university, community college district, school district, special district or municipality shall secure certification before allowing a prime or general contractor to permit coverable employees to start work on a contract, that the contractor, prime or general, has in good standing an account under this act that covers employees who are subject to this act.
  4. Before final settlement is made by the state, county, university, community college district, school district, special district or municipality, the contractor shall furnish evidence that all obligations for covered employees on the contract have been paid as provided by this act.
  5. In private work a contractor who subcontracts all or any part of a contract is liable for the payment of worker’s compensation premiums for the employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor primarily liable for the payment of premiums has paid the premiums as provided for in this act. Any contractor or his carrier who becomes liable for the premiums may recover the amount of the premiums paid and necessary expenses from the subcontractor primarily liable therefor. For premiums paid on behalf of the employees of any subcontractor pursuant to this subsection, the contractor shall be afforded all privileges and immunities under this act as if he were the employer of the subcontractor’s employees.
  6. The owner or lessee of land shall be deemed a contractor when he contracts with another who shall be deemed a subcontractor to have work performed of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part of the work of the trade, business, occupation or profession of the owner or lessee. This subsection shall not apply to the owner or lessee of land principally used for agriculture.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Effect of property owner being employer. —

The question of whether a property owner is an employer within the meaning of the Worker's Compensation Law is one of law. If an owner of a project is an employer, the employee's sole remedy is worker's compensation and the employee may not subject the owner to a common-law tort action. On the other hand, if the owner is a third party, he is subject to a common-law tort action for the injuries sustained by the contractor's employee. Bence v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 13, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1981).

Stated in

Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1988).

§ 27-14-207. Employer registration required; person acquiring trade of another employer; transfer of experience and assignment of rates; out of state employers.

  1. Any employer subject to this act shall not commence business or engage in work in this state without applying for coverage under this act and receiving a statement of coverage from the division.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person acquiring the trade, organization, business or substantially all of the assets of an employer subject to this act shall assume the previous employer’s account, experience rating and premium rate as assigned by the division, provided the previous employer is not participating in the premium deductible program under W.S. 27-14-201(t). If the previous employer is participating in the premium deductible program, the acquiring person shall assume the previous employer’s account, experience rating and premium rate as determined without premium deductible program eligibility. The acquiring person shall assume the premium rate which is in effect at the time of the acquisition based on the existing account’s classification, experience rating and any surcharge which may apply, as determined without premium deductible program eligibility.
  3. A person acquiring the trade, organization, business or substantially all of the assets of any employer subject to this act whose owners or shareholders have not held an ownership interest in the employer being acquired within one (1) year previous to the date of acquisition shall assume the previous employer’s account number, experience rating and premium rate as assigned by the division, provided the previous employer is not participating in the premium deductible program under W.S. 27-14-201(t). If the previous employer is participating in the premium deductible program, the acquiring person shall assume the previous employer’s account, experience rating and premium rate as determined without premium deductible program eligibility.
  4. The transfer of some or all of an employer’s workforce to another person shall be considered a transfer of trade or business when, as a result of the transfer, the transferring employer no longer performs trade or business with respect to the transferred workforce, and the trade or business is performed by the person to whom the workforce is transferred.
  5. If an employer transfers all or a portion of its trade or business to another employer and, at the time of the transfer, there is substantially common ownership, management or control of the two (2) employers, then the workers’ compensation experience attributable to the transferred trade or business shall be transferred to the employer to whom the business is transferred. The rates of both employers shall be recalculated and made effective the first day of the calendar quarter immediately following the date of the transfer of trade or business.
  6. If, following a transfer of experience under this section, the department determines that a substantial purpose of the transfer of the trade or business was to obtain a reduced premium liability, then the accounts of the employers involved shall be combined into a single account.
  7. If a person is not an employer under this section at the time the person acquires the trade or business of an employer, the workers’ compensation experience of the acquired employer shall not be transferred to the person if the department finds that the person acquired the trade or business of the employer solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining a lower premium rate. Instead, the person shall be assigned the applicable industry base rate in effect at the time of the acquisition. In determining whether the trade or business was acquired solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining a lower premium rate, the department shall use objective factors which may include the cost of acquiring the business, whether the person continued the business enterprise of the acquired business, how long the business enterprise was continued, or whether a substantial number of new employees were hired for performance of duties unrelated to the business activity conducted prior to acquisition.
  8. Where an employer has not had prior operations in Wyoming and has not had prior worker’s compensation insurance coverage in Wyoming, and moves or expands operations from another state into Wyoming, and begins operations that are the same or similar to operations outside of Wyoming, the division shall assign the employer experience modification rate as calculated per the current experience modification rating formula in place at the time. The division shall assign such experience modification to the partial year ending June 30 after the start of coverage in Wyoming and to the first full policy year subsequent to the start of coverage in Wyoming.
  9. The division by rule and regulation shall establish procedures to identify the transfer or acquisition of a business, or the movement of an out of state operation to Wyoming, for purposes of this section and W.S. 27-14-806 . The division may require by regulation an out of state employer to submit any information necessary for the purpose of determining an experience modification rate under subsection (h) of this section.

History. Laws 1995, ch. 121, § 1; 1999, ch. 114, § 1; 2003, ch. 185, § 1; 2005, ch. 185, § 2; 2017 ch. 128, § 1, effective July 1, 2017.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in (b), thrice substituted “person” for “employer”, and substituted “assume the premium rate” for “make contributions at the premium rate”; in (c), twice substituted “person” for “employer”; and added (d) through (h).

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, added (h); redesignated former (h) as (j); in (j), added “or the movement of an out of state operation to Wyoming” in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

Article 3. Nonresident Employers

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen's Compensation §§ 31 to 38.

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 22 to 25.

§ 27-14-301. Applicability of provisions; reciprocity.

  1. This act applies  to all injuries and deaths occurring in Wyoming in employment described  in W.S. 27-14-108(a), (d), (e), (j), (k) or (m) but applies to injuries and deaths occurring  in Wyoming to employees of nonresident employers only if the worker’s  compensation or similar law of the nonresident employer’s home  state applies to all injuries and deaths occurring in that state or  the nonresident employer’s home state and Wyoming have an active  agreement under W.S. 27-14-306(d). This act applies to all injuries and deaths occurring  outside of Wyoming in employment described in W.S. 27-14-108(a), (d), (e), (j), (k) or (m) under the following conditions:
    1. Repealed by Laws 2006, ch. 2, § 2.
    2. The employee at the time of the injury is working under a contract for hire made in Wyoming for employment by an employer who has a principal place of business within the state established for legitimate business-related purposes and the employment is within the United States, a United States territory, Canada or Mexico, but which is not principally localized in any other state, United States territory, Canada or Mexico; or
    3. The employee at the time of the injury is working under a contract for hire made in Wyoming for employment principally localized in another state, United States territory, Canada or Mexico, the workers’ compensation law of which jurisdiction does not require that the employment be covered by a workers’ compensation insurance policy issued under the laws of that jurisdiction.
  2. Repealed by Laws 2006, ch. 2, § 2.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 29, § 1; 1997, ch. 177, § 1; 2006, ch. 2, §§ 1, 2; 2018 ch. 38, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, deleted “if the employment is principally localized in Wyoming” in the introductory language of (a); repealed former (a)(i), which read: “The employment is principally localized in Wyoming”; repealed former (b), pertaining to the description of the principle location of employment.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in (a), inserted “but applies to injuries and deaths occurring in Wyoming to employees of nonresident employers only if the worker's compensation or similar law of the nonresident employer's home state applies to all injuries and deaths occurring in that state or the nonresident employer's home state and Wyoming have an active agreement under W.S. 27-14-306(d). This act applies” preceding “to all injuries” and made a stylistic change.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Wyoming law not applicable. —

Colorado law applied to the plaintiff's injury, notwithstanding the plaintiff's contention that he worked from the headquarters of a subcontractor with its principal place of business in Wyoming, where he was hired at a Colorado site to perform duties solely at the Colorado site and there was nothing in the record to indicate that he had ever even been to the Wyoming office. Stuarte v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 551 (D. Wyo. 2001).

Where the plaintiff entered into his employment contract with a Wyoming company in Colorado and performed work under that contract only in Colorado, his employment was not principally localized in Wyoming, even though the company issued the plaintiff's paychecks and performed other administrative tasks related to his employment from its Wyoming office and had no other place of business. Stuart v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25246 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2001).

Principal location. —

Claimant's employment was principally located in Wyoming such that he was entitled to benefits where (1) the employer occupied a fixed premises at the job site in a trailer that had been placed there for a substantial duration; (2) the employer had a recognizable physical and mailing address as evidenced by maintenance of a post office box; (3) there were a secretary, a telephone, and a facsimile machine on site; and (4) the employer regularly conducted its ancillary business from the trailer. The employer's election not to obtain coverage was not determinative of whether the claimant was entitled to benefits. Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, 109 P.3d 887, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2005) (decided prior to 2006 amendment).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Compensability of specially equipped van or vehicle under workers' compensation statutes, 63 ALR5th 163.

§ 27-14-302. Required reporting; security required for certain nonresident employers.

  1. Nonresident employers before starting work, and from time to time after the work has been commenced, shall report to the director the nature and progress of the work, the location of the work and the number of employees engaged in and upon the work and likely to be so engaged for the next thirty (30) days, giving further and detailed information as the director may reasonably demand.
  2. Before starting business or engaging work in this state, a nonresident employer as defined by W.S. 27-1-106 (a) shall register as required by W.S. 27-14-207 , and shall either pay an advance premium deposit as provided in the department’s rules and regulations or shall file with the director a surety bond or other security approved by the director, as provided in W.S. 27-1-106 .
  3. and (d) Repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 93, § 2.
  4. The requirements of this section shall be waived if the nonresident employer provides a certificate of coverage pursuant to W.S. 27-14-306(b).

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 29, § 1; 1991, ch. 93, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 163, § 1; 2006, ch. 2, § 1.

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, inserted the registration and deposit requirements in (b) and added (e).

Cited in

Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, 109 P.3d 887, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (2005).

§ 27-14-303. Contract with nonresident conditioned upon compliance.

A contract shall not be let to a nonresident employer for work or services within the state until the contributions provided by this act have been paid.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Cited in

Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, 109 P.3d 887, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (2005).

§ 27-14-304. Return of deposit to nonresident employer after cessation of operations.

Money, bonds or other security deposited pursuant to this act shall be returned to the nonresident employer in accordance with W.S. 27-1-106 .

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1993, ch. 163, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

§ 27-14-305. Secretary of state designated agent for service of process.

Nonresident employers upon engaging in any covered employment, unless they designate a resident agent for service of process, shall be deemed from the date of the commencement of work to have designated the secretary of state as their agent for service of any process upon them in any action prosecuted pursuant to this act. The secretary of state upon the receipt of any process shall send the process by certified or registered mail return receipt requested to the last known address of the employer.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

§ 27-14-306. Extraterritorial applicability of provisions; reciprocity.

  1. Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 177, § 2.
  2. A certificate from an authorized officer of the worker’s compensation department or similar agency of another state certifying that an employer of that state is bound by the worker’s compensation or similar law of that state and the law will be applied to employees of the employer while in this state, is prima facie evidence of the application of the worker’s compensation or similar law of the certifying state. This subsection shall apply only when the certifying state accepts Wyoming worker’s compensation certification as prima facie evidence of the application of Wyoming worker’s compensation or similar law or when the certifying state and Wyoming have an active agreement under subsection (d) of this section.
  3. The benefits under this act or similar laws of the other state that are received by the employee for an injury sustained while working for the employer in this state are the exclusive remedy against the employer and coemployees acting within the scope of their employment for an injury whether or not that injury resulted in death.
  4. Upon approval of the governor, the division shall enter into an agreement with any worker’s compensation division or similar agency of another state to promulgate regulations not inconsistent with this act to carry out the extraterritorial application of the worker’s compensation or similar law of the agreeing state.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 29, § 1; 1995, ch. 121, § 2; 1997, ch. 177, § 2; 2018 ch. 38, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in (b), added the last sentence.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Applied in

State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 WY 111, 384 P.3d 267, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2016).

Cited in

Salt Creek Welding, Inc. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 897 P.2d 1306, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1995).

§ 27-14-307. Penalty for failure to post bond.

The willful failure of any nonresident employer in a covered employment to give bond or other security required by this act constitutes a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or both.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Article 4. Employee Benefits

Compensation not barred because of work continuation. —

A worker cannot be barred from compensation for an injury incurred in his employment because he continued to work. In re Van Buskirk, 741 P.2d 120, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 494 (Wyo. 1987).

Nor because employee receives former wages. —

The mere fact that after the injury the employee receives, or is offered, his former wages, or a larger sum, does not necessarily preclude recovery of worker's compensation. In re Van Buskirk, 741 P.2d 120, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 494 (Wyo. 1987).

Cited in

Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 931 P.2d 234, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1997).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen's Compensation §§ 379 to 445.

Workers' compensation: vocational rehabilitation statutes, 67 ALR4th 612.

Workers' compensation: recovery for home service provided by spouse, 67 ALR4th 765.

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 266 to 295.

§ 27-14-401. Medical, hospital and ambulance expenses; review of claim; employer and division designated providers; contracts for bill review, case management and related programs; air ambulance reimbursement.

  1. The expense of medical and hospital care of an injured employee shall be paid from the date of the compensable injury unless under general arrangement the employee is entitled to free medical and hospital care or the employer furnishes adequate and proper medical and hospital care to his employees.
  2. No fee for medical or hospital care under this section shall be allowed by the division without first reviewing the fee for appropriateness and reasonableness in accordance with its adopted fee schedules.
  3. Hospital care includes private nursing or nursing home care if approved by the director.
  4. Medical and hospital care shall be obtained if possible within Wyoming, or in an adjoining state if the hospital or health care provider in the adjoining state is closer to the scene of the accident or to the usual place of employment of the employee than a hospital or health care provider in Wyoming, unless otherwise authorized by the division. Except as otherwise authorized by the division, reimbursements for travel in obtaining medical and hospital care shall not be paid:
    1. For travel of less than ten (10) miles one (1) way except by ambulance travel as set forth in W.S. 27-14-401(e);
    2. For travel other than that necessary to obtain the closest available medical or hospital care needed by the employee except in those instances where travel within Wyoming is at a greater distance than travel outside of Wyoming;
    3. In excess of the rates at which state employees are paid per diem and mileage.
  5. If transportation by ambulance is necessary, the division shall allow a reasonable charge for the ambulance service at a rate not in excess of the rate schedule established by the director under the procedure set forth for payment of medical and hospital care, provided this subsection shall not apply to air ambulance transport services.
  6. Subject to subsection (h) of this section, an employer or the division may designate health care providers to provide nonemergency medical attention to his employees or to claimants under this act. Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, the employee may for any reason, select any other health care provider. If the employee selects a health care provider other than the one (1) selected by the employer or the division, the employer or division may require a second opinion from a health care provider of their choice. The second opinion may include an independent medical evaluation, a functional capacity exam or a review of the diagnosis, prognosis, treatment and fees of the employee’s health care provider. The independent medical evaluation, a functional capacity exam or the review by the employer’s health care provider shall be paid for by the employer and the evaluation, a functional capacity exam or review by the division’s health care provider shall be paid from the worker’s compensation account.
  7. The division may engage in and contract for medical bill review programs, medical case management programs and utilization review programs. The division may also negotiate with out-of-state health care providers regarding the payment of fees for necessary medical care to injured workers, not to exceed the usual, customary charges for the comparable treatment in the community where rendered or the amount payable for the same services by the worker’s compensation fund or account of the state where rendered, whichever is less.
  8. In the case of an inmate employed in a correctional industries program authorized by W.S. 25-13-101 through 25-13-107 or performing services pursuant to W.S. 7-16-202 , the department of corrections shall select the health care provider for the inmate.
  9. Emergency and medically necessary air ambulance transport services for an employee shall be covered under W.S. 42-4-123 , subject to availability and any limitations specified by the department under W.S. 42-4-123 (a). The department of workforce services shall pay reimbursement for services under this section to the department of health as specified under W.S. 42-4-123. Application of this subsection shall be contingent on operation of the air ambulance transport services program under W.S. 42-4-123(b).

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1991, ch. 133, § 1; 1993, ch. 157, § 1; 1997, ch. 177, § 1; 1998, ch. 117, § 1; 1999, ch. 141, § 2; ch. 150, § 1; 2005, ch. 231, § 1; 2019 ch. 189, § 3, effective April 1, 2020; 2020 ch. 22, § 2, effective March 9, 2020.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, inserted “or account” in (g).

The 2019 amendment, effective April 1, 2020, in (e), added “provided this subsection shall not apply to air ambulance transport services” at the end; and added (j).

The 2020 amendment, in (j), added the last sentence.

Laws 2020, ch. 22, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 9, 2020.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Applicability.—

Laws 2019, ch. 189 § 6, provides: "This act applies to air ambulance transport services provided on or after April 1, 2020."

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

Worker's compensation act considered continuing appropriation. —

Because the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act is considered a continuing appropriation and the payment of claims under the Act requires no further action under the appropriation provision of the constitution, and because the Act, with the workers’ compensation ambulance provision severed from it, authorizes the payment of the claimants’ air ambulance charges in full, the severed statute is now part of the Act’s continuing appropriation, and the Office of Administrative Hearings did not order a payment without appropriation. Air Methods v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2018 WY 128, 432 P.3d 476, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2018).

Compensation for unauthorized medical treatment denied.—

Worker’s compensation claimant was not entitled to benefits when the claimant underwent a surgical procedure to treat a work-related back injury that had not been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and was not an off-label use of medical services. Furthermore, the claimant failed to provide sufficient documentation of the procedure’s safety and effectiveness, thus rendering it alternative medicine for which benefits were denied. Harborth v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2018 WY 99, 424 P.3d 1261, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2018).

Federal preemption. —

District court did not err when it found that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-401 and a rate schedule the Workers' Compensation Division of the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services developed for paying companies that provided air-ambulance services to workers who were covered under Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 41713, because they regulated prices charged by air carriers that provided air transportation services; however, the district court exceeded its authority when it ordered officials at the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services to pay the full amount companies charged for air-ambulance services, whatever that amount might be. Eaglemed LLC v. Cox, 868 F.3d 893, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15962 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2017).

District court did not err when it found that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-401 and a rate schedule the Workers’ Compensation Division of the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services developed for paying companies that provided air-ambulance services to workers who were covered under Wyoming’s Worker’s Compensation Act were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 41713, because they regulated prices charged by air carriers that provided air transportation services; however, the district court exceeded its authority when it ordered officials at the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services to pay the full amount companies charged for air-ambulance services, whatever that amount might be. Eaglemed LLC v. Cox, 868 F.3d 893, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15962 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2017).

In a case in which the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division paid the claimants, who operated air ambulance services in Wyoming, only the amounts permitted by its fee schedule, the Division was required to pay the full amount billed by the claimants because severing the workers’ compensation ambulance provision was consistent with the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act’s goal of quick and efficient delivery of medical benefits; as severed, air ambulance charges incurred by an injured worker were covered expenses, and the Division had authority to pay those charges; and, applying the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), the Division was barred by the ADA’s preemption provision from taking unilateral action to reduce the claimants’ rates. Air Methods v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2018 WY 128, 432 P.3d 476, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2018).

Relation of charges to workplace injury. —

Office of Administrative Hearings properly denied the claimant's claim for payment for a left knee arthroscopy that he claimed was related to his workplace injury because substantial evidence supported the conclusion that there was no causal connection between the claimant's 1993 workplace injury and his 2009 left knee pain as the medical evidence could not be stretched to support the claimant's assertion that he received “continuous” treatment for his left knee Trump v. State, 2013 WY 140, 312 P.3d 802, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2013).

Second compensable injury rule is alive and well. — Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1995).

Relation of charges to workplace injury. —

Division was not estopped from denying benefits based on its issuance of decision stating that claimant's injury was compensable, since that decision was distinct from division's authority to analyze each charge submitted by claimant to determine whether such change was causally related to workplace injury. Armstrong v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 140, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1999).

Award for physician's bill and hospital charges not disposition of case on merits. —

Where district court made orders of award in payment of physician's bill and hospitalization charges in action under Workmen's Compensation Law (now Worker's Compensation Act), this was not a disposition of the case on its merits so as to justify an award for compensation. In re Corey, 65 Wyo. 301, 200 P.2d 333, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1948).

Services rendered by nonresident surgeons should be duly authorized by Wyoming courts upon good reasons advanced before claimants should be permitted, without limitation, to employ professional medical service beyond the borders of this state. Such matters should not be left to the claimant himself to determine and to thereby fasten a liability upon the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation fund of this state. Ludlow v. Wortham Mach. Co., 71 Wyo. 331, 257 P.2d 358, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1953).

Notice to employer of change in physician not required. —

While subsection (b) requires notice to an employer with an opportunity for hearing before a claim is allowed for payment, it does not require notice to the employer of a change in attending physician with an opportunity to object thereto. Dyna-Drill v. Wallingford, 605 P.2d 1301, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1980).

Closest available medical or hospital care. —

Conclusion by Office of Administrative Hearings that an Idaho Falls doctor was the closest available provider for a workers' compensation claimant, an Idaho resident, was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary and capricious; conclusion only meant that the claimant was not entitled to reimbursement of travel expenses incurred to obtain treatment from the physician who was not the closest available provider. Dorman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 94, 281 P.3d 342, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2012).

Where a claimant argued that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-401 required the hearing examiner to reimburse him for the portion of his Utah travel expenses that he would have paid if he had instead gone to Rock Springs, Wyoming for treatment, the statute expresses a preference that medical care be obtained in Wyoming and/or at an appropriate facility closest to an employee's home, and the claimant's interpretation would read the expressed preference and its corollary effect on travel reimbursement out of the statute. Birch v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 WY 31, 319 P.3d 901, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2014).

Home health care. —

A workers' compensation hearing examiner was without authority to award nonprofessional home health care to an injured worker in the absence of a mutual agreement between the employee, employer, and director of the workers' compensation division. (decision under prior law); State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Jacobs, 924 P.2d 982, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1996).

Inmate employed in a correctional industries program. —

Under § 25-13-106(a) and subsection (h) of this section, inmates working in the correctional industries program, which includes the prison laundry, are covered by worker's compensation. In re Worker's Comp. Claim v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 37, 42 P.3d 461, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 2002).

Quoted in

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Girardot, 807 P.2d 926, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1991); Serda v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 38, 42 P.3d 466, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2002); Beall v. Sky Blue Enters. (in re Beall), 2012 WY 38, 271 P.3d 1022, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Mar. 14, 2012).

Cited in

State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Malkowski, 741 P.2d 604, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 499 (Wyo. 1987); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Jackson, 994 P.2d 320, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1999); Porter v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 69, 396 P.3d 999, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2017).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Workers' compensation: value of home services provided by victim's relative, 65 ALR4th 142.

Workers' compensation: compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 ALR4th 110.

Compensability of specially equipped van or vehicle under workers' compensation statutes, 63 ALR5th 163.

§ 27-14-402. Payment for artificial replacement.

In addition to payment of medical and hospital care provided by this act, an injured employee may receive payment for essential and adequate artificial replacement of any part of the body which is amputated. If the injury requires artificial replacement an injured employee may receive payment for any adequate and essential artificial aid to hearing or sight, a spinal brace or other similar brace or for artificial dental replacement. Payment for artificial dental replacement shall be in accordance with the schedule adopted by the division.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Calculation based on monthly income. —

Where employee's income varied substantially from month to month the hearing examiner properly averaged employee's income to determine employee's temporary total disability benefits and excluded gratuities that were not reported to the government. However, where employee had worked three and one half months the examiner improperly divided the total income by four months. Goe v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 2002 WY 6, 38 P.3d 1063, Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2002).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Workers' compensation as covering cost of penile or similar implants related to sexual or reproductive activity, 89 ALR4th 1057.

§ 27-14-403. Awards generally; method of payment.

  1. In addition to payment of medical and hospital care and artificial replacement, an injured employee and his dependents may be entitled to one (1) or more awards for:
    1. Temporary total disability or temporary light duty;
    2. Permanent partial impairment;
    3. Permanent partial disability or vocational rehabilitation as provided under W.S. 27-14-408 ;
    4. Permanent total disability; or
    5. Death.
  2. Notwithstanding the date of death or the date of the determination of permanent total disability, in the case of permanent total disability or death, each child of an employee shall be paid two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per month for payments made after July 1, 2009, until the child dies or reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years, whichever first occurs, or if the child is physically or mentally incapacitated until the child dies unless qualified for and receiving benefits under the Medicaid home and community based waiver program. If the child is enrolled or preregistered in a post secondary educational institution including a four-year college, community college or private trade school licensed pursuant to W.S. 21-2-401 through 21-2-407 and providing career, technical or apprenticeship training, the child shall receive the amount provided by this section until the child attains the age of twenty-five (25) years. The amount awarded under this subsection shall be adjusted for inflation annually by the division, using the consumer price index or its successor index of the United States department of labor, bureau of labor statistics, or three percent (3%), whichever is less.
  3. All awards stated in this section except awards under paragraph (a)(i), subsection (b) and paragraphs (e)(ii), (iv) and (v) and (h)(ii) and subsection (k) of this section shall be paid monthly at the rates prescribed by this subsection. For permanent partial impairment under paragraph (a)(ii) of this section, the award shall be calculated at the rate of two-thirds (2/3) of the statewide average monthly wage for the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the quarterly period in which the benefits are first paid as determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14-802 . For temporary total disability under paragraph (a)(i) of this section, the award shall be paid monthly at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of the statewide average monthly wage or two-thirds (2/3) of the injured employee’s actual monthly earnings at the time of injury, whichever is greater, but shall not exceed the lesser of one hundred percent (100%) of the injured employee’s actual monthly earnings at the time of the injury or the statewide average monthly wage for the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the quarterly period in which the injury occurred as determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14-802 with one-half (1/2) of the monthly award paid on or about the fifteenth of the month and one-half (1/2) paid on or about the thirtieth of the month. For temporary light duty under paragraph (a)(i) of this section, the award shall be paid monthly at the rate of eighty percent (80%) of the difference between the employee’s light duty wage and the employee’s actual monthly earnings at the time of injury. For permanent partial and permanent total disability or death under paragraphs (a)(iii), (iv) and (v) of this section, the award shall be paid monthly computed as follows:
    1. For those employees whose actual monthly earnings are less than seventy-three percent (73%) of the statewide average monthly wage, the award shall be ninety-two percent (92%) of the injured employee’s actual monthly earnings;
    2. For those employees whose actual monthly earnings are equal to or greater than seventy-three percent (73%) of the statewide average monthly wage, but less than the statewide average monthly wage, the award shall be two-thirds (2/3) of the statewide average monthly wage;
    3. For those employees whose actual monthly earnings are greater than or equal to the statewide average monthly wage, the award shall be two-thirds (2/3) of the employee’s actual monthly earnings, but the award shall be capped at and shall not exceed the statewide average monthly wage;
    4. In the case of death due to work related causes, and if the award computed under paragraph (i), (ii) or (iii) of this subsection is less than eighty percent (80%) of the statewide average monthly wage, the award shall be adjusted to an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of the statewide average monthly wage or seventy-five percent (75%) of the injured employee’s actual monthly earnings at the time of injury, whichever is greater. In no event shall the award exceed two (2) times the statewide average monthly wage for the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the quarterly period in which the injury occurred as determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14-802;
    5. Awards for permanent total disability shall be adjusted for inflation annually by the division, using the consumer price index or its successor index of the United States department of labor, bureau of labor statistics, for the calendar year before the date of adjustment or three percent (3%), whichever is less. The adjustment provided by this paragraph shall apply to all awards for permanent total disability benefits in effect on or after July 1, 2009 using as the base for calculation the award in effect on that date or the first award, whichever is later. The adjustment shall become effective annually on July 1 and shall be applied to all awards for permanent total disability that were first made at least one (1) year before the effective date of the adjustment.
  4. If an injured employee entitled to receive or receiving an award under paragraph (a)(ii), (iii) or (iv) of this section dies due to causes other than the work related injury, the balance of the award shall be paid:
    1. To the surviving spouse;
    2. If there is no surviving spouse or if the spouse remarries or dies, the balance of the award shall be paid to the surviving dependent children of the employee. Each surviving dependent child shall receive a share of the award in the proportion that the number of months from the death or remarriage until the child attains the age of majority, or if the child is physically or mentally incapacitated until the child attains the age of twenty-one (21) years, bears to the total number of months until all children will attain these ages;
    3. If there is no surviving spouse or if the spouse remarries or dies and there are no dependent children or the children have attained the age of majority or twenty-one (21) if physically or mentally incapacitated, or die, the balance of the award shall be paid to a surviving parent of the employee if the parent received substantially all of his financial support from the employee at the time of injury. If two (2) remaining parents of the employee who received substantially all of their financial support from the employee at the time of the injury survive the employee, the balance of the award shall be divided equally between the two (2) parents;
    4. Payment of the award shall cease:
      1. If there is no surviving spouse, dependent children or dependent parents;
      2. Upon remarriage or death of a spouse and there are no dependent children or dependent parents;
      3. Upon the death of a dependent child as to payments to that child; and
      4. Upon the death of a dependent parent as to payments to that parent.
  5. If an injured employee dies as a result of the work related injury whether or not an award under paragraphs (a)(i) through (iv) of this section has been made:
    1. All awards under paragraphs (a)(i) through (iv) of this section shall cease as of the date of death;
    2. The burial expenses of the deceased employee shall be paid in an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) together with an additional amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) to cover other related expenses, unless other arrangements exist between the employer and employee under agreement;
    3. The surviving spouse shall receive for one hundred (100) months a monthly payment as provided by subsection (c) of this section. If the surviving spouse dies before the award is entirely paid or if there is no surviving spouse, the unpaid balance of the award shall be paid to the surviving dependent children of the employee in the manner prescribed by paragraph (d)(ii) of this section. If there are no dependent children, further payments under this paragraph shall cease as of the date of the spouse’s death;
    4. In addition to any amount paid under paragraph (e)(iii) of this section, surviving children shall receive an award as provided by subsection (b) of this section;
    5. If the employee died with no surviving spouse or dependent children but with one (1) surviving parent or two (2) surviving parents of the employee who received at least one-half (1/2) of his or their financial support from the employee at the time of injury, the surviving parent or parents shall receive a monthly payment as provided by subsection (c) of this section for sixty (60) months thereafter or until the parent or the survivor of them dies.
  6. Awards to an employee or a spouse for permanent partial disability, permanent total disability or death may, upon application to the division with a showing of exceptional necessity and notice to the employer, be paid in whole or in part in a lump sum. In no event shall an award for permanent partial impairment under W.S. 27-14-405 be paid in a lump sum.
  7. Following payment in full of any award, or if a lump sum settlement was made under subsection (f) of this section when the award would have been fully paid but for the lump sum settlement, to an employee for permanent total disability or to a surviving spouse for death of an employee, an additional award for extended benefits may be granted subject to the following requirements and limitations:
    1. In the case of an employee:
      1. A claim for compensation is filed by the employee or someone on his behalf;
      2. The employee establishes a reasonable effort on his behalf has been made to return to part time or full time employment including retraining and educational programs;
      3. The division in determining entitlement under this paragraph shall consider the amount of the monthly award made to an injured worker pursuant to W.S. 27-14-403(a)(iv), all earned income of the injured worker, all employment based retirement income of the injured worker, all income derived by the injured worker as a result of the injury, excluding mortgage or any other loan credit insurance, or any supplemental income insurance purchased by or on behalf of the employee and any periodic payments from any other governmental entity to the injured worker. The division shall not consider any other income received by the injured worker or members of the injured worker’s household;
      4. The maximum monthly amount of additional compensation shall not exceed the amount provided in subsection (c) of this section;
      5. The division may attach reasonable conditions to application for or receipt of awards under this subsection including retraining or educational programs and the award may be adjusted in accordance with fulfillment of the conditions;
      6. The division may decrease an award to qualify an employee eligible for maximum benefits under any other state or federal pension plan;
      7. Any award granted under this subsection shall not exceed twelve (12) months unless the division determines an award for a period exceeding twelve (12) months but not greater than four (4) years is appropriate.
    2. In the case of a surviving spouse, upon application to the division and a showing of necessity, the division may award continued monthly payments to the spouse not to exceed one-third (1/3) of the statewide average monthly wage for the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the quarter in which the injury occurred. An award granted under this paragraph shall not exceed twelve (12) months but may be renewed and shall cease at the time the spouse dies or remarries.
  8. All awards to a minor or individual with a legal disability shall be paid:
    1. To the legal guardian or conservator if one exists; or
    2. As the division determines to be in the best interests of the minor or individual if there is no legal guardian or conservator.
  9. As used in this section:
    1. “Actual monthly earnings” means the injured employee’s actual monthly earnings at the time of injury excluding any payment for casual or unscheduled overtime and any fringe benefit;
    2. “Overtime” means payments for work in excess of forty (40) hours per week;
    3. “Statewide average monthly wage” means the statewide average monthly wage for the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the quarterly period in which the injury occurred as determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14-802 .
  10. Any injured worker who has or is receiving medical services entirely in Wyoming from a Wyoming health care provider shall be eligible if otherwise qualified for temporary total disability payments at the rate of seventy percent (70%) of the injured worker’s actual monthly earnings at the time of the injury but not to exceed one hundred and three percent (103%) of the statewide average wage for the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the quarterly period in which the injury occurred as determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14-802 , with the following exceptions:
    1. If an injured worker is injured outside of Wyoming, the injured worker if otherwise qualified shall be eligible to receive temporary total disability payments at the rate provided in this subsection, provided the injured worker receives services entirely in Wyoming from a Wyoming health care provider after initial treatment following the injury;
    2. An injured worker otherwise qualified for temporary total disability payments shall be eligible to receive temporary total disability payments at the rate provided in this subsection if the services or treatment by an out-of-state health care provider were rendered upon the instruction of the division; or
    3. An injured worker otherwise qualified for temporary total disability payments shall be eligible to receive temporary total disability payments at the rate provided in this subsection if due to unavailability of medical services in Wyoming, the division provides written authorization, before or after treatment, to the injured worker to obtain the medical services from an out-of-state health care provider and the out-of-state health care provider agreed to accept as full payment the fees paid by the division pursuant to the division’s fee schedule. For purposes of this subsection, medical services shall be deemed unavailable in Wyoming if the distance from the injured worker’s residence to an in-state health care provider is at least one hundred (100) miles greater than the distance from the injured worker’s residence to an out-of-state medical provider;
    4. An injured worker otherwise qualified for temporary total disability payments shall be eligible to receive temporary total disability payments at the rate provided in this subsection if the employer has a contractual agreement with an out-of-state health care provider.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 1996, ch. 82, § 1; 1998, ch. 117, § 1; 2001, ch. 75, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 10, § 1; 2004, ch. 13, § 1; ch. 32 § 1; 2009, ch. 156, § 1.

The 2004 amendments. —

The first 2004 amendment, by ch. 13, § 1, effective July 1, 2004, in (a)(i), added “or temporary light duty”; and in the introductory paragraph of (c), updated internal references and inserted the penultimate sentence.

The second 2004 amendment, by ch. 32, § 1, effective July 1, 2004, in (b) substituted “eighteen (18) years” for “majority” and added the second sentence; in (c), in the first sentence of (c), updated internal references and substituted “calculated” for “paid monthly,” and inserted “with one-half (1/2) of the monthly award paid on or about the fifteenth of the month and one-half (1/2) paid on or about the thirtieth of the month” following “determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14-802 ”; and in (e)(i) substituted “(iv)” for (iii).”

