§ 1. Power inherent in the people.

All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness; for the advancement of these ends they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper.

Construction. —

Art. 1, § 1, Wyo. Const., recognizes the ultimate right of the people to alter, reform, or abolish government, through peaceful means or otherwise, but when read in pari materia with the rest of the constitution, it does not contemplate the adoption of laws under the existing government, whether by legislation or initiative, other than through constitutionally established means. Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2004).

While Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 1 recognizes the ultimate right of the people to alter, reform, or abolish government, that right must be exercised in accordance with the constitution. Reading art. 1, § 1 in pari materia with other relevant constitutional provisions, the framers intended that laws altering the government would be adopted only through the constitutional amendment process. Maxfield v. State, 2013 WY 14, 294 P.3d 895, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2013).

Local self-government to be given effect. —

The supreme court must give effect to local self-government insofar at least as required by constitution, at the same time remembering that it is the court's duty to uphold a legislative act, to the extent that is reasonably possible. Stewart v. Cheyenne, 60 Wyo. 497, 154 P.2d 355, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1944).

Applied in

Simpkin v. Rock Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 237 P. 245, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (1925).

Quoted in

Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1980).

Cited in

Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1989).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Wyoming Constitution: A Centennial Assessment,” see XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. 13 (1991).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 ALR3d 486.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 ALR3d 564.

Implied cause of action for damages for violation of provisions of state constitutions, 75 ALR5th 619.

What constitutes reverse sex or gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — Nonemployment cases, 166 ALR Fed 1.

§ 2. Equality of all.

In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are equal.

Rights are relative. —

Neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute, but such rights are relative. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

The rights protected by this section are not absolutes and do not preclude imposition, by decision or statute, of such reasonable restrictions, on those rights as are in the public interest. Haskins v. State, 516 P.2d 1171, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1973).

Arbitrary and invidious discrimination condemned. —

This section does not require exact equality. Only arbitrary and invidious discrimination is condemned. Cavanagh v. State, 505 P.2d 311, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1973).

Bald assertions of discrimination are insufficient. —

A person contesting the constitutionality of a statute must do more than make bald assertions of what he thinks is discriminatory. Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1963); United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1978).

Equal protection claims test. —

The four aspects of the test for analyzing state constitution equal protection claims inquire as to (1) what class is harmed by the legislation and has that group been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our laws; (2) what is the public purpose to be served by the law; (3) what is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies disparate treatment; and (4) how are the characteristics used to distinguish people for disparate treatment relevant to the purpose the challenged law purportedly intends to serve. Allhusen v. State, 898 P.2d 878, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1995), (decided prior to 2001 amendments to the Mental Health Professions Practice Act).

Burden on assailant to show classification is arbitrary. —

One who assails the classification in a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1963).

It is appellant's burden to show that it has been subjected to disparate treatment, resulting in a denial of equal protection. United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1978).

Public school principal failed to meet his burden of showing that his statements made to the board of education on the career education program and football reserved ticket sales were constitutionally protected or the substantial or motivating factor for his termination. Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist., 558 F.2d 982, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12285 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1977).

Criminal law cannot be lacking in definition. —

The constitutional guarantee of equal rights under the law will not tolerate a criminal law so lacking in definition that each defendant is left to the vagaries of individual judges and juries. State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1963); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

Grand jury constitutional. —

The perceived advantages which flow from the procedure involving a complaint and preliminary examination followed by an information do not justify a conclusion that a defendant is denied equal protection of the law because a grand jury is used. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Wyoming is not committed to absolute uniformity in sentencing for criminal offenses. Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 327 (Wyo. 1982).

First degree murder for child abuse. —

Defendant's prosecution for felony murder under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 , based on his abuse of a child under 16, rather than for child abuse, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503 , did not violate equal protection, under this section, or Wyo. Const. art. I, § 34, as the provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 allowing a first degree murder prosecution for child abuse gives fair notice that life imprisonment or execution is a possible penalty. Johnson v. State, 2003 WY 9, 61 P.3d 1234, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. Feb. 18, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 841, 124 S. Ct. 108, 157 L. Ed. 2d 74, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5710 (U.S. 2003).

Placing guilty, unconvicted, person on probation. —

Although the prosecutor gave no reason for the state's refusal to consent to treatment under § 7-13-301 (placing guilty, unconvicted, person on probation), the prosecutor, not the judge, controls the prosecution up to adjudication, and the court will not presume that suspect factors or arbitrary classifications exist. Thus, the refusal to consent to sentencing under § 7-13-301 was not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. Nov. 9, 1990); Hudson v. State, 800 P.2d 471, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1990); Heggen v. State, 800 P.2d 475, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1990); Cambio v. State, 800 P.2d 482, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1990); Gezzi v. State, 800 P.2d 485, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 1990); Kruzich v. State, 800 P.2d 489, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 1990).

Sex offender registration for juveniles.—

Sex offender registration for juveniles did not violate the Equal Protection Clause in Wyo. Const. art. I, § 2, as juveniles were afforded the same opportunity as adults to enter into a consent decree deferring their respective cases and have them discharged and never adjudicated delinquent. Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

Criminal acquittees are dissimilar to civil acquittees for equal protection purposes. —

A criminal acquittee has placed his mental illness at issue, proved it by a preponderance of the evidence, and committed a criminal act. Such important differences render a criminal acquittee dissimilar to a civil committee for equal protection purposes. Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, 36 P.3d 586, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2001).

Felons and misdemeanants are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes. —

The defendant argued that he was being treated differently from a person who was serving the same amount of time in the state penitentiary because those in prison were afforded opportunities such as good time, vocational and educational programs, merit programs, library and recreational facilities and therapy programs which were not available in the county jail; however, this equal protection claim failed because felons and misdemeanants are not similarly situated persons for purposes of identification of a classification of similarly situated persons who are being treated differently. Tilley v. State, 912 P.2d 1140, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1996).

Negligence immunity of co-employees unconstitutional. —

The statute which, under the Wyoming worker's compensation scheme, grants immunity from suits by co-employees to employees who were acting within the scope of their employment, § 27-14-104 , is unconstitutional because it violates the Wyoming Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992).

Right of illegitimate infant to claim and recover damages for parent's wrongful death. —

Wyoming's wrongful death statute cannot constitutionally deny an illegitimate infant the right to claim and recover damages for the wrongful death of his or her parent. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1975), overruled, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 296 (Wyo. 1984).

Right to choose to belong or not to belong to a union is included in the guaranty of liberty and pursuit of happiness. Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance Local, 70 Wyo. 165, 246 P.2d 778, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1952).

Right to associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty under Wyoming constitution. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Gender-based classifications are not ipso facto invalid. A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982).

And failure to give father same procedure to establish paternity as mother constitutional. —

The failure to give the biological father the same procedure to establish paternity or nonpaternity as is given to the mother does not unconstitutionally deprive the father of due process of law nor equal protection of the law by virtue of an impermissible gender-based classification. A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982).

Classifications based on improper criteria of legitimacy or illegitimacy constitute denial of equal protection. Bowers v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 593 P.2d 182, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 394 (Wyo. 1979).

And no legitimate state interest is served by discrimination between legally married spouses. Bowers v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 593 P.2d 182, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 394 (Wyo. 1979).

Private School Licensing Act. —

No classification had been created by the Private School Licensing Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-401 through 21-2-407 , and it was unnecessary to do any further analysis under the test where those institutions that were already accredited obviously did not have to apply to become accredited, and those institutions that were not accredited had to become accredited within the time frame provided; therefore, no equal protection violation occurred because different classifications were not created under the act or the rules adopted by the Wyoming Department of Education. Newport Int'l Univ., Inc. v. State, 2008 WY 72, 186 P.3d 382, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2008).

Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act (§ 9-2-1501 et seq.) (repealed in 2005) is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause of the state constitution. The act is not rationally related to protection of the public health or economic and social stability of the state. Also, the legislature's use of the law to protect one class of people from financial difficulties, while it dilutes the rights under the constitution of another class of people, cannot be condoned. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1988).

Mental Health Professions Practice Act violates equal protection. —

Under the Mental Health Professions Practice Act, private counselors rights to equal protection have been transgressed; none of the evidence demonstrates that supervision by public, licensed counselors results in the qualification of counselors who are more competent or more ethical and, thus, more likely to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. The differentiation of the public employer or the charitable employer from the private, for-profit employer cannot be justified as a proper classification and, thus, is not a legitimate exercise in police power. This classification is not founded on a reasonable basis, is arbitrary, and constitutes unwarranted discrimination. It is a violation of equal protection and must be set aside. Allhusen v. State, 898 P.2d 878, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1995), (decided prior to 2001 amendments to the Mental Health Professions Practice Act).

The mandatory licensure provisions under § 33-38-110 , the prerequisites to licensure found in § 33-38-106 , and the licensure exemptions set forth in § 33-38-103 violate guarantees of equal protection under art. 1, §§ 2 and 34, Wyo. Const. and art. 3, § 27, Wyo. Const.; these provisions must be stricken as contrary to guarantees of equal protection, the guarantee of uniform operation of laws, and as special legislation. The unconstitutional provisions are of no effect, and the law in the form it existed prior to the 1993 amendments is controlling. Allhusen v. State, 898 P.2d 878, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1995), (decided prior to 2001 amendments to the Mental Health Professions Practice Act).

Legislature may not prohibit occupations, unless they are detrimental to public welfare. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Prohibiting uninvited visitation of private residences by solicitors. —

Ordinance declaring uninvited visitation of private residences by solicitors, peddlers, itinerant merchants and others, for the purpose of soliciting orders for or selling goods, wares and merchandise, a nuisance and imposing a penalty, is valid exercise of the police power. Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1936).

Prohibition of water variances not unconstitutional. —

A prohibition of water variances does not violate art. 1, § 7, Wyo. Const., in that it is an exercise of absolute and arbitrary power; does not deny due process by denying a fair opportunity to challenge applicable water quality standards; and does not deny equal protection of the laws by discriminating between water and other pollutant dischargers. United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1978).

There are rational reasons to distinguish between water and other pollutant dischargers, including: the different nature of the natural resources; the difference in the number of pollutant dischargers within each class; and the difference in the extent of damage which can result from the various discharges. United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1978).

Application of the rule against holding incompatible offices, whether by the common law or legislative enactment, does not result in an unconstitutional infringement of personal and political rights. Haskins v. State, 516 P.2d 1171, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1973).

Regulation of use of highways. —

State or municipal highway regulations must be reasonable, operate with equality and have some tendency to accomplish object in view. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Courts must determine in first instance whether legislature may prohibit use of highways in particular case, and whether regulation amounting to prohibition is reasonable. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Control of highways may in proper cases be extended to prohibiting their use, and legislature may subject private carriers to appropriate regulations. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Statute prohibiting use of highways by motor transportation companies, except under certificate and subject to regulation and supervision by public service commission, is void as applied to private carriers. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Statutory regulations making for safety in the operation of all motor vehicles on the highways are clearly within the authority of the state, which may demand compensation for the special facilities which it has provided to promote the public safety without violation of this section. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1935).

Seat belt usage provision does not violate equal protection laws. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1402(f) does not violate the equal protection clauses of either the United States nor the Wyoming Constitutions under rational review basis; the statute's purpose is to encourage seat belt use while limiting the penalties for seat belt nonuse and preserving the right to compensation for accidents caused by negligent tortfeasors, and it is conceivable that § 31-5-1402(f) serves the purposes for which it was enacted. Huff v. Shumate, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27781 (D. Wyo. 2004).

Suspension of license violated equal protection guarantees. —

Section 31-7-126 (former) and § 31-7-128(f), which provide for the driver's license suspension of individuals under 19 years of age convicted of possession or consumption of alcohol, violate the Wyoming Constitution's equal protection guarantees. Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1992).

Suspension of commercial driving privileges. —

Driver, who had his driver's license suspended for driving while under the influence while driving his personal noncommercial motor vehicle, was not deprived of his equal protection rights when, because he held a commercial driver's license, he was not granted a probationary driver's license because of § 31-17-105 (now repealed); the legislative concern with safety will remain and be legitimate regardless of the makeup or characteristics of individuals in the regulated group. Wilson v. State, 841 P.2d 90, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1992).

Requirement that railroads fence rights-of-way is not discriminatory. —

The fact that railroads are required to fence their rights-of-way while motor transports are not required to fence a highway right-of-way is not discriminatory so as to make the requirement unconstitutional. Chicago & N. W. R.R. v. Bishop, 390 P.2d 731, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1964).

Constitutionality of § 14-6-203 . —

The statutory scheme of § 14-6-203 is constitutional; there is no demonstrable prejudice arising out of the failure to assign the burden of proof prior to any hearing; and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to transfer case to juvenile court or on the part of the trial judge in transferring another case to the county court from juvenile court for a preliminary examination with the view that the case would be prosecuted in the district court. Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1995).

Stalking statute constitutional. —

The specific provision of § 6-2-506 making stalking a felony if committed in violation of any condition of probation, parole, or bail is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate the defendant's right to equal protection. Garton v. State, 910 P.2d 1348, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1996).

Applied in

Mealey v. City of Laramie, 472 P.2d 787, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1970); DS v. Department of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1980); State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 415 (Wyo. 1982).

Quoted in

Walgreen Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 70 Wyo. 193, 246 P.2d 767, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1952); State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 231 (Wyo. 1974); Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1980); White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1989); Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14885 (D. Wyo. 1991); GWJ v. MH, 930 P.2d 371, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1996); Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017).

Stated in

Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984).

Cited in

Hovey v. Sheffner, 16 Wyo. 254, 93 P. 305, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 24 , 15 L.R.A. (n.s.) 227 (1908); Bowers v. Getter Trucking Co., 514 P.2d 837, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1973); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1976); Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1977); Todd v. State, 566 P.2d 597, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 271 (Wyo. 1977); Mayland v. State, 568 P.2d 897, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 283 (Wyo. 1977); Great W. Sugar Co. v. Johnson, 624 P.2d 1184, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1981); Johnston v. Board of Trustees, 661 P.2d 1045, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1983); Bridge v. Eisenman Transp., Inc., 742 P.2d 768, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 510 (Wyo. 1987); Allen v. Natrona County Sch. Dist. No. One, 811 P.2d 1, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1991); Ottema v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div., 968 P.2d 41, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1998); RS v. Johnson County Dept. of Family Servs. (In re JL), 989 P.2d 1268, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1999); EBH v. Hot Springs Dep't of Family Servs., 2001 WY 100, 33 P.3d 172, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2001); MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002); Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp., 2003 WY 77, 71 P.3d 717, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2003); In re JJF v. State, 2006 WY 41, 132 P.3d 170, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. Apr. 6, 2006); DT v. State, 2017 WY 36, 391 P.3d 1136, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Industrial Siting Legislation: The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and Siting Act — Advance or Retreat?” see XI Land & Water L. Rev. 27 (1976).

For case note, “Water Rights — Impairment of Existing Water Rights Under the Wyoming Watershed Act. Associated Enters., Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist., 656 P.2d 1144, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1983),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 83 (1984).

For comment, “Prosecution as a Juvenile or an Adult? Is the Discretion Vested in the District Attorney by Section 14-6-203(c) of the Wyoming Statutes Unconstitutional and Violative of the Proper Role of a Prosecutor?” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1984).

For comment, “Reforming Criminal Sentencing in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 575 (1985).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Requiring apology as “affirmative action” or other form of redress under state Civil Rights Act, 85 ALR3d 402.

Prohibition, under state civil rights laws, of racial discrimination in rental of privately owned residential property, 96 ALR3d 497.

Constitutionality of assault and battery laws limited to protection of females only or which provide greater penalties for males than for females, 5 ALR4th 708.

Validity of ordinance restricting number of unrelated persons who can live together in residential zone, 12 ALR4th 238.

Sex discrimination in treatment of jail or prison inmates, 12 ALR4th 1219.

Constitutionality of gender-based classifications in criminal laws proscribing nonsupport of spouse or child, 14 ALR4th 717.

On-the-job sexual harassment as violation of state civil rights law, 18 ALR4th 328.

Statutory or constitutional provision allowing widow but not widower to take against will and receive dower interests, allowances, homestead rights, or the like as denial of equal protection of law, 18 ALR4th 910.

Validity of state statute providing for termination of parental rights, 22 ALR4th 774.

Refusal to rent residential premises to persons with children as unlawful discrimination, 30 ALR4th 1187.

Applicability and application of zoning regulations to single residences employed for group living of mentally retarded persons, 32 ALR4th 1018.

Race as factor in adoption proceedings, 34 ALR4th 167.

Validity and application of statute exempting nonmanagerial, nonfinancially interested employees from obscenity prosecution, 35 ALR4th 1237.

Validity of state statute or local ordinance requiring, or giving preference to, the employment of residents by contractors or subcontractors engaged in, or awarded contracts for, the construction of public works or improvements, 36 ALR4th 941.

Validity and construction of state statute or rule allowing or changing rate of prejudgment interest in tort actions, 40 ALR4th 147.

Validity and construction of products liability statute precluding or limiting recovery where product has been altered or modified after leaving hands of manufacturer or seller, 41 ALR4th 47.

Validity of state statute providing for periodic payment of future damages in medical malpractice action, 41 ALR4th 275.

Validity, construction and application of state statutory provision prohibiting sales of commodities below cost — modern cases, 41 ALR4th 612.

Validity, construction and application, in nonstatutory personal injury actions, of state statute providing for borrowing of statute of limitations of another state, 41 ALR4th 1025.

Validity, construction and application of enactment, implementation or repeal of formal educational requirement for admission to the bar, 44 ALR4th 910.

Court appointment of attorney to represent, without compensation indigent in civil action, 52 ALR4th 1063.

Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily committed mentally ill persons with neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs as violative of state constitutional guaranty, 74 ALR4th 1099.

Validity, construction, application, and effect of statute requiring conditions, in addition to expiration of time, for reinstatement of suspended or revoked driver's license 2 ALR5th 725.

Validity of state or local gross receipts tax on gambling, 21 ALR5th 812.

Voir dire exclusions of men from state trial jury or jury panel — Post-J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 3121, cases, 88 ALR5th 67.

Federal and state constitutional provisions as prohibiting discrimination in employment on basis of gay, lesbian, or bisexual sexual orientation or conduct, 96 ALR5th 391.

Federal and state constitutional provisions and state statutes as prohibiting employment discrimination based on heterosexual conduct or relationship, 123 ALR 5th 411.

Sex discrimination in law enforcement and corrections employment, 53 ALR Fed 31.

Effect of broadcaster's employment practices on renewal of broadcaster's radio license, 56 ALR Fed 49.

Sex discrimination in United States Armed Forces, 56 ALR Fed 850.

Effect of broadcaster's employment practices on renewal of broadcaster's television license, 57 ALR Fed 16.

When will federal government employee be excused from 30-day limitation period, established by equal employment opportunity commission regulation (29 CFR § 1613.214(a)(1)(i)), for bringing matters relating to employment discrimination to attention of equal employment opportunity counselor, 57 ALR Fed 116.

Propriety of federal court's ordering state or local tax increase to effectuate civil right decree, 76 ALR Fed 504.

What constitutes violation of 18 USC § 245(b), prohibiting interference with civil rights, 76 ALR Fed 816.

Eligibility of illegitimate child for survivor's benefits under Social Security Act, pursuant to § 216(h)(2)(A) of Act (42 USC § 416(h)(2)(A)), where state intestacy law denying inheritance right, or application of that state law to § 216(h)(2)(A), may violate child's right to equal protection of laws, 116 ALR Fed 121.

Availability of Nominal Damages in Action Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.), 143 ALR Fed 269.

Sex discrimination in public education under Title IX — Supreme Court cases, 158 ALR Fed 563.

What constitutes reverse or majority race or national origin discrimination violative of federal constitution or statutes — nonemployment cases 152 ALR Fed 1.

What constitutes reverse sex or gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — Nonemployment cases, 166 ALR Fed 1.

What constitutes reverse or majority race or national origin discrimination violative of federal constitution or statutes — Public employment cases, 168 ALR Fed 1.

Equal protection and due process clause challenges based on racial discrimination — Supreme Court cases, 172 ALR Fed 1.

§ 3. Equal political rights.

Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting the political rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Cross references. —

As to appointment of guardian or conservator on grounds of incompetency, etc., see §§ 3-1-105 and 3-2-101 .

Rights are relative. —

Neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute, but such rights are relative. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

The rights protected by this section are not absolutes, and they do not preclude imposition, by decision or statute, of such reasonable restrictions on those rights as are in the public interest. Haskins v. State, 516 P.2d 1171, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1973).

Men and women are equal before the law. —

The “equality” provisions of the constitution, this section and art. 6, § 1, emphasize the fact that women in Wyoming are men's equals before the law. State v. Yazzie, 67 Wyo. 256, 218 P.2d 482, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1950).

Term limit statute unconstitutional. —

Term limit law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103 , as it applies to candidates for the state legislature, whether adopted by initiative or legislative action, is unconstitutional and unenforceable because it violates art. 1, § 3 and art. 3, §§ 2 and 52(g), Wyo. Const. No law, whether enacted by the legislature through the legislative process or by the people through the initiative process, may condition political rights and privileges upon a circumstance or condition such as incumbency. Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2004).

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 3 prohibited the passage of any law conditioning political rights and privileges upon a circumstance or condition other than those enumerated. Because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103 conditioned the right to hold the office of Secretary of State on incumbency, not an enumerated condition, it was unconstitutional. Maxfield v. State, 2013 WY 14, 294 P.3d 895, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2013).

Municipal election candidacy requirements constitutional. —

Since Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-301 does not create a class of persons who must resign their employment before seeking election to municipal office, the statute is not unconstitutional on that ground. Hayes v. City of Sheridan, 2005 WY 10, 105 P.3d 459, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2005).

Workers' compensation. —

The state had a legitimate interest in and rational basis for creating the statutory classification that exempts mobile home parks from mandatory workers' compensation coverage. Gonzales v. Grass Valley Mobile Home Park, 933 P.2d 484, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1997), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Felons and misdemeanants are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes. —

The defendant argued that he was being treated differently from a person who was serving the same amount of time in the state penitentiary because those in prison were afforded opportunities such as good time, vocational and educational programs, merit programs, library and recreational facilities and therapy programs which were not available in the county jail; however, this equal protection claim failed because felons and misdemeanants are not similarly situated persons for purposes of identification of a classification of similarly situated persons who are being treated differently. Tilley v. State, 912 P.2d 1140, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1996).

Purpose of statute must be within scope of police power. —

The due process clause has a substantive aspect as well as a procedural one and in order that a statute may be valid, the purpose, aim or end thereof must be within the scope or purview of the police power. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

Statute providing that only taxpayers may vote at bond elections is invalid so far as it relates to elections on propositions to create public debt. Simpkin v. Rock Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 237 P. 245, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1925).

Private School Licensing Act. —

No classification had been created by the Private School Licensing Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-401 through 21-2-407 , and it was unnecessary to do any further analysis under the test where those institutions that were already accredited obviously did not have to apply to become accredited, and those institutions that were not accredited had to become accredited within the time frame provided; therefore, no equal protection violation occurred because different classifications were not created under the act or the rules adopted by the Wyoming Department of Education. Newport Int'l Univ., Inc. v. State, 2008 WY 72, 186 P.3d 382, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2008).

Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act (§ 9-2-1501 et seq.) (repealed in 2005) is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause of the state constitution. The act is not rationally related to protection of the public health or economic and social stability of the state. Also, the legislature's use of the law to protect one class of people from financial difficulties, while it dilutes the rights under the constitution of another class of people, cannot be condoned. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1988).

Professional Review Panel Act unconstitutional. —

The Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act (§ 9-2-1801 et seq.) violates the equal protection guarantees of the Wyoming Constitution and is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Wyoming Ass'n of Consulting Eng'rs & Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1990).

Negligence immunity of co-employees unconstitutional. —

The statute which, under the Wyoming worker's compensation scheme, granted immunity from suits by co-employees to employees who were acting within the scope of their employment, § 27-14-104 , is unconstitutional because it violated the Wyoming Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992).

Application of the rule against holding incompatible offices, whether by the common law or legislative enactment, does not result in an unconstitutional infringement of personal and political rights. Haskins v. State, 516 P.2d 1171, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1973).

Criminal law cannot be lacking in definition. —

The constitutional guarantee of equal rights under the law will not tolerate a criminal law so lacking in definition that each defendant is left to the vagaries of individual judges and juries. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

Grand jury constitutional. —

The perceived advantages which flow from the procedure involving a complaint and preliminary examination followed by an information do not justify a conclusion that a defendant is denied equal protection of the law because a grand jury is used. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Statute relating to transfer of prisoners. —

Section 10, ch. 63, Laws 1913, concerning the transfer of prisoners, is not unconstitutional as violating constitutional guarantees of due process, equality of rights or trial by jury with opportunity to defend, nor as permitting exercise of arbitrary power or a delegation of judicial functions to an executive board. Uram v. Roach, 47 Wyo. 335, 37 P.2d 793, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1934).

Suspension of license violated equal protection guarantees. —

Section 31-7-126 (former) and § 31-7-128(f), which provide for the driver's license suspension of individuals under 19 years of age convicted of possession or consumption of alcohol, violate the Wyoming Constitution's equal protection guarantees. Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1992).

Seat belt usage provision does not violate equal protection laws. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1402(f) does not violate the equal protection clauses of either the United States nor the Wyoming Constitutions under rational review basis; the statute's purpose is to encourage seat belt use while limiting the penalties for seat belt nonuse and preserving the right to compensation for accidents caused by negligent tortfeasors, and it is conceivable that § 31-5-1402(f) serves the purposes for which it was enacted. Huff v. Shumate, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27781 (D. Wyo. 2004).

Constitutionality of § 14-6-203 . —

The statutory scheme of § 14-6-203 is constitutional; there is no demonstrable prejudice arising out of the failure to assign the burden of proof prior to any hearing; and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to transfer case to juvenile court or on the part of the trial judge in transferring another case to the county court from juvenile court for a preliminary examination with the view that the case would be prosecuted in the district court. Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1995).

Applied in

State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 415 (Wyo. 1982); Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1991).

Quoted in

Miller v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 Wyo. 502, 337 P.2d 262, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (1959); Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1980); Galesburg Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1982); Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1136, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 229 (Wyo. 1989); White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1989); Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14885 (D. Wyo. 1991); Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017).

Cited in

People ex rel. Emerson v. Shawver, 30 Wyo. 366, 222 P. 11, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (1924); State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1963); Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12370 (D. Wyo. 1970); Bowers v. Getter Trucking Co., 514 P.2d 837, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1973); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1976); Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1977); Mayland v. State, 568 P.2d 897, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 283 (Wyo. 1977); Tilley v. State, 912 P.2d 1140, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1996); Tate v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 932 P.2d 746, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1997); Ottema v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div., 968 P.2d 41, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1998); Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp., 2003 WY 77, 71 P.3d 717, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2003).

Law reviews. —

For comment dealing with validity of loyalty oaths for candidates, see 5 Wyo. L.J. 146.

For article, “The Constitutionality of Wyoming's Oil and Gas Compulsory Pooling Provision,” see 6 Wyo. L.J. 300.

For article, “Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming — Part II,” see VII Land & Water L. Rev. 617 (1972).

For case note, “Legal Interests vs. Relational Interests. Coyne v. State ex rel. Thomas, 595 P.2d 970, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 424 (Wyo. 1979),” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 349 (1980).

For case note, “Constitutional Law — Equal Protection Analysis. Awarding Public Works Contracts: Granting Preference to Resident Bidders. Galesburg Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 393 (1983).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

For comment, “Child Custody Arrangements: Say What You Mean, Mean What You Say,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 591 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

State laws prohibiting sex discrimination as violated by dress or grooming requirements for customers of establishments serving food or beverages, 89 ALR3d 7.

Construction and application of state equal rights amendments forbidding determination of rights based on sex, 90 ALR3d 158.

Prohibition, under state civil rights laws, of racial discrimination in rental of privately owned residential property, 96 ALR3d 497.

Constitutionality of assault and battery laws limited to protection of females only or which provide greater penalties for males than for females, 5 ALR4th 708.

Sex discrimination in treatment of jail or prison inmates, 12 ALR4th 1219.

Propriety of automobile insurer's policy of refusing insurance, or requiring advanced rates, because of age, sex, residence, or handicap, 33 ALR4th 523.

Exclusion of one sex from admission to or enjoyment of equal privileges in places of accommodation or entertainment as actionable sex discrimination under state law, 38 ALR4th 339.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance regulating commercial video game enterprises, 38 ALR4th 930.

Propriety of asking prospective female jurors questions on voir dire not asked of prospective male jurors, or vice versa, 39 ALR4th 450.

Tax on hotel-motel room occupancy, 58 ALR4th 274.

AIDS infection as affecting right to attend public school, 60 ALR4th 15.

Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily committed mentally ill persons with neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs as violative of state constitutional guaranty, 74 ALR4th 1099.

Application of statute denying access to courts or invalidating contracts where corporation fails to comply with regulatory statute as affected by compliance after commencement of action, 23 ALR5th 744.

Sex discrimination in law enforcement and corrections employment, 53 ALR Fed 31.

Application of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 USC §§ 1681 et seq.) to sex discrimination in educational employment, 54 ALR Fed 522.

Sex discrimination in United States Armed Forces, 56 ALR Fed 850.

Defense of good faith in action for damages against law enforcement official under 42 USC § 1983, providing for liability of person who, under color of law, subjects another to deprivation of rights, 61 ALR Fed 7.

Public institutions of higher learning as “persons” subject to suit under 42 USC § 1983, 65 ALR Fed 490.

Disparate impact test for sex discrimination in employment under title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.), 68 ALR Fed 19.

Award of attorneys' fees under 42 USC § 1973 l (e), providing for award to prevailing party, other than United States, of reasonable attorney's fee as part of costs in any action or proceeding to enforce voting guaranties of fourteenth or fifteenth amendments, 68 ALR Fed 206.

Who is “prevailing party” for purposes of awards of attorneys' fees under 42 USC § 19731(e), providing for such awards to prevailing parties in actions or proceedings to enforce voting guarantees under fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, 127 ALR Fed 1.

What constitutes termination of employee due to pregnancy in violation of Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS § 2000e(k)), 130 ALR Fed 473.

Right of action under Title IX of Education Amendments Act of 1972 (20 USCS § 1681 et seq.) against school or school district for sexual harassment of student by student's peer, 141 ALR Fed 407.

Availability of Nominal Damages in Action Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.). 143 ALR Fed 269.

What constitutes reverse or majority race or national origin discrimination violative of federal constitution or statutes — nonemployment cases 152 ALR Fed 1.

What constitutes reverse or majority gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — public employment cases 153 ALR Fed 609.

Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 for racial discrimination — Supreme Court cases, 164 ALR Fed 483.

What constitutes reverse sex or gender discrimination against males violative of federal constitution or statutes — Nonemployment cases, 166 ALR Fed 1.

Equal protection and due process clause challenges based on sex discrimination — Supreme Court cases, 178 ALR Fed 25.

§ 4. Security against search and seizure.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized.

Cross references. —

As to search warrants in criminal cases, see Rule 41, W.R.Cr.P., and §§ 7-7-101 to 7-7-105 .

As to arrests without warrant, see § 7-2-103 .

As to search warrants in connection with juvenile court, see § 14-6-218 .

As to search warrants in connection with controlled substances, see §§ 35-7-1045 and 35-7-1046 .

State and federal constitutional provisions compared. —

Constitutional restriction of United States against unreasonable searches and seizures is about the same as constitutional restriction on that subject in Wyoming constitution, and federal courts have, speaking broadly, interpreted such restriction as rigidly as Wyoming supreme court. State v. Hiteshew, 42 Wyo. 147, 292 P. 2, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1930).

The provision of the Wyoming constitution covering search and seizure is different than that of the United States constitution and makes it mandatory that the search warrant be issued upon an affidavit. Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 230 (Wyo. 1976).

The language of this section differs somewhat from its federal counterpart and the court was unable to consider the impact of those differences where the defendant had not succeeded in invoking the independent protection of the Wyoming constitution. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. May 16, 1994).

This section has been recognized to be somewhat stronger than its federal counterpart in that under the Wyoming Constitution it is mandatory that the search warrant be issued upon an affidavit. Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1996).

This section is narrower than its federal counterpart and requires a search to be reasonable under all circumstances. Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1999).

Scope of the protection provided by the Wyoming Constitution is the “same as and parallel to” that provided by the federal constitution. Consonant with the Fourth Amendment, the opening of closed containers during an inventory search is permissible if conducted in good faith, pursuant to a standardized police policy, and as long as the search is not a ruse for general rummaging for evidence of a crime; prior Wyoming precedent has permitted inventory searches and the opening of closed containers during those searches. Johnson v. State, 2006 WY 79, 137 P.3d 903, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 2006).

State constitutional issue not preserved. —

Defense counsel's mere uttering of the words “Wyoming Constitution” during arguments on a suppression motion did not preserve for review the question of whether a warrantless search of a vehicle absent exigent circumstances violated art. I, § 4, Wyo. Const., where counsel offered no independent state constitutional analysis. State v. Williams, 2004 WY 53, 90 P.3d 85, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2004).

Search and seizure under state and federal constitutions the same. —

In some cases the court has held that the Wyoming Constitution offers greater protection to its citizens than the Constitution of the United States, but the court's approach in search and seizure cases has implied the reading of the state and federal constitutions together and treating the scope of the state provision the same as that of the federal provision. Callaway v. State, 954 P.2d 1365, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1998).

Section is limitation only on powers of government. —

Constitutional inhibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is limitation only on powers of government. State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1924).

Officer's Motivation. —

Supreme Court has previously held that an officer’s primary motivation is irrelevant under this section, so long as an observed traffic violation justifies the stop. Thus, where defendant offered no cogent argument for departing from that precedent, the Supreme Court declined to consider it. Gibson v. State, 2019 WY 40, 438 P.3d 1256, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2019).

Detention at traffic stop reasonable. —

District court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana evidence discovered in her vehicle following a traffic stop because the detention was lawful under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 as the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified the extended detention and expanded scope of questioning. Klomliam v. State, 2014 WY 1, 315 P.3d 665, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 2014).

Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as the trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the detention and questioning of defendant because the trooper believed that the driver was trying to conceal his identity; defendant eventually admitted the driver’s true identity, thereby revealing that she had previously lied about his identity; while she claimed that the protective order against the driver was no longer valid, her previous dishonesty justified the trooper’s further efforts to verify the validity of that order, and her further detention; and the trooper then asked if there was anything illegal in her car, and defendant admitted that there was marijuana in the car. Rodriguez v. State, 2018 WY 134, 430 P.3d 766, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2018).

The provisions of this section apply to the investigatory stage of a case. — Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970).

Locating identification information on trailer parked in public parking lot not “search.” —

The activity of a law enforcement officer, in determining the ownership of missing equipment by directing a mechanic to climb upon a truck trailer parked in a public parking lot, to locate identification information on the equipment on the trailer, was constitutionally permissible. No “search” of the trailer, which was open to public view, was ever made. Pellatz v. State, 711 P.2d 1138, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 442 (Wyo. 1986).

Search and mere entrance distinguished. —

A search, as distinguished from a mere entrance, involves an intent to go through and examine for the purpose of finding or ascertaining something. Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970).

A search entails a process of differentiating between objects with an intent to locate a particular object. Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970).

Only unreasonable searches are forbidden. — State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1924).

Wyoming constitution does not prohibit all warrantless searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Not all searches and seizures are forbidden, but only those that are unreasonable. Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1982), reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1995).

Whether search is reasonable is judicial question. — State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1924).

Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. —

In a prosecution for illegal possession and sale of marijuana, probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant existed where an officer's corroboration of a confidential informant's statements provided a basis that the confidential informant was a reliable and credible source of information, and the affidavit established a continuous, lengthy, and ongoing scheme of drug trafficking. Cordova v. State, 2001 WY 96, 33 P.3d 142, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2001), reh'g denied, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. Nov. 20, 2001).

Search warrant affidavit did not provide a sufficient nexus for a search because the affidavit made no mention of defendant's residence and it did not identify the given address as defendant's residence, the place where his daughters resided, or as a place having any connection to defendant or the alleged sexual assaults. Bouch v. State, 2006 WY 122, 143 P.3d 643, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 2006).

Search warrant was supported by probable cause where a drug buyer told an informant that he had bought drugs from defendant, another informant stated that the buyer was a heavy user of methamphetamine and that he had told her that defendant was his primary supply source, and the buyer's vehicle was observed by law enforcement parked in front of defendant's residence just a few days before the affidavit was executed and the warrant issued. Schirber v. State, 2006 WY 121, 142 P.3d 1169, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 2006).

Search not pretextual. —

Evidence used to convict defendant of burglary was not obtained through a pretextual search, where officers did not depart from routine procedure in searching defendant's home for drugs pursuant to a valid warrant, and there was no evidence that officers' search for drugs was motivated only by intent to find evidence of burglary. Pendelton v. State, 966 P.2d 951, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 1998).

Student searches. —

Because students who participate in extracurricular activities are already regulated more strictly, their reasonable expectations of privacy are even more limited than those of the general student population. Accordingly, the legitimate expectations of privacy are reduced for those students subject to drug testing under a school district's policy. Hageman v. Goshen County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2011 WY 91, 256 P.3d 487, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2011).

Public school students in Wyoming are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4, but what is reasonable under all of the circumstances must be determined in light of factors such as the age of the students and the school environment; because Wyoming school districts have a compelling interest in providing for the safety and welfare of their students, in order to maintain safety and welfare, schools are afforded the flexibility to impose rules on students that might be inappropriate for adults. A school's role is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults; because of the degree of supervision and control a school commonly exercises over its students, students generally have diminished privacy expectations born of the government's duty to maintain safety, order, and discipline in the schools. Hageman v. Goshen County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2011 WY 91, 256 P.3d 487, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2011).

Because participation in extracurricular activities is optional, a policy requiring participating students to submit to random drug and alcohol testing preserves an option for a student who choose not to be tested. Such a student can refuse testing while paying a price (nonparticipation) that is serious but less severe than expulsion from the school. A student who genuinely believes that his privacy rights are unduly infringed by the school district's policy may choose not to submit to drug and alcohol testing. He will have to forego optional extracurricular activities, but he is not deprived of the fundamental right to an education. Hageman v. Goshen County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2011 WY 91, 256 P.3d 487, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2011).

Where a school district, in an effort to address a perceived drug and alcohol problem among its students, adopted a policy requiring all students who participated in extracurricular activities to consent to random drug and alcohol testing and where parents filed suit, challenging the policy as unconstitutional, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the school district because, while Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4, protected public school students from unreasonable searches and seizures, the testing at issue was reasonable; students were already subject to more stringent rules and regulations than adults and had limited expectations of privacy in the school setting, and the school district had a compelling interest in providing for the safety and welfare of its students and thus had a legitimate interest in deterring drug and alcohol use among students. Further, the policy requiring random, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing for all students who participated in extracurricular activities was rationally related to furthering its interest in deterring drug and alcohol use among students. Hageman v. Goshen County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2011 WY 91, 256 P.3d 487, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 2011).

Home entitled to more sanctity than boat or automobile. —

A person's home is entitled to more sanctity and greater protection, when it comes to deciding what is a reasonable search, than one's boat or automobile. Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1971).

Defendant without legitimate expectation of privacy in homes searched without standing to object. —

Inasmuch as the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the other two homes located on the same property his home was located on — he was neither in possession of or present in the other homes prior to or at the time they were searched, he had no title to nor interest in the property, which was owned by his sister, and did not regularly visit the other homes — he had no standing to object to the constitutionality of their search. Tompkins v. State, 705 P.2d 836, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 538 (Wyo. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1052, 106 S. Ct. 1277, 89 L. Ed. 2d 585, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 659 (U.S. 1986).

People have privacy interest in wallets and other personal effects that does not disappear because the personal effect has been lost or mislaid. Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 225 (Wyo. 1995).

Motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the State's search of defendant's wallet was properly denied where it was on defendant's person when the defendant was told that he was under arrest, and although he then removed it from his pocket and laid it on the kitchen counter directly in front of him, the wallet remained in the defendant's immediate area and it was reasonable and appropriate for the officer to seize the wallet and search it for weapons or evidence. Andrews v. State, 2002 WY 28, 40 P.3d 708, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2002).

Detention after traffic stop to use drug sniffing dog was not justified. —

The continued detention of defendant for a dog sniff of the exterior of his vehicle after state troopers had concluded a routine traffic stop was not justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity and therefore it was violative of Art. 1, § 4, Wyo. Const. and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The fact that defendant was nervous, possessed food containers, and gave vague travel plans about visiting friends even though he had been unemployed for two months did not provide reasonable suspicion for illegal conduct. Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, 92 P.3d 828, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2004).

Affidavit requirement. —

Search warrant affidavit that did not identify the foundation for the statements contained therein, where statements were not attributable to any particular source, made it impossible to assess the reliability of the statements, and contained insufficient information from which magistrate could find the requisite probable cause. Hixson v. State, 2001 WY 99, 33 P.3d 154, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2001).

Under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4, defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied because defendant did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the deputy's misstatement in the affidavits was deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth; and the affidavits, even without the proper date and time, provided probable cause to issue search warrants. Lefferdink v. State, 2011 WY 75, 250 P.3d 173, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 2011).

Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied as the affidavit established probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of the search warrant because the affidavit stated that the informant told an officer she had eaten a marijuana cookie provided by defendant; her statement against her penal interest was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to search; the information in the affidavit described with sufficient particularity the place to be searched; the fact that defendant had so recently delivered the cookies to the informant made it reasonably probable that evidence of those cookies could be found on defendant's motorcycle or in his car; and the officer corroborated the details provided by the informant. Fosen v. State, 2017 WY 82, 399 P.3d 613, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 2017).

Affidavit requirement: Remotely communicated search warrant. —

In response to certified questions, the Supreme Court of Wyoming determined that the statutory procedures for a remotely communicated search warrant in a matter involving driving while under the influence of alcohol were constitutional because they complied with the constitutional search warrant affidavit requirements. Smith v. State, 2013 WY 122, 311 P.3d 132, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 2013).

As a general rule searches not made under warrant are unreasonable. State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1924).

As a general rule a search and seizure is unlawful, except when made under a warrant issued in conformity with law. State v. Munger, 43 Wyo. 404, 4 P.2d 1094, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1931).

Searches and seizures made without a warrant or outside the judicial process are “per se unreasonable,” subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Kish v. State, 642 P.2d 453, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1982); Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1983).

And burden is upon state to establish that search and seizure is reasonable in the absence of a search warrant. Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1982), reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1995); Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1983).

Whether search and seizure is unreasonable depends upon all circumstances of each case. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Reasonableness of search first determined by trial court. —

The reasonableness of a search is in the first instance a substantive determination to be made by the trial court, subject to review. Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1982), reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1995).

But reasonableness of search is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. Each case requires a weighing of the need for the particular search in the public interest against the invasion of the personal rights that the search calls for. Courts must prove the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is carried on, the justification for its initiation and the place in which it is conducted. Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1982), reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1995).

When search without warrant reasonable. —

An officer has right to search party arrested and take from his person and possession, and from handbags, sacks, and other things that he carries with him, and from any place to which lawful access has been obtained, property reasonably believed to be connected with a crime and the fruits, means or evidences thereof, and may take property of evidentiary value shown him by the prisoner, and he may take and hold them to be disposed of as court directs, notwithstanding this section. Wiggin v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1922).

Search of defendant's flock of sheep on government-owned range, and seizure of stolen sheep, was not unreasonable. State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1924).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress drug evidence found in his shirt pocket where the search was reasonable under all of the circumstances and did not violate Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 because defendant had been arrested for driving with a suspended license and asked the passenger to retrieve his shirt out of the vehicle, therefore the assisting deputy was justified on the basis of safety concerns in retrieving the shirt himself rather than allowing the passenger to go back to the vehicle. Also, the deputy was further justified in checking the shirt for weapons before handing it to the passenger, and once he discovered a hard object in the pocket, he also was justified in removing it from the pocket before handing the shirt to the passenger. Cotton v. State, 2005 WY 115, 119 P.3d 931, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2005).

The search of an automobile without a warrant, as incident to a lawful arrest, is not unreasonable or unlawful. Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 234 (Wyo. 1971).

Facts police officer learned during first few moments of his investigation were sufficient to justify intrusive search after stop of defendant where reason for stopping defendant was different from the articulable facts and suspicion which led officer to implement intrusive measures after the stop. Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1997).

In defendant's murder case, a court did not err in not suppressing the evidence seized through a search of defendant's home where the allegedly objectionable entries into the home were very limited and were all within certain exigent circumstance exceptions to the warrant requirement. The status of the victims was not known until an officer's initial entry. Moreover, once it was clear that a double homicide had occurred, the status of defendant became very important for law enforcement safety, and defendant's location, whether or not he was armed, and what type of weapon he was armed with were crucial pieces of information that were immediately necessary to help insure the safety of officers that were searching for defendant. Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, 98 P.3d 857, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2004).

Detention at traffic stop unreasonable. —

Defendant's detention in a patrol car was not reasonable where defendant was detained and subjected to persistent and sustained questioning that unreasonably expanded the scope of the stop far beyond the speeding offense into a full-blown drug investigation, and where at no time during that phase of the detention did the trooper ask defendant for his consent to that type of questioning or detention. O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, 117 P.3d 401, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2005).

Detention at traffic stop reasonable. —

Detention was reasonable under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 because the totality of the circumstances showed, inter alia, that: the license plate on the vehicle was not on file; the registration had been altered; the license plate number did not match the registration; and defendant appeared nervous when he could not remember the names of the people he had visited. Negrette v. State, 2007 WY 88, 158 P.3d 679, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 2007).

Detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying a stop where the trooper knew that both men were California residents, were occupants of a van registered in Illinois, that neither man owned the van, and that they were traveling to an exit number on the interstate. That, combined with their nervousness, the presence of air fresheners, overcompensation in reducing the driving speed, and avoidance of eye contact, amounted to reasonable suspicion enough to justify the trooper's decision to expand the scope of the stop. Marquez-Guitierrez v. State, 2007 WY 155, 167 P.3d 1232, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 2007).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of marijuana that was found in defendant's vehicle because defendant's one-time lane deviation, which was extensive, both in time and distance, constituted a statutory violation, and thus warranted a traffic stop; the deviation was eight inches over the fog line for approximately 550 feet. Dods v. State, 2010 WY 133, 240 P.3d 1208, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2010).

Scope of Warrant. —

Officer's action in inspecting radios and removing their battery packs was reasonable as incident to his search for controlled substances in defendant's home as authorized under a warrant. The serial numbers came into the officer's view upon removal of the battery packs and therefore the inspection thereof also fell within the scope of the warrant because it produced no additional invasion of defendant's privacy interest. Schirber v. State, 2006 WY 121, 142 P.3d 1169, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 2006).

Computer check for outstanding warrants not a seizure of defendant. —

No seizure of defendant occurred under U.S. Const. amend. IV and Wyo. Const. art. I, § 4, when an officer stopped defendant as he was walking down the street, asked for his name, and ran a computer check for outstanding warrants; encounter remained consensual because defendant was in no way detained or restricted during the computer check. Wilson v. State, 2009 WY 1, 199 P.3d 517, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 2009).

One's house cannot be searched without a search warrant, except as incident to a lawful arrest at the house. Goddard v. State, 481 P.2d 343, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1971).

Search of one's residence without a warrant, and not in connection with a valid arrest there, is violative of this section. State v. Crump, 35 Wyo. 41, 246 P. 241, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 1926).

A home is entitled to special dignity and special sanctity, and the proper way to search a home is to obtain a search warrant. Goddard v. State, 481 P.2d 343, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1971); Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1982), reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1995).

DNA collection from convicted felons is constitutional. —

The DNA Identification Record System Act's, § 7-19-401 et seq., purpose in collecting DNA identification information to advance the legitimate state interest in criminal law enforcement does not violate the Fourth Amendment, because collecting DNA samples either from blood, saliva, or hair, through routine, unobtrusive procedures is minimally intrusive, and convicted felons have diminished privacy rights. Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1999).

Warrantless search of parolee. —

A search warrant based upon probable cause need not be obtained before a parolee may be searched if there is reasonable suspicion that the parolee has committed a parole violation or crime, and if the search is reasonably related to the officer's duty. Reasonable suspicion requires that the officer be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief that a condition of parole has been or is being violated. Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. June 21, 1990).

Juvenile searched without reasonable suspicion of probation violation. —

It is within the court's discretion to allow a probation officer to search a juvenile without reasonably suspecting that a probation violation exists. In re Interests of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (Wyo. 1992).

When warrantless body search permitted without arrest. —

A warrantless body search may be conducted in spite of the fact that the person searched is not formally under arrest when the character of the search is highly unintrusive, the evidence sought will be forever lost absent the search and sufficient probable cause exists to support a formal arrest. Van Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 463 (Wyo. 1979).

Search incident to DWI arrest. —

Characteristics of a DWI arrest for suspected alcohol intoxication permit a search of passenger compartment of vehicle for any intoxicant, alcohol or narcotic, as evidence related to the crime of driving while under the influence. Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1999).

Blood test performed near accident scene admissible. —

A blood test performed at or near the scene of an accident where criminal negligence or negligent homicide is a factor is admissible in a trial for such a crime. Van Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 463 (Wyo. 1979).

Stop warranted based on totality of the circumstances. —

Law enforcement agencies can build upon reliable information which has been supplied by other law enforcement agencies, and as long as the totality of the circumstances suggests that the information has been corroborated in such a manner that it gives rise to the existence of the necessary reasonable-articulable-suspicion requirement, the investigatory stop is warranted. Buckles v. State, 998 P.2d 927, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2000).

Investigatory stop of person warranted. —

The investigatory stop of the defendant was supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion where (1) the police stopped a vehicle after a registration check revealed that the car's license plates were listed as lost or stolen, (2) the driver stated that he was traveling with the defendant and that he was driving around looking for him, (3) when the defendant walked past the scene, he made eye contact with the driver, indicating that they knew each other, (4) the defendant stopped further up the street and sat down to watch the stop, (5) a large cache of stolen coins was found inside the trunk of the car, and (6) after the driver was arrested, the defendant got up and started to walk away when an officer looked over at him. Martindale v. State, 2001 WY 52, 24 P.3d 1138, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 2001).

In a prosecution of defendant for possession of a controlled substance, a deputy sheriff's investigative detention of defendant prior to seizure of the evidence did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. Facts supporting the deputy's reasonable suspicion were: (1) the particular area where defendant's vehicle was parked was known by local law enforcement officers to have a history of criminal activity, including underage drinking, drug use, vandalism, and theft from cars; (2) when the deputy entered the pullout area, he observed a “flurry of movement” in the front seat area of the vehicle; (3) when defendant partially lowered the passenger window, the deputy immediately noticed an “old burnt smell” or “chemical smell” that he associated with drug use, but could not quite identify; (4) defendant's car seat was reclined back, making it difficult for the deputy to see defendant or his hands; and (5) defendant was visibly nervous. Keller v. State, 2007 WY 170, 169 P.3d 867, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 2007).

Investigatory stop of vehicle was warranted, where degree of particularity in facts furnished by police informant, coupled with corroboration of the prediction of future events, gave officers a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant and others were engaging in illegal activity. Frederick v. State, 981 P.2d 494, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1999).

Reasonableness of detention at traffic stop. —

The reasonableness of the detention is to be measured by whether the police acted diligently under all the circumstances of the case and whether the detention involved delay unnecessary to a legitimate police inquiry. State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. May 25, 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. May 25, 1994).

Court, in defendants' drug case, did not err by denying their motion to suppress evidence where the officer was justified in detaining defendants longer than it took to issue traffic citations; defendant driver had no driver's license, defendant driver was traveling cross-county with no cash or credit card, and the two defendants' stories about what they were doing differed. Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, 65 P.3d 33, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2003).

Frisks and pat-down searches. —

When conducting a frisk or pat-down search, a law enforcement officer does not have to be absolutely certain an object felt on the suspect's person is a weapon prior to removing the object for inspection, so long as the officer reasonably believes that the object may be a weapon. Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1996).

A law enforcement officer's seizure of hypodermic needles after discovering them during a pat-down weapons search was proper where the officer reasonably believed that what he felt on the suspect's person might have been a weapon. Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1996).

Automatic companion rule. —

Wyoming has adopted the automatic companion rule, justifying pat-down searches of companions of arrested persons for the possible concealment of weapons. Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1996).

Warrantless automobile searches. —

There are differences between motor vehicles and other property which permit warrantless searches of automobiles in circumstances in which warrantless searches would not be reasonable in other contexts. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Where the police had probable cause to believe not only that the occupants of the automobile were involved in the commission of the crime but that the automobile was carrying the fruits of the crime and the instruments used to accomplish it and the latter conclusion was made even more credible by the close proximity in time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, the search of the automobile at the place it was stopped was constitutionally valid. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Search of fuse box in passenger compartment of vehicle was justified as a search incident to defendant's DWI arrest, where officers observed shell casings alerting them to possible presence of a small handgun. Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1999).

Court, in defendants' drug case, did not err by denying their motion to suppress evidence where defendants' consent to a search of a vehicle was voluntary and the officer's conduct in obtaining the consent was not coercive. Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, 65 P.3d 33, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2003).

Supreme court determined that defendant's consent to search the vehicle in which drugs were located was voluntarily given; defendant did not submit to the will of the officers, but he instead affirmatively gave consent, and the number of officers present at the scene and the presence of police dogs were reasonable under the circumstances. Guzman v. State, 2003 WY 118, 76 P.3d 825, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 143 (Wyo. 2003).

Where a search of a vehicle defendant was driving was incident to a lawful arrest and reasonable under all the circumstances because of officer safety concerns, the search did not violate Wyo. Const. art. I, § 4. Even though defendant had been arrested and was secure inside the patrol car, the presence of a box, the contents of which were unknown, as well as an intoxicated passenger in the vehicle, presented officer safety concerns. Clark v. State, 2006 WY 88, 138 P.3d 677, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 2006).

District court erred in refusing to suppress drug-related evidence which was seized during a vehicle search incident to appellant's arrest for two traffic violations--driving under suspension and failing to maintain liability insurance--because there was no reasonable basis, articulable from the totality of the circumstances, to justify the search, which violated Wyo. Const. art. I, § 4; with respect to the search, there was no reasonable basis for the officer to believe appellant was armed or that there were weapons in the vehicle, and the “pat down” search of appellant's person did not uncover any weapons. By the officer's own account, he and appellant engaged in a friendly conversation, appellant was honest about his suspended license, he seemingly offered a reasonable explanation for his presence at the park where he was arrested, and he cooperated with the officer and did not resist arrest or become combative; as such, the State did not meet its burden to prove that the search-incident-to arrest exception applied. Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, 171 P.3d 525, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 2007).

Warrantless search proper. —

It was permissible to search without a warrant based upon reasonable cause to belief that the evidence of the theft could be found in defendant's vehicle. Callaway v. State, 954 P.2d 1365, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1998).

Warrantless search of stolen vehicle, and containers within, proper. —

It was proper for the police to conduct a warrantless search and seizure of a vehicle, including any closed containers found within, which they knew to be stolen. Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 529 (Wyo. 1985).

Probable cause for warrantless automobile search. —

Although a warrantless search of an automobile may be legal without an arrest, the basis for the probable cause for such search may be the same as that for probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Car was properly searched when it was stopped since at the time of the stop there was probable cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a search. Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1996).

Probable cause supported warrantless search of defendant's car where informant told police that the defendant had marijuana in his car, and although informant was intoxicated and expressed hostility toward defendant, her report was corroborated by police officer's observations and independent determination that defendant was the subject of other criminal investigations and had an extensive criminal record. Borgwardt v. State, 946 P.2d 805, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 1997).

Warrantless search of impounded vehicle. —

An inventory search of an impounded automobile is not unreasonable when it is conducted pursuant to standardized police procedure, whether or not such procedures are in writing. Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1996).

Inventory search of impounded vehicle. —

Inclusion of defendant's belongings in an inventory search of an impounded car was proper because neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause were required, and defendant's contention that his baggage should have been released to him prior to the inventory would defeat the purpose of the inventory search. Defendant did not request his belongings prior to the inventory search, and even if he had, the officer was not required to provide them until after the contents were inventoried. Johnson v. State, 2006 WY 79, 137 P.3d 903, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 2006).

Inventory search of defendant's vehicle was proper because the court found that an officer had custody of defendant's vehicle after his arrest, and that the trooper did not act in bad faith because he inventoried the vehicle in anticipation of impounding it; no one was available to take possession of the car after defendant was arrested, and the inventory was complete by the time defendant's father arrived. Hunnicutt-Carter v. State, 2013 WY 103, 308 P.3d 847, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 2013).

When warrantless automobile search harmless error. —

Assuming the search of an automobile the next morning at the city shops without first obtaining a search warrant was improper and that the items obtained therefrom were improperly admitted into evidence, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where such items were merely cumulative to the other evidence and defendants would have been convicted absent such evidence. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Evidence obtained as result of canine sniff. —

The district court erred in suppressing evidence obtained as a result of the “canine sniff” of the respondents' vehicle; the initial stop was lawful and was followed by a minimally intrusive detention of the vehicle and the respondents on a reasonably articulable suspicion premised upon objective facts indicating that the respondents' vehicle contained contraband. State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. May 25, 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. May 25, 1994).

Denial of defendants' motion to suppress was proper because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-210 prohibited following another vehicle more closely, the trooper testified that he saw defendants following a truck at less than one vehicle length behind, and there was nothing in the record warranting a conclusion that the district court's credibility determination or finding of probable cause was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The totality of the circumstances was further sufficient to support the conclusion that the trooper had reasonable suspicion that defendants were transporting controlled substances due to a drug dog sniff; thus, questioning them about matters outside the scope of the traffic violation was reasonable and provided probable cause for the search. Phelps v. State, 2012 WY 87, 278 P.3d 1148, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 2012), overruled in part, Allgier v. State, 2015 WY 137, 358 P.3d 1271, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 2015).

Since the dog sniff occurred during a traffic stop based on a truck's missing license plate and was conducted while an officer attempted to determine whether the vehicle was stolen, and thus did not impermissibly extend the stop, it was constitutionally permissible Engdahl v. State, 2014 WY 76, 327 P.3d 114, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 2014).

Fruit of the poisonous tree. —

Motion to suppress was properly denied in a drug case because, although all evidence directly related to an expired wiretap was excluded, a traffic stop and pat-down search were sufficiently separate to obviate the use of the exclusionary rule; an officer noticed that defendant had invalid tags while she was leaving a location where a drug transaction supposedly took place and subsequently arrested her on an suspended license. Hall v. State, 2007 WY 138, 166 P.3d 875, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 2007).

Removal of automobile from scene requires justification. —

There must be some justification for the removal of the automobile from the scene of the stop, such as the fact that defendants were apprehended in the early evening hours and this may have rendered a careful search impractical and unsafe for the police officers. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Exigencies of situation determine whether warrantless search by police or firemen is permissible. — Shaffer v. State, 640 P.2d 88, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 297 (Wyo. 1982).

Emergency assistance exception. —

Where officers received an urgent, garbled radio transmission at 4:30 a.m. from defendant's wife, an emergency medical technician (EMT), and went to their home to locate the EMT where they found a system for growing mushrooms in a bedroom, the search of the home was constitutional because the emergency assistance exception applied since the officers were acting reasonably when they investigated the possible emergency and properly limited their efforts to determining whether anyone was in need of assistance rather than investigating a crime. Moulton v. State, 2006 WY 152, 148 P.3d 38, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 2006).

And if warrantless entry constitutional, seizure of evidence afterwards constitutional. —

Officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished. And if the warrantless entry to put out the fire and determine its cause is constitutional, the warrantless seizure of evidence while inspecting the premises for these purposes is also constitutional. Shaffer v. State, 640 P.2d 88, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 297 (Wyo. 1982).

Warrantless search. —

A warrantless search will not be held illegal when consent is obtained from a person who the police reasonably believe possesses authority to provide such consent. Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 1998).

Exigent circumstances. —

The district court did not err in denying defendants' motion to suppress by finding the State had sustained its burden of proving that the forcible entry into defendants' home was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement of the constitution where officers smelled marijuana on one of the defendant's person and also emanating from the residence. It was reasonable for the deputies to suspect that once the occupants were aware of the officers' presence, there was a possibility that any evidence of contraband would be destroyed. Rideout v. State, 2005 WY 141, 122 P.3d 201, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 2005).

Consent to chemical testing. —

District court properly dismissed, for lack of a justiciable controversy, a driver’s request for a declaration that the state constitution precluded a law enforcement officer from statutorily deeming the driver’s consent to chemical testing because, while the loss of driving privileges was a genuine, tangible, and existing interest, the officer did not “deem” the driver’s consent to breath testing, rather the driver “agreed” to take the test, therefore, a declaration would have no effect on the admissibility of the breath sample that sustained the suspension of the driver’s license, the district court lacked the jurisdiction to consider the driver’s request for declaratory relief, and mootness was not the basis for the dismissal. Leavitt v. Wyo. DOT, 2017 WY 149, 406 P.3d 1266, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 2017).

Consent to search. —

In order to show consent to search without warrant which would otherwise be illegal, testimony must show that the consent was really voluntary with a desire to invite search, and not merely to avoid resistance. Tobin v. State, 36 Wyo. 368, 255 P. 788, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1927).

Consent of a landlord or hotel or motel manager would not be sufficient to justify an officer to make a search of a tenant's premises without a warrant. Goddard v. State, 481 P.2d 343, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1971).

The issue of the voluntariness of the consent to a police search may be properly resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard. Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 347 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3986 (U.S. 1981).

Motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the State's search of defendant's duffel bag was properly denied, where, prior to trial, defendant had denied ownership of the bag and the officers who conducted the search reasonably believed that the owners of the property where the duffel bag was found had authority to consent to a search of their home and its contents. Andrews v. State, 2002 WY 28, 40 P.3d 708, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2002).

Consent to search was voluntary where the driver of the van was told he was free to go, and he extended the interaction between himself and the trooper by asking a question about the warning ticket. The driver testified at the suppression hearing that the trooper released him before requesting consent to search, that the trooper was easy-going and non-threatening, and that he was not coerced or intimidated into giving consent. Marquez-Guitierrez v. State, 2007 WY 155, 167 P.3d 1232, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 2007).

Consent to search automobile. —

Evidence seized from defendant's vehicle was admissible where, following routine traffic stop, defendant engaged in casual conversation with police officer and voluntarily gave officer permission to search his car. Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1998).

Consent to further questioning was voluntary. —

Denial of defendant's motion to suppress and his conviction for felony possession of marijuana were appropriate because defendant's consent to further questioning was voluntary; defendant was advised that he was free to leave and that he was not required to consent to further questioning. Seymour v. State, 2008 WY 61, 185 P.3d 671, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 2008).

Giving of Miranda warnings is not prerequisite to obtaining consent to search: However, that a person is being held in custody and that the state failed to give the warnings required by Miranda to that person are factors to be considered on the issue of voluntariness. Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1983).

Factors to be considered in determining voluntariness of consent to search. —

See Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1983).

Trial court properly ruled that consent to search of van was voluntary. Three police officers testified that the defendant, who was driving the van, consented to the search, while the defendant merely said that he was shocked and scared and didn't remember saying anything. Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 551 (Wyo. 1985).

Search pursuant to admission gained unlawfully is illegal. —

A search made pursuant to an admission gained unlawfully by stealth, force or coercion is illegal. Wiggin v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1922).

Objects in plain view. —

Objects falling into the plain view of an officer, who has a right to be where he is, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence. Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997, 92 S. Ct. 1259, 31 L. Ed. 2d 466, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 3358 (1972); McCutcheon v. State, 604 P.2d 537, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1979); Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1982), reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1995).

Given a lawful search, some things may be seized in connection therewith which are not particularly described in the search warrant. Valerio v. State, 542 P.2d 875, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1975).

Testimony at suppression hearing by officer who was not at the scene of defendant's arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant executed with a search warrant did not establish the facts necessary to support admissibility of any items of evidence under the plain view doctrine and could not salvage the defective search warrant. Hixson v. State, 2001 WY 99, 33 P.3d 154, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2001).

When police officer followed an individual into defendant's home, and saw loose marijuana and drug paraphernalia on the table and saw defendant placing marijuana in a pipe and passing it, the evidence was in plain view, and the initial, warrantless entry of the home was justified given the exigent circumstances. Hughes v. State, 2003 WY 35, 65 P.3d 378, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2003).

When police officer followed an individual into defendant's home, and saw loose marijuana and drug paraphernalia on the table and saw defendant placing marijuana in a pipe and passing it, the evidence was in plain view, and the initial, warrantless entry of the home was justified given the exigent circumstances. Hughes v. State, 2003 WY 35, 65 P.3d 378, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2003).

Requirements for seizure of evidence in plain view are: (1) the officers' presence must be proper; (2) the items observed must appear to the officer to be possible evidence; and (3) the “plain view” doctrine is applicable only to the inadvertent discovery of incriminating evidence. Kish v. State, 642 P.2d 453, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1982).

The plain-view doctrine is applied when a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1982), reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1995).

Plain-view doctrine requires lawful initial intrusion. —

The condition precedent to reliance upon the plain-view doctrine as grounds for a warrantless seizure is that the initial intrusion which brings the police within plain view of such an article is itself lawful. McCutcheon v. State, 638 P.2d 650, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 281 (Wyo. 1982).

Officers were not entitled to continue search after finding item identified in warrant, and thus they were not lawfully on premises when other items came into view, and remainder of seized items should have been suppressed. Taylor v. State, 7 P.3d 15, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2000).

Plain view alone is not enough to justify warrantless seizure of evidence; exigent circumstances must also be present. Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1982), reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 344 (Wyo. 1982), overruled, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1995).

Defendant's rights were not violated when sheriff's investigators retrieved boots from property room at a county detention center without a search warrant, after he was jailed, in order to conduct experiments on them. His boots were legally seized when he was jailed, and the outsides of his boots were in plain view when he was arrested. The officers who seized his boots later on had a reasonable basis for wanting to compare the soles of the boots with scuff marks on the wall near the scene of the crime. Marquez v. State, 754 P.2d 705, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1988).

Search and seizure of trash and garbage cans. —

See Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970).

Procurement of telephone records not “search.” —

Police agent's procurement of defendant's telephone records, including those linking his name to his unlisted telephone number, did not constitute a “search” invading a “legitimate expectation of privacy” sufficient to demonstrate an invasion of defendant's constitutional rights. Any person using a telephone, whether on legitimate business or otherwise, assumes a risk that the telephone can, and will, reveal the numbers that he dials. Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. Feb. 24, 1993).

In order to issue search warrant, judge or magistrate must have “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause exists. Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1993).

“Probable cause.” —

Existence of probable cause authorizing issuance of search warrant is judicial question which cannot be determined by prosecuting attorney or prohibition commissioner. State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1920).

The determination of probable cause must rest upon the factual showing in each case. Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 230 (Wyo. 1976).

Even though a warrant may be issued only upon a finding of probable cause, the term means something less than evidence which would justify condemnation, and such finding may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial. Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970); McCutcheon v. State, 604 P.2d 537, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1979).

A finding of probable cause by the justice of the peace can be satisfied by hearsay information providing the affidavit sets forth sufficient of the underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge the validity of the informant's conclusion as to the existence of evidence. Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970).

An information verified on information and belief by the prosecuting attorney was sufficient to show probable cause, where the prosecuting attorney also filed an affidavit stating in positive terms facts showing probable cause. State v. Bruner, 78 Wyo. 111, 319 P.2d 863, 1958 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1958). See also State v. Sureties of Krohne, 4 Wyo. 347, 34 P. 3, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1893).

Results of examinations made by the department of agriculture are admissible under the provisions of § 1-12-301 in the trial of a case, if relevant and upon the laying of a proper foundation. That being true, it can scarcely be said that the department's certified reports were not reliable for the purpose of determining probable cause for the purpose of obtaining a warrant, and certainly they are relevant to affiant's belief that defendant was a user and possessor of marijuana. Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970). See also Rules 902, 1005, 1102, W.R.E.

Probable cause exists to support an arrest warrant if the proof is sufficient to cause a person to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief that a public offense has been committed in which the accused participated. Kimbley v. Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1983).

Test for determining existence of probable cause is whether a factual situation is sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that a crime was being committed or that one had been committed; the issuing officer must weigh and consider all of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a search warrant. Bonsness v. State, 672 P.2d 1291, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 390 (Wyo. 1983).

Affidavit for search warrant must be strictly construed, especially when right of security against search of dwelling is in question. State v. Scott, 41 Wyo. 438, 286 P. 390, 1930 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1930).

Affidavits supporting warrants to include facts, not bare conclusions. —

An affidavit in support of a search warrant must include more than bare conclusions of the affiant: Facts which lead the affiant to believe that a warrant is justified must be presented in the affidavit. Bonsness v. State, 672 P.2d 1291, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 390 (Wyo. 1983).

But interpreted in realistic fashion. —

Affidavits for a warrant must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a common sense and realistic fashion. Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970); McCutcheon v. State, 604 P.2d 537, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1979).

And technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common-law pleadings have no proper place in the area of issuing warrants. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. This is not to say that probable cause can be made out by affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating only the affiant's or an informer's belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of the underlying circumstances upon which that belief is based. Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970); McCutcheon v. State, 604 P.2d 537, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 500 (Wyo. 1979).

Affidavits upon which search warrants are based are to be tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing admissibility of evidence and issuing magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations. Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 230 (Wyo. 1976).

District court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol concentration test because the affidavit in support of the search warrant was deficient since it contained bare conclusions; the judge issuing the warrant was not provided with facts supporting the officer's conclusion that defendant was driving when the warrant was issued, and some of the underlying factual information supporting that conclusion was essential to support issuance of the warrant. Snell v. State, 2014 WY 46, 322 P.3d 38, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2014).

Good faith exception to exclusionary rule. —

Supreme court had no facts to demonstrate that the case was an appropriate one to consider whether a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would become part of the Wyoming Constitution's protections against unreasonable search and seizure because a determination of whether the good faith exception applied would require, inter alia, the testimony of the officer executing the affidavit, but the officer did not testify at the suppression hearing. Snell v. State, 2014 WY 46, 322 P.3d 38, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2014).

Sufficiency of description. —

Under this section, providing that no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by affidavit particularly describing the thing to be seized, a designation of the property to be searched for as intoxicating liquor, without describing the kind or quantity, is insufficient. State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1920).

In a prosecution for felony possession of marijuana, not enough information justified the sweeping assertions made by the affiant and relied upon by the judge in issuing a search warrant against defendant, and no reasonable attorney would have foregone the opportunity to test the search warrant via a motion to suppress; as such, defendant was clearly prejudiced by counsel's failure in that regard and received ineffective assistance of counsel. Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, 63 P.3d 904, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2003).

Affidavit in support of a search warrant contained sufficient information from which a magistrate could make an independent decision concerning the credibility of a confidential informant; the affidavit reflected the informant's firsthand knowledge of criminal activity, which the informant described with particularity, and the informant's observations were made in close temporal proximity to the date of an interview with a police officer and execution of the warrant. In re T.J.S. v. State, 2005 WY 68, 113 P.3d 1054, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2005).

Affidavit need not particularly describe place searched. —

There is no requirement that the affidavit supporting a warrant particularly describe the place to be searched, only the warrant itself must particularly describe the place to be searched. Bland v. State, 803 P.2d 856, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 1990).

A bare conclusion that an accused is known to the police as a user and possessor of marijuana standing alone is of no probative value in deciding to issue a search warrant. Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970).

Information obtained by a fellow officer engaged in a common investigation is a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number. Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 206 (Wyo. 1970).

Hearing required when affidavit contains false statements. —

Both the United States and the Wyoming constitutional provisions require a hearing when a defendant offers proof that false statements were included in the affidavit to support a search warrant, knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth; however, the defendant must show these statements were necessary to a finding of probable cause. Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1993).

Delay in use or execution of arrest warrant does not make it invalid; there are no constitutional requirements dictating that an arrest warrant be executed at the earliest opportunity. Kimbley v. Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1983).

Warrant provides general immunity from liability to law enforcement officers. —

The issuance of a warrant valid on its face provides law enforcement officers qualified immunity from liability for tortious conduct as a matter of public policy in the interests of an effective system of law enforcement: There are exceptions caused by a lack of good faith and unreasonable action by officers. Kimbley v. Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1983).

Investigatory stop and transportation did not constitute arrest. —

Transporting defendant across the street to continue an investigative stop, as a hostile crowd confronted the officers, did not transform a Terry stop into an arrest, requiring probable cause, and the officers did not have to choose between continuing the investigation at the risk of personal safety or abandoning the investigation; in addition, a police agent feared for another officer's safety when approaching defendant with a drawn gun, and the display of force was not unreasonable, and did not transform the otherwise valid Terry stop into an arrest. Eckenrod v. State, 2003 WY 51, 67 P.3d 635, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 2003).

Elements of arrest. —

To effect an arrest there must be actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person arrested, or his voluntary submission to custody, and the restraint must be under real or pretended legal authority. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Facts constituting arrest. —

Defendants were “arrested” when a police officer ordered them from a vehicle, moved them to the rear of it, displayed a weapon and the defendants would have been physically restrained if they had attempted to leave the scene or to enter the automobile. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Fact of arrest is not controlled by subjective judgment of police officers involved. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

When warrantless arrest constitutional. —

A peace officer may constitutionally arrest a person without a warrant if, at the moment the arrest is made, he has probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed by the person to be arrested or he has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime is being committed in his presence by the person to be arrested. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Determination of probable cause to arrest without warrant depends upon whether the facts and circumstances within the peace officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that the person arrested has committed or is committing an offense. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

An arresting officer may use information he gathers to bolster a tip by an informant to the point that there exists probable cause for arrest, if the information gathered by the officer is corroborative of the informant's tip; therefore, where the police made an arrest based upon the information that had come to them from an anonymous informant, and with the further corroboration of that information by the law enforcement officer both prior to and after the investigatory stop and the other information gained at that time, the police officers had the requisite probable cause for a warrantless arrest in accordance with § 7-2-103 .Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Wyo. 1992).

Defendant's warrantless arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol, which was made at a hospital by a patrol sergeant with a county sheriff's department, was constitutional because it was based on information gathered by a state trooper, who was investigating defendant's automobile accident. Stowe v. State, 2014 WY 97, 331 P.3d 127, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2014).

Constitutionally sufficient showing of probable cause. —

See Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 1995).

Police officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for negligent homicide where the officer knew that a traffic accident had occurred which resulted in the loss of life, eye witnesses on the scene indicated defendant was driving in an extremely erratic and hazardous manner, the roadway was clear and provided no explanation for the severity of the accident and the defendant reeked of alcohol. Van Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 463 (Wyo. 1979).

Arrest cannot be used as pretext to search for evidence of unrelated crime. Where the defendant was arrested outside her home, and there was nothing in the record to support a reasonable belief that there might be other persons inside her home who posed a threat to the officers' safety, since the information gained through the surveillance of her home supported her assertions that her boyfriend was the only other person on the premises, and he had already stepped outside, a protective sweep of her home was not warranted. Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 461 (Wyo. 1987).

Traffic stop as pretext. —

Officer personally observed defendant's traffic violation and had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop, regardless of whether the officer's primary motivation was to stop defendant's car to search for narcotics; the traffic stop did not violate Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 or the Fourth Amendment. Also, the scope, duration, and intensity of the seizure, after the initial stop, were not contested by defendant; accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, 146 P.3d 492, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 2006).

Appellate inquiry limited to evidence in record. —

An appellate court's inquiry into whether or not an arrest is legal in a given case is restricted to an objective consideration of the evidence in the record. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 447 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 755 (U.S. 1980).

Violation of constitutional rights prerequisite for exclusionary rule. —

One seeking the imposition of the exclusionary rule must be claiming a violation of his own constitutional rights under this section. Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 347 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3986 (U.S. 1981).

In defendant's drug case, defendant did not have standing to challenge the search because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle owned by someone else and because he disavowed ownership of the pencil box in which the evidence was found. Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, 152 P.3d 376, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2007).

As is expectation of privacy. —

Where the claim is that the police have improperly searched or seized something, the claimant must have had a legitimate expectation of privacy as to that thing. Factors to be considered in making this determination include: (1) the precautions taken in order to maintain one's privacy; (2) the likely intent of the drafters of the United States and Wyoming constitutions; (3) the property rights the claimant possessed in the invaded area; and (4) the legitimacy of the individual's possession of or presence in the property which was searched or seized. Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 347 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3986 (U.S. 1981).

Defendant who rented basement apartment had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to areas used solely by his landlady, or as to machete he released to landlady's daughter during altercation. Beadles v. State, 984 P.2d 1083, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1999).

No right of privacy in criminal activity. —

“Participant monitoring” without a warrant or court order pursuant to Wyoming's Communication Interception Act, § 7-3-601 et seq. (now repealed), does not violate this section because the accused assumes the risk of disclosure by engaging in criminal activity with another, forfeiting the reasonable expectation of privacy which might otherwise sustain a constitutional challenge to the evidence. Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1999).

Exclusionary rule applies to state prosecutions. —

In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1961 U.S. LEXIS 812, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961), the United States supreme court held the exclusionary rule was applicable to state prosecutions. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 58 Ohio Op. 2d 434, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 65 (U.S. 1971), limited, Mayer v. Moeykens, 373 F. Supp. 649, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12657 (D. Vt. 1973).

Everything becoming accessible to prosecution through improper search is inadmissible. —

If the initial search is held improper, not only the evidence obtained by such search but everything which becomes accessible to the prosecution by reason of the initial search would be inadmissible as “a fruit of the poisonous tree.” Goddard v. State, 481 P.2d 343, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 199 (Wyo. 1971).

Evidence sufficient to support seizure of goods. —

The evidence was found sufficient to support a finding that the goods in question appeared to police officers, admitted into the defendant's room, to be possible evidence of burglary. The seizure of the goods and their introduction into evidence at trial was therefore proper. Kish v. State, 642 P.2d 453, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1982).

Statute held not violative of section. —

Section 23-6-109 , giving game wardens the right to search without warrant automobiles for wildlife taken in violation of state law, does not violate this section. Gilkison v. State, 404 P.2d 755, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1965).

Preservation for review. —

Where defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of marijuana and one count of possession of methamphetamine while reserving the right to appeal, and his motion to suppress in the district court only cited to Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 and his argument at the suppression hearing focused exclusively on the Fourth Amendment, defendant did not properly raise the state constitutional argument in the district court and, consequently, the Supreme Court of Wyoming declined to consider his argument on appeal. Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, 135 P.3d 620, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 2006).

Failure to present proper argument barred consideration. —

In a challenge to a search and seizure, defendant's failure to present proper argument supporting adequate and independent state grounds to apply Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4, instead of the Fourth Amendment, prevented the appellate court from considering other than the federal constitutional principles at issue. Fender v. State, 2003 WY 96, 74 P.3d 1220, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 2003).

Warrantless automobile searches. —

It was reasonable under Wyo. Const. art. I, § 4, to search defendant's car for evidence which might have served to sustain defendant's prosecution for violation of a protection order and/or that he might have been an imminent and serious danger to his victims because: (1) defendant was the subject of an order of protection under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-21-104(b); (2) defendant's victims went to a crisis intervention office because defendant was calling them repeatedly; (3) defendant and an occupant of defendant's car were seen driving by the crisis center by his victims, and this was reported to the police; (4) while the victims waited for the police to arrive at the crisis center, defendant and his companion drove by a second time; and (5) a police officer searched defendant's person incident to arresting him for violation of the order of protection; that the cursory search of the car's interior uncovered evidence of the possession with intent to deliver proscribed narcotics, rather than evidence of the violation of the protection order, did not negate the admissibility of that evidence. Sam v. State, 2008 WY 25, 177 P.3d 1173, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2008).

Applied in

Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1977); Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 332 (Wyo. 1983); Southworth v. State, 913 P.2d 444, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1996); Nellis v. Wyoming DOT, 932 P.2d 741, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1997).

Quoted in

Crouse v. State, 384 P.2d 321, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1963); State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo. 1985); Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, 95 P.3d 802, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (2004).

Cited in

State v. Sorenson, 34 Wyo. 90, 241 P. 705, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (1925); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14834 (10th Cir. 1988); City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming Dep't of Emp. v. Patrick, 818 P.2d 54, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1991); Keehn ex rel. Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 1992); Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1992); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1999); Bailey v. State, 12 P.3d 173, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 2000); Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, 89 P.3d 324, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (2004); Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, 99 P.3d 987, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (2004); Garvin v. State, 2007 WY 190, 172 P.3d 725, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Dec. 6, 2007); State v. Deen, 2015 WY 5, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Jan. 8, 2015); Tingey v. State, 2017 WY 5, 387 P.3d 1170, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Search of Person Under Authority to Search Premises,” see 3 Wyo. L.J. 94.

For article, “Admissibility in the Federal Courts of Evidence Obtained by Eavesdropping Through the Use of Communications Devices,” see 7 Wyo. L.J. 89.

For note on authority of game wardens to search automobiles without a warrant, see 13 Wyo. L.J. 56 (1959).

For note, “Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure,” see 15 Wyo. L.J. 218 (1961).

For article, “The Seizure of Property as Evidence, Its Unlawful Retention, and Suggested Remedies of the Owner,” see 19 Wyo. L.J. 172 (1965).

For case note, “Search and Seizure — The Automobile Exception: Attempting to Establish a Bright-line Rule Regarding Searches of Passengers' Containers,” see XXXV Land & Water L. Rev. 585 (2000).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure, 77 ALR3d 636.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of adult defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's minor child — state cases, 99 ALR3d 598.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by domestic employee or servant, 99 ALR3d 1232.

Concern for possible victim (rescue doctrine) as justifying violation of Miranda requirements, 9 ALR4th 595.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues, 12 ALR4th 318.

Use, in attorney or physician disciplinary proceeding, of evidence obtained by wrongful police action, 20 ALR4th 546.

Employment of photographic equipment to record presence and nature of items as constituting unreasonable search, 27 ALR4th 532.

Search and seizure: suppression of evidence found in automobile during routine check of vehicle identification number (VIN), 27 ALR4th 549.

Admissibility, in criminal case, of evidence discovered by warrantless search in connection with fire investigation — post-Tyler cases, 31 ALR4th 194.

Propriety in state prosecution of severance of partially valid search warrant and limitation of suppression to items seized under invalid portions of warrant, 32 ALR4th 378.

Validity, in state criminal trial, of arrest without warrant by identified peace officer outside of jurisdiction, when not in fresh pursuit, 34 ALR4th 328.

Validity of routine roadblocks by state or local police for purpose of discovery of vehicular or driving violations, 37 ALR4th 10.

Retailer's surveillance of fitting or dressing rooms as invasion of privacy, 38 ALR4th 954.

Validity of, and admissibility of evidence discovered in, search authorized by judge over telephone, 38 ALR4th 1145.

Search and seizure: what constitutes abandonment of personal property within rule that search and seizure of abandoned property is not unreasonable — modern cases, 40 ALR4th 381.

Admissibility, in criminal case, of physical evidence obtained without consent by surgical removal from person's body, 41 ALR4th 60.

Propriety of governmental eavesdropping on communications between accused and his attorney, 44 ALR4th 841.

Validity of arrest made in reliance upon uncorrected or outdated warrant, list or similar police record, 45 ALR4th 550.

Officer's ruse to gain entry as affecting admissibility of plain-view evidence — modern cases, 47 ALR4th 425.

Necessity that police obtain warrant before taking possession of, examining or testing evidence discovered in search by private person, 47 ALR4th 501.

Eavesdropping on extension telephone as invasion of privacy, 49 ALR4th 430.

Propriety of state or local government health officer's warrantless search — post-Camara cases, 53 ALR4th 1168.

Seizure of books, documents or other papers under search warrant not describing such items, 54 ALR4th 391.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in public restroom, 74 ALR4th 508.

Search and seizure of telephone company records pertaining to subscriber as violation of subscriber's constitutional rights, 76 ALR4th 536.

“Caller ID” system, allowing telephone call recipient to ascertain number of telephone from which call originated, as violation of right to privacy, wiretapping statute, or similar protections, 9 ALR5th 553.

Lawfulness of search of person or personal effects under medical emergency exception to warrant requirement, 11 ALR5th 52.

Prisoner's rights as to search and seizure under state law or constitution—Post-Hudson cases, 14 ALR5th 913.

State constitutional requirements as to exclusion of evidence unlawfully seized—Post-Leon cases, 19 ALR5th 470.

Search and seizure: Lawfulness of demand for driver's license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance pursuant to police stop to assist motorist, 19 ALR5th 884.

Admissibility, in motor vehicle license suspension proceedings, of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, 23 ALR5th 108.

Search conducted by school official or teacher as violation of fourth amendment or equivalent state constitutional provision, 31 ALR5th 229.

Search and seizure of bank records pertaining to customer as violation of customer's rights under state law, 33 ALR5th 453.

Sufficiency of description in warrant of person to be searched, 43 ALR5th 1.

Application of “plain-feel” exception to warrant requirements — state cases, 50 ALR5th 581.

Propriety of search of nonoccupant visitor's belongings pursuant to warrant issued for another's premises, 51 ALR5th 375.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of adult defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's minor child — state cases, 51 ALR5th 425.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's adult relative other than spouse — state cases, 55 ALR5th 125.

Observation through binoculars as constituting unreasonable search, 59 ALR5th 615.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in driveways, 60 ALR5th 1.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in warrantless search of rental property authorized by lessor of such property — state cases, 61 ALR5th 1.

Searches and seizures: reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of garbage or trash receptacle, 62 ALR5th 1.

Belief that burglary is in progress or has recently been committed as exigent circumstance justifying warrantless search of premises, 64 ALR5th 637.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's spouse (resident or nonresident) — state cases, 65 ALR5th 407.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in tent or campsite, 66 ALR5th 373.

Validity of anticipatory search warrants — state cases, 67 ALR5th 361.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by one, other than relative, who is cotenant or common resident with defendant — state cases, 68 ALR5th 343.

Civilian participation in execution of search warrant as affecting legality of search, 68 ALR5th 549.

Effect of retroactive consent on legality of otherwise unlawful search and seizure, 76 ALR5th 563.

Permissibility and sufficiency of warrantless use of thermal imager or Forward Looking Infra-Red Radar (F.L.I.R.), 78 ALR5th 309.

Validity of police roadblocks or checkpoints for purpose of discovery of illegal narcotics violations, 82 ALR5th 103.

Validity of search or seizure of computer, computer disk, or computer peripheral equipment, 84 ALR5th 1.

What constitutes compliance with knock-and-announce rule in search of private premises — State cases, 85 ALR5th 1.

Federal and state constitutions as protecting prison visitor against unreasonable searches and seizures, 85 ALR5th 261.

Constitutionality of secret video surveillance, 91 ALR5th 585.

Expectation of privacy in internet communications, 92 ALR5th 15.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches, 99 ALR5th 557.

Error, in either search warrant or application for warrant, as to address of place to be searched as rendering warrant invalid, 103 ALR5th 463.

Search warrant as authorizing search of structures on property other than main house or other building, or location other than designated portion of building, 104 ALR5th 165.

Admissibility, in civil proceeding, of evidence obtained through unlawful search and seizure, 105 ALR5th 1.

Odor detectable by unaided person as furnishing probable cause for search warrant, 106 ALR5th 397.

When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of cocaine so untimely as to be stale — State cases,109 ALR5th 99.

When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sexual offense so untimely as to be stale — State cases,111 ALR5th 239.

When are facts relating to marijuana, provided by one other than police or other law enforcement officer, so untimely as to be stale when offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of a controlled substance — State cases,112 ALR5th 429.

When are facts relating to drug other than cocaine or marijuana so untimely as to be stale when offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of controlled substance — State cases,113 ALR5th 517.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle based on odor of marijuana — State cases, 114 ALR5th 173.

When are facts relating to marijuana, provided by police or other law enforcement officer, so untimely as to be stale when offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of controlled substance—State cases, 114 ALR5th 235.

Validity of warrantless search based in whole or in part on odor of narcotics other than marijuana, or chemical related to manufacture of such narcotics, 115 ALR5th 477.

Validity of routine roadblocks by state or local police for purpose of discovery of driver's license, registration, and safety violations, 116 ALR5th 479.

Use of trained dog to detect narcotics or drugs as unreasonable search in violation of state constitutions, 117 ALR5th 407.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues-Motions and objections during trial and matters other than pretrial motions, 117 ALR5th 513.

Validity of warrantless search of other than motor vehicle or occupant of vehicle based on odor of marijuana — State cases, 122 ALR 5th 439.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle driver based on odor of marijuana — State cases, 123 ALR 5th 179.

Validity of search conducted pursuant to parole warrant, 123 ALR 5th 221.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle passenger based on odor of marijuana, 1 A.L.R.6th 371.

Application of Leon good faith exception to exclusionary rule where police fail to comply with knock and announce requirement during execution of search warrant, 2 A.L.R.6th 169.

Application in state narcotics cases of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers' rule under Fourth Amendment—Cocaine cases, 4 A.L.R.6th 599.

Employee's expectation of privacy in workplace. 18 A.L.R.6th 1.

Expectation of privacy in text transmissions to or from pager, cellular telephone, or other wireless personal communications device. 25 A.L.R.6th 201.

Timeliness of execution of search warrant. 27 A.L.R.6th 491.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's relative, 48 ALR Fed 131.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in warrantless search of property or premises authorized by one having ownership interest in property or premises other than relative, 49 ALR Fed 511.

Sufficiency of description of business records under Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity in federal warrant authorizing search and seizure, 53 ALR Fed 679.

Validity, under federal constitution, of search conducted as condition of entering public building, 53 ALR Fed 888.

Aerial observation or surveillance as violative of fourth amendment guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure, 56 ALR Fed 772.

Attachment or use of transponder (beeper) to monitor location of airplane or automobile as constituting “search” within fourth amendment, 57 ALR Fed 646.

Validity, under fourth amendment, of “mail cover,” 57 ALR Fed 742.

Propriety of monitoring of telephone calls to or from prison inmates under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 USC § 2510 et seq.) prohibiting judicially unauthorized interception of wire or oral communications, 61 ALR Fed 825.

Delay in sealing or failure to seal tape or wire recording as required by 18 USC § 2518(8)(a) as ground for suppression of such recording at trial, 62 ALR Fed 636.

Propriety of search involving removal of natural substance or foreign object from body by actual or threatened force, 66 ALR Fed 119.

Interception of telecommunication by or with consent of party as exception, under 18 USC § 2511(2)(c) and (d), to federal proscription of such interceptions, 67 ALR Fed 429.

Admissibility of evidence obtained by unconstitutional search in proceedings under Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 USC § 651 et seq.), 67 ALR Fed 724.

When do facts shown as probable cause for wiretap authorization under 18 USC § 2518(3) become “stale,” 68 ALR Fed 953.

Propriety in federal prosecution of severance of partially valid search warrant and limitation of suppression to items seized under invalid portions of warrant, 69 ALR Fed 522.

Fourth amendment as protecting prison visitor against unreasonable searches and seizures, 69 ALR Fed 856.

What claims are sufficient to require government, pursuant to 18 USC § 3504, to affirm or deny use of unlawful electronic surveillance, 70 ALR Fed 67.

Use of electronic tracking device (beeper) to monitor location of object or substance other than vehicle or aircraft as constituting search violating fourth amendment, 70 ALR Fed 747.

Admissibility, in trial for federal offense involving malicious use of explosives (under 18 USC § 844), of evidence of taggants embedded in explosives, 70 ALR Fed 906.

What constitutes “an opportunity for full and fair litigation” in state court precluding habeas corpus review under 28 USC § 2254 in federal court of state prisoner's fourth amendment claims, 75 ALR Fed 9.

Fourth amendment as prohibiting strip searches of arrestees or pretrial detainees, 78 ALR Fed 201.

Validity of warrantless search under extended border doctrine, 102 ALR Fed 269.

Warrantless detention of mail for investigative purposes as violative of fourth amendment, 115 ALR Fed 439.

Permissibility under fourth amendment of detention of motorist by police, following lawful stop for traffic offense, to investigate matters not related to offense, 118 ALR Fed 567.

What circumstances fall within public safety exception to general requirement, pursuant to or as aid in enforcement of federal constitution's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to give Miranda warnings before conducting custodial interrogation — post-Quarles cases, 142 ALR Fed 229.

When is consent voluntarily given so as to justify search conducted on basis of that consent — Supreme Court cases, 148 ALR Fed 271.

Use of trained dog to detect narcotics or drugs as unreasonable search in violation of fourth amendment, 150 ALR Fed 399.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of adult defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's minor relative 152 ALR Fed 475.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's spouse 154 ALR Fed 579.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's adult relative other than spouse, 160 ALR Fed 165.

Sufficiency of information provided by anonymous informant to provide probable cause for Federal search warrant — cases decided after Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 54 (U.S.), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S. Ct. 33, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 884 (U.S. 1983).

Validity of warrantless administrative inspection of business that is allegedly closely or pervasively regulated; cases decided since Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S. Ct. 774, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 66 (U.S. 1970), limited, Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13579 (D.N.M. 1976), limited, United States v. Device, Labeled "Theramatic", 641 F.2d 1289, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 18799 (9th Cir. Haw. 1981).

When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of federal nondrug offense so untimely as to be stale,187 ALR Fed 415.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle based on odor of marijuana — Federal cases, 188 ALR Fed 487.

Validity of warrantless search of other than motor vehicle or occupant of motor vehicle based on odor of marijuana — Federal cases, 191 ALR Fed 303.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle occupant based on odor of marijuana — Federal cases, 192 ALR Fed 391.

Sufficiency of information provided by confidential informant, whose identity is known to police, to provide probable cause for federal search warrant where there was indication that informant provided reliable information to police in past — Cases decided after Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 54 (U.S.), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S. Ct. 33, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 884 (U.S. 1983).

§ 5. Imprisonment for debt.

No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.

Cross references. —

As to seizure of persons for purpose of securing satisfaction of judgments, see Rule 64, W.R.C.P.

Prohibition not implicated for contempt order in domestic case. —

In a contempt proceeding, a district court's order that required imprisonment if a mother did not make certain payments arising from a domestic proceeding did not implicate the prohibition on debt imprisonment because the order to pay money arose from a status obligation. GGV v. JLR, 2005 WY 14, 105 P.3d 474, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 2005).

Imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine is not an imprisonment for debt. In re MacDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 P. 18, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1893).

Punishment for fraud by check not violative of section. —

Since a criminal intent to deceitfully issue an insufficient funds check is an essential element of the crime of fraud by check, prohibited by § 6-3-702 , that statutory section does not violate this constitutional section. State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 415 (Wyo. 1982).

No imprisonment absent capacity to pay. —

A convicted person cannot be subjected to revocation of probation for noncompliance with restitution unless, in accord with the statutes, a plan has been developed which demonstrates the required criteria, including capacity to pay. In the absence of capacity to pay with reasonable effort made, imprisonment for debt occurs in contravention of this section. Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1991).

Cited in

State v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 192, 53 P.2d 13, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (1935).

Stated in

Nicodemus v. State, 2017 WY 34, 392 P.3d 408, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 2017).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Necessity of conviction of offense associated with property seized in order to support forfeiture of property to state or local authorities, 38 ALR4th 515.

§ 6. Due process of law.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

I. In General.

II. Particular Statutes and Proceedings Considered. I.In General.

“Liberty” means liberty to do anything not unlawful. The liberty envisioned by this section is not alone a liberty of person such as is offended by enslavement, imprisonment or other restraint. It contemplates a person's liberty to do all that is not made unlawful. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

Life, liberty or property may be protected. —

If a person cannot be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, he necessarily must have the right to protect it. Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1962).

Petition to intervene brought by irrigators to adjudicate water rights was properly dismissed by the district court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., as the matter was barred by res judicata and the petition was untimely. The disputed reservoir certificates were previously adjudicated in 1963; moreover, the district court's decision to dismiss the matter did not impinge on the irrigators' due process rights. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to use Water in the Big Horn River System, 2004 WY 21, 85 P.3d 981, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2004).

And a person is not to be deprived of his liberty without due process of law. Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1965).

Statute in violation of due process cannot stand. —

No statute which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, contrary to this section, can stand. Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1965).

Neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute. Such rights are relative. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

Property rights and the right to make contracts should be free from governmental interference; still these rights are not absolute. This of course means the sovereign may, in proper circumstance, limit the exercise of these rights. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

Persons may make or refrain from making contracts. —

Persons are at liberty to make lawful contracts. Equally, persons are at liberty to refrain from making contracts. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

A legislative act which purports to burden a person with a contractual covenant agreed to by private parties or private interests, but not agreed to by the nonsigning retailer, violates that person's liberty not to so contract if he elects, and robs that person of his liberty without due process. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

Due process clause has a substantive aspect as well as a procedural one. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

Due process required for enhancement. —

Because sentencing enhancement provision for battery against a household member did not contain a notice requirement, defendant was entitled to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the possibility of an enhanced sentence for recidivism which was satisfied where he was notified in the original charging documents that a conviction on the current charge would constitute his third conviction under the Family Violence Protection Act, and at his arraignment, defendant was notified of the prior convictions upon which the state later relied for enhanced sentencing. Messer v. State, 2004 WY 98, 96 P.3d 12, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2004).

Formality or informality of procedure is unrelated to the constitutional right of due process. Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1965).

No personal jurisdiction due to insufficient contacts with Wyoming. —

Personal jurisdiction was lacking in a defamation case in which the parties' contractual dealings took place outside Wyoming, no defamatory statements were shown to have been made in Wyoming, and any contacts with Wyoming were attenuated. Cheyenne Publ., LLC v. Starostka, 2004 WY 88, 94 P.3d 463, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2004).

Employment at will. —

The right of the individuals to employment could not be violated when either party could terminate the employment contract at will; no interference with a property right is present in that instance which would justify reliance upon the due process clause. Allhusen v. State, 898 P.2d 878, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1995), (decided prior to 2001 amendments to the Mental Health Professions Practice Act).

All are entitled to be informed as to what the state commands or forbids. State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1963); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

And speculation as to meaning of penal statutes cannot be required. —

No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1963); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

Hence, vague criminal statute violates due process. —

A criminal statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1963); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

Criminal statutes cannot be couched in terms so vague and indefinite as to deny due process to an accused. State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1963).

The requirement of a reasonable degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the criminal law, is a well-established element of the guarantee of due process of law. State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1963); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

Right to be apprised and confront evidence. —

One of the most basic elements of due process is the right of each party to be apprised of all the evidence upon which an issue is to be decided, with the right to examine, explain, or rebut such evidence. The right to hear and controvert all evidence upon which a factual adjudication is to be made includes the right to hear and cross-examine witnesses. Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1965).

Partnership was not bound by arbitrations where it was not furnished with notice or an opportunity to be heard. Pecha v. Smith, Keller & Assocs., 942 P.2d 387, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1997).

Court may deny access to tape recorded statement. —

In a juvenile proceeding, defendant's constitutional rights were not violated as a result of the court denying him access to the alleged victim's tape-recorded statement where the record evidenced that defendant failed to show any of the required elements for advancing a Brady claim where initially, defendant was unable to establish that the investigatory tape was lost or destroyed because of the calculated, bad faith effort of authorities with the intent to deny him the tape. All that was established was that the detective was unable to locate the investigatory tape for production and defendant was unable to establish that the evidence was constitutionally material and that its exculpatory value was apparent to authorities prior to its loss or destruction. KC v. State, 2004 WY 74, 92 P.3d 805, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2004).

Notice that party in action entitled to receive. —

If a person entitled to notice has a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them, and is put on inquiry with respect to any contentions that might be doubtful, he has received the notice required by constitutional law. Department of Revenue & Taxation, Motor Vehicle Div. v. Andrews, 671 P.2d 1239, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 377 (Wyo. 1983).

Notice sufficient where property owner apprised of issues in controversy. —

The notice which must be given in terminating a professor's teaching contract, must afford the person who is being deprived of a property interest a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The requirements of the law are met where the notice given is not misleading and apprises the property owner of the issues in controversy. White v. Board of Trustees, 648 P.2d 528, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 361 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107, 103 S. Ct. 732, 74 L. Ed. 2d 956, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 2894 (U.S. 1983).

Published notice of proposed changes to land use management plan did not violate landowners' right to due process. —

Landowners' right to procedural due process was not violated by the adoption of a land use management plan because the statutory notice was given; a published notice that identifies the particular issues discussed, even in general terms, is sufficient. Laughter v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2005 WY 54, 110 P.3d 875, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 2005).

Service of process on foreign corporation. —

Due process requires only that the representative served with process be a responsible representative of the foreign corporation. Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1963).

Due process violation for inadequate notice to doctor. —

In a proceeding to suspend his license to practice medicine, a doctor was deprived of his constitutional right to due process by the state medical board of examiner's failure to provide the requisite notice under § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(D). Devous v. Wyoming State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1993).

This section does not interfere with the police power of the state to enact laws for the general welfare of the people. At the same time any law in furtherance of the police power must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Pirie v. Kamps, 68 Wyo. 83, 229 P.2d 927, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1951); Kalman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 390 P.2d 724, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1964).

This section does not state that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,” but states that no person shall be deprived thereof “without due process of law.” That is a recognition of the fact that the natural and inherent rights are not absolute or unlimited, but are relative. It is a recognition, in other words, of the police power. That power, giving the legislature the right to enact laws for the health, safety, comfort, moral and general welfare of the people, is an attribute of sovereignty, is essential for every civilized government, is inherent in the legislature except as expressly limited, and no express grant thereof is necessary. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

But the due process clause has a substantive aspect which definitely limits police power. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

Police power is not unlimited, but is subject to the limitations of due process. Schakel v. State, 513 P.2d 412, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1973).

Purpose of statute must be within scope of police power. —

In order that a statute may be valid, the purpose, aim or end thereof must be within the scope or purview of the police power. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

Burden on party claiming infringement. —

A party claiming an infringement of his constitutional rights must assume the burden of demonstrating that infringement. He is required to show that he has a protected interest of life, liberty or property, and that the interest has been affected in an impermissible way. Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1989).

One who assails the classification in a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1963); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 292 (Wyo. 1978).

And mere assertions of discrimination are insufficient. —

A person contesting the constitutionality of a statute must do more than make bald assertions of what he thinks is discriminatory. Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1963).

Voluntariness of confession. —

In an indecent act case, a court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress because defendant's confession was voluntary where he went to the police station at the request of a police officer, but he was not under arrest, he was given Miranda warnings before the interview commenced, which he waived, and although the police officer was insistent and persistent in his questioning, he did not force defendant to answer questions. Goulart v. State, 2003 WY 108, 76 P.3d 1230, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2003).

In a murder case, a court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements because they were voluntary where he did not affirmatively invoke his right to remain silent. Defendant's statements that he did not really want to talk to the officers and that he had nothing to tell the officers were not unambiguous invocations of his right to remain silent; they were ambiguous with regards to whether or not he was affirmatively invoking his right to remain silent. Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, 98 P.3d 857, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2004).

In a murder case, a court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements because they were voluntary where officers properly complied with Miranda; defendant understood English, he was read his rights, he clearly indicated that he understood those rights, and defendant's responses indicated no confusion on his part. Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, 98 P.3d 857, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2004).

Confession was properly admitted where defendant arrived at the police station voluntarily, he was given his Miranda warnings, there was no suggestion that any of the officers questioned defendant after he requested counsel, and his first attempt to initiate re-contact with the officers failed because they would not speak with him unless he signed a request for contact form, which he was reluctant to do. Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, 114 P.3d 1252, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 2005).

Murder defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress his statements failed because defendant's will was not overborne due to sleep deprivation or intoxication, and no showing was made of police misconduct during the interview, meaning defendant's statements were voluntarily given to detectives. Carter v. State, 2010 WY 136, 241 P.3d 476, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 2010).

Voluntariness of statements. —

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress defendant's statements to officers because defendant did not demonstrate that a suppression motion based on the alleged Miranda violation would have been granted as it did not appear that defendant was subjected to express questioning, or its functional equivalent, prior to being advised of his Miranda rights. After he was arrested, an officer located defendant in a patrol vehicle, read him his Miranda rights, and defendant indicated that he understood his rights and that he wanted to waive those rights and make a statement. Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, 121 P.3d 127, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 2005).

Statements made by defendant to investigator did not have to be suppressed as involuntary statements because defendant initiated communications with investigator, defendant was informed of his Miranda rights by investigator, and while defendant had previously invoked his right to counsel prior to one of the communications, he knowingly and voluntarily waived that right prior to speaking with investigator. Hicks v. State, 2008 WY 83, 187 P.3d 877, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 2008).

Trustee should have been given notice and opportunity to be heard to protect her interest, if any, in disputed property; trustee had not been given opportunity to present argument or evidence regarding question of whether sale should have been approved. Capshaw v. Osbon, 2008 WY 95, 190 P.3d 156, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2008).

In defendant's sexual abuse case, defendant's statement was not involuntary because, while defendant claimed that he was extremely fatigued, there was nothing in the interview that showed that to be the case. Defendant never asked to end the interview, or complained about being tired, he also continually denied the allegations against him in the midst of the religious references made by the deputy, and defendant had been informed of his Miranda warnings. Mersereau v. State, 2012 WY 125, 286 P.3d 97, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2012); 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (2012).

No error in failing to suppress non-custodial interrogation. —

In defendant's sexual assault case, a court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress his confession where the confession was non-custodial because he went to the station of his own will, he was told he did not have to answer questions, would not be arrested that day, and was free to leave at any time. In addition, the confession was voluntary as the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the statements and had the opportunity to hear the witness' testimony and weigh their credibility. Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, 84 P.3d 320, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2004).

Defendant's statements to police did not violate his self-incrimination rights where the detective characterized the interrogation as her posing questions to defendant and he ‘answered if he wanted to.’ He took advantage of that option by refusing to identify his supplier or customers, despite the fact the occupants were watched to ensure that no evidence was compromised, they were allowed to do what they pleased, defendant apparently slept for a great deal of the time the officers searched the premises, and, when he needed to relieve himself, the officers respected his choice to go outside rather than be accompanied to the restroom by an officer. Gompf v. State, 2005 WY 112, 120 P.3d 980, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 2005).

Defendant's statement to police was voluntary where his car was not ‘blocked in’ by the officers, he was informed that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to talk to the officers, the officers were in plain clothes, and the entire encounter lasted less than thirty minutes. Jelle v. State, 2005 WY 111, 119 P.3d 403, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2005).