This section is set out as directed by the legislative service office.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (b), in the first sentence, substituted “two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00)” for “one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00)”, substituted “July 1, 2009” for “July 1, 2001”, substituted “twenty-one (21) years” for “eighteen (18) years”, and substituted “unless qualified for and receiving benefits under the Medicaid home and community based waiver program” for “or attains the age of twenty-one (21) years, whichever first occurs”, in the second sentence, inserted “post secondary” preceding “educational institution”, substituted “four-year college, community college or private trade school licensed pursuant to W.S. 21 2 401 through 21 2 407 and providing career, technical or apprenticeship training” for “post-secondary education institution”, and substituted “twenty-five (25) years” for “twenty-one (21) years”, and in the third sentence, added “or three percent (3%), whichever is less” at the end; in the introductory language of (c), in the second sentence, substituted “in which the benefits are first paid” for “in which the injury occurred”, in the third sentence, inserted “thirty percent (30%) of the statewide average monthly wage or” following “at the rate of” and substituted “whichever is greater, but shall not exceed the lesser of one hundred percent (100%) of the injured employee's actual monthly earnings at the time of the injury or” for “but not to exceed”; in (c)(iv), added the provision beginning with “or seventy-five percent (75%)” at the end of the first sentence and added the second sentence; added (c)(v); in (e)(iii), substituted “one hundred (100) months” for “fifty-four (54) months” in the first sentence; in (e)(v), in the first sentence, inserted “or two (2) surviving parents” following “one (1) surviving parent”, substituted “at least one-half (1/2) of his or their financial support” for “substantially all of his financial support”, inserted “or parents” following “the surviving parent”, substituted “a monthly payment as provided by subsection (c) of this section for sixty (60) months” for “six hundred dollars ($600.00) the first month after the death and one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) for thirty (30) months”, inserted “or the survivor of them” following “until the parent”, and deleted “whichever is less from the end”, and deleted the second sentence, which concerned payments to two surviving parents of persons without surviving spouses or children; in (k)(iii), added the last sentence; and added (k)(iv).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Receipt of benefits based on common-law marriage. —

A common-law marriage valid in the state in which contracted is valid in Wyoming for purposes of receipt of benefits under the worker's compensation laws. Jim's Water Serv. v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 376 (Wyo. 1979), limited, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990); Bowers v. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Div., 593 P.2d 182, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 394 (Wyo. 1979).

But illegitimate child of deceased workman's wife not entitledto compensation. —

The illegitimate child of deceased workman's wife, neither acknowledged nor supported by decedent, does not qualify for death benefits under this section as decedent's stepchild. Smith v. National Tank Co., 350 P.2d 539, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1960).

Permanent total disability. —

A workers' compensation claimant's injury, for purposes of his new claim for permanent total disability and extended benefits, was deemed to have occurred when he was found to be permanently disabled. Rodgers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 246, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1997), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. July 8, 1997).

Temporary total benefits. —

Employee had an ascertainable loss where he had a poor prognosis and could not safely return to a physically demanding position, and he had reached maximum medical improvement unless he was willing to consider fusion surgery. Phillips v. TIC-The Industrial Co. of Wyoming, Inc. (In re Phillips), 2005 WY 40, 109 P.3d 520, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2005).

Determining causation when death occurs. —

It is not necessary to determine whether the fatal injury, even if it is a second injury, occurred in the course and scope of employment, but rather, it is necessary to determine whether the injured employee (already injured by a work related injury) died as a result of the work related injury. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1997), limited, Fisher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safey & Compensation Division (In re Fisher), 2008 WY 89, 189 P.3d 866, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2008).

Where work-related injuries rendered decedent a paraplegic who died 12 years later from smoke inhalation after a fire at his home because his paraplegia rendered him unable to cough with sufficient force to expel mucus from his lungs, the supreme court of Wyoming held that his surviving spouse was entitled to receive death benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(e); but for the effects of his workplace injury, decedent most likely would have fully recovered from the smoke inhalation. Fisher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safey & Compensation Division (In re Fisher), 2008 WY 89, 189 P.3d 866, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2008).

Supreme court of Wyoming expressly rejects the “quasi-course of employment” theory of recovery for death benefits; in order for a second injury to be compensable, the original compensable injury must itself be the direct cause of the subsequent injury. Fisher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safey & Compensation Division (In re Fisher), 2008 WY 89, 189 P.3d 866, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2008).

Surviving spouse may maintain action for permanent disability.—

A surviving spouse of an employee, who suffers a compensable injury but who dies from causes other than the compensable injury before he has made a formal claim for permanent disability benefits, may maintain a separate action for permanent disability benefits. Cordova v. Holly Sugar Corp. (In re Cordova), 882 P.2d 880, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 1994).

Death benefits preclude recovery for emotional distress. —

In providing death benefits articulated in this section, legislature subsumed entire prospect of recovery for death of an employee engaged in covered employment, and thus claim by survivors for intentional infliction of emotional distress was derivative of claim under Worker's Compensation Act and was properly dismissed. Anderson v. Solvay Minerals, Inc., 3 P.3d 236, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, Collins v. COP Wyo., LLC, 2016 WY 18, 366 P.3d 521, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2016).

Initial burden on employee to show reasonable efforts madeto obtain suitable employment. —

In a hearing upon a claim for permanent total disability because of a back injury, in order to sustain his burden of proof, the employee had to show reasonable efforts were made to obtain suitable employment. As the employee testified that he had not attempted to work or to look for any work since his injury, he did not shift the burden of proof to the employer. Rose v. Westates Constr. Co., 703 P.2d 1084, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 518 (Wyo. 1985).

Subjective belief that injury makes employment search futilenot enough. —

Claimant's belief that his back injury and its accompanying pain would make his search futile was not enough to relieve him of the burden of showing reasonable efforts to secure employment, in view of evidence showing that there were a number of available jobs that one with his injury quite possibly could hold. Worker's Compensation Claim of Cannon v. FMC Corp., 718 P.2d 879, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 543 (Wyo. 1986).

Court properly concluded that employee's participation in horse-raising partnership corroborated supervisory skills that the employee had acquired as a product of his police experience. Rose v. Westates Constr. Co., 703 P.2d 1084, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 518 (Wyo. 1985).

Injury “occurred” when physician's report mailed. —

Where, although a claimant may have known that his 1963 injury was the source of his medical difficulties as early as November 1986, but it was not until May 1988, when so informed by his examining physician, that he became aware that his injury (total disability) had “occurred,” pursuant to subsection (c), the injury occurred when the physician's report was mailed on May 2, 1988. In re Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. Mar. 27, 1991).

Calculation based on time of injury. —

Where employee's income varied substantially from month to month the hearing examiner properly averaged employee's income to determine employee's temporary total disability benefits and excluded gratuities that were not reported to the government. However, where employee had worked three and one half months the examiner improperly divided the total income by four months. Goe v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 2002 WY 6, 38 P.3d 1063, Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2002).

Employee had actual monthly earnings at the time of injury within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(c) where the employee had monthly earnings, which did not fluctuate widely from pay period to pay period but were consistent and fixed month after month at a specified hourly rate and number of hours per week, and thus the hearing examiner properly calculated the employee's benefits by applying the formula set out in the division's rules and regulations; answers to any questions about the claimant's work history and the longevity of his employment were speculative and irrelevant to the statutory framework of the worker's compensation law, which focuses on the circumstances at the time of the injury. Wilson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Wilson), 2003 WY 105, 75 P.3d 669, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 2003).

Substantiation required. —

Expenses claimed under the death benefits provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403 (e)(ii) must be documented with receipts or other substantial evidence, and where the spouse had not substantiated a claim for a certain sum, the denial of her claim for an additional benefit of $ 2,500 to cover other unitemized funeral expenses was affirmed. Loberg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Loberg), 2004 WY 48, 88 P.3d 1045, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 2004).

Calculation based on time of injury proper. —

Substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's determination that temporary total disability benefits should be calculated based on the claimant's actual monthly earnings at the time of the accident. Bhutto v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 933 P.2d 481, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1997).

Extended benefits award. —

An employee may receive an extended benefits award up to the maximum amount permitted under subsection (c) in addition to all of the income received as specified in subsection (g)(i)(C); however, extended benefits are not limited to an amount adequate only for mere subsistence. In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 2000).

Benefits denied. —

Under this section, substantial evidence supported the denial of workers' compensation benefits where a claimant's story regarding a back injury was inconsistent; moreover, the testimony of the claimant's doctor was disregarded since he was not given the correct medical history, and his opinions were based largely on what he was told by the claimant. McIntosh v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2007 WY 108, 162 P.3d 483, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2007).

Additional benefits awarded based on state's average weeklywage at time of injury. —

The district court was correct in awarding a claimant additional benefits under former § 27-12-405(d)(iv) (now see subsection (g) of this section) based upon the state's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, and not the average weekly wage at the time of the application. In re Shapiro, 703 P.2d 1079, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 512 (Wyo. 1985).

Apportionment of benefits between 2 employers. —

The question of whether there should be an apportionment of total temporary disability benefits between two employers could not be considered as an issue where the trial court found that the employer had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the earlier injury sustained by the employee was an intervening cause in regard to the subsequent injury. Brad Ragan Tire Co. v. Gearhart Indus., 744 P.2d 1125, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 531 (Wyo. 1987).

Applying 1987 version of this section. —

Although worker's compensation division erroneously awarded employee extended benefits from 1992 through 1994 based on a 1985 statute, division was not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel or judicial estoppel from applying 1987 version of this section to employee's 1995 claim. Ottema v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 968 P.2d 41, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1998).

1987 version of this section applied to employee's claim, where although his logging accident occurred in 1985, he first sought permanent total disability certification in 1990, visited a doctor in 1990 who found him permanently totally disabled, and applied for permanent total disability certification in 1991. Ottema v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 968 P.2d 41, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1998).

Retrospective award of extended benefits allowed. —

Under former law, where the statute was silent with regards to the availability of past payments, the rule of liberal construction was applied in favor of the employee, resulting in a retrospective award of extended benefits for permanent total disability. Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 209, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1998).

Applying 1987 version of this section. —

Finding in favor of claimant in a workers' compensation action was appropriate pursuant to 1987 requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(g)(i)(C) because the Workers' Safety and Compensation Division erred when it considered the claimant's wife's income as part of household income attributable to an employee; phrase “income of the claimant” necessarily restricted the subsequent types of income listed, including household income. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Johnson, 2008 WY 59, 185 P.3d 16, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2008).

Cited in

Duncan v. Laramie County Community College, 768 P.2d 593, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1989); Whiteman v. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 987 P.2d 670, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1999); Osenbaugh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 10 P.3d 544, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 2000); Moller v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 702, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 211 (Wyo. 2000); Nagle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Nagle), 2008 WY 99, 190 P.3d 159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Aug. 19, 2008); Picozzi v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2013 WY 86, 304 P.3d 977, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Jul 16, 2013).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Workmen's compensation: posthumous children and children born after accident as dependents, 18 ALR3d 900.

Workers' compensation: incarceration as terminating benefits, 54 ALR4th 241.

Workers' compensation: reopening lump-sum compensation payment, 26 ALR5th 127.

§ 27-14-404. Temporary total disability; benefits; determination of eligibility; exceptions for volunteers or prisoners; period of certification limited; temporary light duty employment.

  1. If after a compensable injury is sustained and as a result of the injury the employee is subject to temporary total disability as defined under W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xviii), the injured employee is entitled to receive a temporary total disability award for the period of temporary total disability as provided by W.S. 27-14-403(c). The period for receiving a temporary total disability award under this section for injuries resulting from any one (1) incident or accident shall not exceed a cumulative period of twenty-four (24) months, except that the division pursuant to its rules and regulations and in its discretion may in the event of extraordinary circumstances award additional temporary total disability benefits. The division’s decision to grant such additional benefits shall be reviewable by a hearing examiner only for an abuse of discretion by the division.
  2. Any employee awarded benefits under W.S. 27-14-405 or 27-14-406 is not eligible for benefits under subsection (a) of this section unless the employee has returned to gainful employment and following employment, undergoes additional surgery not reasonably contemplated before the award for permanent impairment or disability and then only for a reasonable period of recuperation, confinement for medical care during the actual period of confinement or unless application is made and an award is granted under W.S. 27-14-605 .
  3. Payment under subsection (a) of this section shall cease prior to expiration of the twenty-four (24) month maximum period specified under subsection (a) of this section if:
    1. Recovery is complete to the extent that the earning power of the employee at a gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training is substantially restored; or
    2. The employee has an ascertainable loss, qualifies for benefits under W.S. 27-14-405 or 27-14-406 and the first monthly payment pursuant to either of those sections has been issued to the employee.
  4. Disability payments under this section shall not be allowed for the first three (3) days of disability unless the incapacity extends beyond eight (8) days. If payments cease for a period of eight (8) days or more, the employee may apply for reinstatement under W.S. 27-14-605 and any award granted shall be treated as an initial award. In determining the period of disability, the day the disability occurred shall be included unless the employee received full payment of wages for that day. No employee shall be forced to use sick leave before applying for or instead of benefits under this section. Benefits under subsection (a) of this section shall not be paid if:
    1. An employee or his personal representative fails to file a claim for benefits within thirty (30) days after the first day immediately succeeding the first thirty (30) days of any certified period of temporary total disability;
    2. A claim is filed without the signature of the claimant and certification by the attending health care provider; or
    3. An employee is receiving unemployment compensation under W.S. 27-3-101 through 27-3-704 .
  5. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, any volunteer or mine rescue team member covered under this act and sustaining a temporary total disability in the line of duty shall receive the maximum benefit allowable under this section.
  6. Any individual serving time in any penal or correctional institution who is an employee under this act or any probationer or parolee not covered by a qualifying employer-employee relationship performing work pursuant to court order is not eligible for benefits under this section for injuries suffered during the period of incarceration, probation or parole. Upon release from the penal or correctional institution or upon completion of probation or parole, any remaining benefits for which the individual would otherwise qualify for under this section shall be paid from and after the date of release or completion. In addition, any individual classified as a school-to-work participant under this act is not eligible for benefits under this section for injuries suffered during the participation in a school-to-work program activity.
  7. Only a health care provider may certify temporary total disability under this act. The length of time of the initial certification or recertification of temporary total disability shall be established by the department after considering the recommendation of the health care provider and current medical literature. Subject to W.S. 27-14-609 , the employer, employee or division may request recertification of the period of temporary total disability at intervals of not less than sixty (60) days, provided that in the event of extraordinary circumstances, the division may reconsider recertification at any time. The temporary total disability shall not exceed the period allowed by W.S. 27-14-404(a).
  8. Payment under subsection (a) of this section shall be suspended if the injured employee fails to appear at an appointment with his health care provider. Payment shall be suspended under this subsection until such time as the employee appears at a subsequent rescheduled appointment. Payment shall not be suspended for failing to appear at an appointment if the employee notifies the case manager or the division prior to the appointment or within twenty-four (24) hours after missing the appointment and the division determines, after recommendation by the case manager, that the employee made all reasonable efforts to appear at the appointment. At the time of the first benefit payment under this section, the division shall notify the employee of the requirements and other provisions of this subsection, including the procedures to be followed in notifying the case manager or the division. For purposes of this subsection, health care provider includes physical and occupational therapists.
  9. An employer may make a written offer of temporary light duty work to an employee receiving temporary total disability under subsection (a) of this section. The offer shall be a bona fide offer on a form supplied by the division, stating with specificity the proposed hours of employment, starting date, wage and physical or other functional capacity requirements of the light duty work. If the employee accepts the offer, the temporary total disability award shall cease and the employee shall receive a temporary light duty award, subject to the following terms and conditions:
    1. After notice to the employer, the health care provider who certified temporary total disability has certified on the light duty work agreement that the employee is released to perform the light duty work described in the agreement;
    2. All periods of light duty work may not exceed one (1) year cumulatively for any one (1) injury;
    3. The temporary light duty assignment commences not less than fourteen (14) days following the written offer;
    4. Payment of the temporary light duty award shall cease as provided for temporary total disability under subsection (c) of this section or if the employee’s actual monthly earnings from all sources when combined with the temporary light duty award exceed ninety-five percent (95%) of the employee’s actual monthly earnings at the time of injury;
    5. The employer shall provide the division before commencement of the light duty work with a copy of the light duty work agreement signed by the employer and the employee, and shall report to the division by the fifteenth of each month the employee’s hours and rate of pay for the previous month;
    6. The temporary total disability award of any employee refusing a bona fide written offer of temporary light duty work pursuant to this subsection shall be reduced by two-thirds (2/3) unless the employee provides written proof to the employer and the division of enrollment by the employee in any collegiate, vocational retraining, general education development or other program approved by the division which is designed to retrain the employee for employment in an occupation other than that previously offered by the employer; and
    7. The temporary light duty award under this subsection and the balance of a temporary total disability award under paragraph (vi) of this subsection shall not be charged to the employer’s experience rating established under W.S. 27-14-201(d).
  10. If the employer objects to a division determination that an injury is compensable and the employee’s health care provider has certified the employee as temporarily totally disabled, an injured worker may request an interim benefit while his case is under appeal. The amount of the benefit will be calculated at the temporary total disability rate as determined under W.S. 27-14-403(c) and shall be paid for up to three (3) months until a final compensability decision by a hearing examiner is issued or until the expiration of the period of certified temporary disability, whichever occurs first. The period during which the interim benefit is received shall be included in the time period allowed under W.S. 27-14-404(a). The experience rating of the employer against whom a claim is made shall not be charged for the interim benefit if the injury is determined after hearing not to be compensable. Only one (1) interim benefit under this subsection may be awarded per injury.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 161, § 1; ch. 226, § 1; ch. 264, § 2; 1993, ch. 205, § 1; ch. 216, § 1; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 1995, ch. 100, § 1; 1996, ch. 82, § 1; 2000, ch. 98, § 1; 2004, ch. 13, § 1; 2009, ch. 156, § 1.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, rewrote (j), amending temporary light duty awards and requirements.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (c)(ii), added “and the first monthly payment pursuant to either of those sections has been issued to the employee” at the end.

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Maximum medical improvement.—

Medical Commission did not err by using the definition of maximum medical improvement (MMI) in the AMA Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment because the AMA Guides definition of MMI was consistent with Wyoming law. Morris v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 119, 403 P.3d 980, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2017).

Benefits cease when stability or recovery reached.—

Medical Commission's determination that an employee's temporary total disability (TTD) benefits were properly terminated on the ground that she reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) was supported by substantial evidence because it properly accepted the conclusion of the Division's experts; the Commission properly rejected the testimony of the employee's surgeon because the surgeon misunderstood, or did not agree with, the meanings of MMI, ascertainable loss, and TTD under Wyoming law. Morris v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 119, 403 P.3d 980, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2017).

Termination of temporary total disability benefits.—

Medical Commission's determination that an employee's temporary total disability (TTD) benefits were properly terminated on the ground that she reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) was supported by substantial evidence because it properly accepted the conclusion of the Division's experts; the Commission properly rejected the testimony of the employee's surgeon because the surgeon misunderstood, or did not agree with, the meanings of MMI, ascertainable loss, and TTD under Wyoming law. Morris v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 119, 403 P.3d 980, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2017).

Applicability. —

Office of administrative hearings incorrectly ruled that the claimant's request for modification of temporary total disability benefits due to increased incapacity was governed by this section, requiring proof of additional surgery, and not § 27-14-605(a). Osenbaugh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 10 P.3d 544, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 2000).

The procedural requirements of subsection (d) do not apply during the pendency of a contested case, and the hearing examiner may properly award retroactive temporary total disability benefits if the claimant prevails on the merits. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1997).

Purpose of awarding temporary total disability benefits is to provide income for an injured employee while he or she recovers. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ohnstad, 802 P.2d 865, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1990).

The provisions dealing with temporary total disability benefits, when read together, indicate that the legislature intended for workers who are temporarily injured to be compensated until their earning power is substantially restored. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ohnstad, 802 P.2d 865, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1990).

Compensable injury required. —

This section does not require that the temporary disability come about as a result of the first compensable injury, or the original compensable injury, but simply that the temporary disability be caused by a compensable injury. This section in no way limits the award of temporary total disability benefits for a second compensable injury to a certain period of time following the first or original compensable injury. Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1995).

Increase of incapacity due solely to injury. —

Under §§ 27-14-404(b) and 27-14-605(a), a claimant who had previously accepted a permanent partial impairment award was entitled to additional benefits following surgery if she could prove that she suffered an increase of incapacity due solely to her injury; however, this did not mean that she had to prove she suffered an increase in permanent incapacity, and a showing of a temporary increase was sufficient. Hernandez v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. 1, Hernandez v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. 1 (In re Hernandez), 8 P.3d 318, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 2000).

Medical Commission's finding that the employee did not meet his burden of proving that he was entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-605(a) and 27-14-404(b) was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence; the employee suffered an increase in incapacity due solely to his work related injury. In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Glaze v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2009 WY 102, 214 P.3d 228, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Aug. 19, 2009).

When temporary disability deemed total. —

If a claimant is unable to perform remunerative work with reasonable consistency, without pain and discomfort, temporary disability is deemed total. Pacific Power & Light v. Parsons, 692 P.2d 226, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 356 (Wyo. 1984).

Retroactive award of temporary total disability benefits affirmed where the record contained sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that claimant was unable to work with reasonable consistency without pain and discomfort. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1997).

Worker may do some work and earn some money without disqualification. —

Doing some work and earning some money during a period of temporary total disability does not automatically disqualify a worker from receiving disability benefits. Pacific Power & Light v. Parsons, 692 P.2d 226, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 356 (Wyo. 1984).

Hearing after termination of benefits constitutional. —

Notwithstanding the question of whether or not worker's interest in temporary total disability benefits is a property right, former § 27-12-602 (see now § 27-14-602 ) clearly states that a hearing is available. Procedural due process of law is provided if, upon a hearing after termination of temporary total benefits, retroactive relief may be awarded the worker. Higgins v. State, 739 P.2d 129, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 988, 108 S. Ct. 508, 98 L. Ed. 2d 507, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 5149 (U.S. 1987).

Prospective benefit awards not authorized. —

This Act does not authorize the hearing examiner's award of claims which accrue after the hearing date, because the hearing examiner is limited to the issues which exist at the time of the hearing. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1997).

Employee who received lump sum permanent partial disability award and later became temporarily and totally disabled after rod removal surgery sustained an increase of incapacity and was therefore entitled to additional benefits, regardless of whether his permanent partial disability had increased. Parnell v. State, 735 P.2d 1367, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 428 (Wyo. 1987).

Determination of permanent effect of original disability. —

A workers' compensation claimant's first application for permanent benefits, after the claimant had received total temporary benefits, was a new claim for benefits that did not entail an increase or decrease in disability, but a determination as to the permanent effect of the original disability. Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1997), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. Feb. 4, 1997).

Requirements for termination of benefits. —

The statute does not require actual employment, only that the earning power is substantially restored. Shassetz v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 920 P.2d 1246, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1996).

Benefits cease when stability or recovery reached. —

If a physician does not certify that a workman is totally disabled or when it is indicated that he has reached the point of stability or recovery, temporary total disability benefits must cease. Higgins v. State, 739 P.2d 129, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 988, 108 S. Ct. 508, 98 L. Ed. 2d 507, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 5149 (U.S. 1987).

Benefits under former § 27-14-404(b) (now subsection (d) of this section) terminate only when the worker recovers, because only then does he regain his earning power. Incarceration does not restore a disabled worker's earning power. In re Injury to Spera, 713 P.2d 1155, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 470 (Wyo. 1986).

Employee had an ascertainable loss where he had a poor prognosis and could not safely return to a physically demanding position, and he had reached maximum medical improvement unless he was willing to consider fusion surgery. Phillips v. TIC-The Industrial Co. of Wyoming, Inc. (In re Phillips), 2005 WY 40, 109 P.3d 520, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2005).

Maximum duration of benefits.

Employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits after the 36-month period provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(a) (2011) and Wyo. Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules of the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, ch. 7, § 2(b)(i) and (ii) because (1) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(a) allowed such benefits for a maximum of 24 months, (2) Wyo. Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules of the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, ch. 7, § 2(b)(i) and (ii) extended this period for a maximum of 12 months, and (3) the second injury rule did not apply to extend the period further, as the plain language of the statute and Rules applied the 36-month limitation to all “injuries” resulting from any one incident or accident, encompassing situations in which an employee received multiple injuries simultaneously or a subsequent compensable injury as the result of a single workplace accident. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Smith, 2013 WY 26, 296 P.3d 939, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 2013).

Receipt of temporary total disability benefits is limited to a maximum period of 36 months, which includes 24 months authorized under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(a) and an additional 12 months allowed in extraordinary circumstances pursuant to rules of the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division because, under the plain language of the statute, this limitation applied to all “injuries” resulting from any one incident or accident, encompassing situations in which a claimant received multiple injuries simultaneously or a subsequent compensable injury as the result of a single workplace accident. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Smith, 2013 WY 26, 296 P.3d 939, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 2013).

In determining when eligibility for benefits ceases, nonmedical factors may be considered during the healing period. Once the healing period has ended, however, nonmedical factors become relevant only in determining the extent of the employee's permanent disability. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Taylor, 737 P.2d 1063, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 460 (Wyo. 1987).

Claimant conducting own business not totally disabled. —

Substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's conclusion that the claimant's earning power had been substantially restored and that the claimant was not temporarily and totally disabled. The claimant was conducting his own welding business and had distributed business cards in order to solicit business. Although he testified that he was still experiencing pain and that he had not yet been released for work by his physician, he had no apparent difficulty moving or engaging in the various work activities associated with the welding profession. Sims v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 872 P.2d 555, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1994).

Computation of hourly wage earner's monthly rate of pay. —

A method of computing an hourly wage earner's monthly rate of pay is to multiply the hourly rate by the hours worked in a week, times the 52 weeks in the year and divide by 12 months. This formula may be used so long as the resulting figure fairly represents the parties' understanding. Hasser v. Flint Eng'g, 647 P.2d 66, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1982).

Erroneous allowance as to temporary and permanent disability. —

Allowance for temporary total disability and for permanent total disability, treating claimant's disability as temporary up to time of allowance for permanent total disability is erroneous, where disability was permanent from beginning. Marsh v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo. 220, 284 P. 260, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1930).

Not erroneous not to tender disability payments in gold and silver. —

Tendering to a claimant 2/3 of the amount he had received as salary in the form of federal reserve notes, and not in gold and silver, was not an erroneous tender, it not being alleged that the payment of the claimant's salary had been tendered and received in gold and silver. Skurdal v. State, 708 P.2d 1241, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 601 (Wyo. 1985).

Burden of proof. —

Where hearing examiner determined that injured worker's temporary total disability benefits should be terminated, injured worker had burden of demonstrating that his earning power had not been substantially restored and for that reason he was entitled to a continuation of temporary total benefits. Shassetz v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 920 P.2d 1246, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1996).

Wyoming Medical Commission's determination that the employee did not meet his burden of proving he was entitled to further TTD benefits, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404 , was supported by substantial evidence, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c), Wyo. R. App. P. 12.09; the independent medical examination report was properly admitted and the finding that the employee lacked credibility was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and the employee's doctor's opinions were inconsistent with the medical evidence. In re Worker's Comp. Claim v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n & Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 49, 250 P.3d 1082, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Mar. 21, 2011).

Carpet cleaner awarded benefits for time he worked as counselor. —

Carpet cleaner was entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits for the period he worked as a counselor, where he had earned approximately $1,200 per month before he was injured and four dollars per hour while he was working as a counselor. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ohnstad, 802 P.2d 865, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1990).

Application for reinstatement of benefits not untimely. —

Trial court erred in upholding the denial of TTD benefits to an employee because pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(d), the employee was entitled to apply for reinstatement of TDD benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 as the payment of benefits had ceased for a period of eight days or more; a physician's order that the employee was not to work was evidence of increased incapacity within the meaning of § 27-14-605 .Boe v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2009 WY 115, 216 P.3d 494, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Sept. 17, 2009).

Extended benefits. —

Workers' compensation claimant was properly denied extended temporary total disability (TTD) benefits under this section because the fact that a claimant's benefits were disputed or the subject of a contested case was not a circumstance the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division had established as a basis for extended TTD benefits. Dorman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 94, 281 P.3d 342, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2012).

Wyoming Worker's Safety and Compensation Division exceeded its statutory authority by adopting a rule limiting additional temporary total disability benefits to twelve months because, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404 , the Division was authorized, but not required, to award temporary total disability benefits beyond the statutory maximum. State ex rel. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. v. Clements, 2014 WY 68, 326 P.3d 177, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 2014).

Doctor's form. —

Office of Administrative Hearing (OAH) properly denied claim for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, where “Return to Work/School” document did not include a certification that the employee was temporarily totally disabled under Wyoming law or set forth the reasons for the disability or expected period of disability as required by the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division Rule and Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-404(d) and 501(b); moreover, the doctor's form did not provide detailed information about the health care provider or the employee's diagnosis, treatment plan, or prognosis. Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 152, 243 P.3d 953, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2010).

Reduction of benefits proper. —

Trial court erred in overturning a decision reducing an employee's TTD benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(j) on the ground that the employee refused an offer of light duty work because the employee acknowledged that, on the surface, the light duty job offer appeared to be bona fide in that it took into consideration every physical limitation the employee had and accommodated those limitations. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Cave, 2011 WY 133, 261 P.3d 724, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Sept. 20, 2011).

Quoted in

Carson v. Wyoming State Penitentiary, 735 P.2d 424, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 419 (Wyo. 1987); Cordova v. Holly Sugar Corp., 882 P.2d 880, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 1994); Snyder v. State, 957 P.2d 289, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1998); Kebschull v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2017 WY 94, 399 P.3d 1249, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2017).

Cited in

Smith v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 965 P.2d 687, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1998), overruled on other grounds, Slater v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2001 WY 29, 18 P.3d 1195, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2001); Moller v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 702, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 211 (Wyo. 2000); State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Gerrard, 2001 WY 7, 17 P.3d 20, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2001); McIntosh v. Wyo. Medical Comm'n, 2007 WY 108, 162 P.3d 483, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (July 12, 2007); Nagle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Nagle), 2008 WY 99, 190 P.3d 159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Aug. 19, 2008); Stallman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Stallman), 2012 WY 147, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Nov 20, 2012).

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 157.02D (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-14-405. Permanent partial disability; benefits; schedule; permanent disfigurement; disputed ratings.

  1. and (b) Repealed by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 3.
  2. Renumbered as (k) by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 2.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 3.
  4. Renumbered as (m) by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 2.
  5. An injured employee suffering an ascertainable loss may apply for a permanent partial impairment award as provided in this section.
  6. An injured employee’s impairment shall be rated by a licensed physician using the most recent edition of the American Medical Association’s guide to the evaluation of permanent impairment. The award shall be paid as provided by W.S. 27-14-403 for the number of months determined by multiplying the percentage of impairment by sixty (60) months.
  7. An injured employee awarded permanent partial impairment benefits may apply for a permanent disability award subject to the following terms and conditions:
    1. The injured employee is because of the injury, unable to return to employment at a wage that is at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the monthly gross earnings the employee was earning at the time of injury;
    2. An application for permanent partial disability is filed not before three (3) months after the date of ascertainable loss or three (3) months before the last scheduled impairment payment, whichever occurs later, but in no event later than one (1) year following the later date; and
    3. The employee has actively sought suitable work, considering the employee’s health, education, training and experience.
  8. The disability award under subsection (h) of this section shall be payable monthly in the amount provided by W.S. 27-14-403 for the number of months determined by adding the number of months computed under this subsection as follows:
    1. Fourteen (14) months, multiplied by a fraction in which the numerator is sixty-five (65) minus the employee’s age at the date of injury and the denominator is forty-five (45);
    2. Eight and one-half (8 1/2) months, multiplied by a fraction in which the numerator is four (4) minus the employee’s completed years of education beyond the twelfth grade, not to exceed four (4) years, and the denominator is four (4);
    3. Six (6) months, multiplied by a fraction in which the numerator is four (4) minus the number of different occupations in which the employee has worked at least eighteen (18) months in the eight (8) year period preceding the injury but not to exceed four (4), and the denominator is four (4);
    4. Up to two (2) months if the employee at the time of injury was engaged in a formal education or training program for an occupation which was reasonably expected to pay more than the employee’s employment at the time of injury and the employee, because of the permanent injury, will be unable to enter into the new occupation;
    5. One (1) month if the employee is forty-five (45) to forty-nine (49) years of age at the time of injury, two (2) months if the employee is fifty (50) to fifty-four (54) years of age at the time of injury, and three (3) months if the employee is fifty-five (55) years of age or older at the time of injury.
  9. An employee incurring permanent disfigurement due to an injury to the face or head which affects his earning capacity or ability to secure gainful employment shall receive in proportion to the extent of the disfigurement, an additional physical impairment award not to exceed six (6) months of compensation payable monthly as provided by W.S. 27-14-403(c). Any previous disfigurement to the face or head of the employee shall be considered when authorizing the award.
  10. If the percentage of physical impairment is disputed, the division shall obtain a second opinion and if the ratings conflict, shall determine the physical impairment award upon consideration of the initial and second opinion. Any objection to a final determination pursuant to this subsection shall be referred to the medical commission for hearing by a medical hearing panel acting as hearing examiner pursuant to W.S. 27-14-616 .
  11. This section specifies the length of time amounts computed pursuant to W.S. 27-14-403(c) are to be awarded and except for amounts awarded under W.S. 27-14-408 , shall not be construed to allow awards in excess of the amounts computed pursuant to W.S. 27-14-403(c).

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1987, ch. 94, § 1; 1993, ch. 229, § 2; 1994, ch. 86, §§ 2, 3; 2000, ch. 98, § 1; 2009, ch. 156, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (g), substituted “sixty (60) months” for “forty-four (44) months.”

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Maximum medical improvement.—

Medical Commission did not err by using the definition of maximum medical improvement (MMI) in the AMA Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment because the AMA Guides definition of MMI was consistent with Wyoming law. Morris v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 119, 403 P.3d 980, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2017).

Claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and no longer qualified for temporary total disability benefits because substantial evidence in the testimony of doctors supported the decision that the claimant had reached MMI—despite the plan by the claimant’s to use a spinal cord stimulator to reduce the claimant’s pain and improve the claimant’s quality of living following a work related back injury. Coggins v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workers' Comp. Div., 2018 WY 77, 421 P.3d 555, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 2018).

Legislative treatment of cumulative effect of injuries. —

Examination of compensation schedule for permanent partial disability in conjunction with definition of permanent total disability makes it clear that while legislature fixed specific awards for loss of single members of body, cumulative effect of injuries has not been overlooked. Sakamoto v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 36 Wyo. 325, 255 P. 356, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1927).

A worker's compensation case involving a disputed impairment rating which was initially referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings under W.S. § 27-14-616 shall be transferred to the medical commission pursuant to subsection (m) of this section. Lyles v. State ex rel. Division of Workers' Compensation (In re Lyles), 957 P.2d 843, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1998).

Loss of earning capacity primary consideration in disability compensation. —

The concept of disability compensation rests on the premise that the primary consideration is not medical impairment as such, but rather loss of earning capacity related to that impairment. Factors other than medical evidence, such as loss of income in appropriate cases, may be considered in determining the amount of the award. McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Co., 694 P.2d 93, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 429 (Wyo. 1985).