Statements while intoxicated were voluntary. —

In a case where defendant gave a confession to taking indecent liberties with a minor, a motion to suppress evidence was properly denied. Although witnesses testified that defendant was intoxicated both before and after the interview, this was not enough to justify suppression where defendant gave appropriate answers and appeared to have understood the questions posed during the interview, and defendant initiated contact with police after requesting an attorney. The fact that defendant might have been led to believe that his leaving after the questioning was a possibility was not sufficient evidence of coercion. Gordon v. State, 2004 WY 105, 97 P.3d 64, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2004).

Counsel not ineffective for failing to argue for suppression of statements due to evidence of intoxication. —

Counsel were not ineffective at a suppression hearing regarding the voluntariness of defendant's statements due to intoxication where it was apparent from a transcript of the interview that he was responsive and gave coherent, detailed answers to the detective's questions and that he was able to converse with the detective. Siler v. State, 2005 WY 73, 115 P.3d 14, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 2005).

Waiver of rights. —

Defendant waived his due process right to be heard by voluntarily absenting himself from the scheduled hearing of which he had notice. Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1995).

Due process clause requires availability of hearing when protected property interest is involved. AT & T Communications of Mountain States v. State Bd. of Equalization, 768 P.2d 580, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1989).

Juror selection error must be harmful. —

In defendant's sexual exploitation case, although the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to a juror because there was no statement from the juror that he would be able to consider the case only on the evidence presented in court under the law, as instructed, without regard to his stated bias, the error was not prejudicial to defendant. There was nothing to indicate that any of the jurors who served on the panel were not qualified to serve. All of the jurors including the two identified by defendant as likely recipients of a peremptory challenge if he had had one available were passed for cause. Since there was no demonstration that the jury was not impartial and that defendant was denied a fair trial, he could not meet his burden of showing harmful error. Klahn v. State, 2004 WY 94, 96 P.3d 472, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2004), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. Sept. 21, 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 963, 125 S. Ct. 1726, 161 L. Ed. 2d 605, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3005 (U.S. 2005).

“Biased” juror may be rehabilitated. —

In defendant's sexual exploitation case, a court did not err by failing to grant defendant's challenge for cause to a juror who showed a bias where the trial court, after fully exploring the juror's perceived prejudice and having the opportunity to listen to her answers and observe her demeanor, concluded that there were no grounds for a challenge for cause, and the juror was sufficiently rehabilitated. Klahn v. State, 2004 WY 94, 96 P.3d 472, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 2004), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 146 (Wyo. Sept. 21, 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 963, 125 S. Ct. 1726, 161 L. Ed. 2d 605, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3005 (U.S. 2005).

Exposure of jury to information about accused's other crimes. —

The exposure of the jury panel to information by a prospective juror that the accused was possibly involved in another crime is the type of situation which requires unfair prejudice to be presumed and requires the jury panel be disqualified. Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1995).

Criteria for giving jury instruction is existence of evidence. —

The review required by the trial court, in determining whether the accused has a right to have a theory of the defense instruction, directs attention only to the existence of an evidentiary basis for the jury's consideration and not a criteria of some convincing character of the evidence as analyzed by the trial court or the appellate jurist. Stagner v. State, 842 P.2d 520, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1992).

Legislature may not prohibit occupations, unless detrimental to public welfare. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Word “willfully” in penal statute is not ambiguous. Todd v. State, 566 P.2d 597, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 271 (Wyo. 1977).

Effective assistance of counsel. —

Counsel were not ineffective for conceding defendant's guilt in a murder case where it was apparent from the record that counsel sought to avoid a first-degree murder conviction by admitting that defendant stabbed and killed the victim, undermining the requisite mental state for first-degree murder due to his intoxication, and asking the jury for a verdict of manslaughter based on the circumstances surrounding the stabbing. Siler v. State, 2005 WY 73, 115 P.3d 14, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 2005).

Lack of counsel never harmless error. —

The assistance of counsel is such a basic right that the lack of such assistance can never be treated as harmless error. It is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1922 (U.S. 1980).

Error to allow counsel to withdraw but deny request for continuance. —

In a child visitation case, a father was denied due process where a court erred by allowing the father's counsel to withdraw one day before the trial and by denying his request for a continuance to obtain substitute counsel. The father was not extended notice concerning his counsel's motion to withdraw, there was no withdrawal hearing, and he was not notified of the withdrawal order. Moreover, the visitation hearing was so abbreviated that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded that evidence had been presented of such a change warranting modification of visitation or that modification was in the best interest of the child. Sims v. Day, 2004 WY 124, 99 P.3d 964, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 2004).

When joint representation denies effective assistance of counsel. —

A defendant is denied the fundamental right of effective assistance of counsel when the trial court requires joint representation of defendants over timely objections; prejudice is then presumed and need not be independently shown. Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1922 (U.S. 1980).

Prosecution's intrusion into attorney-client relationship. —

The prosecution's intrusion into the attorney-client relationship of the defendant and his defense counsel did not substantially prejudice the defendant's defense where a deputy sheriff had devulged to the prosecutor the substance of some of the conversations between defense counsel and the defendant that he had overheard during trial preparation sessions at which he was present for security reasons. Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 930, 113 S. Ct. 2395, 124 L. Ed. 2d 296, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 3540 (U.S. 1993).

Vindictive prosecution not shown. —

Where defendant was charged with possession and concealment of the stolen property and disposing of the identical stolen property, the second count having previously been charged, but that case was dismissed without prejudice after the jury was seated and the first witness was sworn, and the jury in the second trial found defendant guilty of both counts, but the trial judge sentenced him only on count I, later dismissing count II, the defendant did not show there was vindictive prosecution because he was charged with the second count in the second trial. Crozier v. State, 882 P.2d 1230, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1994), limited, State v. Newman, 2004 WY 41, 88 P.3d 445, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 2004).

Defendant's right to a fair trial.—

Defendant was deprived of a fair trial because prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the State of Wyoming failed to comply with the district court’s discovery order and when the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument and because the district court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear a leg restraint at trial without conducting a hearing to evaluate the necessity for the restraint. Black v. State, 2017 WY 135, 405 P.3d 1045, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2017).

Prosecutor's comments did not cause defendant to have an unfair trial. —

Pursuant to plain error review, defendant was not denied a fair trial where prosecutor's comments did not have a deleterious effect on the jury's verdict. The prosecutor's comments did not cross the line between legitimate argument and illegitimate vouching for the credibility of the State's witnesses, and he did not directly state that it was his opinion that the witnesses were credible nor did he give that impression or suggest that the jurors did not have that determination to make. Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, 110 P.3d 1206, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. June 29, 2005).

Right to fair trial not violated by prosecutor's remarks. —

In a vehicular homicide case, defendant's right to a fair trial was not violated by prosecutor's remarks during opening and closing argument regarding the effect that the victim's death would have on family and friends where the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming, the district court gave a jury instruction immediately prior to the prosecutor's opening statement, and the district court also specifically instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks immediately after they occurred. Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, 99 P.3d 457, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1001, 125 S. Ct. 1931, 161 L. Ed. 2d 775, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3570 (U.S. 2005).

In defendant's indecent liberties case, the prosecutor's closing argument, which included remarks that it was the jury's duty and that the right thing to do was to find defendant guilty, did not deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial. Defendant was not prejudiced by the fleeting comments, especially in light of the district court's comprehensive instructions to the jury that it could only consider the evidence presented during the trial, and it was not likely that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant had they not been made. Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, 100 P.3d 1270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 2004).

Prosecutorial misconduct not prejudicial due to court instructions. —

In an arson case, defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial based on prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor made a valid inquiry into defendant's ability to recall with accuracy the events that occurred before, during and after the time of the fire. Although the prosecutor made an improper comment regarding defendant “skipping out on a bill,” the district court sustained an objection, and the jury was given both oral and written instructions to disregard any testimony for which an objection was sustained. In addition, the existence of a check was as well known to defendant as it was to the prosecution, so the evidence was not withheld. Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, 94 P.3d 1034, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2004).

No violation in denying motion to change judge. —

In a child custody case, a judge did not violate a mother's due process rights with respect to her motion for a change of judge because the judge gave substantive consideration of the motion in a manner appropriate to the circumstances. The district court held a hearing. Although the district court declined to hear the mother's testimony on the change of judge issue, choosing instead to rely solely on her affidavit, the mother's attorney did not make an offer of proof as to what her live testimony might have added to the affidavit. Mace v. Nocera, 2004 WY 154, 101 P.3d 921, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2004).

Gender-based classifications are not ipso facto invalid. A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982).

Wyoming does not recognize claim under section when no state action is alleged. Hatfield v. Rochelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d 1308, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1991).

Failure of administrative agency to follow own rules. —

Administrative agency must follow its own rules as they have the force and effect of law; however, a person asserting an agency's rule violations must show how the breach denied her due process or violated her fundamental rights. MN v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In the Interest of MN), 2003 WY 135, 78 P.3d 232, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2003).

I.Presentence confinement credit.

District court erred in ruling that it did not have authority to award pre-sentence confinement credit for the time defendant spent in in-patient treatment where even though defendant was not in official detention, Wyoming case law made clear that trial judges had discretion to grant or deny credit for time served in presentence custody if the custody was not due to defendant's indigency and the amount of time plus the sentence did not exceed the maximum allowable sentence. Daniels v. State, 2014 WY 125, 335 P.3d 483, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2014).

Given the district court told defendant he would receive credit for the time he spent successfully completing in-patient treatment, it abused its discretion by subsequently denying such credit without justification. Daniels v. State, 2014 WY 125, 335 P.3d 483, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2014).

Applied in

Bass v. City of Casper, 28 Wyo. 387, 205 P. 1008, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (1922); J. Ray McDermott & Co., v. Hudson, 370 P.2d 364, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1962); Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962); DS v. Department of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1980); State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 415 (Wyo. 1982); Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 289 (Wyo. 1983); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1988); Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1990); Meridian Aggregates Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 827 P.2d 375, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1992); McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1994); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1995); KT v. State, 902 P.2d 1288, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1995); Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 1995); Daniel v. State, 923 P.2d 728, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1996); Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 1996); Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, 54 P.3d 248, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2002); White v. State, 2003 WY 163, 80 P.3d 642, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2003).

Quoted in

Thomas v. Jultak, 68 Wyo. 198, 231 P.2d 974, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1950); Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1980); Galesburg Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1982); State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 658 (Wyo. 1986); White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1989); Barron v. Barron, 834 P.2d 685, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1992); Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1993); RPM v. State, Dep't of Family Servs., 917 P.2d 169, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1996); Heilig v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, 2003 WY 27, 64 P.3d 734, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 2003).

Stated in

Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1961); Weiss v. State ex rel. Cardine, 455 P.2d 904, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1969); Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984); Allied Fid. Ins. Co. v. Environmental Quality Council, 753 P.2d 1038, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 1988); In re Contempt Order Issued Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1988).

Cited in

Smith v. State, 2005 WY 113, 119 P.3d 411, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (2005)State v. Kelley, 17 Wyo. 335, 98 P. 886, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (1909); State v. Berry, 36 Wyo. 257, 254 P. 488, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (1927); Moore v. Jarvis, 44 Wyo. 92, 8 P.2d 818, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1932); Fristam v. City of Sheridan, 66 Wyo. 143, 206 P.2d 741, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (1949); Eastwood v. Wyoming Hwy. Dep't, 76 Wyo. 247, 301 P.2d 818, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (1956); J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Hudson, 348 P.2d 73, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1962); Hansen v. Smith, 395 P.2d 944, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1964); Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12370 (D. Wyo. 1970); Harding v. State, 478 P.2d 64, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1970); Boggs v. State, 484 P.2d 711, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 216 (Wyo. 1971); Griffith ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't v. Stephenson, 494 P.2d 546, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 234 (Wyo. 1972); Jackson v. Wyoming State Treas. ex. rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't, 521 P.2d 571, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 196 (Wyo. 1974); Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 1974); Tri-County Elec. Ass'n v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1974); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1976); Neu v. Grant, 548 F.2d 281, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10584 (10th Cir. 1977); Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1977); State ex rel. Weber v. Municipal Court, 567 P.2d 698, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 311 (Wyo. 1977); Schoeller v. Board of County Comm'rs, 568 P.2d 869, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 314 (Wyo. 1977); Mayland v. State, 568 P.2d 897, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 283 (Wyo. 1977); Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 406 (Wyo. 1979); Goodman v. State, 601 P.2d 178, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 473 (Wyo. 1979); Nimmo v. State, 607 P.2d 344, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 243 (Wyo. 1980); Great W. Sugar Co. v. Johnson, 624 P.2d 1184, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1981); Wyoming Bd. of Equalization v. State ex rel. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 637 P.2d 248, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 396 (Wyo. 1981); Horn v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 356 (Wyo. 1982); Board of County Comm'rs v. Teton County Youth Servs., Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 393 (Wyo. 1982); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1983); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 457 (Wyo. 1987); Miller v. Campbell County, 722 F. Supp. 687, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11685 (D. Wyo. 1989); Kautza v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1991); In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992); M.M. v. State, 827 P.2d 1117, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1992); Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1992); Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1992); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 93 (Wyo. 1994); Higgins v. State, 889 P.2d 964, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1995); Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1995); Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1995); Talbott v. State, 902 P.2d 719, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 17 4 (Wyo. 1995); Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1996); Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1997); Ottema v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div., 968 P.2d 41, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 1998); RS v. Johnson County Dept. of Family Servs. (In re JL), 989 P.2d 1268, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1999); MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002); Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, 43 P.3d 80, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 2002); O'Brien v. State, 2002 WY 63, 45 P.3d 225, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2002); Rice v. State, 2004 WY 130, 100 P.3d 371, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (2004); Smith v. State, 2005 WY 113, 119 P.3d 411, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (2005); Hoke v. Motel 6 Jackson & Accor N. Am., Inc., 2006 WY 38, 131 P.3d 369, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. Mar. 27, 2006); Kovach v. State, 2013 WY 46, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Apr 19, 2013); Lundahl v. Gregg, 2014 WY 110, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Sept. 5, 2014); Lundahl v. Gregg, 2014 WY 110, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Sept. 5, 2014); Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, 401 P.3d 834, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Constitutionality of the Wyoming Underground Water Statute,” see 3 Wyo. L.J. 140.

For comment, “The Constitutionality of Automobile Compensation Plans in Wyoming,” see 5 Land & Water L. Rev. 191 (1970).

For comment, “Competitive Bidding on Public Works in Wyoming: Determination of Responsibility and Preference,” see 11 Land & Water L. Rev. 243 (1976).

For article, “Insanity, Bifurcation and Due Process: Can Values Survive Doctrine,” see 13 Land & Water L. Rev. 515 (1978).

For case note, “Is the Current Test of the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment Proper? Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (1982),” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 681 (1982).

For case note, “Constitutional Law — Equal Protection Analysis. Awarding Public Works Contracts: Granting Preference to Resident Bidders. Galesburg Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 393 (1983).

For comment, “Prosecution as a Juvenile or an Adult? Is the Discretion Vested in the District Attorney by Section 14-6-203(c) of the Wyoming Statutes Unconstitutional and Violative of the Proper Role of a Prosecutor?” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1984).

For case note, “Constitutional Law — A Constitutional Right of Access to State-Held Information. Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 289 (Wyo. 1983),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 719 (1984).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

For article, “Ousting the Judge: Campaign Politics in the 1984 Wyoming Judicial Retention Elections,” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 371 (1989).

For case note, “CRIMINAL LAW — Right to Counsel at Preindictment Lineups — Should Wyoming Change Its Position? Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 437 (Wyo. 1987),” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 541 (1989).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure — Witness Immunity — The Story of a County Attorney Who Said, 'I Think I Can, I Think I Can,' and the Brave Little Conscience that Couldn't be Shocked. Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1990),” see XXVII Land & Water L. Rev. 191 (1992).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

For article, “Wyoming's New Comparative Fault Statute,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 509 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Sufficiency of courtroom facilities as affecting rights of accused, 85 ALR3d 918.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of gagging, shackling or otherwise physically restraining accused during course of state criminal trial, 90 ALR3d 17.

Propriety of prosecutor's argument regarding other evidence not presented, 90 ALR3d 646.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's argument giving jury impression that judge believes defendant guilty, 90 ALR3d 822.

Interference by prosecution with defense counsel's pretrial interrogation of witnesses, 90 ALR3d 1231.

Admissibility, as against interest in criminal case, of declaration of commission of criminal act, 92 ALR3d 1164.

Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in state criminal case, 94 ALR3d 15.

Validity, construction and application of regulation regarding outside employment of governmental employees or officers, 94 ALR3d 1230.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding right to and incidents of jury trial, 3 ALR4th 601.

Right of accused in criminal prosecution to presence of counsel at court-appointed or -approved psychiatric examination, 3 ALR4th 910.

Availability in state court of defense of entrapment where accused denies committing acts which constitute offense charged, 5 ALR4th 1128.

Zoning regulations limiting use of property near airport as taking of property, 18 ALR4th 542.

Statutory or constitutional provision allowing widow but not widower to take against will and receive dower interests, allowances, homestead rights, or the like as denial of equal protection of law, 18 ALR4th 910.

Validity of statute making sodomy a criminal offense, 20 ALR4th 1009.

Validity of state statutes and regulations limiting or restricting public funding for abortions sought by indigent women, 20 ALR4th 1166.

Validity of state statute providing for termination of parental rights, 22 ALR4th 774.

Validity and construction of statute prohibiting employers from suggesting or requiring polygraph or similar tests as condition of employment or continued employment, 23 ALR4th 187.

In personam jurisdiction, under long-arm statute, over nonresident attorney in legal malpractice action, 23 ALR4th 1044.

Propriety of requiring suspect or accused to alter, or to refrain from altering, physical or bodily appearance, 24 ALR4th 592.

Religious activities as doing or transaction of business under “long-arm” statutes or rules of court, 26 ALR4th 1176.

State or municipal towing, impounding, or destruction of motor vehicles parked or abandoned on streets or highways, 32 ALR4th 728.

Enforceability of agreement by law enforcement officials not to prosecute if accused would help in criminal investigation or would become witness against others, 32 ALR4th 990.

Validity and application of statute allowing endangered child to be temporarily removed from parental custody, 38 ALR4th 756.

Validity, construction and application of statutes, or of condominium association's bylaws or regulations, restricting number of units that may be owned by single individual or entity, 39 ALR4th 88.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance making it offense to have possession of open or unsealed alcoholic beverage in public place, 39 ALR4th 668.

Validity and construction of state statute or rule allowing or changing rate of prejudgment interest in tort actions, 40 ALR4th 147.

Consumption or destruction of physical evidence due to testing or analysis by prosecution's expert as warranting suppression of evidence or dismissal of case against accused in state court, 40 ALR4th 594.

Admissibility, in criminal case, of physical evidence obtained without consent by surgical removal from person's body, 41 ALR4th 60.

Validity of state statute providing for periodic payment of future damages in medical malpractice action, 41 ALR4th 275.

Validity, construction and application of state statutory provision prohibiting sales of commodities below cost — modern cases, 41 ALR4th 612.

Validity, construction and application of state statute forbidding unfair trade practice or competition by discriminatory allowance of rebates, commissions, discounts or the like, 41 ALR4th 675.

Validity and construction of state statutory provision forbidding court to stay, pending review, judgment or order revoking or suspending professional, trade or occupational license, 42 ALR4th 516.

Constitutionality, construction and application of statute as to effect of taking appeal, or staying execution, on right to redeem from execution or judicial sale, 44 ALR4th 1229.

Tax on hotel-motel room occupancy, 58 ALR4th 274.

AIDS infection as affecting right to attend public school, 60 ALR4th 15.

Standing of media representatives or organizations to seek review of, or to intervene to oppose, order closing criminal proceedings to public, 74 ALR4th 476.

Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily committed mentally ill persons with neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs as violative of state constitutional guaranty, 74 ALR4th 1099.

Propriety of telephone testimony or hearings in prison proceedings, 9 ALR5th 451.

Rights as to notice and hearing in proceeding to revoke or suspend license to practice medicine, 10 ALR5th 1.

Abutting owner's right to damages for limitation of access caused by traffic regulation, 15 ALR5th 821.

Actions by state official involving defendant as constituting “outrageous” conduct violating due process guaranties, 18 ALR5th 1.

Validity and application of statute or regulation authorizing revocation or suspension of driver's license for reason unrelated to use of, or ability to operate, motor vehicle, 18 ALR5th 542.

Sufficiency, as to content, of notice of garnishment required to be served upon garnishee, 20 ALR5th 229.

Right to compensation for real property damaged by law enforcement personnel in course of apprehending suspect, 23 ALR5th 834.

Validity, construction and application of state statutory provisions limiting amount of recovery in medical malpractice claims, 26 ALR5th 245.

Zoning authority as estopped from revoking legally issued building permit, 26 ALR5th 736.

Validity, construction and application of state statutes prohibiting sale or possession of controlled substances within specified distance of schools, 27 ALR5th 593.

Failure of police to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence as violating criminal defendant's rights under state constitution, 40 ALR5th 113.

Validity, construction, and application of regulations regarding outside employment of governmental employees or officers, 62 ALR5th 671.

Failure of state prosecutor to disclose exculpatory photographic evidence as violating due process, 93 ALR5th 527.

Failure of state prosecutor to disclose fingerprint evidence as violating due process, 94 ALR5th 393.

Failure of state prosecutor to disclose exculpatory ballistic evidence as violating due process, 95 ALR5th 611.

Failure of state prosecutor to disclose exculpatory medical reports and tests as violating due process, 101 ALR5th 187.

Failure of state prosecutor to disclose pretrial statement made by crime victim as violating due process, 102 ALR5th 327.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4304 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4651 (2002) to state death penalty proceedings,110 ALR5th 1.

Defense of good faith in action for damages against law enforcement official under 42 USC § 1983, providing for liability of person who, under color of law, subjects another to deprivation of rights, 61 ALR Fed 7.

Validity, under federal constitution, of so-called “head shop” ordinances or statutes, prohibiting manufacture and sale of drug-use-related paraphernalia, 69 ALR Fed 15.

Delay between seizure of personal property by federal government and institution of proceedings for forfeiture thereof as violative of fifth amendment due process requirements, 69 ALR Fed 373.

Liability of supervisory officials and governmental entities for having failed to adequately train, supervise, or control individual peace officers who violate plaintiff's civil rights under 42 USC § 1983, 70 ALR Fed 17.

Situs of debt or property for purposes of act of state doctrine, 77 ALR Fed 293.

Construction and application of provision of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, that defendant's confession shall not be inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal prosecution solely because of delay in presentment before magistrate, 124 ALR Fed 263.

Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 for racial discrimination — Supreme Court cases, 164 ALR Fed 483.

Equal protection and due process clause challenges based on racial discrimination — Supreme Court cases, 172 ALR Fed 1.

Equal protection and due process clause challenges based on sex discrimination — Supreme Court cases, 178 ALR Fed 25.

Forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to pretrial detainees — Federal cases, 188 ALR Fed 285.

Failure of state prosecutor to disclose exculpatory tape recorded evidence as violating due process. 24 A.L.R.6th 1.

II.Particular Statutes and Proceedings Considered.

Comments by judge. —

Defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial was not violated by comments made by a judge during a burglary trial relating to the possible excusing of a doctor as a juror and the fact that someone would be in trouble if the trial ran longer than three days; the comments were not calculated to belittle or disparage defense counsel or create the impression that the defense had no merit. Fernandez v. State, 2007 WY 198, 172 P.3d 730, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 211 (Wyo. 2007).

Divorce proceedings. —

The right to due process extends to and is required in divorce actions. Teton v. Teton, 933 P.2d 1130, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 1997).

Divorce granted in favor of the wife was proper where the husband answered the complaint, filed affidavits in support of his position, and was allowed to participate and be heard at trial; thus, his due process rights were not violated, Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6. Welch v. Welch, 2003 WY 168, 81 P.3d 937, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 205 (Wyo. 2003).

In a divorce case, a wife's due process rights under Wyo. Const. art. I, § 6 and the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when a district court entered a default divorce decree based on a supplemental pleading that was not served on the wife; a wife's motion to modify the decree should have been granted because the supplemental affidavit contained claims for relief that were not in the original complaint. Bradley v. Bradley, 2005 WY 107, 118 P.3d 984, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2005).

Where a wife filed a complaint for divorce, where the husband in his answer stated that he did not object to the divorcing being awarded to the wife, where the wife moved for an emergency hearing six days later because she was in the hospital in critical condition and wanted the divorce finalized before she died, and where the district court entered a divorce decree awarding a divorce to the wife and retaining jurisdiction to equitably divide the marital estate after efforts to schedule a hearing with the husband's attorney were unsuccessful, the district court did not err under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 6(c)(2), Wyo. R. Civ. P. 12, or Wyo. R. Civ. P. 56 and did not violate the husband's due process rights under U.S. Const. amend. XIV and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, because the motion for an emergency hearing to award a divorce in a proceeding in which both parties had agreed that a divorce was appropriate was not a motion that would determine the final rights of either party. The final rights of the parties were left to be determined at a later date, and the husband would be afforded a full hearing prior to a determination of his final rights. Kelly v. Kilts, 2010 WY 151, 243 P.3d 947, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 2010).

Statements to law enforcement officers. —

In a case in which defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation, defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as defendant’s statements to the troopers were voluntary and not coerced as her free will was not overcome; thus, the troopers did not engage in coercive police tactics and did not violate defendant’s due process rights. Rodriguez v. State, 2018 WY 134, 430 P.3d 766, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2018).

Petitioners lacked standing in custody modification. —

A stepfather and sibling had no standing to pursue a petition to set aside the modification of a custody order granting custody of a minor to the minor's father because such a right is not granted by way of statutes or common law. Rather, the fundamental right to the care and control of a minor is held by the parents, and the only persons allowed to pursue a modification of a custody order are grandparents and primary caregivers. MBB v. ERW, 2004 WY 134, 100 P.3d 415, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 2004).

No process at school board informational gathering. —

Where a school board's informational gatherings were not “meetings” that had to be held under the open meeting statute, § 16-4-403 , no process was due because there was no state action which deprived the plaintiffs (parents of a high school student) of any property. Additionally, although under Wyoming law a student has a property interest in obtaining a public education, a student does not have an equal interest in where he receives that education, sufficient to challenge a school board's decision to close a school. Ward v. Board of Trustees, 865 P.2d 618, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1993).

Requirement of accreditation. —

Although requirement of accreditation was a delegation of power made by the Wyoming department of education to the accrediting institution, this delegation did not violate the Wyoming Constitution as the Wyoming Constitution does not directly prohibit delegations of public power to private entities or to public agencies, and any constitutional limitation was therefore indirect; here, applicants had sufficient guarantees of due process, and the delegation of accreditation to private entities was reasonable. Newport Int'l Univ., Inc. v. State, 2008 WY 72, 186 P.3d 382, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2008).

Tenure in public office not protected. —

Rights to office are limited; legislature has complete control over them except as specifically limited by constitution and tenure in office is not protected by this section. Cowan v. State, 57 Wyo. 309, 116 P.2d 854, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1941).

Removal of public officers by governor. —

This section was not violated by power of governor to remove officers, conferred by statute. State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500, 228 P. 636, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1924).

Due process right to pretermination notice and hearing. —

A municipal judge has an identifiable property right in his office and, therefore, has a federal constitutional right to due process of law that demands notice of an action for his discharge and a hearing prior to termination of his appointment to office. This section affords equivalent protection in such a case. Town of Upton v. Whisler, 824 P.2d 545, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1992).

Summary judgment was improper on a due process claim where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether, prior to being deprived of their property interest in their employment in a school lunch cafeteria, several employees received sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard to satisfy due process; there were factual questions regarding notice of the charges, the evidence against the employees, and whether they were allowed to present their side of the story. The employees were told they were terminated when they refused to serve lunch due to alleged mistreatment. Metz v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2007 WY 166, 173 P.3d 334, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 2007).

Right to hearing on change in permanency plan. —

In Wyoming dependency/neglect proceedings, due process requires that if a change in a permanency plan includes adoption or permanent placement other than reunification, parents must have the right to request, and on request must be provided with, an evidentiary hearing, and a parent must request the hearing if he or she desires one, because there may be instances in which parents do not dispute a recommendation or are content with a non-evidentiary hearing, so the failure to request such a hearing waives that right. KC v. State (In the Interest of GC), 2015 WY 73, 351 P.3d 236, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2015).

Hearing on change in goal of a permanency plan from reunification to adoption did not violate a mother's due process rights because (1) the mother did not seek a hearing or directly claim the hearing held violated due process, and (2) lack of a full evidentiary hearing was not plain error, as such a right was not clear at the time of the hearing, since Wyo. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3) said the rules of evidence only applied to juvenile adjudicatory hearings. KC v. State (In the Interest of GC), 2015 WY 73, 351 P.3d 236, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2015).

Notice of expiration of livestock brand. —

The state livestock board satisfied the due process rights of the owner of a livestock brand by mailing notice of the expiration date of the brand to the owner's prior address; the brand owner had failed to notify the board of her address change, thus making actual notice unfeasible. Tate v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 932 P.2d 746, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1997).

Inadequate notice for modification of default judgment. —

The modification of a default judgment against one of the co-defendants in a garnishment proceeding in a subsequent hearing which was held for the purpose of considering claims for exemption from garnishment violated the plaintiff's due process rights, as the notice given was not adequate to suggest in any way that the default judgment would be amended or modified. Barker Bros. v. Barker-Taylor, 823 P.2d 1204, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1992).

Service on insurance commissioner without separate notice to insurer inadequate. —

Personal service under § 26-3-122 must be accomplished by serving the insurance commissioner and providing a notice of service with a copy of the service to the insurer. One or the other is simply insufficient to satisfy due process. Gookin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1992).

Notice served upon party, not attorney, unconstitutional. —

A trial-setting notice in a divorce action served upon a party, but not upon the party's attorney, violates Rule 5(b), W.R.C.P., and does not satisfy the requirements of constitutional due process. Loghry v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1996).

Regulating hours of work on public works. —

Statute regulating hours of work on public works did not violate the provisions of this section. State v. A. H. Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387, 240 P. 208, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1925).

Regulation of use of highways. —

Control of highways may in proper cases be extended to prohibiting their use, and legislature may subject private carriers to appropriate regulations. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Courts must determine in first instance whether legislature can prohibit use of highways in particular case and whether regulating amounting to prohibiting is reasonable. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

State or municipal highway regulations must be reasonable, operate with equality and have tendency to accomplish object in view. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Statute prohibiting use of highways by motor transportation companies, except under certificate and subject to regulation by public service commission, is void as applied to private carriers. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Regulation of seat belt use. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1402(f) does not violate the substantive due process requirements of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions by arbitrarily depriving the defendant of her property by requiring her to pay more than her fair share of the total fault; the legislature's objective in enacting § 31-5-1402(f), so that seat belt nonuse could not be used to establish comparative fault, was legitimate, and the means chosen to do so, the distinction between vehicle occupants who wear seat belts and those who do not, was grounded in a rational basis. Huff v. Shumate, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27781 (D. Wyo. 2004).

Driver's license revocation proceedings. —

Because a driver's license was not a fundamental right, but a privilege, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-102(a)(xxv), due process was not violated by the utilization of a preponderance of the evidence in commercial driver's license revocation proceedings under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305 and this section. State v. Robbins, 2011 WY 23, 246 P.3d 864, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 2011).

Land development regulation. —

Teton County, Wyo., Land Dev. Reg. § 2450, which limits the square footage of homes that can be built in the jurisdiction, does not violate an area homeowner's due process rights facially because the land use regulation is rationally related to its purpose of preserving the area's beauty, past, microeconomics, and housing market, nor does the regulation violate the homeowner's due process rights as applied because the homeowner failed to present any evidence to meet his burden of showing that the limitations on habitable space in his home violates the constitution beyond a reasonable doubt. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, 65 P.3d 720, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. 2003).

Landowners' right to substantive due process was not violated by the adoption of a county's growth management plan because it provided sufficient guidance for enforcement officials and those subject to regulation; moreover, land-use regulations, including zoning laws, that reasonably promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the populace, even when adversely affecting real property interests, are permissible governmental action, the county had a legitimate interest both in requiring amendment of the subdivision plat in the face of a proposed contrary use and in maintaining public access to the surrounding properties, and there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the county. Laughter v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2005 WY 54, 110 P.3d 875, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 2005).

When a board of county commissioners (board) granted a company proposing to build a wind farm a wind energy conversion system permit, it was not a violation of due process for the board to accept and rely on information submitted after a public hearing because (1) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-506 mandated the procedure to be followed in such cases, and (2) there was no allegation that the required procedures were not followed. Northern Laramie Range Found. v. Converse Co. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs, 2012 WY 158, 290 P.3d 1063, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 2012).

Regulation of motor carriers. —

The provisions of § 56, ch. 65, Laws 1935, regulating motor carriers, which authorized the public service commission to initiate appropriate civil proceedings to enforce obedience to, or for violation of, the act did not violate this section. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1935).

Prohibiting automatic filling stations. —

A municipal ordinance prohibiting filling stations without an attendant, thus barring automatic stations, was not so arbitrary as to deny due process of law. Nance v. Cheyenne, 56 F.2d 453, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1994 (D. Wyo. 1931).

Requirement that railroads fence rights-of-way. —

The fact that railroads are required to fence their rights-of-way while motor transports are not required to fence a highway right-of-way is not discriminatory so as to make the requirement unconstitutional. Chicago & N. W. R.R. v. Bishop, 390 P.2d 731, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1964).

Height limitation in noninstrument approach zone to airport legitimate exercise of police power. —

A city ordinance providing a height limitation in a noninstrument approach zone to an airport was an exercise of the police power, and certain home owners who had a tree in violation of this limitation, who were notified they would have to trim it, and who challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance, failed to demonstrate such a significant impact on their plot as a whole as to counterbalance the significant public interest in protecting the airport flight path. Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 579 (Wyo. 1985).

Quarantine and condemnation of animals. —

Former statutes, giving state veterinarian power to quarantine and condemn certain diseased or infected animals, did not violate the United States constitution, or this section as a taking of property without due process of law. Arbuckle v. Pflaeging, 20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1912).

The power conferred by statute on sheep inspectors to quarantine sheep infected with or which have been exposed to infectious diseases is not inhibited by the constitution. Richter v. State, 16 Wyo. 437, 95 P. 51, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1908).

Requiring sheep to be dipped annually. —

Former statute, requiring all sheep within state to be dipped annually, did not take private property without due process of law in violation of the United States constitution, and this section. State v. Hall, 27 Wyo. 224, 194 P. 476, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1920).

Requiring construction bond from contractor. —

A statute requiring companies or owners constructing ditches, canals and reservoirs, to take bond from the contractor “in some guarantee or surety company authorized to do business in the state,” violated this section, as a restriction on the liberty of contract. Moreover, the statute created a personal liability for other things than labor and materials which actually went into the work, and thus was a taking of property without due process. George Bolln Co. v. North Platte Valley Irrigation Co., 19 Wyo. 542, 121 P. 22, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1912).

Former Fair Trade Act violated this section. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

Providing against unfair competition. —

Section 40-4-107 (repealed), providing against unfair competition, did not violate the due process clause of this section. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

State policy interest furthered by 38-1-101 is sufficient state action to invoke the federal or Wyoming due process clause. Pete Lien & Sons v. Ellsworth Peck Constr. Co., 896 P.2d 761, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1995).

Requiring disclosure of amount of virgin wool in article offered for sale. —

Statute requiring disclosure by label of amount of virgin wool contained in woolen articles offered for sale was held valid exercise of police power, not denying due process or privileges of citizens of the State v. W. S. Buck Mercantile Co., 38 Wyo. 47, 264 P. 1023, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1928).

Prohibiting granting or extending of liquor license outside city limits. —

An act prohibiting the granting or extending of a liquor license outside the limits of a city or town did not violate this section. State ex rel. Jones v. Board of Comm'rs, 18 Wyo. 153, 105 P. 295, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1909).

Authorizing city to condemn land within or without corporate limits. —

Act authorizing city to condemn land within or without corporate limits is not violative of this or of any other provision of the constitution. Edwards v. Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 P. 677, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1911), reh'g denied, 19 Wyo. 110, 122 P. 900, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1912).

Permitting fee in land to be taken for way of necessity. —

Statute permitting fee in land to be taken for way of necessity does not deny due process of law. Meyer v. Colorado Cent. Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 60 (Wyo. 1929).

Termination of temporary total disability benefits. —

Notwithstanding the question of whether or not worker's interest in temporary total disability benefits is a property right, former § 27-12-602 (see now § 27-14-602 ) clearly states that a hearing is available. Procedural due process of law is provided if, upon a hearing after termination of temporary total benefits, retroactive relief may be awarded the worker. Higgins v. State, 739 P.2d 129, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 466 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 988, 108 S. Ct. 508, 98 L. Ed. 2d 507, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 5149 (U.S. 1987).

Aid-to-Dependent-Children claimant not entitled to hearing to determine legislative facts. —

The requirement of due process of law that an opportunity be afforded to be heard on issues of adjudicative facts does not necessarily encompass any similar hearing on legislative facts. Where the only questions of fact to which an Aid to Dependent Children claimant claims could be determined at the fair hearing are: (1) that the new assistance unit factors were not properly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act; and (2) that the need level, which ultimately determines the amount of the benefit for a given assistance unit, was not properly established, the “facts” which she would have resolved in a hearing are legislative facts. Walker v. Karpan, 726 P.2d 82, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 615 (Wyo. 1986).

Mixing adjudicative and investigative roles in administrative proceeding constitutional. —

Merely because an individual plays both an investigative and an adjudicative role in an administrative proceeding, it does not necessarily follow that due process has been denied. Armed Forces Coop. Insuring Ass'n v. Department of Ins., 622 P.2d 1318, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 332 (Wyo. 1980), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

County department of public assistance not bound by interpretative guideline in state manual. —

A county department of public assistance is not bound by an interpretative rule or guideline in the state social services manual, since such a guideline is not the equivalent of a duly promulgated rule or regulation having the force of law, and the failure of the department to follow the manual's review procedures does not deprive a party of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Condemnation of land for irrigation ditches. —

A statute providing for the condemnation of land for irrigation ditches was in violation of this section, in failing to provide for notice to the landowner of the time and place when he may be heard as to the amount of his damages, though he is required to be notified of the appointment of appraisers. Sterritt v. Young, 14 Wyo. 146, 82 P. 946, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1905).

Permanent injunction. —

In an irrigation company's suit to enjoin land owners from interfering with access, the entry of a permanent injunction at a preliminary hearing was proper, and did not violate the owner's due process rights, where the district court's failure to enter an order of consolidation was not erroneous because the underlying rights of the parties were determined in earlier litigation and were therefore res judicata. Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 2003 WY 126, 77 P.3d 412, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2003).

Authorizing cities to apportion sewer assessments against adjacent land according to area. —

A statute authorizing certain cities to apportion sewer assessments against adjacent land, according to its area, will not be held unconstitutional, within this section, in absence of a showing of its unconstitutional operation in individual cases. McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120, 96 P. 697, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1908).

Providing further assessments on land in drainage district without notice. —

Section 41-9-245 , providing for further assessments on land in a drainage district without notice, in view of notice and hearing had on fixing the first assessment, did not contravene this section when total assessments were less than adjudged benefits. In re Bench Canal Drainage Dist., 24 Wyo. 143, 156 P. 610, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1916).

A prohibition of water variances does not violate art. 1, § 7, Wyo. Const., in that it is an exercise of absolute and arbitrary power; does not deny due process by denying a fair opportunity to challenge applicable water quality standards; and does not deny equal protection of the laws by discriminating between water and other pollutant dischargers. United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1978).

Given various means by which a corporation could present its views as to a water turbidity standard, including opportunity to participate in the promulgation process and to assure that there was procedural compliance, opportunity to obtain judicial review, if it was affected in fact by the rule adopted, and opportunity to seek the amendment or repeal of the rule, the corporation's rights to procedural due process were not infringed by the prohibition of water variances under § 35-11-601(o). United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1978).

Setting up revolving local improvement fund. —

This section is not violated by ch. 155, Laws 1953, authorizing a municipality to set up a revolving local improvement fund from the proceeds of city or state gasoline or state cigarette license taxes, from which fund the city may annually deposit in the local improvement district fund a sum sufficient to meet the difference between the principal amount of assessments due that year and the amount of assessments actually collected that year. Banner v. Laramie, 74 Wyo. 429, 289 P.2d 922, 1955 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1955).

Prohibiting visitation of private residences by solicitors. —

An ordinance declaring visitation of private residences by solicitors, peddlers, itinerant merchants and the like for the purpose of soliciting orders for, or selling goods, wares and merchandise, a nuisance and imposing a penalty is valid and not in violation of any constitutional or statutory provision. Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1936).

Requiring snow removal. —

If the Cheyenne ordinance on snow removal were construed as requiring more than reasonable care on the part of an occupant of property to keep his sidewalk free of ice and snow, then in that case the ordinance would be unconstitutional and void. Kalman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 390 P.2d 724, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 1964).

Contract relating to excess lands and their disposition. —

The provisions of a contract between a water conservancy district and the United States, relating to excess lands and their disposition, were not violative of this section. In re Bridger Valley Water Conservancy Dist., 401 P.2d 289, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1965).

Enjoying property without mining activities not protected. —

Where objectors had not provided any authority or argument that their interests in enjoying their property without adjacent mining activities had risen to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest, and because a mere allegation of a constitutional violation does not suffice to justify an inquiry, their due process claim was not further considered. Pfeil v. Amax Coal W., 908 P.2d 956, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 232 (Wyo. 1995).

Equality of taxation. —

Neither due process nor equal protection imposes upon a state any rigid rule of equality of taxation. The requirement of equal and uniform taxation substantially covers the ground of the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (1943). As to requirement of equal and uniform taxation, see § 28 of this article.

Taxation of livestock brought into state to graze. —

An act providing for the taxation of livestock brought into the state to graze did not violate the provisions of this section. Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 P. 593, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1898).

Tax lien without notice for unpaid sewer service charges. —

A provision of § 22, ch. 17, Laws 1950, for a tax lien without notice for unpaid sewer service charges violates this section, but the remainder of § 22 may stand as valid, since the parts are separable. In re West Highway Sanitary & Improvement Dist., 77 Wyo. 384, 317 P.2d 495, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1957).

Judgment debtors. —

Judgment debtor was denied due process of law when the district court, without the benefit of a hearing, denied the debtor's Objection to Sale of Property. Lutz v. Schmillen, 915 P.2d 599, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1996), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Failing to provide for compensation for United States citizens residing abroad. —

Statute providing for lump sum compensation payment to surviving dependent parents of deceased employee is not unconstitutional in failing to provide for United States citizens residing abroad, in absence of showing that there are dependent parents residing abroad. Cuthbertson v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 50 Wyo. 441, 62 P.2d 311, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1936).

Jurisdiction of divorce action obtained by publication authorizes court to dispose of homestead within state without violating this section. Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo. 1, 215 P. 485, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1923).

Adoption statute constitutional. —

Because the legislature did not provide that paternal grandparent visitation rights survived the adoption of their grandchild by the child's maternal grandparents, such visitation rights were limited and terminable without notice, and therefore did not rise to the magnitude of constitutionally protected liberty interests. The adoption statutes extinguished all legal relationships between the adopted child and his biological family. Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, 107 P.3d 158, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 2005).

Incarcerated defendant in divorce action. —

Where the defendant, incarcerated at the state penitentiary, did not appear in a divorce action and judgment was entered against him, he was denied his day in court. Murray v. Murray, 894 P.2d 607, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 1995).

Failure to give biological father same procedure to establish paternity as mother constitutional. —

The failure to give the biological father the same procedure to establish paternity or nonpaternity as is given to the mother does not unconstitutionally deprive the father of due process of law nor equal protection of the law by virtue of an impermissible gender-based classification. A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 4426 (U.S. 1982).

State not obligated to pay for medical examination in parental termination hearing. —

Due process requires expenditure of public monies for tests performed by a defense expert where those tests could exclude a defendant as the guilty party. The court, however, does not commit error when it holds that the state does not have to pay for a medical examination where, in a parental-termination hearing, a father is charged with having “sexual intercourse” with his daughter because, even if the examination reveals no rupture or trauma to the hymeneal area — a factor which serves to deny sexual intercourse in the medical sense — from the legal point of view, this physical evidence does not mean that the father has not engaged in sexual intercourse, as sexual intercourse, as defined in law, is accomplished if there is the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the female by the sexual organ of the male. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Juveniles and adults are not similarly situated. —

Juvenile's argument that his equal protection rights were violated by three-year probation term for crime with a maximum sentence of one year failed because juveniles and adults are not similarly situated; proceedings in juvenile court are equitable as opposed to being criminal. In re Interests of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (Wyo. 1992).

Juvenile probation. —

Due process rights were not violated in a juvenile case because the recommendations of the multi-disciplinary team and the preliminary findings of the juvenile probation officer were included in the trial court's order, which met the statutory purpose of designing individualized dispositions. Moreover, defendant signed off on these conditions, so he had actual knowledge of them. CT v. State (In re CT), 2006 WY 101, 140 P.3d 643, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 2006).

Incarcerated defendant entitled to be heard. —

The defendant was denied due process of law when the court ignored a timely motion for a trial continuance based upon the plaintiff's failure to answer a cross-complaint and interrogatories, and proceeded with trial without allowing the incarcerated pro se defendant any opportunity to be heard in opposition prior to subjecting him to significant property rights deprivation. Tageant v. Tageant, 909 P.2d 322, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 1996).

Shackling of defendant during trial. —

In a sexual assault case, a court's abuse of discretion in allowing the shackling of defendant during trial was harmless error and did not deny defendant his right to a fair trial where defendant was seated before the jury was brought in, and the shackles could not be seen once the jury was seated. Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, 78 P.3d 205, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1205, 124 S. Ct. 1476, 158 L. Ed. 2d 127, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1455 (U.S. 2004).

In a murder case, defendant was not denied the right to a fair trial where, although he was improperly restrained at trial with leg restraints, the error was harmless. Evidence of defendant's guilt was strong; he pleaded guilty in federal court to similar charges from the incident, and the evidence of guilt was much more than a credibility contest as considerable and independent circumstantial evidence existed supporting his guilt on the charges. Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, 99 P.3d 928, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4397 (U.S. 2005).

Declaring minor a delinquent. —

Trial court violated minor's due process rights when it found her in contempt of court and placed her in a school for girls without notifying her that she could be declared to be a delinquent child and placed in the girls' school if she violated the juvenile court's order and the court failed to file a petition in the juvenile court stating the jurisdictional facts as required by § 14-6-212 .TLL v. State (In the Interest of TLL), 899 P.2d 44, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1995).

Unconstitutionality of former workmen's compensation provision relating to third-person liability not shown beyond reasonable doubt. —

See Stephenson v. Mitchell, 569 P.2d 95, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 317 (Wyo. 1977).

Property right created in Deputy Sheriff. —

Section 18-3-611 creates a property right in the position of a full-time deputy sheriff by requiring that any termination of employment be for cause and after notice and opportunity for a hearing. In addition to the statutory requirements for notice and opportunity to be heard, there is then a federal constitutional right to due process of law that demands notice of the cause for termination and a hearing on the existence of the cause prior to terminating employment of a full-time deputy sheriff. Lucero v. Mathews, 901 P.2d 1115, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. Sept. 26, 1995).

Statements by public school principal. —

Public school principal failed to meet his burden of showing that his statements made to the board of education on the career education program and football reserved ticket sales were constitutionally protected or the substantial or motivating factor for his termination. Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist., 558 F.2d 982, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12285 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1977).

Procedure prescribed by rules of State Bar Disciplinary Code is constitutionally fair. —

See Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 P.2d 460, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 307 (Wyo. 1977).

Failure to appear with counsel requires hearing. —

When the basis for the entry of a default against a corporation is failure to appear with counsel, due process demands at least an informal hearing for presentation of evidence and explanations of the defendant, its counsel, and the opposing party. Lawrence-Allison & Assocs. W. v. Archer, 767 P.2d 989, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1989).

Notation “careless driving” accompanied by reference to ordinance number informs defendant of the nature of the offense charged with all the specificity needed. Swisse v. Sheridan, 561 P.2d 712, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1977).

The purpose behind uniform traffic citations is to provide for the speedy and effective disposition of traffic offenses. Within such an informal procedure it is not necessary that the charge be set forth with the same technical precision and formality as required in an information or verified complaint. All that is required is that the accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. Such a requirement can be fulfilled by stating the commonly used name of the offense and the statute or ordinance violated. This is sufficient even if it means the accused may be required to inquire of the arresting officer or someone else exactly what the offense includes. Swisse v. Sheridan, 561 P.2d 712, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1977).

Cognovit judgment pursuant to lease. —

A cognovit judgment obtained against a lessee-store owner pursuant to a lease provision which authorized any attorney to appear for and confess judgment against the lessee in case of default is not, per se, violative of the lessee's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution, § 8 of this article and this section. Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 618 P.2d 547, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 311 (Wyo. 1980).

A cognovit judgment is not per se violative of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States nor art. 1, §§ 6 and 8, Wyo. Const. This is so because a defendant against whom a cognovit judgment is obtained has a remedy under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 639 P.2d 1385, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1982).

Willful destruction of property. —

In former § 6-10-105 , relating to willful destruction of property, the word “willfully” as used therein is not vague or ambiguous and does include and comprehend an unlawful and evil intent. It therefore cannot be held to be violative of the due process standard of this section as being vague or overbroad. Todd v. State, 566 P.2d 597, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 271 (Wyo. 1977).

Section 6-2-106 (homicide by vehicle) does not deprive the defendant of due process on the grounds of vagueness. Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 268 (Wyo. 1984).

Section 6-2-106 (aggravated vehicular homicide) is clear enough for the man of ordinary intelligence to understand and, thus, is not unconstitutionally vague. Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 621 (Wyo. 1985).

Stalking statute constitutional. —

The specific provision of § 6-2-506 making stalking a felony if committed in violation of any condition of probation, parole, or bail is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate the defendant's right to equal protection. Garton v. State, 910 P.2d 1348, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1996).

But defendant has right to be heard. —

Defendant who was convicted of stalking based on a protective order issued while defendant was in a locked psychiatric ward was not afforded due process because defendant did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Joyner v. State, 2002 WY 174, 58 P.3d 331, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 201 (Wyo. 2002).

No denial of due process where prosecutor argued elements of stalking. —

In a stalking case, defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct where the State argued that the jury must consider the facts introduced at trial, and it presented each element of stalking and discussed the evidence produced on each element, including defendant's observed movements on April 4, 2002, and the fact that he continuously lied about his whereabouts and movements that evening. Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, 98 P.3d 181, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 2004).

Sexual assault provision constitutional. —

Section 6-2-303(a)(vi), which makes it criminal for any person in a position of authority over a victim to use that position to cause the victim to submit, is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, and is within the police power of the state to enact laws for the general welfare of the people. Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 393 (Wyo. 1987).

Defendants' convictions for violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-315(a)(i) and 6-2-316 after they had consensual sexual intercourse with 15-year-old victims were proper because the statutes were not ambiguous and their meaning and scope could be readily determined by reading the sexual assault statutes in pari materia; the appellate court rejected defendants' statutory construction contentions, as well as their unconstitutionally vague as applied challenges. Crain v. State, 2009 WY 128, 218 P.3d 934, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2009).

Term “solicit” not unconstitutionally vague. —

Court rejected defendant's claim that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-104 (now repealed), the statute under which he was convicted on two alternative theories of soliciting or knowingly encouraging a person under the age of 16 to engage in illicit sexual intrusion, violates due process guaranteed by the U.S. Const. amend. XIV and Art. I, § 6, Wyo. Const. because it is unconstitutionally vague in that it does not define the term “solicit” or provide fair notice of the prohibited conduct. The term “solicit” is used in numerous Wyoming statutes without being separately defined, and the plain meaning of the term is clear from its dictionary definitions and is routinely used by other jurisdictions. Blakeman v. State, 2004 WY 139, 100 P.3d 1229, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 2004).

No violation of due process to prosecute older, male sex partner. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (now repealed) is not so vague as to violate defendant's due process. While it does not specifically define “immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties,” courts have previously held that the statute prohibits sexual intercourse between adult males and minor females, and the previous holdings provided proper notice that the acts defendant took with the victim were illegal. Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, 96 P.3d 1027, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2004).

For discussion of Wyoming Sex Offenders Registration Act as constitutional, see Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1996).

No constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon. —

Where applicant for a gun permit contended he had a fundamental right to own a firearm, guaranteed by the Wyoming Constitution, and that he was, therefore, entitled to a hearing, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that there was no constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon and, just as one may not drive an automobile without a license, one may not carry a concealed weapon without a permit. King v. Wyo. Div. of Crim. Investigation, 2004 WY 52, 89 P.3d 341, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 2004).

Commitment. —

Due process requires that the nature of an individual's commitment reasonably relate to the purpose for which the individual was committed; in other words, a criminal acquittee may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer. Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, 36 P.3d 586, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2001).

Prosecution entitled to notes of social worker hired by defendant. —

Where defendant asserted an affirmative defense of diminished capacity and battered woman syndrome and hired a licensed social worker to evaluate her, trial court's order requiring production of social worker's notes did not intrude on defendant's attorney-client privilege, and her constitutional right to assistance of counsel was not violated. Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 2000).

Prosecutor may point out discrepancies between defendant and others. —

In a murder case, defendant was not denied the right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutors, in making certain statements regarding the defendant's capacity for lying, were not attempting to induce the jurors to base their factual determinations on the prosecutors' personal beliefs or opinions, but were merely pointing out that the evidence and the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses contradicted that of defendant. Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, 99 P.3d 928, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4397 (U.S. 2005).

Statements to law enforcement officers. —

Prosecution has burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that a defendant's statement to law enforcement officers was voluntarily made. Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1999).

Defendant's statement to law enforcement officers was voluntarily given; there was no evidence that officers or prosecutor intimidated defendant or improperly induced him to sign immunity agreement in exchange for his statement, and prosecutor was justified in later nullifying agreement on grounds that defendant's statement proved to be substantially incorrect. Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1999).

There was no error in the trial court's determination that the defendant's statements/confessions were voluntary where (1) the only allegation of coercion arose from the defendant's subjective perception that if he cooperated/confessed, then his children would be returned to him, but the district court resolved that evidentiary dispute in favor of the state, (2) there was no indication that the defendant's mental state was impaired, other than the natural anxiety a defendant might feel where drugs are found in his home and he has been involved in the distribution of those drugs, and (3) the defendant was read his Miranda rights, and he was given the opportunity to speak with a lawyer if he chose. Lara v. State, 2001 WY 53, 25 P.3d 507, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 2001).

Because defendant, who was convicted of indecent liberties with a child, was not in custody when questioned at his residence by the police, no Miranda warnings were required; similarly, staements made by defendant during a custodial interview at the sherfiff's office were made voluntarily, and there was no evidence in the record to support a showing of coercive government action. Gunn v. State, 2003 WY 24, 64 P.3d 716, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2003).

Statements that defendant made during her interrogation were not voluntary and, therefore, should have been suppressed, where the police had already identified her as being the principal suspect and, even though she was upset and crying because she was concerned about being charged with a serious crime during her pregnancy, the police continued to interrogate her for two hours. Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1991).

Statements to police. —

Defendant's statements to police were knowing and voluntary and trial court correctly denied his motions to suppress; although police interview occurred eleven hours after defendant was first advised of his Miranda rights and after surgery to defendant's hand, officer partially re-advised defendant of his rights and defendant acknowledged that he remembered and understood the prior warning, and defendant presented no evidence demonstrating his statements were involuntary. Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1999).

Defendant's lies about the assailant's identity were inadmissible where defendant had not been read the Miranda warnings. Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, 48 P.3d 1063, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2002).

Where defendant's post-Miranda, voluntary statement confirmed that defendant had provided false statements to the police with the intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct their investigation and render assistance to the assailant, the improper admission of defendant's unwarned statements did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury, so the admission of the evidence was harmless error. Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, 48 P.3d 1063, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2002).

Where an officer approached defendant with a drawn gun, defendant was escorted across the street and questioned, and, after being read Miranda rights, defendant confessed involvement in possession of marijuana, the confession was voluntary. Eckenrod v. State, 2003 WY 51, 67 P.3d 635, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 2003).

Jury's consideration of defendant's statement to detective. —

In a sexual assault case, defendant was not denied the right to a fair trial from prosecutorial misconduct where, given the dispute regarding what defendant had actually said in his statement to a detective regarding his being sexually abused as a child, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the jury to have the entire statement to consider. The State pointed out that although defendant could have requested a limiting instruction directing the jury to restrict its consideration of the evidence to the question of whether the statement actually constituted a denial that he touched the victim inappropriately, the record did not show that he did so. Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, 98 P.3d 143, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 2004).

Defendant's voluntary statements not basis for suppression. —

In defendant's second degree murder case, defendant's constitutional rights were not violated because the trial court refused to suppress his statements to police where: (1) defendant's statements to police, when he was asked to go to the police station and make a statement, were voluntary as was his waiver of Miranda rights that occurred about five minutes after police began his interview, and (2) inquiry ceased when defendant asked about obtaining a lawyer and specified one by name. Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, 86 P.3d 851, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2004).

A motion to suppress a confession was properly denied in a case involving sexual assault because it was voluntarily given; defendant was not promised probation, and defendant's nervousness and learning disability were not relevant since very simple “yes” or “no” questions were asked, and the process was thoroughly explained. Wilkins v. State, 2005 WY 2, 104 P.3d 85, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2005).

Precharging delay not unconstitutional. —

Although excessive precharging delay may violate a defendant's right to due process under this section, where the defendant in a prosecution for delivery of a controlled substance failed to prove that a 25 month delay was done for an improper tactical advantage, and where whatever resulting prejudice was attributed to his own behavior, the defendant's due process rights were not violated. Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1992).

Intentionally delaying filing charges, resulting in substantial prejudice, unconstitutional. —

A defendant is denied due process where the prosecutor delays filing charges to gain a tactical advantage, and where substantial prejudice results from the delay. An “implication” that an intentional delay existed is not enough; some evidence must be in the record to support the charge. Also, an argument by the defendant that she “suffered greatly” from a delay because of the death of a witness is not enough; the defendant must demonstrate why her defense was impaired. Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1991).

Due process right to a speedy appeal. —

In defendant's sexual assault case, the almost 31-month delay in preparing the transcript did not deny defendant his right to a speedy appeal in violation of his right to due process where he did not establish any basis for reversal of his conviction or reduction of his two consecutive life sentences prison term, he did not establish that he suffered anxiety or concern beyond that normally accompanying a pending appeal, and he suffered no prejudice. Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, 78 P.3d 205, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1205, 124 S. Ct. 1476, 158 L. Ed. 2d 127, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1455 (U.S. 2004).

Accused does not need notice and opportunity to be heard before grand jury in order to protect his constitutional right to due process. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Presumed that jury followed instructions, observed oath. —

It must be presumed that a grand jury followed the court's instructions as to its powers, duties and obligations and that each grand juror fully lived up to and observed his solemn oath, presumably administered in accordance with § 7-5-201 .Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

And rubber stamping not inferred. —

The number of indictments (61) and the individual counts (327) found in a relatively short period of time (3 days) by the grand jury did not support an inference of rubber stamping. The cases were not complex, and the grand jury might have relied upon the same evidence in addressing cases involving several defendants. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Indictment encompassing elements of offenses deemed adequate. —

The several counts in the indictment encompassed the appropriate elements for the offenses charged, and, whatever instruction may have been given to the grand jury, it was apparent that its members did understand the elements of these offenses. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Hearsay is admissible in grand jury proceedings without limitation, and the determination of probable cause may rest exclusively on such evidence. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Grand jury testimony need not be recorded in the absence of a procedural rule or statute which requires recording, and the failure to do so does not violate due process. Rule 18, W.R. Cr. P., which permits the inspection and copying of the transcript of grand jury testimony of the defendant or the testimony of a witness after he has testified, if the testimony was recorded, satisfies any due process requirements. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Absent bad faith or prejudice, state may file charges years after events occur. —

A physician charged with inflicting sexual intrusions during pelvic examinations that occurred from 20 months to 17 years earlier was not denied due process or a fair trial as a matter of law; once the state became aware of the potential crimes, it proceeded diligently to investigate and file charges, and there was no indication of bad faith or evidence of specific prejudice. Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 577 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 459, 93 L. Ed. 2d 405, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4771 (U.S. 1986).

Plea to charge, quoting from statute, constitutional. —

A denial of due process did not occur because the defendant was forced to plead to grand jury charges with the only available information being the date and the quotation from the statute he allegedly violated, where he chose not to file a motion for a bill of particulars. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Plea entered without understanding of finality, in reliance on undisclosed promises, unconstitutional. —

Where defendant pled guilty to all charges against him and requested the death penalty, his pleas were entered without an understanding of their finality, in reliance on undisclosed promises by his counsel, and were, therefore, not knowing and voluntary and were obtained in violation of due process. Osborn v. Schillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23167 (D. Wyo. 1986), aff'd, 861 F.2d 612, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14834 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1988).

Statutory presumptions in criminal proceedings. —

The legislature may enact statutory presumptions in criminal proceedings, but the presumption cannot be made a conclusive one, and insofar as its application by way of instruction would make it in any manner conclusive, it is constitutionally impermissible as violative of due process. O'Neal v. State, 498 P.2d 1232, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 260 (Wyo. 1972).

Warrantless arrests. —

Section 7-2-103 , relating to arrests without warrant, is an appropriate expression of the state and federal constitutional guarantee of every citizen's right to due process of law. Rodarte v. Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 1976).

Holding of preliminary hearing or examination by nonlawyer justice of the peace in felony matter does not constitute a denial of due process. Thomas v. Justice Court of Washakie County, 538 P.2d 42, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1975).

Defendant's due process rights not denied by prosecutor's questions during voir dire. —

In defendant's indecent liberties case, defendant was not denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's questions during voir dire where, although the trial court might have been more aggressive in managing the voir dire process, it did allow considerable latitude to both sides. The limitations placed on voir dire by the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure were flexible, and purposely so, so as to allow the trial court discretion in that important process. Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, 100 P.3d 1270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 2004).

Open voir dire in capital murder case not abuse of discretion. —

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital murder case by requiring an open voir dire with the entire venire panel present. Such an open voir dire, rather than a sequestered examination, did not create a “presumption of guilt” in the minds of the potential jury members, and thus did not deny the constitutional right of a fair and impartial jury. Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 4708 (U.S. 1984).

No constitutional violation for state to remove death-inhibited jurors through peremptory challenge. —

The defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury was not violated by the state using its peremptory challenge to remove death-inhibited jurors from the jury panel in a capital murder case. Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 4708 (U.S. 1984).

Jurors willing to impose death penalty not unreliable where protective instructions given. —

The jurors ultimately selected to sit on the defendant's case did not become prosecution prone, prejudiced, unrepresentative or unreliable because of a willingness to impose the death penalty, if justified, where adequate protective instructions were given. State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 187, 88 L. Ed. 2d 155, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 4988 (U.S. 1985).

Bifurcated trial procedure for adjudication of guilt and insanity under § 7-11-305(a) as that subsection existed prior to its 1978 amendment was violative of a criminal defendant's right to due process. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

Reasonable men must necessarily guess at the meaning of § 7-11-305(a) as it existed prior to its 1978 amendment. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

The statutory procedure of § 7-11-305(a) as it existed prior to its 1978 amendment failed to provide sufficient guidance as to the type of evidence which is admissible during the first procedural phase. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

Section 7-11-305(a) as it existed prior to its 1978 amendment failed to satisfy due process requirements with respect to specific intent crimes, such as the former crime of alleged attempt to commit rape, as well as to general-intent crimes, such as the former crime of rape. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

Section 7-11-305(a) as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment, as applied in this case, violated appellant's right to due process of law. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

For detailed discussion of uncertainty of § 7-11-305(a) as it existed prior to its 1978 amendment, see Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977).

The decision in Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1977), which held that § 7-11-305(a) as it existed prior to its 1978 amendment was unconstitutional because it inhibited the truth-finding function and thereby violates the defendant's right to the fair trial which due process of law requires, must be applied retroactively to all cases not finally decided and in which the bifurcated procedure provided by § 7-11-305(a) was employed. Flores v. State, 572 P.2d 746, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 287 (Wyo. 1977).

Possession of stolen property may imply guilt. —

An instruction that the jury may infer guilty knowledge from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property did not transgress constitutional standards. Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 452 (Wyo. 1987).

Prosecutorial Misconduct. —

Defendant's conviction was reversed because (1) the prosecution pervasively used improper “was she lying” questions to undermine defendant's credibility when that was the central issue, (2) the prosecution did not have a strong case, (3) efforts to cure the prosecution's error were ineffective, and (3) defendant did not invite the error, and counsel timely objected. McGinn v. State, 2015 WY 140, 361 P.3d 295, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2015).

Suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 279 (Wyo. 1977).

No Brady violation. —

In defendant's vehicular homicide case, the State did not commit a Brady violation where defendant presented no evidence that the prosecution failed to preserve the vehicle, and he did not contend that it was lost, destroyed, or contaminated by the prosecution. Defendant presented no evidence that the minivan's condition prevented him, or his expert, from examining, photographing, or testing the scrape marks at issue, and he did not show the exculpatory value of the evidence. Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, 99 P.3d 457, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1001, 125 S. Ct. 1931, 161 L. Ed. 2d 775, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3570 (U.S. 2005).

In defendant's assault case, there was no Brady due process violation where the State produced an audio tape on the second day of trial and the vehicle on the last day of trial, and defense counsel did not seek a continuance, but instead chose to proceed with the trial and do what he could with the newly disclosed evidence. Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, 131 P.3d 348, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 2006).

Because defendant had knowledge of information that an accomplice would have provided testified about in order to impeach a witness, there was no Brady violation by the state's failure to provide defendant with information regarding the accomplice's knowledge; in addition, the evidence was not material because defendant had already vigorously assaulted the witness that the accomplice's testimony would have discredited. Hicks v. State, 2008 WY 83, 187 P.3d 877, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 2008).

Three-pronged test that must be applied in nondisclosure cases to determine whether a violation of due process has occurred includes: (a) suppression of evidence by the prosecution after a request by the defense; (b) the evidence's favorable character for the defense; and (c) the materiality of the evidence. Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 279 (Wyo. 1977).

If omitted evidence creates reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed, but if there is no reasonable doubt about guilt, whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. Hopkinson v. State, 679 P.2d 1008, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 273 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 228, 83 L. Ed. 2d 157, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 360 (U.S. 1984).

Granting summary judgment prior to discovery was error. —

In negligence case, a court erred by granting defendants' motion for summary judgment because it scheduled the hearing before the deadline for discovery had passed, and therefore plaintiffs were deprived of due process. All of the proposed discovery materials clearly had a bearing on whether there were genuine issues of material fact and needed to be examined by plaintiffs' expert in order to rebut defendants' assertions with respect to spoliation of evidence. Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, 101 P.3d 446, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 186 (Wyo. 2004).

Probation officer's perjury unconstitutional. —

The trial court properly refused a probation officer's dismissal motion of claims against him on the basis of qualified immunity because a reasonable probation officer would have known that the perjury of the sort he allegedly committed, as proscribed by § 6-5-301(a), implicated his probationer's right to substantive due process under this section and the United States constitution. Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 1992), cert. denied, White v. Cooney, 510 U.S. 813, 114 S. Ct. 60, 126 L. Ed. 2d 30, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4946 (U.S. 1993).

Probation revocation. — Defendant's due process rights were not violated in a probation revocation proceeding under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 39 because a district court was allowed to consider a termination report and an investigation report as hearsay evidence in the dispositional stage since the Wyoming Rules of Evidence were suspended during that stage; moreover, the district court did not find defendant's denial of involvement in a robbery scheme to be credible. Sinning v. State, 2007 WY 193, 172 P.3d 388, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 2007).

Failure of state to obtain medical report of sexual assault victim for trial does not rise to the level of a due process violation. Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1988), overruled in part, Bean v. State, 2016 WY 48, 373 P.3d 372, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2016).

Prosecution's intrusion into attorney-client relationship. —

On appeal the court rejected defendant's claim that his right to effectively defend and participate in his defense was denied where a deputy sat during trial in a chair along a wall, halfway between defendant's table and the prosecution's table, as far as practicable from defendant; there was no evidence that the deputy heard anything said at defendant's table, the deputy had been instructed never to repeat anything he heard at defendant's table, there was no allegation of prejudice from the use of any information obtained by the deputy from overhearing conversation at defendant's table, and defendant did not state what conversation he would have had if the deputy had not been seated in nearby. Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2003).

For application of prosecutorial disclosure rule to three distinct categories of cases, involving: (a) prosecutorial tolerance of perjured testimony; (b) prosecutorial suppression after specific request by defense for exculpatory evidence; and (c) no request, or only general one, by defense for exculpatory evidence, see Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 279 (Wyo. 1977).

Witnesses' identifications in prosecution for first-degree murder. —

In a prosecution for first-degree murder, defendant's constitutional rights were not denied where certain of the witnesses' identifications were only that the deceased had been in a bar on a certain date and where the identifications of the defendant resulted from the witnesses' own surmises. Smith v. State, 574 P.2d 1227, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1978).

Where the record did not demonstrate that the exculpatory value was apparent before the evidence, a list of 12 other witnesses gathered at scene by a highway patrol officer, was lost or that the defendant was unable to obtain comparable evidence by any other measurably available means, and where there was nothing to evidence any bad faith on the part of the investigating officers, the failure of the state to make this evidence available to the defendant did not violate his right to due process of law. Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. Apr. 21, 1993).

Arbitrary limitation upon party's right to call rebuttal witnesses unconstitutional infringement. —

The court's decision, in a proceeding seeking modification of a divorce decree, to limit a party's right to call rebuttal witnesses, made without inquiring whether there was anything new to present, was in error under the Rules of Evidence and infringed upon the constitutional right to be heard. However, since there was nothing which indicated that the rebuttal witness to be called had, in fact, anything new to say, the error was harmless. Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 589 (Wyo. 1985).

Inadmissibility of victim impact statements in death penalty cases. —

Neither the Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102 death penalty statute nor Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-21-101 through 103 general victim impact statutes authorize the introduction of victim impact evidence during capital sentencing, and the trial court errs in allowing its introduction; such error, however, is subject to harmless error analysis. Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2003); Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 47, 70 P.3d 179, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. May 20, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 970, 124 S. Ct. 438, 157 L. Ed. 2d 317, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 7776 (U.S. 2003).

Instructions. —

General instructions on the matter of criminal-intent burden of proof and the necessity to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt are insufficient to meet the due process requirements which dictate that the defendant will have his theory affirmatively presented to the jury by way of instruction. Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 322 (Wyo. 1977).

Instruction differentiating between resisting arrest, escaping detention. —

Where the defendant escaped while officers attempted to arrest him, he was entitled to an instruction which differentiated between resisting arrest and escaping detention following an arrest. Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1990).

“Mistake of Fact” jury instructions. —

In a prosecution for receiving or concealing a stolen car, where the defendant twice testified that a co-defendant told her he bought the car, the defendant's testimony must be taken as entirely true for purposes of testing the competency of evidence needed to support a theory of defense jury instruction; the defendant's testimony was competent evidence to support a “Mistake of Fact” instruction, and the court's refusal to give this instruction violated federal and Wyoming due process. Stagner v. State, 842 P.2d 520, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1992).

No right to jury nullification. —

Jury nullification, or the unreviewable power of a jury to acquit even in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, is not a right enjoyed by a criminal defendant and, therefore, did not require that a fined violator of a dog licensing ordinance be afforded a jury trial in contravention of the clear provisions of this rule. Nollsch v. Rock Springs, 724 P.2d 447, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 603 (Wyo. 1986).

Failure to offer lesser included offense instruction. —

The failure to give a lesser included offense instruction which is supported by the evidence constitutes an error implicating the due process guarantees under this section. The “statutory elements” test is the one to invoke to determine whether a lesser included offense instruction under Rule 31(c), W.R.Cr.P. is appropriate. Under this test, one offense is not necessarily included in another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense; and where the lesser offense requires an element not required for the greater offense, no instruction is to be given under Rule 31(c). State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1993).

Lesser included offense within jury verdict sustained. —

Even though the jury incorrectly concluded that the necessary elements were present to elevate the defendant's crime from burglary to aggravated burglary, an examination of the record disclosed there was sufficient finding that each of the elements of burglary was met. Therefore, the defendant's conviction for the crime of aggravated burglary was set aside, but his conviction was sustained as to the lesser included offense of burglary. Such an action was not a violation of the defendant's due process right under U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 and Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 6, or of his right to a trial by jury under Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 9. Simonds v. State, 762 P.2d 1189, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1988).

No due process violation in considering a broad range of reports and information before imposing sentence. —

Trial court did not violate defendant's due process rights under Wyo. Const. art. I, § 6 in sentencing defendant to consecutive five-to eight-year prison terms for his convictions on four counts of forgery because defendant's sentence did not exceed the maximum penalty provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-602(b) and defendant's trial counsel had withdrawn her objection to the remaining disputed items in a pre-sentence investigation report. W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) specifically permits information about the prior criminal record of the defendant and his characteristics to be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence, and the trial court, in exercising its discretion, may consider a broad range of reports and information. Davis v. State, 2005 WY 93, 117 P.3d 454, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2005).

Presentence investigation. —

Defendant's due process rights were not violated by the procedures surrounding a presentence report under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 32; a foreign probation report was properly considered, a statement that defendant did not accept responsibility was not inaccurate, the report was made in a “nonargumentative style,” the failure to address alternatives to prison was corrected in an amended report, and there was no requirement that members of defendant's family be contacted. Gorseth v. State, 2006 WY 109, 141 P.3d 698, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 2006).

Mere submission of a victim impact statement and presentence investigation report that contains statements from individuals who may be beyond those affected by the charged crimes does not without more constitute a procedural error in sentencing or prosecutorial misconduct; therefore, in a case involving sexual assault and indecent acts with a minor, error was not shown based on the fact that other statements were included. Hubbard v. State, 2008 WY 12, 175 P.3d 625, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 2008).

Mental evaluation to determine mental competency. —

Defendant underwent a mental evaluation which concluded he was competent, and he did not contest the results of the evaluation or request an additional evaluation; after the evaluation was completed, there was no new evidence suggesting defendant's capacity had diminished. Thus, the district court complied with the mental examination requirements set out in the statutes, and defendant's due process rights were not violated. Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, 132 P.3d 1155, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 2006), reh'g denied, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. May 3, 2006).

Restriction on driving privileges constitutional. —

The classification in § 31-7-105(f)(iii)(A), which mandates that no second-time Driving-While-Under-the-Influence offender can be eligible to receive a discretionary grant of limited driving privileges, is constitutional under the due process guarantee of this section. Moreno v. Department of Revenue & Taxation, 775 P.2d 497, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo. 1989).

Procedures to eliminate arbitrariness in imposition of death penalty. —

In order to satisfy the requirements of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 169 (1972), the sentencing authority's discretion must be guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (U.S. 1982).

Modification of verdict in criminal case by supreme court. —

Modification by supreme court of verdict of murder in second degree to one of manslaughter was authorized and not infringement of due process. State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 253 P. 14, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1927).

Transfer of prisoner from industrial institute to penitentiary. —

Statute empowering board of charities and reform to transfer prisoner in industrial institute to penitentiary if it should appear he had been previously convicted of crime does not deny due process. Uram v. Roach, 47 Wyo. 335, 37 P.2d 793, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1934).

Comments by judge. —

In a murder case, there was no evidence in the transcript or in the record that the court's comments admonishing counsel for their conduct caused prejudice and deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Moreover, the court's comments did not interfere with the attorney-client relationship, so as to deprive the defendant of the right to a fair trial, where the court did not express an opinion on the appropriateness of the defense strategy until after the defendant indicated that the defendant would not pursue that strategy. In addition, with respect to the court's merely reiterating an argument made to it by the prosecution, the defendant's contention that the court committed misconduct by supplying the state with the basis for the admission of evidence was contrary to the record and without merit. Also, the court did not commit misconduct by specifically directing a particular statement towards the prosecutor, where the statement was not a comment on the evidence, but rather, was an expression of frustration on the part of the court over what it perceived as unnecessary and dilatory tactics by the prosecution. Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, 73 P.3d 1041, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. Aug. 26, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1165, 124 S. Ct. 1179, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1212, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 898 (U.S. 2004).

Failure to appoint counsel at juvenile proceeding. —

Mother did not show how the failure to appoint her counsel at an initial juvenile proceeding violated her due process rights regarding termination of parental rights proceedings; termination proceedings are entirely separate and distinct from neglect proceedings, deriving their respective genesis from separate statutes and requiring different burdens of proof. MN v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In the Interest of MN), 2003 WY 135, 78 P.3d 232, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 2003).

No due process violation in raising visitation issue during shelter care hearing. —

Mother's procedural due process rights under this section were not violated even though the mother was not given notice that a visitation issue was going to arise at an initial hearing; the relevant statute gave notice to any parent that issues involving the conditions of shelter care could arise at any time, and the mother was given meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard when she challenged the trial court’s ruling on visitation after the hearing. DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, 79 P.3d 997, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. Jan. 13, 2004).

Sentencing considerations. —

Defendant's due process rights under U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 and Wyo. Const. art. I, § 6 were not violated when uncharged activity was considered by a trial court during sentencing for a drug offense, where the evidence was reliable and accurate based on an officer's involvement and the information was taped and corroborated. Peden v. State, 2006 WY 26, 129 P.3d 869, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 2006).

Due process not denied in re-licensure hearing by the Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Board. —

Where appellant was denied relicensure of his clinical social work license, he was not denied due process by the Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Board's ruling that evidence concerning matters that occurred after the license application was denied was admissible because issues are not limited to the matters reflected in the notice of hearing and appellant had timely notice of the hearing. In re Licensure of Jerry Penny v. State ex rel. Wyo. Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 2005 WY 117, 120 P.3d 152, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2005).

Failure to provide father with opportunity to be heard prior to termination of parental rights. —

In a termination of parental rights action, the trial court violated the father’s due process rights when it determined the best interests of the child without providing the father an opportunity to be heard. The hearing on summary judgment was limited to whether grounds for termination existed and there was no indication in the record that the related, and essential, issue of whether termination was in the best interests of the child was raised or considered. In re NRAE v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2020 WY 121, 472 P.3d 374, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2020).

Sex offender registration requirements.—

Registration requirements of the Wyoming Sexual Offender Registration Act did not violate defendant juvenile's due process rights, substantive or procedural, under the Wyoming or U.S. constitutions, as defendant did not content that there was a fundamental right at issue and procedural due process did not entitle defendant to a second hearing to demonstrate he was not a high risk to reoffend. Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

Vagueness.

Provisions of the Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct alleged to have been violated by a judge's refusal to marry same -sex couples were not void for vagueness where she was not being disciplined for her expression of her religious beliefs, but for her conduct in refusing to impartially perform her judicial functions, and an ordinary judge would have understood that refusal to conduct some marriages on the basis of the sexual orientation of the couple did not comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct. Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 639, 199 L. Ed. 2d 527, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 103 (U.S. 2018).

Filing of lien to recover cost of Medicaid benefits.

In a case in which the State filed a lien against two properties to recover the cost of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of a decedent, the decedent's sons were not denied due process of law, as they were provided notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the validity of two quitclaim deeds. Gheen v. State ex rel. Dep't of Health, 2014 WY 70, 326 P.3d 918, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 2014), reh'g denied, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. July 1, 2014).

§ 7. No absolute, arbitrary power.

Absolute, arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.

Neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute, but are relative. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

One who assails the classification in a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1963); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 292 (Wyo. 1978).

Defendant’s conviction for sexual contact with a resident of a correctional facility did not violate her due process rights under either the state or federal constitutions because the statutes at issue clearly proscribed her conduct, the State had an undeniable interest in ensuring the relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who supervised their confinement was not undermined by sexual contact, consensual or otherwise, and, although defendant raised the Wyoming constitutional argument below and on appeal, her argument largely echoed her argument under the federal constitution and she provided no analysis of any of the requisite factors or legal reasons justifying resort to independent state grounds. Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, 437 P.3d 830, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2019).

And mere assertion of discrimination is insufficient. —

A person contesting the constitutionality of a statute must do more than make bald assertions of what he thinks is discriminatory. Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1963).

Reasonable basis required for different legislation as to different classes. —

There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation as to different classes, and the differences must not be arbitrary and without just relation to the subject of the legislation. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 292 (Wyo. 1978).

And sustaining facts assumed. —

If any state of facts can be reasonably conceived which sustains the classification made by a statute, such facts will be assumed. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 292 (Wyo. 1978).

Right to associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty under Wyoming constitution. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Legislature may not prohibit occupations, unless detrimental to public welfare. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Removal of public officer by governor. —

Statute authorizing governor to remove public officer from office does not authorize arbitrary exercise of power. State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500, 228 P. 636, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1924).

Contract between the United States and an irrigation district which vested arbitrary power in the secretary of the interior over the property of the landowners of the district violated the spirit of this section. Owl Creek Irrigation Dist., 71 Wyo. 30, 253 P.2d 867, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1953).

Regulation of use of highways. —

Control of highways may in certain cases be extended to prohibiting use, and legislature may subject private carriers to appropriate regulations. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Courts must determine in first instance whether legislature can prohibit use of highways in particular case and whether regulating amounting to prohibiting is reasonable. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

State or municipal highway regulations must be reasonable, operate with equality and have some tendency to accomplish object in view. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Statute prohibiting use of highways by motor transportation companies, except under certificate and subject to regulation by public service commission, is void as applied to private carriers. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Regulation of motor carriers. —

The provisions of § 56, ch. 65, Laws 1935, regulating motor carriers, which authorized the public service commission to initiate appropriate civil proceedings to enforce obedience to, or for violation of, the act did not violate this section. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1935).

Requirement that railroads fence rights-of-way. —

The fact that railroads are required to fence their rights-of-way while motor transports are not required to fence a highway right-of-way is not discriminatory so as to make the requirement unconstitutional. Chicago & N. W. R.R. v. Bishop, 390 P.2d 731, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1964).

Prohibition of water variances does not violate this section in that it is an exercise of absolute and arbitrary power; does not deny due process by denying a fair opportunity to challenge applicable water quality standards; and does not deny equal protection of the laws by discriminating between water and other pollutant dischargers. United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1978).

Given various means by which a corporation could present its views as to a water turbidity standard, including opportunity to participate in the promulgation process and to assure that there was procedural compliance, opportunity to obtain judicial review, if it was affected in fact by the rule adopted, and opportunity to seek the amendment or repeal of the rule, the corporation's rights to procedural due process were not infringed by the prohibition of water variances under § 35-11-601(o). United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1978).

Cheyenne “Sunday Closing Ordinance.” —

The Cheyenne “Sunday Closing Ordinance” is so permeated with unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and oppressive provisions that it cannot stand, and the means adopted are without substance in accomplishing the end in view, as a legitimate exercise of the police power. Therefore, it is directly violative of this section. Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1964).

Fair Trade Act. —

The former Fair Trade Act was in conflict with and in violation of this section. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

Unfair competition. —

Section 40-4-107 (repealed), providing against unfair competition, did not violate the provisions of this section. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 1938 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1938).

Requiring disclosure of amount of virgin wool in article offered for sale. —

Statute requiring disclosure by label of amount of virgin wool contained in woolen articles offered for sale was valid exercise of police power, not denying due process or privileges of citizens of United States. State v. W. S. Buck Mercantile Co., 38 Wyo. 47, 264 P. 1023, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1928).

Elimination of trading stamp business. —

An act to eliminate the trading stamp business, which, in the legislative view, presented an evil to be dealt with, could not be said to be either arbitrary or capricious and without reasonable relation to the evil sought to be suppressed. Steffey v. Casper, 358 P.2d 951, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1961).

Vagueness.

Provisions of the Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct alleged to have been violated by a judge's refusal to marry same -sex couples were not void for vagueness where she was not being disciplined for her expression of her religious beliefs, but for her conduct in refusing to impartially perform her judicial functions, and an ordinary judge would have understood that refusal to conduct some marriages on the basis of the sexual orientation of the couple did not comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct. Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 639, 199 L. Ed. 2d 527, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 103 (U.S. 2018).

Prohibiting visitation of private residences by solicitors. —

An ordinance declaring visitation of private residences by solicitors, peddlers, itinerant merchants and the like for the purpose of soliciting orders for, or selling goods, wares and merchandise, a nuisance and imposing a penalty is valid, and not in violation of any constitutional or statutory provision. Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1936).

Industrial Development Projects Act is constitutional. Uhls v. State, 429 P.2d 74, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1967).

Compulsory dipping of sheep. —

Former statute, providing for compulsory dipping of all sheep kept or herded within the state, whether diseased or not, done under supervision of an inspector, and regulations of the state board, did not violate this section. State v. Hall, 27 Wyo. 224, 194 P. 476, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1920).

Failing to provide for compensation for United States citizens residing abroad. —

Statute providing for lump sum compensation payment to surviving dependent parents of deceased employee is not unconstitutional in failing to provide for United States citizens residing abroad, in absence of showing that there are dependent parents residing abroad. Cuthbertson v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 50 Wyo. 441, 62 P.2d 311, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1936).

Notation “careless driving” accompanied by reference to ordinance number informs defendant of the nature of the offense charged with all the specificity needed. Swisse v. Sheridan, 561 P.2d 712, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1977).

The purpose behind uniform traffic citations is to provide for the speedy and effective disposition of traffic offenses. Within such an informal procedure it is not necessary that the charge be set forth with the same technical precision and formality as required in an information or verified complaint. All that is required is that the accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. Such a requirement can be fulfilled by stating the commonly used name of the offense and the statute or ordinance violated. This is sufficient even if it means the accused may be required to inquire of the arresting officer or someone else exactly what the offense includes. Swisse v. Sheridan, 561 P.2d 712, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1977).

Felons and misdemeanants are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes. —

The defendant argued that he was being treated differently from a person who was serving the same amount of time in the state penitentiary because those in prison were afforded opportunities such as good time, vocational and educational programs, merit programs, library and recreational facilities and therapy programs which were not available in the county jail; however, this equal protection claim failed because felons and misdemeanants are not similarly situated persons for purposes of identification of a classification of similarly situated persons who are being treated differently. Tilley v. State, 912 P.2d 1140, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1996).

Placing guilty, unconvicted, person on probation. —

Although the prosecutor gave no reason for the state's refusal to consent to treatment under § 7-13-301 (placing guilty, unconvicted, person on probation), the prosecutor, not the judge, controls the prosecution up to adjudication, and the court will not presume that suspect factors or arbitrary classifications exist. Thus, the refusal to consent to sentencing under § 7-13-301 was not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. Nov. 9, 1990); Hudson v. State, 800 P.2d 471, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1990); Heggen v. State, 800 P.2d 475, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1990); Cambio v. State, 800 P.2d 482, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1990); Gezzi v. State, 800 P.2d 485, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 1990); Kruzich v. State, 800 P.2d 489, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 112 (Wyo. 1990).

Transfer of prisoner from industrial institute to penitentiary. —

Statute empowering board of charities and reform to transfer prisoner in industrial institute to penitentiary if it should appear he had been previously convicted of crime becomes part of sentence as though extended into court record, does not deny due process and is not a change of sentence, but a carrying out of the original sentence. Uram v. Roach, 47 Wyo. 335, 37 P.2d 793, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1934).

Applied in

DS v. Department of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1980); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1988); Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1991).

Quoted in

State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 231 (Wyo. 1974); State ex rel. Weber v. Municipal Court, 567 P.2d 698, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 311 (Wyo. 1977); Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1980); White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1989); Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14885 (D. Wyo. 1991); Gonzales v. Grass Valley Mobile Home Park, 933 P.2d 484, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1997).

Stated in

Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1961); Weiss v. State ex rel. Cardine, 455 P.2d 904, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1969).

Cited in

McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120, 96 P. 697, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (1908); Befumo v. Johnson, 2005 WY 114, 119 P.3d 936, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (2005); Arbuckle v. Pflaeging, 20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (1918); State v. Loucks, 30 Wyo. 485, 222 P. 37, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (1924); Moore v. Jarvis, 44 Wyo. 92, 8 P.2d 818, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1932); Fristam v. City of Sheridan, 66 Wyo. 143, 206 P.2d 741, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (1949); Eastwood v. Wyoming Hwy. Dep't, 76 Wyo. 247, 301 P.2d 818, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (1956); Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12370 (D. Wyo. 1970); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); Todd v. State, 566 P.2d 597, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 271 (Wyo. 1977); Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 924 P.2d 91, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 1996); Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1996); RS v. Johnson County Dept. of Family Servs. (In re JL), 989 P.2d 1268, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1999); Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, 36 P.3d 586, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2001); MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002); Befumo v. Johnson, 2005 WY 114, 119 P.3d 936, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (2005): Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, 114 P.3d 1252, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (2005); In re JJF v. State, 2006 WY 41, 132 P.3d 170, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. Apr. 6, 2006); Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Industrial Siting Legislation: The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and Siting Act — Advance or Retreat?” see XI Land & Water L. Rev. 27 (1976).

For case note, “Water Law — The State Engineer's Authority with Reference to Change of Use, Place of Use, Point of Diversion, and Means of Conveyance of Water Embraced by Water Permits. Green River Dev. Co. v. FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1983),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 59 (1984).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Defense of good faith in action for damages against law enforcement official under 42 USC § 1983, providing for liability of person who, under color of law, subjects another to deprivation of rights, 61 ALR Fed 7.

§ 8. Courts open to all; suits against state.

All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct.

Cross references. —

As to judicial departments generally, see art. 5, §§ 1 to 29, Wyo. Const.

As to civil jurisdiction and procedure of justice of the peace courts, see ch. 21 of title 1.

As to suits by or against the state or political subdivisions, see ch. 35 of title 1.

As to probate courts, see §§ 2-2-101 to 2-2-404 .

As to supreme court, see §§ 5-2-101 to 5-2-501 .

As to district courts, see §§ 5-3-101 to 5-3-504 .

As to municipal courts, see §§ 5-6-101 to 5-6-304 .

As to circuit courts, see §§ 5-9-101 to 5-9-214 .

As to juvenile courts, see §§ 14-6-201 to 14-6-244 .

As to state military courts, see §§ 19-12-101 to 19-12-109 and 19-10-108 .

Closure of proceedings constituted harmless error.—

It was erroneous for a trial court to have closed the proceedings to the public in a termination of parental rights case to preserve the confidentiality of Wyoming Department of Family Services records concerning reports and investigations in the neglect proceedings which led to the termination case, as closure was not a remedy narrowly tailored to protecting confidentiality. However, the error was harmless as the parent did not attempt to show that the parent was harmed by the court's closing the trial to the public. LeBlanc v. State (In re ARLeB), 2017 WY 107, 401 P.3d 932, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2017).

Fundamental right. —

The right to access to the courts is a fundamental right pursuant to this section, requiring strict scrutiny analysis. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992).

Standard issued governing opening of pretrial proceedings and their records to public, including representatives of news media. —

See Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1979), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Public access to court proceedings should be limited only in exceptional circumstances, in order to enhance public trust and confidence in the judicial process, and to insulate the process against attempts to use the courts as tools for persecution. Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1979), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Where the public's access to pretrial proceedings is restrained, the public (which includes the media) has no constitutional right under the first or sixth amendments to the United States constitution or any corollary provisions of the Wyoming constitution to have free access to such preliminary-hearing proceedings or to all information in the possession of the courts, but access to court proceedings should be limited only in exceptional circumstances. State ex rel. Feeney v. District Court, 607 P.2d 1259, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 614 P.2d 710, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 259 (Wyo. 1980).

Not absolute right of access. —

The United States supreme court has never held that the first or sixth amendments to the federal constitution create an absolute right to access to all court proceedings or to all information in the possession of the courts. Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1979), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

And determination of closure not open. —

The portion of a pretrial proceeding involved in the determination of closure shall, itself, be closed to the public. Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 342 (Wyo. 1979), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Information relevant to doctor's accreditation discoverable. —

Former § 35-2-602 (confidentiality of hospital reports, see now § 35-2-609 ) cannot be construed to preclude a plaintiff's access to all information which is relevant to a doctor's accreditation, in a cause of action against a hospital for negligence in the accreditation and maintenance of qualified medical personnel. The privilege protects from discovery the records concerning the internal proceedings of the hospital committee, but does not exempt from discovery materials which the committee reviews in the course of carrying out its function, nor any action which may be taken thereafter by the hospital as may be influenced by the committee decision. In short, privileged data does not include the materials reviewed by the committee, only those documents produced by the committee as notes, reports and findings in the review process. Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 518 (Wyo. 1987), limited, Adams v. Walton, 2011 WY 58, 248 P.3d 1167, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2011).

This section in effect prevents suits against the state unless they are specifically authorized by the legislature. Hamblin v. Arzy, 472 P.2d 933, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1970).

Suit against state requires legislative consent. —

No suit may be maintained against the state until the legislature makes provision for such filing and absent such consent, no suit or claim may be made against the state. Biscar v. University of Wyoming Bd. of Trustees, 605 P.2d 374, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 229 (Wyo. 1980).

Explicit legislative authorization is required before a suit can be maintained against the state. Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1994); Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 138 (Wyo. 1996), reh'g denied, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. Oct. 29, 1996), overruled in part, Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2011).

Test of state liability without state consent. —

The ultimate test of whether a state agency or employee may be made liable to suit without consent of the state must be found in the answer to the question whether the agency or employee was engaged in a governmental function. Where the activity has been undertaken at the direction of the legislature, or involves legislative or judicial discretion, it has been held to be governmental, but where the activity has historically been carried on by a private corporation, or if it generates fees, it is proprietary. Biscar v. University of Wyoming Bd. of Trustees, 605 P.2d 374, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 229 (Wyo. 1980).

Claim otherwise barred by sovereign immunity may be raised as counterclaim. —

A claim which would otherwise be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity may be asserted as a counterclaim in a government-initiated lawsuit if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and is asserted to reduce or defeat the government's claim. Ruppenthal v. State, 849 P.2d 1316, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1993).

State has never consented to be sued for tort. —

It is clear from constitutional and statutory provisions that Wyoming has never given its consent that it might be sued for a tort. Price v. State Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1946).

A state exercising governmental functions cannot be made to respond in damages for tort and is not liable for the torts of its officers or agents in the discharge of their official duties, unless it has voluntarily assumed such liability and consented to be liable. Chavez v. Laramie, 389 P.2d 23, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1964).

And any change must be effected by the legislature. —

Despite the inequities that immunity from suit may produce, it is well established in this state that any change must be effected by the legislature rather than by the courts. Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10184 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1971).

This section did not change the common-law rule that a wrongful death action abates on the death of the wrongdoer. Mull v. Wienbarg, 66 Wyo. 410, 212 P.2d 380, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1949).

Wrongful death statute not violative. —

The two-year condition precedent of the wrongful death statute, § 1-38-102(d), does not violate the open courts provision contained in this section. Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 2000).

Suit against trustees of university as action against state. —

Suit against the trustees of the university to quiet title to land forming part of the land granted to the state for the benefit of a university by Act of Admission, ch. 664, 26 Stat. 222 (1890), § 8, was a suit “against the state,” and not maintainable without consent of the state, the state being holder of the legal title to the land, and the trustees being public agents of the state. Hjorth Royalty Co. v. University of Wyoming, 30 Wyo. 309, 222 P. 9, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1924).

A suit against the University of Wyoming and its trustees for damages for injuries sustained when a child fell from a dormitory window should have named the state of Wyoming and not the university and its trustees, if it is possible to sue the state directly. Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (Wyo. 1975).

University of Wyoming enjoys sovereign immunity. —

The University of Wyoming, together with its officers, as they undertake to act in their official capacities, enjoys sovereign immunity since a suit against the university or these officers is a suit against the state. Biscar v. University of Wyoming Bd. of Trustees, 605 P.2d 374, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 229 (Wyo. 1980).

Loss of sovereign immunity as to property rights. —

The state loses its sovereign immunity when it places itself in the same class and on the same footing with private individuals in connection with its property rights. Biscar v. University of Wyoming Bd. of Trustees, 605 P.2d 374, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 229 (Wyo. 1980).

Constructing and improving of public streets and highways is a governmental function, in connection with which a municipal corporation cannot be sued for the negligence of its officers or agents. Chavez v. Laramie, 389 P.2d 23, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1964).

Immunity for highway construction and maintenance constitutional. —

Section 1-39-120 , providing immunity from suit for design, construction and maintenance of highways, bears a reasonable relation to the legitimate legislative objectives of conserving public funds and preserving a fair and viable system of compensating persons injured by governmental actions. There is no constitutional infirmity in the statute. White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1989).

Waiver of state immunity as to actions in federal courts. —

Where there is no clear intent in a waiver of immunity statute to subject the state agencies to actions in the federal courts, such suits may not be maintained. Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10184 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1971).

Suits for violation of federal rights. —

Where a violation of federal constitutional rights and entitlement to relief under the federal civil rights acts have been established, this section may not immunize state university officials from such and override the federal constitutional principles in view of the supremacy clause. Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10184 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1971).

That litigation is costly, does not make it unavailable. Kerper v. Kerper, 819 P.2d 407, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1991).

Requirement that plaintiff pay sanctions not denial of access. —

In an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff was not denied access to the courts where (1) a mistrial was declared after the plaintiff's first witness made reference to liability insurance, in violation of an in limine order, and (2) the plaintiff was ordered to pay sanctions prior to a new trial. Terry v. Sweeney, 10 P.3d 554, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 2000).

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) specifically permitted the court to enter an order staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, and Rule 37(b) provided that the trial court required the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court found that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances made an award of expenses unjust; there was no violation of Wyo. Const. art. I, § 8 when a district court ordered a trial postponed until sanctions are paid, and the action was dismissed solely because of appellants' failure to comply with appropriate court orders. White v. State ex rel. Wyo. DOT, 2009 WY 90, 210 P.3d 1096, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 2009).

Standards for, and limitations upon, causes of action allowed. —

The fact that the courts are required to be open and to afford justice for injury done does not mean that a party is assured of success in a legal action, or that standards cannot be set for, and limitations cannot be placed upon, causes of action — all in the interest of justice. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1982).

Governmental Claims Act does not violate this section. Troyer v. Department of Health & Social Servs., Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation, 722 P.2d 158, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 589 (Wyo. 1986).

This section is not self-executing. Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 434 (Wyo. 1979).

This section is not self-executing; no suit can be maintained against the state until the legislature makes provision for such filing. May v. Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1993).

This section is not self-executing. —

Because immunity under the Wyoming Government Claims Act is an immunity from suit and not merely a defense to liability, it, like qualified immunity, is effectively lost if the case is erroneously permitted to go to trial; therefore, a denial of summary judgment based on a claim of governmental immunity is appealable without the need for a writ of review. Wyo. State Hosp. v. Romine, 2021 WY 47, 483 P.3d 840, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 2021).

Presentation of claim is condition precedent to maintenance of action. —

The presentation of claim to the proper auditing officer as required by statute is a condition precedent to the right to maintain action thereon. Utah Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1933).

A claim against the state highway commission, as a claim against the state, must be presented to state auditor or as directed by law and such presentation is condition to the right to sue the commission even upon contract. Price v. State Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309, 1946 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1946).

And petition must show that claim was properly filed. —

In an action against the state highway department on a construction contract, the petition was fatally defective where it did not show that claim was timely filed and filed with proper auditing officer. Utah Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1933).

Cognovit judgment not per se unconstitutional. —

A cognovit judgment is not per se violative of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States nor art. 1, §§ 6 and 8, Wyo. Const. This is so because a defendant against whom a cognovit judgment is obtained has a remedy under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 639 P.2d 1385, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1982).

Section 1-3-111 violative of section. —

Section 1-3-111 , which prior to its 1981 amendment provided, that no action shall be brought more than 10 years after substantial completion of an improvement to real property against any person performing or furnishing design, planning, supervision, construction or supervision of the construction of the improvement, violated this section, § 34 of this article and art. 3, § 27, Wyo. Const.Phillips v. ABC Builders, 611 P.2d 821, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 273 (Wyo. 1980).

Statute of limitations constitutional. —

Section 1-3-111 , which sets forth a statute of limitations for actions involving improvements to real property, is constitutional and does not violate the open courts, uniform operation of general law, and special and local laws provisions of the Wyoming constitution. Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1991); Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. Dec. 21, 1993).

Removal of public officer by governor. —

Statute authorizing governor to remove public officer from office did not violate this section. State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500, 228 P. 636, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1924).

Dismissal with prejudice is not denial of access. —

District court's dismissal, with prejudice, of a passenger's second personal injury complaint did not bar the passenger's access to a court in violation of the Wyoming Constitution's guarantees of access to courts because the passenger failed to comply with the court's discovery orders; the passenger's first complaint was also dismissed for failing to comply with court orders but the dismissal was without prejudice. Reynolds v. Bonar, 2013 WY 144, 313 P.3d 501, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2013).

Applicability to driver's license suspension proceedings. —

Motorist was not entitled, under statute, to discovery of information concerning equipment used to perform chemical breath analysis, and thus his constitutional rights were not implicated when he did not receive information until day before contested case hearing. Jones v. State ex rel. Wyo. DOT, 991 P.2d 1251, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1999).

Section 12-8-301 was not violative. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301 did not infringe upon the fundamental right of access to the courts established by Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8 or upon any other fundamental interest, including equal protection of the law, by creating a cause of action against persons who illegally sold or served alcohol to people who caused injuries, while not recognizing the same cause of action against persons who legally sold or served alcohol. Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp., 2003 WY 77, 71 P.3d 717, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. July 24, 2003).

Section 1-3-107 violative of section. —

Statute of limitations for minors, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(ii), violated this section. The court also held that the exception now contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-114 “except for an action arising from error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care services” was constitutionally infirm. Kordus v. Montes, 2014 WY 146, 337 P.3d 1138, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 2014).

Quoted in

Mott v. England, 604 P.2d 560, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 506 (Wyo. 1979); Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 316 (Wyo. 1980); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 549 (Wyo. 1986); Williams v. Tharp, 2017 WY 8, 388 P.3d 513, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2017).

Stated in

Denver Buick, Inc. v. Pearson, 465 P.2d 512, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1970); Simons v. Laramie County Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 1116, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1987); Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Constr. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 167 (Wyo. 1992).

Cited in

State v. Board of Comm'rs, 4 Wyo. 313, 33 P. 992, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (1892); Eastwood v. Wyoming Hwy. Dep't, 76 Wyo. 247, 301 P.2d 818, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (1956); State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1976); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1988); Lesh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 624, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12514 (D. Wyo. 1989); Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 50 ; Meridian Aggregates Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 827 P.2d 375, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1992); Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1993); Scott v. School Dist. No. 6, 815 F. Supp. 424, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2899 (D. Wyo. 1993); Harston v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 913 P.2d 870, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 1996).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Liability Insurance as Affecting Immunity from Suit,” see 1 Wyo. L.J. 86.

For article, “Constitutionality of Special Bills for Private Relief,” see 6 Wyo. L.J. 261.

For article, “Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming,” see VII Land & Water L. Rev. 229 (1972).

For article, “Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming — Part II,” see VII Land & Water L. Rev. 617 (1972).

For case note, “Sovereign Immunity of the State of Wyoming. Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 274 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1979).

For comment, “Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions — a Statutory Analysis,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 619 (1980).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — Constitutionality of Wyoming's Co-employee Immunity Statute under Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution.Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 355 (1983).

For comment, “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming: Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 221 (1985).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

For comment, “An Obstacle Course to Court: A First Look at Wyoming's Medical Review Panel Act,” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 489 (1987).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

For article, “Wyoming's New Comparative Fault Statute,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 509 (1996).

For article, “Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act: An Update,” see XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. 249 (1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Governmental liability from operation of zoo, 92 ALR3d 832.

Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent occupant of moving vehicle, or for damage to such vehicle, as result of police chase, 4 ALR4th 865.

Liability of telephone company for mistakes in or omissions from its directory, 47 ALR4th 882.

Attorneys' fees: obduracy as basis for state-court award, 49 ALR4th 825.

Exclusion of public from state criminal trial by conducting trial or part thereof at other than regular place or time, 70 ALR4th 632.

Standing of media representatives or organizations to seek review of, or to intervene to oppose, order closing criminal proceedings to public, 74 ALR4th 476.

Right to jury trial in action under state civil rights law, 12 ALR5th 508.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statutes requiring bond or other security in taxpayers' action, 41 ALR5th 47.

Bringing of patent infringement suit as violation of §§ 1 and 2 of Sherman Act (15 USC §§ 1 , 2), 62 ALR Fed 203.

Private individual's standing to challenge omission or adequacy of environmental impact statement required by § 102(2)(C) of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 USC § 4332(2)(C) [42 USC § 4332(c)]), 62 ALR Fed 337.

Access to federal courts by foreign state, or national thereof, which United States does not recognize or with which United States has no diplomatic relations, 65 ALR Fed 881.

§ 9. Trial by jury inviolate.

The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases. A jury in civil cases and in criminal cases where the charge is a misdemeanor may consist of less than twelve (12) persons but not less than six (6), as may be prescribed by law. A grand jury may consist of twelve (12) persons, any nine (9) of whom concurring may find an indictment. The legislature may change, regulate or abolish the grand jury system. (As amended by Laws 1980, Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, p. 528.)

Cross references. —

As to trial by jury in civil cases, see chapter 11 of title 1 and Rules 38, 39 (a) and (c), 47 and 48, W.R.C.P.

As to grand jury, see chapter 5 of title 7.

As to jury trial in criminal cases, see chapter 11 of title 7 and Rules 24 (a) and 25, W.R. Cr. P.

Accused does not need notice and opportunity to be heard before grand jury in order to protect his constitutional right to due process. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

This section does not mandate trial by jury but guarantees it. Robbins v. State, 635 P.2d 781, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 382 (Wyo. 1981).

Right to jury trial inapplicable to eminent domain proceeding. —

The general expression in this section that the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate does not apply to or affect a proceeding to condemn property under the power of eminent domain. In the absence of an express provision in the constitution granting it, a jury trial is not a constitutional right in such cases. Edwards v. Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 P. 677, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1911), reh'g denied, 19 Wyo. 110, 122 P. 900, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1912).

Or injunctive proceeding. —

Public service commission could enjoin defendant from operating motor vehicle over state highways without permit and defendant could not challenge act authorizing district courts to restrain violations on ground act was unconstitutional for failing to provide right of trial by jury in criminal case. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1935).