Loss of earnings benefits was premised on claimant's ability to work at a reduced level of functioning, and evidence did not support award where claimant's inability to join the work force was due to his incarceration. Apodaca v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 977 P.2d 56, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1999).

Injured employee was not entitled to permanent partial disability benefits, where he was given full medical release to return to work as a mechanic and was physically capable of performing his work, but instead sought and accepted lower paying parts department position. Sidwell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 977 P.2d 60, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1999).

Evidence supported finding that injured employee voluntarily took a lower paying position, and thus hearing examiner was not required to determine whether employee's pre-injury and post-injury wages were comparable. Sidwell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 977 P.2d 60, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1999).

Hearing examiner did not err by considering the employee's actual post-injury employment even though it commenced after she applied for and was denied permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits and was located in Nebraska because the focus of this section, which sets out the requirements for PPD benefits, was on an injured employee's actual ability to earn, and if the court were to accept the employee's argument that her employment commencing after the filing of an application for PPD benefits could not be considered, employees would have a disincentive to return to work following an injury. Such an interpretation would clearly be inconsistent with this section, which required employees to show they had actively sought suitable work in order to qualify for PPD benefits. Chavez v. Mem'l Hosp. of Sweetwater County, 2006 WY 82, 138 P.3d 185, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2006).

Employee should have been awarded permanent partial disability benefits because the employee could not find employment in Wyoming at a wage that was at least 95 percent of his pre-injury wage. One proposed job did not defeat the employee's overwhelming evidence that he was entitled to benefits. Block v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2009 WY 34, 202 P.3d 1064, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 2009).

Workers' compensation claimant was unable to return to work at a job paying at least 95% of what he was earning prior to his work injury as required by this section for permanent partial disability benefits because the claimant asserted that he was unable to drive based on the limited range of motion in his neck and a physical therapist confirmed that the claimant's coordination and timing were slow. Mahaffey v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 45, 249 P.3d 234, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Mar. 11, 2011).

Comparison of pre-injury wage and post-injury wage. —

The court considered loss of earning capacity and whether a comparison of the pre-injury wage to the post-injury wage offered was compensable under the applicable statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h). The worker's post-injury wage was compensable, and the order awarding benefits was affirmed. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Savicki, 2004 WY 71, 92 P.3d 294, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 2004).

Permanent partial disability benefits were properly awarded to claimant because substantial evidence showed that claimant was unable to return to employment at a wage that was at least 95 percent of his pre-injury wage pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i), given his physical impairment and lifting restrictions. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. v. Baldwin (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Baldwin), 2008 WY 125, 196 P.3d 1087, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2008).

Claim for permanent partial disability benefits was properly denied because the claimant could not show that he was unable to return to work at a wage at least 95 percent of his pre-injury wage, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i); he earned more per month over the past seven years prior to his application for benefits than he earned prior to his 2001 injury. Decker v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2013 WY 75, 303 P.3d 1134, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 2013).

Double recovery prohibited. —

A claimant cannot properly be compensated for the partial loss of his entire arm and also be compensated for the individual injuries to the same member. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Colvin, 681 P.2d 269, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 285 (Wyo. 1984).

The language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405 , as it was in effect in 1990 and 2000, was clear and unambiguous, and the subtraction language in the statute in effect in 1990 was superfluous, because the law did not allow one to receive double compensation for the same injury. Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2003 WY 83, 72 P.3d 799, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2003).

Although Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-406(a) is ambiguous as to whether all previous impairment awards under this section must be deducted from a permanent total disability award, a reduction was proper where the claimant did not contend that any aspect of his impairment was unrelated to his permanent total disability. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 57, 248 P.3d 1155, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 2011).

Permanent total disability. —

A workers' compensation claimant's injury, for purposes of his new claim for permanent total disability and extended benefits, was deemed to have occurred when he was found to be permanently disabled. Rodgers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 246, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1997), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. July 8, 1997).

Permanent partial disability is not affected by fact worker has continued to work and has received increases in his salaries. In re Van Buskirk, 741 P.2d 120, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 494 (Wyo. 1987).

Return to work at lesser wage. —

Where wage at which injured employee could return to work was 89 percent of his pre-injury wage, employee could not be deemed able to return to employment at a comparable or higher wage, and thus hearing examiner erred in denying employee's claim for permanent partial disability benefits. Adams v. State, ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 975 P.2d 17, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 22 .

Setting of “comparable wage” at 80% held to be without effect. —

In accordance with the court's statutory interpretation of what constitutes a “comparable wage” in Adams v. State, ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 975 P.2d 17, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 22 , and because the division lacks the power to legislate or to amend the Act, the division's rule setting 80 percent as a threshold of wage comparability was an improper attempt to amend § 27-14-405(h)(i) and was, therefore, without effect. Cochran v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 993 P.2d 320, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Wyo. 1999).

Additional compensation awarded for separate injury. —

A prior award for permanent partial disability does not bar an employee from additional compensation premised upon a separate and distinct injury. In re Van Buskirk, 741 P.2d 120, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 494 (Wyo. 1987).

Totally disabled employee entitled to additional benefits. —

An employee who received a lump sum permanent partial disability award, and later became temporarily and totally disabled after rod removal surgery, sustained an increase of incapacity and was therefore entitled to additional benefits, regardless of whether his permanent partial disability had increased. Parnell v. State, 735 P.2d 1367, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 428 (Wyo. 1987).

But employee not totally disabled is not so entitled. —

Where injured worker who had received partial disability awards for 74.5% whole body impairment for slip-and-fall injury at work subsequently applied for an additional 25.5% disability award after back surgery, the hearing officer correctly refused the application since the evidence showed the worker was not totally disabled and was capable of finding work after the surgery. Whiteman v. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 987 P.2d 670, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1999).

Determination of permanent effect of original disability. —

A workers' compensation claimant's first application for permanent benefits, after the claimant had received total temporary benefits, was a new claim for benefits that did not entail an increase or decrease in disability, but a determination as to the permanent effect of the original disability. Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1997), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. Feb. 4, 1997).

Weight of evidence did not support determination of permanent partial disability, where the attending physician stated that claimant had suffered no loss of function of body or limb in terms of physical impairment, and the claimant alleged pain which could not be substantiated. Fischer v. State, 734 P.2d 558, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 414 (Wyo. 1987).

Date of compensable injury not equated with determination of partial disability. —

Although under certain circumstances the date of a compensable injury and a determination of partial disability could be simultaneous, it is error to equate compensable injury with determination of partial disability. Claim of Evans, 417 P.2d 17, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1966).

Apportionment of pre-existing condition and work-related injury not authorized under Wyoming law. —

Wyoming Medical Commission properly determined that a workers' compensation claimant's injury was a material aggravation of a preexisting condition and rated his impairment at 23 percent; the Commission did not apportion the rating between the claimant's pre-existing condition and the work-related injury, concluding that apportionment was not authorized under Wyoming law. Also, the Commission specifically found that claimant's back condition and impairment were aggravated by the work injury, and that there was no evidence that the claimant was receiving a double recovery because he had never received an impairment rating before the current injury; thus, for purposes of awarding permanent partial impairment benefits, the trial court was correct in not apportioning the claimant's pre-existing condition and his work-related injury. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Faulkner, 2007 WY 31, 152 P.3d 394, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2007).

Burden of proof. —

To receive permanent partial disability benefits, a claimant must show not only that he has suffered a permanent impairment which would not substantially change in the future, but also the extent to which the permanent impairment resulted from the compensable injury. Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1997), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. Feb. 4, 1997).

Claimant failed to meet her burden of proof that she was unable to return to employment at a comparable or higher wage than she was earning at time of her injury, where her testimony was anecdotal, self-serving, unsupported by documentary evidence, and demonstrated that she was able to work periodically, and without any substantial showing that there was good reason that she was not able to work more than periodically. Lunde v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 6 P.3d 1256, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2000).

Hearing examiner did not err by considering the employee's actual post-injury employment even though it commenced after she applied for and was denied permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits and was located in Nebraska because the focus of this section, which set out the requirements for PPD benefits, was on an injured employee's actual ability to earn. There was no dispute regarding the employee's actual post-injury employment; therefore she did not meet the statutory requirements for PPD benefits under this section and the Workers' Safety and Compensation Division was entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 56, as a matter of law. Chavez v. Mem'l Hosp. of Sweetwater County, 2006 WY 82, 138 P.3d 185, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2006).

Standard of proof. —

This section requires a claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury renders him incapable of returning to work at a higher or comparable wage. Wright v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 978 P.2d 1162, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 1999).

When determining compensation, court considers how claimant impaired in performing pre-injury work. —

This section was designed to allow the trial court to consider the work for which a claimant was suited before the injury and how he was impaired in performing this work after the injury when determining the compensation a claimant should receive. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Colvin, 681 P.2d 269, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 285 (Wyo. 1984).

Court considers ability to perform work for which claimant is suited. —

The trial court is not limited to considering only the claimant's decreased ability to perform the work he held before the injury. Rather, it is the claimant's ability to continue to perform work for which he is reasonably suited which is one factor to be considered. Worker's Compensation Claim of Cannon v. FMC Corp., 718 P.2d 879, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 543 (Wyo. 1986).

An injured employee's ability to perform work for which that person is reasonably suited is just one of the factors to be addressed in deciding how the injury affected earning capacity. At least in part, that focus must rest upon whether the injury will prevent or hinder the injured worker from continuing in, or returning to, an occupation for which that person has the proper training and experience. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Borodine, 784 P.2d 228, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 250 (Wyo. 1989).

And is not bound by medical testimony. —

In making the factual determination of the extent of the claimant's injury, the trial court is not bound by medical testimony; nonmedical witnesses and other evidence may be relied on. Worker's Compensation Claim of Cannon v. FMC Corp., 718 P.2d 879, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 543 (Wyo. 1986).

Vocational evaluations. —

Vocational evaluations should be based on available jobs in Wyoming, and evaluation of such jobs must be conducted with some basis in reality which gives recognition to the worker's disability. Lunde v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 6 P.3d 1256, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2000).

It was not error to rely on the claimant's actual employment in Texas instead of a theoretical vocation evaluation because the report did not refer to a claimant's lifting restrictions and did not use the correct wage as the basis for its conclusions. Also, the claimant was unable to perform or not qualified for several jobs in Wyoming. In re Worker's Compensation Claim v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2006 WY 114, 142 P.3d 686, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (2006).

Where hearing officer's decision denying appellant's claim for permanent partial disability benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i) was based on the vocational evaluator's erroneous assessment of his wages at the time of the injury, the supreme court of Wyoming reversed the district court's decision affirming the denial of benefits as unsupported by substantial evidence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c). Yother v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2007 WY 192, 173 P.3d 356, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 207 (Dec. 11, 2007).

Actively seeking suitable employment. —

The claimant was improperly denied permanent partial disability benefits, notwithstanding the contention by the employer that he had not actively sought suitable employment, where a letter written by the claimant's physician clearly relayed his medical opinion that any level of regular work activity would make the claimant's already extraordinarily limited physical capacity and condition worse since such opinion supported the inference that the claimant could not return to work at all, at least for a comparable or higher wage. Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2001 WY 48, 23 P.3d 32, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 2001).

There was substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's conclusion that claimant had not engaged in any kind of sustained effort to apply or train for work and that there was work at a comparable or higher wage available for claimant despite a language barrier and lifting restrictions. Hermosillo v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 175, 58 P.3d 924, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 2002).

Substantial evidence supported the office of administrative hearings' decision that the employee had not actively sought suitable employment as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405 . While the employee contacted six employers in October 2000, the employee only submitted four actual employment applications; the employee contacted two employers in 2001, but submitted no employment applications; just days before submitting an application for permanent partial disability, the employee contacted six other employers, yet did not submit a single employment application; and the employee had not pursued potential alternative occupation positions that were available. Ludwig v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Ludwig), 2004 WY 34, 86 P.3d 875, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2004).

Although in its decision the office of administrative hearings (OAH) also concluded that the evidence supported the finding that the employee was unable to work because of a degenerative back condition, rather than a specific work-related injury, the Wyoming Supreme Court was satisfied that the determinative issue before the OAH was whether the employee actively sought suitable employment as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h). The employee was given adequate notice of that determinative issue, fully litigated that issue, there was no due process violation, and the OAHs decision was conclusive. Ludwig v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Ludwig), 2004 WY 34, 86 P.3d 875, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2004).

Permanent partial disability benefits were properly awarded to a claimant because substantial evidence supported hearing examiner's determination that claimant sought suitable work pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(iii) where claimant had registered with the Wyoming Job Network and could describe a number of potential employers whom he had contacted. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. v. Baldwin (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Baldwin), 2008 WY 125, 196 P.3d 1087, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2008).

Evidence of disability. —

Evidence — Manual for Orthopedic Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent Physical Impairment — supported finding of a permanent partial disability of 20% for a back injury, the only other evidence being the testimony of the employee himself with respect to limitations of function, which testimony was consistent with his medical diagnosis and treatment and not in conflict with the medical evaluation. Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 517 (Wyo. 1985).

Employee eligible where he had an ascertainable loss. —

Employee had an ascertainable loss and qualified for benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405 where he had a poor prognosis and could not safely return to a physically demanding position, and he had reached maximum medical improvement unless he was willing to consider fusion surgery, but the employee had to submit written application to qualify. Phillips v. TIC-The Industrial Co. of Wyoming, Inc. (In re Phillips), 2005 WY 40, 109 P.3d 520, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2005).

Disputed impairment rating. —

Pursuant to subsection (e) and where the percentage of physical impairment was disputed, plaintiff was entitled to a second opinion with respect to his impairment rating. Routh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1998), reh'g denied, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. Feb. 17, 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 814, 119 S. Ct. 49, 142 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4815 (U.S. 1998).

Workers' compensation division acted in accordance with law when it employed a case review physician to review claimant's disputed impairment ratings, and then relied on physician's review in denying benefits. Pohl v. Bailey Co., 980 P.2d 816, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1999).

In a workers' compensation case, rejection of the employee's treating physician's impairment rating was proper because independent medical evaluators concluded that the employee's impairment did not involve an alteration of motion segment integrity, as determined by the treating physician, and that a 2% whole person impairment rating was consistent with the employee's medical history. Willey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Willey), 2012 WY 144, 288 P.3d 418, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2012).

Workers' compensation claimant was not entitled to a permanent partial impairment rating greater than 9% whole body because his level of impairment was properly classified as Class 1 under the motion segment lesions grid; a rating made by a physician's assistant did not include an analysis of the dermatomal distribution, and a finding of loss of reflexes was contradicted by other medical records. A report specifically referred to the grade 4 radiculopathy factors when a doctor determined that the impairment fell within Class 1, and the claimant did not offer any medical evidence to show that the doctor's interpretation of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment was incorrect. Hurt v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Hurt), 2015 WY 106, 355 P.3d 375, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2015).

Because a worker's 2010 permanent partial impairment (PPI) evaluation using the 6th edition of the American Medical Association (AMA) Guides resulted in a rating that was less than his 2005 rating using the 5th edition (7 percent whole body PPI in 2010, rather than 21 percent whole body in 2005), it was proper to deny a PPI award beyond the 21 percent already paid. It was proper to compare ratings calculated under different editions of the American Medical Association (AMA) Guides. Green v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 WY 81, 304 P.3d 941, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 2013).

Evidence of loss of income. —

The district court properly refused to admit evidence of claimant's prior earnings on the issue of loss of income, where the primary factor in his failure to obtain work was the depressed economy in his county and the surrounding environs. Arcoren v. Westburne Drilling, 730 P.2d 128, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 652 (Wyo. 1986).

A single check stub from a past pay check would be insufficient to properly establish loss of income. Arcoren v. Westburne Drilling, 730 P.2d 128, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 652 (Wyo. 1986).

Award of permanent partial disability was proper because a claimant showed a loss of earnings under this section; a back injury rendered the claimant ineligible to return to employment at a paint store, so the fact that the store had closed after the injury was not the cause of loss of earnings and neither was the lack of overtime at a new job. In re Bonsell v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 WY 114, 142 P.3d 686, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2006).

Subjective pain. —

Subjective pain may support an impairment rating under the American Medical Association (AMA) Guides when that pain reduces the claimant's range of motion. Pacific Power & Light v. Heermann, 872 P.2d 1171, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1994).

Judicial discretion as to manner of payment. —

The discretion of trial judge as to the manner of payment of compensation for permanent partial disabilities should not be disturbed, on appeal, except for abuse of that discretion. McKinney v. Manning & Martin, 55 Wyo. 268, 99 P.2d 922, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1940).

Lump sum payments not the rule. —

Lump sum payments of compensation for permanent partial disabilities are the exception and not the rule, conformable with view that generally disabled workman and his dependents will be best served with payments as wages are paid; hence, any lump sum payment is largely within discretion of the judge, who should consider all surrounding needs, present and possible. McKinney v. Manning & Martin, 55 Wyo. 268, 99 P.2d 922, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1940).

Veteran's administration rating not relevant. —

Fact that federal rating board of the veteran's administration rated employee as permanently partially disabled to the extent of 25% should not have any weight with the court, being the opinion of an unrelated tribunal involving quite different matters from those at bar. Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1936).

Allowance of proportionate amount for permanent total disability. —

District court was authorized to allow miner sustaining permanent partial disability through injuries to back and spine, which disability was not listed in schedule, proportionate amount of statutory sum for permanent total disability. In re Koprowski, 48 Wyo. 334, 46 P.2d 61, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1935).

Calculation of additional benefits. —

Office of Administrative Hearings' method of calculating a claimant's additional benefits was correct, where the claimant had had a second compensable injury making his Permanent Partial Impairment rating an additional eight percent over his original assessment. Therefore, the calculation, based on the version of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(g) in effect in 2000, was eight percent times 44 months times the wage rate in effect in the quarter preceding July 2000. Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2003 WY 83, 72 P.3d 799, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2003).

Applied in

Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 875 P.2d 1272, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1994); Ireland v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 998 P.2d 398, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2000); Howe v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 109, 401 P.3d 939, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2017).

Quoted in

Allen v. Natrona County Sch. Dist. No. One, 811 P.2d 1, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1991); Cordova v. Holly Sugar Corp., 882 P.2d 880, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 1994); Erdman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 5 P.3d 64, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2000); Serda v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 38, 42 P.3d 466, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2002).

Stated in

Sims v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 872 P.2d 555, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1994).

Cited in

Thompson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 768 P.2d 600, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1989); Hemme v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 914 P.2d 824, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1996); Hernandez v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. 1 (In re Hernandez), 8 P.3d 318, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 2000); Nagle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Nagle), 2008 WY 99, 190 P.3d 159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Aug. 19, 2008); Lane-walter v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 52, 250 P.3d 513, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Mar. 24, 2011); Picozzi v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2013 WY 86, 304 P.3d 977, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Jul 16, 2013); Kebschull v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2017 WY 94, 399 P.3d 1249, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2017).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Workers' compensation: Recovery for carpal tunnel syndrome, 14 ALR5th 1.

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law §§ 81.01D, 84.01D (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-14-406. Permanent total disability; benefits.

  1. Subject to W.S. 27-14-602 , upon certification by a physician licensed to practice surgery or medicine that an injury results in permanent total disability as defined under W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xvi), an injured employee shall receive for eighty (80) months a monthly payment as provided by W.S. 27-14-403(c) and dependent children shall receive an award as provided by W.S. 27-14-403(b). The eighty (80) month period shall be reduced by the number of months for which previous awards under W.S. 27-14-405 were made for the injury that resulted in the determination of permanent total disability, with the injured worker receiving the monthly amount calculated pursuant to W.S. 27-14-403(c) for the balance of the eighty (80) month period. The monthly payment amount computed under W.S. 27-14-403(c) and any amount awarded under W.S. 27-14-408 shall constitute the exclusive benefit for both the physical impairment and the economic loss resulting from an injury, including loss of earnings, extra expenses associated with the injury and vocational rehabilitation. An employee shall not receive benefits under this section if receiving benefits under W.S. 27-14-404 or 27-14-405 .
  2. This section specifies the length of time amounts computed pursuant to W.S. 27-14-403(c) are to be awarded and except for amounts awarded under W.S. 27-14-408 , shall not be construed to allow awards in excess of the amounts computed pursuant to W.S. 27-14-403(c).
  3. Any objection to a final determination pursuant to this section shall be referred to the medical commission for hearing by a medical hearing panel acting as hearing examiner pursuant to W.S. 27-14-616 .

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1993, ch. 229, § 2; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 2015 ch. 19, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in the first sentence, deleted “less any previous awards under W.S. 27-14-405 which were involved in the determination of permanent total disability” preceding “and dependent children” and made a related change, and inserted the present second sentence.

Total disability should not be declared permanent unless certain. — Carter Oil Co. v. Gibson, 34 Wyo. 53, 241 P. 219, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1925); Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, 603 P.2d 862, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 487 (Wyo. 1979).

Award for “permanent total disability” will be made only in clear case. Standard Oil Co. v. Sullivan, 33 Wyo. 223, 237 P. 253, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1925).

Except in cases of permanent disability described in statute, total disability should not be declared permanent unless it appears clearly that affliction will not yield to treatment and workman will never be able to work at any gainful occupation. In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1941).

Circumstances indicating necessity for award. —

Aside from injuries specifically described in statute, award for permanent total disability should not be made unless affliction will not yield to treatment and workman never will be able to work at any gainful occupation, and unless it so appears award should be for temporary total disability. Standard Oil Co. v. Sullivan, 33 Wyo. 223, 237 P. 253, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1925).

Ability to perform light duty jobs. —

Although a workers' compensation claimant sustained a serious lumbar injury that had not been medically resolved, for which he continued to receive treatment, and his injury prevented him from returning to the type of work he had done all of his life, the claimant was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the odd lot doctrine or Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xvi) because three doctors stated that the claimant was capable of gainful employment with restrictions and a vocational evaluator concluded claimant could find work in his geographic area in jobs such as cashier, rental clerk, telemarketer, desk clerk and customer representative. Moss v. State, 2010 WY 66, 232 P.3d 1, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2010).

Occasional employment allowed. —

One may be totally disabled for all practical purposes of competing for remunerative employment in any general field and yet obtain occasional employment under rare conditions at small remuneration. In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1941).

Psychological injury. —

Substantial evidence, including expert testimony from numerous doctors, supported the Medical Commission's determination that the psychiatric aid's disability was purely psychological and not caused by a compensable physical injury and thus, the Medical Commission did not err as a matter of law in determining it did not have statutory authority to award permanent total disability benefits. Hathaway v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 WY 12, 317 P.3d 590, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 2014).

Age of claimant as affecting working ability. —

The trial court's finding that the employee's age, even though he is now uninjured, prevents his engagement in employment for which he claims to have been qualified appears to be immaterial, providing the claimant is otherwise qualified to receive compensation. His working ability immediately prior to the accident may be taken into consideration by the court as a basis for computing the extent of permanent partial or total disability in awarding compensation. Long v. Big Horn Constr. Co., 75 Wyo. 276, 295 P.2d 750, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1956).

Burden of proof of injury on employee. —

The principle that compensation statutes in effect at time of compensable injury are applicable does not in any way relieve the employee of the burden to show the actual time of the compensable injury, its cause, and its relation to his employment at the time of injury. Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 401 P.2d 708, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1965).

Burden of proof as to availability of work for employee on employer. —

Where employee is found permanently and totally disabled to do hard or manual work, but might do light work of a special nature not generally available, burden is on employer to show special work is available to employee. In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1941).

Where it is found that the employee is permanently and totally disabled so far as hard or manual work is concerned, but that he might do light work of a special nature not generally available, the burden is on the employer to show that such special work is available to the employee. Before the burden shifts to the employer, the employee must prove that he or she is so disabled that he or she will not be capable of employment in any well known branch of the labor market. Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, 603 P.2d 862, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 487 (Wyo. 1979).

Second compensation injury rule. —

There was no basis for disbelieving claimant's testimony that his leg gave out on him, as it had many times in the past and there was likewise no factual circumstance contained in the record that would have disallowed application of the second compensable injury rule, but indeed was a classic case of the application of that rule; thus, as was the case with his claim for permanent total disability, there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusions to the contrary. Nagle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Nagle), 2008 WY 99, 190 P.3d 159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2008).

Court not bound by medical testimony. —

In making the factual determination of the extent of the claimant's injury, the trial court is not bound by medical testimony; nonmedical witnesses and other evidence may be relied on. Worker's Compensation Claim of Cannon v. FMC Corp., 718 P.2d 879, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 543 (Wyo. 1986).

Compensation statutes in effect at time of compensable injury are applicable. — Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 401 P.2d 708, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1965).

Where the injury was completely apparent and compensable when the workman filed his report of the accident in February 1965, the award for permanent partial disability should be based on the maximum amount allowable under former § 27-85 as amended by ch. 204, § 3, Laws 1961, rather than the amount allowable under former § 27-85 as amended by ch. 193, § 6, Laws 1965. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't v. Schultz, 444 P.2d 313, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1968).

But changes in compensation rates become integral part of employment status. —

Where claimant was injured in 1954 but returned to work and was subsequently disabled by increased arthritic changes in the original injury in 1963, it was held that changes in compensation rates had become an integral part of the employment status. Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 400 P.2d 529, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 401 P.2d 708, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1965).

Increase from temporary to permanent justified award. —

Where former award of 331/3 percent permanent partial disability was made on expectancy that employee's condition would improve but employee's condition appeared worse at time of trial, judgment increasing award to that for permanent total disability will not be disturbed. In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1941).

Loss of fingers. —

Evidence showing employee's loss of fingers on both hands was held to justify award for permanent total disability. Sakamoto v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 36 Wyo. 325, 255 P. 356, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1927).

“Odd-lot doctrine” provides that permanent total disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well known branch of the labor market. Schepanovich v. United States Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1983).

Test to be invoked as to application of “odd-lot doctrine” is whether the workman is so disabled that the services which he is reasonably equipped to perform by his experience and training are not marketable in a well known branch of the labor market in the community so as to provide a steady and continuous source of income rather than sporadic or intermittent employment. Schepanovich v. United States Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1983).

In order to come within “odd-lot” doctrine, it is burden of the employee to establish not only that he is no longer capable of working at the job in which he was employed at the time of his injury, but that the degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other facts, such as mental capacity, education, training, or age, must prima facie place him in that category. The burden of proof then shifts to the employer to establish that light work of a special nature which the employee could perform but which is not generally available was in fact available to him. City of Casper v. Bowdish, 713 P.2d 763, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 461 (Wyo. 1986); Anaya v. Holly Sugar Corp., 928 P.2d 473, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1996), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. Jan. 6, 1997).

Injured worker failed to bring himself within “odd-lot doctrine,” in light of doctor's testimony that his disability would not stop him from doing sedentary work, and testimony from employment security commission that there were many jobs generally available for which the worker would be educationally qualified. Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, 698 P.2d 1141, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1985).

The subjective determination of a worker's compensation claimant that he was too disabled to work or that a job search would have been futile on his part was not adequate to sustain his burden of producing evidence under the odd-lot doctrine. Anaya v. Holly Sugar Corp., 928 P.2d 473, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1996), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. Jan. 6, 1997).

A worker's compensation claimant was not entitled to an award of permanent total disability benefits under the odd-lot doctrine where he failed to go forward with objective evidence that he was too disabled to work or that a job search would have been futile. Anaya v. Holly Sugar Corp., 928 P.2d 473, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1996), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. Jan. 6, 1997).

“Odd-lot” claimant need not show total incapacity. —

An injured workman who comes within the “odd-lot doctrine” need not show that he is totally incapable of doing any work at all in order to be entitled to an award for permanent total disability. Schepanovich v. United States Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 360 (Wyo. 1983).

Previous impairment award. —

Although this section is ambiguous as to whether all previous impairment awards under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405 must be deducted from a permanent total disability award, a reduction was proper where the claimant did not contend that any aspect of his impairment was unrelated to his permanent total disability. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 57, 248 P.3d 1155, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 2011).

Stated in

Sims v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 872 P.2d 555, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1994).

Cited in

Cordova v. Holly Sugar Corp., 882 P.2d 880, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 1994); Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1995); Hernandez v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. 1 (In re Hernandez), 8 P.3d 318, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 2000); Phillips v. TIC-The Industrial Co. of Wyoming, Inc. (In re Phillips) 2005 WY 40, 109 P.3d 520, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (2005); Picozzi v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2013 WY 86, 304 P.3d 977, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Jul 16, 2013).

§ 27-14-407. Forfeiture of benefits due to unsanitary or injurious practice.

If an injured employee knowingly engages or persists in an unsanitary or injurious practice which tends to imperil or retard his recovery, or if he refuses to submit to medical or surgical treatment reasonably essential to promote his recovery, he forfeits all right to compensation under this act. Forfeiture shall be determined by the hearing examiner upon application by the division or employer.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

To “persist” in injurious practices retarding injured employee's recovery means to continue against opposition or remonstrance. In re Hibler, 37 Wyo. 332, 261 P. 648, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1927).

Proof required for injurious practices. —

More is required under this section than proof of a mere potential for harm or a possibility of harm; there must be proof that the worker's acts were not benign, but did, in some way, imperil or retard his recovery. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Bergeron, 948 P.2d 1367, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1997).

Employer had burden of proof that employee persisted in injurious practices retarding recovery. In re Hibler, 37 Wyo. 332, 261 P. 648, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1927).

And that recovery was thus retarded. —

Burden is on employer to prove that workman's recovery has been retarded by persistence in injurious practices, and rule is the same when the employer asserts that workman has refused to submit to treatment reasonably essential to promote his recovery. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Harvey, 52 Wyo. 349, 75 P.2d 1, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1938).

Injurious pattern of conduct found. —

While the employee's acts of trimming the surgical pins, treating the injury with honey, not taking all of the antibiotics, returning to work even though the surgeon had not released the employee to do so, failing to wear the splint at all times, and pulling the pins out of the finger were not in and of themselves injurious practices, they demonstrated a pattern of conduct which supported the conclusion that the employee “persisted” in a course of action which “tended” to imperil or impede recovery. Celotex Corp. v. Andren (In re Andren), 917 P.2d 178, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 1996).

Failure to report to alcohol detoxification program as ordered by court constituted “an unsanitary or injurious practice which [tended] to imperil or retard his recovery,” so the district court did not err in terminating the claimant's benefits. Hanberg v. World Wide Constr., 741 P.2d 107, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 487 (Wyo. 1987).

Allergic reactions to substances in work environment. —

A claimant was diagnosed as suffering from allergic reactions to substances in his work environment and was treated with salves and lotions through 1984, when a doctor suggested to him that he change work to alleviate some of his symptoms. In 1986, he again sought medical advice, and was ordered to quit working. The district court properly found that the first specific medical enjoinder that the claimant received ordering him to end his job occurred in 1986, and his claim was timely under § 27-14-502(a), was not barred under this section, and was not the result of the claimant's own negligence. In re Meredith, 743 P.2d 874, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 515 (Wyo. 1987).

Injurious-practice defense was inappropriate where there was no evidence to support a finding that returning to logging work imperiled or retarded the employee's recovery, and the employer did not present evidence that established the contrary. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Hollister, 794 P.2d 886, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1990).

Refusal to allow the use of blood products. —

Employee, who died from injuries suffered in a work-related car accident, did not forfeit all right to death benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-407 , when he refused to allow the use of blood products because, given his critical injuries and the extended period of time that it took to get to the hospital, the acceptance of the transfusion of blood products could not be deemed to be reasonably essential to the employee's survival. Williams v. State. Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Compensation Claim), 2009 WY 57, 205 P.3d 1024, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Apr. 21, 2009).

Cited in

Vandre v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workers' Comp. Div. (In re Vandre), 2015 WY 52, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Mar. 31, 2015).

Stated in

Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2001 WY 48, 23 P.3d 32, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 2001).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Workers' compensation: reasonableness of employee's refusal of medical services tendered by employer, 72 ALR4th 905.

What amounts to failure or refusal to submit to medical treatment sufficient to bar recovery of workers' compensation, 3 ALR5th 907.

Workers' Compensation: Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Providing that Worker Who Suffers Workplace Injury and Subsequently Tests Positive for Alcohol Impairment or Illegal Drug Use Is Not Eligible for Workers' Compensation Benefits. 22 A.L.R.6th 329.

§ 27-14-408. Vocational rehabilitation; application; eligibility; plan; limitation; modification, suspension or termination.

  1. An injured employee may apply to the division to participate in a vocational rehabilitation program if:
    1. An award has been made under W.S. 27-14-405(f) and (g) or it is reasonably expected, due to the nature and extent of the injury, that an award will be made under W.S. 27-14-405(f) and (g);
    2. The compensable injury will prevent the employee from returning to any occupation for which the employee has previous training or experience and in which the employee was gainfully employed at any time during the three (3) year period before the injury;
    3. The employee’s injury has not previously resulted in an award for vocational disability, whether denominated loss of earnings, loss of earning capacity or vocational award; and
    4. The employee elects in writing to accept vocational rehabilitation instead of any permanent partial disability award under W.S. 27-14-405(h) and (j) arising from the same physical injury.
  2. Upon receipt of an application, the division shall determine if the employee is eligible for participation in a rehabilitation program pursuant to this section.
  3. Upon final determination of an injured worker’s eligibility for rehabilitation, the division shall immediately send a copy of the application and determination to the local office of the division of vocational rehabilitation of the department of workforce services.
  4. The division of vocational rehabilitation shall upon receipt of the determination of eligibility, immediately provide the injured employee with a written explanation of the rehabilitation services available to injured employees and its procedures for developing and supervising an individualized rehabilitation plan for the employee.
  5. The division of vocational rehabilitation shall in cooperation with the injured employee, develop an individualized rehabilitation plan for the employee agreed to by both the division of vocational rehabilitation and employee, that:
    1. Is reasonably contemplated to restore the employee’s ability to return to former employment, a related occupation or other suitable employment which, to the extent reasonably possible, has an earnings level comparable to the employee’s pre-injury earnings;
    2. Shall not exceed five (5) years or a total cost of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) unless extended or increased for extenuating circumstances as defined by rule and regulation of the division;
    3. Is the least costly feasible plan consistent with the rehabilitation goal established pursuant to paragraph (e)(i) of this section; and
    4. Includes provisions for living expenses during the rehabilitation plan if the employee is not receiving payments for living expenses from any other government benefit program including worker’s compensation, and other sources of household income are insufficient to pay minimally necessary living expenses, provided the vocational rehabilitation program is pursued as rapidly as possible.
  6. The division may modify, suspend or terminate the participation of an injured worker in the rehabilitation program upon certification by the division of vocational rehabilitation that the injured worker has failed to cooperate or maintain satisfactory progress toward the mutually agreed upon rehabilitation plan goals.

History. Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 1; 1995, ch. 63, § 1; 2009, ch. 156, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (e)(ii), substituted “five (5) years” for “four (4) years.”

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (c).

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 4, provides:

“(a) The Wyoming legislature determines that:

“(i) Permanent impairment and disability benefits and participation in vocational rehabilitation programs under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act for covered injuries are intended to cover a large portion of the injured worker's economic loss; and

“(ii) the permanent impairment and disability benefit amount and if applicable, participation in any vocational rehabilitation program available under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act constitute the exclusive benefit amount for loss of earnings, extra expenses associated with the injury and vocational rehabilitation.”