Contempt proceedings not “criminal case.” —

Proceedings against defendant in connection with a citation for contempt was not a “criminal case” within the meaning of that term as used in this section. Weiss v. State ex rel. Cardine, 455 P.2d 904, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 927, 90 S. Ct. 1815, 26 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 1748 (1970). But see Skinner v. State, 838 P.2d 715, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 1992).

Termination of parental rights may not be interpreted as a “criminal case” in order that this section will be permitted to insure a jury trial. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Also, right to jury trial in parental-termination action cannot be characterized as fundamental. Neither the federal nor the state constitution secures a jury trial in this civil action. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Defendant's right to a fair trial.—

Defendant was deprived of a fair trial because prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the State of Wyoming failed to comply with the district court’s discovery order and when the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument and because the district court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear a leg restraint at trial without conducting a hearing to evaluate the necessity for the restraint. Black v. State, 2017 WY 135, 405 P.3d 1045, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2017).

Possibility of imprisonment raises right to jury. —

When an ordinance provides that imprisonment may be a part of the penalty, the accused is entitled to a jury for that reason, and it is his right to be so tried regardless of whether the sentence ultimately imposed includes a term of imprisonment. Lapp v. Worland, 612 P.2d 868, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 283 (Wyo. 1980).

Jury trial not required where initial violation only results in fine. —

Unless multiple convictions under a statute result in mandatory incarceration, a jury trial is not required where the initial violation will result only in a fine. City of Casper v. Fletcher, 916 P.2d 473, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 1996).

Jury trial required only when confinement more than six months. —

A jury trial in a case of criminal contempt is required only if the party guilty of contempt is exposed to confinement for more than six months. Skinner v. State, 838 P.2d 715, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 1992) (decided under former Rule 41 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure). But see Weiss v. State, 455 P.2d 904, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 927, 90 S. Ct. 1815, 26 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 1748 (U.S. 1970).

Municipal court jury trial for DWUI offense. —

There is a right to a jury trial in municipal court upon a charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWUI), which is a serious offense, although the municipal DWUI ordinance provides for a maximum fine of $750 only and no jail term. City of Casper v. Cheatham, 739 P.2d 1222, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 471 (Wyo. 1987).

Provision, providing that police court cases tried without jury, unconstitutional. —

Section 5-6-207 , which provides that cases in police court for violations of city ordinances shall be tried without a jury, unconditionally denies the right to a jury trial in all cases in municipal court involving violations of city ordinances without regard to the potential sentences and is therefore unconstitutional. Brenner v. Casper, 723 P.2d 558, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 594 (Wyo. 1986).

Court may deny jury trial on issue of damages in default case. Farrell v. Hursh Agency, 713 P.2d 1174, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 483 (Wyo. 1986).

Essential element of trial by jury is that there be impartial jurors, who unanimously decide the facts in controversy under the direction of a judge. Lapp v. Worland, 612 P.2d 868, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 283 (Wyo. 1980).

Fair trial right not violated by inflammatory publicity. —

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying a change of venue where the effects of inflammatory publicity on potential jurors were mitigated by a carefully controlled voir dire so as to avoid the denial of a fair trial to the defendant. Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1992).

Right to fair trial not violated by prosecutor's remarks. —

In a vehicular homicide case, defendant's right to a fair trial was not violated by prosecutor's remarks during opening and closing argument regarding the effect that the victim's death would have on family and friends where the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming, the district court gave a jury instruction immediately prior to the prosecutor's opening statement, and the district court also specifically instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks immediately after they occurred. Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, 99 P.3d 457, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1001, 125 S. Ct. 1931, 161 L. Ed. 2d 775, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3570 (U.S. 2005).

Prosecutorial Misconduct. —

Defendant's conviction was reversed because (1) the prosecution pervasively used improper “was she lying” questions to undermine defendant's credibility when that was the central issue, (2) the prosecution did not have a strong case, (3) efforts to cure the prosecution's error were ineffective, and (3) defendant did not invite the error, and counsel timely objected. McGinn v. State, 2015 WY 140, 361 P.3d 295, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2015).

Right to jury trial not violated by the court's consideration of enhancement factors. —

Court rejected defendant's claim that the trial court violated his right to a jury trial by improperly considering his character, motives and selfishness in imposing consecutive five- to eight-year prison sentences on his forgery convictions, which factors were not admitted by defendant or found by a jury as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4304 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4573 (2004) because defendant's sentence did not exceed the maximum penalty provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-602(b) and Apprendi and Blakely were cases in which the determination of facts could enhance a criminal penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. Davis v. State, 2005 WY 93, 117 P.3d 454, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2005).

Concept of jury trial is not inflexible in all details, so long as the essential elements of the institution are preserved. Lapp v. Worland, 612 P.2d 868, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 283 (Wyo. 1980).

Jury trial waivable by defendant. —

Right to a common-law jury trial in Wyoming is a right which belongs to the defendant and which may be waived. Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1980).

Requisite inquiry on adequacy of jury waiver is: (1) was the waiver express; and (2) was it knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Robbins v. State, 635 P.2d 781, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 382 (Wyo. 1981).

Showing required in questioning jury composition. —

It is fundamental in questioning the composition of a jury that a mere showing that a class was not represented in a particular jury is not enough; there must be a clear showing that its absence was caused by discrimination. Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 871, 96 S. Ct. 137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 102, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2819 (U.S. 1975).

Simplest method by which any defendant could challenge a jury as being selected by systematic and intentional exclusion of any group of persons would be to present the names of various persons who were entitled to be on the jury list and whose names were not contained thereon. Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 871, 96 S. Ct. 137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 102, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2819 (U.S. 1975).

Merely because no blacks are on a jury panel there is no presumption of systematic and intentional exclusion because of color. Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 871, 96 S. Ct. 137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 102, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2819 (U.S. 1975).

Women permitted to serve as jurors. —

The clause in this section in which the word “men” appears was not inserted for the purpose of preventing the legislature from changing the statutes in effect in regard to the persons competent for jury service. The legislature was therefore entitled to enact ch. 61, Laws 1949, duly incorporated in § 1-11-101 , which permitted women to serve as petit jurors in criminal and civil cases in the district court. Such act did not violate this section. State v. Yazzie, 67 Wyo. 256, 218 P.2d 482, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1950).

Right of women to sit as jurors in criminal case can only be asserted by woman. —

Even if a woman on a criminal prosecution would have a right to women on the jury under art. 6, § 1, Wyo. Const., a male citizen, on a prosecution against him, cannot complain that women were excluded from the jury, since the right of women to sit as jurors, if it is a right, can only be asserted by a woman. McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 30 P. 293, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1892).

Prosecutorial misconduct not prejudicial due to court instructions. —

In an arson case, defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial based on prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor made a valid inquiry into defendant's ability to recall with accuracy the events that occurred before, during and after the time of the fire. The prosecutor made an improper comment regarding defendant “skipping out on a bill,” the district court sustained an objection, and the jury was given both oral and written instructions to disregard any testimony for which an objection was sustained. In addition, the existence of a check was as well known to defendant, as it was to the prosecution, so the evidence was not withheld. Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, 94 P.3d 1034, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2004).

Unanimity of verdict required. —

Statute which dispenses with unanimity of verdict is unconstitutional. First Nat'l Bank v. Foster, 9 Wyo. 157, 61 P. 466, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1900), reh'g denied, 9 Wyo. 157, 63 P. 1056, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1901).

Poll of jury ensured that verdict was unanimous. Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1995).

Unanimous verdict waivable with consent of court. —

Defendant has a qualified right to intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to a unanimous verdict, contingent only upon the consent of the court and the state, providing the waiver conforms strictly to constitutional standards. Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1980).

Conditions which must be met before less-than-unanimous verdict may be accepted. See Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 278 (Wyo. 1980).

Lesser-included offense within jury verdict sustained. —

Even though the jury incorrectly concluded that the necessary elements were present to elevate the defendant's crime from burglary to aggravated burglary, an examination of the record disclosed there was sufficient evidence presented to justify the jury's finding that each of the elements of burglary was met. Therefore, the defendant's conviction for the crime of aggravated burglary was set aside, but his conviction was sustained as to the lesser included offense of burglary. Such an action was not a violation of the defendant's due process right under U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 and Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 6, or of his right to a trial by jury under Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 9. Simonds v. State, 762 P.2d 1189, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1988).

Jurors willing to impose death penalty not unreliable where protective instructions given. —

The jurors ultimately selected to sit on the defendant's case did not become prosecution prone, prejudiced, unrepresentative or unreliable because of a willingness to impose the death penalty, if justified, where adequate protective instructions were given. State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 187, 88 L. Ed. 2d 155, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 4988 (U.S. 1985).

Mitigating circumstances individually weighed by death-penalty jurors. —

The jury must be told by the trial court in a death sentence case that mitigating circumstances need not be found unanimously by the jury, but that mitigating circumstances may be found by individual jurors and weighed by them individually in deciding the life or death question. Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1991) (decided under facts existing prior to 1989 amendment of § 6-2-102 ).

Grand jury continued in use concurrently with accusation by information. —

Under this section authorizing the legislature to “change, regulate or abolish” the grand jury system, the grand jury system may be continued in use concurrently with accusation by information. In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 329, 40 P. 520, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1895).

Removal of public officer by governor. —

Statute authorizing the governor to remove public officer from office did not violate this section. State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500, 228 P. 636, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1924).

Transfer of prisoner from industrial institute to penitentiary. —

Statute empowering board of charities and reform to transfer prisoner in industrial institute to penitentiary if it should appear he had been previously convicted of crime becomes part of sentence as though extended into court record, does not deny due process and is not a change of sentence but a carrying out of the original sentence. Uram v. Roach, 47 Wyo. 335, 37 P.2d 793, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1934).

Jury and bailiff expenses may not be taxed as costs of prosecution against the convicted defendant. The right to trial by jury in criminal prosecutions must be kept inviolate. Johnson v. State, 532 P.2d 598, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 1975).

Appeal to district court from police justice. —

On appeal to district court from a police justice, provision of city charter that such case should stand trial in the district court upon transcript and that no trial de novo shall be had was held not violative of this section. Stutsman v. Cheyenne, 18 Wyo. 499, 113 P. 322, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1911).

Modification of verdict in criminal case by appellate court. —

Modification by appellate court of verdict of murder in second degree to one of manslaughter was authorized and not an infringement of right to jury trial. State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 253 P. 14, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1927).

Defendant's right to a fair trial not denied by prosecutorial line of questioning. —

In a drug case, defendant was not denied the right to a fair trial where the State “forced” her to call the credibility of the State's witnesses into question by essentially forcing her to allege that the State's witnesses were all part of some vast conspiracy because the questions were reasonably related to the subject matter of the direct examination, were not intended as an improper search for opinion testimony, and were not aimed at an evaluation of the credibility of the State's witnesses but were instead a search for an explanation of the evidence against defendant. Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, 89 P.3d 324, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2004), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. May 25, 2004).

In a drug case, defendant was not denied the right to a fair trial by the State's “personal attack” on defense counsel and a comment that defendant and defense counsel were deserving of shame where the prosecutor's comments appeared to have been made to counter the idea that a witness was irresponsible and a drunk, they were the only statements of their kind, and they appeared in isolation. Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, 89 P.3d 324, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2004), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. May 25, 2004).

In a drug case, defendant was not denied the right to a fair trial by the prosecutor's comment that she “did it” where the prosecutor's comments were not meant to imply that he was relying upon information outside the evidence presented at trial and likewise appeared not to have been a statement of the prosecutor's personal beliefs but instead suggested findings of fact and conclusions that could have been drawn from those facts. Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, 89 P.3d 324, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 2004), reh'g denied, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. May 25, 2004).

Applied in

Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1983); Vaupel v. State, 708 P.2d 1248, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 627 (Wyo. 1985); Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1991); Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, 54 P.3d 248, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2002); White v. State, 2003 WY 163, 80 P.3d 642, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2003).

Quoted in

Hyatt Bros. ex rel. Hyatt v. Hyatt, 769 P.2d 329, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

Moore v. Jarvis, 44 Wyo. 92, 8 P.2d 818, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1932); Scott v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 428, 317 P.2d 513, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (1957); Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 1974); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); Madrid v. State, 592 P.2d 709, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 508 (Wyo. 1979); Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982); De Sersa v. State, 729 P.2d 662, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 645 (Wyo. 1986); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1988); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1993); Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, 43 P.3d 80, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 2002); O'Brien v. State, 2002 WY 63, 45 P.3d 225, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2002); Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, 401 P.3d 834, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For note, “Trial By Jury in a Felony Case — A Mandatory Requirement?” see 19 Wyo. L.J. 26 (1964).

For article, “Wyoming Foreclosure Decrees — Personal Judgments and the Right to Jury Trial,” see IV Land & Water L. Rev. 227 (1969).

For comment, “The Constitutionality of Automobile Compensation Plans in Wyoming,” see V Land & Water L. Rev. 191 (1970).

For comment, “Immunity and the Grand Jury,” see VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 629 (1973).

For case note, “Constitutional Law — Does the New Death Qualification Standard Ensure a Biased Jury? Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 105 S. Ct. 844, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 43 (1985),” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 579 (1986).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure — When Should a Jury Trial Be Required in the Wyoming Municipal Courts? City of Casper v. Cheatham, 739 P.2d 1222, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 471 (Wyo. 1987),” see XXV Land & Water L. Rev. 611 (1990).

For case note, “Appeal and Error—The Omnipotent Wyoming Supreme Court: New Allegations and Evidence Will Be Heard for the First Time on Appeal. Boller v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 677 (1993).

For case note, “Constitutional Law — A Petty Mail Fraud Case With Serious Implications: The Supreme Court Extends the Petty Offense Doctrine to Multiple Petty Offenses in Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 135 L. Ed. 2d 590, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4241 (1996),” see XXXII Land & Water L. Rev. 859 (1997).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Constitutional right to jury trial in proceeding for adjudication of incompetency or insanity or for restoration, 33 ALR2d 1145.

Validity and efficacy of accused's waiver of unanimous verdict, 97 ALR3d 1253.

Authority of state court to order jury trial in civil case where jury has been waived or not demanded by parties, 9 ALR4th 1041.

Validity of agreement, by stipulation or waiver in state civil case, to accept verdict by number or proportion of jurors less than that constitutionally permitted, 15 ALR4th 213.

Right to jury trial in stockholders' derivative action, 32 ALR4th 1111.

Right of accused, in state criminal trial, to insist, over prosecutor's or court's objection, on trial by court without jury, 37 ALR4th 304.

Materiality of testimony forming basis of perjury charge as question for court or jury in state trial, 37 ALR4th 948.

Jury trial waiver as binding on later state civil trial, 48 ALR4th 747.

Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 ALR4th 565.

Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory discharge from employment, 52 ALR4th 1141.

Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 ALR4th 955.

Small claims: jury trial rights in, and on appeal from, small claims court proceeding, 70 ALR4th 1119.

Exclusion of public and media from voir dire examination of prospective jurors in state criminal case, 16 ALR5th 152.

Contractual jury trial waivers in state civil cases, 42 ALR5th 53.

Constitutional right to jury trial in cause of action under state unfair or deceptive trade practices law, 54 ALR5th 631.

Propriety of using anonymous juries in state criminal cases, 60 ALR5th 39.

Right to jury trial in child neglect, child abuse, or termination of parental rights proceedings, 102 ALR5th 227.

Complexity of civil action as affecting seventh amendment right to trial by jury, 54 ALR Fed 733.

Oral stipulation to proceed in federal criminal trial with less than 12 jurors as satisfying Rule 23(b) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 57 ALR Fed 367.

Waiver of right to trial by jury as affecting right to trial by jury on subsequent trial of same case in federal court, 66 ALR Fed 859.

Standing of criminal defendant to challenge, on constitutional grounds, discriminatory composition of federal grand jury where defendant is not member of class allegedly excluded, 68 ALR Fed 175.

Propriety of ordering separate trials as to liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions involving personal injury, death or property damage, 78 ALR Fed 890.

Propriety of blanket or per se rule prohibiting federal grand jury from indicting witness who has previously testified before same grand jury under grant of use immunity, 139 ALR Fed 489.

Right to jury trial on issue of damages in copyright infringement actions under 17 U.S.C. § 50, 163 ALR Fed 467.

Validity and application of computerized jury selection practice or procedure, 110 ALR5th 329.

Denial of accused's request for initial contact with attorney — drunk driving cases, 109 ALR5th 611.

§ 10. Right of accused to defend.

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to have a copy thereof, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process served for obtaining witnesses, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. When the location of the offense cannot be established with certainty, venue may be placed in the county or district where the corpus delecti [delicti] is found, or in any county or district in which the victim was transported. (As amended by Laws 1975, Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, p. 474.)

Cross references. —

As to change of venue in criminal cases, see § 1-7-102 and references thereunder.

As to effect of delay in bringing accused to trial, see § 7-11-203 .

As to assignment of counsel, see Rule 44, W.R. Cr. P.

As to subpoena of witnesses, see Rule 17, W.R. Cr. P.

As to place of prosecution or trial, see Rule 18, W.R. Cr. P.

As to presence of defendant during proceedings, see Rule 43, W.R. Cr. P.

Defendant not denied right to effectively cross-examine child victim.—

Defendant was not denied his right to effectively cross-examine the child victim and any error was harmless; the victim provided verbal responses to most questions and her motive in not answering some questions might have been due to a lack of memory or a misunderstanding as opposed to a refusal to answer. Defense counsel’s cessation of questioning appeared to have been strategic and even assuming defendant would have been able to discredit the victim, the verdict would not have been different because her testimony was not the only evidence of guilt. Tamblyn v. State, 2020 WY 76, 465 P.3d 440, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 86 (Wyo. 2020).

Defendant's opportunity to confront witnesses not denied. —

Because the victim and forensic examiner were under subpoena requiring them to testify at trial, but defendant did not call them to testify, he was not denied an opportunity to confront those witnesses, and the amendment to the felony information, without a continuance, had no effect on his defense, and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. LaJeunesse v. State, 2020 WY 29, 458 P.3d 1213, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 2020).

Defendant had effective counsel.

—

Trial counsel was not ineffective because excessive cross-examination carried risk, it could have allowed the witness to walk back statements favorable to the defense, elicited unfavorable testimony, or inadvertently enhanced the witness’s or the victim’s credibility; the fact that trial counsel could have pursued a different strategy by continuing to press a witness on her pretrial statements did not prove counsel’s assistance ineffective. Shields v. State, 2020 WY 101, 468 P.3d 1097, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2020).

Trial counsel demonstrated the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary to represent defendant because there was no requirement that defense attorneys in cases involving charges of sexual abuse of a minor to have specialized training and experience; defendant indicated her desire to continue with lead counsel. Shields v. State, 2020 WY 101, 468 P.3d 1097, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2020).

Trial counsel did not perform deficiently with respect to their pretrial investigation, and no prejudice showing had been made, because defendant did not identify how trial counsels’ further review of and familiarity with the materials they received from the State before trial would have benefited the defense or otherwise affected the trial outcome. Shields v. State, 2020 WY 101, 468 P.3d 1097, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2020).

Defendant failed to show that had trial counsel raised a pre-trial taint argument, it would have prevented the minor victim from testifying or that by presenting the taint evidence only at trial her chances of acquittal were lessened because there was no evidence that a reasonably competent attorney would have requested a separate taint hearing; to the extent the defense advanced a peripheral taint argument at trial, trial counsel implemented sufficient safeguards through cross-examination. Shields v. State, 2020 WY 101, 468 P.3d 1097, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2020).

Defendant's right to a fair trial.—

Appellant’s right to a fair trial was not denied when the district court refused to individually query jurors about pretrial publicity where all of the jurors who had seen the two articles at issue averred that they could decide the case based on the evidence at trial and the court’s instructions. Pickering v. State, 2020 WY 66, 464 P.3d 236, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2020).

Defendant had effective counsel.—

Appellant’s arguments that defense counsel lacked time to reasonably investigate, they relied on undeveloped defense theories at trial, and they did not interview the officers alleged to be victims were rejected where a lesser included manslaughter jury instruction had been requested, appellant failed to identify what favorable evidence, if any, would have been garnered had the alleged victims been interviewed, and counsel had access to and read the officer and victim statements. Pickering v. State, 2020 WY 66, 464 P.3d 236, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2020).

Appellant’s arguments that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a mental health expert was rejected where appellant failed to plead not guilty by reason of mental illness, and thus, any expert testimony would not have been admissible. Pickering v. State, 2020 WY 66, 464 P.3d 236, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2020).

Jury instructions not prejudicial. —

Although the district court erred by failing to define substantial step for the jury and by including the concept of attempt in the elements of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor when instructing the jury, counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the instructions as defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to object because the evidence against him was overwhelming as defendant’s statements over several weeks confirmed he had the specific intent to inflict sexual intrusion upon the victim and his actions were strongly corroborative of the firmness of his intention to complete the crime of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. Weston v. State, 2019 WY 113, 451 P.3d 758, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2019).

This section is similar to U.S. Const., amend. 6. State v. Yazzie, 67 Wyo. 256, 218 P.2d 482, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1950).

And U.S. supreme court decisions on speedy trials accorded full credit in questions presented to state supreme court. —

In recognition of the supreme law of the land, the United States supreme court decisions on speedy trials were accorded full credit in deciding the question presented to the state supreme court as to whether there was an unconstitutional delay in bringing defendants to trial. Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 1976).

Under the following facts, reason and justification for defendant's absence was sufficiently established and could not be held voluntary, such that continuing the trial in his absence resulted in prejudice: (1) the defendant suffered a heart attack during trial and because of persistent chest pain, there was a risk of a major heart attack or cardiac complications occurring in the future; (2) the defendant was not present to assist and consult with his attorney when instructions on the law were submitted and during closing arguments; and (3) the defendant was not able to consult with or advise his attorney concerning the appropriate means for responding to the jury's inquiry, during deliberations, concerning the applicability of self-defense. Maupin v. State, 694 P.2d 720, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 437 (Wyo. 1985).

Constitutional right to attorney of choice. —

The person accused of the commission of a crime has the constitutional right to be represented by an attorney of his own choice; this is the construction given to the 6th amendment to the constitution of the United States, and the same construction must be given to this section of the constitution of the state of Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 235 (Wyo. 1978).

Or to appointed counsel. —

The accused has an absolute right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to employ his own attorney. Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 235 (Wyo. 1978).

Lack of counsel never harmless error. —

The assistance of counsel is such a basic right that the lack of such assistance can never be treated as harmless error. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1922 (U.S. 1980).

Where the right to counsel has been denied at a critical stage of the proceedings, the denial can never be treated as harmless error, and reversal is automatic. Nelson v. State, 934 P.2d 1238, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1997).

Prosecutorial Misconduct. —

Defendant's conviction was reversed because (1) the prosecution pervasively used improper “was she lying” questions to undermine defendant's credibility when that was the central issue, (2) the prosecution did not have a strong case, (3) efforts to cure the prosecution's error were ineffective, and (3) defendant did not invite the error, and counsel timely objected. McGinn v. State, 2015 WY 140, 361 P.3d 295, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2015).

Exercise of right to self-representation. —

When a defendant wants to exercise his right to self-representation: (1) the defendant must be the one to initially request the right; (2) the demand must be timely; and (3) the request must not be used as a delaying tactic. Williams v. State, 655 P.2d 273, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 419 (Wyo. 1982).

When a defendant fails to make a timely request to proceed pro se, the trial court has discretion in deciding whether to allow the defendant the exercise of the right. Williams v. State, 655 P.2d 273, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 419 (Wyo. 1982).

Protective restrictions are imposed on exercise of right of self-representation because it involves a waiver of the fundamental right to counsel; inherent in these protective restrictions is the fact that a court must assure itself that the defendant is competent to waive counsel. Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1988).

Counsel's advice to defendant not to testify was reasonable. —

Defendant did not show that counsel was ineffective where defense counsel's advice to defendant not to testify was reasonable, as was counsel's decision not to call certain witnesses as they would serve no useful purpose; district court properly prohibited the defense investigator from testifying. Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, 184 P.3d 687, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 59 (Wyo. 2008), reh'g denied, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. June 19, 2008).

Determining whether right to counsel intelligently waived depends on particular facts. —

The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 553 (Wyo. 1986).

Defendant's right to appear pro se does not include absolute prohibition against standby counsel. Rather, a pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over his case and it is only when, over a defendant's objection, standby counsel's participation effectively interferes with any significant decisions or matters of importance that such a right is eroded. Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1988).

Defendant has no right to manipulate his right to counsel for purpose of delaying and disrupting trial. Hurst v. State, 563 P.2d 232, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 251 (Wyo. 1977), overruled in part, Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982).

And he may not unreasonably reject counsel appointed to represent him. Hurst v. State, 563 P.2d 232, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 251 (Wyo. 1977), overruled in part, Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982).

As no constitutional right to particular attorney. —

The constitutional right to have counsel appointed does not include a right to demand that a particular attorney be appointed by the court, and this rule also pertains in instances in which a defendant asks for the substitution of a particular attorney. Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 235 (Wyo. 1978).

And appointment of substitute counsel discretionary. —

While a trial court has the power in its discretion to appoint substitute counsel, its refusal to do so is not error unless an abuse of discretion is shown. A factual showing of good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel is essential to the demonstration of an abuse of discretion, and good cause is to be found in incompetence, commitment to a position or an interest which would conflict with the furnishing of an effective defense to the accused, or other good reason to conclude that appointed counsel is unable to furnish effective assistance. Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 235 (Wyo. 1978).

Defendant's right to counsel under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 was not violated when the trial court refused to appoint substitute standby counsel, given that once defendant asserted the right to self-representation, the trial court had no duty to appoint counsel for defendant, and the trial court considered the issue and found that substitution was not warranted. May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2003).

When right to representation applicable. —

A criminal defendant is entitled to be represented at all adversary judicial proceedings against him following his arrest and at any custodial interrogation prior to his arrest. Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 909, 104 S. Ct. 265, 78 L. Ed. 2d 249, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1917 (U.S. 1983).

Counsel is required not just at trial, but at “critical stages” both before and after trial in which the substantial rights of the accused may be affected. Nelson v. State, 934 P.2d 1238, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1997).

A request for counsel made prior to the commencement of adversarial criminal proceedings does not invoke the right to counsel under this section. Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 438 (Wyo. 1987).

Right to counsel attaches only upon commencement of adversary criminal proceedings. Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1989).

No right to consult attorney before taking chemical test. —

The state constitution did not give the defendant a limited right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to chemical testing for blood alcohol. Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, 32 P.3d 313, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 2001).

Prearrest investigation does not trigger right to counsel. —

The mere fact that an accused is questioned by police officers during their prearrest investigation does not trigger that person's right to counsel. Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 303 (Wyo. 1983).

Right to representation does not extend to preindictment line-up stage of criminal proceedings. Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 437 (Wyo. 1987).

No right to be present at conferences. —

There is no right to be present at the jury instruction conference or the jury question conference; the defendant's presence is not required at conferences that encompass purely legal issues. Lobatos v. State, 875 P.2d 716, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 1994).

Defendant waived her right to be present at bench conferences involving prospective jurors, where both she and her counsel acquiesced in her absence while defense counsel represented her interests for that part of trial. Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2000).

In a defendant's murder case, the defendant's right to be present was not violated, where (1) there was no indication that the defendant's absence from a conference on an objection was anything but voluntary, (2) the absence was for a brief period of time, (3) there was no indication that the defendant possessed any special information on the question that his counsel did not, and (4) there was no indication that the defendant's presence could have altered the judge's decision on the objection in any way. Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, 73 P.3d 1041, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. Aug. 26, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1165, 124 S. Ct. 1179, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1212, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 898 (U.S. 2004).

Effect of failure to consult counsel prior to arrest. —

Failure to consult with counsel prior to being arrested does not foreclose law enforcement officers from interrogating the defendant after his arrest once they give him a proper statement of his constitutional rights in accordance with Miranda, and he has given them a waiver of those rights. Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 303 (Wyo. 1983).

Failure to provide counsel at preliminary hearing does not in all cases entitle a defendant to a release or a new trial. Hurst v. State, 563 P.2d 232, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 251 (Wyo. 1977), overruled in part, Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982).

Waiver of right to appeal defects by not objecting prior to trial. —

Where defendant argued that he was improperly denied an attorney at his preliminary hearing, defendant waived the right to appeal defects in the preliminary hearing by not objecting prior to trial. Coleman v. State, 2005 WY 69, 115 P.3d 411, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 2005).

Right to counsel during probation revocation. —

Although Rule 44(a)(2), W.R.Cr.P., limits the circumstances under which the court is required to appoint counsel in a probation revocation proceeding, a defendant is constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel in the specific circumstance when the proceeding includes sentencing. Nelson v. State, 934 P.2d 1238, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1997).

Under Wyoming's judicial revocation procedure where the state is represented by a prosecutor and the rules of evidence apply to a portion of the proceedings, the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel for indigent probationers when the indigent probationer is entitled to be represented by an attorney under § 7-6-104(a). An inescapable corollary to such a holding is the invalidation of W.R.Cr.P. 44(a)(2), in the context of judicial revocations. Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 2000).

Also, no right to presence at probation modification hearing. —

Defendant's rights under Wyo. Const. art. I, § 10 were not violated when district court denied his requests to modify terms of his probation or to discharge him from probation without his presence at the hearing; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-304(a) and Wyo. R. Crim. P. 39(b) did not mandate that district court hold a hearing on defendant's motions for modification of his probation, and consequently was not entitled to be present at the gratuitous hearing that was held. Demillard v. State, 2008 WY 93, 190 P.3d 128, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2008).

Right to be present not violated. —

Defendant's constitutional right to be present was not violated when a trial court ruled on defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence and reduced defendant's sentence because defendant's presence would have been useless; because defendant had already completed the statutory maximum sentence for the crime, it would have made no possible difference whether the trial court imposed the maximum sentence or a lesser sentence. Osborn v. State, 2012 WY 159, 290 P.3d 1096, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 2012), reh'g denied, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. Jan. 15, 2013).

Defendant's right to counsel was not violated where defendant appeared in court and answered questions regarding his prior convictions, his age, and his educational background, and was asked about his intention to change his plea to guilty, where prior to making any inquiry as to the defendant's plea, the trial judge clearly informed the defendant of his right to have counsel present before he changed his plea, defendant did not waive that right, and no plea was entered at the proceeding. Duffy v. State, 837 P.2d 1047, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 1992).

When duty to provide counsel not discharged. —

A criminal defendant's right to effective counsel is inviolate and the court has a duty to provide such counsel, and this duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case. Adger v. State, 584 P.2d 1056, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1978).

Right to counsel is not dependent upon any request. It is automatic and may only be withdrawn by an express waiver by the accused. Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 438 (Wyo. 1987).

Reimbursement for statutorily authorized court costs. —

The district court could not require a criminal defendant to make reimbursement for the costs of his court-appointed counsel, where the crime which he committed occurred before the effective date of the statute authorizing assessments for such expenses. Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1989).

When joint representation denies effective assistance of counsel. —

A defendant is denied the fundamental right of effective assistance of counsel when the trial court requires joint representation of defendants over timely objections; prejudice is then presumed and need not be independently shown. Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 505 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 1922 (U.S. 1980).

Failure to hire an expert was not evidence of ineffectiveness. —

In an arson case, counsel was not ineffective in failing to engage the services of an expert witness to counter the testimony of the State's three expert fire investigators where the decision not to call an expert was a tactical one, and defense counsel opted to rely on intense cross-examination of the State's experts, as well as the lack of evidence placing defendant at the scene when the fire occurred. Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, 94 P.3d 1034, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2004).

Counsel's performance was not deficient for failing to retain an expert to testify at the competency hearing for the child victim where, even though the expert could have presented evidence that the victim had been diagnosed with ADHD, the district court was aware that the victim had traits consistent with the diagnosis, it was aware from the victim's testimony and behavior at the hearing that she had developmental, intellectual, and behavioral issues, and the evidence of a particular diagnoses would not have changed the competency determination. Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 16, 367 P.3d 1108, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 2016).

Failing to object to experts was not grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel. —

In an arson case, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the State's experts where a proper foundation for each was established, the experts were not used to vouch for the credibility of the others, and each rounded-out the testimony of the others. Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, 94 P.3d 1034, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2004).

Ineffectiveness related to a motion to withdraw plea. —

There was no violation of Wyo. R. Crim. P. 11 based on an alleged failure to advise defendant of the immigration consequences of pleading to a lesser drug charge; therefore, no evidentiary hearing was required on a motion to withdraw the plea since there was no relief available, and no ineffective assistance of counsel claim was alleged. Valle v. State, 2006 WY 43, 132 P.3d 181, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 2006), overruled in part, Ortega-Araiza v. State, 2014 WY 99, 331 P.3d 1189, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2014).

Presumption of prejudice in all instances of multiple representation. —

Prejudice will be presumed in all instances of multiple representation of criminal defendants and, in the absence of an appropriate waiver, multiple representation will constitute reversible error. Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1992).

Absent a valid waiver, prejudice is presumed in all instances of multiple representation of criminal defendants; in the absence of an appropriate waiver, multiple representation will constitute reversible error. Kenney v. State, 837 P.2d 664, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1992).

Court must advise defendant where multiple representation. —

The court must, in each case in which the same attorney represents more than one defendant, separately advise each of those defendants of the right to be represented by an attorney free from any conflict of interest and of the dangers inherent in the multiple representation. Should any defendant decide to forego the representation by the attorney who is representing another defendant, the judge will appoint separate counsel for any defendant who qualifies for state-appointed counsel. On the other hand, if any defendant insists upon being represented by the attorney of his choice and chooses the attorney who is representing another defendant, the judge must obtain from that defendant a request, preferably in writing, to be represented by that attorney and must also obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be represented by an attorney free from any conflict of interest. Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1992).

The trial judge has a duty to apprise the defendant of conflict problems that may develop during any dual representation of interested parties. Kenney v. State, 837 P.2d 664, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1992).

Multiple representation requires waiver and absence of conflict of interest. —

If the defendant insists on retaining an attorney who is representing another co-defendant, the trial judge must obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be represented by an attorney free from any conflict of interest and determine that no real conflict exists. Kenney v. State, 837 P.2d 664, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1992).

Attorney should not have undertaken joint representation where under the factual circumstances existent between the codefendants, one person likely was the “heavy” as the principal and the other constituted the “follower”; joint representation was sure to disfavor one or the other. Kenney v. State, 837 P.2d 664, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1992).

Defendant's right to a fair trial.—

Defendant was deprived of a fair trial because prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the State of Wyoming failed to comply with the district court’s discovery order and when the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument and because the district court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear a leg restraint at trial without conducting a hearing to evaluate the necessity for the restraint. Black v. State, 2017 WY 135, 405 P.3d 1045, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2017).

Presumption of effective assistance of counsel. —

It takes more than assumption and conjecture to overcome the presumption that defendant's trial counsel's decisions were sound trial strategy, and defendant failed to demonstrate that her trial counsel made errors so serious he could not have been functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Cureton v. State, 950 P.2d 544, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 1997).

Burden of proof in showing counsel ineffective. —

In order for the assistance that a criminal defendant receives from his counsel to be deemed ineffective, the defendant must prove that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient in that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by this section; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense by errors so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1997).

Where defendant asserted that his first appointed counsel's conflict of interest, together with that counsel's pursuit of an insanity defense on defendant's behalf, resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel, but accused failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient or that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense, because accused did not meet his burden of proof in showing that either of these requisites occurred, his argument of ineffective assistance of counsel was baseless. Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1988).

Defendant's contention that counsel was ineffective because it failed to enter into evidence expert medical testimony purportedly explaining why test results for cannabinoids were positive was not supported by the record. Miller v. State, 942 P.2d 1108, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1997).

Determination of ineffective assistance. —

The supreme court examines the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the circumstances in determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the function of counsel is to make the adversarial testing process work in every case. Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1997).

Defendant had effective counsel. —

Defense counsel's failure to object to testimony of defendant's prior contact with police did not violate defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, since this was a reasonable decision within wide range of professionally competent assistance, and there was no showing of any prejudice caused by the testimony; moreover, defendant used his prior contact with same officers to impeach their credibility. Denmon v. State, 989 P.2d 631, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1999).

See State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 187, 88 L. Ed. 2d 155, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 4988 (U.S. 1985); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 640 (Wyo. 1986); Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1997).

Defendant's right to counsel under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 was not violated when a public defender other than the one appointed to represent defendant appeared on a hearing on defendant's motion to proceed pro se; defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit because defendant made no showing an actual conflict of interest as contended, nor did defendant show prejudice. May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2003).

In a murder and robbery case, defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. Given defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness, defense counsel had no choice but to present the alternative theories consistent with his client's alternate pleas; counsel did not fail to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and counsel's misstatement during closing argument did not fall below standards of reasonable competency. Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, 76 P.3d 323, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2003).

In a murder case, defendant failed to sustain his burden of proving that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because counsel (1) failed to object to the joinder of the charges for trial; (2) failed to object to hearsay testimony and unduly prejudicial evidence; (3) failed to adequately investigate; (4) failed to object to leading questions; (5) failed to object to the district court's erroneous application of W.R.E. 613; (6) failed to make a record objection to the security measures employed at trial; (7) failed to object to the use of, and the jury's reliance upon, a demonstrative exhibit that was never introduced into evidence; (8) failed to object to the jury being advised it was a non-capital case; and (9) failed to offer any defense instructions, particularly theory-of-defense instructions. On the contrary, defense counsel vigorously represented his client and challenged the prosecution's evidence, and defendant did not demonstrate that counsel's performance was outside the range of professionally competent assistance, nor did he show that the outcome of his trial would have been different absent attorney error. Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, 99 P.3d 928, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4397 (U.S. 2005).

Counsel were not ineffective at a suppression hearing regarding the voluntariness of defendant's statements due to intoxication where it was apparent from a transcript of the interview that he was responsive and gave coherent, detailed answers to the detective's questions and that he was able to converse with the detective. Siler v. State, 2005 WY 73, 115 P.3d 14, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 2005).

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress defendant's statements to officers because defendant did not demonstrate that a suppression motion based on the alleged Miranda violation would have been granted as it did not appear that defendant was subjected to express questioning, or its functional equivalent, prior to being advised of his Miranda rights. After he was arrested, an officer located defendant in a patrol vehicle and read him his Miranda rights, and defendant indicated that he understood his rights and that he wanted to waive those rights and make a statement. Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, 121 P.3d 127, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 2005).

Counsel was not ineffective for allegedly failing to conduct an adequate investigation into his defense that he was lawfully in possession of certain items because counsel denied that defendant had told them that there were specific emails memorializing an agreement with his employer about the items. There was no evidence in the record other than defendant's uncorroborated assertions to suggest that such emails ever existed. Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, 141 P.3d 106, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2006).

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make an adequate record of defendant's diabetic condition, because defendant did not specifically identify what steps he believed counsel should have taken or effectively explain how making a better record of his condition would have benefited him. Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, 141 P.3d 106, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2006).

Defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel when a trial court limited the length of closing arguments, which the trial court had the discretion to do in defendant's murder trial. Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, 142 P.3d 1134, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2006).

In a hearing on remand, although the trial court considered and rejected defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, despite the availability of the evidence from the remand hearing, despite bearing the burden of proof, and in the face of the standard of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the trial court's detailed decision letter, defendant presented to the supreme court only two and one-half pages of very generalized argument supporting his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel; in effect, defendant's brief was nothing more than a recitation of the allegations themselves, with no analysis of either the allegedly deficient conduct, or any prejudice that might have resulted therefrom, and thus his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was denied. Rion v. State, 2007 WY 197, 172 P.3d 734, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 210 (Wyo. 2007).

Counsel was not ineffective in relation to defendant's guilty plea to sexual assault because the evidence against him was fairly substantial, even without his confession, and defendant obtained a substantial benefit by accepting the plea agreement whereby 35 serious felony charges were dropped. Palmer v. State, 2008 WY 7, 174 P.3d 1298, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 2008).

Counsel's performance was not deficient for failing to have its expert testify at trial concerning the child victims' testimony where the expert's observations were not tangibly different from evidence developed by counsel through cross-examination of the State's witnesses, which he formulated with the expert's assistance. Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 16, 367 P.3d 1108, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 2016).

Supreme Court found that defendant failed to demonstrate trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by her failure to adequately advance the defense theory of the case. Bruckner v. State, 2018 WY 51, 417 P.3d 178, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 2018).

Supreme Court found that trial counsel’s tactical decision in not objecting to admission of defendant’s videotaped statements could not be considered deficient performance. Bruckner v. State, 2018 WY 51, 417 P.3d 178, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 2018).

Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because defendant failed to overcome the presumption that trial counsel exercised reasonable judgment in making the tactical choice to ask the court to join the charges for trial. Neidlinger v. State, 2021 WY 39, 482 P.3d 337, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 2021).

District court did not err in denying the motion asserting defendant’s trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to raise a challenge under Batson as the prosecutor testified that he struck Juror #116 because he did not have a spouse or children, did not have a job that interacts with people, and had recently changed jobs, and he or a family member had been a complainant, defendant, or witness in a criminal case; and the State’s reasons for utilizing a peremptory challenge on Juror # 116 were neutral and non-discriminatory. Yazzie v. State, 2021 WY 72, 487 P.3d 555, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 2021).

Ineffective assistance for failure to investigate witnesses. —

Defendant's contentions that his counsel failed to investigate and present witnesses which may have countered state's evidence were sufficiently substantial to warrant reversal and remand to the trial court for a hearing to be held regarding those contentions. Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1993).

State's case depended entirely on the officer's testimony about what the officer saw during the traffic stop; because defendant's attorney made no effort to to cross-examine the officer at all as to what the officer saw and did not reasonably investigate what the officer could have seen, defendant's attorney was ineffective and defendant's conviction for possession of a felony amount of methamphetamine, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 , was reversed. Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2003).

Counsel ineffective for failing to investigate defendant's mental history. —

In an arson case, counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate the petitioner's mental history for a possible insanity defense before trial where counsel was aware of a bipolar diagnosis, did not obtain medical records for review, and did not consult with a mental health professional nor obtain an opinion about the petitioner's mental state at the time of the offense. Counsel's failure to properly investigate the matter and make an insanity plea appeared to have deprived the petitioner of the only true defense available to him, and it had a reasonable likelihood of success. Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, 115 P.3d 1110, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 2005).

Counsel not ineffective in handling of expert testimony. —

In defendant's second degree murder case, counsel was not ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the victim's actual cause of death by presenting expert testimony that challenged the autopsy results where the unrefuted evidence presented was that defense counsel did investigate and check into the basis for the coroner's opinions as to the cause of death of the victim. Additionally, counsel made knowing and considered tactical trial decisions relative to the handling of the cause of death issue in connection with the theory of the defense presented to the jury at trial. Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, 86 P.3d 851, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2004).

Ineffective assistance for allowing defendant to absent himself. —

Defendant failed to show that his defense counsel was ineffective in allowing defendant to absent himself from the peremptory challenge portion of jury selection where, to the contrary, the record reflected that counsel systematically included the defendant in the jury evaluation and selection process. Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 182 (Wyo. 2002).

Ineffective assistance based upon failure to object. —

In defendant's sexual assault case, counsel was ineffective for failing to make appropriate objections, because garnering trust for one's client rarely began by allowing the jury to hear the detailed testimony from two murder trials in which that client was convicted; neither was the client's veracity enhanced by allowing law enforcement officers to testify that they believed he was guilty. Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, 193 P.3d 228, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2008).

In defendant's sexual assault case, counsel was ineffective for failing demand notice of or object to prior acts of misconduct because the state produced uncharged misconduct evidence at trial, without defense counsel having filed a pretrial demand for notice of such evidence, without defense counsel objecting contemporaneously with the introduction of the evidence, and without evidence being scrutinized by district court prior to its admission. Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, 193 P.3d 228, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2008).

Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in a drug case because counsel failed to object to a prosecutor's questions that prompted testimony from law enforcement amounting to an opinion that defendant was guilty of crimes charged and the prosecutor's questions and comments vouching for the credibility of the State's witnesses, and he failed to request that audio tapes be played in their entirety; moreover, counsel failed to demand notice of prior bad acts evidence, request a pre-trial hearing to determine admissibility, enter an objection to the testimony, or request an instruction telling the jury to disregard it. There was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's actions, the result of the trial would have been different. Fennell v. State, 2015 WY 67, 350 P.3d 710, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2015).

Counsel may have been ineffective for failure to pursue discovery and to protect defendant's right to testify. —

Trial court abused its discretion in ignoring remand directive that it determine if defense counsel had been ineffective in failing to follow-up on defendant's request to provide documents that might support loan/purchase defenses and in failing to ask for continuance on the record but instead waiving defendant's right to testify at trial after health problems made it doubtful that defendant could testify effectively. Barker v. State, 2005 WY 20, 106 P.3d 297, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 2005).

Ineffective assistance for egregious errors. —

Counsel's failure to move to suppress defendant's statements and diary resulting from an illegal search and seizure, together with the failure to object to these at trial, were so egregious that these errors, without more, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and demanded reversal of her arson conviction. Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 1992).

Assistance not ineffective for tactical decision. —

Defendant's counsel was not ineffective under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 for not raising the defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency where nothing in the record indicated other than that defendant consented to the trial strategy of admitting to shooting victims to avoid the death penalty or to reduce culpability for the sentencing phase. Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2003).

Counsel were not ineffective for conceding defendant's guilt in a murder case where it was apparent from the record that counsel sought to avoid a first-degree murder conviction by admitting that defendant stabbed and killed the victim, undermining the requisite mental state for first-degree murder due to his intoxication, and asking the jury for a verdict of manslaughter based on the circumstances surrounding the stabbing. Siler v. State, 2005 WY 73, 115 P.3d 14, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 2005).

Ineffectiveness for failing to request presentence investigation report. —

In a sexual assault case, defendant did not show prejudice for alleged ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to request a presentencing investigation report or to object to the harshness of imposition of two life sentences either at sentencing or afterwards because, under the habitual criminal statute, the trial court had no choice but to impose two life sentences. Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, 78 P.3d 205, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1205, 124 S. Ct. 1476, 158 L. Ed. 2d 127, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1455 (U.S. 2004).

Waiver of right to defend by counsel. —

The right or privilege to defend by counsel, as guaranteed by this section, may be waived or renounced, and it is not denied by a mere failure to assign counsel, there being no invasion of it disclosed unless it appears by the record that a request for assignment of counsel was denied by the court. James v. State, 27 Wyo. 378, 196 P. 1045, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1921).

Use of nonlawyer judge. —

The performance of an accused's lawyer is not per se impaired when a nonlawyer judge presides over the accused's misdemeanor trial. Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1992).

Trial court's intrusion into attorney-client relationship. —

Defendant's bald assertion that a trial court interfered with the attorney-client relationship was insufficient in a case where the trial court conducted a hearing prior to closing argument relating to defense counsel's effectiveness; defendant asserted only that the implications of the interference could have reverberated through defense counsel's closing, his argument at sentencing, or during any advice he provided defendant after the hearing. Fernandez v. State, 2007 WY 198, 172 P.3d 730, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 211 (Wyo. 2007).

Prosecution's intrusion into attorney-client relationship. —

The prosecution's intrusion into the attorney-client relationship of the defendant and his defense counsel did not substantially prejudice the defendant's defense where a deputy sheriff had divulged to the prosecutor the substance of some of the conversations between defense counsel and the defendant that he had overheard during trial preparation sessions at which he was present for security reasons. Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 930, 113 S. Ct. 2395, 124 L. Ed. 2d 296, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 3540 (U.S. 1993).

On appeal the court rejected defendant's claim that his right to effectively defend and participate in his defense was denied where a deputy sat during trial in a chair along a wall, halfway between defendant's table and the prosecution's table, as far as practicable from defendant; there was no evidence that the deputy heard anything said at defendant's table, the deputy had been instructed never to repeat anything he heard at defendant's table, there was no allegation of prejudice from the use of any information obtained by the deputy from overhearing conversation at defendant's table, and defendant did not state what conversation he would have had if the deputy had not been seated in nearby. Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2003).

Prosecutorial misconduct not prejudicial due to court instructions. —

In an arson case, defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial based on prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor made a valid inquiry into defendant's ability to recall with accuracy the events that occurred before, during and after the time of the fire. The prosecutor made an improper comment regarding defendant “skipping out on a bill,” the district court sustained an objection, and the jury was given both oral and written instructions to disregard any testimony for which an objection was sustained. In addition, the existence of a check was as well known to defendant, as it was to the prosecution, so the evidence was not withheld. Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, 94 P.3d 1034, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2004).

Right to fair trial not violated by prosecutor's remarks. —

In a vehicular homicide case, defendant's right to a fair trial was not violated by prosecutor's remarks during opening and closing argument regarding the effect that the victim's death would have on family and friends where the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming, the district court gave a jury instruction immediately prior to the prosecutor's opening statement, and the district court also specifically instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks immediately after they occurred. Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, 99 P.3d 457, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1001, 125 S. Ct. 1931, 161 L. Ed. 2d 775, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3570 (U.S. 2005).

Court rejected defendant's claim that the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial during the closing argument by misstating key facts to the jury, improperly personalizing her argument, improperly commenting on or vouching for the credibility of trial witnesses, and implying that defendant's testimony was not credible simply because he had been charged with crimes. Defendant bore the burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct and did not object to the alleged incidents of misconduct at trial, and the prosecutor's remarks were legitimate argument as to what particular inferences the jury should and should not make based on the evidence produced at trial, and what evidence and other factors the jury should weigh in evaluating the credibility of the witnesses. Davis v. State, 2005 WY 93, 117 P.3d 454, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 2005).

Defendant's right to a fair trial was not violated by a prosecutor's remarks in an arson case because, even though the remarks during closing argument improperly failed to recognize the limited effect of a statement made by a neighbor to a fire inspector, there was other evidence admitted to show the condition of an apartment before the fire. There was also no prosecutorial misconduct relating to the questioning of the inspector about the reasons for setting a fire since defense counsel opened the door, and the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence, violate rules pertaining to courtroom professionalism, or improperly comment on witness credibility. Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, 166 P.3d 879, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1153, 128 S. Ct. 1095, 169 L. Ed. 2d 830, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 762 (U.S. 2008).

Right to a fair and impartial trial not violated by judicial comments. —

Defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial was not violated by comments made by a judge during a burglary trial relating to the possible excusing of a doctor as a juror and the fact that someone would be in trouble if the trial ran longer than three days; the comments were not calculated to belittle or disparage defense counsel or create the impression that the defense had no merit. Fernandez v. State, 2007 WY 198, 172 P.3d 730, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 211 (Wyo. 2007).

Statement made during police interrogation held inadmissible. —

Where the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial. Kennedy v. State, 422 P.2d 88, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 1967), commented on in III Land & Water L. Rev. 613 (1968).

Prosecution entitled to notes of social worker hired by defendant. —

Where defendant asserted an affirmative defense of diminished capacity and battered woman syndrome and hired a licensed social worker to evaluate her, trial court's order requiring production of social worker's notes did not intrude on defendant's attorney-client privilege, and her constitutional right to assistance of counsel was not violated. Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Wyo. 2000).

Shackling of defendant during trial. —

In a sexual assault case, a court's abuse of discretion in allowing the shackling of defendant during trial was harmless error and did not deny defendant his right to a fair trial where defendant was seated before the jury was brought in, and the shackles could not be seen once the jury was seated. Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, 78 P.3d 205, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1205, 124 S. Ct. 1476, 158 L. Ed. 2d 127, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1455 (U.S. 2004).

Right of allocution not violated. —

In the context of Wyo. R. Crim. P. 32(c) and the constitutional right of allocution, a defendant's right of allocution is not violated when he or she has been given an adequate opportunity under the circumstances to speak on his or her own behalf. Sandoval v. State, 2009 WY 121, 217 P.3d 393, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2009).

Defendant was not denied the right of allocution during a sentencing hearing for second-degree murder because defendant was able to present a statement on defendant's own behalf to the trial court; defendant did not describe on appeal the additional information defendant would have presented to the trial court had defendant been asked in a different manner. Sandoval v. State, 2009 WY 121, 217 P.3d 393, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2009).

Defendant not required to speak to court. —

A defendant's choice to exercise his right to allocution is entirely voluntary; he can speak to the court, but he is not required to do so; a defendant's statements may be admissible against him in further proceedings, provided they are voluntary. Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. July 8, 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022, 113 S. Ct. 661, 121 L. Ed. 2d 586, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 7732 (U.S. 1992).

Defendant's waiver of right to testify was valid and constitutionally sufficient. His trial counsel did not restrict him from testifying, thus he did not meet his initial burden of establishing that he was not permitted to testify. Consequently, he could not show that his testimony would have been to establish that his trial counsel's performance was deficient. Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1995).

Defendant should have timely information of accusation. State v. Kusel, 29 Wyo. 287, 213 P. 367, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1923).

Fatal variance in information. —

Where defendant who lived in California sold drugs to Wyoming residents in California, to be sold in Wyoming, and was convicted of conspiracy with intent to deliver methamphetamine, but the information alleged that “the conspiratorial agreement occurred in Wyoming or defendant conspired to commit an act beyond the State of Wyoming,” the failure to include an element of the offense charged in the information, that a conspiracy occurred that was intended to have had an effect in Wyoming, was a fatal variance, which a detailed affidavit could not cure. Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, 66 P.3d 703, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 2003).

Amendment of information. —

An information may not be amended if it prejudices the defendant or charges a different offense. The prohibition against charging additional or different offenses implicates the defendant's right to know the charges against him and to prepare a defense to those charges, which is protected by U.S. Const. amend. VI, and this provision. Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, 37 P.3d 1279, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 2002), reh'g denied, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 1 6 (Wyo. Feb. 5, 2002).

Lack of specific date in information not necessary where not required by statute. —

Where the statutory definition of the offense does not require a specific date, such a date need not be given in the information; alleging a general time period is sufficient to give notice to a defendant and allow him to prepare an alibi defense. Stewart v. State, 724 P.2d 439, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 605 (Wyo. 1986).

Omission of victims' names error. —

Omission of the victims' names from the criminal complaint, the criminal warrant, and the information rendered the documents fatally defective, deprived the lower courts of jurisdiction and warranted reversal of conviction of violation of § 14-3-104 .Walker v. State, 847 P.2d 542, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. Mar. 16, 1993).

Uniform traffic citations sufficiently inform of nature of offense. —

The purpose behind uniform traffic citations is to provide for the speedy and effective disposition of traffic offenses. Within such an informal procedure it is not necessary that the charge be set forth with the same technical precision and formality as required in an information or verified complaint. All that is required is that the accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. Such a requirement can be fulfilled by stating the commonly used name of the offense and the statute or ordinance violated. This is sufficient even if it means the accused may be required to inquire of the arresting officer or someone else exactly what the offense includes. Swisse v. Sheridan, 561 P.2d 712, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1977).

The notation “careless driving” accompanied by reference to the ordinance number informs defendant of the nature of the offense charged with all the specificity needed. Swisse v. Sheridan, 561 P.2d 712, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 239 (Wyo. 1977).

Sufficiency of indictment. —

An indictment to be legally sufficient must fairly indicate the crime charged, must state the essential elements of the alleged crime, must be sufficiently definite so that the defendant can prepare his defense and must grant protection from further prosecution for the same offense. Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1976).

In a criminal indictment, it is only necessary to allege sufficiently to allow the accused to understand the charge and prepare his defense. Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1976).

Where a defendant is not misled to his prejudice, an indictment is not invalid because it does not conform exactly to the language of the statute. However, any variations from the statutory language must be in words carrying the same import as the statute. Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1976).

It was clear that defendant had adequate notice of the charge for which he was convicted, one count of larceny by bailee in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(b) (2001), in comparing the charging documents with the trial court's oral ruling. The court did not see the amount of evidence presented as creating a problem with defendant's right to notice of the charges against him; it simply amounted to a failure of proof on the State's part; moreover, there was no prejudice to defendant as the trial court specifically rejected the State's contentions as to the other items. Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, 141 P.3d 106, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2006).

Evidence, including deputy's testimony that defendant kicked him and testimony of defendant's roommate that defendant thrashed about and knocked a group down the stairs, was sufficient to convict defendant of felony interference with a peace officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b). Regardless of which theory was asserted, defendant was adequately advised of the charge against him under U.S. Const. amend. VI and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10. Hulsy v. State, 2009 WY 81, 209 P.3d 901, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 2009).

Penal statute held void for uncertainty. —

Act declaring 8 hours to constitute a lawful day's work on public works and penalty for violation thereof was void as a penal statute in view of this section because of indefiniteness and uncertainty of its penal provisions. State v. A. H. Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387, 240 P. 208, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1925).

Statute validating indictments notwithstanding minor defects. —

Statute providing that indictments or informations shall not be deemed invalid by reason of certain omissions or defects as, for instance, stating the time imperfectly, when construed with other sections concerning procedure for questioning materiality of defects, does not violate this section of the constitution. White v. State, 23 Wyo. 130, 147 P. 171, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1915), reh'g denied, 23 Wyo. 130, 148 P. 342, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1915), writ of error dismissed, 241 U.S. 655, 36 S. Ct. 726, 60 L. Ed. 1224, 1916 U.S. LEXIS 1393 (U.S. 1916).

Offenses included in charge. —

In the charge of an intent to commit murder in the first degree, there is necessarily included a charge of intent to commit murder in the second degree, and voluntary manslaughter. Brantley v. State, 9 Wyo. 102, 61 P. 139, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1900).

Information charging murder with malice will support conviction on proof showing murder during attempted robbery, notwithstanding this section. Harris v. State, 34 Wyo. 175, 242 P. 411, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1926).

District court erred in instructing the jury that assault was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault and battery where assault did not require a threat to use a drawn deadly weapon, and aggravated assault and battery did not require an attempt to cause bodily injury to another. Cecil v. State, 2015 WY 158, 364 P.3d 1086, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Wyo. 2015).

Two victims identified in single count of information. —

Information was sufficient, where defendant failed to show prejudice from state's identification of two victims in one count. Taylor v. State, 7 P.3d 15, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2000).

Information may not be amended if it prejudices defendant or charges different offense. The prohibition against charging additional or different offenses implicates the defendant's right to know the charges against him and to prepare a defense to those charges, which is protected by this section and the sixth amendment to the federal constitution.McInturff v. State, 808 P.2d 190, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1991).

Victim's records not released unless constitutionally material. —

Where a defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with a minor, the nondisclosure to defense counsel of school records concerning the child did not deny the defendant his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confront witnesses and to compulsory process, nor did the trial court err in conducting an in-camera review of the records and applying a standard of constitutional materiality in determining which records, if any, were to be released to defendant's counsel. Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 792 P.2d 570, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 1990).

Violation of confrontation right by prohibiting cross-examination. —

In defendant's sexual assault case, a court violated defendant's confrontation rights by prohibiting defendant from cross-examining the victim where the victim was the only witness to the alleged crime, there was no physical evidence tying defendant to the alleged assault nor were there any eyewitnesses, the victim did not report the allegations until three months after the fact when he was brought in for questioning about his own sexual improprieties with another boy. Had defense counsel been allowed to explore the issue with the victim during cross-examination, the jury reasonably might have inferred that the victim was fearful about what would happen to him as a result of his own acts and concocted the allegations against defendant to shift the focus of the police inquiry away from him. Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, 84 P.3d 320, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2004).

Although defendant contended that a district court improperly limited defendant's cross-examination of a witness by denying defendant the opportunity to explore potential evidence of bias and a possible ulterior motive for the testimony of the witness, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the relative unimportance of the testimony of the witness and the strength of the case against defendant. Broussard v. State, 2017 WY 73, 396 P.3d 1016, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 2017).

No violation of confrontation right by prohibiting cross-examination. —

In a felony child abuse case, defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because defendant was not prevented from having an opportunity to conduct an effective cross-examination of an alleged victim relating to the victim's alleged molestation of his sister; the trial court failed to make a final ruling as to whether defendant could offer the evidence, and defense counsel did not broach the subject on cross-examination. Moreover, defendant was permitted to testify regarding the alleged molestation, which he did at length. Swan v. State, 2014 WY 38, 320 P.3d 235, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2014).

Although defendant contended that a district court improperly limited defendant's cross-examination of a witness, defendant failed to establish that defendant's cross-examination of the witness was improperly limited as a sanction for defendant's failure to comply with a pretrial disclosure order because the district court did not make any reference to the sanction in ruling on defendant's objection and the district court specifically authorized additional inquiry about any memory issues that the witness may have had. Broussard v. State, 2017 WY 73, 396 P.3d 1016, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 2017).

Allowing testimony of three-year-old child did not deny accused right of confrontation. In Interest of CB, 749 P.2d 267, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1988).

Prosecution's failure to advise counsel of hypnotic sessions involving witness was not unconstitutional, where prosecutor did not know of sessions until day before trial and defense counsel had had time to review the tapes. Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 633 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 174, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 849 (U.S. 1987).

Not all tendered exhibits admissible. —

The constitutional right to a defense does not guarantee the opportunity to a criminal defendant to have every tendered exhibit introduced into evidence. Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 393 (Wyo. 1987).

Denial of access to a tape recorded statement did not violate rights. —

In a juvenile proceeding, defendant's constitutional rights were not violated as a result of the court denying him access to the alleged victim's tape-recorded statement where the record evidenced that defendant failed to show any of the required elements for advancing a Brady claim where initially defendant was unable to establish that the investigatory tape was lost or destroyed because of the calculated, bad faith effort of authorities with the intent to deny him the tape. All that was established was that the detective was unable to locate the investigatory tape for production and defendant was unable to establish that the evidence was constitutionally material and that its exculpatory value was apparent to authorities prior to its loss or destruction. KC v. State, 2004 WY 74, 92 P.3d 805, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2004).

Introduction of certain evidence did not deny confrontation with witnesses. —

The introduction in evidence of duly certified copies of prison records, of judgments of conviction of previously committed felonies as alleged and of fingerprint records of defendant duly certified though taken in other states did not deprive defendant of the constitutional guaranty of confronting the witnesses against him. Waxler v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1950).

The admission into evidence of court files and records on the issue of the defendant's habitual criminal status did not violate his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 449 (Wyo. 1985).

Inadmissibility of victim impact statements in death penalty cases. —

Neither the Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102 death penalty statute nor Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-21-101 through 7-21-103 general victim impact statutes authorize the introduction of victim impact evidence during capital sentencing, and the trial court errs in allowing its introduction; such error, however, is subject to harmless error analysis. Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2003).

Defendant's right to present a defense not violated. —

In an indecent liberties case, defendant's constitutional right to present a defense was not denied by the court's refusal to admit the testimony of a witness regarding an assessment of the relationship between the victim's father and the victim so that the factfinder might infer that the victim had a motive to lie. The purported testimony was not relevant, or was at most conditionally relevant, and the necessary preconditions were not met. Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, 100 P.3d 1270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 2004).

When defense counsel's inquiry into defendant's “nonstatements,” in an effort to prove an intoxication defense, was improperly barred on hearsay grounds, defendant's right to present a complete defense was not violated because ample other evidence of defendant's intoxication was presented. Toth v. State, 2015 WY 86, 2015 WY 86A, 353 P.3d 696, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 104 (Wyo. 2015).

Excluding defendant's expert testimony on the ability of a 15-year-old to form the specific intent to commit a crime did not violate defendant's right to present a defense because the testimony was not relevant, as (1) the expert would not have testified that 15-year-olds had no ability to form such an intent, as the testimony merely suggested that 15-year-olds were more impulsive than adults and had a reduced ability to evaluate consequences, (2) to the extent the testimony could be viewed as evidence of diminished capacity, it was not appropriate to expand defense of mental incapacity beyond the scope of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302 , and, (3) the defense of infancy was supplanted by the legislature's allocation of jurisdiction between juvenile and criminal courts. Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, 301 P.3d 106, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 51 (Wyo. 2013).

Defendant's prior convictions elicited by defense counsel. —

The trial court's erroneous ruling that defense counsel could not elicit the fact of the defendant's prior convictions upon direct examination was an error of constitutional magnitude, but was nonetheless harmless error under the totality of all the evidence. Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1991).

Extent and manner of cross-examination vested within court's discretion. —

While the denial of the right of cross-examination clearly would be error, the extent and manner of cross-examination are matters which are vested within the discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on such evidence will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1982), overruled in part, Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, 75 P.3d 628, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2003).

Repeating questions asked on direct examination may be restricted. —

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting defense counsel, in his cross-examination of a witness, from repeating questions asked on direct examination. Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 449 (Wyo. 1985).

Constitutional standards for admissibility of prior testimony. —

In the constitutional context, the following standards must be met in order for prior testimony to be admissible: (1) the prosecution must demonstrate that good faith efforts to obtain the presence of the missing witness for trial have been unavailing; and (2) the witness must have been subject to adequate cross-examination at the previous hearing or trial. Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1982), overruled in part, Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, 75 P.3d 628, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2003).

Former testimony is admissible under the confrontation clauses of both the constitutions of the United States and Wyoming if the witness who gave the former testimony is unavailable to testify at trial and if the prior testimony bore an “indicia of reliability” sufficient to afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. Prior testimony bears an adequate indicia of reliability when the prior testimony was given under oath, when it was given while the defendant was represented by counsel, when the defendant's counsel could and did cross-examine the witness, and when cross-examination which would be conducted at trial would not touch upon any new and significantly material line of inquiry. Impeachment of the witness, who identified the defendant at the preliminary hearing, is not a new line of inquiry. Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 624 (Wyo. 1985).

Confrontation ensures reliability. —

Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the United States Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation, pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1838 (2004). To the extent prior cases of the Wyoming Supreme Court have followed the test enunciated by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 140 (1980) to determine admissibility under the Confrontation Clause, those cases are overruled: Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 196 (Wyo. 2000); Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1996); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (1982).Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, 98 P.3d 172, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2004).

Requirements of section before hearsay admissible. —

Before hearsay becomes admissible, this section and U.S. Const., amend. 6 impose a burden upon the state, in addition to those found under Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E., such that the prosecutor is required to establish: (1) that the declarant is unavailable to appear at trial; and (2) that there exists sufficient background information concerning the circumstances under which the hearsay statement was made to provide the jury with an adequate basis to evaluate its veracity. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (U.S. 1982).

Confrontation clause satisfied where hearsay has sufficient reliability. —

Rule 803(4), W.R.E., represents a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, and, therefore, admission of evidence pursuant to that rule does not violate the confrontation clause. Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1997).

A statement made in the course of procuring medical services, when the declarant presumably knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think can be replicated by testimony in the context of the courtroom; where the proffered hearsay has those sufficient guarantees of reliability to bring it within a firmly-rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the confrontation clause of the Constitution is satisfied. Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1993).

In absence of objection, erroneous admission of hearsay must rise to plain error before it will be considered by the appellate court. Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 482 (Wyo. 1986).

When failure to produce informant not deprivation of right of confrontation. —

The state's failure to subpoena and produce an informant at a defendant's trial does not deprive him of his right to confront the witnesses against him, pursuant to U.S. Const., amend. 6, and art. 1, § 10, Wyo. Const., where the defendant is furnished with the name and address of the informant well in advance of trial, he does not apply ex parte, under Rule 20, W.R.Cr.P. (now Rule 17), for a subpoena to be issued at state expense, and he makes no other effort to secure the informer's attendance at trial. Montez v. State, 670 P.2d 694, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1983).

Confrontation right not violated by circumstantial evidence. —

Admission of papers found in defendant's dresser drawers did not violate his right to confrontation where they were offered as nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of defendant's past trafficking activities in controlled substances and of his knowledge regarding the illicit contents of a package. Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. Feb. 24, 1993).

Defendant's confrontation rights weren't violated by the poor picture quality of electronic testimony of a prosecution witness. Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1999).

Confrontation clause violated by reading statement into the record. —

In an aggravated assault case, the Confrontation Clause was violated where a police officer was allowed to read a co-defendant's statement into evidence after the co-defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment on the stand since defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine, and the error was not harmless because the statement was the only real evidence corroborating a victim's statement. Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, 98 P.3d 172, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2004).

Confrontation clause violated by admitting hearsay statement. —

Where testimonial statements from a deceased victim that implicated defendant in the charges brought were at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands was the one the constitution actually prescribed, namely, confrontation. Because the appellate court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the hearsay statements of the victim did not contribute to defendant's conviction, the conviction was reversed. Sarr v. State, 2005 WY 67, 113 P.3d 1051, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 2005).

Receipt into evidence in joint trial of one coactor's declaration implicating another coactor, under the exception to the hearsay rule that a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not hearsay, does not violate the other coactor's constitutional right of confrontation. Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1977), commented on in XIII Land & Water L. Rev. 629 (1978).

Where there is concerted action between codefendants, evidence of the declarations of one, during and in furtherance of the common design or plan, is admissible against the other defendants, even though no conspiracy is charged. And where a joint venture is shown, declarations made during and in furtherance of the venture are admissible against the party not present even though no conspiracy is alleged. Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1977), commented on in XIII Land & Water L. Rev. 629 (1978).

No challenge allowed to co-conspirator's out-of-court-statement. —

There can be no challenge under the confrontation clause to the admission of a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement. Such statements clearly fall outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion. Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1989).

There must be evidence showing conspiracy, other than coconspirator's statement alone. Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1977), commented on in XIII Land & Water L. Rev. 629 (1978).

Fairness standard requires impartial jurors. —

The exposure of the jury panel to information by a prospective juror that the accused was possibly involved in another crime is the type of situation which requires unfair prejudice to be presumed and requires the jury panel be disqualified. Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1995).

District court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial as fairness and impartiality were not lost when a potential juror expressed an opinion that defendant should be locked up because the district court also took appropriate curative measures by dismissing the potential juror for cause, instructing the members of the jury pool to disregard the statement, and, at the behest of defense counsel, advising the jury pool on the presumption of innocence. Brown v. State, 2015 WY 4, 340 P.3d 1020, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2015).

In a child sexual abuse case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial as defendant was not deprived of a fair and impartial jury because all the venire who became emotional while explaining the source of their concerns for serving on the jury were excused for cause; and the record did not indicate that the other potential jurors became biased because they observed those excused as defendant was acquitted of three of the four counts of child sexual abuse against him, which supported a conclusion that the jury decided the case based upon the evidence. Brown v. State, 2015 WY 4, 340 P.3d 1020, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2015).

Juror cannot hear separate trials of defendants. —

Where two persons charged with a crime arising out of the same transaction are granted separate trials, a juror hearing the trial of the first defendant is not qualified as a juror for the subsequent trial of the second defendant, the reason being that the juror has formed or expressed an opinion upon the merits of the case. The refusal to excuse such an unqualified juror for cause is prejudicial where the defendant challenges the juror for cause, the court denies the challenge, the defendant does not accept the jury because of it, and he exhausts his peremptory challenges. Lee v. State, 743 P.2d 296, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 513 (Wyo. 1987).

Evidence admissible under “open door doctrine” is not violation of constitutional right to confront witnesses. Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 401 (Wyo. 1979).

Invited error doctrine may require inquiry into off-limits matter. —

Where application of the invited error doctrine would be tantamount to waiver of the right of confrontation, purposeful rather than inadvertent inquiry into off-limits matter is required for application of the rule. Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 401 (Wyo. 1979).

Right to compulsory process. —

There was no error in trial court's failure to comply fully with pro se defendant's approximately 62 motions asking that subpoenas be issued for witnesses for the defense; defendant's right to summon witnesses in his defense was not violated, where even many witnesses for whom defendant could not provide a street/delivery address were sought and served, if possible, and the record showed all witnesses material to his defense were available to be called to the witness stand. Lemus v. State, 2007 WY 111, 162 P.3d 497, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2007).

Violation of compulsory process does not automatically create reversible error. —

Violation of the provision of this section as to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses does not automatically create reversible error. State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1956).

Failure to serve amended information not error. —

Amendment to information charging armed robbery, so as to allege the ownership of the property taken, was one of form and not of substance, so that no error occurred in proceeding with the trial without service of the amended information on the accused or a plea thereto. Valerio v. State, 445 P.2d 752, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1968).

Speedy trial clause seeks to protect accused against inability to defend himself and when this protection breaks down, prejudice becomes identifiable. Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 406 (Wyo. 1979).

And speedy trial guarantee reaches out to protect rights of convicts. Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 406 (Wyo. 1979).

Primary purpose of right to speedy trial under this section is to prevent the defendant's right to a fair trial from being substantially impaired by pretrial delay. A violation of the right to a speedy trial precludes the establishment of guilt by trial, but it does not preclude the valid establishment of guilt by a voluntary plea. Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 232 (Wyo. 1989).

There is no precise length of delay that automatically constitutes constitutional violation of the speedy trial right. Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 497 (Wyo. 1979).

Delay due to failure to accept a plea was contrary to law. —

Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by his continuous incarceration for 720 days. This delay was due largely in part to the district court's refusal to accept defendant's nolo contendere plea because of his unwillingness to concede that he committed the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon without provocation. This is contrary to Wyoming law and, thus, constituted an error of law. Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, 93 P.3d 222, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2004).

Wyoming has no statute of limitations as to commencement of criminal prosecutions. Boggs v. State, 484 P.2d 711, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 216 (Wyo. 1971).

Speedy trial clause has no application to prearrest delay. Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1991).

Right to speedy trial effectuated. —

Statute requiring accused person to be tried within specified times or discharged makes effective this section, guaranteeing a speedy trial, and constitutes a legislative declaration of what is a reasonable delay. State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1908).

Statute providing for accused's discharge unless tried before end of third term is reasonable legislative declaration of “reasonable time” to secure speedy trial. State v. Levand, 37 Wyo. 372, 262 P. 24, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1927), reh'g denied, 37 Wyo. 372, 262 P. 24, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1928).

Speedy trial not denied.—

Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated because the reason for the delay—competency examinations, refiling of the indictment, and trial scheduling concerns—was a neutral factor, while defendant's assertion of the speedy trial right weighed only slightly in defendant's favor. The prejudice factor weighed heavily in the State of Wyoming's favor, as defendant failed to provide any facts or argument, other than general assertions, that defendant was in any way prejudiced. Webb v. State, 2017 WY 108, 401 P.3d 914, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 2017).

Considerations in determining presence of prejudice. —

In determining whether a defendant has suffered actual prejudice from delay in having his case come to trial, the court should consider the oppressiveness of pretrial incarceration, unusual pretrial anxieties and any impairment of a defense to be offered. Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1982), overruled in part, Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, 75 P.3d 628, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2003).

In establishing a constitutional violation of the right to a speedy trial, the trial court will consider: (1) length of incarceration; (2) pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of defense. Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 149 (Wyo. 1993).

When speedy trial right for second trial accrues. —

Following a reversal and remand by the supreme court, a defendant's speedy trial right begins to accrue, for purposes of the second trial, when the mandate of reversal is issued and filed in the district court. Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 371 (Wyo. 1982), overruled in part, Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, 75 P.3d 628, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2003).

Court erred by dismissing a charge on speedy trial grounds because the 24-year gap between the dismissal of the first charge and the filing of the second charge was excluded from the speedy trial clock; defendant was not held in custody during that time, and therefore the time between the dismissal and recharging was not counted. State v. Humphrey, 2005 WY 131, 120 P.3d 1027, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1139, 126 S. Ct. 1152, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1002, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 796 (U.S. 2006).

Demand for speedy trial required. —

A demand must be made by a defendant to take advantage of the right for a speedy trial. Shafsky v. Casper, 487 P.2d 468, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 236 (Wyo. 1971).

Determination of unnecessary delay in affording trial. —

Where the question to be decided is whether there were unnecessary delays in affording an accused a trial, each case must be determined on its own peculiar facts and circumstances, and factors to be considered are: length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of his right and prejudice to the defendant. Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S. Ct. 2164, 36 L. Ed. 2d 693, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 2578 (U.S. 1973).

Each case involving the question as to whether a speedy trial has been granted must be considered upon its own peculiar facts. Hurst v. State, 563 P.2d 232, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 251 (Wyo. 1977), overruled in part, Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982).

Four factors which must be considered in determining whether a speedy trial has been granted are length of delay; reason for delay; defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to defendant. These are to be considered together, along with any other relevant circumstances, in a determination of this question. Hurst v. State, 563 P.2d 232, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 251 (Wyo. 1977), overruled in part, Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982); Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 406 (Wyo. 1979); Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 497 (Wyo. 1979); Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 328 (Wyo. 1981); Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1981).

Speedy trial analysis requires balancing of four factors: (1) The length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of her speedy trial right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. July 8, 1992).

When the length of the delay is neither “presumptively prejudicial” nor significantly long, no further analysis is warranted. Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. July 8, 1992).

Although it is not an essential element that there be a demand on the part of the defendant for a speedy trial, nor is it necessary affirmatively to show prejudice as a result of such delay, it is eminently proper in determining this question to consider these factors and the reasons therefor. Hurst v. State, 563 P.2d 232, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 251 (Wyo. 1977), overruled in part, Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982).

Reasonable continuances allowed for counsel's convenience. —

Acceptable continuances for a reasonable time for convenience of counsel are appropriate to extend the speedy trial time limitations within the continued responsibility of the trial court. DeSpain v. State, 774 P.2d 77, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1989).

107-day delay unconscionable. —

A 107-day delay between the time when the defendants were arrested and the time when they were brought before the magistrate is so long as to be unconscionable. Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 406 (Wyo. 1979).

And 95-day delay justifies further inquiry. —

Where the record shows that there was an interval of 95 days from the date of defendant's arrest and the date of the preliminary hearing, during which period of time he was in jail, the delay is sufficient to justify further inquiry into whether or not he was given a speedy trial. Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 497 (Wyo. 1979).

But lengthy delay not conclusive of violation. —

A lengthy delay in and of itself does not give rise to a per se conclusion that defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated. Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1981).

District court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss his trial for sexual assault based on an alleged violation of defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial where a 235 day delay occurred between defendant's waiver of the preliminary hearing and defendant's arraignment. The time period was not presumptively prejudicial and only 120 days was shown to have been attributable to the State, the other days being attributable to defendant's dissatisfaction with the assignment of judges and the resulting docketing issues, and defendant was not incarcerated and had made little or no effort to locate witnesses. Walters v. State, 2004 WY 37, 87 P.3d 793, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2004).

Defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 10 because, although a delay of nearly a year warranted careful analysis, the delay was not so excessive that it resulted in a presumption of prejudice. Defendant had suffered prejudice because of the length of his pretrial incarceration, but the critical factor was the parties' contributions to the delay, and defendant had demanded and received a special prosecutor and new defense counsel and his part in the delay weighed against finding that his constitutional right was violated. Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 139, 121 P.3d 790, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. Nov. 15, 2005).

Burden of proving delay. —

Burden of proving prejudicial delay from a speedy trial violation lies with the defendant. Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, 93 P.3d 222, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 2004).

Eighteen-month delay following complaint denies speedy-trial right. —

A delay of over one and one-half years between the filing of the criminal complaint and the subsequent trial violated the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial, where none of the causes for the delay could be attributed to the defendant. Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1989), reh'g denied, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. June 12, 1989).

The defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial where, of the 18 months taken to bring him to trial following the initial complaint, the defendant was jointly responsible for three, or perhaps four, months of the delay, with a balance of at least 14 months for which the state offered no plausible explanation or justification. Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 1989), reh'g denied, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. June 12, 1989).

Absence of specific reasons in record for delay. —

The mere absence of specific reasons in the record for delay does not require a finding that such delay was purposely caused by the state. Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1981).

Pretrial delay not unconstitutional. —

In a prosecution for delivery of a controlled substance, defendant's rights to a speedy trial under this section were not violated by a pretrial delay of 276 days since the defendant failed to show that any significant delay was not due to his own refusal to waive extradition or that the detriment of four and a half months of unemployment was due to an unreasonable state practice. Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1992).

Relief for pre-charging delay foreclosed. —

Defendant's failure to demonstrate substantial prejudice to fair trial rights and the presence of some intentional effort to obtain a tactical advantage due to the delay forecloses relief for pre-charging delay. Vernier v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1996).

A prearrest delay may impair the capacity of the accused to prepare his defense, but where the delay itself does not raise the presumption of prejudice, the petitioner has the burden of alleging more than the mere conclusion that he was “greatly prejudiced” to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Boggs v. State, 484 P.2d 711, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 216 (Wyo. 1971).

Speedy trial denied. —

Where defense counsel at arraignment on May 9, 1972, suggested to the trial court that a trial date could be set when his motions were heard; the court then advised that it could not tell definitely when a jury would be called, and that it could be “this summer, but in the greater likelihood it is going to be this fall;” the prosecutor did nothing to expedite trial; and nothing intervened from June, 1972, to August, 1973, to cause a delay in trial which began in September, 1973, the state, not having shown good cause for the delay or that it was necessary, deprived the defendants of their state and federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 1976).

Speedy trial not denied. —

Defendants were not denied speedy trial where trial was had within first term after venue was changed. State v. Levand, 37 Wyo. 372, 262 P. 24, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1927), reh'g denied, 37 Wyo. 372, 262 P. 24, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1928).

A delay of approximately 14 months from the date of crime, where the case was tried approximately one year after the preliminary hearing, was not unconstitutional. Hurst v. State, 563 P.2d 232, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 251 (Wyo. 1977), overruled in part, Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982).

The prejudice to the defendant from a 62-day delay between accusation and trial, where the defendant did not make a request for speedy trial until almost a month following the indictment, and where part of the reason for the delay was because of attempts to negotiate and settle the case before trial, was not of such a magnitude that would cause reversal. Tageant v. State, 683 P.2d 667, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1984).

The defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated under the following facts: (1) although there was a sufficient unnecessary delay — six months — to trigger the applicable four-part balancing test, the delay was not outrageous; (2) while the prosecutor did not have a good reason for the delay — his indecision as to the constitutionality of the original charge, aggravated vehicular homicide —, at least his motives were legitimate; (3) the defendant preserved his speedy trial right by raising timely objections; but (4) the defendant could not prove prejudice, in that the testimony of his chief witness, who disappeared before trial, was stipulated to by the prosecution, and in that he was free on bond during the entire proceeding. Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 621 (Wyo. 1985).

Where the total elapsed time, excluding the period between the state's dismissal and refiling of the complaint, was 320 days, the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not denied; the delay attributable to the state was justified because it was the result of a missing witness, and there was no evidence in the record to support any inference that the state requested the dismissal in bad faith or with a sinister motive. Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1992).

After deduction of delays attributable to defendant's motions requesting a change in judges and objecting to extending the speedy trial date, only 113 days passed between the date of arrest and the time of trial, which was not significantly long, considering Wyo. R. Crim. P. 48 imposes a 120-day deadline. McDaniel v. State, 945 P.2d 1186, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 1997).

Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not denied where the jury trial was set within a 120-day period and was continued for neutral reasons at the state's request within the 180-day deadline, after a hearing, and where defendant failed to prove prejudice based on pretrial anxiety and pretrial incarceration. Sides v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1998).

Although the delay between defendant's arrest and his change of plea was over a year, defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy preliminary hearing and trial where the other three factors outlined in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 34 (1972), weighed heavily against defendant. Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 192 (Wyo. 1999).

Defendant's right to speedy trial was not violated despite passage of 174 days between his arraignment and trial, since first continuance was due to crowded nature of trial court's docket, and second continuance was granted at defense attorney's request. Germany v. State, 999 P.2d 63, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 2000).

Although delay of 536 days between arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial, defendant's right to speedy trial was not violated; delay was caused by recording problems at various preliminary hearings and resulted in no actual prejudice to defendant, and she waited to assert her speedy trial rights until just a few days before trial. Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2000).

W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) is a procedural rule that does not effect the substantive constitutional right to a speedy trial; therefore, an amended version of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) that allows a longer time for trial applied to a kidnapping and sexual assault case, where the amended Rule 48(b) went into effect after defendant's arrest, but before defendant's arraignment. Dean v. State, 2003 WY 128, 77 P.3d 692, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 2003).

In a vehicular homicide case, even though defendant's trial did not begin until 374 days after his arrest, defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated where (1) three continuances were sought by the defendant due to the unavailability of trial witnesses and one continuance was sought in order to allow an expert witness to examine potentially exculpatory evidence regarding the subject vehicle; (2) there was no evidence indicating that the vehicle's condition was actually altered or somehow prevented the defendant or his expert from examining or testing the vehicle in anticipation of trial; and (3) defendant did not show any actual prejudice, citing only pretrial anxiety and not even his pretrial incarceration. Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, 99 P.3d 457, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1001, 125 S. Ct. 1931, 161 L. Ed. 2d 775, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3570 (U.S. 2005).

Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated because, although the delay of almost one year necessitated careful analysis, the length of the delay was not so excessive that it resulted in a presumption of prejudice. Defendant was prejudiced to a very limited extent as a result of the delay, but his much weightier contribution to the delay - for example, he requested a mental evaluation, but then told the examiner not to complete and finalize the report - counseled against finding that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Potter v. State, 2007 WY 83, 158 P.3d 656, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 2007).

Defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 were not violated because the nearly five-month delay was not extraordinary, defendant acquiesced in the delay until he thought the speedy trial clock had run, the delay was caused by the overcrowded docket and some inattention to speedy trial concerns, and defendant received full credit for the time spent in jail. Seteren v. State, 2007 WY 144, 167 P.3d 20, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 2007).

Where defendant was first indicted for murder in 1980 but charges were dismissed and then refiled in 2004, defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated because although delay occurred in bringing defendant to trial and defendant asserted her right to a speedy trial, length of the delay was not unreasonable in light of the facts in this case and where defendant had not demonstrated actual prejudice arising from delay in criminal proceedings. Humphrey v. State, 2008 WY 67, 185 P.3d 1236, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 2008).

Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the passage of 411 days between the State's filing of charges against defendant and his trial where the defense bore the bulk of the responsibility for the delays due to a change in counsel and continuances, there was no allegation that the State deliberately attempted to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense, defendant did not vigorously assert his right to a speedy trial, and there was no showing that the victims' memories or testimony were affected by the delay. Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 16, 367 P.3d 1108, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 2016).

Conclusion that second trial would violate defendant's right to a speedy trial premature. —

In defendant's aggravated assault case, after declaring a mistrial, a court erred by dismissing the case with prejudice where no speedy trial violation had occurred up to the point when the district court granted the mistrial and dismissed the case with prejudice. The district court's conclusion that any second trial would necessarily violate defendant's right to a speedy trial was premature. State v. Newman, 2004 WY 41, 88 P.3d 445, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 2004).

Applying the speedy trial test from Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court concluded that the 637-day delay in bringing defendant to trial did not substantially impair defendant's right to a fair trial, and that defendant's right to speedy trial was not violated. Durkee v. State, 2015 WY 123, 357 P.3d 1106, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2015).

No violation of confrontation right by prohibiting cross-examination.

It was not an abuse of discretion to exclude a victim’s alleged prior false accusation of sexual assault because (1) the limited probative value of the evidence was outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice, and, (2) due to the victim’s inability to recall the prior accusation, extensive, potentially inadmissible, evidence would have been required to admit the prior accusation. Sparks v. State, 2019 WY 50, 440 P.3d 1095, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 5 0 (Wyo. 2019); Booth v. Booth, 2019 WY 5, 432 P.3d 902, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2019).

Effect of weather conditions or judge's illness. —

A defendant cannot be heard to claim that his rights to a speedy trial were violated because weather conditions or a judge's illness forced trial continuances. Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 405 (Wyo. 1981).

Delay by defendant waives safeguards. —

The defendant may be disentitled to speedy trial safeguards where the delay is all or partly the responsibility of the defendant. Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 406 (Wyo. 1979); Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 497 (Wyo. 1979).

Where defendant was arrested for several counts of illegal possession of controlled substances, he entered plea of nolo contendere; because defendant did not assert a speedy trial defense in the district court and did not reserve his right to assert the issue on appeal, defendant waived his right to appeal this issue. Miller v. State, 2009 WY 125, 217 P.3d 793, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 2009).

Effect of pre-arrest and pre-indictment delay. —

A claim based solely on pre-arrest and pre-indictment delay does not raise any question under the speedy trial provision of the Wyoming constitution. Hovee v. State, 596 P.2d 1127, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 431 (Wyo. 1979).

Defendant in criminal prosecution is entitled to impartial jury, not sympathetic one. A corollary to that rule is that a defendant is not entitled to a jury ignorant of current events. Smethurst v. State, 756 P.2d 196, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 1988).

Juror exposure to publicity about criminal case is to be anticipated and, indeed, jurors may even have formed an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, which, by itself, is not a ground for requiring a change of venue. The test is whether a juror can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence. Amin v. State, 811 P.2d 255, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (Wyo. 1991).

Person accused of crime has no constitutional right to any particular method of selecting jury and is entitled only to an impartial jury of the county and within those limits the legislature may define the qualifications of jurors. State v. Bolln, 10 Wyo. 439, 70 P. 1, 1902 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1902).

Waiver of right to trial by impartial jury. —

With respect to the contention that the defendants, who were convicted of rape, were denied their right to a trial by an impartial jury where one of the jurors, a victim of a prior rape, had not disclosed that information at the voir dire examination, defendants not only waived that right as to this ground by their failure to examine with respect to it, but, furthermore, their failure to demonstrate on the record actual bias on the part of the juror would foreclose the possibility that they could, as a fundamental matter, claim any right to be relieved of the consequences of their waiver. Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1976).

Passing jury panel for cause waived defendant's claim of reversible error for trial court's failure to dismiss a potential juror for cause. Prindle v. State, 945 P.2d 1180, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1997), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Instruction regarding circumstantial evidence. —

Where circumstantial evidence is wholly relied on for conviction, trial court should instruct on the law regarding such evidence whether requested to do so or not, as being fundamental to the defendant's having a fair trial such as the constitution and laws guarantee to him. Gardner v. State, 27 Wyo. 316, 196 P. 750, 1921 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1921).

Instruction to deadlocked jury. —

An instruction given at a time when it appears a jury may be deadlocked must not have a coercive impact upon the jury. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

Communications from a judge to a jury are coercive when they possess the substantial propensity for prying minority jurors loose from beliefs they honestly have, constitute an undue intrusion into the jury's province and dilute the requirement of unanimity. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

A statement in an instruction to a deadlocked jury that the jury sitting is as competent as another is not coercive language in a supplemental instruction. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1977).

Determination of whether shackling defendant is appropriate. —

The court held that defendants are not to be shackled or otherwise physically restrained in the courtroom during a jury trial, nor should other exceptional security measures be utilized, unless the State first moves that such measures be utilized, the court has heard such motion, and after allowing the defendant an opportunity to contest the motion, the court has stated on the record the compelling reasons justifying the measures. Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 2003).

Venue of prosecution was properly laid in county where alleged libelous communication was received. State v. Levand, 37 Wyo. 372, 262 P. 24, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1927), reh'g denied, 37 Wyo. 372, 262 P. 24, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1928).

Venue of prosecution was properly laid. — Where there was conflicting evidence on where the offense occurred, the location of the offense could not be established with certainty, and therefore the predicate requirement for considering alternative avenues for establishing venue was met. Anderson v. State, 2014 WY 74, 327 P.3d 89, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2014).

Venue provision does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. —

The venue provision in Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 10, does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings which are, instead, controlled by § 14-6-204 .NJC v. State (In the Interest of NJC), 913 P.2d 435, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1996).

Venue provision in Juvenile Court Act constitutional. —

The venue provision in the Juvenile Court Act which allows a juvenile delinquency proceeding to be brought where the alleged delinquent act occurs or where the juvenile resides is not in conflict with the venue provision of this section. This venue provision is inapplicable to juvenile delinquency matters because these proceedings are deemed not to be criminal. NJC v. State (In the Interest of NJC), 913 P.2d 435, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1996).

Jurisdiction in county where threatening calls received. —

Section 1-7-102 (venue in criminal cases) and this section granted venue and jurisdiction in the county where the defendant made threatening phone calls, or where the phone calls were received, because the threats took effect in the county where they were received. McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. Feb. 2, 1994).

Change in venue due to pretrial publicity was not warranted. —

Defendant was not denied a fair trial due to the trial court's denial of his motion for a change of venue due to pretrial publicity about defendant's crimes and a separate investigation in which he was a murder suspect because although there were 12 articles published about defendant none was sensational or inflammatory and the last was published three months before trial and also because only five of 48 prospective jurors expressed concern about their ability to be impartial in light of the pretrial publicity, none of the five was seated on the jury, and the record did not indicate that it was difficult to seat an impartial jury. Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2003).

In a murder case, a court properly denied defendant's motion for change of venue where the news articles were generally factual in nature, reporting information obtained from court documents and from a potential witness, and they were not sensational, inflammatory, or prejudicial. Defense counsel and the trial court appropriately and properly examined the jury venire, and there was no indication that the pretrial publicity made jury selection difficult or created such prejudice that a change of venue was necessary. Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, 99 P.3d 928, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4397 (U.S. 2005).

In defendant's felony murder case, the trial court did not err by failing to grant a change of venue because sixty-five jurors were summoned for the trial, of those, 12 had heard about the case, and each of those jurors was closely examined. One juror expressed a view that he could not put aside his opinion and he was excused for cause, and at the close of voir dire, defendant passed the jury for cause and had no objections to the jury selection. Lemus v. State, 2007 WY 111, 162 P.3d 497, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2007).

Effect of statutory repeal. —

Repeal of statutory provision which allowed accused to secure change of magistrate upon preliminary examination did not deprive one accused of committing crime before such repeal of any substantial right or protection. People ex rel. Chandler v. McDonald, 5 Wyo. 526, 42 P. 15, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1895).

Appeal to district court from police justice. —

On appeal to district court from a police justice, provision in city charter that such case shall stand trial in the district court upon transcript and that no trial de novo shall be had, was held not violative of this section. Stutsman v. Cheyenne, 18 Wyo. 491, 113 P. 321, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1911).

No Brady violation. —

Because defendant had knowledge of information that an accomplice would have provided testified about in order to impeach a witness, there was no Brady violation by the state's failure to provide defendant with information regarding the accomplice's knowledge; in addition, the evidence was not material because defendant had already vigorously assaulted the witness that the accomplice's testimony would have discredited. Hicks v. State, 2008 WY 83, 187 P.3d 877, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 2008).

Consideration of errors on appeal. —

Only in extreme cases disclosing fundamental and prejudicial errors that prevented fair and impartial trial guaranteed by constitution will exception be made to statutory rule of law requiring timely objections and exceptions at trial, to secure consideration of such alleged errors on appeal. Loy v. State, 26 Wyo. 381, 185 P. 796, 1919 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1919).

In reviewing assertion that prosecutorial misconduct resulted in denial of a fair trial, supreme court will view the case in its entirety, including an evaluation of the state of the evidence and the probability of prejudicial impact on the defendant under the circumstances of the particular case. Stogner v. State, 674 P.2d 1298, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1984).

Transfer of prisoner from industrial institute to penitentiary. —

Statute empowering board of charities and reform to transfer prisoner in industrial institute to penitentiary if it should appear he had been previously convicted of crime becomes part of sentence as though extended into court record, does not deny due process and is not a change of sentence, but a carrying out of the original sentence. Uram v. Roach, 47 Wyo. 335, 37 P.2d 793, 1934 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1934).

Improper recording of preliminary hearing. —

Defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was not violated by the district court's refusal to remand for a second preliminary hearing because a complete recording of the original hearing was not available due to a breakdown of recording equipment. Sidwell v. State, 964 P.2d 416, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 1998).

Law library access. —

Defendant's constitutional rights under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 were not violated when the trial court refused to require the detention center where defendant was housed to provide defendant greater access to the law library and legal materials; defendant failed to provide any documentary evidence that his demands for more library time were denied, and defendant's performance during the trial indicated that defendant was adequately prepared. May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 2003).

Due process violated in criminal contempt proceedings. —

Defendant's due process right to notice of criminal contempt charges was violated because (1) an order to show cause gave no adequate notice of the terms of the order defendant allegedly violated or defendant's alleged conduct constituting some violations, and (2) the error was compounded by a refusal to give defendant's counsel access to the juvenile court file containing the underlying order. Brown v. State, 2017 WY 45, 393 P.3d 1265, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2017).

Criminal conviction following juvenile adjudication. —

Protection against double jeopardy under U.S. Const. amend. V and Wyo. Const. art. I, § 11 was violated because defendant was adjudged delinquent of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree and then criminally prosecuted and punished for the same offense. Haynes v. State, 2012 WY 151, 288 P.3d 1225, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 2012).

Applied in

Connor v. State, 537 P.2d 715, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 1975); Nimmo v. State, 603 P.2d 386, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 485 (Wyo. 1979); Higgins v. State, 889 P.2d 964, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1995); Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1995); Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 1995); Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1996); Daniel v. State, 923 P.2d 728, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1996); Baumgartner v. State, 7 P.3d 912, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 2000); Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, 43 P.3d 551, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2002); Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, 54 P.3d 248, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2002); White v. State, 2003 WY 163, 80 P.3d 642, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 200 (Wyo. 2003); Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, 98 P.3d 181, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 139 (2004); Smith v. State, 2008 WY 98, 190 P.3d 522, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Aug. 19, 2008).

Quoted in

King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1989); Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, 33 P.3d 758, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 2001); Wilkie v. State, 2002 WY 164, 56 P.3d 1023, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 2002); Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, 95 P.3d 802, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (2004).

Stated in

Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1961); Small v. State, 623 P.2d 1200, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 295 (Wyo. 1981); Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984).

Cited in

Moore v. Jarvis, 44 Wyo. 92, 8 P.2d 818, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1932); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595, 1942 U.S. LEXIS 489 (1942); State v. Wilson, 76 Wyo. 297, 301 P.2d 1056, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (1956); State v. Benales, 365 P.2d 811, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 1961); Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 209 (Wyo. 1974); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975); State ex rel. Weber v. Municipal Court, 567 P.2d 698, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 311 (Wyo. 1977); De Sersa v. State, 729 P.2d 662, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 645 (Wyo. 1986); Long v. State, 745 P.2d 547, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 542 (Wyo. 1987); Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1992); Keene v. State, 835 P.2d 341, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 91 (Wyo. 1992); Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1992); Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1994); Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1997); Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 198 (Wyo. 1999); James v. State, 998 P.2d 389, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2000); Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, 43 P.3d 80, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 2002); O'Brien v. State, 2002 WY 63, 45 P.3d 225, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2002); Sarr v. State, 2003 WY 42, 65 P.3d 711, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 52 (Wyo. 2003); Lafferty v. State, 2016 WY 52, 374 P.3d 1244, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 2016); Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, 401 P.3d 834, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For note, “The Obligation of Securing a Speedy Trial,” see 11 Wyo. L.J. 44.

For article, “United States Supreme Court — Public Defender by Judicial Fiat?,” see 19 Wyo. L.J. 179 (1965).

For comment, “Criminal Law: Limitation of Prosecution — Time,” see V Land & Water L. Rev. 179 (1970).

For comment on Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (1976), rehearing denied, 553 P.2d 1390, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 213 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (1977), see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 319 (1977).

For case note, “The Standards for the Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel. Adger v. State, 584 P.2d 1056, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 551 (1979).

For case note, “The Confrontation Clause and the Catch-all Exception to the Hearsay Doctrine, Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (1982),” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 703 (1982).

For case note, “Constitutional Law — Does the New Death Qualification Standard Ensure a Biased Jury? Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 105 S. Ct. 844, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 43 (1985),” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 579 (1986).

For case note, “Criminal Law — Right to Counsel at Preindictment Lineups — Should Wyoming Change Its Position? Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 437 (Wyo. 1987),” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 541 (1989).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure — The Right to a Speedy Trial — Has the Wyoming Supreme Court Correctly Applied the Balancing Test? Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1989),” see XXV Land & Water L. Rev. 267 (1990).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure — Witness Immunity — The Story of a County Attorney Who Said, 'I Think I Can, I Think I Can,' and the Brave Little Conscience that Couldn't be Shocked. Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1990),” see XXVII Land & Water L. Rev. 191 (1992).

For case note, “Constitutional Law — The United States Supreme Court on Gender-Based Peremptory Jury Challenges — Constitutionally Correct But Out of Touch With Reality: Litigants Beware! J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 144 S. Ct. 1419 (1994),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 195 (1996).

For article, “The Wyoming Criminal Code Revisited: Reflections after Fifteen Years,” see XXXIII Land and Water L. Rev. 523 (1998).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of incriminating statement obtained in violation of Miranda rule, 77 ALR3d 669.

Illness or incapacity of judge, prosecuting officer, or prosecution witness as justifying delay in bringing accused speedily to trial — state cases, 78 ALR3d 297.

Use of peremptory challenge to exclude from jury persons belonging to a class or race, 79 ALR3d 14.

Sufficiency of courtroom facilities as affecting rights of accused, 85 ALR3d 918.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of gagging, shackling or otherwise physically restraining accused during course of state criminal trial, 90 ALR3d 17.

Propriety of prosecutor's argument regarding other evidence not presented, 90 ALR3d 646.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's argument giving jury impression that judge believes defendant guilty, 90 ALR3d 822.

Interference by prosecution with defense counsel's pretrial interrogation of witnesses, 90 ALR3d 1231.

Admissibility, as against interest in criminal case of declaration of commission of criminal act, 92 ALR3d 1164.

Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in state criminal case, 94 ALR3d 15.

Accused's right to represent himself in state criminal proceeding — modern state cases, 98 ALR3d 13.

Loss of jurisdiction by delay in imposing sentence, 98 ALR3d 605.

Accused's right to depose prospective witnesses before trial in state court, 2 ALR4th 704.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding right to and incidents of jury trial, 3 ALR4th 601.

Right of accused in criminal prosecution to presence of counsel at court-appointed or -approved psychiatric examination, 3 ALR4th 910.

Availability in state court of defense of entrapment where accused denies committing acts which constitute offense charged, 5 ALR4th 1128.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding argument, 6 ALR4th 16.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding speedy trial and related matters, 6 ALR4th 1208.

Right of juvenile court defendant to be represented during court proceedings by parent, 11 ALR4th 719.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding appellate and postconviction remedies, 15 ALR4th 582.

Prosecutor's reference in opening statement to matters not provable or which he does not attempt to prove as ground for relief, 16 ALR4th 810.

Continuances at instance of state public defender or appointed counsel over defendant's objections as excuse for denial of speedy trial, 16 ALR4th 1283.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of witness testifying while in prison attire, 16 ALR4th 1356.

Circumstances giving rise to prejudicial conflict of interests between criminal defendant and defense counsel — state cases, 18 ALR4th 360.

Denial of, or interference with, accused's right to have attorney initially contact accused, 18 ALR4th 669.

Denial of accused's request for initial contact with attorney — drunk driving cases, 18 ALR4th 705.

Denial of accused's request for initial contact with attorney — cases involving offenses other than drunk driving, 18 ALR4th 743.

Admissibility of expert or opinion testimony on battered wife or battered woman syndrome, 18 ALR4th 1153.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecution's calling as witness, to extract claim of self-incrimination privilege, one involved in offense charged against accused, 19 ALR4th 368.

Conditions interfering with accused's view of witness as violation of right of confrontation, 19 ALR4th 1286.

Waiver of right to counsel by insistence upon speedy trial in state criminal case, 19 ALR4th 1299.

Sufficiency of access to legal research facilities afforded defendant confined in state prison or local jail, 23 ALR4th 590.

Right of prosecution to discovery of case-related notes, statements, and reports — state cases, 23 ALR4th 799.

Right of accused to be present at suppression hearing or at other hearing or conference between court and attorneys concerning evidentiary questions, 23 ALR4th 955.

Validity and efficacy of minor's waiver of right to counsel — modern cases, 25 ALR4th 1072.

Validity of jury selection as affected by accused's absence from conducting of procedures for selection and impaneling of final jury panel for specific case, 33 ALR4th 429.

Admissibility or use in criminal trial of testimony given at preliminary proceeding by witness not available at trial, 38 ALR4th 378.

Necessity for presence of judge during voir dire examination of prospective jurors in state criminal case, 39 ALR4th 465.

Validity, construction and application of state recoupment statutes permitting state to recover counsel fees expended for benefit of indigent criminal defendants, 39 ALR4th 597.

Impeachment of verdict by juror's evidence that he was coerced or intimidated by fellow juror, 39 ALR4th 800.

Application of speedy trial statute to dismissal or other termination of prior indictment or information and bringing of new indictment or information, 39 ALR4th 899.

Propriety of use of multiple juries at joint trial of multiple defendants in state criminal prosecution, 41 ALR4th 1189.

Constitutionality, with respect to accused's rights to information or confrontation, of statute according confidentiality to sex crime victim's communications to sexual counselor, 43 ALR4th 395.

Propriety of governmental eavesdropping on communications between accused and his attorney, 44 ALR4th 841.

Drunk driving: motorist's right to private sobriety test, 45 ALR4th 11.

Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility of complainant in sexual offense prosecution, 45 ALR4th 310.

Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial in state criminal case during its progress as ground for mistrial, new trial or reversal, 46 ALR4th 11.

Admissibility, at criminal prosecution, of expert testimony on reliability of eyewitness testimony, 46 ALR4th 1047.

Exclusion of public from state criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover witness, 54 ALR4th 1156.

Relief available for violation of right to counsel at sentencing in state criminal trial, 65 ALR4th 183.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepresentation, or failure to advise, of immigration consequences of guilty plea — state cases, 65 ALR4th 719.

Prosecutor's appeal in criminal case to racial, national or religious prejudice as ground for mistrial, new trial, reversal or vacation of sentence — modern cases, 70 ALR4th 664.

Right of indigent defendant in state criminal case to assistance of ballistics experts, 71 ALR4th 638.

Standing of media representatives or organizations to seek review of, or to intervene to oppose, order closing criminal proceedings to public, 74 ALR4th 476.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: use or nonuse of interpreter at prosecution of foreign language speaking defendant, 79 ALR4th 1102.

What constitutes assertion of right to counsel following Miranda warnings — state cases, 83 ALR4th 443.

Right of indigent defendant in state criminal case to assistance of psychiatrist or psychologist, 85 ALR4th 19.

When does delay in imposing sentence violate speedy trial provision, 86 ALR4th 340.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: use or nonuse of interpreter at prosecution of hearing-impaired defendant, 86 ALR4th 698.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: Compulsion, duress, necessity, or “hostage syndrome” defense, 8 ALR5th 713.

Prejudicial effect of statement by prosecutor that verdict, recommendation of punishment, or other finding by jury is subject to review or correction by other authorities, 10 ALR5th 700.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: Battered spouse syndrome as defense to homicide or other criminal offense, 11 ALR5th 871.

Criminal defendant's representation by person not licensed to practice law as violation of right to counsel, 19 ALR5th 351.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude ethnic and racial groups, other than black americans, from criminal jury — Post-Batson state cases, 20 ALR5th 398.

Determination of indigency entitling accused in state criminal case to appointment of counsel on appeal, 26 ALR5th 765.

What persons or entities may assert or waive corporation's attorney-client privilege — modern cases, 28 ALR5th 1.