Laws 1995, ch. 2, § 2, provides: “The legislature, by adopting this act, intends to clarify the intent of 1994 Wyoming Session Laws, Chapter 86, Section 5, but does not intend to substantively modify that law. This act intends to clarify that 1994 Wyoming Sessions Laws, Chapter 86, applies only to injuries covered under Wyoming worker's compensation which occur on or after July 1, 1994, and that those covered injuries occurring on or before June 30, 1994 are subject to the law in effect prior to July 1, 1994.”

Savings clauses. —

Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 5, as amended by Laws 1995, ch. 2, § 1, provides: “This act shall not apply to permanent partial and permanent total benefits awarded under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act prior to July 1, 1994.”

Cited in

Nagle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Nagle), 2008 WY 99, 190 P.3d 159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Aug. 19, 2008).

Article 5. Claim Procedure

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen's Compensation §§ 488 to 503.

Presumption or inference that accidental death of employee engaged in occupation of manufacturing or processing arose out of and in course of employment, 47 ALR5th 801.

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 153 et seq.

§ 27-14-501. Report by health care provider accepting cases; report of examination; recertification; bills; filing of claims.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after accepting the case of an injured employee and within thirty (30) days after each examination or treatment, a health care provider or a hospital shall file without charge a written medical report with the division. Upon request, the division shall provide a copy of the report to the employer or employee. The division shall notify the employer and the employee that they shall be provided a copy of the report upon request. The report shall state the nature of the injury, the diagnosis, prognosis and prescribed treatment. Any health care provider or hospital failing or refusing to file the report or transmit copies within the time prescribed by this subsection or presenting a claim for services not reasonably justified or which was not required as a result of the work related injury shall forfeit any remuneration or award under this act for services rendered or facilities furnished the employee. Fees or portions of fees for injury related services or products rendered shall not be billed to or collected from the injured employee. Any tests to be administered or other services proposed to be rendered by a health care provider which are clearly not germane to the injury shall be disclosed to the injured employee, if possible, and the employee shall be advised that the cost of the tests or services will be the responsibility of the employee if he consents to the tests or services. Any other necessary and reasonable test or report including initial and necessary follow-up testing for blood borne pathogens, which may be required by division policy or requested by the division, employer or employee may be paid in accordance with a fee schedule adopted by the division. The division shall by rule and regulation institute an appropriate policy for testing for blood borne pathogens after possible occupational exposure and for immediate prophylactic treatment if medically indicated, and shall inform hospitals and primary health care providers of this policy.
  2. Any health care provider attending an employee injured while engaged in any employment covered under this act and certifying temporary total disability under W.S. 27-14-404 shall examine the employee before certification and shall without charge file a written report with the division. Prior to each period of subsequent recertification of temporary total disability, the health care provider shall reexamine the employee and file without charge a written report with the division. In addition, the health care provider shall as soon as practical notify the division upon releasing an injured employee from temporary total disability. Upon request, the division, without delay, shall transmit copies to the employer or employee. The report shall specify reasons for temporary total disability or continued temporary total disability and is subject to the time limitations and penalties imposed under subsection (a) of this section. Any health care provider certifying or recertifying temporary total disability without an examination of the employee shall be reported to the state licensing board for the respective health care provider.
  3. Any bill for medical and hospital care which is not properly dated, itemized and certified by the claimant may be disallowed by the division.
  4. Within thirty (30) days after the first of the month succeeding the month in which services were rendered to the injured employee, itemized bills and claims for medical and hospital care shall be filed with the division. The division shall upon request provide copies to the employee or employer. Any bill or claim not filed by the claimant in accordance with this subsection may result in a denial of the bill or claim.
  5. An initial claim for temporary total disability benefits under W.S. 27-14-404 and any subsequent claim for temporary total disability following the initial period of certification shall be filed with the division and the division shall transmit a copy of the initial claim to the employer. Failure to file a claim for temporary total disability in accordance with W.S. 27-14-404 (d) shall result in denial of the claim.
  6. A claim for permanent impairment or disability benefits under W.S. 27-14-405 and 27-14-406 and a claim for death benefits under W.S. 27-14-403 shall be filed with the division.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 1996, ch. 82, § 1; 1998, ch. 117, § 1.

Cross references. —

As to employer's report of injury see § 27-14-506 .

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Hospital and medical care. —

The statute does not provide authority for the workers' compensation division to impose a ninety-day time requirement without qualification for an application to have a personal care item defined as hospital or medical care because it plainly applies to health care providers and not to an employee. Dietz & Assoc's. v. State (ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div.), 12 P.3d 702, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 211 (Wyo. 2000), overruled in part, McCallister v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2019 WY 47, 440 P.3d 1078, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2019).

Commission not authorized to determine compensability of proposed surgery. —

Medical commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether employee's proposed back surgery would be compensable where statute presumed that claims for expenses would be made after medical services were rendered, and commission was not authorized to determine compensability of procedure when claim had not been properly submitted and procedure had not been the subject of a final determination by the division of workers' safety and compensation. Daiss v. Division of Workers' Safety & Compensation, Dep't of Empl., 965 P.2d 692, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1998).

Substantiation required. —

Expenses claimed under the death benefits provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403 (e)(ii) must be documented with receipts or other substantial evidence, and where the spouse had not substantiated a claim for a certain sum, the denial of her claim for an additional benefit of $ 2,500 to cover other unitemized funeral expenses was affirmed. Loberg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Loberg), 2004 WY 48, 88 P.3d 1045, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 2004).

Doctor's form. —

Office of Administrative Hearing (OAH) properly denied claim for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, where “Return to Work/School” document did not include a certification that the employee was temporarily totally disabled under Wyoming law or set forth the reasons for the disability or expected period of disability as required by the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division Rule and Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-404(d) and 501(b); moreover, the doctor's form did not provide detailed information about the health care provider or the employee's diagnosis, treatment plan, or prognosis. Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 152, 243 P.3d 953, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2010).

Cited in

Porter v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 69, 396 P.3d 999, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2017).

Quoted in

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Girardot, 807 P.2d 926, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1991).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Workers' compensation: compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 ALR4th 110.

Social security: Right to disability benefits as affected by refusal to submit to, or cooperate in, medical or surgical treatment, 114 ALR Fed 141.

§ 27-14-502. Employee's injury report to employer and division; presumption raised by failure to file report; release of information.

  1. As soon as is practical but not later than seventy-two (72) hours after the general nature of the injury became apparent, an injured employee shall, in writing or by other means approved by the department, report the occurrence and general nature of the accident or injury to the employer. In addition, the injured employee shall within ten (10) days after the injury became apparent, file an injury report with the employer and the division in a manner and containing information prescribed by division rule and regulation. If the injured employee is physically unable to comply, a personal representative of the employee, his dependents or a personal representative of the dependents in case of death shall, following notification by the employer or department of reporting requirements, make and file the report for the injured employee.
  2. If an injured employee, any dependent or personal representative makes a written report of the injury to the employer or his representative, the employer shall acknowledge receipt of the report in writing either upon the report or a copy of the report.
  3. Failure of the injured employee, any dependent or personal representative to report the accident or injury to the employer and to file the injury report in accordance with subsection (a) of this section is a presumption that the claim shall be denied. The presumption may be rebutted if the employee establishes by clear and convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to the employer or division in investigating the injury and in monitoring medical treatment.
  4. The filing of an employee’s injury report under this section is a release of information for the duration of the benefit period and upon request and upon notice to the employee, any medical care provider, physician or hospital treating the employee for the injury shall release medical records pertaining to the injury to the division or the employer.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1996, ch. 82, § 1.

The term “injury” as used in the compensation statutes means compensable injury. — Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 275 (Wyo. 1972).

Claim and reports constitute pleadings. —

The claim and reports in compensation cases take the place of pleadings and should be liberally construed. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Harvey, 52 Wyo. 349, 75 P.2d 1, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1938).

Time for giving notice of latent injury. —

Where an employee in the course of his employment sustains an apparent trivial injury which does not result in present disability and which would not reasonably be expected to cause future disability, but which injury in fact after a period of latency does cause future disability, the time for giving notice of the occurrence of the injury to the employer runs from the time when it becomes apparent that such injury has resulted in, or is likely to cause, compensable disability. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 275 (Wyo. 1972).

The fact that the injury notice was given by the employee to the employer 31 hours after attendance at a hospital emergency room, and not within the 24-hour limit, did not preclude an award of benefits, where the employee had worked for two days and then, being unable to continue, had promptly given notice and filed the required reports at the same time he obtained medical attention from an orthopedic physician. W.E. Bill Sauer's Drilling Co. v. Gendron, 720 P.2d 909, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 583 (Wyo. 1986) (limit is now 72 hours).

In order for an employee to have complied with the 20-day (now 10-day) notice provision, she must have filed her notice with the clerk of court within 20 (now 10) days from the time she realized she had a compensable injury. There was substantial evidence to warrant the trial court's finding that the employee, a nurse, first realized she had a compensable injury when a final diagnosis revealed a herniated disk, suffered earlier following the lifting of a patient from his bed. In re Injury to Klevgard, 747 P.2d 509, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 562 (Wyo. 1987).

Where, based on consultation with a physician, claimant had knowledge that her respiratory problems were a condition which could result in, or was likely to cause, a compensable injury, her report of injury filed more than ten days after she gained such knowledge was untimely. Zielinske v. Johnson County Sch. Dist. No. 1, Zielinske v. Johnson County Sch. Dist. No. 1 (In re Zielinske), 959 P.2d 706, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1998).

A hearing examiner's finding that the claimant did not timely file an injury report with the employer or the workers' safety and compensation division was clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence where the claimant thought that his injury was caused by exposure to a chemical paint stripper, but he was given a nonwork-related diagnosis by several physicians, and the claimant nevertheless diligently pursued medical treatment, and he filed an injury report before he finally received a diagnosis that confirmed his suspicions. Rice v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2001 WY 21, 19 P.3d 508, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 2001).

Hearing examiner erred in determining the date of compensableinjury. —

Hearing examiner erred in determining the date of compensable injury and concluding that a workers' compensation claim was untimely filed; the weight of the evidence showed that the employee injured himself but did not know the nature of and the full extent of his back injury until after a second incident, when he notified his employer of injury, discontinued working, and sought medical treatment. Iverson v. Frost Constr. (In re Iverson), 2003 WY 162, 81 P.3d 190, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 2003).

Effect of untimely report on jurisdiction. —

Timely reporting of an injury is not a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Summers (In re Summers), 987 P.2d 153, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1999).

Presumption of prejudice. —

Claimant failed to overcome the presumption that her claim should be denied based on the prejudice caused to the employer by her delay in reporting that she had been diagnosed with asthma and could not work with cleaning chemicals. Zielinske v. Johnson County Sch. Dist. No. 1 (In re Zielinske), 959 P.2d 706, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1998).

Where both division and employer elected to participate in contested case, injured employee was required to show that neither employer nor division were prejudiced by late filing of injury report. Beitel v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Beitel), 991 P.2d 1242, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1999).

Where six months elapsed between employee's injury and her filing an injury report, employee failed to meet her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to employer or division in investigating injury and monitoring medical treatment, and employee therefore failed to rebut presumption that her claim should be denied. Nissen v. Cheyenne Frontier Days, Inc., 983 P.2d 722, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 1999).

The plain language of subsection (c) indicates that the statutory presumption does not arise unless an employee both failed to report within 72 hours and failed to file an injury report within ten days. Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, 19 P.3d 500, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2001).

A presumption of claim denial did not arise where the claimant sufficiently complied with the requirement to report to his employer within 72 hours, even if he failed to file an injury report within 10 days. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, 24 P.3d 1133, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2001).

No presumption of denial arose from the fact the claimant did not file a report within 10 days and there was no prejudice where: (1) the claimant did not seek continuing medical treatment until after she filed for worker's compensation benefits, (2) she saw a physician only one time prior to filing for benefits, (3) surgery was the only treatment recommended by her physician, and (4) there was no evidence to suggest surgery would have been avoided through conservative treatment during the time period between her recognition of her injury and her injury report. State ex rel. State Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, 26 P.3d 1029, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 2001).

Claimant failed to rebut statutory presumption. —

Claimant failed to notify his employer within seventy-two hours after the general nature of his injury became apparent, and he also failed to rebut the statutory presumption that his claim should be denied by showing a lack of prejudice to his employer or the division in investigating the injury and monitoring medical treatment. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2000), reh'g denied, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. Feb. 8, 2000).

Where claimant injured her neck and reported the injury to her employer, and two weeks latter injured her back but did not report it, and learned six months later at her annual checkup that she had degenerative disks in her neck and back and reported her condition the next day to her employer, the hearing examiner properly awarded her benefits for her neck injury but not for her back injury; the claimant failed to produce evidence to rebut the presumption arising under § 27-14-502(c) that the worker's compensation division and the employer were prejudiced by her failure to timely report her second injury. Logue v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 62, 44 P.3d 90, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 2002).

When injury becomes apparent is a question of fact. —

An employee's duty to report a work-related injury commences when general nature of his injury becomes apparent, which is a question of fact. Beitel v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Beitel), 991 P.2d 1242, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1999).

Plaintiff's injury was readily apparent at time it occurred.—

Employee was aware that he was injured while changing grader blades and related that information to his doctors, and thus his injury became apparent for statute of limitations purposes when it occurred, as opposed to when he was later told he had a herniated disc. Beitel v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Beitel), 991 P.2d 1242, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 1999).

Diagnosis of injury by doctor. —

The evidence indicated that the correct date of compensable injury was October 22, rather than October 15, where the claimant believed that he had not sustained an injury on October 15 and that his symptoms were caused by asthma, and he did not understand the nature and seriousness of his injury until he received a doctor's diagnosis on October 22. Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, 19 P.3d 500, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2001).

Testimony of driver's accident reconstruction expert was not violative of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-209 where the expert used law enforcement reports as a foundation for his expert opinion. The expert mentioned the reports as foundational documents but did not testify as to the specific contents of the documents; his opinion went exclusively to the reconstruction of the accident and he did not testify as to negligence. McGuire v. Solis, 2005 WY 129, 120 P.3d 1020, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 2005).

Denial of workers' compensation claim was reversed because under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a), as a matter of law, the general nature of the employee's injury became apparent when the employee learned on the date of diagnosis that she likely had a torn rotator cuff. Blommel v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Empl., 2005 WY 128, 120 P.3d 1013, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (2005).

Court may rely upon employee's testimony to establish time injury occurred and the employee's testimony as to when she reported the injury to her employer. In re Injury to Klevgard, 747 P.2d 509, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 562 (Wyo. 1987).

Time is question of law. —

The question of the time when the employee first knows that he has suffered an injury which results in, or is likely to cause, compensable disability is of course one for the trial judge. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 275 (Wyo. 1972).

Employee was required to report injury to employer and filereport with court clerk. —

Legislature used conjunctive term “and” in subsections (a) and (c) of this section, and therefore employee was required to both report her injury to her employer and to file report with clerk of court within statutory time periods; where employee did not file her report with clerk of court within ten days after her injury became apparent, her claim was correctly denied for failure to rebut the presumption of denial arising from her tardiness. Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 968 P.2d 436, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1998).

“Filing” of injury report not satisfied by telephoning. —

Telephonic communications between the parties and the clerk of the court do not satisfy the statutory requirement for “filing.” Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1983).

General finding of timely notice. —

General finding that timely notice of the injury was made by the employee to his employer is a finding of all essential facts necessary to support it. In re Brothers, 510 P.2d 19, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1973).

Failure to file in timely manner. —

Summary judgment was appropriate where the evidence showed the claimant knew he had suffered a compensable injury, at least by the date of the surgery and in fact when he decided, upon consultation with his physician, to have the surgery but failed to file a report of injury until five months later. Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1995).

Employee's report of injury was not timely where it was not made until after she had surgery for her condition, and she failed to establish lack of resulting prejudice to her employer in investigating accident or monitoring medical treatment. Hampton v. Lifecare Ctr. ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. (In re Workers' Compensation Claim of Hampton), 3 P.3d 837, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 2000).

Employer who first raised the issue of the timeliness of the worker's claim on appeal waived the issue. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Summers (In re Summers), 987 P.2d 153, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1999).

Failure to file in a timely manner and failure to rebut presumptionof prejudice. —

Denial of workers' compensation benefits was affirmed because the claimant's injury reports to her employer and to the workers' compensation division were not timely filed and she made no attempt to rebut the presumption of prejudice that arose. Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 7, 105 P.3d 101, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2005).

Filing where injury occurs over time. —

Even in the case of an injury which occurs over a period of time, the reporting requirements of § 27-14-502 are as important as the filing requirements of § 27-14-503 , perhaps more so. Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1995).

Burden of proof not met. —

Employee claiming workers' compensation benefits for an ankle injury failed to prove that the injury was work-related where employee did not mention the injury to his supervisor and did not appear to be limping, employee went to the emergency room the next day after participating in other activities after work and the next morning, and where employee failed to report the injury to his employer within 72 hours or to the division within 10 days pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a). Bush v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2008 WY 117, 193 P.3d 260, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2008).

Evidence sufficient to show employer prejudiced by late filing.—

Where employee filed report of injury after statutory deadline and the employer had an affirmative policy of monitoring the health care of its employees and assisting in whatever ways were possible to permit an adjustment to the working conditions, this information in the record provided substantial evidence before the hearing examiner of prejudice to the employer and to the division, through the employer, in monitoring the employee's medical treatment. Curnow v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 899 P.2d 875, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1995).

Employer not prejudiced by untimely injury report. —

Where claimant was referred for surgery, which was ultimately performed, because there was neither treatment in the interim nor any evidence that alternative treatment would have prevented surgery, the claimant's employer could not be prejudiced by the untimely injury report. Payne v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 993 P.2d 313, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1999).

Factual finding implicit in stated findings. —

Although the hearing examiner did not make an express finding that the general nature of the employee's injury became apparent to him when his doctor gave him the diagnosis of the herniated disk, that factual finding was so implicit in the hearing examiner's stated findings as to be tantamount to an express finding. Little Am. Ref. Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1993).

February 1996 version of section applied to claim. —

Employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits was governed by law in effect in February 1996, when her injury occurred, and therefore version of this section in effect prior to 1996 amendment applied to her claim. Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 968 P.2d 436, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1998).

The concept of a compensable injury should be the same for purposes of both statutes (former 27-12-502 and former 27-12-503). City of Casper v. Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1994) (decided under former §§ 27-12-502 and 27-12-503).

Allergic reactions to substances in work environment. —

A claimant was diagnosed as suffering from allergic reactions to substances in his work environment and was treated with salves and lotions through 1984, when a doctor suggested to him that he change work to alleviate some of his symptoms. In 1986, he again sought medical advice, and was ordered to quit working. The district court properly found that the first specific medical enjoinder that the claimant received ordering him to end his job occurred in 1986, and his claim was timely under subsection (a), was not barred under § 27-14-407 , and was not the result of the claimant's own negligence. In re Meredith, 743 P.2d 874, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 515 (Wyo. 1987).

Equitable estoppel. —

Where employer mistakenly told injured employee that she was not entitled to workers' compensation coverage, equitable estoppel applied to prevent workers' compensation division from relying on both one-year statute of limitations and ten-day accident reporting requirement. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1999).

Applied in

Borelson v. Holiday Inn, 911 P.2d 426, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 820 P.2d 553, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1991); Sheth v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 11 P.3d 375, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 2000); Robbins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2003 WY 29, 64 P.3d 729, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2003); Popick v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2005 WY 110, 118 P.3d 993, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (2005); Rogers v. Russell Constr. Co., 2016 WY 80, 376 P.3d 1172, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 2016).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Provision of workmen's compensation insurance policy with respect to notice of accident, claim, etc., 18 ALR2d 443.

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law §§ 126.01D, 126.04D (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-14-503. Statute of limitations.

  1. A payment for benefits involving an injury which is the result of a single brief occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time shall not be made unless in addition to the proper and timely filing of the injury reports, an application or claim for benefits is filed within one (1) year after the date the injury occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the injury by the employee. The injury report is not a claim for benefits.
  2. The right of compensation for an injury which occurs over a substantial period of time is barred unless a claim for benefits is filed within one (1) year after a diagnosis of injury is first communicated to the employee, or within three (3) years from the date of last injurious workplace exposure to the condition causing the injury, whichever occurs last, excluding injury caused by ionizing radiation to which the three (3) year limitation does not apply. If death results from ionizing radiation within one (1) year after a diagnosis of the medical condition is first communicated to the employee or if death occurs without the communication of a diagnosis to the employee, a claim shall be filed within one (1) year after the date of death.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 2.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 229, § 1; ch. 264, § 2; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 1996, ch. 82, §§ 1, 2.

Section governs injury resulting from single occurrence. —

A worker's compensation claim was not governed by § 27-14-603 (burden of proof where injuries occur over substantial period of time). The evidence was uncontradicted that the claimant was able to perform hard physical labor both before and after receiving the injury in question. The injury was the result of a single brief occurrence (muscle spasm) and did not occur over a substantial period of time. Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 820 P.2d 553, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1991).

Term “injury” from the date of occurrence of which the mandatory time limitation imposed upon the employee to file his claim for compensation commences to run means a compensable injury under the law. Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1936).

The term “injury” as it relates to the limitation period for the filing of claims means “compensable injury.” Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 401 P.2d 708, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1965).

The concept of a compensable injury should be the same for purposes of both statutes (former 27-12-502 and former 27-12-503). City of Casper v. Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1994) (decided under former §§ 27-12-502 and 27-12-503).

Injury becomes compensable when properly diagnosed. —

Employee struck in hip by falling pipe in July, 1934, who continued to work, and was told by company physician that he had arthritis but who in following January, after X-ray pictures, was told by another physician that a fragment of bone had been broken, and who filed his claim the following April 10th, was not barred by the statute, as injury was not a compensable injury until he had received correct diagnosis. Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1936).

When a correct diagnosis and prognosis of present or likely future disability is communicated to the claimant, the injury is discovered, it is compensable, and the statute of limitations begins to run. City of Casper v. Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1994) (decided under prior law).

Compensable injury was discoverable at time of accident, and therefore employee's claim for worker's compensation benefits filed almost two years after accident was correctly denied on statute of limitations grounds; employee fell and had pain within thirty minutes, was unable to return to work for a couple of days, and was told by chiropractor he had a misaligned disk, and a reasonable person would have concluded he had suffered a compensable injury at that time. Mitchell v. State Rec. Comm'n Snowmobile Trails, 968 P.2d 37, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1998).

Injury occurs when surgical correction occurs. —

Even though the attending physician concludes that a worker has suffered an injury which may require surgical correction at some future time, he cannot be expected to submit to that procedure until it is absolutely required. In that situation, the compensable injury occurs when he is operated upon to correct the condition. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Malkowski, 741 P.2d 604, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 499 (Wyo. 1987).

Injury reports. —

Inasmuch as an injury report is not a claim for benefits, the period of limitations contained in this section cannot be computed from the date of filing of an injury report. Popick v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 110, 118 P.3d 993, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2005).

Commission not authorized to determine compensability of proposedsurgery. —

Medical commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether employee's proposed back surgery would be compensable where statute presumed that claims for expenses would be made after medical services were rendered, and commission was not authorized to determine compensability of procedure when claim had not been properly submitted and procedure had not been the subject of a final determination by the division of workers' safety and compensation. Daiss v. Division of Workers' Safety & Compensation, Dep't of Empl., 965 P.2d 692, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1998).

Claimant met all of statutory time limits. —

See In re Meredith, 743 P.2d 874, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 515 (Wyo. 1987).

Applicability to injuries resulting in death. —

Limitation of time for application for compensation by injured employee is applicable to injuries resulting in death. In re Martini, 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1928).

Applicable to surviving parents. —

Limitation for filing claim by injured employee is applicable to claim by surviving parents. In re Martini, 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1928).

Limitation period begins with parentage decree entry. —

In the case of a child born out of wedlock to a worker's girl friend after the worker's death, the date of determination of parentage was the date the right to claim benefits accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run with the entry of a parentage decree. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

Lack of knowledge as to limitations for filing claim for compensation is no excuse for failure to file claim within prescribed time. In re Martini, 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1928).

Claim for additional retrospective benefits. —

The statute of limitations under § 27-14-605(a), not subsection (a) of this section, was the proper statute to be applied where the employee had already received a favorable determination, but wanted additional retrospective benefits. Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 209, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1998).

Failure to file in timely manner. —

Summary judgment was appropriate where the evidence showed the claimant knew he had suffered a compensable injury, at least by the date of the surgery and in fact when he decided, upon consultation with his physician, to have the surgery but failed to file a report of injury until five months later. Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1995).

Employer's failure to file timely report not fraud or misrepresentation.—

Where there was no evidence of fraud on the employer's part, or that employer provided incorrect information to injured worker concerning worker's compensation coverage, employer's failure to timely file an injury report, in and of itself, did not rise to the level of fraud or misrepresentation necessary to invoke equitable estoppel; employer and worker's compensation division were therefore not prevented from asserting statute of limitations as a defense. Mitchell v. State Rec. Comm'n Snowmobile Trails, 968 P.2d 37, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1998).

That employee's surviving parents were in Italy was no excuse for not filing claim for compensation in time. In re Martini, 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1928).

The claim and reports in compensation cases take the place of pleadings and should be liberally construed. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Harvey, 52 Wyo. 349, 75 P.2d 1, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1938).

When “cause of action” exists. —

A “cause of action” exists in favor of an employee at the time he receives an injury arising out of an industrial accident occurring during the course of his employment. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1978).

Filing where injury occurs over time. —

Even in the case of an injury which occurs over a period of time, the reporting requirements of § 27-14-502 are as important as the filing requirements of § 27-14-503 , perhaps more so. Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1995).

“Discovery” of ionizing radiation injury. —

An injury is discovered for purposes of subsection (b), when a claimant has knowledge or when a reasonable person, under the circumstances, should have knowledge that the decedent's injuries were related to his or her employment. This necessarily implies a duty of due diligence on the part of the claimant in pursuing a claim. Olheiser v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1994) (decided prior to the 1994 amendment).

Start date of limitations period. —

A benefits claim was properly denied for failure to file within the prescribed period of the statute of limitations of former § 27-12-503, which began to run as soon as claimant should reasonably have realized the serious and compensable nature of his injuries after receiving an extensive, detailed diagnosis and taking a leave from work for intolerable pain. His claim for benefits for the identical, although aggravated, injury filed four years after the diagnosis of the initial injury was denied as expired. Aanenson v. State, 842 P.2d 1077, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 182 (Wyo. 1992).

The statute of limitations does not begin running until the claimant has suffered a compensable injury. City of Casper v. Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1994) (decided under prior law).

When unjust to deny compensation for injury. —

It is unjust to an employee to deny him compensation because he had tried to keep his place on an employer's payroll by doing his regular work and then found that conditions produced at the time of an accident, and which medical science could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not forecast, have gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1978).

Sufficient evidence to support bar of claim. —

The evidence was found sufficient to support the district court's finding that the statute of limitations began to run over one year before the claim was filed. In re Robinson, 641 P.2d 195, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1982).

Claim time barred by this section. —

Where, in his own report, claimant attributed his shoulder injuries to the incident in April 1995, and there was no substantial evidence that the incident occurred later than that, claimant's report of injury on July 8, 1996, was time barred under subsection (a) as beyond the one year time period provided by law. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2000), reh'g denied, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. Feb. 8, 2000).

Employee's filing of three injury reports in 2003 was beyond the period of limitations found in this section because the medical records showed that the employee's self-referral to a doctor in 2002 was to obtain a second opinion concerning the diagnosis of asbestosis that the employee had already received, but even more significant was the fact that the employee filed three injury reports, which were not claims for benefits, and the period of limitations could not have been computed from the date of filing of an injury report; the statutory period passed no matter what date in 2002 was used to determine the commencement of the period, and thus the employee's petition for review should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the appeal had to be dismissed because the court had no better jurisdiction than did the trial court. Popick v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 110, 118 P.3d 993, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2005).

Plaintiff's back injury was readily apparent to her at timeit occurred. —

See In re Grindle, 722 P.2d 166, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 588 (Wyo. 1986).

Disposition of single-occurrence claim not res judicata. —

Subsections (a) and (b), and its predecessors, identify two distinct types of claims: (1) claims resulting from a single brief occurrence; and (2) injuries that occur over a substantial period of time. The former is not related to the latter and cannot serve as a disposition that makes an occupational disease claim res judicata. Mattis v. Husky RMP Properties, 790 P.2d 1279, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1990).

Employer estopped from invoking limitation period followingmisleading statements as to compensation coverage. —

An employer's misleading statements, that a part-time municipal employee was not covered by worker's compensation, although unintentional, were sufficient to constitute estoppel and prevent the employer and the state of Wyoming from invoking the statute of limitations as a defense. Bauer v. State, 695 P.2d 1048, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 457 (Wyo. 1985), limited, Mitchell v. State Rec. Comm'n Snowmobile Trails, 968 P.2d 37, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1998).

Equitable estoppel. —

Where employer mistakenly told injured employee that she was not entitled to workers' compensation coverage, equitable estoppel applied to prevent workers' compensation division from relying on both one-year statute of limitations and ten-day accident reporting requirement. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1999).

Where claimant filed pursuant to § 27-14-503(a) a claim for benefits within one year of the date of her injury there was no reasonable basis for the division's final determination of untimeliness as a reason for denial of benefits, and no reasonable basis for the claims analyst to have relied upon it either when he wrote the letter of final determination to the claimant, or when he explained the timing problem over the telephone to the claimant's representative. Appleby v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 84, 47 P.3d 613, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 2002).

Claim timely filed after discovery of work-related injury.—

Where claimant slipped and fell on ice while at work, he suffered from stuttering, migraines, and short term memory loss; having found no permanent injury, his doctor gave claimant an unconditional work release. Months later when claimant was having trouble doing tasks at work that used to be easy for him, claimant was sent home, never returned to work, and filed a worker's compensation claim shortly after he discovered he had a work-related injury; the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that claimant timely filed a claim for benefits pursuant to this section. Montoya v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Montoya), 2009 WY 32, 203 P.3d 1083, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2009).

Under prior law, claim not filed within 3 years of injuriousexposure barred. —

The law in effect at the time an employee became aware that he was suffering from asbestosis, in December of 1982, was a former version of § 27-12-503, predecessor to this section, which required a claim to be filed within one year after the employee was informed of his injury, or within three years of his last injurious exposure which caused the condition, “whichever occurred first.” Therefore, the employee's claim, filed in June, 1983, was barred, since it had to be brought within three years of the last injurious exposure in 1971, or by 1974. This was so, even though the claim was filed after May 27, 1983, the effective date of the 1983 amendment to that section, which changed the language in what is now subsection (b). Wyoming Ref. Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 460 (Wyo. 1985).

Negligence action. —

Even though plaintiff's injury was suffered in the workplace, the four-year limitations period of § 1-3-105 , not this section, applied to her culpable negligence action against coworkers. James v. Montoya, 963 P.2d 993, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1998).

Applied in

Olheiser v. State, ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 886 P.2d 269, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 1994); Pittman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 917 P.2d 614, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1996).

Cited in

Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, 19 P.3d 500, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming — Part II,” see VII Land & Water L. Rev. 617 (1972).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

When limitation period begins to run against claim, under workmen's compensation act or occupational disease acts, for contraction of disease, 11 ALR2d 277.

Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing actions to enforce workmen's compensation benefits, 15 ALR2d 519.

Statute of limitations applicable to action, by way of subrogation or the like, by employer or insurance carrier against third person for injury to employee, 41 ALR2d 1044.

When limitations period begins to run as to claim for disability benefits for contracting of disease under Workers' Compensation or Occupational Diseases Act, 86 ALR5th 295.

When time period commences as to claim under workers' compensation or occupational diseases act for death of worker due to contraction of disease, 100 ALR5th 567.

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law §§ 53.04, 126.05D (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-14-504. Amendment of employee's injury report.

An employee’s injury report may be amended at any time before an initial award is made in order that the employee may correctly set out the nature of his injury. Any amendment may be approved, disapproved or contested as if an original injury report.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1996, ch. 82, § 1.

§ 27-14-505. Tolling of statute of limitations while persons under disability.

If an injured employee is mentally incompetent or a minor, or where death results from the injury and any of his dependents are mentally incompetent or minors, at the time when any right or privilege accrues under this act, no limitation of time provided for in this act shall run so long as the mentally incompetent or minor has no guardian.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Test for mental incompetence. —

The mental incompetence provision was intended to toll the statute of limitations for those individuals whose medically diagnosed mental condition is so severe as to render them unable to protect their legal right to compensation by following the statutory procedures provided in the Collicott v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Collicott), 2001 WY 35, 20 P.3d 1077, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 2001).

Limitation period begins with parentage decree entry. —

In the case of a child born out of wedlock to a worker's girl friend after the worker's death, the date of determination of parentage was the date the right to claim benefits accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run with the entry of a parentage decree. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

§ 27-14-506. Employer's injury report; penalty for failure to report.

  1. When an injury is reported by any employee, the employer shall file an employer’s injury report with the division within ten (10) days after the date on which the employer is notified of the injury and he shall mail or deliver a copy of the report to the employee. The employer’s injury report shall be certified and shall contain any information provided by rules and regulations adopted by the director. The employer shall state on the injury report that either the injury is:
    1. Compensable and under the jurisdiction of this act; or
    2. Not compensable under this act and the reasons therefor.
  2. Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 2.
  3. Willful failure or gross negligence to report occurrences causing injury to any of his employees by an employer is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 1996, ch. 82, §§ 1, 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Employer's report.

In a workers' compensation case, the Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings had subject matter jurisdiction to hold a contested hearing because an employer was the appropriate party to the action; the term “person” was broadly defined and included individuals doing business under a trade name. An interested party properly objected to the final determination of compensability, and an argument that no valid employer submitted a valid injury report was rejected. Heikkila v. Signal Mt. Lodge, 2013 WY 23, 295 P.3d 844, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2013).

“Filing” of injury report not satisfied by telephoning. —

Telephonic communications between the parties and the clerk of the court do not satisfy the statutory requirement for “filing.” Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1983).

Employer's failure to file timely report not fraud or misrepresentation.—

Where there was no evidence of fraud on the employer's part, or that employer provided incorrect information to injured worker concerning worker's compensation coverage, employer's failure to timely file an injury report, in and of itself, did not rise to the level of fraud or misrepresentation necessary to invoke equitable estoppel; employer and worker's compensation division were therefore not prevented from asserting statute of limitations as a defense. Mitchell v. State Rec. Comm'n Snowmobile Trails, 968 P.2d 37, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1998).

Admissibility into evidence. —

Report filed by employer, concerning accident and injury suffered thereby, is ordinarily admissible in evidence. Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 43 Wyo. 108, 299 P. 284, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1931).

The claim and reports in compensation cases take the place of pleadings and should be liberally construed. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Harvey, 52 Wyo. 349, 75 P.2d 1, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1938).

§ 27-14-507. Employer required to post notice.

Each employer shall keep posted in a conspicuous place for employees a notice which shall be furnished by the division and which shall contain a brief summary of this act and procedures for filing claims. Each employer shall also keep a copy of this act and have it available for all employees.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Cited in

State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 27-14-508. Blank form supplied by director; instructions to employees, employers and health care providers; training programs for clerks of court.

  1. The director shall:
    1. Prepare, print and supply free of charge any blank forms necessary in administering this act to be used insofar as possible in all procedures under this act;
    2. Prepare and print instructions for making correct claims for the information and use of employees;
    3. Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 2.
    4. Prepare and print instructions for proper claim procedures for the information and use of health care providers and providers of medical and hospital care;
    5. Prepare and print instructions for proper claim procedures including approving or objecting to claims for the information and use of employers.
  2. Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 2.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1996, ch. 82, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

§ 27-14-509. Autopsy may be required; procedure.

Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for death for which an autopsy is necessary to accurately and scientifically ascertain and determine the cause of death, a hearing examiner may order an autopsy. The hearing examiner may designate a licensed physician who is a specialist in autopsies to perform or attend the autopsy and to certify his findings. The autopsy findings are a public record and shall be filed with the division. The hearing examiner may exercise the authority on his own motion or on an application made to him at any time by any party in interest upon the presentation of facts showing that a controversy may exist in regard to the cause of death or the existence of any compensable injury. All proceedings for compensation shall be suspended upon refusal of a claimant or his representative to permit an autopsy when ordered and no compensation shall be payable during the continuance of the refusal.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1996, ch. 82, § 1.

§ 27-14-510. Misrepresentations or false statements; failure of employer to establish account or furnish payroll report.

  1. Any person who knowingly makes, authorizes or permits any misrepresentation or false statement to be made for the purpose of him or another person receiving payment of any kind under this act is guilty of:
    1. A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, if the value of the payment is less than five hundred dollars ($500.00);
    2. A felony punishable by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or both, if the value of the payment is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more.
  2. Any employer who knowingly makes a false statement in a payroll report or reports resulting in the avoidance of or reduction in the employer’s premium obligation within a one (1) year period is guilty of:
    1. A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, if the avoided premium or reduction in premium is less than five hundred dollars ($500.00); or
    2. A felony punishable by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or both, if the avoided premium or reduction in premium is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more.
  3. Any employer who knowingly makes a false statement in an injury report with the intention of denying a worker benefits due under this act is guilty of:
    1. A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, if the value of the benefits is less than five hundred dollars ($500.00);
    2. A felony punishable by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or both, if the value of the benefits is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more.
  4. Any employer who knowingly fails to establish an account or knowingly fails to furnish a payroll report as required by this act is guilty of:
    1. A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, for a first conviction; or
    2. A felony punishable by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or both, for a second or subsequent conviction.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1993, ch. 176, § 1; 1996, ch. 82, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Self-incrimination privilege. —

Employee properly asserted the privilege against self-incrimination in workers' compensation proceedings, in response to discovery requests, because the employee gave a reasoned explanation for invoking the privilege, as the employee reasonably believed the employee's discovery responses could be used in a criminal prosecution under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-510(a). Debyah v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 WY 94, 353 P.3d 711, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2015).

Misrepresentation in obtaining employment. —

Workers' compensation benefits were properly awarded to an injured employee who was determined to be an alien not authorized to be in or work in the United States because the employer reasonably believed, based on documentation and information provided, that the employee was authorized to work in the United States, even though this was later found to be false. Moreover, the employee did not misrepresent the facts of his injury to receive benefits, and there was no reasonable nexus between the misrepresentations he made to gain employment and his application for benefits for the work-related injury he subsequently suffered. L & L Enters. v. Arellano (In re Arellano), 2015 WY 21, 344 P.3d 249, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 2015).

Cited in

Sims v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 872 P.2d 555, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1994).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Wyoming Criminal Code Revisited: Reflections after Fifteen Years,” see XXXIII Land and Water L. Rev. 523 (1998).

§ 27-14-511. Recovery of benefits paid by mistake or fraud.

The attorney general may bring a civil action to recover the value of any benefits or other monies paid under this act due to mistake, misrepresentation or fraud. The attorney general shall be entitled to recover the costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees in cases of misrepresentation or fraud. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a criminal prosecution where appropriate. Any civil action for recovery of overpayment resulting from a mistake by the division shall be commenced within one (1) year after the alleged overpayment and shall be limited to recovery of those mistaken payments made within twelve (12) months before the commencement of the action.

History. Laws 1991, ch. 131, § 1; 2009, ch. 156, § 1.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added the last sentence.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Eligibility for workers' compensation as affected by claimant's misrepresentation of health or physical condition at time of hiring, 12 ALR5th 658.

Article 6. Contested Cases

Eight-month wait for court order not illegal. —

Former § 27-12-604(d) was not violated when a district court waited over eight months to issue its order, absent a showing of resultant prejudice. In re Smith, 762 P.2d 1193, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1988).

Cited in

Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen's Compensation §§ 602 to 633.

100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 414 et seq.

§ 27-14-601. Payment or denial of claim by division; notice; objections; review and settlement of claims; filing fee; preauthorization of hospitalization or surgery.

  1. Upon receipt, the division shall review the initial injury reports to determine if the injury or death resulting from injury is compensable and within the jurisdiction of this act. No subsequent claim for compensation under this act shall be approved if the division determines the injury or death is not compensable and under the jurisdiction of this act or if the employer states on his injury report that the injury is not compensable, until a determination is rendered by the division. The division shall provide notice of its determination to the employee, employer and the claimant.
  2. Following review of each bill and claim for medical and hospital care pursuant to W.S. 27-14-401(b), the division may approve or deny payment of all or portions of the entire amount claimed and shall:
    1. Notify the employee and the health care provider in writing of any portion of a claim for which the employee may be liable for payment;
    2. Provide the health care provider with a detailed monthly statement of respective claims and bills for services rendered and the amount approved for payment;
    3. Provide the employer with a detailed monthly statement of all medical and hospital claims affecting his experience rating.
  3. Repealed by Laws 1994, ch. 86, § 3.
  4. Upon receipt of a claim for impairment, disability or death benefits filed under W.S. 27-14-403 (g) or 27-14-501(e) and (f) and if the initial injury or death resulting from injury is determined compensable and within the jurisdiction of this act, the division shall determine if the injured employee or his dependents are eligible for benefits and shall approve or deny the claim in accordance with this act. If a claim is approved, the division shall determine the amount of the award for compensation in accordance with W.S. 27-14-403 through 27-14-406 and 27-14-408 , if applicable. The division shall provide notice of any determination under this subsection to the employer, employee and the claimant.
  5. In accordance with this act, the division shall by rule and regulation establish necessary procedures for the review and settlement of the compensability of an injury or death resulting from injury and of claims filed under this act through interviews with employees, employers and health care personnel or through review of written reports. Nothing in this act shall prohibit the employer or division from reaching a settlement of up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) under this subsection in any one (1) case without an admission of compensability or that the injury was work related.
  6. A health care provider receiving payment erroneously under this act pursuant to a determination by the division following review and settlement under subsection (e) of this section or a decision by a hearing examiner is liable for repayment to the worker’s compensation account. Except in contested cases, the division may deduct the amount liable from future payments under this act limited to deduction of those mistaken payments made for services provided within twelve (12) months before the deduction. If necessary, the division may recover repayment by civil action as provided in W.S. 27-14-511 .
  7. No claim for benefits under this act shall be denied based solely on the failure of the employer to have complied with the requirements of this act.
  8. If any claim under W.S. 27-14-404 through 27-14-406 which has been approved and for which an employee is receiving benefits is objected to by an employer, the employee shall be notified by the division within one (1) working day of the objection.
  9. Notice to any employee or his dependents under this section of a final determination by the division denying the compensability of an initial injury, a claim for medical or hospital care for which the employee or his dependents may be liable for payment or denying any impairment, disability or death benefit, shall include reasons for denial and a statement of the employee’s or his dependents’ rights to a hearing before a hearing examiner as provided by this act and to legal representation.
  10. Determinations by the division pursuant to this section and W.S. 27-14-605 shall be in accordance with the following:
    1. The initial review of entitlement to benefits pursuant to subsections (a) and (e) of this section shall be made by the division within fifteen (15) days after the date the injury report or claim is filed. Following initial review, the division shall issue a final determination or if a final determination cannot be made based upon available information at that time, the division may issue a request for additional information as necessary;
    2. Following issuance of a request for additional information under paragraph (k)(i) of this section, the division shall investigate the matter and issue its final determination within forty-five (45) days after issuing the request;
    3. Notice of a final determination issued by the division under this subsection shall include a statement of reasons and notice of the right to a hearing;
    4. Any interested party may request a hearing before a hearing examiner on the final determination of the division by filing a written request for hearing with the division within fifteen (15) days after the date the notice of the final determination was mailed by the division. If the division has not rendered a final determination within sixty (60) days following the date the claim was filed, any interested party may request a hearing before a hearing examiner in the manner prescribed by this paragraph. The date a written request for hearing is filed shall be determined pursuant to W.S. 16-4-301(a);
    5. Upon receipt of a request for hearing, the division shall immediately provide notice of the request to the appropriate hearing authority as determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14-616 ;
    6. If timely written request for hearing is not filed, the final determination by the division pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to further administrative or judicial review, provided however that, in its own discretion, the division may, whenever benefits have been denied to a worker, make a redetermination within one (1) year after the date of an original determination regardless of whether or not a party has filed a timely appeal pursuant to paragraph (iv) of this subsection.
  11. Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 2.
  12. The division shall maintain a complete and current file for every worker’s compensation case filed with the division in accordance with this act.
  13. The division pursuant to its rules and regulations may issue a determination of preauthorization for an injured worker’s nonemergency hospitalization, surgery or other specific medical care, subject to the following:
    1. The division’s determination that the worker suffered a compensable injury is final and not currently subject to contested case or judicial review;
    2. A claim for preauthorization is filed by a health care provider on behalf of the injured worker;
    3. The division’s determination pursuant to this subsection is issued in accordance with the procedures provided in subsection (k) of this section;
    4. Following a final determination to preauthorize, the necessity of the hospitalization, surgery or specific medical care shall not be subject to further review and providers’ bills shall be reviewed only for relatedness to the preauthorized care and reasonableness in accord with the division’s fee schedules.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1994, ch. 86, §§ 2, 3; 1995, ch. 172, § 1; 1996, ch. 82, §§ 1, 2; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 10, § 1; 2005, ch. 185, § 2; 2009, ch. 156, § 1; 2016 ch. 36, § 1, effective July 1, 2016.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added (o).

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (f), in the second sentence, added “Except in contested cases” at the beginning and added “limited to deduction of those mistaken payments made for services provided within twelve (12) months before the deduction” at the end, and in the third sentence, added “as provided in W.S. 27-14-511 ” at the end.

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, rewrote the former last sentence, which read: “If the written request for hearing is sent to the division by certified or registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, proof of such mailing within the time provided by this subsection with a receipt signed by an agent of the state of Wyoming shall be presumed to be timely filing of the request with the division” in (k)(iv).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (i) or (l) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

ARTICLE: Damned if You do, Damned if You Don't: A Contextual Analysis of Co-Employee Liability and Wyoming Workers' Compensation Subrogation, 16 Wyo. L. Rev. 415 (2016).

Preauthorization denied. —

There was substantial evidence presented through a doctor to support the hearing examiner's conclusion that the proposed treatment of implantation of a spinal cord stimulator was causally related to the worker's workplace injury, however, there was also substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the stimulator was not medically necessary; while physicians generally agreed that implantation of a stimulator was reasonable treatment, it was not reasonable treatment for the employee under these circumstances, as no physician testified as to the resolution of the employee's primary complaints, and the denial of preauthorization was affirmed. Hildebrant v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 WY 41, 345 P.3d 875, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2015).

Employer's late objection. —

Representation by a workers' compensation division employee to an employer that the employer could file a late objection to an award, which representation was made after the deadline for objecting had passed, did not estop the Office of Administrative Hearings from granting judgment to the employee under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(k)(vi) because the objection was untimely. Schwab v. JTL Group, Inc., 2013 WY 138, 312 P.3d 790, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2013).

Collateral estoppel. —

First Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) order was not a final appealable order and therefore collateral estoppel was not applicable because it was not a prior adjudication of workers’ compensation benefits, even though it vacated the hearing and directed the Department of Workforce Services, Workers’ Compensation Division to award the claimant workers’ compensation benefits, as the OAH had not heard evidence or argument from the parties and it returned the case to the Division prior to any substantive action. Lower v. Peabody Powder River Servs., LLC ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2020 WY 33, 459 P.3d 443, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 3 3 (Wyo. 2020); 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (March 4, 2020).

Order remanding case for hearing not appealable. —

District court's order remanding a worker's compensation case to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) was not a final, appealable order under Wyo. R. App. P. 1.05(a); however, the appellate court could and did convert the notice of appeal to a writ of review pursuant to Wyo. R. App. P. 13. Schwab v. JTL Group, Inc., 2013 WY 138, 312 P.3d 790, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2013).

Applicability. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601 did not require the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division to inform the employee that she filed an incorrect form or did not fill it out correctly; it simply required the Division to make a determination as to whether the employee was eligible for benefits and provide notice of that determination to the interested parties. Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 152, 243 P.3d 953, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2010).

Processing of claims is a procedural right that was properly conducted under the Internal Hearing Unit even though the Internal Hearing Unit was created after plaintiff's injury. Internal Hearing Unit. Sheneman v. Division of Workers' Safety & Comp. Internal Hearing Unit, 956 P.2d 344, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1998).

Authority to analyze each charge for relation to workplace injury. —

Division was not estopped from denying benefits based on its issuance of decision stating that claimant's injury was compensable, since that decision was distinct from division's authority to analyze each charge submitted by claimant to determine whether such charge was causally related to workplace injury. Armstrong v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 140, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1999).

Determining causation when death occurs as a result of second injury. —

Supreme court of Wyoming expressly rejects the “quasi-course of employment” theory of recovery for death benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(a); in order for a second injury to be compensable, original compensable injury must itself be the direct cause of the subsequent injury. Fisher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safey & Compensation Division (In re Fisher), 2008 WY 89, 189 P.3d 866, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2008).

District judges may employ assistants in making investigations who are entitled to compensation and expenses. Sheridan Coal Co. v. Harnesberger, 43 Wyo. 226, 3 P.2d 80, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1931).

Clerk has authority to deny claim for benefits. — Harris v. State, 736 P.2d 309, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 434 (Wyo. 1987) (decided prior to 1989 amendment).

Final determination. —

Because “final determination” refers to the written letter of the Department of Employment Worker's Safety and Compensation Division (division) responding to a claim, its use in § 27-14-601(k)(vi) does not preclude review of the division's decision that a request for a contested case hearing is timely; should the review affirm the untimeliness decision, the “final determination” is not subject to further review. Appleby v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 84, 47 P.3d 613, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 2002).

Employer's failure to file objection. —

Employer's letter to division on day following employee's filing of claim could not act as a “continuing objection” to employee's claim, because it preceded issuance of division's final determination and did not request a hearing; final determination was therefore not subject to further administrative or judicial review, due to employer's failure to exercise its right to hearing within time allowed under subdivision (k) of this section. Pacificorp v. Todd, 1 P.3d 1216, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2000).

Employee's burden of proof. —

Despite preauthorization under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(o) by the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division for a procedure to remove an employee's left testicle, the burden remained with the employee to prove that he was entitled to reimbursement for his medical expenses; the employee failed to meet that burden. Beall v. Sky Blue Enters. (In re Beall), 2012 WY 38, 271 P.3d 1022, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2012).

Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., inapplicable where employee fails to file objection. —

A 1994 amendment to this section specifically precluding “further administrative or judicial review” absent a timely written request for hearing renders Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b) inapplicable in cases where the employee fails to file a timely written objection. Bila v. Accurate Telecom, 964 P.2d 1270, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1998).

Reasons for objecting not required. —

A claimant is not required under § 27-14-601(k)(iv) to state reasons for objecting in order to secure a contested case hearing; the Department of Employment Worker's Safety and Compensation Division lacks authority to require a claimant to provide a reason for objecting to the final determination in a written request for hearing. Appleby v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 84, 47 P.3d 613, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 89 (Wyo. 2002).

Who are entitled to reasonable compensation. —

Assistants employed by the court are only entitled to a reasonable compensation for the services performed. Sheridan Coal Co. v. Harnesberger, 43 Wyo. 226, 3 P.2d 80, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1931).

Division erred by denying claim for death benefits. —

Where work-related injuries rendered decedent a paraplegic who died 12 years later from smoke inhalation after a fire at his home because his paraplegia rendered him unable to cough with sufficient force to expel mucus from his lungs, the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division erred by finding that decedent did not die as a result of a work-related injury; the supreme court of Wyoming held that his surviving spouse was entitled to receive death benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(a). Fisher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safey & Compensation Division (In re Fisher), 2008 WY 89, 189 P.3d 866, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2008).

Limitation on appointment of investigator. —

The appointment of an official investigator to whom every claim would automatically be referred and who would be paid fixed fees is not authorized. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dep't v. Christiansen, 491 P.2d 1251, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 273 (Wyo. 1971).

Claimant's request for hearing was untimely. —

Where the division's final determination provided claimant the required notice of a right to a hearing before a hearing examiner and correctly calculated the deadline for receipt of his response by the division in order to secure this right, and the division received claimant's written response two days beyond the deadline, the hearing examiner's determination that claimant's request for hearing was timely filed was unsupported by substantial evidence. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2000), reh'g denied, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. Feb. 8, 2000).

Collateral estoppel. —

An uncontested final determination by the division denying a worker's compensation claim will not be given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent proceedings for outstanding claims, and claimant was not precluded from establishing, for purposes of her outstanding claims, that her hip and knee ailments were directly related to her earlier ankle injury and its treatment. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Jackson, 994 P.2d 320, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1999).

Claimant was not collaterally estopped from challenging the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division's final determination because the claimant's failure to object to the Division's earlier final determination did not preclude the claimant's objection to the Division's later final determination denying benefits to cover MRI costs. Whether the claimant's MRI was compensable as diagnostic testing depended on whether the evidence showed an objective indication of a physiologic connection between the claimant's injury and the diagnostic measure. Porter v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 69, 396 P.3d 999, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2017), reh'g denied, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. July 11, 2017).

Compensation for unauthorized medical treatment denied.—

Worker’s compensation claimant was not entitled to benefits when the claimant underwent a surgical procedure to treat a work-related back injury that had not been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and was not an off-label use of medical services. Furthermore, the claimant failed to provide sufficient documentation of the procedure’s safety and effectiveness, thus rendering it alternative medicine for which benefits were denied. Harborth v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2018 WY 99, 424 P.3d 1261, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 2018).

Applicability.—

This section allowing providers to bill injured workers does not apply to air ambulances. EagleMed, LLC v. Wyoming, 227 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185156 (D. Wyo. 2016), dismissed, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191687 (D. Wyo. Aug. 16, 2016), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 868 F.3d 893, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15962 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2017), dismissed in part, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241964 (D. Wyo. Apr. 12, 2018).

Party filing objection.

In a workers' compensation case, the Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings had subject matter jurisdiction to hold a contested hearing because an employer was the appropriate party to the action; the term “person” was broadly defined and included individuals doing business under a trade name. An interested party properly objected to the final determination of compensability, and an argument that no valid employer submitted a valid injury report was rejected. Heikkila v. Signal Mt. Lodge, 2013 WY 23, 295 P.3d 844, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2013).

Applied in

Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998); Osenbaugh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 10 P.3d 544, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 2000).

Cited in

Forni v. Pathfinder Mines, 834 P.2d 688, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1992); State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1994); Manning v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 938 P.2d 870, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 1997); Collicott v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2001 WY 35, 20 P.3d 1077, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 2001).

§ 27-14-602. Contested cases generally.

  1. A hearing examiner designated by the office of administrative hearings created by W.S. 9-2-2201 shall conduct contested cases under this act in accordance with this section.
  2. Upon receipt of a request for hearing from the division as provided in W.S. 27-14-601(k)(v), the case shall be determined by a hearing examiner in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the injury as a small claims hearing or as a contested case hearing subject to the following:
    1. A request for hearing shall be conducted as a small claims hearing if the amount at issue is less than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), is not an issue of the compensability of the injury pursuant to W.S. 27-14-601(a) and the division requests the hearing be held as a small claims hearing. The division shall provide notice that it seeks a small claims hearing under this paragraph in the notice of request for hearing filed pursuant to W.S. 27-14-601(k)(v). If the division provides such notice, the hearing shall be a small claims hearing unless a party to the hearing objects within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice of request, in which case the hearing officer shall review the file and determine if a small claims hearing is appropriate or if a contested case hearing is necessary or appropriate. Each party to the hearing may within thirty (30) days from the date of notice of request, submit to the hearing examiner any written evidence and argument on the issue. The hearing officer may require either party to provide such documents, filings and evidence as the hearing officer deems relevant to the issue. Copies of the material submitted to the hearing examiner shall be mailed or delivered to all opposing parties. In addition, each party may submit rebuttal evidence and argument to the hearing examiner within forty-five (45) days following the date of notice of request for hearing. Upon request of any party to the hearing and at the discretion of the hearing officer, any proceeding under this paragraph may be conducted in person or by telephone. The hearing examiner shall review the case and written submissions and render a written decision not more than seventy-five (75) days following referral of the request for hearing. No attorney fees or other costs shall be allowed by the hearing examiner on behalf of or for any party to a hearing under this paragraph. In addition, the attorney general’s office shall not represent or directly assist the division in the preparation for a hearing under this paragraph;
    2. All other requests for hearing not specified under paragraph (b)(i) of this section shall be conducted as a contested case in accordance with procedures of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure as applicable under rules of the office of administrative hearings. The hearing examiner designated by the office of administrative hearings shall render a decision in a contested case within thirty (30) days after the close of the record. If the contested case is heard by the hearing panel created pursuant to W.S. 27-14-616(b)(iv), the panel shall render a decision within forty-five (45) days after the close of the record;
    3. Appeals may be taken from the decision rendered in any small claims hearing or contested case hearing by any affected party to the district court as provided by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act;
    4. Hearings under this section shall be held at a location mutually convenient to the parties, as determined by the hearing officer. If the injury occurs at a location outside Wyoming, the hearing shall be held in the county in which the employer’s principal place of business is located, unless the hearing officer determines a different location is more convenient to the parties;
    5. Any hearing conducted pursuant to this section involving multiple sites may be conducted through audio or video conferencing at the discretion of the hearing officer or hearing panel.
  3. All written reports, claims and other documents filed with the division shall be considered as pleadings in the case. The attorney general’s office shall represent the division in all contested cases. The hearing examiner has exclusive jurisdiction to make the final administrative determination of the validity and amount of compensation payable under this act. Except as otherwise specified in this subsection, all court costs shall be paid from the worker’s compensation account if the judgment is in favor of the employer or the division. If judgment is against the employer and the employer contested the claim without being joined in the contest by the division, the court costs shall be paid by the employer. When the employer or division prevails, the court costs shall not affect the employer’s experience rating. If judgment is against a health care provider, the court costs shall be paid by the health care provider.
  4. Upon request, the hearing examiner may appoint an attorney to represent the employee or claimants and may allow the appointed attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceeding. An appointed attorney shall be paid according to the order of the hearing examiner either from the worker’s compensation account, from amounts awarded to the employee or claimants or from the employer. In any contested case where the issue is the compensability of an injury, a prevailing employer’s attorney fees shall also be paid according to the order of the hearing examiner from the worker’s compensation account, not to affect the employer’s experience rating. An award of attorney’s fees shall be for a reasonable number of hours and shall not exceed the benefits at issue in the contested case hearing. In all other cases if the employer or division prevails, the attorney’s fees allowed an employee’s attorney shall not affect the employer’s experience rating. Attorney fees allowed shall be at an hourly rate established by the director of the office of administrative hearings and any application for attorney’s fees shall be supported by a verified itemization of all services provided. No fee shall be awarded in any case in which the hearing examiner determines the claim or objection to be frivolous and without legal or factual justification. If the division or a hearing examiner determines that an injured worker’s failure to meet any procedural deadline in this act is through the fault of the worker’s attorney, the division shall reconsider its determination or a hearing examiner shall order the contested case returned to the division for redetermination of the contested issues as provided in W.S. 27-14-601(k).
  5. Except as otherwise provided within this subsection, all documents filed with the division under subsection (c) of this section may be maintained by the division on computer and the hearing examiner or court may admit into evidence any documents resident in the computer imaging file. If a genuine issue as to the authenticity of the document is raised by a party, by a hearing examiner or by the court, the hearing examiner or court may, before admitting the document into evidence, require the division to certify that the record is a true and correct copy or transcript of records on file in the division.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1990, ch. 88, § 1; 1992, ch. 30, § 2; 1993, ch. 32, § 1; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 1995, ch. 193, § 1; 1996, ch. 82, § 1; 1997, ch. 177, § 1; 1998, ch. 117, § 1; 2009, ch. 156, § 1.

Cross references. —

For Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, see the Wyoming Court Rules Annotated.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (d), added the last sentence.

Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. —

See § 16-3-101(a), (b)(xi).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Jurisdiction. —

Employee’s workers’ compensation request for judicial review was dismissed because, (1) statutorily, only district courts in the counties where the administrative action was taken or the employee resided had jurisdiction, (2) the failure of the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division (Division) to appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss did not waive jurisdiction, and (3) the statute did not merely specify venue. McCallister v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2019 WY 47, 440 P.3d 1078, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 4 7 (Wyo. 2019); Pier v. State, 2019 WY 3, 432 P.3d 890, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2019).

Division of workers' safety and compensation had authority to form internal hearing unit, and division was authorized to promulgate rules and regulations relating to resolution of contested matters not required to be heard by medical commission or office of administrative hearings, including agency review of claimed late filings. Van Gundy v. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., Dep't of Empl., 964 P.2d 1268, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1998).

Claim and reports in compensation cases take the place of pleadings. Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 1970).

The procedural requirements of § 27-14-404(d) do not apply during the pendency of a contested case, and the hearing examiner may properly award retroactive temporary total disability benefits if the claimant prevails on the merits. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1997).

Exhaustion of administrative remedies. —

Only after plaintiff had pursued the contested case hearing would he have exhausted his administrative remedies and be entitled to judicial review in the state district court. Routh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1998), reh'g denied, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. Feb. 17, 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 814, 119 S. Ct. 49, 142 L. Ed. 2d 38, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4815 (U.S. 1998).

And they should be liberally construed. Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 1970).

Summary judgment may be utilized. —

In light of the 1990 amendment of the statute and the adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure by the Rules for Contested Case Practice, a summary judgment can be utilized in a case before the Office of Administrative Hearings and should be granted when appropriate. Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1995).

Substantive law in effect at time of employee's injury governs employee's receipt of worker's compensation benefits. Ottema v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 968 P.2d 41, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1998).

Law in effect at time of injury— exception. —

Where subsequent expository legislation clearly announced intent that medical commission hear all medically contested workers' compensation cases regardless of date of injury, this legislation controlled over prior case law and over prior, general legislation contained in subdivision (b) of this section; medical commission therefore had jurisdiction to hear medically contested case involving injury which occurred before commission was established. Pohl v. Bailey Co., 980 P.2d 816, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1999).

Employer is entitled to dispute any award or claim on the basis that it is unreasonable or improper and certainly can raise the question as to whether the award or claim is causally related to the industrial accident which occurred or whether it may be attributable to some other event. Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1983).

The language of this section does not include reports of physicians, but the important thing about the provision is that the claim of the workman and the statement and report of the employer make up the issues. Hearing is had on them in the sense in which trial is had on pleadings in other cases. Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 1970).

No prejudice where evidence in unadmitted reports same as informationreceived into evidence. —

In a hearing on an application for additional benefits or modification, the evidence and testimony received were identical to that contained in reports which were in the court file but were not offered or received into evidence, and which were improperly referred to by the court. Thus, the evidence contained in the reports was otherwise properly before the court and no prejudice resulted. In re Jones, 702 P.2d 1299, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 511 (Wyo. 1985).

Hearing after termination of benefits constitutional. —

Notwithstanding the question of whether or not worker's interest in temporary total disability benefits is a property right, this section clearly states that a hearing is available. Procedural due process of law is provided if, upon a hearing after termination of temporary total benefits, retroactive relief may be awarded the worker. Higgins v. State, 739 P.2d 129, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 988, 108 S. Ct. 508, 98 L. Ed. 2d 507, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 5149 (U.S. 1987).

Claimant's case was properly referred to and adjudicated by hearing officer (now examiner) where the claim was filed after July 1, 1987, even though the office of independent hearing officers (examiners) was not created until after the claimant's injury had occurred. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Rivera, 796 P.2d 447, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 1990).

Hearing examiner acquired jurisdiction of claim. —

The hearing examiner acquired jurisdiction for purposes of initiating the contested case proceedings under his exclusive jurisdiction when the clerk of the district court transmitted the official case file to him even though the Worker's Compensation Division had not made a final determination on the employee's claim. Little Am. Ref. Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1993).

Error where clerk departs from statutory procedure. —

See Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1983).

Worker not entitled to reopen case following written settlement stipulation. —

A settlement stipulation, acquiesced to by the district court, although no order was entered expressly approving the stipulation, and the accompanying orders of award were judicial determinations to be accorded finality. The worker was not entitled to reopen the case, as the written stipulation did not violate constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting contractual devices to relieve an employer from a liability created by the worker's compensation laws. Further, the worker was not entitled to a hearing on his petition to reopen the case, as there was no factual dispute, the petition being subject to dismissal by operation of a legal bar. Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 509 (Wyo. 1986).

District court has no authority to afford affirmative relief in connection with a review of workers' compensation proceedings. Its disposition is limited to the review of authority articulated in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 3 of title 16). State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Hollister, 794 P.2d 886, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1990).

Authority to award attorney's fees. —

Administrative agencies did not have authority to disregard rules establishing how attorneys representing workers' compensation claimants would be compensated, and thus neither agencies nor court could grant attorney's request for a fee greater than that set by rules. Goedert ex rel. Wolfe v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 1225, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 1999).

Award of attorneys' fees requires appointment of attorney. —

Hearing examiner did not have power or discretion to award attorneys' fees to one not appropriately appointed as petitioner's attorney. Whiteman v. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 984 P.2d 1079, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1999).

Causation and attorney's fees. —

Subsection (d) nowhere mentions the word “causation” nor does it provide an exception based on causation; therefore, the subsection applied notwithstanding a determination that the workers' safety and compensation division had raised causation as an issue. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Gerrard, 2001 WY 7, 17 P.3d 20, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2001).

Amount of attorney's fee. —

An award of attorney's fees to the claimant was proper, notwithstanding that it was greater than the amount at issue, where the workers' safety and compensation division conceded that the fee was reasonable and the attorney's participation and the resulting stipulated dismissal meant that the considerable expense of a full contested case hearing was avoided. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Gerrard, 2001 WY 7, 17 P.3d 20, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2001).

Award of attorney fees not limited to “benefits at issue.” —

The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) properly awarded attorney fees to a workers' compensation claimant's appointed attorney in the claimants appeal of a denial of benefits. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) does not limit the award of an employee's attorney fees to the ‘benefits at issue’ and there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the determination of the hearing examiner on reasonableness under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b)(i). OAH. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Smith, 2005 WY 137, 121 P.3d 150, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (2005).

Hearing on motion for attorneys' fees. —

Failure to hold hearing before denying motion for award of attorneys' fees was not improper and did not violate petitioner's due process rights. Whiteman v. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 984 P.2d 1079, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1999).

Amount awarded for attorney's compensation modifiable. —

The district court could hear an appeal from a hearing examiner's order reducing the compensation of an attorney for a worker's compensation claimant, and could modify the order, where the court found the amount awarded was unreasonable and the hearing examiner provided no factual or legal basis to justify the fee reduction. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1991).

Accrual of right to legal representation. —

This section is silent as to when an employee's right to paid legal representation accrues. Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1997), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

An employee is entitled to paid legal representation when the workers' compensation division issues a final determination regarding the compensability of an injury, whether or not a formal request for a contested case is filed. Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1997), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

The fact that a compensation claimant's right to paid legal representation accrues when the workers' compensation division issues a final determination does not require the hearing examiner to award attorney fees to the claimant's attorney; that determination is made on a case-by-case basis pursuant to the statutory standards. Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1997), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Applied in

Olsten Temporary Servs. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 870 P.2d 360, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1994); Manning v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 938 P.2d 870, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 1997).

Quoted in

In re Claim of Taffner, 821 P.2d 103, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1991); Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 931 P.2d 234, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1997); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Jackson, 994 P.2d 320, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 1999); Serda v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 38, 42 P.3d 466, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2002); State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 WY 111, 384 P.3d 267, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2016).

Cited in

Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 798 P.2d 323, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 1990); State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Ohnstad, 802 P.2d 865, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1990); Shassetz v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 920 P.2d 1246, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1996); Cargile v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 965 P.2d 666, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1998); Nagle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Nagle), 2008 WY 99, 190 P.3d 159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Aug. 19, 2008).

Stated in

Porter v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 69, 396 P.3d 999, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2017).

§ 27-14-603. Burden of proof; required proof of circumstances; coronary conditions; hernia.

  1. The burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a substantial period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment and to prove by a preponderance of evidence that:
    1. There is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under which the work is performed and the injury;
    2. The injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the employment;
    3. The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate cause;
    4. The injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally exposed outside of the employment; and
    5. The injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee.
  2. Benefits for employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and solely caused by an injury, are not payable unless the employee establishes by competent medical authority that:
    1. There is a direct causal connection between the condition under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition; and
    2. The causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees in that particular employment, irrespective of whether the employment stress is unusual to or abnormal for the individual employee; and
    3. The acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after the alleged causative exertion.
  3. If an employee suffers a hernia, he is entitled to compensation if he clearly proves that:
    1. The hernia is of recent origin;
    2. Its appearance was accompanied by pain;
    3. It was immediately preceded by some accidental strain suffered in the course of the employment; and
    4. It did not exist prior to the date of the alleged injury.
  4. If an employee establishes his right to compensation for a hernia as provided and elects not to be operated on, he shall not be compensated for the results of future strangulation of the hernia.
  5. In those proceedings in which the entitlement of an employee to benefits for successive compensable injuries is established but no single employer can be determined to be chargeable for the injuries, the division shall apportion the benefit charge in accordance with W.S. 27-14-201(d).

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1991, ch. 90, § 1; 1994, ch. 86, § 2.

I.General Consideration.

Brief muscle spasm not governed by section. —

A worker's compensation claim was not governed by this section. The evidence was uncontradicted that the claimant was able to perform hard physical labor both before and after receiving the injury in question. The injury was the result of a single brief occurrence (muscle spasm), and did not occur over a substantial period of time. Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 820 P.2d 553, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1991).

Burden of proof. —

Compensation claimant has burden of showing that he has experienced compensable injury. In re Scrogham, 52 Wyo. 232, 73 P.2d 300, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1937).

Medical Commission determination that the workers’ compensation claimant failed to meet his burden was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence because the Commission reasonably rejected the opinions of the claimant’s medical experts, as Commission’s factual concerns about the study relied on by the physician and its application to the claimant were plainly supported by the record and the Commission expressed concern that the physician did not have sufficient knowledge about the claimant’s exposure either through meeting him or examining adequate records about his exposure. McMillan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2020 WY 68, 464 P.3d 1215, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 2020).

Claimant has the burden of establishing every essential element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Pease v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 453 P.2d 887, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1969); Johnson v. State, 798 P.2d 323, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 1990).

Burden did not shift where decedent's wife failed to prove elements of her claim. —

Where a widow who claimed her husband's fatal heart attack was due to employment stress clearly unusual to and abnormal for his job failed to prove all the elements of her claim, the burden did not then shift to the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division to present evidence. Loomer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 47, 88 P.3d 1036, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 2004).