Failure or refusal of state court judge to have record made of bench conference with counsel in criminal proceeding, 31 ALR5th 704.

Right to appointment of counsel in contempt proceedings, 32 ALR5th 31.

Right of accused to have evidence or court proceedings interpreted, because accused or other participant in proceedings is not proficient in the language used, 32 ALR5th 149.

Substitution of judge in state criminal trial, 45 ALR5th 591.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons from criminal jury based on religious affiliation — post-Batson state cases, 63 ALR5th 375.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client — issues of mental matters concerning persons, other than counsel's client, who are involved in criminal case, 80 ALR5th 55.

Examination and challenge of state case jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexuality, 80 ALR5th 469.

Denial of accused's request for initial contact with attorney in cases involving offenses other than drunk driving — Cases focusing on presence of inculpatory evidence other than statements by accused and cases focusing on absence of particular inculpatory evidence, 90 ALR 5th 225.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client — conduct at trial regarding issues of insanity, 95 ALR5th 125.

Denial of, or interference with, accused's right to have attorney initially contact accused, 96 ALR5th 327.

Validity and efficacy of minor's waiver of right to counsel — cases decided since application of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 40 Ohio Op. 2d 378, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 1478 (U.S. 1967).

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues-Motions and objections during trial and matters other than pretrial motions, 117 ALR5th 513.

Denial of accused's request for initial contact with attorney in cases involving offenses other than drunk driving — Cases focusing on presence of inculpatory statements, 90 ALR 5th 225.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding guilty pleas - coercion or duress. 19 A.L.R.6th 411.

Effect upon accused's sixth amendment right to impartial jury of jurors having served on jury hearing matter arising out of same transaction or series of transactions, 68 ALR Fed 919.

Appointment of counsel, in civil rights action, under forma pauperis provisions (28 USC § 1915(d)), 69 ALR Fed 666.

Propriety of federal court's exclusion of public from criminal or civil trial in order to protect trade secrets, 69 ALR Fed 892.

Effect of Speedy Trial Act provision (18 USC § 3161(c)(2)) that unless defendant consents in writing to contrary, trial may not commence less than 30 days from date on which defendant first appears through counsel or expressly waives counsel or elects to proceed pro se, 71 ALR Fed 415.

Substitution of judges under Rule 25 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 73 ALR Fed 833.

Necessity that Miranda warnings include express reference to right to have attorney present during interrogation, 77 ALR Fed 123.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of comments by counsel vouching for credibility of witness — federal cases, 78 ALR Fed 23.

What constitutes assertion of right to counsel following Miranda warnings — federal cases, 80 ALR Fed 622.

Constitutional right to counsel as ground for quashing or modifying federal grand jury subpoena directed to attorney, 83 ALR Fed 504.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepresentation, or failure to advise, of immigration consequences of waiver of jury trial, 103 ALR Fed 867.

What constitutes “fees” or “costs” within meaning of federal statutory provision (28 USCS § 1915 and similar predecessor statutes) permitting party to proceed in forma pauperis without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, 142 ALR Fed 627.

Right of enemy combatant to counsel, 184 ALR Fed 527.

§ 11. Self-incrimination; jeopardy.

No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If a jury disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy.

Cross references. —

As to testimony of criminal defendant, see § 7-11-401 .

Punishment for felony murder and underlying felony unconstitutional.—

District court erred when it sentenced defendant to life in prison with the opportunity for parole for felony murder and a concurrent sentence of a term if imprisonment for the underlying offense of aggravated child abuse because the imposition of multiple punishments for felony murder and the underlying felony violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions. Hartley v. State, 2020 WY 40, 460 P.3d 716, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. 2020).

Improper dual sexual assault convictions under same statute. —

When defendant was convicted under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) and (viii), one of the convictions had to be vacated because (1) the convictions resulted from disjunctive charges under the same statute and were based on a single criminal act, so (2) the legislature presumably intended only one conviction. Solis v. State, 2013 WY 152, 315 P.3d 622, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 2013).

Nature of privilege. —

The privilege against self-incrimination is that the person shall not be compelled to testify. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is that the evidence shall not be extorted. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

There are two basic reasons for enforcement of right against self-incrimination. —

to safeguard against fear and torture so that there will not be extorted expressions of untruth and to prevent the state from depriving a person of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction. Abeyta v. State, 592 P.2d 705, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 388 (Wyo. 1979).

Protection provided. —

This section assures the same protection as the federal constitution. State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1993).

Section does not prohibit court from compelling defendant to furnish handwriting exemplars. Brunmeier v. State, 733 P.2d 265, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 403 (Wyo. 1987).

Court may not require defendant to speak. —

A defendant's choice to exercise his right to allocution is entirely voluntary; he can speak to the court, but he is not required to do so; a defendant's statements may be admissible against him in further proceedings, provided they are voluntary. Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. July 8, 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022, 113 S. Ct. 661, 121 L. Ed. 2d 586, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 7732 (U.S. 1992).

Pre-arrest right to silence. —

The state constitutional language itself protects an accused's right to silence and the existence of that right does not depend upon Miranda advice. The constitutional right to silence exists at all times: before arrest, at arrest, and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it. The right is self-executing. Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1995).

Effect of Miranda. —

The decision of the supreme court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2817, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966) is pertinent in the construction that the state supreme court should give to the state constitutional provision. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

Implicit in the Miranda warning is the assurance that silence will carry no penalty, and use for impeachment purposes of defendant's silence, at time of arrest, after Miranda warnings violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.Irvin v. State, 560 P.2d 372, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 231 (Wyo. 1977).

Defendant's lies about the assailant's identity were inadmissible where defendant had not been read the Miranda warnings. Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, 48 P.3d 1063, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2002).

Right to remain silent does not depend on being advised of right. —

The right of an accused to remain silent under this section of the Wyoming constitution does not depend upon his being advised of that right, but exists by virtue of the constitutional language. Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1978), limited, Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1986).

Purpose of such advice. —

Advice as to the right of an accused to remain silent by law enforcement officers or by the justice of the peace or by the judge of the district court is only for the purpose of expanding its protection by assuring that the accused person is aware of it. Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1978), limited, Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1986).

Incriminating statement, not product of interrogation, admissible. —

A murder defendant's statement that he went outside his house to fight the victim and then stabbed the victim by reflex was admissible, where it was not the product of an interrogation and the police were merely informing the defendant of the charges against him when he made the statement. Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (Wyo. Mar. 15, 1991).

Interrogation. —

To determine whether an accused was in custody during an interrogation, two distinct inquiries are required, one into the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and one into whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 1996).

Because defendant, who was convicted of indecent liberties with a child, was not in custody when questioned at his residence by the police, no Miranda warnings were required, and the statements made by defendant during a custodial interview at the sheriff's office were made voluntarily, where the defendant pointed to no evidence in the record to support a showing of coercive government action. Gunn v. State, 2003 WY 24, 64 P.3d 716, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2003).

Defendant's statements to police did not violate his self-incrimination rights where the detective characterized the interrogation as her posing questions to defendant and he ‘answered if he wanted to.’ He took advantage of that option by refusing to identify his supplier or customers, despite the fact the occupants were watched to ensure that no evidence was compromised, they were allowed to do what they pleased, defendant apparently slept for a great deal of the time the officers searched the premises, and, when he needed to relieve himself, the officers respected his choice to go outside rather than be accompanied to the restroom by an officer. Gompf v. State, 2005 WY 112, 120 P.3d 980, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 2005).

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress defendant's statements to officers because defendant did not demonstrate that a suppression motion based on the alleged Miranda violation would have been granted as it did not appear that defendant was subjected to express questioning, or its functional equivalent, prior to being advised of his Miranda rights. After he was arrested, an officer located defendant in a patrol vehicle, read him his Miranda rights, and defendant indicated that he understood his rights and that he wanted to waive those rights and make a statement. Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, 121 P.3d 127, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 2005).

No error in failing to suppress non-custodial interrogation. —

In defendant's sexual assault case, a court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress his confession where the confession was non-custodial because he went to the station of his own will, he was told he did not have to answer questions, would not be arrested that day, and was free to leave at any time. In addition, the confession was voluntary as the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the statements and had the opportunity to hear the witness' testimony and weigh their credibility. Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, 84 P.3d 320, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2004).

Statements made with awareness of consequences admissible. —

The court properly limited the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to investigating officers to those that were furnished prior to the advice that the victim had died. These statements were the product of uncoerced choice and demonstrated sufficient comprehension to assure that the waiver of the defendant's right to silence was made with full awareness of both the nature of his right and the consequences of his decision. Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1988).

Violation of the right against self-incrimination results in a void, not merely erroneous, judgment. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975); Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1976).

Right against self-incrimination depends upon facts. —

Under what circumstances a witness shall be protected in refusing to answer necessarily depends in a great measure upon the facts adduced in the case. Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1899).

Failure to respond to repeated statements of the defendant that he desired counsel was a violation of defendant's constitutional rights. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

Equivocal request for counsel. —

Admission of defendant's statements at trial did not violate his rights under this section, where his question concerning the availability of an attorney was an equivocal request for counsel and did not affect the validity of his subsequent waiver of his constitutional rights. Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 438 (Wyo. 1987).

Even if it was assumed that the defendant, charged with second-degree murder, was improperly questioned by the police after an equivocal request for counsel, his statements did not rise to the level of plain error. The defendant did make inconsistent statements during the interview about how the victim received his injuries; however, he emphatically denied killing the victim throughout the interview, and there was abundant evidence in the record that the defendant did in fact kill the victim. Suliber v. State, 866 P.2d 85, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 205 (Wyo. 1993).

Later, proper examination could not correct earlier, improper examination. —

Having previously failed properly to advise the accused of his privilege not to testify against himself, and knowing of the accused's desire for counsel, investigating officers could not continue to examine him and could not, by finally coming up with a proper warning and an apparently freely made statement, clear away the debris of the earlier and improper examinations. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

Later Miranda confession admissible after unwarned statements excluded. —

Where defendant's post-Miranda, voluntary statement confirmed that defendant had provided false statements to the police with the intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct their investigation and render assistance to the assailant, the improper admission of defendant's unwarned statements did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury, so the admission of the evidence was harmless error. Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, 48 P.3d 1063, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 2002).

Immunity under this section is complete unless waived by the witness with knowledge of his rights. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

Prior convictions of felonies not to be considered as factor in waiver. —

The supreme court rejected the argument that a factor which might be considered in whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel is the fact that defendant had been convicted of felonies on three prior occasions. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

Voluntary statements are those which proceed from spontaneous suggestion of the party's own mind, free from the influence of any extraneous disturbing cause. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

Voluntariness of confession. —

In an indecent act case, a court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress because defendant's confession was voluntary where he went to the police station at the request of a police officer, but he was not under arrest, he was given Miranda warnings before the interview commenced, which he waived, and although the police officer was insistent and persistent in his questioning, he did not force defendant to answer questions. Goulart v. State, 2003 WY 108, 76 P.3d 1230, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 2003).

Confession was properly admitted where defendant arrived at the police station voluntarily, he was given his Miranda warnings, there was no suggestion that any of the officers questioned defendant after he requested counsel, and his first attempt to initiate re-contact with the officers failed because they would not speak with him unless he signed a request for contact form, which he was reluctant to do. Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, 114 P.3d 1252, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 2005).

Defendant's voluntary statements not basis for suppression. —

In defendant's second degree murder case, defendant's constitutional rights were not violated because the trial court refused to suppress his statements to police where: (1) defendant's statements to police, when he was asked to go to the police station and make a statement, were voluntary as was his waiver of Miranda rights that occurred about five minutes after police began his interview, and (2) inquiry ceased when defendant asked about obtaining a lawyer and specified one by name. Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, 86 P.3d 851, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2004).

Statements held to be voluntary. —

Although defendant was not experienced with law enforcement and was of below average intelligence, where there was no evidence that he was unusually susceptible to coercion or easily influenced by police detective, and he indicated before he confessed that no promises were made to him by detective, his confession was voluntary. Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1997).

Defendant's statement to police was voluntary where his car was not ‘blocked in’ by the officers, he was informed that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to talk to the officers, the officers were in plain clothes, and the entire encounter lasted less than thirty minutes. Jelle v. State, 2005 WY 111, 119 P.3d 403, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2005).

Defendant's statement to law enforcement officers was voluntarily given; there was no evidence that officers or prosecutor intimidated defendant or improperly induced him to sign immunity agreement in exchange for his statement, and prosecutor was justified in later nullifying agreement on grounds that defendant's statement proved to be substantially incorrect. Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1999).

Defendant's statements to police were knowing and voluntary and trial court correctly denied his motions to suppress; although police interview occurred eleven hours after defendant was first advised of his Miranda rights and after surgery to defendant's hand, officer partially re-advised defendant of his rights and defendant acknowledged that he remembered and understood the prior warning, and defendant presented no evidence demonstrating his statements were involuntary. Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1999).

There was no error in the trial court's determination that the defendant's statements/confessions were voluntary where (1) the only allegation of coercion arose from the defendant's subjective perception that if he cooperated/confessed, then his children would be returned to him, but the district court resolved that evidentiary dispute in favor of the state, (2) there was no indication that the defendant's mental state was impaired, other than the natural anxiety a defendant might feel where drugs are found in his home and he has been involved in the distribution of those drugs, and (3) the defendant was read his Miranda rights, and he was given the opportunity to speak with a lawyer if he chose. Lara v. State, 2001 WY 53, 25 P.3d 507, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 68 (Wyo. 2001).

Where an officer approached defendant with a drawn gun, defendant was escorted across the street and questioned, and, after being read Miranda rights, defendant confessed involvement in possession of marijuana, the confession was voluntary. Eckenrod v. State, 2003 WY 51, 67 P.3d 635, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 2003).

In a murder case, a court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements where they were voluntary; the officers properly complied with Miranda, and defendant understood English, he was read his rights, he clearly indicated that he understood those rights, and defendant's responses indicated no confusion on his part. Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, 98 P.3d 857, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2004).

In a murder case, a court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements where he did not affirmatively invoke his right to remain silent. Defendant's statements that he did “not really” want to talk to the officers and that he had nothing to tell the officers were not unambiguous invocations of his right to remain silent. Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, 98 P.3d 857, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 150 (Wyo. 2004).

A motion to suppress a confession was properly denied in a case involving sexual assault because it was voluntarily given; defendant was not promised probation, and defendant's nervousness and learning disability were not relevant since very simple “yes” or “no” questions were asked, and the process was thoroughly explained. Wilkins v. State, 2005 WY 2, 104 P.3d 85, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2005).

Defendant's statements to police did not violate his self-incrimination rights where the detective characterized the interrogation as her posing questions to defendant and he ‘answered if he wanted to.’ He took advantage of that option by refusing to identify his supplier or customers, despite the fact the occupants were watched to ensure that no evidence was compromised, they were allowed to do what they pleased, defendant apparently slept for a great deal of the time the officers searched the premises, and, when he needed to relieve himself, the officers respected his choice to go outside rather than be accompanied to the restroom by an officer. Gompf v. State, 2005 WY 112, 120 P.3d 980, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 134 (Wyo. 2005).

Defendant's statement to police was voluntary where his car was not ‘blocked in’ by the officers, he was informed that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to talk to the officers, the officers were in plain clothes, and the entire encounter lasted less than thirty minutes. Jelle v. State, 2005 WY 111, 119 P.3d 403, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2005).

Statements while intoxicated were voluntary. —

In a case where defendant gave a confession to taking indecent liberties with a minor, a motion to suppress evidence was properly denied. Although witnesses testified that defendant was intoxicated both before and after the interview, this was not enough to justify suppression where defendant gave appropriate answers and appeared to have understood the questions posed during the interview, and defendant initiated contact with police after requesting an attorney. The fact that defendant might have been led to believe that his leaving after the questioning was a possibility was not sufficient evidence of coercion. Gordon v. State, 2004 WY 105, 97 P.3d 64, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2004).

Burden on state to show voluntary character of statement. —

Self-incriminating statements are not per se admissible over objection, when the evidence discloses that the defendant was in custody for the crime charged at the time of making such statements, unless shown to have been voluntarily made. There is no presumption that such statements are voluntarily made, but, on the contrary, the presumption is the other way, and upon the trial of an accused the burden is upon the state, seeking to prove such statements, to show their voluntary character. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

The burden of proof of voluntariness and waiver is on the state. Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1976).

Prosecution has burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that a defendant's statement to law enforcement officers was voluntarily made. Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 1999).

When a district court does not have the evidence to make a determination that coercion did or did not cause the defendant to make a statement, it has no choice but to decide that the state has not rebutted the presumption that the statement was involuntary. State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1997).

Showing required of voluntary character of statement. —

The voluntary character of the statement where the accused is under arrest cannot be shown without also showing that he had the benefit of counsel or was fully informed of his rights. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

The question is not whether the examining officers have been “unfair” to the accused; it is whether the state has proved that the statements were freely made by an informed and knowledgeable accused after full and proper warning as to his constitutional rights. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1975).

To support the state's position that a defendant was not threatened or promised anything in such a way as to coerce a confession, the state must supply the court with details of all relevant circumstances as well as the interrogating officer's reasons for believing the defendant appeared to freely decide for himself to forego the assistance of counsel and provide an incriminating statement. State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1997).

There must be separate fair hearing and reliable determination on issue of voluntariness in front of the judge alone before the statements may be received in evidence at the trial for jury consideration. Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 243 (Wyo. 1977).

Standard of proof for determining voluntariness of confessions is that of preponderance of the evidence. Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 243 (Wyo. 1977).

Knowing and intelligent waiver of self-incrimination. —

Police agents could reasonably interpret a fully Mirandized defendant's statement that he knew and had visited a suspected drug associate for innocent reasons, as being an initiatory expression of willingness to engage in a generalized discussion regarding the investigation. Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1992).

Right against self-incrimination is sacred. —

No constitutional right of an accused person is more sacred than his right not to make a statement or testify against himself. Gabrielson v. State, 510 P.2d 534, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1973).

And it is highly improper for any comment or question to be made or asked pertaining thereto. Gabrielson v. State, 510 P.2d 534, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1973).

Prosecution may not make reference to defendant's failure to take the stand in his own defense. Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 871, 96 S. Ct. 137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 102, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2819 (U.S. 1975).

It is improper and reversible error to comment on the failure of a defendant to testify in his own behalf, and the test is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Oldham v. State, 534 P.2d 107, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1975).

But the rule does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence, or on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence, or to call logical witnesses. Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 247 (Wyo. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 871, 96 S. Ct. 137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 102, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2819 (U.S. 1975).

It is not improper for the government to draw attention to the failure of lack of evidence on a point if it is not intended to call attention to the failure of the defendant to testify. Oldham v. State, 534 P.2d 107, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1975).

Any comment upon accused's exercise of his right to remain silent is prejudicial error which will entitle the accused to a reversal of the conviction. Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 354 (Wyo. 1984), limited, Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1986).

Comment on defendant's silence. —

In a domestic abuse case, the prosecutor violated defendant's constitutional rights where he repeatedly commented on defendant's pre-arrest silence, and stated that, in talking with the officer, there was “no explanation of innocence” by defendant. Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, 75 P.3d 1016, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2003).

Prosecutor did not improperly comment on defendant's right to remain silent, where prosecutor elicited testimony to reconstruct defendant's behavior during his initial encounter with law enforcement, and drew attention only to defendant's reluctance to leave the victim alone with the deputies; testimony did not indicate that defendant not want to talk to the deputies. Lessard v. State, 2007 WY 89, 158 P.3d 698, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2007).

Prosecutor did not improperly comment on defendant's right to remain silent, based on admission of the transcript of defendant's post-arrest statement that contained a request for counsel. and request to have a DNA test; the context of defendant's request for counsel indicated that defendant wanted an attorney in an attempt to force a detective to conduct a DNA test, not to protect his right to silence or hide his guilt. There was nothing in the record indicating that the prosecutor used that statement for the prohibited inference of guilt from silence. Lessard v. State, 2007 WY 89, 158 P.3d 698, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2007).

Prosecutor's statements did not implicate defendant's right to remain silent, and therefore defendant did not establish plain error, where they merely informed the jury that a confession was not required to convict a defendant. Collins v. State, 2015 WY 92, 354 P.3d 55, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 107 (Wyo. 2015).

Viewing it in context, the prosecutor’s comment that the only person willing to explain how defendant’s semen ended up inside of the victim is the victim, did not constitute a direct or indirect comment on defendant’s failure to testify. Ridinger v. State, 2021 WY 4, 478 P.3d 1160, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 5 (Wyo. 2021).

Court upheld defendant's conviction for assault and battery where an officer's testimony concerning defendant's refusal to talk to him did not reflect an intent to cast guilt upon defendant in violation of her constitutional right to remain silent. Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 153, 148 P.3d 23, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2006).

Prosecution does not violate defendant's privilege against self-incrimination or commit prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting testimony about, or commenting upon, his refusal to voluntarily provide a sample for DNA testing. Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, 199 P.3d 1052, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2009).

Reversal for prosecutorial comment on silence. —

Since the right to remain silent is a self-executing right, an accused is presumed to be exercising the right by his silence, pre-arrest and pre- Miranda when questioned by the state's agents for purposes of a criminal investigation; accordingly, the prosecutorial use of the citizen's silence to infer the guilt of the citizen is constitutionally prohibited. Prosecutorial violations are subject to the mandate that failure to respect the constitutional right of the citizen-accused not to have his silence called to the attention of the jury will entitle the accused to a reversal of conviction. Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1995).

Error to inform jury of defendant's refusal to take lie detector test. —

It was error to inform the jury, through the admission of the defendant's videotaped deposition, of his refusal to submit to a lie detector test. The error was repeated when, after objection, the videotape was edited to contain only the refusal to take a lie detector test, without the accompanying explanation, and sent to the jury room to be viewed during deliberations. Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 482 (Wyo. 1986).

Refusal to provide DNA sample admissible. —

Neither U.S. Const. amend. V nor Wyo. Const. art. I, § 11, are implicated when a trial court admits into evidence a defendant's refusal to provide a DNA sample and allows a prosecutor to argue that such refusal is indicative of guilt. Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, 199 P.3d 1052, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2009).

Comment upon the defendant's failure to testify at trial can be held to be nonprejudicial only where it can be shown beyond reasonable doubt to have been harmless and not to have contributed to a conviction. Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1976).

Statement in closing argument did not constitute comment. —

Statement in prosecutor's closing argument that defendant's only witness wasn't even there when events occurred and that she was speculating as to what happened was not a comment on defendant's failure to testify. Stanton v. State, 692 P.2d 947, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1984).

Comments upon silence of accused prior to arrest not prejudicial error. —

The rule established in Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1978), overruled on other grounds, Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1982) and Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 354 (Wyo. 1984) to the effect that any comment upon the accused's exercise of his right to remain silent is prejudicial error, is limited to comments upon the silence of the accused either after his arrest or after he has been advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1986).

The arresting officer's references to the defendant's initial silence when the officer encountered him were not comments upon the defendant's exercise of the right to silence; the fact that the appellant initially ignored the officer and failed to respond to him was presented in direct testimony simply as part of the circumstances under which the officer first encountered the defendant and continued his contact with him, the questions and answers had nothing to do with the crime itself, and the prosecutor did not mention in opening or argue in closing that the appellant's silence somehow proved guilt. Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, 43 P.3d 80, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 2002), overruled in part, Jones v. State, 2019 WY 45, 439 P.3d 753, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 2019).

Where the prosecutor asked only one question concerning whether the inmate responded when told why he had been arrested, the prosecutor did not attempt to use the inmate's silence to the state's advantage and did not argue to the jury that the inmate's silence was evidence of or an admission of guilt. Thus, the inmate's right to silence pursuant to Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11 was not violated. Abeyta v. State, 2003 WY 136, 78 P.3d 664, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo. 2003).

Cross-examination of defendant concerning his failure to tell law enforcement officers or the county attorney of his alibi defense constituted impermissible comment on defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent and therefore violated this section of the state constitution. Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 258 (Wyo. 1978), limited, Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1986).

Standard by which court determines whether or not prosecutor has made impermissible comment on the failure of the accused to testify is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Cyrus v. State, 639 P.2d 900, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1982).

Prosecutor's closing argument, allegedly containing comment on right of silence, considered in entirety. —

In reaching a conclusion with respect to whether there was an impermissible comment upon the defendant's exercise of his right of silence, the supreme court must consider the closing argument in its entirety and is not permitted to take sentences and phrases out of context. Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 553 (Wyo. 1986).

Prosecutor may not emphasize defendant's refusal to discuss certain areas during interrogation. —

The defendant, prior to agreeing to participate in interrogation sessions, had signed a statement acknowledging his right to stop answering questions at any time and had refused to respond to questions during two sessions of interrogation at the police department. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked about those areas that he had refused to discuss, emphasized the fact that he had not denied certain aspects of the alleged assault and, in closing arguments, repeatedly directed the jury's attention to his silence when asked certain questions, thereby inviting the inference that a truthful answer would have established guilt. These statements constituted impermissible comment on the defendant's exercise of his right of silence. Brewster v. State, 712 P.2d 338, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 623 (Wyo. 1985).

Comment by defense constitutes waiver. —

Where defense attorney himself uttered the first comment upon the defendant's silence, thereby waiving the constitutional rights of the defendant, any remark which the prosecution made in rebuttal could not then be said to be in violation of the defendant's rights. Stanton v. State, 692 P.2d 947, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 355 (Wyo. 1984).

Prosecutor's comment on defendant's failure to produce a shirt in evidence did not violate his right against self-incrimination, where defendant testified about the color of his shirt and defendant's counsel attempted to impeach the state's witnesses by cross-examination on that subject. De Sersa v. State, 729 P.2d 662, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 645 (Wyo. 1986).

The prosecutor's comments concerning the defendant's silence did not constitute a violation of either the state or federal constitution, where defense counsel opened the door to the comments by repeatedly raising the issue of the defendant's cooperation. Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1995).

Instruction to disregard defendant's failure to testify. —

There is no clear rule of law which states that the giving of a jury instruction to disregard and draw no inference from a defendant's failure to testify is error. Quite to the contrary, there is substantial authority for the proposition that, even if unrequested, the giving of such a cautionary instruction is proper. Daellenbach v. State, 562 P.2d 679, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1977).

Communications between acquaintances not privileged. —

There is no constitutionally protected right upon which the right to silence rests when it involves communications between two mutual acquaintances. Abeyta v. State, 592 P.2d 705, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 388 (Wyo. 1979).

Testimony voluntarily given at coroner's inquest. —

Where, at a coroner's inquest, defendant before testifying was advised of his rights and duly cautioned, his testimony thereafter given voluntarily is admissible against him. Maki v. State, 18 Wyo. 481, 112 P. 334, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1911).

Driver's refusal to submit to chemical blood-alcohol test admissible. —

Evidence that a person who has been arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants has refused to submit to a chemical blood-alcohol test is admissible in cases brought in municipal courts for the violation of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the driving of an automobile while under the influence of intoxicants, as well as in state prosecutions, and does not violate the state or federal constitution. Laramie v. Mengel, 671 P.2d 340, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 383 (Wyo. 1983).

Permissive inference from unexplained possession of stolen property. —

Defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was not violated by instruction allowing jury to draw permissive inference, from defendant's unexplained possession of stolen car, that he knew the car was stolen. Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2000).

Evidence obtained by lawful search. —

Receipt of evidence obtained by lawful search is not forcing defendant to testify against himself. State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1924).

Search incident to arrest. —

An officer has right to search a party arrested and take from his person and possession, and from handbags, sacks, and other things that he carries with him, and from any place to which lawful access has been obtained, property reasonably believed to be connected with a crime and the fruits, means, or evidence thereof, and may take property of evidentiary value shown him by the prisoner, and he may take and hold them to be disposed of as the court directs, notwithstanding this section. Wiggin v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1922).

Consent to warrantless search. —

In order to show consent to search without warrant which would otherwise be illegal, testimony must show that the consent was really voluntary with a desire to invite search, and not merely to avoid resistance. Tobin v. State, 36 Wyo. 368, 255 P. 788, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1927).

Inadmissibility of statement of defendant may affect introduction of evidence seized in search to which defendant consented. Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1983).

Propriety of admitting prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes depends upon defendant's testimony. —

Since the defendant did not testify, he did not preserve on appeal the issue of the propriety of the pretrial ruling that his 17-year-old criminal convictions would be admissible for impeachment purposes. To balance the probative value with the prejudicial effect of a prior conviction, the court had to know the precise nature of the defendant's testimony. Additionally, such a ruling did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to remain silent. Vaupel v. State, 708 P.2d 1248, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 627 (Wyo. 1985).

Double jeopardy clause has same meaning as fifth amendment. —

While the respective double jeopardy provisions of the Wyoming state constitution and the fifth amendment to the federal constitution are dissimilar in language, they have the same meaning and are coextensive in application. Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1977); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (U.S. 1983).

Double jeopardy not applicable where offenses charged are separate and distinct.—

Prosecution of defendant for felony interference with a peace officer, after defendant had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor interference with a peace officer, did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because defendant committed two separate acts of interference when police officers responded to a domestic disturbance at defendant's home, as misdemeanor interference occurred inside defendant's home when defendant resisted arrest, while felony interference occurred outside the home when defendant elbowed an officer. Redding v. State, 2016 WY 41, 371 P.3d 136, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2016).

Defendant was properly sentenced consecutively for the crimes for which defendant was convicted because there was no double jeopardy violation in that aggravated assault and battery was not the same offense as attempted second-degree murder pursuant to the same-elements test. Jones v. State, 2016 WY 110, 384 P.3d 260, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2016).

It was not plain error to convict defendant of both strangulation of a household member and the lesser-included offense of domestic battery because the convictions did not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law, as the convictions did not violate double jeopardy since the crimes arose from separate and distinct acts, as the underlying acts occurred in different rooms and were separated by some amount of time and resulted in separate injuries to the victim. Drakeford v. State, 2017 WY 115, 402 P.3d 980, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 2017).

Kidnapping and first-degree sexual abuse of a minor each require an element the other does not, as the former requires sexual intrusion, whereas the latter does not, and that the kidnapping charge referred to the sexual abuse charge was of no moment, as the jury was not required to find every element of sexual abuse to convict defendant of kidnapping, and the jury had to find only that defendant removed the child victim with the intent to commit sexual abuse. Double jeopardy did not require the sentences to be merged. Winters v. State, 2019 WY 76, 446 P.3d 191, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 2019).

As prohibition represents policy of finality. —

The prohibition against placing a defendant “twice in jeopardy” represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit in criminal proceedings. Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 238 (Wyo. 1978), overruled, Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 595 (Wyo. 1986).

And curb on power of state. —

The state with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 238 (Wyo. 1978), overruled, Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 595 (Wyo. 1986).

When double jeopardy attaches. —

Double jeopardy does not attach in the case of a jury trial until a jury is empaneled and sworn. Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 215 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 558 P.2d 509, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 323 (Wyo. 1977).

Statutory elements analysis. —

Defendant's conviction for incest was a lesser-included offense of the crime of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and constituted the “same offense” under a double jeopardy analysis. Bowlsby v. State, 2013 WY 72, 302 P.3d 913, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 2013).

The statutory elements analysis should be used as the foundation for double jeopardy protection in connection with both multiple prosecutions and multiple or cumulative punishments. State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1993).

Same elements test is Wyoming's sole test for evaluating sentencing merger questions (overruling past decisions applying the facts or evidence test, including James v. State, 2012 WY 35, 271 P.3d 1016 (Wyo. 2012); Winstead v. State, 2011 WY 137, 261 P.3d 743 (Wyo. 2011); Najera v. State, 2009 WY 105, 214 P.3d 990 (Wyo. 2009); Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249 (Wyo. 2000); Rouse v. State, 966 P.2d 967 (Wyo. 1998); Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1995); Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1992)).Sweets v. State, 2013 WY 98, 307 P.3d 860, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Aug 14, 2013).

For case setting forth statutory elements analysis, see State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 1993).

Civil vs. criminal penalty. —

The Wyoming supreme court has adopted a five-criteria test to determine whether a penalty imposed by the state is “civil” or “criminal”; the court considers: (1) type of offense; (2) penalty; (3) collateral consequences; (4) punitive significance; and (5) arrest and detention. Glasrud v. City of Laramie, 934 P.2d 1242, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1997).

Information sufficient to protect from double jeopardy. See Vernier v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1996).

Double jeopardy not applicable where offenses charged are separate and distinct. —

If the offenses charged are separate and distinct, either with respect to statutory definition, or because they grow out of different transactions and different evidence is needed to prove each, then the constitutional inhibition against double jeopardy is not applicable. Jackson v. State, 522 P.2d 1356, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1055, 95 S. Ct. 637, 42 L. Ed. 2d 652, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3665 (U.S. 1974); Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1976).

Court did not violate defendant's double jeopardy rights by failing to merge his sentences because defendant was convicted of burglary for entering a home without authorization to demand sex from the female victim and aggravated assault and battery for the vicious beating which followed the victim's refusal to comply with his demands for sex. The elements of the two crimes were very different, and defendant could have committed either of his crimes without necessarily committing the other. Gould v. State, 2006 WY 157, 151 P.3d 261, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 854, 128 S. Ct. 125, 169 L. Ed. 2d 88, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 9472 (U.S. 2007).

Defendant's contention that she was twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when she was prosecuted for child endangerment after she had been convicted of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance stemming from the same methamphetamine found in her trailer was rejected because the elements of the two crimes were different. Granzer v. State, 2010 WY 130, 239 P.3d 640, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 2010).

And defendant may be found guilty and sentenced as to each offense. —

So long as the offenses charged are not factually inconsistent, a defendant may be found guilty and judgment of sentence thereon may be had as to each of the offenses charged without a violation of double jeopardy. Jackson v. State, 522 P.2d 1356, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1055, 95 S. Ct. 637, 42 L. Ed. 2d 652, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3665 (U.S. 1974); Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (Wyo. 1976).

No double jeopardy violation in sentencing. —

Under the Blockburger analysis, first-degree premeditated murder requires proof of premeditated malice, while aggravated robbery does not require proof of malice, and the jury expressly found defendant guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated robbery; therefore, merger of the sentence to life imprisonment on defendant's first-degree murder conviction and the sentence to a term of years on defendant's aggravated robbery conviction was not required. Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, 76 P.3d 323, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2003).

By imposing four consecutive sentences, a trial court did not violate defendant's right against multiple punishments for the same offense after defendant pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and battery and two counts of DUI with serious bodily injury; the factual basis provided evidence of defendant's intoxication, as well as other evidence of erratic, dangerous, and irresponsible driving. James v. State, 2012 WY 35, 271 P.3d 1016, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 36 (Wyo. 2012), overruled in part, Sweets v. State, 2013 WY 98, 307 P.3d 860, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2013).

District court properly defendant's motions to correct an illegal sentence because there was no increase in punishment and no violation of his double jeopardy protections; all of the fees imposed upon defendant's conviction were mandated by statute, and the statutes indicated that the fees were imposed as a result of being convicted in a criminal case, not as part of the sentence for any particular crime. Hawes v. State, 2016 WY 30, 368 P.3d 879, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 2016 WY 30, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 2016).

Because defendant's previous sentence was illegal, he had no justifiable expectation of finality in his sentence. Therefore, there was no double jeopardy violation when defendant's sentence was increased by three months after he had begun serving it. Patterson v. State, 2013 WY 153, 314 P.3d 759, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 2013).

Plea did not prohibit State's continued prosecution on remaining charges. —

Notwithstanding the district court's acceptance of defendant's guilty pleas to two drug-related crimes, defendant was not entitled to use the Double Jeopardy Clauses as a sword to prevent the State from completing its prosecution on another drug-related charge in count two when it did not agree to defendant's guilty pleas. State v. King, 2002 WY 93, 48 P.3d 396, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 98 (Wyo. 2002).

Multiple preliminary hearings. —

One preliminary hearing, unproductive for the state, does not prohibit another. Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 215 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 558 P.2d 509, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 323 (Wyo. 1977).

Driver's license suspensions. —

Driver's license suspensions under § 31-6-102 do not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy, because they are civil proceedings, separate and distinct from prosecutions for driving while under the influence. Glasrud v. City of Laramie, 934 P.2d 1242, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 33 (Wyo. 1997).

Erroneous discharge of jury. —

Erroneous or void discharge of jury on Sunday will not deprive court of further jurisdiction, and whether it may furnish accused with good defense, either as matter of law or fact, upon another trial for same offense, is to be determined in the manner provided by law the same as any other defense, and accused is not entitled to discharge on habeas corpus. Hovey v. Sheffner, 16 Wyo. 254, 93 P. 305, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 1908).

Discussion of settled double jeopardy principles. —

See Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1977).

Not in trying all offenses at once. —

See Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1977).

Where defendant was charged with five counts of assault with a deadly weapon, there was no prejudice in charging, trying and submitting them to the jury, receiving the five verdicts, and sentencing on only one. Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1977).

Conviction permitted on two distinct factually consistent charges. —

If two offenses charged are separate and distinct either with respect to statutory definition or because they grow out of different transactions and different evidence is needed to prove each, the constitutional inhibition against double jeopardy is not applicable and, so long as the offenses charged are not factually inconsistent, a defendant may be found guilty and judgment and sentence entered thereon may be had as to each of the offenses charged. Goodman v. State, 601 P.2d 178, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 473 (Wyo. 1979).

And on distinct offenses emanating from single act or transaction. —

Two or more distinct offenses may emanate from the same transaction or act and the rule that a person cannot be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense has no application where two separate and distinct crimes are committed by one and the same act. Goodman v. State, 601 P.2d 178, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 473 (Wyo. 1979).

It is not double jeopardy to be tried for several offenses arising out of the same episode in a single trial. Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 483 (Wyo. 1979).

Where the defendant performed fellatio upon the victim and then made the victim reciprocate, two distinct acts of fellatio were committed and two separate sentences proper. Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 534 (Wyo. 1987).

Where the defendant was tried and acquitted on a charge of larceny and was subsequently tried and convicted on a charge of burglary arising out of the same circumstances giving rise to the larceny charge, the trial court in the burglary case properly declined to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to evidence used in the defendant's earlier trial for larceny. Eatherton v. State, 810 P.2d 93, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 1991).

Substantive crime and conspiracy to commit crime are not same offense for double jeopardy purposes, and the fact that there is a mere overlap of proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation. Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. July 8, 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022, 113 S. Ct. 661, 121 L. Ed. 2d 586, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 7732 (U.S. 1992).

No double jeopardy violation occurred in prosecution for conspiracy to commit rape since the conduct constituting the crime of conspiracy is separate and apart from the conduct that makes up the substantive offenses of rape and kidnapping. Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 1992), reh'g denied, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. July 8, 1992).

Doctrine of merger was not applicable to the offenses of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and being an accessory to first-degree murder. Vena v. State, 941 P.2d 33, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 1997), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

No double jeopardy violation. —

Reinstatement of prior action, which resulted in conviction, did not violate double jeopardy protections, as nothing indicated prosecutorial intent to goad defense into moving for mistrial. Derrera v. State, 2014 WY 77, 327 P.3d 107, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 81 (Wyo. 2014).

Defendant's second trial did not violate his right against double jeopardy because the record was devoid of any evidence indicating prosecutorial intent to goad the defense into moving for a mistrial; and, although defendant contended that he had no other option but to request a mistrial in the first trial and that the prosecutor forced him into that position by providing objectionable material to the jury, and that the prosecutor's conduct was perhaps negligent, there was no intent to manipulate defendant into moving for a mistrial. Montoya v. State, 2016 WY 127, 386 P.3d 344, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 2016).

After defendant's first trial resulted in a mistrial at his request, defendant's motion to dismiss the case before the second trial began based on the prohibition against double jeopardy was properly denied as the prosecutor did not goad defendant into requesting a mistrial because, although the prosecutor acknowledged that he misunderstood the law and conceded his questioning encroached on defendant's right to silence, the prosecutor's comments did not support a conclusion that he acted intentionally in the hopes of the trial ending prematurely as he explained that he did not act maliciously in trying to impeach defendant with statements he had previously made; and he argued that the error did not rise to the level of requiring a mistrial. King v. State, 2017 WY 129, 403 P.3d 1070, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2017).

Notice invalid for improper included lesser offense. —

Where the information charged defendant with only second degree sexual assault, instructing jury members that defendant could be convicted for taking indecent liberties with a child worked material prejudice for failure of full proper notice, requiring reversal. Derksen v. State, 845 P.2d 1383, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1993).

Prosecution for homicide of fetus and assault on pregnant woman not double jeopardy. —

A defendant may be prosecuted both for the act of killing an unborn child during an assault and battery on a pregnant woman and for the assault and battery on the pregnant woman (or her killing) without violating the rule against double jeopardy. Goodman v. State, 601 P.2d 178, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 473 (Wyo. 1979).

Aggravated assault and DUI injury separate offenses. —

The prosecution and conviction of the defendant for aggravated assault and battery after he pled guilty to causing serious bodily injury to another as a result of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, since each offense required proof of an element not necessary for proof of the other. Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1989).

Conviction of misdemeanor battery did not prevent prosecution for aggravated assault and battery. —

Prosecution of defendant for aggravated assault and battery was not barred by the double jeopardy provision of the Wyoming and U.S. Constitutions even though defendant had already been convicted of misdemeanor battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) based on the same attack because although evidence of the greater offense existed at the time of the original conviction, the state was unable to discover such evidence despite the exercise of due diligence. Daniel v. State, 2008 WY 87, 189 P.3d 859, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 90 (Wyo. 2008).

Aggravated burglary and aggravated assault and battery statutes do not proscribe same offense, and multiple punishments therefor do not violate the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition. Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1989).

Dual sentences for aggravated assault and escape. —

The imposition of dual and consecutive sentences for aggravated assault (§ 6-2-502 ) and attempted escape (§§ 6-5-206 and 6-1-301 ), for a single violent escape attempt, which could have resulted in a single sentence under § 6-5-207 (escape by violence), did not violate double jeopardy constitutional provisions. Under the applicable statutory elements test, clearly different offenses were demonstrated, while the prosecutor had the requisite discretion to elect the charge or charges which could be brought based on the specific facts of the case. DeSpain v. State, 865 P.2d 584, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 1993).

Prosecution for burglary and larceny constitutional. —

The defendant's constitutional rights against double jeopardy were not denied when the state was allowed to prosecute him for burglary and the lesser included offense of larceny in the same prosecution. Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 1988).

Burglary and property destruction separate offenses. —

Burglary requires unauthorized entry of a building or vehicle; property destruction does not. Property destruction requires unauthorized destruction or injury to property; burglary does not. Even though both violations can arise from the same incident, each has an element not found in the other; burglary and property destruction are defined by different statutes with different elements and provide separate penalties and, therefore, constitute two separate offenses. Longstreth v. State, 890 P.2d 551, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1995).

But not larceny and failure to account. —

Where evidence of embezzlement by larceny is also evidence used to support the charge of a public official's failure to account, these offenses have merged. Howard v. State, 762 P.2d 28, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. Nov. 7, 1988).

No double jeopardy violation where charges involve different victims. —

Defendant's double jeopardy rights were not violated where he pleaded guilty to misdemeanor interference with an officer, and was later prosecuted for felony interference, because the charges involved different victims. Pope v. State, 2002 WY 9, 38 P.3d 1069, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 2002).

Suspension of license constituted double jeopardy. —

Section 31-7-126 (former) and § 31-7-128(f), which provide for the suspension of driver's license for individuals less than 19 years of age when convicted of possession or consumption of alcohol, constituted punishment for a previous conviction in violation of the prohibition of double jeopardy under this section. Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1992).

Cumulative sentences for second-degree murder and use of firearm constitute double jeopardy. —

Cumulative sentences for attempted second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission thereof were improper as the charges merged for punishment purposes and only one sentence should have been imposed. Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 218 (Wyo. 2000), reh'g denied, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. Dec. 5, 2000), modified, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 231 (Wyo. Dec. 15, 2000), overruled in part, Sweets v. State, 2013 WY 98, 307 P.3d 860, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2013).

Double jeopardy not violated by consecutive sentences. —

The judge's decision to sentence defendant to consecutive sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony (i.e., conspiracy) did not violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Wyoming constitutions. Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1988).

Consecutive sentences for felony murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery did not violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Wyoming constitutions, where the evidence necessary to support the conspiracy charge was not the same as the evidence necessary to support the felony murder charge. Garcia v. State, 774 P.2d 623, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 132 (Wyo. 1989).

Nor by later-required restitution. —

The reserve determination of assessable costs to include a conjectural right to later require restitution is not in contravention of the double-jeopardy clause. Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 553 (Wyo. 1987).

Consecutive sentences for multiple counts of sexual assault. —

A defendant who is being sentenced for two or more separate acts of sexual assault in the second degree may be sentenced to consecutive life sentences for each separate act without implicating the double jeopardy clause; thus, the court did not err in sentencing defendant to six consecutive life sentences where he pleaded guilty to six counts of sexual assault. DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, 55 P.3d 1233, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 175 (Wyo. 2002).

Enhanced sentence for felony as habitual offender not prohibited. —

The trial court did not err in allowing prior crimes to be used a second time to enhance defendant's current sentence; habitual criminality is a status rather than a substantive offense, and a finding of such only enhances punishment for the most recent qualifying event. Kearns v. State, 2002 WY 97, 48 P.3d 1090, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2002).

Consecutive sentences for assaulting 2 victims constitutional. —

Imposition of consecutive sentences upon conviction of two counts of aggravated assault and battery involving two victims did not violate the double jeopardy clause, where defendant committed two separate acts against two different individuals, each of which violated a single criminal statute. Tuggle v. State, 733 P.2d 610, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 417 (Wyo. 1987).

Criminal conviction following juvenile adjudication. —

Protection against double jeopardy under U.S. Const. amend. V and Wyo. Const. art. I, § 11 was violated because defendant was adjudged delinquent of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree and then criminally prosecuted and punished for the same offense. Haynes v. State, 2012 WY 151, 288 P.3d 1225, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 2012).

Where two statutes are intended to suppress different evils, the acquittal or conviction on one will not prevent prosecution of the other. Goodman v. State, 601 P.2d 178, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 473 (Wyo. 1979).

When defendant waives defense of former jeopardy. —

If a defendant so requests and a mistrial is granted, he is deemed, absent prosecutorial bad faith or overreaching, to have waived any argument of former jeopardy to prevent a retrial. Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 238 (Wyo. 1978), overruled, Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 595 (Wyo. 1986).

In those situations in which a defendant neither requests or acquiesces nor specifically objects to the granting of a mistrial, a plea of former jeopardy is ineffective if incomplete termination of the trial was dictated by “manifest necessity” or to meet “the ends of public justice.” Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 238 (Wyo. 1978), overruled, Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 595 (Wyo. 1986).

A trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second trial, as this accords recognition to society's interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws. Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 238 (Wyo. 1978), overruled, Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 595 (Wyo. 1986).

A reviewing court may consider the merits of a defendant's double jeopardy challenge following entry of an unconditional guilty or no contest plea if the claim can be resolved on the basis of the charging documents and/or the record as it existed at the time the defendant pleaded. If resolution of the claim requires evidence outside the existing record, the claim shall be deemed waived by the guilty or no contest plea. Redding v. State, 2016 WY 41, 371 P.3d 136, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 2016).

Compulsory process. —

At a trial for conspiracy to commit burglary, the district court erred when it denied defendant's request for handwriting exemplars from a co-conspirator's statement as the subpoena process provided the court with legal authority to require a non-party to appear before trial to provide handwriting exemplars. A defendant can be compelled to provide handwriting exemplars without violating the right against self-incrimination. West v. State, 2013 WY 128, 311 P.3d 157, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 2013).

If jury cannot agree on verdict, there is no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense before a different jury. Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1978).

Prosecution for escape not barred by previous punishment imposed by prison. —

A criminal prosecution for prison escape is not barred by a plea of former jeopardy based on disciplinary punishment previously imposed by prison authorities for the same escape. Hamby v. State, 559 P.2d 1388, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 230 (Wyo. 1977).

Prosecution for escape was not barred by a previous punitive sanction imposed by the Wyoming state penitentiary in moving defendant to solitary confinement, or segregation, for a period not to exceed six months, prior to the criminal prosecution. Martz v. State, 566 P.2d 222, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1977).

Separate sentences constitutional. —

The imposition of separate sentences for aiding and abetting aggravated robbery and for conspiracy to commit burglary did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, since the legislature intended the offenses to be punished as separate offenses. Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1990).

Punishment for felony murder and underlying felony unconstitutional. —

The imposition of multiple punishments for felony murder and the underlying felony violates the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Wyoming constitutions. Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1992).

Separate sentences unconstitutional. —

Defendant's right against double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted and sentenced on multiple counts of cruelty to animals that resulted from a single continuous criminal transaction. Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 1992).

Separate sentencing for felony and as habitual offender prohibited. —

Sentencing a defendant for a felony and then sentencing the defendant again for his status as an habitual offender would violate the double jeopardy prohibition. Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 417 (Wyo. 1982).

Changing concurrent sentence to consecutive sentence unconstitutional. —

Where a defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment following his convictions for aggravated burglary and interference with a peace officer, but successfully challenged the aggravated burglary conviction (which was reduced to simple burglary), along with the life sentence imposed for that offense pursuant to Wyoming's “habitual criminal” statute, the district court judge violated the defendant's constitutional right against double jeopardy when he subsequently increased the defendant's sentence for interference with a peace officer by improperly changing the sentence from running concurrent to running consecutive with the defendant's simple burglary sentence. Simonds v. State, 799 P.2d 1210, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1990).

Defendant's conviction did not amount to double jeopardy where he had previously been punished administratively by loss of good time. Hurst v. State, 563 P.2d 232, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 251 (Wyo. 1977), overruled in part, Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982).

Allowance of writ of review would not necessarily place defendant in jeopardy for a second time. —

In defendant's aggravated assault case, where the district court concluded that the prosecution's conduct provided grounds for a mistrial, granted the defense motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice on the basis of speedy trial concerns, the State's writ of review was appropriate. The State had no other adequate remedy, the issues presented were of constitutional magnitude and public importance, and it was not established that allowing the writ would place defendant in jeopardy for a second time. State v. Newman, 2004 WY 41, 88 P.3d 445, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 2004).

Retrial following reversal because of legal error constitutional. —

The retrial of the defendant did not place him twice in jeopardy, because the reversal of his prior conviction was premised upon the incorrect receipt of evidence and an incorrect instruction. Stamper v. State, 701 P.2d 557, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 487 (Wyo. 1985).

Course of retrial following reversal. —

On retrial of a person following reversal, there is no restriction on the evidence that can be produced: a verdict of guilty can be found and all the incidents of a new trial, including statutorily required findings, can be pursued in every respect as though upon original trial, less, of course, the errors found in the first trial. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (U.S. 1983).

And retrial not limited to findings at first trial. —

Where a death penalty is reversed purely as a matter of law, the submission, or finding in a new sentencing trial of aggravating circumstances found not to exist in the first trial does not amount to double jeopardy. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (U.S. 1983).

Because the jury in the first trial of the defendant imposed the death sentence, there was no “acquittal” of the death sentence; therefore, there was no double jeopardy in the retrial of the penalty phase, and on aggravating circumstances not found to exist in the first trial could be found to have existed in the second. State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 187, 88 L. Ed. 2d 155, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 4988 (U.S. 1985).

Double jeopardy. —

Defendant’s convictions and sentences for two counts of kidnapping violated double jeopardy because the evidence was insufficient to show that two kidnappings occurred, as the evidence did not support the State’s position that the victim regained her liberty when she was allowed to clean her mouth in the kitchen before defendant removed the victim from the home and put her in the backseat of her car. Volpi v. State, 2018 WY 66, 419 P.3d 884, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2018).

Defendant’s convictions and sentences for strangulation of a household member and domestic battery did not violate double jeopardy because defendant failed to carry his burden of proving that the two convictions were based on the same incident, as the first was based on defendant’s pushing the victim down on the concrete, grabbing her hair, and slamming her head against the ground as she exited her vehicle to look for her keys, and the second was based on defendant’s covering the victim’s mouth and nose with his hand and pressing down until she could not breath while inside their apartment. Volpi v. State, 2018 WY 66, 419 P.3d 884, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2018).

Self-incrimination privilege asserted in workers' compensation proceedings. —

Employee properly asserted the privilege against self-incrimination in workers' compensation proceedings, in response to discovery requests, because the employee gave a reasoned explanation for invoking the privilege, as the employee reasonably believed the employee's discovery responses could be used in a criminal prosecution under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-510(a). Debyah v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 WY 94, 353 P.3d 711, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2015).

It was an abuse of discretion for a hearing examiner to dismiss an employee's workers' compensation claim for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination in response to discovery requests because the hearing examiner only found the requested information was relevant, rather than balancing the employee's properly asserted privilege against the conflicting interests of the Workers' Compensation Division. Debyah v. State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 WY 94, 353 P.3d 711, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2015).

Double jeopardy barred retrial after acquittal. —

Where the jury found defendant not guilty of attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree murder, the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss the attempted first degree murder charge without prejudice. Because the State could not re-charge defendant under the Double Jeopardy Clause, an order clarifying that the dismissal was with prejudice was appropriate. Landeroz v. State, 2011 WY 168, 267 P.3d 1075, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 2011).

Re-trial was not barred where jury deadlocked. —

Because the jury's failure to reach a verdict on the attempted manslaughter charge was not an event which terminated jeopardy, the State could re-prosecute defendant for that charge. Landeroz v. State, 2011 WY 168, 267 P.3d 1075, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 2011).