Injury not compensable. —

Employee was not entitled to worker's compensation benefits where the employee did not prove that the injury occurred within the scope and course of employment, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102 , and that the injury occurred over a substantial period of time pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a); the physician, who treated the employee for years, linked the ailment to things other than work, and the employee's medical witness's testimony was properly given little weight because the witness was not given complete and accurate information from the employee. Robbins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2003 WY 29, 64 P.3d 729, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2003).

The burden is on a claimant of workmen's (now worker's) compensation benefits to show that he is entitled to an award of compensation. Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 1970); Gifford v. Cook--McCann Concrete, 526 P.2d 1197, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 237 (Wyo. 1974).

It is the burden of the employee to show the actual time of disability and cause under the statute then in effect. Olson v. Federal Am. Partners, 567 P.2d 710, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1977).

Wyoming Medical Commission's decision denying a claimant workers' compensation benefits was supported by substantial evidence where the Commission properly rejected the claimant's treating physician's opinion that the claimant's thoracic outlet syndrome (TOS), which developed gradually, was caused by her employment; his opinion lacked foundation as to the frequency of the claimant's heavy-duty employment obligations as a custodian and her non-work-related activities. The Commission properly accepted the opinion of a non-treating physician that the claimant's TOS was not caused by her employment, based on the claimant's entire medical history. Sanchez v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 WY 64, 134 P.3d 1255, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2006).

Wyoming Medical Commission did not err in failing to apply Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603 because a claimant presented no evidence to suggest that his injury occurring over time was caused by the conditions of his work. Chavez v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2009 WY 46, 204 P.3d 967, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2009).

Benefits improperly denied where claimant met burden of proof. —

In a workers' compensation case, benefits were improperly denied to the claimant who suffered back pain occurring over a period of time where the treating physician, even though acknowledging that the claimant's condition had probably been present since adolescence or early adulthood and could be the result of aging, rejected that explanation because of the claimant's age and instead attributed the condition due to the heavy lifting, turning, and bending at a diesel mechanic job, and where claimant denied participating in activities involving snowmobiles, four wheelers, sports, or motorcycles or activities involving any other hazards that would equal his work conditions. By a preponderance of the evidence, the claimant met his statutory burden of proof and, without any evidence that a hazard to which he would have been equally exposed outside of the employment even existed, he had no further burden. Baxter v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 2004 WY 138, 100 P.3d 427, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Wyo. 2004).

Charging benefits against industrial classification. —

While an employer asserted that it was not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard before worker compensation benefits were paid to an injured employee, a hearing officer did not have the authority, pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, to remedy the situation by ordering the division to charge benefits to an industrial class as a whole rather than a single employer. Subsection (e) of this section is not ambiguous and clearly instructs the division, not the office of administrative hearings, to charge benefits against the industrial classification in only one specific situation: where the series of injuries which entitles the employee to benefits does not permit determination of which single employer is to be charged. An adequate remedy for employers who allege division mistakes cause the employer's experience rating to be improperly charged is to petition the division to remove any charges from its experience rating which arose as a result of the division's own neglect, mistake or inadvertence, pursuant to § 27-14-201 .Olsten Temporary Servs. v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Nyquist), 870 P.2d 360, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1994).

Before worker's compensation benefits can be charged to an industrial classification, two things must be shown: successive compensable injuries and no single employer identifiable for the injuries. While the fact that an employee has filed previous claims and been paid benefits is evidence of successive compensable injuries, there are other ways to prove an employee has suffered those injuries. L & H Welding & Mach. Co. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 876 P.2d 984, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1994).

Asymptomatic congenital reactive airway disease. —

A finding that aggravation of claimant's asymptomatic congenital reactive airway disease was a natural incident of his work in a garage was sufficiently supported by evidence that the garage was polluted and that claimant had quit smoking. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 436 (Wyo. 1987).

Apportioning benefits charges. —

Although the claimant's case did not involve a second compensable injury, subsection (e) of this section nonetheless clarifies that it is up to the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division to apportion benefits charges. KG Constr., Inc. v. Sherman, 2005 WY 116, 120 P.3d 145, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 2005).

Benefits properly granted where claimant met burden of proof. —

Doctor made an authoritative statement that, while the claimant's 20-years of working for the employer might not have been the only cause of his injury, his employment with the employer was certainly a contributing factor; thus, the hearing examiner's conclusion that the claimant's back problems followed as a natural incident of his work, which involved constant jostling of his spine in the truck cab and heavy labor attendant to the truck driving, was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Also, there was no error in the hearing examiner's conclusion that the claimant's work for the employer was a proximate cause of his back problems and no hazard outside of his work (smoking, aging, or personal activities) was identified which could have just as well caused the injury; accordingly, the claimant met his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his injuries occurred over a substantial period of time and arose in the course of his employment with the employer. KG Constr., Inc. v. Sherman, 2005 WY 116, 120 P.3d 145, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 2005).

Where burden of proof not sustained. —

Where a doctor says that he cannot connect the claimant's exposure to sustained cold weather on a job site and his illness and, even if there is some causal relationship, he cannot say that the exposure is the only factor contributing to the claimant's pneumonia, the claimant has not sustained his burden of proof under paragraph (a)(iii) of this section. In re De Forrest, 603 P.2d 865, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 491 (Wyo. 1979).

Claimant failed to meet the burden of proof. —

Claimant failed to meet the burden of proof required by this section where he claimed that his chronic bronchitis resulted from work conditions, but the record indicated that claimant was a heavy cigarette smoker and his doctor could not state with certainty that the bronchitis was caused by employment conditions alone. Hammond v. Hitching Post Inn, 523 P.2d 482, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 214 (Wyo. 1974).

Workers' compensation medical commission did not err in denying benefits to claimant where claimant failed to meet her burden of establishing a causal connection between her work-related injury of July 1998 and her back surgery in September of 2001, especially where claimant's failure to inform her treating physicians of a 1997 work injury, and her sporadic compliance with physical therapy and other medical orders, called her credibility into question. Hicks v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 11, 105 P.3d 462, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 2005).

Statute does not require medical testimony to establish relationship between the employment and the injury but merely that convincing proof should be offered to support an award. In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1943).

Hearing examiner improperly considered causation. —

The hearing examiner's decision that claimant did not meet his burden of proof was contrary to law because he improperly considered causation when determining claimant was not eligible for any loss of earnings benefits. Ireland v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 998 P.2d 398, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2000).

Dermatitis resulting from contact with chemicals. —

An attendant, who suffered a severe attack of dermatitis while working in a state training school dispensary, sustained an accidental injury for which she was entitled to compensation, where it was shown that the dispensary used chemicals which could cause severe dermatitis and that certain other susceptible attendants working in that part of the school were affected in this way by these chemicals. Wright v. Wyoming State Training Sch., 71 Wyo. 173, 255 P.2d 211, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1953).

Allergic reaction. —

In a claim for benefits for an allergic reaction, there was substantial evidence supporting the hearing examiner's determination that the employee's claim was governed by § 27-14-102 rather than this section. Murray v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 993 P.2d 327, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1999).

Carpal tunnel syndrome. —

Expert medical testimony, notes in several doctors' records, medical testing, and reports supported a hearing examiner's determination that the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome was not work-related but was a pre-existing condition, and that his work aggravated, accelerated, or combined with his carpal tunnel syndrome to produce a compensable injury. Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Payne, 2001 WY 49, 23 P.3d 38, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 2001).

Employee struck by lightning. —

Employee who was struck by lightning while standing in office of mining company where he had just turned in his time card was entitled to recover compensation for injuries sustained where the evidence showed that transformers and wires leading into the office building were without proper grounds. Claim of Carey, 74 Wyo. 37, 283 P.2d 1005, 1955 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1955).

Cut finger. —

Baker injured in kitchen where power machinery was used, by cutting his finger while opening a tin can, was entitled to compensation. Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 43 Wyo. 108, 299 P. 284, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1931).

Hemorrhage in eye. —

Blindness caused by hemorrhage in eye, which occurred after workman lifted heavy sack, was compensable, notwithstanding that workman was predisposed to hemorrhages by previous tuberculosis and irrespective of whether strain of lifting sack was unusual. In re Scrogham, 52 Wyo. 232, 73 P.2d 300, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1937).

Injury from rock dust. —

Injury to lungs from inhaling rock dust while attending rock crusher is compensable as directly resulting from injury arising through accident, as evidence does not show that injury suffered was customary result of claimant's work. In re Pero, 49 Wyo. 131, 52 P.2d 690, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1935).

Appendicitis. —

Upon evidence that workman operating plow, attached to a tractor, struck hard ground causing plow suddenly to jump up, severely straining and throwing operator, followed by severe cramps and pain in region of stomach, forcing him to discontinue work early that day, when he never before had such experience, and four hours later pain was localized on right side of claimant's abdomen, which was diagnosed as appendicitis, for which he was operated on next day, operation disclosing inflamed appendix, facts were sufficient to justify judgment on the claim. In re Grant, 54 Wyo. 382, 92 P.2d 563, 1939 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1939).

Traumatic neurosis. —

A truckdriver who is shifted back and forth between scheduled driving and unscheduled driving as an “on call” substitute is entitled to compensation for traumatic neurosis. Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1984).

Nontraumatic mental injury must be caused by workplace stress of greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other workers employed in the same or similar jobs in order to be compensable. The “other workers” can be those employed by the same employer or by different employers. Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 454 (Wyo. 1986).

Circumstance supporting finding that claimant did not sustain injury. —

In an action by claimant to recover compensation the fact that the claimant did not mention to the unit foreman that he had injured his back was a strong circumstance to support decision of the district court that the claimant had not sustained an injury. Parkel v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 69 Wyo. 122, 237 P.2d 634, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1951).

Prior ankle injury found not to be proximate cause of later medical bills. —

There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that a prior ankle injury was not a proximate cause of the claimant's later medical bills, as the claimant continued working immediately following the injury and did not see a doctor about the injury from the time of the accident until eight months later. Collins v. Goeman Gen. Tire, 682 P.2d 332, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1984).

Injury sustained over two week period. —

The hearing examiner did not err in deciding that the claimant's shoulder injury did not occur over a substantial period of time where the injury occurred over a two-week period during which she moved several computers at work and the claimant testified that her shoulder began to ache about a week into moving the computers. State ex rel. State Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, 26 P.3d 1029, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 2001).

Reviewing court need only find substantial evidence. —

Although the claimant is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, each element of subsection (a) of this section at the agency hearing, the reviewing court's inquiry is not based on a preponderance of the evidence standard; the reviewing court asks whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's conclusion that the claimant successfully satisfied the burden of proof required by this section. Sinclair Trucking v. Bailey, 848 P.2d 1349, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1993), overruled in part, Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2002).

Ruptured brain aneurysm. —

Substantial evidence supported hearing examiner's determination that ruptured brain aneurysm was a compensable injury where work-related stressors were documented throughout the case and doctor testified that, to a reasonable medical probability, such stressors caused aneurysm to rupture. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Waggener, 946 P.2d 808, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 1997).

There was substantial evidence to sustain claimant's award where she had already established her initial claim to a work related back injury and she testified in her subsequent claim for a recurring back injury that there were many things she did in the course and scope of her employment which required exertion and that no specific incident resulted in the recurrence of her back pain. Hansen v. MR. D's Food Ctr., 827 P.2d 371, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1992).

Although evidence showed that the claimant had back degeneration before beginning his employment with defendant employer and although he performed repetitive heavy lifting in the foundry industry beginning in 1976 that would have hastened the degenerative process, where the record established that the claimant did not experience severe enough pain in the cervical and lumbar spine to seek medical assistance until November 1994, approximately eight months after he had been employed by the defendant, and subsequently continued to experience severe back problems when he remained employed there, the record supported a determination that the claimant's work for the defendant actually caused his back injuries, or at least contributed in a material degree to the aggravation of his preexisting degenerative back condition. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Parrish, 2004 WY 144, 100 P.3d 1244, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2004).

Town employee, although fighting fire beyond city limits, performing town function. —

The argument that because the house fire was physically beyond the city limits, the town employee was not performing a function for the town in his activities at the time was rejected as ignoring reality and intra-governmental fire-fighting cooperation expected and required in rural Wyoming. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Van Buskirk, 721 P.2d 570, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 580 (Wyo. 1986).

Applied in

Romero v. Davy McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1993); Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1995).

Quoted in

Hohnholt v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 248 (Wyo. 1989); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Fisher (In re Fisher), 914 P.2d 1224, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 1996); Payne v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 993 P.2d 313, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1999).

Cited in

Worker's Comp. Claim of Blood v. Grace Drilling Co., 863 P.2d 147, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1993); Shryack v. Carr Constr. Co., 3 P.3d 850, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 2000); Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2005 WY 160, 124 P.3d 686, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (2005); Kenyon v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 14, — P.3d —, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Feb. 2, 2011); Middlemass v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 118, 259 P.3d 1161, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Aug. 11, 2011).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Workmen's Compensation — A Confusing Double Standard for Mental Injuries, Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1984),” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 287 (1985).

For comment, “The Compensability of Cardiac Conditions under Wyoming Worker's Compensation: Health Insurance or Worker's Compensation?” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 607 (1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli-Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions, 122 ALR 5th 653.

II.Coronary Conditions.

Wyoming has clearly adopted unusual-exertion rule for coronary-condition cases, even though the rule represents a minority position which has been severely criticized by some textwriters. Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 566 P.2d 219, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 268 (Wyo. 1977).

Subsection (b) manifests appropriate legislative intent. —

The trial courts of this state have not had undue difficulty in applying subsection (b), and it manifests an appropriate legislative intent. Bridge v. Eisenman Transp., 742 P.2d 768, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 510 (Wyo. 1987) (not deciding if former § 27-12-603(b) violated equal protection or proper classification constitutional provisions).

Question of fact. —

Whether the exertion of work was clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, the individual worker in his particular employment is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court, and its findings will be upheld where supported by substantial competent evidence. Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 566 P.2d 219, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 268 (Wyo. 1977).

The supreme court consistently has treated as a question of fact the issue of whether the “causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment.” In those instances in which the district court found as a fact that the period of employment stress was not unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment, a denial of benefits has been upheld. Bridge v. Eisenman Transp., 742 P.2d 768, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 510 (Wyo. 1987) (not deciding if former § 27-12-603(b) violated equal protection or proper classification constitutional provisions).

Burden of proof. —

To sustain his burden of proof, as to legal causation, the statute requires that the employee show that the causative exertion was clearly something beyond his normal routine — something more than the worker's usual work. Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 566 P.2d 219, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 268 (Wyo. 1977).

Exposure to carbon monoxide. —

The claimant failed to establish that his myocardial infarction was caused by his exposure to unsafe levels of carbon monoxide and, therefore, he was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Sheth v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 11 P.3d 375, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 195 (Wyo. 2000).

Medical causation required. —

While required legal causation may be present for appellate decision-making purposes, medical causation is required by this section. Claim of McCarley, 590 P.2d 1333, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 373 (Wyo. 1979).

Causal connection between work and heart attack must be more than “possibility.” —

Employee did not meet his burden of proof on the issue of medical causation where his medical expert said only that there “could have” been a causal connection between the moving of the filing cabinets and the heart attack and that it was “certainly possible” that the effort precipitated, aggravated or accelerated the attack, as said testimony did no more than make the causal link a possibility. Nuanes v. State, 694 P.2d 86, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 428 (Wyo. 1985).

Claimant did not meet his burden of proof as to medical causation, where, although his physician testified that it was “possible” that claimant's work activity caused his heart attack, the physician also testified that it was equally “possible” that there was no connection between the two. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Taylor, 718 P.2d 63, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 545 (Wyo. 1986).

Expert testimony as to probability of causation. —

The causal-connection requirement is satisfied if a medical expert testifies that it is more probable than not that work exertion or stress contributed in a material degree to the precipitation, aggravation, or acceleration of a myocardial infarction. Kaan v. State, 689 P.2d 1387, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 346 (Wyo. 1984).

Determination of causal relationship between heart injury and employment. —

The burden of the trial court in determining the causal relationship between a heart injury of a workman and his employment is most difficult. Certainly he cannot be satisfied in discharging this upon less than the preponderance of believable evidence that the work effort contributed in a material degree to the precipitation, aggravation or acceleration of the existing disease. Claim of Vondra, 448 P.2d 313, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 215 (Wyo. 1968).

Sufficient competent medical testimony to find direct causal connection between employee's exertion and cardiac condition. —

See In re Injury to Kemp, 711 P.2d 1142, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 445 (Wyo. 1986).

Where, under subsection (b) of this section, a qualified pathologist declined to say that he could determine to a reasonable medical certainty that stress caused or precipitated the death and stated that the employee could have died in his sleep just as easily as on the job, but also testified that the stress was a “contributing factor” and that the employee's arrhythmia “very likely” and “probably” was due to the physical exertion and strain, that testimony is sufficient evidence of the causal connection between employment and injury. Jim's Water Serv. v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 376 (Wyo. 1979), limited, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

A board certified cardiologist's testimony was adequate to establish a direct casual connection between a police chief's work activity and his myocardial infarction. In re Claim of Taffner, 821 P.2d 103, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1991).

Material contribution by work effort to disease. —

Under subsection (b) of this section, the question that needs to be answered is whether the work effort contributed to a material degree to the precipitation, aggravation or acceleration of the existing disease and the resulting death. Jim's Water Serv. v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 376 (Wyo. 1979), limited, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

Measuring exertion and stress which lead to coronary occlusion. —

In determining whether the exertion which results in a coronary occlusion occurred during a period of stress unusual or abnormal to working conditions, the best approach is first, to ascertain the normal and usual task of the employee, then determine if the event in question exceeded that limit. Jim's Water Serv. v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 376 (Wyo. 1979), limited, State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1990).

Death from coronary occlusion following fall and injury to hand. —

Evidence supported trial court's finding that employee's death from coronary occlusion was not result of fall and injury to his hand suffered while at work. In re Corey, 65 Wyo. 301, 200 P.2d 333, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1948).

Death from coronary thrombosis following chest injury. —

Evidence justified an award of compensation where employee died from a coronary thrombosis 14 days after sustaining a severe chest injury. White v. Maverick Prod. Co., 63 Wyo. 452, 182 P.2d 818, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1947).

Where police officer suffers fatal heart attack due to stress attributed to a role conflict arising out of the necessity to perform law enforcement functions with respect to an individual who is in the company of the officer's daughter, the circumstances do not manifest any unusual or abnormal stress for a peace officer, and an application for worker's compensation benefits on behalf of the widow and minor children of the deceased officer must be denied. Creek v. Hulett, 657 P.2d 353, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 273 (Wyo. 1983).

Stress by driver repositioning load not unusual. —

The period of stress experienced by a truck driver who had to reposition an improperly balanced load, after finding no paperwork and a trailer lacking proper brakes and lights, was not unusual to, or abnormal for, employees who drive tractor-trailer rigs. Desotell v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 767 P.2d 998, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1989).

Claim denied where driving stress not abnormal. —

Though a worker was hired as a pipe inspector, he suffered a fatal heart attack while working as truck driver, and since substantial evidence supported the finding of the Wyoming Medical Commission that the stress on the day he died was not clearly abnormal to or unusual for truck drivers, his widow's death benefit claim was properly denied. Loomer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 47, 88 P.3d 1036, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 2004).

Phrase “particular employment” as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b)(ii) means the task being performed at the time of the causative exertion; consequently, a claimant must prove exertion that is clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees performing that task as opposed to employees performing the job for which that claimant may originally have been hired. Loomer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 47, 88 P.3d 1036, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 2004).

Sufficient evidence of unusual exertion. —

Where the record in the case indicated that the employee's usual work consisted of mixing cement and carrying hod with the assistance of helpers or a hoisting device, and on the day of his heart attack, the employee had no helpers, nor did he use a hoist, this is sufficient evidence of unusual exertion, particularly when the employee was required to climb stairs continuously — which he testified was unusual to his normal routine. Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 566 P.2d 219, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 268 (Wyo. 1977).

There was substantial evidence to justify the finding by the workers' compensation division that the muddy conditions under which the benefits claimant changed the flat tire of the truck he was driving (1) were unusual and abnormal, and (2) led to the claimant's heart attack. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Harris, 931 P.2d 255, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1997).

Lifting 300 pound steel plates in freezing weather for three hours was not usual or normal stress in the welding profession, and therefore hearing examiner's denial of benefits for heart attack was contrary to the evidence. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brewbaker, 972 P.2d 962, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1999), reh'g denied, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. Mar. 25, 1999).

After an employee died from a heart attack he suffered at work while servicing a front end loader, his widow should have been awarded benefits because it was established that the exertion itself was unusual or abnormal for an employee servicing heavy equipment, pursuant to the standard in this statute. The overwhelming weight of the evidence established that it was unusual or abnormal to encounter an access panel that was stuck or physically “very hard” to open or close. Scherf v. State (In re Scherf), 2015 WY 130, 360 P.3d 66, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. 2015).

III.Hernia.

Applicability of section. —

In an action to recover benefits for a herniated disk, the hearing examiner erred in requiring proof under this section for an injury occurring over a period of time; this section is intended to require a higher burden of proof for workers claiming benefits for illnesses or injuries developing over time without a definite triggering accident or event, such as is the case with repetitive motion injuries or repeated exposure to caustic or carcinogenic substances, but does not apply when the claimant's injury is precipitated by a single, identifiable incident. Yenne-Tully v. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2000).

A hearing examiner erred when she imposed the burden of proof for injuries occurring over a substantial period of time where (1) the claimant suffered his first back injury when a snow fence fell on him in 1982, (2) he had no further back problems until 1989, when he fell down a flight of stairs while working as a guard at the state penitentiary, (3) the division paid for the claimant's conservative treatment for his back through 1991, (4) the claimant continued to lead an active life, but experienced constant back pain and had to leave work early or miss work on many occasions, and (5) he awoke one morning in 1997 and could not move due to extreme pain, and an MRI the following month revealed a herniated disc. Yenne-Tully v. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2000).

Employee's hernia occurred “in the course of the employment,” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(c)(iii), and was compensable as a second or subsequent compensable injury; if a casual link existed between an employee's original work injury and his development of a hernia, the hernia arose in the course of employment and was compensable as a second of subsequent compensable injury. Ball v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 128, 239 P.3d 621, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Sept. 22, 2010).

Provisions to be liberally construed. —

The special provisions of the law relating to hernia are to be liberally construed in favor of the workman. In re Hardison, 429 P.2d 320, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1967).

Statute on hernia was passed to limit liability in such cases, but with all books defining hernia in terms of protrusion, legislature passed act with that meaning in mind and limitation of liability must be construed on that basis. In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1943).

Congenital origin does not preclude recovery. —

Though hernia is congenital in origin, it does not preclude employee from recovering compensation where protrusion results from accidental injury while working. In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1943).

In most cases hernia is a disease. —

In most cases hernia is caused by malformation or inherent weakness in the abdominal wall and is a disease rather than the result of an accident. In re Hardison, 429 P.2d 320, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1967).

Burden of proof in hernia cases. —

The claimant's burden in hernia cases is to show the actual time of the compensable injury, its cause, and its relation to his employment at the time of injury. In re Hardison, 429 P.2d 320, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1967).

Statute puts burden on the employee of proving not only the hernia and the accidental strain, but that the hernia was immediately preceded by the strain. Johnson v. Ideal Bakery, 51 Wyo. 111, 63 P.2d 791, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (1937).

The term “clearly prove” requires evidence that is clear and convincing. Although this means something more than a preponderance, it does not mean proof beyond all reasonable doubt. In re Hardison, 429 P.2d 320, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1967).

The time of injury is particularly important in cases involving hernia. In re Hardison, 429 P.2d 320, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1967).

Petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of clearly proving that he suffered his hernia while working for respondent employer; record established that petitioner kept moving furniture, performed one-handed pushups, and lifted a co-worker during three weeks following date he claims he suffered hernia, while never informing respondent of his problem. Bando v. Clure Bros. Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 1999).

Claimant did not satisfy burden of proof in hernia case. —

Denial of workers' compensation benefits was affirmed because the claimant's injury reports to her employer and to the workers' compensation division were not timely filed; moreover, even if she had timely filed her claim she did not present evidence satisfying her onerous burden of proof regarding hernial injuries because her testimony was uncertain as to whether the hernia was recent and whether the hernia existed prior to the time of the accidental strain that caused her to seek medical attention. Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 7, 105 P.3d 101, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2005).

Proximate substantial cause. —

Where opening heavy door was immediately followed by pain and protrusion, and workman was subsequently operated on for hernia, and medical examination prior to incident had disclosed no hernia, testimony proved accident was proximate substantial cause. In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1943).

Latent hernia not suggested. —

The requirement of clear proof that a hernia was immediately preceded by some accidental strain suggests that a compensable hernia cannot ordinarily be a trivial injury which remains in a state of latency for a period of seven months. Big Horn Coal Co. v. LaToush, 501 P.2d 1250, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 305 (Wyo. 1972).

Occurrence seven months before report and claim. —

Where an employee seems to claim that the real origin of a hernia resulted from an occurrence seven months before the workman's report of accident and claim for compensation, it would be difficult to say such proof meets the standard contemplated by the legislature when it enacted this section. Big Horn Coal Co. v. LaToush, 501 P.2d 1250, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 305 (Wyo. 1972).

Pain. —

The view of the legislature at the time these provisions were adopted was that “pain” would accompany a hernia of traumatic origin. In re Hardison, 429 P.2d 320, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1967).

As evidence of pain, a “vague feeling of insecurity” insufficient in itself even to direct the attention of claimant to the “protrusion” or to cause “discomfort” in his work before and after such discovery does not measure up to the standard required. In re Hardison, 429 P.2d 320, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1967).

The office of the statutory requirement that the appearance of the hernia be accompanied by pain is to date the onset of the hernia. Big Horn Coal Co. v. LaToush, 501 P.2d 1250, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 305 (Wyo. 1972).

“Accidental strain” has been defined as a strain that is unforeseen, unexpected and unintended. In re Hardison, 429 P.2d 320, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1967).

Normal manner of work. —

Employee doing his work in his normal and regular way whereby he sustains hernia suffers accident which is compensable, provided other conditions, requisite under statute, exist. In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1943).

Opening door. —

Where hernia was produced by prying open door weighing 400 pounds, though he had done so under same conditions for about six months, accidental injury was sufficiently shown. In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1943).

Meat department work. —

Grocery clerk working part time in meat department was entitled to workmen's compensation for inguinal hernia sustained while lifting a 100 pound salt sack. Christensen v. Sikora, 57 Wyo. 57, 112 P.2d 557, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (1941).

Treatment reasonable and necessary. —

Claimant's use of Marinol to treat severe and persistent pain, the result of an inguinal hernia suffered in a work-related accident, was reasonable, necessary, and not experimental, and thus district court erred in affirming Wyoming medical commission decision denying claimant his Marinol prescription. Tarraferro v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2005 WY 155, 123 P.3d 912, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 182 (Wyo. 2005).

Determination of causal relationship between heart injury and employment. —

District court did not err in affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding the denial of benefits to a medical/surgical charge nurse because the OAH correctly interpreted subsection (b)(ii) to require that the causative exertion be unusual or abnormal for the nurse at her specific place of employment, rather than being unusual or abnormal for a medical/surgical unit charge nurse in the nursing profession generally. In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Fieseler v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2013 WY 116, 309 P.3d 1233, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2013).

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 44.05 (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-14-604. Examination by impartial health care provider; costs; report by nonresident provider.

  1. In any contested proceeding, the hearing examiner may appoint a duly qualified impartial health care provider to examine the employee and give testimony. The fee for the service shall be as ordered by the hearing examiner, with mileage allowance as is allowed to other witnesses to be assessed as costs and paid as other witness fees are paid. The employer or employee may, at his own expense, also designate a qualified health care provider who may be present at the examination of the employee and give testimony at later hearings.
  2. If the employer and employee stipulate to an examination of the employee by a nonresident, qualified health care provider designated by the hearing examiner, and that the report of the health care provider as to his examination shall be admitted in evidence, the hearing examiner may order payment of the reasonable cost and expense of the employee’s attendance upon the health care provider, the provider’s fee for examination of the employee and his report thereon. The fees and costs shall be charged in the same manner as other costs and witness fees. The nonresident health care provider shall report in writing to the hearing examiner and include answers to questions asked by the hearing examiner relative to the employee’s condition.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Liberal application. —

Provision authorizing court to appoint physician to examine employee on employer's application should be liberally applied because contest affects not merely immediate parties thereto but often state compensation fund as a whole. In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1941).

When medical knowledge essential. —

In a compensation case where the real crucial question was whether pain in claimant's back was due to his use of a “pry” stick in loading heavy equipment, the task to which he had been assigned, or was due to a congenital defect, which produced an abnormal body posture, medical scientific knowledge was essential to a correct solution of the problem. Ludlow v. Wortham Mach. Co., 71 Wyo. 331, 257 P.2d 358, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1953).

Discretion of court. —

Where employer's attorney did not ask for appointment of impartial physician in compensation proceeding to examine employee but asked for examination by physician who had previously declared employee was malingerer, trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing application. In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1941).

Quoted in

Serda v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 38, 42 P.3d 466, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2002).

Stated in

Payne v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 993 P.2d 313, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1999).

Cited in

Mattis v. Husky RMP Properties, Inc., 790 P.2d 1279, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1990).

§ 27-14-605. Application for modification of benefits; time limitation; grounds; termination of case; exceptions.

  1. If a determination is made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits under this act, an application may be made to the division by any party within four (4) years from the date of the last payment for additional benefits or for a modification of the amount of benefits on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or fraud. The division may, upon the same grounds and within the same time period, apply for modification of medical and disability benefits to a hearing examiner or the medical commission, as appropriate.
  2. Any right to benefits shall be terminated and is no longer under the jurisdiction of this act if a claim for any benefit is not filed with the division within the four (4) year limitation prescribed under subsection (a) of this section.
  3. A claim for medical benefits which would otherwise be terminated under subsection (b) of this section and barred under W.S. 27-14-503(a) and (b) may be paid by the division if the claimant:
    1. Submits medical reports to the division substantiating his claim;
    2. Proves by competent medical authority and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the condition is directly related to the original injury; and
    3. Submits to an examination by a health care provider selected by the division and results of the examination validate his claim.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 229, § 1; 1994, ch. 86, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Applicability. —

In a decision applying the second compensable injury rule, the claimant need not comply with the provisions of this section, because the case is not actually being reopened; this section applies to original benefits awarded after a determination in favor of the employee, but medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits awarded at a later date pursuant to the second compensable injury rule are not among the benefits the statute controls. Yenne-Tully v. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2000).

Second compensable injury rule did not apply where claimant did not contend that bilateral wrist tendinitis or his wearing of a wrist splint for that originally diagnosed condition caused his thoracic outlet syndrome. Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2005 WY 160, 124 P.3d 686, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 2005).

Where the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division did not contest the compensability of an original claim or seek to retract any payments already made to a benefits claimant, but challenged the right to payment of future benefits, this section was not applicable. The claimant was required to prove that he was entitled to receive benefits for his unpaid claims, despite the previous award. McIntosh v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2007 WY 108, 162 P.3d 483, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2007).

Hearing examiner explicitly acknowledged that the stricter burden of proof of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 was not applicable, and referred to the second compensable injury rule as being more lenient; the hearing examiner's finding that the employee was required to show the causal connection to a reasonable degree of medical probability, rather than requiring the employee to show that the second injury was “due solely to” the original compensable injury, indicated the hearing examiner used the proper burden of proof. In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Roger Kaczmarek Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety, 2009 WY 110, 215 P.3d 277, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Sept. 3, 2009).

Employee was not entitled to worker's compensation benefits for chiropractic treatment in 2010 based on a workplace fall in 2002 because the evidence failed to show that the employee's 2010 condition was directly related to the back injuries suffered in 2002. Rogers v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 117, 284 P.3d 815, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2012).

Section supersedes Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b). —

Where benefits have been awarded to a workers' compensation claimant, this section's specific language regarding the reopening of the workers' compensation case supersedes the general provisions regarding relief from judgment found in Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Erhart v. Flint Eng'g & Constr., 939 P.2d 718, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1997); Shaffer v. State, 960 P.2d 504, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1998).

Section balances concept of finality with need to assure injured workmen receive benefits. —

An award, being characterized as a judicial determination, is subject to the concept of finality. Given this proposition, this section represents an attempt by the legislature to balance the concept of finality as applied to worker's compensation awards with the need to assure that injured workmen receive the full amount of any benefits to which they are entitled under the law. Conn v. Ed Wederski Constr. Co., 668 P.2d 649, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 353 (Wyo. 1983), overruled in part, Slater v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Slater), 2001 WY 29, 18 P.3d 1195, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2001).

Second compensable injury rule. —

Under the second compensable injury rule, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury for which he is seeking benefits resulted from his prior work accident, not a preexisting condition. Walsh v. Holly Sugar Corp. (In re Walsh), 931 P.2d 241, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1997).

Worker's benefits claim should have been analyzed pursuant to the second compensable injury rule and the hearing examiner erred in determining the claim pursuant to this section; the four-year statute of limitations did not apply and the worker sufficiently raised the second compensable injury theory to alert the hearing examiner to his theory of recovery. Carabajal v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 119, 119 P.3d 947, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 2005).

Where an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition requiring additional medical intervention, the second compensable injury rule is applicable, as it is palpably unjust to the employee to deny him compensation because he tries to keep his place on the employer's pay roll by doing his regular work and then finds that conditions produced at the time of the accident, have gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury. Yenne-Tully v. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2000).

Second compensable injury rule inapplicable. —

Medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits awarded at a later date pursuant to the second compensable injury rule are not among the benefits this section controls. Rather, this section rests on the premise that following an initial determination in favor of an injured employee, any party may, within four years of the award, seek to modify the benefits awarded. Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1995).

Whether injury is compensable is question of fact. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1994).

Fraud must occur in connection with award for injury. —

This section cannot be perceived as foreclosing worker's compensation benefits that were not fraudulently obtained simply because of inaccuracies uttered in obtaining the employment; the fraud to which this section alludes must occur in connection with the award for the injury. Forni v. Pathfinder Mines, 834 P.2d 688, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1992).

District court clerk was not proper party to request reopening under this section, and district court therefore had no jurisdiction to proceed with case because of the absence of any pleading sufficient to invoke the power of the court. R.L. Manning Co. v. Millsap, 687 P.2d 252, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 337 (Wyo. 1984).

Workers' compensation benefits were properly awarded to an injured employee who was determined to be an alien not authorized to be in or work in the United States because the employer reasonably believed, based on documentation and information provided, that the employee was authorized to work in the United States, even though this was later found to be false. Moreover, the employee did not misrepresent the facts of his injury to receive benefits, and there was no reasonable nexus between the misrepresentations he made to gain employment and his application for benefits for the work-related injury he subsequently suffered. L & L Enters. v. Arellano (In re Arellano), 2015 WY 21, 344 P.3d 249, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 2015).

No need to “reopen” case. —

Defendant's case did not need to be “reopened”, pursuant to this section, where the Division did not claim, nor did the hearing examiner find, that defendant's initial injury was not compensable or that worker's compensation benefits were awarded by mistake, nor did the Division seek repayment of previously paid benefits. Snyder v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 957 P.2d 289, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 1998).

It is obligation of injured employee to plead statutory ground for reopening. FMC v. Lane, 773 P.2d 163, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1989).

And hearing officer must find statutory ground. —

The failure of an independent hearing officer to make required findings of fact regarding the existence of a statutory basis for reopening the case violated the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 3 of title 16) and necessitated remanding the case for further proceedings. FMC v. Lane, 773 P.2d 163, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 1989).

Determination of permanent effect of original disability. —

A workers' compensation claimant's application for permanent benefits, after the claimant had received total temporary benefits, was a new claim for benefits that did not entail an increase or decrease in disability, to which this section would apply, but rather a determination as to the permanent effect of the original disability. Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1997), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. Feb. 4, 1997).

Division cannot stipulate reopening of case. —

Where the workers' compensation division entered into a stipulation stating that a workman had a right to reopen his case, the stipulation vitiated the division's option to contest the reopening of the case on the grounds of res judicata, and the worker still carried his burden to demonstrate the existence of a mistake which would justify the reopening of his case and the award of additional benefits. Warehime v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 806 P.2d 292, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1991).

Determination made in favor of employee. —

Administrative hearing officer did not err in ruling that injured employee was not entitled to reopen his workers' compensation case, since this section restricts reopening of cases to those in which a determination has been made in favor of or on behalf of an employee. Bila v. Accurate Telecom, 964 P.2d 1270, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1998).

Division may reopen case to terminate benefits. —

While the legislature has created a vehicle whereby the division, among others, may reopen a case on the grounds of mistake or fraud but has ostensibly limited the remedy available to that of “modification,” no public policy favors the payment of any portion of an unjustified worker's compensation claim. Therefore, the division may petition to reopen a case under subsection (a) for the purpose of terminating worker's compensation benefits originally awarded by mistake or procured by fraud. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1994).

Where benefits denied. —

A workers' compensation claimant was precluded from reopening his case, in which he was denied benefits, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Erhart v. Flint Eng'g & Constr., 939 P.2d 718, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1997); Shaffer v. State, 960 P.2d 504, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1998).

District court properly affirmed the Medical Commission's denial of a worker's application for additional temporary total disability benefits and the second compensable injury rule because the evidence revealed that there was no increase in incapacity, and that any claimed increase was due to at least in part a degenerative process, and was, therefore, not solely caused by his work injury, the statute was clear and unambiguous, the Commission did not misapply the second compensable injury rule by requiring the worker to prove that he had suffered a second injury, and the Commission properly weighed the evidence and made appropriate determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses. Kebschull v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2017 WY 94, 399 P.3d 1249, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2017).

Application for modification not submitted. —

No issue with respect to a 1994 claim was before the hearing examiner for adjudication and, therefore, the only issue to be decided at the hearing was the benefit available to the claimant if he proved his 1998 claim by a preponderance of the evidence. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Conner, 12 P.3d 707, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 2000).

Relief for “mistake” limited to mistake in determination of material fact. —

The failure of the Worker's Compensation Division to divulge the reasons behind its conclusion that appellant was entitled to a 17% additional award was a procedural error, not one of fact; such an error is not contemplated as grounds for modification under the statute. Howton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. (In re Workers' Compensation Claim of Howton), 899 P.2d 869, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. Aug. 15, 1995).

“Mistake in law” presented in direct appeal, not pursuant to this section. —

An alleged “mistake in law” as to an earlier court order terminating benefits should have been presented in a direct appeal from that order and not pursuant to this section. The finality of awards made under this chapter is relaxed only to the extent that the claimant meets the burden of establishing: (1) a mistake in determination of a material fact; (2) fraud; or (3) increase in incapacity due solely to the injury. Prentice Clark House v. State, 701 P.2d 1162, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1985).

Court terminates benefits where mistake made regarding claimant's employment status. —

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting claimant relief from worker's compensation orders and terminating her benefits, where there was a mistake made in the employer's accident report regarding claimant's status as a “sales clerk.” Mini Mart v. Wordinger, 719 P.2d 206, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 550 (Wyo. 1986).

Mistake of material fact and procedural misunderstanding insufficient for modification. —

Injured employee failed to meet her burden of showing that mistake of material fact was made by fact finder, and procedural misunderstanding on part of employee and her doctor regarding availability of future benefits was insufficient to support a modification of her benefits under this section. Smith v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 965 P.2d 687, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1998), overruled in part, Slater v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Slater), 2001 WY 29, 18 P.3d 1195, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2001).

Notification based on unilateral mistake. —

A settlement agreement between a claimant and the division of workers' safety and compensation is not a contract which can be modified only in the event of mutual mistake, and a hearing examiner properly modified an award based on a unilateral mistake made by the division in its calculations. Slater v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2001 WY 29, 18 P.3d 1195, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2001).

Illegal contract to surrender right to reopen. —

Injured workman cannot legally surrender right to reopen original workmen's compensation award and there is no consideration for contract between employer and employee that employer would employ injured worker for life in lieu of further compensation. Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 58 Wyo. 211, 131 P.2d 315, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1942).

Worker not entitled to reopen case following written settlement stipulation. —

A settlement stipulation, acquiesced to by the district court, although no order was entered expressly approving the stipulation, and the accompanying orders of award were judicial determinations to be accorded finality. The worker was not entitled to reopen the case, as the written stipulation did not violate constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting contractual devices to relieve an employer from a liability created by the worker's compensation laws. Further, the worker was not entitled to a hearing on his petition to reopen the case, as there was no factual dispute, the petition being subject to dismissal by operation of a legal bar. Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 509 (Wyo. 1986).

Employees who are seeking additional benefits pursuant to this section have the same burden of proof as they had in their original worker's compensation claims. Employees must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that, through an increase in incapacity due solely to the injury, they are entitled to be awarded additional benefits. Whether an increase in incapacity is due solely to the original work-related injury is a question of fact. Jackson v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 886 P.2d 601, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1994).

Estoppel not applicable to outstanding claims. —

Although the employer and the Workers' Compensation Division did not contest the compensability of the initial injury, the employer and Division were not estopped from objecting to an employee's outstanding claims, since each new claim or award involves a separate administrative determination under § 27-14-606 , and the employee had the burden of proving that he was entitled to receive worker's compensation benefits for his outstanding claims. Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Martinez), 917 P.2d 619, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 1996).

Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division's uncontested payment in the past of a claimant's claims related to syncope episodes, short losses of consciousness, did not preclude the Division from contesting the causation of the claimant's syncope for purposes of future benefits. Hood v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workers' Comp. Div., 2016 WY 104, 382 P.3d 772, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2016).

Doctor's testimony concerning causal connection disregarded where conflicting with immediate version of accident. —

It was within the trial court's province to disregard the testimony of the doctor concerning the causal connection between an industrial accident and the employee's present condition when it was in conflict with the version of the accident related immediately after the event. In re Jones, 702 P.2d 1299, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 511 (Wyo. 1985).

Evidence insufficient to prove causation of increased incapacity. —

In a proceeding to modify an award, brought by a worker who suffered a back injury, received benefits, underwent back surgery and suffered a heart attack, the worker's main witness, his back surgeon, did not state that the heart attack was due solely to the injury, but merely that it occurred shortly after surgery. That was insufficient to prove that the worker's increase in incapacity caused by the heart attack was due solely to the surgery. In re Injury to Loveday, 711 P.2d 396, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 615 (Wyo. 1985).

Evidence insufficient to support highter PPI rating. —

Where the employee failed to offer any evidentiary basis to support a higher permanent partial impairment (PPI) rating than the 15 percent she had already been awarded, specifically where she did not present any credible evidence that her other physical impairments such as her thoracic or shoulder conditions were related to her work accident and did not present any medical evidence that her cervical spine condition was improperly rated, the medical commission hearing panel correctly refused to grant the employee a PPI rating above the 15 percent awarded. Himes v. Petro Eng. & Constr. (In re Workers Comp. Claim), 2003 WY 5, 61 P.3d 393, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2003).

No increase in incapacity due to condition resulting from mundane activities. —

The district court correctly found that an injured worker, who suffered from a herniated disc, had failed to meet his burden of proof of showing an increase in incapacity due solely to the injury or the existence of a mistake. The diagnostic testing immediately following the injury did not disclose a herniated disc. The herniated disc was present later, but the medical experts agreed that it could have resulted from mundane activities. Hunteman v. Ward Transp., 706 P.2d 1126, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 571 (Wyo. 1985).

No increased disability due to natural degeneration. —

An injured worker's problems following his accident were attributable to natural degeneration, as accelerated by the accident. He failed to prove any increase in disability due solely to his injury. Lehman v. State, 752 P.2d 422, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 1988).

When unjust to deny compensation for injury. —

It is unjust to an employee to deny him compensation because he had tried to keep his place on an employer's payroll by doing his regular work and then found that conditions produced at the time of an accident, and which medical science could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not forecast, have gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1978).

It would do violence to the Worker's Compensation Act if, merely because an employee is aware at the time of an accident that a compensable injury may manifest itself in another compensable injury some time in the future, that knowledge will bar a future claim based upon the earlier accident and injury. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1978).

Increase of incapacity due solely to injury. —

Under §§ 27-14-404(b) and 27-14-605(a), a claimant who had previously accepted a permanent partial impairment award was entitled to additional benefits following surgery if she could prove that she suffered an increase of incapacity due solely to her injury; however, this did not mean that she had to prove she suffered an increase in permanent incapacity, and a showing of a temporary increase was sufficient. Hernandez v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. 1, Hernandez v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. 1 (In re Hernandez), 8 P.3d 318, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 2000).

No sound basis articulated for awarding additional benefits. —

See In re Injury to Lea, 707 P.2d 754, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 592 (Wyo. 1985).

Agency reversed where reasons for action not disclosed. —

An agency will be reversed if the reasons underlying the action are not disclosed, whether the final conclusion of the agency is correct or not because without such enunciation the supreme court cannot perform its legislatively mandated review. Howton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. (In re Workers' Compensation Claim of Howton), 899 P.2d 869, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. Aug. 15, 1995).

Failure of agency to explicate basis for award abuse of discretion. —

The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to disclose by the evidence and the record the facts upon which its actions are based; failure of the agency to explicate its reasons for reaching an award of 17% was an abuse of discretion on the part of the agency. Howton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. (In re Workers' Compensation Claim of Howton), 899 P.2d 869, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. Aug. 15, 1995).

Benefits paid for surgery related to injury. —

This section does not foreclose the payment of benefits for surgical procedures relating to an injury even though a period of more than four years has elapsed from the last award, where no application for permanent partial disability or any rating has been made and further treatment was, and is, contemplated. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Malkowski, 741 P.2d 604, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 499 (Wyo. 1987).

Time period extended upon judicial determination. —

Order entered by the district court which provided for the payment of temporary total disability payments was a judicial determination which extended the time for a petition to reopen to four years. Deroche v. R.L. Manning Co., 737 P.2d 332, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 445 (Wyo. 1987).

Application for reinstatement of benefits not untimely. —

Trial court erred in upholding the denial of TTD benefits to an employee because pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(d), the employee was entitled to apply for reinstatement of TDD benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 as the payment of benefits had ceased for a period of eight days or more; a physician's order that the employee was not to work was evidence of increased incapacity within the meaning of § 27-14-605 .Boe v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2009 WY 115, 216 P.3d 494, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Sept. 17, 2009).

Claimant's burden of proof, when applying to reopen the case and modify benefits received under this section, is the same burden as exists in the original claim. He must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there has occurred an increase in incapacity due solely to the injury, or mistake or fraud in connection with the initial award. Woodman v. Grace Bomac Drilling, 736 P.2d 313, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 453 (Wyo. 1987).

Where claimant did not allege any mistake or fraud, he had the burden to establish an increase or decrease in incapacity due solely to the injury. Deroche v. R.L. Manning Co., 737 P.2d 332, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 445 (Wyo. 1987).

Where worker makes no claim to additional compensation based on the grounds of mistake or fraud, he must show that he has sustained additional incapacity entirely as a result of the injury in order to collect additional benefits. Loghry v. Capshaw Well Serv., 739 P.2d 1227, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 472 (Wyo. 1987)(burden not met).

Claimant’s burden of proof. —

Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division's award of permanent partial impairment benefits in 1990 did not, by itself, satisfy an employee's burden of proving that his abdominal pain was related to his 1982 workplace injury to his toe; the Division's award was not a final adjudication that precluded it from challenging future benefits. Jacobs v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2013 WY 62, 301 P.3d 137, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2013).

Additional benefits upon becoming temporarily, totally disabled. —

An employee who received a lump sum permanent partial disability award, and later became temporarily and totally disabled after rod removal surgery, sustained an increase of incapacity and was therefore entitled to additional benefits, regardless of whether his permanent partial disability had increased. Parnell v. State, 735 P.2d 1367, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 428 (Wyo. 1987).

Additional surgery not required. —

The only prerequisites for additional benefits under subsection (a) are that the claimant has previously been awarded either temporary total disability or permanent partial disability benefits and, not meeting the first alternative of § 27-14-404(b), has met the second alternative by filing a petition to reopen and modify under § 27-14-605(a); it is not necessary for the claimant to undergo additional surgery following the previous award. Osenbaugh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 10 P.3d 544, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 2000).

Modification of award for increased incapacity. —

The trial court properly granted modification of an award due to increased incapacity where (1) the employee's theory was that she experienced an increase of incapacity due solely to the injury when her physician ordered her not to work, (2) the employee submitted a physician's certification of temporary total disability, and (3) there was nothing to indicate that the physician was mistaken in ordering the employee not to work. State ex rel. State Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Henriksen, 2001 WY 42, 21 P.3d 1185, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2001).

Amount awarded for attorney's compensation modifiable. —

The district court could hear an appeal from a hearing examiner's order reducing the compensation of an attorney for a worker's compensation claimant, and could modify the order, where the court found the amount awarded was unreasonable and the hearing examiner provided no factual or legal basis to justify the fee reduction. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1991).

Effect of claimant not being afforded a hearing. —

Subsection (a) does not differentiate between those unsuccessful claimants who have had hearings and those unsuccessful claimants who have not had hearings. Shaffer v. State, 960 P.2d 504, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1998).

Construction of application as Rule 60(b) motion. —

The claimant's application to reopen his workers' compensation case under subsection (a) would not be construed as being a motion for relief under W.R.C.P 60(b) where the record did not show that the workers' compensation and safety division violated the workers' compensation law. Shaffer v. State, 960 P.2d 504, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1998).

Applied in

Bohren v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 883 P.2d 355, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1994); Stockdale v. Transystems Servs., Inc., 908 P.2d 980, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 235 (Wyo. 1995); Fritz v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 937 P.2d 1345, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1997); State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 WY 111, 384 P.3d 267, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2016).

Quoted in

Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 786 P.2d 874, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1990); In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Bobby Joe Pickens Ex Rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2006 WY 54, 134 P.3d 1231, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. May 4, 2006); Kenyon v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 14, — P.3d —, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Feb. 2, 2011).

Cited in

E.H. Oftedal & Sons v. Thompson, 966 P.2d 977, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 1998); Pohl v. Bailey Co., 980 P.2d 816, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1999); Whiteman v. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 987 P.2d 670, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1999); Hall v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 2001 WY 136, 37 P.3d 373, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2001); Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2002); Phillips v. TIC—Phillips v. TIC-The Industrial Co. of Wyoming, Inc. (In re Phillips) 2005 WY 40, 109 P.3d 520, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (2005); In re Worker's Compensation Claim v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Med. Comm'n & Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2005 WY 104, 118 P.3d 441, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (2005); Jacobs v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (in re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2009 WY 118, 216 P.3d 1128, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Sept. 25, 2009).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Workers' compensation: incarceration as terminating benefits, 54 ALR4th 241.

Workers' compensation: reopening lump-sum compensation payment, 26 ALR5th 127.

§ 27-14-606. Determination and awards are administrative determination as to all parties; notice and hearing requirements.

Each determination or award within the meaning of this act is an administrative determination of the rights of the employer, the employee and the disposition of money within the worker’s compensation account as to all matters involved. No determination shall be final without notice and opportunity for hearing as required by this act.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

“Judicial determination.” —

First Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) order was not a final appealable order and therefore collateral estoppel was not applicable because it was not a prior adjudication of workers’ compensation benefits, even though it vacated the hearing and directed the Department of Workforce Services, Workers’ Compensation Division to award the claimant workers’ compensation benefits, as the OAH had not heard evidence or argument from the parties and it returned the case to the Division prior to any substantive action. Lower v. Peabody Powder River Servs., LLC ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2020 WY 33, 459 P.3d 443, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 3 3 (Wyo. 2020); 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (March 4, 2020).

Concept of finality balanced with need to assure injured workmen receive benefits. —

An award, being characterized as a judicial determination, is subject to the concept of finality. Given this proposition, former § 27-12-606 (now see § 27-14-605 ) represents an attempt by the legislature to balance the concept of finality as applied to worker's compensation awards with the need to assure that injured workmen receive the full amount of any benefits to which they are entitled under the law. Conn v. Ed Wederski Constr. Co., 668 P.2d 649, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 353 (Wyo. 1983), overruled in part, Slater v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Slater), 2001 WY 29, 18 P.3d 1195, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2001).

Employer is entitled to dispute any award or claim on the basis that it is unreasonable or improper, and certainly can raise the question as to whether the award or claim is causally related to the industrial accident which occurred or whether it may be attributable to some other event. Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1983).

Claimant failed to meet her burden to prove that she was entitled to receive benefits for permanent partial impairment and that the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, despite previous awards which may have been made for the same injury. Weaver v. Cost Cutters, 953 P.2d 851, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1998).

Estoppel not applicable to outstanding claims. —

Although the employer and the Workers' Compensation Division did not contest the compensability of the initial injury, the employer and Division were not estopped from objecting to an employee's outstanding claims, since each new claim or award involves a separate administrative determination under this section, and the employee had the burden of proving that he was entitled to receive worker's compensation benefits for his outstanding claims. Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Martinez), 917 P.2d 619, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 1996).

Medical Commission (Commission) was not collaterally estopped from considering evidence of the employee's preexisting condition that could have been presented by the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division in 1998; the Commission determined if the employee's treatment in 2007 was related to his 1991 work injury, which was not identical to the issue considered in 1998. Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 76, 233 P.3d 583, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 2010).

Limitation period not governed by civil rule. —

Because an award of worker's compensation benefits is no longer a “judicial determination,” the modification or termination of such an award should not be governed by the one-year statute of limitations contained in Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., but is superseded by § 27-14-605(a) (time limitation for modification of benefits). State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1994).

Award as final adjudication. —

Absent an express reservation of jurisdiction or a declaration by the legislature to the contrary, any award under the act is a final adjudication of the parties as to the matters covered thereby, the same as in any other case. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dep't v. Niezwaag, 452 P.2d 214, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 1969).

An award of compensation to an injured employee is a final judgment, unless expressly reserving jurisdiction to reopen case. Midwest Ref. Co. v. George, 41 Wyo. 55, 281 P. 1005, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1929).

A workers' compensation division's uncontested award of benefits did not rise to the level of a “final adjudication” necessary to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion to outstanding claims for worker's compensation benefits. Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1997), reh'g denied, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. Feb. 4, 1997).

Where the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division did not contest the compensability of an original claim or seek to retract any payments already made to a benefits claimant, but challenged the right to payment of future benefits, the claimant was required to prove that he was entitled to receive benefits for his unpaid claims, despite the previous award. McIntosh v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2007 WY 108, 162 P.3d 483, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2007).

Judgment properly set aside due to employee's lack of notice. —

Judgment granting an employee full compensation was properly set aside at the same term where employee was not present when the judgment was entered and knew nothing about it until afterward. In re Shaul, 46 Wyo. 549, 30 P.2d 478, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1934).

No worker's compensation determination can be final unless the employer receives notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Padilla v. Lovern's, Inc., 883 P.2d 351, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1994).

“Judicial determination.” —

Payment of a doctor's bill by virtue of an instrument entitled “order of award” executed by the clerk of court, after notice had been given to the employer and a card had been returned indicating receipt of notice and approval, was a “judicial determination” within the purview of this section. In re Millsap, 732 P.2d 1065, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 398 (Wyo. 1987) (decided under prior law).

Method of adjudication irrelevant where no employer objection. —

Whether a claim is adjudicated under the formal dispute procedures, or informally by the clerk of the district court — where there is no employer objection — the character of the award as a judicial determination is not changed. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Svoboda, 573 P.2d 417, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 256 (Wyo. 1978).

Employee, by failing to appeal, without standing to challenge validity of stipulation. —

An employee was without standing to challenge the validity of a stipulation entered into with his employer because he failed to appeal the district court's “final order of award,” which ruled that the stipulation, and the prior court order approving and enforcing the agreement, limited the benefits payable on account of the employee's injury and that the provisions of that prior order should be enforced, but instead filed a petition to reopen the case and appealed from a denial of that petition. In re Injury to Lea, 707 P.2d 754, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 592 (Wyo. 1985).

Applied in

Fritz v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 937 P.2d 1345, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1997).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing actions to enforce workmen's compensation benefits, 15 ALR2d 519.

Workers' compensation: bonus as factor in determining amount of compensation, 84 ALR4th 1055.

§ 27-14-607. Rights of director to defend against claim; no waiver.

The director or his designee may for any reason appear before the hearing examiner or in the district court and defend against any claim and shall in all respects have the same rights of defense as the employer. Failure to contest a claim does not constitute waiver by the director of his right to participate in further proceedings concerning the award where he does not appear and defend at the original hearing or trial.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Division is granted, by statute, rights equivalent to those of employer, which include the rights to challenge any claim or move to reopen any award. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Svoboda, 573 P.2d 417, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 256 (Wyo. 1978).

Employer and division may not arrange series of partial trials.—

The scheme for division participation does not contemplate that the employer, with division knowledge, proceed with one trial and present only part of the evidence, and, if unsuccessful, that the division then enter the case with the rest of the evidence and have a second trial. Pacific Power & Light v. Parsons, 692 P.2d 226, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 356 (Wyo. 1984).

Applied in

State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1999).

Cited in

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1994).

§ 27-14-608. Attorney fees; penalty for violation.

  1. If the hearing examiner under W.S. 27-14-602(d) or the district court or supreme court under W.S. 27-14-615 set a fee for any person for representing a claimant under this act excluding a health care provider, the person shall not receive any additional fee from the claimant.
  2. Any person violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed six (6) months, or both.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Accrual of right to legal representation. —

The fact that a compensation claimant's right to paid legal representation accrues when the workers' compensation division issues a final determination does not require the hearing examiner to award attorney fees to the claimant's attorney; that determination is made on a case-by-case basis pursuant to the statutory standards. Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1997), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Fees for appeals allowed. —

The critical word “proceeding” in former § 27-12-604(c) (now see § 27-14-615 ) should be interpreted broadly to permit the court to set reasonable attorney's fees for worker's compensation appeals. Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 454 (Wyo. 1986).

Amount awarded modifiable by court. —

The district court could hear an appeal from a hearing examiner's order reducing the compensation of an attorney for a worker's compensation claimant, and could modify the order, where the court found the amount awarded was unreasonable and the hearing examiner provided no factual or legal basis to justify the fee reduction. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1991).

Employee pays attorney fee. —

Amount allowed by statute for attorneys' fees on appeal in workmen's compensation case to supreme court is payable only by the employee, and not out of compensation fund of state. In re Iles, 57 Wyo. 76, 113 P.2d 516, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1941).

Quoted in

Serda v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 38, 42 P.3d 466, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2002).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of claimant's attorney to fee award under § 28(a) of Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 USC § 928(a)) for unsuccessful work before benefits review board, where decision of board is reversed on appeal, 57 ALR Fed 876.

§ 27-14-609. Periodic review of temporary total award; physical examination after temporary total award; purpose; report to division.

  1. The division shall review every award for temporary total disability under W.S. 27-14-404 at least once every six (6) months. Upon request by the employer or division, an employee awarded compensation for temporary total disability shall submit to medical examination by a health care provider at a place designated by the employer or division which is reasonably convenient for the employee. The employee may have a licensed health care provider present of his own selection at his own expense.
  2. The results of the examination shall be reported to the division. The division, without delay, shall forward copies to the employer and employee. If after consideration of all medical reports in the case the division determines that the employee has recovered to the extent that temporary total disability no longer applies and his earning ability is substantially restored, compensation shall be discontinued in accordance with W.S. 27-14-404 unless written objection is filed by the employer or employee with the division within ten (10) days from the date of notice.
  3. If an employee refuses to submit to or obstructs the examination, his right to monthly payments shall be suspended until the examination has taken place. No compensation shall be paid during the period of refusal.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1996, ch. 82, § 1.

Inference from absence of report. —

Where physicians of employer who made examination of employee made no report to the court and employer made no explanation, inference is warranted that physicians found nothing in favor of employer's contention. In re Shaul, 46 Wyo. 549, 30 P.2d 478, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1934).

Recoupment of benefits not authorized. —

Subsection (b) does not confer upon the district judge the authority to order the recoupment of temporary disability benefits which the court decides the appellant has received but to which he is not entitled. In re Johner, 643 P.2d 932, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 331 (Wyo. 1982).

As allowing recoupment defeats purpose of worker's compensationprovisions. —

Allowing recoupment of benefits previously paid and utilized by the worker with a good-faith claim would defeat the general purpose of the worker's compensation statutory provisions, which are designed and meant to assist and protect the injured employee through the recovery process. In re Johner, 643 P.2d 932, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 331 (Wyo. 1982).

Hearing, retroactive relief, after benefits terminated constitutional.—

Notwithstanding the question of whether or not worker's interest in temporary total disability benefits is a property right, former § 27-12-602 (see now § 27-14-602 ) clearly states that a hearing is available. Procedural due process law is provided if, upon a hearing after termination of temporary total benefits, retroactive relief may be awarded the worker. Higgins v. State, 739 P.2d 129, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 988, 108 S. Ct. 508, 98 L. Ed. 2d 507, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 5149 (U.S. 1987).

Benefits cease when stability or recovery reached. —

If a physician does not certify that a workman is totally disabled or when it is indicated that he has reached the point of stability or recovery, temporary total disability benefits must cease. Higgins v. State, 739 P.2d 129, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 988, 108 S. Ct. 508, 98 L. Ed. 2d 507, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 5149 (U.S. 1987).

Quoted in

Swasso v. State ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div., 751 P.2d 887, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1988).

Cited in

Boe v. State Ex Rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2009 WY 115, 216 P.3d 494, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Sept. 17, 2009).

§ 27-14-610. Health care providers required to testify; refusal; privilege inapplicable.

If directed under this act, any health care provider providing professional attention to an employee may be required to testify before the hearing examiner or any court, provide written reports and attend depositions in a professional capacity. Any health care provider refusing to comply with this section shall forfeit any remuneration or award under this act for services rendered or facilities provided the injured employee. The law of privileged communication between health care provider and patient shall not apply.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Cited in

Robbins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2003 WY 29, 64 P.3d 729, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2003).

Law reviews. —

For discussion of physician-patient privilege and the Federal Rules of Evidence, see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 601 (1977).

§ 27-14-611. Administrative determination for compensation; copies to employer and auditor; warrants for payment.

Any administrative determination for compensation to an injured employee or his dependents shall be transmitted by the division to the employer. The division shall transmit a certified copy to the state auditor for filing. The certified copy is direction to the state auditor to issue warrants for payment in accordance with this act.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1996, ch. 82, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

§ 27-14-612. Appeal by employee; costs.

If an appeal to the district court is prosecuted on behalf of the employee, the employee or attorney representing the employee shall order a record of the proceedings at the hearing to be supplied by the hearing examiner without cost to the employee. An electronic recording of the proceedings may serve as the official transcript but upon appeal, the district court may request a written transcript of the proceedings or any portion of the proceedings. The employee or attorney shall also order the papers on file with the division to be prepared, transcribed, certified and forwarded to the district court without cost to the employee. Docket fees in the district court shall be paid for directly out of the worker’s compensation account.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 28, § 1; 1996, ch. 82, § 1.

§ 27-14-613. Appeal by employer; stay of award.

If an appeal is prosecuted on behalf of the employer, the record of the proceedings at the original hearing shall be supplied without cost to the employer. An electronic recording of the proceedings may serve as the official transcript but upon appeal, the district court may request a written transcript of the proceedings or any portion of the proceedings. The employer may employ counsel to conduct the appeal on his behalf. Upon request and on appeal by an employer or the division from an order of award, the hearing examiner may stay the payment of the award or that portion appealed from upon any terms as the hearing examiner deems proper.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 28, § 1.

Law reviews. —

Tyler J. Garrett, Anatomy of a Wyoming Appeal: A Practitioner's Guide for Civil Cases, see 16 Wyo. L. Rev. 139 (2016).

§ 27-14-614. Direct appeal by director from any order; stay of execution; costs.

The director may appeal to the district court from any order or judgment of the hearing examiner awarding compensation or declining to award compensation although he was not a party to the proceedings before the hearing examiner, without the necessity of presenting any petition for reopening of a case to the hearing examiner. After the appeal is perfected, the hearing examiner may stay the execution of the order or judgment appealed from without requiring any bond. The attorney general or his assistant shall represent the director in all cases. All the costs of the new hearings granted upon petition of the director and all costs of appeals conducted by the director shall be paid by the worker’s compensation account except such costs as the court in its discretion shall assess against any of the other parties to the cause.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1991, ch. 91, § 1.

Effect of appeal from order awarding compensation is to stay the execution of such an order until such time as the propriety of the reopening can be determined. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Svoboda, 573 P.2d 417, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 256 (Wyo. 1978).

Nothing is said in this section as to any relief available to the successful employee by way of any counsel fees or other costs. In re Brothers, 510 P.2d 19, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1973).

Division has standing to appeal. —

The division has standing to pursue an appeal from an award of benefits by the office of administrative hearings. State ex rel. State Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, 26 P.3d 1029, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 2001).

Division entitled to direct appeal from court order reinstatingpayments. —

Where the court entered a pretrial order indicating that the trial date would be used for a further probable-cause hearing on the question of reopening the case and also entered an order reinstating payments to claimants and, upon finding that probable cause to reopen had not yet been shown, rescinding a prior ex parte order which suspended payments and reopened the case pending further investigation and a new hearing, the division was entitled to a direct appeal under this section without regard to its petition to reopen, since the order awarded compensation. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Svoboda, 573 P.2d 417, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 256 (Wyo. 1978).

§ 27-14-615. Appointment of attorneys for court proceedings; fees.

The district court may appoint an attorney to represent the employee during proceedings in the district court and appeal to the supreme court. The district court may allow the attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceedings in district court and the supreme court may allow for reasonable fees for services at the conclusion of the proceedings in the supreme court. In any appeal where the issue is the compensability of an injury, a prevailing employer’s attorney fees shall also be paid according to the order of the district court or supreme court from the worker’s compensation account, not to affect the employer’s experience rating. An award of attorney’s fees shall be for a reasonable number of hours and shall not exceed the benefits at issue in the appeal. In all other cases, if the employer or division prevails in the district court or supreme court, as the case may be, the fees allowed an employee’s attorney shall not affect the employer’s experience rating.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1995, ch. 193, § 1.

Attorney's fees allowed for appeals. —

The critical word “proceeding” should be interpreted broadly to permit the court to set reasonable attorney's fees for worker's compensation appeals. Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 454 (Wyo. 1986).

The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) properly awarded attorney fees to a workers' compensation claimant's appointed attorney in the claimants appeal of a denial of benefits because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) does not limit the award of an employee's attorney fees to the “benefits at issue” and there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the determination of the hearing examiner on reasonableness under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b)(i). Further Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-615 authorizes the district court to appoint an attorney to represent the employee in proceedings in district court where the employer appeals the attorney fees awarded by the OAH. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Smith, 2005 WY 137, 121 P.3d 150, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (2005).

Attorney fee award not unreasonable merely because not amount requested. —

Merely because the trial court did not award the amount of attorney's fees requested by the worker's attorney did not make the amount awarded unreasonable. Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, 698 P.2d 1141, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 474 (Wyo. 1985).

Law not liberally construed for benefit of counsel in providing attorney's fees. —

That the Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Law should be construed liberally in favor of the workman is a holding clearly for the benefit of the workman and should not be extended for the benefit of counsel in providing attorney's fees, unless such allowance can be related directly to the benefit of the workman. Williams v. Northern Dev. Co., 425 P.2d 594, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1967).

Benefits at issue. —

This section did not authorize the award of attorney's fees in a proceeding to review an order of the Internal Unit of the Worker's Compensation and Safety Division because no benefits were at issue in the review sought. Sheneman v. Division of Workers' Safety & Compensation Internal Hearing Unit, 962 P.2d 874, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 1998), overruled in part, State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Smith (In re Smith), 2005 WY 137, 121 P.3d 150, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2005).

Sufficiency of order appointing counsel. —

See Claim of Brannan, 455 P.2d 241, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1969).

Trial court's failure to explain award. —

Trial court erred in failing to include any findings of fact or conclusions of law in its order awarding attorney's fees. Gonzales v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div. (In re Gonzales), 992 P.2d 560, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1999).

Quoted in

State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 WY 111, 384 P.3d 267, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2016).

Applied in

Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998); Manning v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 938 P.2d 870, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 1997).

Cited in

Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Swartz, 740 P.2d 401, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 481 (Wyo. 1987).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Competency of witness in proceeding for death under workmen's compensation act as affected by dead man's statute, 77 ALR2d 676.

Workmen's compensation: use of medical books or treatises as independent evidence, 17 ALR3d 993.

Admissibility of opinion evidence as to employability on issue of disability in health and accident insurance and workers' compensation cases, 89 ALR3d 783.

§ 27-14-616. Medical commission; hearing panels; creation; membership; duties; rulemaking.

  1. The medical commission is created to consist of eleven (11) health care providers appointed by the governor as follows:
    1. Seven (7) licensed physicians appointed from a list of not less than fourteen (14) nominees submitted by the Wyoming Medical Society;
    2. Four (4) health care providers appointed from a list of not less than eight (8) nominees developed and submitted by appropriate health care provider groups selected by the director.
  2. One (1) member shall be elected by commission members as chairman and one (1) as vice-chairman. The division shall designate an employee to serve as executive secretary of the commission or contract with an individual to provide executive secretary services to the commission. The governor may appoint no more than eleven (11) additional health care providers as associate members of the commission whose function is limited to serving as members of individual medical hearing panels. Except for initial members, the terms of commission members and associate members shall be three (3) years. Three (3) members of the initial commission and three (3) initial associate members shall be appointed to a one (1) year term and four (4) initial commission members and four (4) initial associate members shall be appointed to a two (2) year term. The duties of the commission shall be:
    1. To promulgate rules and regulations, with the approval of the director of the department, declaring particular medical, hospital or other health care procedures either acceptable or not necessary in the treatment of injuries or particular classes of injuries and therefore either compensable or not compensable under this act or expanding or limiting the compensability of such procedures under this act;
    2. To promulgate rules and regulations, with the approval of the director of the department, establishing criteria for certification of temporary total disability by health care providers and setting forth the types of injuries for which particular health care providers may certify temporary total disability pursuant to W.S. 27-14-404(g);
    3. To advise the division, upon request, on the usefulness of medical cost containment measures;
    4. To furnish three (3) members of the commission to serve as a medical hearing panel to hear cases referred for hearing. The division shall refer medically contested cases to the commission for hearing by a medical hearing panel. The decision to refer a contested case to the office of administrative hearings or a medical hearing panel established under this section shall not be subject to further administrative review. Following referral by the division, the hearing examiner or medical hearing panel shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide all issues related to the written notice of objection filed pursuant to W.S. 27-14-601(k). Different medical hearing panels with different membership may be selected to hear different cases, but a panel may hear more than one (1) case. Individual medical hearing panels shall be selected by the executive secretary under the supervision and guidance of the chairman of the medical commission. At least one (1) member of each panel shall be a physician. One (1) member shall be designated by the executive secretary to serve as chairman of the panel. When hearing a medically contested case, the panel shall serve as the hearing examiner and shall have exclusive jurisdiction to make the final administrative determination of the validity and amount of compensation payable under this act. For cases referred to the medical commission as small claims hearings under W.S. 27-14-602(b), the medical hearing panel may consist of one (1) physician who shall serve as the hearing examiner and shall have exclusive jurisdiction to make the final administrative determination of the validity and amount of compensation payable under this act; and
    5. To advise the division regarding any suspected substandard or inappropriate medical or health care provided to an injured worker by a health care provider or health care facility;
    6. To establish by rule and regulation procedures for decisions pursuant to W.S. 27-15-102(h) and for rebuttals pursuant to W.S. 27-15-103 and to adopt other rules as necessary to implement W.S. 27-15-101 through 27-15-103 .
  3. The members of the commission and of medical hearing panels and any health care provider providing peer reviews or independent medical evaluations, reviews or opinions, when serving shall be deemed public employees for purposes of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and shall be immune from liability pursuant to W.S. 1-39-104 .
  4. The division shall establish a fee schedule for the compensation of members of the medical commission and medical hearing panels for their professional services to be paid from the worker’s compensation account.
  5. Upon agreement of all parties to a case, the hearing examiner in a contested case under this chapter may transfer a medically contested case to a medical hearing panel or may seek the advice of the medical commission on specified medical issues in the contested case. The advice shall be in writing and shall become part of the record of the case.
  6. Any member of the commission who knows or has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that a health care provider or health care facility has provided substandard or inappropriate medical or health care shall immediately report it to the appropriate professional or facility licensing authority and to the division.

History. Laws 1993, ch. 229, § 1; 1995, ch. 157, § 1; 1996, ch. 82, § 1; 1997, ch. 177, § 1; 2005, ch. 231, § 1; 2012, ch. 48, § 1; 2017 ch. 139, § 2, effective March 3, 2017.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “account” for “fund” at the end of (d).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, added (b)(v) and made related changes; in (c), inserted “and any health care provider providing peer reviews or independent medical evaluations, reviews or opinions” and “be deemed public employees for purposes of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and shall,” and substituted “pursuant to W.S. 1-39-104 ” for “and shall be defended by the attorney general if sued and indemnified against loss from legal action in the same manner as state employees”; and added (f).

The 2017 amendment added (b)(vi).

Laws 2017, ch. 139, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2017.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 3 provides that in response to the Wyoming Supreme Court's order of February 21, 1995, in the matter of Steven B. Starr v. Sunlight Ranches, et al., it was the intent of the legislature and the legislature declares, that the medical commission established under § 27-14-616(a) have subject matter jurisdiction over medically contested cases commencing on or after January 1, 1994, regardless of the date of injury.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

Jurisdiction. —

Wyoming Office of the Medical Commission's decision, that claimant failed in meeting his burden of proof in establishing that his medical treatment after Sept 21, 2001 was directly and causally related to his employment, had no impact on any of his prior claims. The commission decided only those issues referred to it and did not exceed its jurisdiction in considering and deciding claims. Spletzer v. Wyo. ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 90, 116 P.3d 1103, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 2005).

In a workers’ compensation case, because an air ambulance company’s interest claim was not addressed in the summary judgment order and therefore was not included in the matter over which the district court acquired jurisdiction, the company’s claim presented an issue separate from but related to the company’s objections referred for hearing, and the Office of Administrative Hearings retained jurisdiction to rule on the interest motion. Air Methods v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2018 WY 128, 432 P.3d 476, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2018).

Determination by worker's compensation division whether torefer case. —

The worker's compensation division must determine if a case is medically contested, and if it is, it must be referred to the medical commission. Russell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 944 P.2d 1151, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1997).

Worker's compensation division, pursuant to its rule defining “medically contested cases,” properly determined that petitioner's claim did not warrant medical commission review. Bando v. Clure Bros. Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 1999).

Appellate review. —

Where a hearing is before the medical commission, the standard of appellate review is no different than it would be where the hearing is conducted before a hearing officer. Bucklin v. State ex rel. Wy. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Bucklin), 2001 WY 101, 33 P.3d 440, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2001).

A worker's compensation case involving a disputed impairment rating which was initially referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings was transferred to the medical commission pursuant to W.S. § 27-14-405(m). Lyles v. State ex rel. Division of Workers' Compensation (In re Lyles), 957 P.2d 843, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1998).

Retroactive application. —

Where subsequent expository legislation clearly announced intent that medical commission hear all medically contested workers' compensation cases regardless of date of injury, this legislation controlled over prior case law and over prior, general legislation; medical commission therefore had jurisdiction to hear medically contested case involving injury which occurred before commission was established. Pohl v. Bailey Co., 980 P.2d 816, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1999).

Medically contested case. —

Medical Commission had jurisdiction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-616(b)(iv) to hear only medically contested cases; having concluded that this was not such a case, the Medical Commission did not then have the statutory authority to proceed to consider the legal issues involved. In re Worker's Compensation Claim v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Med. Comm'n & Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2005 WY 104, 118 P.3d 441, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (2005).

Although the Medical Commission properly recognized that the case before it involved a legal issue rather than a medical issue, it erred when it failed to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but instead, directly referred the case to the Office of Administrative Hearings. Birkle v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2007 WY 9, 150 P.3d 187, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Jan. 18, 2007).

A “medically contested case” is one in which the primary issue requires the application of a medical judgment to complex medical facts or conflicting diagnoses; thus, where the ultimate issue in a case was an issue of law, it was outside the jurisdiction of the Medical Commission. French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1998).

Referral to the Wyoming Medical Commission is proper when cases primarily involve medically contested issues, including, but not limited to, those identified in Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules of the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, Chapter 6, § 1 (a)(i)(A)-(D); the fact that the Medical Commission may, in the course of deciding that medical issue, also be asked to consider non-medical issues does not deprive it of authority to decide the case. Therefore, where the primary issue for determination was the medically contested issue of whether a benefits claimant's back problems were caused by a work-related injury, the Medical Commission had authority to decide the case. McIntosh v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2007 WY 108, 162 P.3d 483, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2007).

Failure to seek transfer to commission. —

The medical commission has provided for referrals from hearing examiners to the medical panel upon agreement of all of the parties, and it is necessary for a claimant to seek such a transfer to avoid waiver of the issue of whether his claim should have been referred to the commission. Russell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 944 P.2d 1151, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1997).

Failure to make basic findings of fact. —

Medical Commission Hearing Panel's order denying the claimant workers' compensation benefits for gastrointestinal problems violated the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act by failing to make basic findings of fact that supported its ultimate findings; the decision cited no evidence or medical opinions and made no basic findings to support its conclusion that the claimant's condition changed substantially after August 2002 or to explain the conclusion that had the narcotic pain medications been responsible for the esophageal stricture, it would have appeared earlier. In re Worker's Compensation Claim v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2006 WY 65, 135 P.3d 568, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 2006).

Determination of issue by commission not required. —

Where neither conflicting medical opinion nor the nature of the injury was central to the issue of whether claimant's injury was work-related, it was appropriate that a hearing examiner resolve the issue of whether or not the injury was work-related. Russell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 944 P.2d 1151, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1997).

Pre-existing disease. —

District court erred in affirming the medical commission's determination that employee failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that treatment and surgery of her neck and shoulder injury were not related to a preexisting cancer and were related to her work injury where the expert medical testimony adduced before the commission established, without a doubt, that there was a preexisting cancer. However, according to that same expert medical testimony, its only role under the circumstances of this case was to predispose employee to the sort of injury that she suffered while at work. Bucklin v. State ex rel. Wy. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Bucklin), 2001 WY 101, 33 P.3d 440, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2001).

Quoted in

Serda v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 38, 42 P.3d 466, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2002); Stevens v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2014 WY 153, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Dec. 2, 2014).

Cited in

Jackson v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 886 P.2d 601, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1994); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Wright, 983 P.2d 1227, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1999); Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2005 WY 160, 124 P.3d 686, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (2005); Nagle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Safety & Comp. Div. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Nagle), 2008 WY 99, 190 P.3d 159, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Aug. 19, 2008).

Stated in

Porter v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. (In re Worker's Comp. Claim), 2017 WY 69, 396 P.3d 999, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2017).

Article 7. Fiscal Provisions

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 731.

100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 387, 388.

§ 27-14-701. Worker's compensation account established; investments; administrative expenses; rehabilitation expenses; worker's compensation claims payment account established for worker's compensation revenue bond proceeds.

  1. Except as provided under subsection (f) of this section, all money received, earned or collected pursuant to this act shall be credited to the worker’s compensation account. In addition to other expenditures authorized under this act, amounts deposited within this account shall be used to pay debt service on revenue bonds issued in accordance with W.S. 27-14-704 . As used in this act, “account” means the worker’s compensation account established under this subsection.
  2. All awards and claim determinations shall be paid from the account provided by subsection (a) of this section.
  3. All money collected and accounted for pursuant to this act not immediately necessary for the purposes of this act shall be invested by the state treasurer in the manner provided by law for investment of permanent state funds. The state treasurer, in consultation with the director and consistent with the investment policy developed by the state loan and investment board, may establish a percent not to exceed forty-five percent (45%) of the total amount collected and accounted for under this subsection to be invested in common stock.
  4. Following a general fund appropriation by the legislature for administrative expenses of the division and for administrative expenses of the office of administrative hearings which are attributable to hearing services provided pursuant to this act, amounts expended pursuant to the appropriations shall be transferred monthly from the account provided by subsection (a) of this section to the general fund as provided by the Wyoming Funds Consolidation Act.
  5. The division shall from the worker’s compensation account, periodically advance or reimburse the division of vocational rehabilitation of the department of workforce services, for administrative and program costs associated with the rehabilitation of injured workers pursuant to W.S. 27-14-408 . Administrative or program costs reasonably available or legally allowable under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, shall not be advanced or reimbursed pursuant to this subsection.
  6. Proceeds from the sale of revenue bonds issued under W.S. 27-14-704 , together with any earnings from the investment of bond proceeds, shall be deposited into the worker’s compensation claims payment account until such bonds are paid or provision for their payment has otherwise been made. Account proceeds may be invested or reinvested by the state treasurer at the direction of the state loan and investment board and may in addition to payment of claims and awards, program and administrative expenses, program reserves and debt service, be used to pay any ongoing and issuance costs of revenue bonds under W.S. 27-14-704 .
  7. The state treasurer, in consultation with the director, shall report to the joint appropriations interim committee not later than December 1, 2016 and every five (5) years thereafter, on the status of the worker’s compensation account and the projected status of the account during the subsequent five (5) year period.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 264, § 2; 1992, ch. 30, § 2; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 1996, ch. 81, § 2; 1998, ch. 13, § 1; 2005, ch. 231, § 1; 2006, ch. 13, § 1, ch. 114, § 1; 2016 ch. 28, § 1, effective March 3, 2016.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, deleted “within the trust and agency fund” at the end of the first sentence in (a).

The 2006 amendments. —

The first 2006 amendment by ch. 13, § 1, effective July 1, 2006, in (c), deleted “excluding provisions pertaining to the investment of Wyoming retirement system monies” at the end of the first sentence, added the second sentence and made a related change.

The second 2006 amendment by ch. 114, § 1, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in (e).

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 5, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 24, 2006.

Pursuant to the conflicting laws provision in ch. 114, both have been given effect in their section as set out.

The 2016 amendment rewrote former second sentence, which read: “The director, in consultation with a qualified independent investment manager, may establish a percent not to exceed forty-five percent (45%) of the total amount collected and accounted for under this subsection to be invested in common stock.” in (c); and added (g).

Laws 2016, ch. 28 § 2, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8 of the Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2016.

Editor's notes. —

Laws 2009, ch. 156, § 2 provides: “There is appropriated fifty-five thousand dollars ($55,000.00) from the worker's compensation account established by W.S. 27-14-701(a) and forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000.00) from the highway fund for one (1) full-time position which is authorized to the office of administrative hearings. These appropriations shall be for the period beginning with the effective date of this act and ending June 30, 2010. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this appropriation shall not be transferred or expended for any other purpose and any unexpended, unobligated funds remaining from this appropriation shall revert as provided by law on June 30, 2010. The position shall be included in the office's 2011-2012 standard biennial budget request and the funding shall be included in the department of employment's and department of transportation's standard biennial budgets.”

Laws 2009, ch. 156, § 3 provides: “There is appropriated twenty-seven thousand five hundred dollars ($27,500.00) from the worker's compensation account established by W.S. 27-14-701(a) and twenty-two thousand five hundred dollars ($22,500.00) from the highway fund for the cost of investigating the acquisition of a case management system capable of accepting and receiving electronic filings and which includes a time management system. No part of this appropriation shall be expended until after the chief information officer has reviewed the proposed expenditure of these funds and the governor has determined the expenditure is appropriate. This appropriation shall not be transferred or expended for any other purpose and any unexpended, unobligated funds remaining from this appropriation shall revert as provided by law on June 30, 2010.”

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

Laws 2006, ch. 114, § 3, provides: “[A]ny other act adopted by the Wyoming legislature during the same session in which this act is adopted shall be given precedence and shall prevail over the amendments in this act to the extent that such acts are in conflict with this act.”

§ 27-14-702. No garnishment, attachment or execution on unpaid award.

Except as provided under W.S. 27-14-703 , no money paid or payable under this act prior to issuance and delivery of the warrant therefor shall be assigned, charged or taken in execution or by garnishment. Any such assignment, attachment, garnishment or charge is void.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Intestate passage. —

Where injured workman who was awarded lump sum payment for total disability died before treasurer's warrant was issued, such award did not pass to his legal representatives as intestate property. La Chapelle v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 29 Wyo. 449, 214 P. 587, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1923), writ of error dismissed, 264 U.S. 575, 44 S. Ct. 452, 68 L. Ed. 857, 1924 U.S. LEXIS 2566 (U.S. 1924).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Construction and effect of statutory exemptions of proceeds of workmen's compensation awards, 31 ALR3d 532.

Validity, construction, and effect of statutory exemptions of proceeds of workers' compensation awards, 48 ALR5th 473.

§ 27-14-703. Disclosure of child support obligations required; notification; amount withheld; payment; applicability of provisions.

  1. An injured employee filing a claim for benefits payable under this act shall disclose if he owes child support obligations enforced pursuant to a plan described in 42 U.S.C. § 654 and approved under 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. If the employee owes child support obligations and is awarded benefits, the division shall notify the state or local child support enforcement agency operating pursuant to a plan described in 42 U.S.C. § 654 and enforcing the obligation that the employee is eligible for benefits.
  2. The division shall withhold from benefits payable to an employee owing child support obligations:
    1. The amount specified by the employee to the division to be withheld under this subsection;
    2. The amount determined pursuant to an agreement under 42 U.S.C. § 654(19)(B)(i) and submitted to the division by the state or local child support enforcement agency; or
    3. Any amount otherwise required to be withheld from benefits payable under this act pursuant to legal process defined under 42 U.S.C. § 662(e) [repealed] and properly served upon the division.
  3. Any amount withheld under subsection (b) of this section shall be paid by the division to the appropriate state or local child support enforcement agency, treated as if paid to the employee as benefits under this act and as if paid by the employee to the state or local child support enforcement agency in satisfaction of his child support obligations.
  4. This section applies only if arrangements are made for reimbursement by the state or local child support enforcement agency for administrative costs incurred by the division attributable to child support obligations enforced by the agency.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3.

Editor's notes. —

42 U.S.C. 662(e), referred to in paragraph (b)(iii), was repealed by P.L. 104-193.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Library References.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 89.08 (Matthew Bender).

§ 27-14-704. Worker's compensation revenue bonds; department determination; issuance by state loan and investment board; bonding procedure, terms and conditions.

  1. The department may upon determining that the issuance of revenue bonds would be financially beneficial to the worker’s compensation account and that bond issuance would not negatively impact employer contribution rates to the account, request the state loan and investment board to issue worker’s compensation revenue bonds to fund awards and claims, program and administrative expenses and program reserves. Upon receipt of a request under this subsection, the state loan and investment board shall review the department’s determination and if it concurs with the determination, the board may issue worker’s compensation revenue bonds in one (1) or more series not to exceed an aggregate amount of two hundred million dollars ($200,000,000.00). The net proceeds from the sale of the bonds shall after payment of issuance costs, be deposited into the worker’s compensation claims payment account established under W.S. 27-14-701(f).
  2. Revenue bonds issued pursuant to this section are limited obligations payable solely from and secured by funds deposited within the worker’s compensation account as created under W.S. 27-14-701(a) and the worker’s compensation claims payment account. The bondholders may not look to any general or other fund for payment of the bonds except for revenues pledged therefor. The revenue bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness or a debt within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory provision or limitation. The bonds shall not be considered or held to be general obligations of the state but shall constitute limited obligations of the state and the board shall not pledge the state’s full faith and credit for payment of the bonds. Each series of bonds may be issued by the board at public or private sale, in denominations and registered form, with such provision for conversion or exchange, for establishing interest rates or methods of determining rates on a variable or fixed rate basis, for establishing maturities and redemption provisions, as determined by the board. The bonds shall be payable at the office of a fiscal agent designated by the board. The state loan and investment board shall not issue any revenue bonds under this section unless the sale results in an economic benefit to the worker’s compensation program as determined by the board. In all other respects, the board may prescribe the form and terms of the revenue bonds and shall do whatever is lawful and necessary for their issuance and payment. Action taken by the board under this section shall be approved by a majority of its members.

History. Laws 1996, ch. 81, § 1; 1998, ch. 13, § 1; 2015 ch. 12, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in (b), deleted “at the office of the state treasurer or” following “bonds shall be payable” in the third from last sentence.

Article 8. Administrative Provisions

§ 27-14-801. Duties of director. [Effective until July 1, 2022]

  1. through (c) Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.
  2. The director may provide for the investigation of facts and circumstances regarding any claim filed under this act. To carry out investigations, he may acquire the services of one (1) or more physicians licensed to practice medicine in this state to serve as medical consultants in investigating any injury or death resulting from injury, the treatment of any injury or death or the recovery of any employee which is reported to the division. The physician shall be paid on a fee for service basis from the worker’s compensation account. The director may also employ consultants to review medical and hospital bills submitted to the division.
  3. The director shall:
    1. Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 2.
    2. Periodically provide for educational programs for and consult with employee groups, employers, hospital administrators and health care providers;
    3. Report to the appropriate professional or facility licensing authority any suspected substandard or inappropriate medical or health care provided to an injured worker by the provider or health care facility.
  4. Any duties designated by statute upon the director may be performed by his designee.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1990, ch. 63, § 3; 1996, ch. 82, § 2; 2012, ch. 48, § 1; 2022 ch. 26, § 1, effective July 1, 2022.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, added (e)(iii).

The 2022 amendment, effective July 1, 2022, added (e)(iv).

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Reliance on reviewing physicians. —

Although reviewing physicians had not personally examined or treated claimant, hearing examiner did not err in crediting their definitive opinions over treating physician's equivocal testimony. Burns v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 4 P.3d 924, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2000).

Cited in

Pohl v. Bailey Co., 980 P.2d 816, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1999).

§ 27-14-801. Duties of director. [Effective July 1, 2022]

  1. through (c) Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.
  2. The director may provide for the investigation of facts and circumstances regarding any claim filed under this act. To carry out investigations, he may acquire the services of one (1) or more physicians licensed to practice medicine in this state to serve as medical consultants in investigating any injury or death resulting from injury, the treatment of any injury or death or the recovery of any employee which is reported to the division. The physician shall be paid on a fee for service basis from the worker’s compensation account. The director may also employ consultants to review medical and hospital bills submitted to the division.
  3. The director shall:
    1. Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 2.
    2. Periodically provide for educational programs for and consult with employee groups, employers, hospital administrators and health care providers;
    3. Report to the appropriate professional or facility licensing authority any suspected substandard or inappropriate medical or health care provided to an injured worker by the provider or health care facility;
    4. Provide information and guidance to employers and employees as provided by W.S. 9-2-2602(b)(viii).
  4. Any duties designated by statute upon the director may be performed by his designee.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1990, ch. 63, § 3; 1996, ch. 82, § 2; 2012, ch. 48, § 1; 2022 ch. 26, § 1, effective July 1, 2022.

§ 27-14-802. Rulemaking power; fees; state's average wages; vocational rehabilitation; contracts with clerks of district court.

  1. The director may adopt rules and regulations for administration of this act. The director shall by rule and regulation establish criteria for qualification of resident and nonresident employers, provide for advance payments of employer premiums under W.S. 27-14-202(e), provide fee schedules for all medical and hospital care rendered injured employees and for the establishment of the state’s average monthly wage. In addition, the division may by rule and regulation establish a separate fee schedule for surgical procedures and hospital admissions preauthorized by the division. Changes in any rule or regulation adopted under this subsection shall be considered only at quarterly intervals.
  2. Before the last day of each quarter in each year, the department shall estimate the average monthly and weekly wage for the twelve (12) months preceding the quarter, based on unemployment insurance commission information and other available statistics.
  3. The division, together with the division of vocational rehabilitation within the department of workforce services, shall jointly establish consistent rules and regulations for the implementation of W.S. 27-14-408 .
  4. The division may contract with the clerks of district court on a county by county basis, for compensation mutually agreed upon, to perform the following functions:
    1. Technical assistance to employers, employees, health care providers and other interested parties in complying with the requirements of this act and interacting with the worker’s compensation system;
    2. Providing necessary forms to employers, employees health care providers and other interested parties;
    3. Responding to inquiries on the status of particular cases;
    4. Obtaining documents including confidential documents, concerning individual cases and transmitting these documents to authorized persons;
    5. Retention and storage of records prior to January 1, 1997; and
    6. Any other administrative function useful in the management of the worker’s compensation program.
  5. Compensation negotiated pursuant to subsection (d) of this section shall be paid from the worker’s compensation account and the agreement may be modified at any time by mutual consent of the parties or may be terminated by either party following notice specified in the agreement.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1989, ch. 29, § 1; ch. 30, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1994, ch. 86, § 2; 1996, ch. 82, § 1; 2002 Sp. Sess., ch. 100, § 3.

Editor's Notes. —

Laws 1996, ch. 82, § 4, provides: “Except as provided by W.S. 27-14-802(d) and (e) as amended under Section 1 of this act, effective January 1, 1997, all duties and responsibilities of the clerks of district court under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act shall be transferred to the worker's compensation division within the department of employment. The division shall identify and notify the clerks of court of those active worker's compensation case files to be transferred to the division. All other worker's compensation case files shall be retained by the clerks of court in accordance with file retention policies in effect for other district court cases.”

“Department,” as used in subsection (b), apparently means the Wyoming department of employment. See § 9-2-2002 .

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

Authority For Internal Hearing Unit. —

This section, along with §§ 16-3-102 and 16-3-112 vested the Division of Workers' Safety and Compensation with authority to form the Internal Hearing Unit comprised of members of the agency. Poll v. State ex rel. Department of Empl., Div. of Workers' Safety & Compensation, 963 P.2d 977, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1998).

Internal Hearing Unit properly formed. —

The Division of Workers Safety and Compensation was authorized to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the resolution of contested matters that are not required to be heard by the Medical Commission or the Office of Administrative Hearings, including agency review of claimed late filings, and had ample authority to form the Internal Hearing Unit. Sheneman v. Division of Workers' Safety & Comp. Internal Hearing Unit, 956 P.2d 344, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1998).

§ 27-14-803. Investigatory powers; examination of employer's records; subpoenas.

  1. In addition to W.S. 27-14-801(d) and if the administrator has reason to believe that an employee, employer, health care provider or any representative thereof has engaged in any activity in violation of this act, he shall make an investigation to determine if this act has been violated and, to the extent necessary for this purpose, may conduct discovery pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. The administrator may examine the books, accounts, payrolls or business operation of any employer to secure any information necessary for any investigation conducted under this section and for the administration of this act at any reasonable time on twenty-four (24) hours notice but excluding Sundays and holidays unless waived by the employer, either in person or through any authorized inspector, agent or deputy.
  3. If records necessary for an investigation under this section are located outside this state, the person being investigated shall:
    1. Make them available to the administrator at a convenient location within this state;
    2. Pay the reasonable and necessary expenses for the administrator or his representative to examine them at the location at which maintained; or
    3. Provide access to comparable officials of the state in which the records are located for inspection as the administrator may require.
  4. If the employer, employee, health care provider or any representative thereof refuses to cooperate and assist discovery by the administrator pursuant to this section, the attorney general may, at the request of the administrator and upon reasonable notice to all parties, apply to the district court for a subpoena or for an order compelling compliance.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1993, ch. 35, § 1.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

§ 27-14-804. Statistical compilation; annual report and projection; additional reporting requirements.

  1. The director shall:
    1. Secure and compile statistical information concerning injuries occurring in employment, showing the number of injuries or fatalities occurring in the employment and any other information relevant to the proper operation or administration of this law;
    2. Report to the governor as provided by W.S. 9-2-1014 ;
    3. Annually prepare and present to the governor and the legislature projections of income, expenditures and account balances for the succeeding twelve (12) month period;
    4. Annually report to the legislature on recommendations for improvement to the initial claims processing and determination process and the effectiveness of the process.
    5. Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3.

History. Laws 1986, Sp. Sess., ch. 3, § 3; 1990, ch. 63, §§ 2, 3; 2005, ch. 231, § 1.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “account balances” for “fund balances” in (a)(iii).

Editor's notes. —

There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

Conflicting legislation. —

Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 3, provides: “The provisions of this act shall supersede the provisions of any other bill enacted into law during the 2005 general session which amends or references accounts or funds to the extent any other enactment is inconsistent with the establishment of the funds and accounts created under this act. The state auditor shall account for any fund or account created in any other legislation enacted in the 2005 general session in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as promulgated by the governmental accounting standards board (GASB) and in accordance with this act.”

§ 27-14-805. Confidentiality of information; unlawful disclosure; exception.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this act, information obtained from any employer or covered employee pursuant to reporting requirements under this act or investigations conducted under W.S. 27-14-803 shall not be disclosed in a manner which reveals the identity of the employer or employee except to the employer, the employee, legal counsel for an employer, legal counsel for an employee or in situations necessary for the division to enforce any of the provisions of this act. The confidentiality limitations of this section do not apply to transfers of information between the divisions of the department of workforce services so long as the transfer of information is not restricted by federal law, rule or contract. In addition, nothing in this section shall prohibit the division from:
    1. Disclosing information obtained from employers and employees under this act and any determination of benefit rights to any state or federal agency as required under regulation of the United States department of health and human services and the state department of health, the United States internal revenue service in administering federal tax laws and to the office of the United States bankruptcy trustee;
    2. Allowing access to information obtained pursuant to the administration of this act to a law enforcement authority of the federal government or this state, upon a written request from that authority stating the information is necessary in connection with a criminal investigation;
    3. Allowing access by the state auditor to certain information obtained under this act limited to name, address, social security identification number and other general information pertaining to benefit entitlements and employers;
    4. Reporting to the appropriate professional or facility licensing authority any suspected substandard or inappropriate medical or health care provided to an injured worker by a health care provider or health care facility.
  2. Any employee who discloses information outside of the department in violation of federal or state law may be terminated without progressive discipline.
  3. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and any other provision of law to the contrary, and for purposes of ensuring any medical or disability benefit payment under this act does not duplicate any benefit payment made by another state agency, insurer, group health plan, third party administrator, health maintenance organization or similar entity, the department may upon request of the state agency, insurer or similar entity, disclose information limited to a recipient’s name, social security number, amount of benefit payment, charge for services, date of services and services rendered relating to the benefit payment made under this act. A state agency, insurer, group health plan, third party administrator, health maintenance organization or similar entity shall, upon request of the department, disclose the same limited information to the department. Information received under this subsection shall be used only for the purpose authorized by this subsection and shall otherwise be confidential and the recipient entity shall be subject to the confidentiality restrictions imposed by law upon information received to the extent required of the department. Any violation of this subsection is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.
  4. Prior to receipt of any benefit under this act, the department shall require an injured employee covered under this act to sign a waiver authorizing the release of information limited to benefit payment information to state agencies, insurers, group health plans, third party administrators, health maintenance organizations or similar entities for purposes specified by subsection (c) of this section.

History. Laws 1989, ch. 264, § 1; 1990, ch. 63, § 2; 1993, ch. 28, § 1; ch. 35, § 1; 1995, ch. 145, § 1; 2012, ch. 1, § 1; ch. 48, § 1.

The 2012 amendments. —

The first 2012 amendment, by ch. 1, § 1, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “workforce services” for “employment” in the introductory language of (a).

The second 2012 amendment, by ch. 48, § 1, effective July 1, 2012, added (a)(iv).

While neither amendment gave effect to the other, both have been given effect in this section as set out above.

Meaning of “this act.” —

See note under same catchline following § 27-14-101 .

§ 27-14-806. Experience rating manipulation; penalties.

  1. A person who knowingly, or with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the true facts or the requirements of this act, violates or attempts to violate the requirements of W.S. 27-14-207 or any other provision of this act related to determining the assignment of a premium rate, or who advises another to violate the requirements of W.S. 27-14-207 or any other provision of this act related to determining the assignment of a premium rate, shall be subject to the following penalties:
    1. A person who is an employer shall be assigned, for the rate year during which the noncompliance or misrepresentation occurred and for the following three (3) rate years, the highest base rate within the industry classification assigned during that year under the division’s rate filing. If the person’s business is already at the highest rate for any year, or if the amount of increase in the person’s rate would be less than two percent (2%) for that year, then a penalty rate of two percent (2%) shall be imposed for that year. This penalty may exceed the maximum assignable rate;
    2. In addition to the penalty imposed pursuant to paragraph (i) of this subsection, any violation or attempted violation of W.S. 27-14-207 or any other provision of this act related to determining the assignment of a premium rate may be prosecuted as a felony punishable by a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.

History. Laws 2005, ch. 185, § 1.

Effective dates. —

Laws 2005, ch. 185, § 3, makes the act effective July 1, 2005.

Cited in

Collins v. COP Wyo., LLC, 2016 WY 18, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Feb. 10, 2016).

Chapter 15 Presumptive Disability For Certain Diseases

§ 27-15-101. Definitions.

  1. As used in this act:
    1. “Firefighter” means a paid fireman defined under W.S. 15-5-201(a)(xi), a firefighter member under W.S. 9-3-402(a)(xxv), an employee under W.S. 15-5-402(a)(viii), a volunteer fireman defined under W.S. 15-5-201(a)(xiv) and a volunteer firefighter or firefighter defined under W.S. 35-9-616(a)(x). “Firefighter” also means an individual employed by a municipal corporation or private organization who devotes the individual’s entire time of employment to the provision of fire protection service for a city, town, county or fire protection district;
    2. “Listed disease” means any of the following:
      1. Cancer, lymphoma or leukemia that may be caused by exposure to heat, smoke, radiation or a known or suspected carcinogen as determined by the International Agency for Research on Cancer;
      2. Cardiovascular disease;
      3. Acute myocardial infarction or stroke;
      4. A disease, illness, health impairment or disability determined on a case-by-case basis under W.S. 27-15-102(h).
    3. “Minimum period of employment” means:
      1. Employment as a firefighter for at least ten (10) years; and
      2. For volunteer firefighters, an individual is considered to have been employed for the minimum period of employment if that individual while actively a volunteer participates or participated in a minimum of forty percent (40%) of the drills conducted by the individual’s department and a minimum of twenty-five percent (25%) of the emergency calls received during the time the volunteer serves or served on call. Volunteer firefighter departments shall keep individual records that document the criteria in this subparagraph.
    4. “This act” means W.S. 27-15-101 through 27-15-103 .

History. 2017 ch. 139, § 1, effective March 3, 2017.

Effective date. —

Laws 2017, ch. 139, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2017.

§ 27-15-102. Presumption of occupational disability; applicability; exceptions.

  1. A firefighter who suffers from a listed disease is presumed to have developed that listed disease during the course and scope of employment. The listed disease is presumed to be an occupational disease, the dominant cause of which is the employment as a firefighter, unless the contrary is proven.
  2. A presumption established under this act applies to a determination of whether a firefighter’s injury, disease, illness, health impairment, disability or death resulted from a listed disease contracted in the course and scope of employment for purposes of benefits or compensation provided under:
    1. Firefighter retirement and disability retirement plans administered by the Wyoming retirement board under W.S. 9-3-401 through 9-3-431 , 15-5-201 through 15-5-209 , 15-5-401 through 15-5-422 and 35-9-616 through 35-9-628 ;
    2. Workers’ compensation benefits paid by or on behalf of an employer to an employee under the provisions of W.S. 27-14-101 through 27-14-806 ;
    3. University of Wyoming and Wyoming community college tuition and fees as provided under W.S. 21-16-1501(h) and (j).
  3. The presumption in subsection (a) of this section applies only to a firefighter who:
    1. Is employed for not less than the minimum period of employment and seeks the presumption within:
      1. Ten (10) years after cessation of employment for a listed disease as defined by W.S. 27-15-101(a)(ii)(A);
      2. One (1) year after cessation of employment for a listed disease as defined by W.S. 27-15-101(a)(ii)(B) or (C);
      3. A period to be determined by the Wyoming worker’s compensation medical commission for a listed disease as defined by W.S. 27-15-101(a)(ii)(D).
    2. Has been exposed to the hazards involved in firefighting during the minimum period of employment; and
    3. On becoming employed or during employment as a firefighter received a physical examination that failed to reveal evidence of the listed disease for which the presumption is sought.
  4. The presumption in subsection (a) of this section does not apply:
    1. If the listed disease is known to be caused by tobacco use and the firefighter:
      1. Is a regular user of tobacco for five (5) or more years; or
      2. Was a regular user of tobacco for five (5) or more years and it has been fewer than ten (10) years since the firefighter gave up the use of tobacco products.
    2. In a cause of action brought in a state or federal court except for judicial review of a proceeding in which there has been a grant or denial of employment-related benefits or compensation.
  5. This act does not create a cause of action.
  6. This act does not enlarge or establish a right to any benefit or compensation or eligibility for any benefit or compensation.
  7. A firefighter who qualifies for a presumption established under this act is entitled only to the benefits or compensation to which the firefighter would otherwise be entitled to receive at the time the claim for benefits or compensation is filed.
  8. A presumption under this act is not limited to the current listed diseases. A firefighter is not precluded from a case-by-case demonstration before the Wyoming workers’ compensation medical commission that the dominant cause of the firefighter’s disease, illness, health impairment or disability is or was employment as a firefighter.
  9. Paragraph (d)(i) of this section only prevents the application of the presumption authorized by this chapter and does not affect the right of a firefighter to provide proof, without the use of the presumption, that an injury, disease, illness, health impairment or disability occurred during the course and scope of employment.

History. 2017 ch. 139, § 1, effective March 3, 2017.

Effective date. —

Laws 2017, ch. 139, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2017.

§ 27-15-103. Presumption rebuttal.

A person opposed to the award of benefits or compensation listed under W.S. 27-15-102(b) may rebut the presumption under this act through a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a risk factor, accident, hazard or other cause not associated with the firefighter’s service was the dominant cause of the listed disease.

History. 2017 ch. 139, § 1, effective March 3, 2017.

Effective date. —

Laws 2017, ch. 139, § 3, makes the act effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const. Approved March 3, 2017.