Vindictive prosecution not shown. —

Where defendant was charged with possession and concealment of the stolen property and disposing of the identical stolen property, the second count having previously been charged, but that case was dismissed without prejudice after the jury was seated and the first witness was sworn, and the jury in the second trial found defendant guilty of both counts, but the trial judge sentenced him only on count I, later dismissing count II, the defendant did not show there was vindictive prosecution because he was charged with the second count in the second trial. Crozier v. State, 882 P.2d 1230, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1994), limited, State v. Newman, 2004 WY 41, 88 P.3d 445, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 2004).

Habitual criminal statute does not punish a defendant for his previous offenses but for his persistence in crime, and to be a habitual criminal involves a status rather than the commission of a separate offense; hence, the use of defendant's prior convictions in 1983, 1987, and 1997 to enhance each of his aggravated assault convictions did not violate his right against double jeopardy. Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 2003).

Applied in

State v. Hambrick, 65 Wyo. 1, 196 P.2d 661, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1948); Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1977); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981); Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 303 (Wyo. 1983); Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1990); Higgins v. State, 889 P.2d 964, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1995); Geiser v. State, 920 P.2d 1243, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 1996); Daniel v. State, 923 P.2d 728, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1996); Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, 94 P.3d 1034, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (2004).

Stated in

Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 1976); Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984).

Cited in

Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1988); Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 212 (Wyo. 1989); Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1993); Talbott v. State, 902 P.2d 719, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 174 (Wyo. 1995); Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1995); Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1996); Munoz v. Munoz, 2002 WY 4, 39 P.3d 390, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 2002); Rice v. State, 2004 WY 130, 100 P.3d 371, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (2004); Daniels v. State, 2014 WY 125, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Oct. 8, 2014); Hamilton v. State, 2015 WY 39, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Mar. 9, 2015).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Immunity and the Grand Jury,” see VIII Land & Water L. Rev. 629 (1973).

As to the privilege against self-incrimination and the Federal Rules of Evidence, see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 601 (1977).

For article, “Insanity, Bifurcation and Due Process: Can Values Survive Doctrine,” see XIII Land & Water L. Rev. 515 (1978).

For case note, “Receiving Stolen Property — The Doctrine of Recent Possession and Problems Associated with Defendant's Testimony. Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 215 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 291 (1979).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law — Applying the ‘Fruit of the Poisonous Tree’ Doctrine to Evidence Obtained through Statements Made Without Proper Miranda Warnings. Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo. 1983),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1984).

For article, “Silence is no Longer Golden: Destruction of the Right to Remain Silent,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 629 (1984).

For article, “Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 159 (1985).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure — The State's Right to Appeal in Criminal Cases. State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d 629, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 284 (Wyo. 1984),” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 723 (1985).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure — Improper Comment Upon Post-Arrest Silence: Wyoming Returns to the Prejudicial Per Se Rule. Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 354 (Wyo. 1984),” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 231 (1986).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure — Witness Immunity — The Story of a County Attorney Who Said, 'I Think I Can, I Think I Can,' and the Brave Little Conscience that Couldn't be Shocked. Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 1990),” see XXVII Land & Water L. Rev. 191 (1992).

For case note, “Constitutional Law—Double Jeopardy—A Constitutional Protection or a Formality to Sidestep in Successive Prosecutions? Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 661 (1993).

For case note, “State Constitutional Law — Wyoming's Interpretation of Its Right to Silence. Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 148 (Wyo. 1995) (replacing Tortolito v. State, 885 P.2d 864, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1994) (withdrawn)),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 217 (1996).

Article, A Comprehensive Treatise on Contempt of Court in Wyoming, 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 1 (2015).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of incriminating statement obtained in violation of Miranda rule, 77 ALR3d 669.

Former jeopardy: propriety of trial court's declaration of mistrial or discharge of jury, without accused's consent, on ground of prosecution's disclosure of prejudicial matter to, or making prejudicial remarks in presence of, jury, 77 ALR3d 1143.

Acquittal of criminal charges other than contempt as precluding contempt proceedings relating to same transaction, 88 ALR3d 1089.

Instruction allowing presumption or inference of guilt from possession of recently stolen property as violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, 88 ALR3d 1178.

Admissibility in evidence of confession made by accused in anticipation of, during, or following polygraph examination, 89 ALR3d 230.

Admissibility of polygraph evidence at trial on issue of voluntariness of confession made by accused, 92 ALR3d 1317.

Double jeopardy as bar to retrial after grant of defendant's motion for mistrial, 98 ALR3d 997.

Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 ALR4th 234.

Propriety of using otherwise inadmissible statement, taken in violation of Miranda rule, to impeach criminal defendant's credibility — state cases, 14 ALR4th 676.

Admissibility in criminal case of blood-alcohol test where blood was taken despite defendant's objection or refusal to submit to test, 14 ALR4th 690.

Retrial on greater offense following reversal of plea-based conviction of lesser offense, 14 ALR4th 970.

What constitutes “manifest necessity” for state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing subsequent trial despite jeopardy's having attached, 14 ALR4th 1014.

Right of partners to assert personal privilege against self-incrimination with respect to production of partnership books or records, 17 ALR4th 1039.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecution's calling as witness, to extract claim of self-incrimination privilege, one involved in offense charged against accused, 19 ALR4th 368.

Impeachment of defense witness in criminal case by showing witness' prior silence or failure or refusal to testify, 20 ALR4th 245.

Necessity and sufficiency of statements informing one under investigation for involuntary commitment of right to remain silent, 23 ALR4th 563.

Right of prosecution to discovery of case-related notes, statements, and reports — state cases, 23 ALR4th 799.

Propriety of increased sentence following revocation of probation, 23 ALR4th 883.

Propriety of requiring suspect or accused to alter, or to refrain from altering, physical or bodily appearance, 24 ALR4th 592.

Sufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs, 25 ALR4th 419.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's argument commenting on failure of defendant's spouse to testify, 26 ALR4th 9.

Power of state court, during same term, to increase severity of lawful sentence — modern status, 26 ALR4th 905.

Contempt finding as precluding substantive criminal charges relating to same transaction, 26 ALR4th 950.

Admissibility in criminal case of evidence that accused refused to take test of intoxication, 26 ALR4th 1112.

Extent and determination of attorney's right or privilege against self-incrimination in disbarment or other disciplinary proceedings — post-Spevack cases, 30 ALR4th 243.

Failure to object to improper questions or comments as to defendant's pretrial silence or failure to testify as constituting waiver of right to complain of error — modern cases, 32 ALR4th 774.

Impeachment of defendant in criminal case by showing defendant's prearrest silence — state cases, 35 ALR4th 731.

Propriety of using single prior felony conviction as basis for offense of possessing weapon by convicted felon and to enhance sentence, 37 ALR4th 1168.

Former jeopardy as bar to retrial of criminal defendant after original trial court's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial — state cases, 40 ALR4th 741.

Admissibility of police officer's testimony at state trial relating to motorist's admissions made in or for automobile accident report required by law, 46 ALR4th 291.

Voluntariness of confession as affected by police statements that suspect's relatives will benefit by the confession, 51 ALR4th 495.

Double jeopardy: various acts of weapons violations as separate or continuing offense, 80 ALR4th 631.

What constitutes assertion of right to counsel following Miranda warnings — state cases, 83 ALR4th 443.

Determination that state failed to prove charges relied upon for revocation of probation as barring subsequent criminal action based on same underlying charges, 2 ALR5th 262.

Requirement under property insurance policy that insured submit to examination under oath as to loss, 16 ALR5th 412.

Propriety, under state constitutional provisions, of granting use or transactional immunity for compelling incriminating testimony — post-Kastigar cases, 29 ALR5th 1.

Sufficiency of corroboration of confession for purpose of establishing corpus delicti as question of law or fact, 33 ALR5th 571.

Coercive conduct by private person as affecting admissibility of confession under state statutes or constitutional provisions — post-Connelly cases, 48 ALR5th 555.

Propriety of probation condition exposing defendant to public shame or ridicule, 65 ALR5th 187.

Sufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs — Drugs or narcotics administered as part of medical treatment and drugs or intoxicants administered by the police, 96 ALR5th 523.

Conviction or acquittal in federal court as bar to prosecution in state court for state offense based on same facts — Modern view, 97 ALR5th 201.

Failure to appeal denial of double jeopardy claim within time limits of Rule 4, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, as precluding review of claim on appeal of conviction at retrial, 51 ALR Fed 770.

Effect on federal criminal prosecution or conviction of prosecutor's noncompliance with petite policy requiring prior authorization of attorney general for federal trial where accused has been previously prosecuted for same acts in state court, 51 ALR Fed 852.

Propriety of court's failure or refusal to strike direct testimony of government witness who refuses, on grounds of self-incrimination, to answer questions on cross-examination, 55 ALR Fed 742.

Right of immune jury witness to obtain access to government affidavits and other supporting materials in order to challenge legality of court-ordered wiretap or electronic surveillance which provided basis for questions asked in grand jury proceedings, 60 ALR Fed 706.

Propriety of search involving removal of natural substance or foreign object from body by actual or threatened force, 66 ALR Fed 119.

Propriety of use of multiple juries at joint trial of multiple defendants in federal criminal case, 72 ALR Fed 875.

Necessity that Miranda warnings include express reference to right to have attorney present during interrogation, 77 ALR Fed 123.

Availability of sole shareholder's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to resist production of corporation's books and records — modern status, 87 ALR Fed 177.

Construction and application of provision of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, that defendant's confession shall not be inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal prosecution solely because of delay in presentment before magistrate, 124 ALR Fed 263.

Admissibility in federal criminal case of results of polygraph (lie detector) test — Post-Daubert Cases, 140 ALR Fed 525.

What circumstances fall within public safety exception to general requirement, pursuant to or as aid in enforcement of federal constitution's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to give Miranda warnings before conducting custodial interrogation — post-Quarles cases, 142 ALR Fed 229.

Double jeopardy considerations in federal criminal cases — Supreme Court cases, 162 ALR Fed 415.

What constitutes “custodial interrogation” of juvenile by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - at police station or sheriff's office. 26 A.L.R.6th 451.

What constitutes “custodial interrogation” at hospital by police officer within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his or her federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation - suspect injured or taken ill. 25 A.L.R.6th 379.

Voluntary nature of confession as affected by appeal to religious beliefs. 20 A.L.R.6th 479.

§ 12. Detaining witnesses.

No person shall be detained as a witness in any criminal prosecution longer than may be necessary to take his testimony or deposition, nor be confined in any room where criminals are imprisoned.

Cross references. —

As to witnesses in criminal matters generally, see §§ 7-11-401 to 7-11-408 .

§ 13. Indictment.

Until otherwise provided by law, no person shall, for a felony, be proceeded against criminally, otherwise than by indictment, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger.

Cross references. —

As to military courts, see §§ 19-12-101 and 19-10-108 .

As to indictments, see Rule 3, W.R. Cr. P.

Rule of supreme court has force and effect of law and is as “otherwise provided by law.” Barnes v. State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo. 1982).

Thus, prosecution in this state may properly be either by information or indictment. Barnes v. State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 343 (Wyo. 1982).

Prosecutions may be by information. In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 329, 40 P. 520, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1895).

Omission of victims' names error. —

Omission of the victims' names from the criminal complaint, the criminal warrant, and the information rendered the documents fatally defective, deprived the lower courts of jurisdiction and warranted reversal of conviction of violation of (former) § 14-3-104 . Walker v. State, 847 P.2d 542, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. Mar. 16, 1993).

Failure to file amended information after change of venue. —

Failure of the prosecuting attorney of the county to which a change of venue has been taken to subscribe and file an amended information is a defect which was waived when no motion to quash was made. State v. Kusel, 29 Wyo. 287, 213 P. 367, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1923).

Quoted in

Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Cited in

In re Wright, 3 Wyo. 478, 27 P. 565, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 8 , 13 L.R.A. 748 (1891); Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 407 (Wyo. 1982).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Limitations on state prosecuting attorney's discretion to initiate prosecution by indictment or by information, 44 ALR4th 401.

§ 14. Bail; cruel and unusual punishment.

All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be inflicted.

Cross references. —

As to bail upon appeal to district court from decision of municipal court, see §§ 5-6-107 , 5-6-203 .

For bail provision, see Rule 3.1, W.R. Cr. P.

Wyoming jurisprudence affords same bail protections as that of United States. Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1977).

When right to bail arises in capital offenses. —

In capital offenses right to bail in favor of an accused arises when proof is not evident nor the presumption great. State v. Crocker, 5 Wyo. 385, 40 P. 681, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1895).

A statute providing that no person under indictment for a capital offense shall be admitted to bail is in conflict with this section. State v. Crocker, 5 Wyo. 385, 40 P. 681, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1895).

Under this section, first degree murder being a capital offense, a person charged with that crime is not entitled to bail if the evidence presented on the hearing is such that if presented on the trial it would be sufficient to sustain a verdict of murder in the first degree. Meldrum v. Campbell, 20 Wyo. 87, 121 P. 26, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1912).

For discussion of Wyoming Sex Offenders Registration Act as constitutional, see Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1996).

Accused as serious flight risk. —

The language of this section provides without equivocation that all persons shall be bailable, and it must control the right to bail over Rule 46.1, W.R. Cr. P; the Wyoming constitution does not permit denial of bail on the ground that the accused is considered to be a serious flight risk. Simms v. Oedekoven, 839 P.2d 381, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. 1992).

Constitutional guaranty of bail is lost after conviction. In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 263, 39 P. 875, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1895); State v. Helton, 72 Wyo. 105, 261 P.2d 46, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1953).

A statute providing that a person convicted of a felony, sentence being suspended pending appeal, shall be imprisoned until the appeal is determined does not conflict with this section. In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 263, 39 P. 875, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1895).

Parolee lacks right to bail. —

A parolee who has been arrested and detained on a parole violation warrant has no right to be admitted to bail. Pisano v. Shillinger, 814 P.2d 274, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 121 (Wyo. 1991).

It was not improper for officer who issued traffic citation to set bail for the defendant. Freeman v. Lusk, 717 P.2d 331, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 524 (Wyo. 1986).

Bail is not excessive merely because defendant is unable to meet it. Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1977).

It is not necessary for a court to repeatedly reduce bail to a point that it can be made by the defendant; the measure is adequacy to insure appearance. Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1977).

Failure to release defendant on bail he could meet, until late date, did not deprive him of fair trial. —

See Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 252 (Wyo. 1977).

Death penalty, if administered in humane fashion, is constitutional. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (U.S. 1983).

Punishment held not “cruel or unusual punishment.” —

Where a defendant convicted of criminal libel is sentenced to 3 months in jail and to pay a fine of $1,000.00, and to stand committed until such fine be paid, the punishment growing out of a failure to pay such fine is not cruel and unusual within this section providing that cruel or unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. In re MacDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 P. 18, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1893).

This section is not violated by a sentence for contempt imposing a fine of $500.00, and a jail sentence of 6 months and until the fine and costs are paid. Fisher v. McDaniel, 9 Wyo. 457, 64 P. 1056, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1901).

Defendant's life imprisonment for causing the death of a child, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 , was not cruel, in and of itself, nor was it unusual, in violation of this section. Johnson v. State, 2003 WY 9, 61 P.3d 1234, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. Feb. 18, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 841, 124 S. Ct. 108, 157 L. Ed. 2d 74, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5710 (U.S. 2003).

Sentence of 17 to 25 years in a case where guilty pleas were entered to third-degree sexual assault and one count of immodest, immoral, or indecent acts with a minor was not disproportionate to the crimes where defendant was accused of touching teenage girls inappropriately for his own sexual gratification; moreover, he was acting like a sexual predator when he groomed the girls. Hubbard v. State, 2008 WY 12, 175 P.3d 625, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 2008).

District court properly denied defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because he did not met his burden of proving that the statute under which he was sentence was cruel or unusual where he was 18 at the time he committed a double homicide, his sentence to two consecutive life sentences for first-degree murder was effectively a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, and the defining the age of majority as 19 did not do so for purposes of determining criminal culpability. Nicodemus v. State, 2017 WY 34, 392 P.3d 408, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 2017).

Defendant was not subjected to cruel and/or unusual punishment when defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 , upon defendant's second conviction for sexual abuse of a minor. Norgaard v. State, 2014 WY 157, 339 P.3d 267, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 2014).

Death penalty imposed only with limited discretion. —

In order to satisfy the requirements of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 169 (1972), the sentencing authority's discretion must be guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (U.S. 1982).

Nineteen-to-20 year sentence for involuntary manslaughter constitutional. —

A sentence of 19 to 20 years for the offense of involuntary manslaughter does not violate federal and state bans on cruel and unusual punishment. Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 327 (Wyo. 1982).

Ten-to-20 year sentence for armed robbery under Wyoming recidivist statute (§ 6-10-201 ) is constitutional, under either the eighth amendment to the United States constitution, or this section of the Wyoming constitution, even though the defendant allegedly deliberately chose to use a nonfunctional gun, unloaded and absent a firing pin, to consciously avoid violence and harm. Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 512 (Wyo. 1986).

Parole prior to expiration of sentence. —

There is no constitutional right to be paroled prior to the expiration of a valid sentence. Dorman v. State, 665 P.2d 511, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 340 (Wyo. 1983).

Denying defendant the ability to receive six months of good time by imposing a minimum sentence of eight years was not cruel and unusual since granting of good time is a matter of grace, not of right. Whitney v. State, 745 P.2d 902, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 538 (Wyo. 1987).

Applied in

State v. District Court, 715 P.2d 191, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 501 (Wyo. 1986).

Quoted in

State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 231 (Wyo. 1974); Fortin v. State, 622 P.2d 418, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 276 (Wyo. 1981); Price v. State, 716 P.2d 324, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 508 (Wyo. 1986); Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30, 390 P.3d 769, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 2017).

Cited in

Todd v. State, 566 P.2d 597, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 271 (Wyo. 1977); Apodaca v. State, 571 P.2d 603, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 299 (Wyo. 1977); Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 482 (Wyo. 1979).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Bail in Wyoming Under the Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure,” see V Land & Water L. Rev. 621 (1970).

For case note, “Is the Current Test of the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment Proper? Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (1982),” see XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 681 (1982).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure—Wyoming Recognizes a Substantive Right to Bail Pending Appeal of Conviction. State v. District Court, 715 P.2d 191, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 501 (Wyo. 1986),” see XXII Land & Water L. Rev. 605 (1987).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of statute abolishing commercial bail bond business, 19 ALR4th 355.

Sufficiency of access to legal research facilities afforded defendant confined in state prison or local jail, 23 ALR4th 590.

Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator's license for “habitual,” “persistent” or “frequent” violations of traffic regulations, 48 ALR4th 367.

Propriety of imposing capital punishment on mentally retarded individuals, 20 ALR5th 177.

Propriety of carrying out death sentences against mentally ill individuals, 111 ALR5th 491.

Application of constitutional rule of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4648 (2002), that execution of mentally retarded persons constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of Eighth Amendment, 122 ALR 5th 145.

When does forfeiture of real property violate excessive fines clause of Eighth Amendment or state constitutions — State cases, 124 ALR 5th 509.

Propriety of denial of pretrial bail under Bail Reform Act (18 USC § 3141 et seq.), 75 ALR Fed 806.

Propriety, under federal constitution, of evidence or argument concerning deterrent effect of death penalty, 78 ALR Fed 553.

When does forfeiture of currency, bank account, or cash equivalent violate excessive fines clause of eighth amendment, 164 ALR Fed 591.

When does forfeiture of real property violate excessive fines clause of Eighth Amendment — Post-Austin cases, 168 ALR Fed 375.

When does forfeiture of motor vehicle pursuant to federal statute violate excessive fines clause of Eighth Amendment, 169 ALR Fed 615.

Excessive fines clause of Eighth Amendment — Supreme Court cases, 172 ALR Fed 389.

§ 15. Penal code to be humane.

The penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of reformation and prevention.

Cross references. —

As to crimes and offenses generally, see title 6.

Purpose of sentencing. —

A sentence is imposed for one or more of four purposes: (1) rehabilitation; (2) punishment (specific deterrence and retribution); (3) example to others (general deterrence); and (4) removal from society (incapacitation or protection of the public). Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 373 (Wyo. 1983), reh'g denied, 707 P.2d 153, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 575 (Wyo. 1985).

Sentencing court may consider factors beyond prevention and rehabilitation. —

This section is not so narrowly drawn as to justify conclusion that the only factors which the court may consider in the imposition of sentence are prevention and rehabilitation; the section speaks to the penal code, not to sentencing, and evinces no intent on the part of the constitutional convention to so limit the discretion of sentencing judges in criminal cases. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984).

Sentence within statutory limits will not be disturbed upon appeal absent clear abuse of discretion. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984).

Consecutive life terms constitutional. —

Consecutive life sentences for felony murder and aggravated kidnapping do not violate this section, despite their preventing the defendant from re-entering society for reformation purposes. Castle v. State, 842 P.2d 1060, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1992).

District court properly denied defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because he did not met his burden of proving that the statute under which he was sentence was cruel or unusual where he was 18 at the time he committed a double homicide, his sentence to two consecutive life sentences for first-degree murder was effectively a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, and the defining the age of majority as 19 did not do so for purposes of determining criminal culpability. Nicodemus v. State, 2017 WY 34, 392 P.3d 408, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 2017).

Humane to impose 10-to-20 year sentence for armed robbery under habitual criminal provision. —

The trial judge imposed a 10-to-20 year sentence for armed robbery under § 6-10-201 (habitual criminal) with the humane principles of reformation and prevention required by this section foremost in mind. Prior to imposing sentence, the trial judge heard testimony from a psychiatrist regarding the defendant's personality disorder and reviewed, in the presence of the defendant, counsel and the jury, the defendant's history of drug abuse, his unhappy family history, the culpability of his past crimes, and the fact that he used an unloaded weapon in the aggravated robbery. Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 512 (Wyo. 1986).

Sentence of incarceration for 36 to 72 months for aggravated vehicular homicide not an abuse of discretion. —

Sentencing of defendant, who was 83 years of age and in poor health, upon conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide, to incarceration for a period of not less than 36 months nor more than 72 months, was not an abuse of discretion, nor did it violate Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 15. The district court imposed the prison sentence because of the retribution aspect of punishment, and so as not to depreciate the seriousness of aggravated homicide by vehicle. Cohee v. State, 2005 WY 50, 110 P.3d 267, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 56 (Wyo. 2005).

Appropriate care for inmate statutorily, constitutionally, mandated. —

The board of charities and reform has a statutory, as well as a constitutional, duty to provide appropriate care for a penitentiary inmate. One method of fulfilling that obligation is for the board to provide adequate medical care. Apodaca v. Ommen, 807 P.2d 939, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1991).

Suspension of license cruel and unusual punishment. —

Section 31-7-126 (former) and § 31-7-128(f), which provide for the loss of driver's license for individuals less than 19 years of age when convicted of possession or consumption of alcohol, inflicts cruel and unusual punishment upon persons subjected to the provisions in violation of the Wyoming Constitution. Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1992).

Quoted in

State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 231 (Wyo. 1974); Fortin v. State, 622 P.2d 418, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 276 (Wyo. 1981); Jessen v. State, 622 P.2d 1374, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 283 (Wyo. 1981).

Cited in

Moore v. Jarvis, 44 Wyo. 92, 8 P.2d 818, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (1932); Todd v. State, 566 P.2d 597, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 271 (Wyo. 1977); Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 482 (Wyo. 1979); Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 327 (Wyo. 1982); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1983); Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 570 (Wyo. 1986); Green v. State, 784 P.2d 1360, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 254 (Wyo. 1989); Moehr v. State, 13 P.3d 1114, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 224 (Wyo. 2000).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Changing Structure of Criminal Sentencing,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 591 (1983).

For comment, “Prosecution as a Juvenile or an Adult? Is the Discretion Vested in the District Attorney by Section 14-6-203(c) of the Wyoming Statutes Unconstitutional and Violative of the Proper Role of a Prosecutor?” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 187 (1984).

For article, “Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 159 (1985).

For comment, “Reforming Criminal Sentencing in Wyoming,” see XX Land & Water L. Rev. 575 (1985).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

§ 16. Conduct of jails.

No person arrested and confined in jail shall be treated with unnecessary rigor. The erection of safe and comfortable prisons, and inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners shall be provided for.

Cross references. —

As to establishment of penal institutions, see art. 7, § 18, Wyo. Const.

As to Western Interstate Corrections Compact, see §§ 7-3-401 to 7-3-406 .

As to sentence, imprisonment, pardon and parole generally, see § 7-13-101 et seq.

As to county jails, see §§ 18-6-201 to 18-6-313 .

As to state penal institutions, see §§ 25-2-101 to 25-4-103 .

Obligation to provide adequate medical care. —

The board of charities and reform has a statutory, as well as a constitutional, duty to provide appropriate care for a penitentiary inmate. One method of fulfilling that obligation is for the board to provide adequate medical care. Apodaca v. Ommen, 807 P.2d 939, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1991).

Extended segregation of intersexual inmate was not cruel and unusual punishment. —

Following a trial to the court, the court reluctantly found that the defendants, prison officials and others, did not violate an inmate's rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, by placing her in segregated confinement for 438 days due solely to her genetically created ambiguous gender, because the inmate was provided with the basic necessities such as food, warmth, and exercise, and the officials were not in disregard of the inmate's and other prisoners' safety, although no precise safety risk was identified. DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2371 (D. Wyo. 2004).

Stated in

Nicodemus v. State, 2017 WY 34, 392 P.3d 408, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of incarcerated mother to retain custody of infant in penal institution, 14 ALR4th 748.

Right of jailed or imprisoned parent to visit from minor child, 15 ALR4th 1234.

§ 17. Habeas corpus.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless, when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

Cross references. —

See also ch. 27 of title 1 and Rule 3, Sup. Ct.

One of the provisos of habeas corpus proceedings is to inquire into jurisdictional matters. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

And errors not affecting jurisdiction will not be reviewed. —

Mere errors of law in imposing a sentence for contempt, which do not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court, will not be reviewed on habeas corpus. Fisher v. McDaniel, 9 Wyo. 457, 64 P. 1056, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1901).

The regularity of the judgment under which petitioner was imprisoned cannot be impeached by habeas corpus for errors not affecting jurisdiction of the court. Hollibaugh v. Hehn, 13 Wyo. 269, 79 P. 1044, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1905).

Method of drawing jury. —

Habeas corpus cannot question the regularity of the method adopted by the court in drawing and summoning the petit jury by which petitioner was convicted. Younger v. Hehn, 12 Wyo. 289, 75 P. 443, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1904).

Appeal available in child-custody cases. —

An appeal is available from action taken in a habeas corpus proceeding in child-custody cases. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Although denial of petition is nonappealable determination. —

Normally, a person may petition for a writ of habeas corpus again and again to the same or other courts, each denial thereof being a nonappealable determination. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Filing of writ in supreme court in restraint cases. —

A writ of habeas corpus in all restraint cases, including child-custody cases, may be filed in the supreme court of Wyoming although the issuance of a similar writ may have been refused by a district court. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court, 621 P.2d 223, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1980).

Quoted in

State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 455 (Wyo. 1985).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

What constitutes “an opportunity for full and fair litigation” in state court precluding habeas corpus review under 28 USC § 2254 in federal court of state prisoner's fourth amendment claims, 75 ALR Fed 9.

§ 18. Religious liberty.

The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall be forever guaranteed in this state, and no person shall be rendered incompetent to hold any office of trust or profit, or to serve as a witness or juror, because of his opinion on any matter of religious belief whatever; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state.

Cross references. —

See also art. 21, § 25, Wyo. Const.

As to churches and religious societies, see also §§ 17-8-101 to 17-8-117 .

Religious belief not violated.

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 18, and Wyo. Cost. art. 21, § 25, were not violated where the judge was being disciplined for declining to uphold the United States and Wyoming Constitutions by refusing to perform same-sex marriages, not due to her religious beliefs. Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 639, 199 L. Ed. 2d 527, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 103 (U.S. 2018).

Drug laws. —

Defendant challenging state drug laws on free exercise grounds failed to establish that statutes were anything other than valid and neutral laws of general applicability. Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2000).

Applied in

Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12370 (D. Wyo. 1970).

Cited in

Williams v. Eaton, 333 F. Supp. 107, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11210 (D. Wyo. 1971); LePage v. State, 2001 WY 26, 18 P.3d 1177, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 34 , 94 A.L.R.5th 777 (Wyo. 2001).

Law reviews. —

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Right of clergyman in court as professional attorney to be in clerical garb, 84 ALR3d 1143.

Validity, under state constitution and laws, of issuance by state or state agency of revenue bonds to finance or refinance construction projects at private religious-affiliated colleges or universities, 95 ALR3d 1000.

Validity and construction of statutes or ordinances prohibiting profanity or profane swearing or cursing, 5 ALR4th 956.

Civil liability for “deprogramming” member of religious sect, 11 ALR4th 228.

Leaving or refusing employment for religious reasons as barring unemployment compensation, 12 ALR4th 611.

Religion as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 22 ALR4th 971.

Validity, under federal and state establishment of religion provisions, of prohibition of sale of intoxicating liquors on specific religious holidays, 27 ALR4th 1155.

Judicial review of termination of pastor's employment by local church or temple, 31 ALR4th 851.

Validity, under state constitutions, of private shopping center's prohibition or regulation of political, social or religious expression or activity, 38 ALR4th 1219.

Liability of religious association for damages for intentionally tortious conduct in recruitment, indoctrination or related activity, 40 ALR4th 1062.

Validity of local or state denial of public school courses or activities to private or parochial school students, 43 ALR4th 776.

Validity of guardianship proceeding based on brainwashing of subject by religious, political or social organization, 44 ALR4th 1207.

Invasion of privacy by a clergyman, church or religious group, 67 ALR4th 1086.

Cause of action for clergy malpractice, 75 ALR4th 750.

Liability of church or religious society for sexual misconduct of clergy, 5 ALR5th 530.

Power of court or other public agency to order medical treatment over parental religious objections for child whose life is not immediately endangered, 21 ALR5th 248.

Validity, under state constitutions, of private shopping center's prohibition or regulation of political, social, or religious expression or activity, 52 ALR5th 195.

Free exercise of religion as applied to individual's objection to obtaining or disclosing social security number, 93 ALR5th 1.

First amendment challenges to display of religious symbols on public property, 107 ALR5th 1.

Validity under federal law of prison regulations relating to inmates' hair length and style, 62 ALR Fed 479.

Validity, construction, and application of provisions of § 702 of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-1) exempting activities of religious organizations from operation of title VII equal employment opportunity provisions, 67 ALR Fed 874.

Constitutionality of teaching or suppressing teaching of Biblical creationism or Darwinian evolution theory in public schools, 102 ALR Fed 537.

Constitutionality of teaching or otherwise promoting secular humanism in public schools, 103 ALR Fed 538.

Validity, construction, and application of Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 USCS §§ 2000bb et seq.), 135 ALR Fed 121.

Validity and construction of public school regulation of student distribution of religious documents at school, 136 ALR Fed 551.

What constitutes “hybrid rights” claim under Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2021 (U.S.), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913, 110 S. Ct. 2605, 110 L. Ed. 2d 285, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2979 (U.S. 1990).

State constitutional challenges to the display of religious symbols on public property. 26 A.L.R.6th 145.

Wearing of religious symbols in courtroom as protected by First Amendment. 18 A.L.R.6th 775.

§ 19. Appropriations for sectarian or religious societies or institutions prohibited.

No money of the state shall ever be given or appropriated to any sectarian or religious society or institution.

Cross references. —

As to general appropriation bills, see art. 3, § 34, Wyo. Const.

As to churches and religious societies, see also §§ 17-8-101 to 17-8-117 .

For the Wyoming Nonprofit Corporation Act, see § 17-19-101 et seq.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Through the Front Door,” see 19 Wyo. L.J. 164 (1965).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of religious holidays, 90 ALR3d 752.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance prohibiting desecration of church, 90 ALR3d 1128.

Validity, under state constitution and laws, of issuance by state or state agency of revenue bonds to finance or refinance construction projects at private religious-affiliated colleges or universities, 95 ALR3d 1000.

§ 20. Freedom of speech and press; libel; truth a defense.

Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good intent and [for] justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense, the jury having the right to determine the facts and the law, under direction of the court.

Cross references. —

As to libel and slander generally, see §§ 1-3-105 , 1-4-102 , 1-29-101 to 1-29-106 .

For provision that article defining and punishing unlawful conduct within governmental facilities does not abridge freedom of speech and press, see § 6-6-304 .

Section compared to federal constitution. —

This section is broader than that found in the First Amendment to the United States constitution in that it also guarantees the right to publish which includes the right not only to speak and to write but also to make the same known. Tate v. Akers, 409 F. Supp. 978, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16485 (D. Wyo. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1166, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 5928 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1977).

Vagueness.

Provisions of the Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct alleged to have been violated by a judge's refusal to marry same -sex couples were not void for vagueness where she was not being disciplined for her expression of her religious beliefs, but for her conduct in refusing to impartially perform her judicial functions, and an ordinary judge would have understood that refusal to conduct some marriages on the basis of the sexual orientation of the couple did not comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct. Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 639, 199 L. Ed. 2d 527, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 103 (U.S. 2018).

No federal civil rights damage claim for violation. —

This section provides only that the right to free speech and press shall be subject to a potential cause of action for libel. It creates no property interest in being free from libel, such as to support a federal civil rights claim for damages. Coen v. Runner, 854 F.2d 374, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 11229 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1988).

Terrorist threat statute doesn't reach protected speech. —

A statute may be challenged “facially” for vagueness only if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Section 6-2-505(a) (terrorist threats) does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech, such as “practical jokes and groundless threats.” Clearly, what the legislature intended to prohibit through § 6-2-505(a) were violent threats which subject society to clear and present dangers. McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 204 (Wyo. 1993), reh'g denied, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. Feb. 2, 1994).

“With good intent and [for] justifiable ends.” —

The language “with good intent and [for] justifiable ends” means that the matter must be published with a good purpose and for a defensible ultimate object, and these are facts to be proven as any other fact of like nature in a litigated case. Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1947).

The phrase “when published with good intent and [for] justifiable ends” of this section is repugnant to the guarantees of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution in libel actions in which the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710, 1964 U.S. LEXIS 1655, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964) and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 1084 (1967) standard applies to public figures who have been criticized by a media defendant regarding matters of public concern. Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1992).

Statute establishing qualification for newspapers entitled to publish legal notices upheld. —

Former statute, providing that a newspaper having the right to publish notices with legal effect must have been established for one year or more, was not in conflict with the provisions for freedom of the press and therefore not unconstitutional. In re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. 226, 11 P.2d 265, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1932).

Publisher's free speech rights outweigh litter prohibition. —

Publisher of a free weekly newspaper distributed door to door and through news racks did not violate the local littering ordinance as the burden on the town was extraordinarily minor and the burden on private property was trivial. The newspaper, as a noncommercial publication, is entitled to the full protection of the Constitution of the United States and Wyoming. The town may not place a complete ban on speech, a form of prior restraint, if that speech is in a form which may eventually be viewed as litter. Miller v. City of Laramie, 880 P.2d 594, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1994).

Public figures. —

Where an unknown person called in to an open microphone talk show conducted by an employee of a radio broadcasting company, which did not use an electronic delay system in connection with the talk show, and the anonymous caller stated that she wished to read a prepared statement and thereupon said that a public figure “had been discharged as insurance commissioner for dishonesty,” the person named in the statement could not recover for defamation. Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1976).

Lawyer representing famous client not “public figure.” —

A lawyer who is merely advocating for a famous or controversial client is not a public figure merely because he has taken on the cause as advocate. Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. Sept. 16, 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984, 112 S. Ct. 1668, 118 L. Ed. 2d 388, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2342 (U.S. 1992).

Contemptuous utterances of attorney directed to supreme court. —

Contemptuous utterances of attorney, consisting of letters and exhibits mailed to the supreme court during the pendency of his petition for permission to practice law in Wyoming and during the pendency of a contempt proceeding in the supreme court, were not justified under the constitutional right of freedom of speech, since such utterances constituted a clear and present danger to the supreme court and the administration of justice, and authorized punishment for contempt. Application of Stone, 77 Wyo. 1, 305 P.2d 777, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1026, 77 S. Ct. 593, 1 L. Ed. 2d 598, 1957 U.S. LEXIS 1248 (U.S. 1957), reh'g denied, 353 U.S. 943, 77 S. Ct. 818, 1 L. Ed. 2d 764 (U.S. 1957).

Disbarment proceeding. —

Provision in reference to libel and slander in which jury determines facts and law is not applicable to disbarment proceeding based on charge of circulating pamphlet making false, contemptuous and scandalous charges against supreme court. State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 P.2d 285, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886, 65 S. Ct. 1571, 89 L. Ed. 2001, 1945 U.S. LEXIS 1905 (U.S. 1945).

The publication of information of a disbarment proceeding by a newspaper is in aid of the public welfare and can unquestionably be regarded as done for “a good purpose” and for a “defensible ultimate object.” Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1947).

Picketing. —

If a labor union, because of an employer's refusal to sign an agreement to employ union members only, without contacting employer's employees or discussing with them conditions of their work or the desirability of their joining the union, pickets the employer's premises and in such picketing states that the employer is unfair to the local union, such picketing is not an exercise of the right of free speech as set out in this section. Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance Local, 70 Wyo. 165, 246 P.2d 778, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1952).

No policy protecting private employee's speech rights. —

Terminating an at-will employee for exercising his right to free speech by refusing to follow a legal directive of a private employer on the employer's premises during working hours (i.e., refusing to wear anti-union buttons) did not violate public policy. Drake v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 891 P.2d 80, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1995).

A teacher has the right to criticize his or her employers. Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1976).

And utterances of a teacher in behalf of his union activities were protected by the United States and Wyoming constitutions. Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1976).

Anonymous letter to school supervisors protected speech. —

An anonymous letter sent by certain employees at the Wyoming girls' school to the school's supervisory board members to advise them regarding administrative problems qualified as “whistle-blowing” protected speech in the context and manner in which it was used. Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 813 P.2d 185, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032, 112 S. Ct. 872, 116 L. Ed. 2d 777, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 266 (U.S. 1992).

Employee talking in derogatory fashion to employer's customers not protected. —

An employee who talked in a derogatory fashion to the customers and business contacts of his employer was not protected, by virtue of his right to speak freely, from disciplinary action by the employer. Allen v. Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 479 (Wyo. 1985), overruled in part, Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 17, 105 P.3d 1079, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2005).

Statements at public school by principal on internal affairs of school system, which were part of the principal's official functions, do not invoke free speech protection. Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist., 558 F.2d 982, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12285 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1977).

Public school principal failed to meet his burden of showing that his statements made to the board of education on the career education program and football reserved ticket sales were constitutionally protected or the substantial or motivating factor for his termination. Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist., 558 F.2d 982, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12285 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1977).

Bookkeeper's constitutional right of free speech was not infringed by dismissal from employment at the Wyoming girls' school, where her actions in making telephone calls to the school superintendent's superior regarding administrative problems did not entitle her to “whistle-blower” status and, in fact, directly impaired the superintendent's authority and ability to discipline the staff. Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 813 P.2d 185, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032, 112 S. Ct. 872, 116 L. Ed. 2d 777, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 266 (U.S. 1992).

No protection based on private employee's speech. —

Grant of summary judgment in favor of two employers in the employee's wrongful termination suit was appropriate because her actions in expressing her negative opinion of her employers were not fair and were potentially harmful or hurtful to her employers. The employee's speech under those circumstances exceeded the limits of protected speech. McGarvey v. Key Prop. Mgmt. LLC, 2009 WY 84, 211 P.3d 503, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 2009).

Political patronage of deputy sheriff. —

Under § 18-3-611 , political patronage and other expressions of the freedom of association and party affiliation are not cause or justification for which a deputy sheriff may be terminated. Lucero v. Mathews, 901 P.2d 1115, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 156 (Wyo. 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. Sept. 26, 1995).

Right of access to police records may be restrained. —

Constitutional right of the public and the press of access to police records may be conditioned by statutory restrictions and balanced with relevant competing-interest considerations: the legislature has authority to promulgate such statutory restraints upon the news-gathering business as will best serve the public good. Sheridan Newspapers v. Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 289 (Wyo. 1983).

Statements deemed defamatory. —

Magazine article statements describing the plaintiff, a practicing attorney, as a “vermin-infested turd dispenser,” a “parasitic scum-sucker,” a “shameless shithole,” a “reeking rectum,” a “hemorrhoidal type” and “Asshole of the Month for July,” were clearly defamatory. Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. Sept. 16, 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984, 112 S. Ct. 1668, 118 L. Ed. 2d 388, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2342 (U.S. 1992).

Criminal libel. —

See In re MacDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 P. 18, 1893 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1893).

Truth of a defamatory statement is a “complete” defense to an action for libel. Ando v. Great Western Sugar Co., 475 F.2d 531, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11030 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1973).

Substantially true news articles complete defense to libel charge. —

When it was stated in a news story that a county official refused to step from his vehicle after being arrested for a traffic violation, grasped the steering wheel tightly and resisted the police officers, was forcibly pulled from his vehicle, and wrestled to a position that his hands were forced behind him and put in handcuffs, the damage to his reputation, if damage there was, was complete. It made little difference in the final result whether he was wrestled against the car or “wrestled to the ground,” as reported in an earlier news story. The news articles reporting the incident were, therefore, substantially true as a matter of law and, hence, a complete defense to a libel charge. Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 568 (Wyo. 1985).

Section does not absolutely guarantee plaintiff trial to jury in defamation case. Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. Sept. 16, 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984, 112 S. Ct. 1668, 118 L. Ed. 2d 388, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2342 (U.S. 1992).

Party not entitled to discuss law before jury. —

In an action of libel the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the plaintiff to discuss before the jury the law of the case including the law relative to punitive damages where the court had set forth the law in instructions to the jury. Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1947).

Instructions to jury. —

Under this section the court may instruct the jury fully upon the law and tell them that they, the jury, did not have the right to decide the case regardless of the law, but that if they could say on their oaths that they knew the law better than the court they might do so, but they should be fully convinced that the court was wrong and that they were right. Nicholson v. State, 24 Wyo. 347, 157 P. 1013, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1916).

Summary judgment may be granted in libel action. —

Despite the statement that the jury shall determine the facts and the law, there is no doubt but that a trial court in a libel action may in a proper case grant a summary judgment. Ando v. Great Western Sugar Co., 475 F.2d 531, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11030 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1973).

This section does not preclude the trial court's use of summary judgment procedure in a defamation action. Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. 1992).

Inflammatory publicity did not deny defendant fair trial. —

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying a change of venue where the effects of inflammatory publicity on potential jurors were mitigated by a carefully controlled voir dire so as to avoid the denial of a fair trial to the defendant. Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1992).

Applied in

Foothill Indus. Bank v. Mikkelson, 623 P.2d 748, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 286 (Wyo. 1981).

Cited in

Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12370 (D. Wyo. 1970); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1988); Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 193 (Wyo. 2000).

Law reviews. —

For note, “Truthful Libel and Right of Privacy in Wyoming,” see XI Wyo. L.J. 184.

For comment on Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1976), see XII Land & Water L. Rev. 749 (1977).

For case note, “Constitutional Law — A Constitutional Right of Access to State-Held Information. Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 289 (Wyo. 1983),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 719 (1984).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

For case note, “Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation — Justifying Restrictions on Lawyers' Speech. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 155 S. Ct. 2371 (1995),” see XXXI Land & Water 231 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 ALR3d 486.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 ALR3d 564.

Libel by newspaper headline, 95 ALR3d 660.

Liability for defamation for criticizing restaurant's food, 96 ALR3d 609.

Privilege of newsgatherer against disclosure of confidential sources or information, 99 ALR3d 37.

Validity and construction of statutes or ordinances prohibiting profanity or profane swearing or cursing, 5 ALR4th 956.

Validity and construction of statutes or ordinances prohibiting or restricting distribution of commercial advertising to private residences — modern cases, 12 ALR4th 851.

Validity of law criminalizing wearing dress of opposite sex, 12 ALR4th 1249.

Validity, propriety, and effect of allowing or prohibiting media's broadcasting, recording, or photographing court proceedings, 14 ALR4th 121.

Right of jailed or imprisoned parent to visit from minor child, 15 ALR4th 1234.

Liability for personal injury or death allegedly resulting from television or radio broadcast, 20 ALR4th 327.

Validity, construction, and effect of statutes, ordinances, or regulations prohibiting or regulating advertising of intoxicating liquors, 20 ALR4th 600.

Libel and slander: attorneys' statements, to parties other than alleged defamed party or its agents, in course of extrajudicial investigation or preparation relating to pending or anticipated civil litigation as privileged, 23 ALR4th 932.

Defamation: loss of employer's qualified privilege to publish employee's work record or qualification, 24 ALR4th 144.

Advertising as ground for disciplining attorney, 30 ALR4th 742.

State constitutional protection of allegedly defamatory statements regarding private individual, 33 ALR4th 212.

Validity of state judicial or bar association rule forbidding use of law firm name unless it contains exclusively names of persons who are or were members of that state's bar, as it applies to out-of-state law firm, 33 ALR4th 404.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of statements or utterances by members of governing body of public institution of higher learning in course of official proceedings, 33 ALR4th 632.

Proof of injury to reputation as prerequisite to recovery of damages in defamation action — post-Gertz cases, 36 ALR4th 807.

Propriety of order forbidding news media from publishing names and addresses of jurors in criminal cases, 36 ALR4th 1126.

Libel and slander: necessity of expert testimony to establish negligence of media defendant in defamation action by private individual, 37 ALR4th 987.

Criticism or disparagement of character, competence or conduct of candidate for office as defamation, 37 ALR4th 1088.

Right of member of nonprofit association or corporation to possession, inspection or use of membership list, 37 ALR4th 1206.

Criticism or disparagement of physician's or dentist's character, competence or conduct as defamation, 38 ALR4th 836.

Defamation of psychiatrist, psychologist or counselor, 38 ALR4th 874.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance regulating commercial video game enterprises, 38 ALR4th 930.

Defamation: application of New York Times and related standards to nonmedia defendants, 38 ALR4th 1114.

Validity, under state constitutions, of private shopping center's prohibition or regulation of political, social or religious expression or activity, 38 ALR4th 1219.

Validity of college or university regulation of political or voter registration activity in student housing facilities, 39 ALR4th 1137.

Use of compulsory bar association dues or fees for activities from which particular members dissent, 40 ALR4th 672.

State or local sales, use or privilege tax on sales of, or revenues from sales of, advertising space or services, 40 ALR4th 1114.

What constitutes “single publication” within meaning of single publication rule affecting action for libel and slander, violation of privacy or similar torts, 41 ALR4th 541.

Trespass: state prosecution for unauthorized entry or occupation, for public demonstration purposes, of business, industrial or utility premises, 41 ALR4th 773.

Defamation: nature and extent of privilege accorded public statements, relating to subject of legislative business or concern, made by member of state or local legislature or council outside of formal proceedings, 41 ALR4th 1116.

Validity and construction of terroristic threat statutes, 45 ALR4th 949.

Criticism or disparagement of attorney's character, competence or conduct as defamation, 46 ALR4th 326.

Defamation by gestures or acts, 46 ALR4th 403.

Rights of state and municipal public employees in grievance proceedings, 46 ALR4th 912.

Defamation: publication by intracorporate communication of employee's evaluation, 47 ALR4th 674.

Defamation: privilege attaching to news report of criminal activities based on information supplied by public safety officers — modern status, 47 ALR4th 718.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for defamation, 49 ALR4th 1158.

Validity, construction and effect of state statutes restricting political activities of public officers or employees, 51 ALR4th 702.

Validity and construction of state court's order precluding publicity or comment about pending civil case by counsel, parties or witnesses, 56 ALR4th 1214.

False light invasion of privacy — cognizability and elements, 57 ALR4th 22.

False light invasion of privacy — defenses and remedies, 57 ALR4th 244.

Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as defamation — post-New York Times cases, 57 ALR4th 404.

Libel or slander: defamation by statement made in jest, 57 ALR4th 520.

Intrusion by news-gathering entity as invasion of right of privacy, 69 ALR4th 1059.

Standing of media representatives or organizations to seek review of, or to intervene to oppose, order closing criminal proceedings to public, 74 ALR4th 476.

Search and seizure of telephone company records pertaining to subscriber as violation of subscriber's constitutional rights, 76 ALR4th 536.

Validity of ordinances restricting location of “adult entertainment” or sex-oriented businesses, 10 ALR5th 538.

Validity and construction of statutes prohibiting harassment of hunters, fishermen or trappers, 17 ALR5th 837.

Who is “public figure” for purposes of defamation action, 19 ALR5th 1.

Validity, construction, and effect of “hate crimes” statutes, “ethnic intimidation” statutes, or the like, 22 ALR5th 261.

Propriety of exclusion of press or other media representatives from civil trial, 39 ALR5th 103.

Propriety of publishing identity of sexual assault victim, 40 ALR5th 787.

Who is “public official” for purposes of defamation action, 44 ALR5th 193.

Validity, under state constitutions, of private shopping center's prohibition or regulation of political, social, or religious expression or activity, 52 ALR5th 195.

Admissibility of evidence of public opinion polls or surveys in obscenity prosecutions on issue whether materials in question are obscene, 59 ALR5th 749.

Reportorial privilege as to nonconfidential news information, 60 ALR5th 75.

First Amendment protection afforded to commercial and home video games, 106 ALR5th 337.

First amendment challenges to display of religious symbols on public property, 107 ALR5th 1.

First Amendment protection afforded to comic books, comic strips, and cartoons,118 ALR 5th 213.

School district rules limiting distribution of literature or other communications among public school teachers as violative of first amendment, 65 ALR Fed 209.

Access of public to broadcast facilities under first amendment, 66 ALR Fed 628.

Requirement that agent of foreign principal register with United States attorney general, under provisions of Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (22 USC § 611 et seq.), 67 ALR Fed 774.

Propriety of federal court's exclusion of public from criminal or civil trial in order to protect trade secrets, 69 ALR Fed 892.

Dismissal of, or other adverse personnel action relating to, public employee for political patronage reasons as violative of first amendment, 70 ALR Fed 371.

Parody as copyright infringement or fair use under Federal Copyright Act (17 USC § 101 et seq.), 75 ALR Fed 822.

What oral statement of student is sufficiently disruptive so as to fall beyond protections of first amendment, 76 ALR Fed 599.

Constitutionality of teaching or suppressing teaching of Biblical creationism or Darwinian evolution theory in public schools, 102 ALR Fed 537.

Constitutionality of teaching or otherwise promoting secular humanism in public schools, 103 ALR Fed 538.

First Amendment protection for law enforcement employees subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 109 ALR Fed 9.

Right of access to federal district court guilty plea proceeding or records pertaining to entry or acceptance of guilty plea in criminal prosecution, 118 ALR Fed 621.

Construction of Freedom of Speech and Assembly Provisions of § 101(a)(2) of Labor—Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 USCS § 411(a)(2)), Included in Bill of Rights of Member of Labor Organization. 143 ALR Fed 1.

Protection of commercial speech under first amendment — Supreme Court cases, 164 ALR Fed 1.

Construction and application of federal and state constitutional and statutory speech or debate provisions. 24 A.L.R.6th 255.

§ 21. Right of petition and peaceable assembly.

The right of petition, and of the people peaceably to assemble to consult for the common good, and to make known their opinions, shall never be denied or abridged.

Cross references. —

For offense and punishment of breach of the peace, see § 6-6-102 .

For provision that article defining and punishing unlawful conduct within governmental facilities does not abridge freedom of assembly, see § 6-6-304 .

As to regulation of the assemblage of large numbers of people, see §§ 35-15-101 to 35-15-112 .

Right of petition not to be curtailed. —

Neither state nor federal officials — whether executive, legislative or judicial — may assume the power to deny or curtail the right of the people to petition the governing authority involved relative to matters connected with its powers and duties. Spriggs v. Clark, 45 Wyo. 62, 14 P.2d 667, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1932).

Picketing. —

If a labor union, because of an employer's refusal to sign an agreement to employ union members only, without contacting employer's employees or discussing with them conditions of their work or the desirability of their joining the union, pickets the employer's premises and in such picketing states that the employer is unfair to the local union, such picketing is not an exercise of the right of peaceable assembly as set out in this section. Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance Local 337, Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance Local, 70 Wyo. 165, 246 P.2d 778, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1952).

Cited in

State v. Smart, 22 Wyo. 154, 136 P. 452, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (1913); Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12370 (D. Wyo. 1970); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Action under 42 USC § 1985(1) for conspiracy to defame or otherwise harm the reputation of federal official, 69 ALR Fed 913.

“Sham” exception to application of Noerr-Pennington doctrine, exempting from federal antitrust laws joint efforts to influence governmental action, 71 ALR Fed 723.

§ 22. Protection of labor.

The rights of labor shall have just protection through laws calculated to secure to the laborer proper rewards for his service and to promote the industrial welfare of the state.

Cross references. —

For other provisions as to protection of labor, see art. 19, §§ 2 to 4 and 7, Wyo. Const.

As to labor and employment generally, see title 27.

Statute regulating the hours of labor on public works does not violate this section. State v. A. H. Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387, 240 P. 208, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1925).

Quoted in

Bebber v. Mills Lumber Co., 429 P.2d 92, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 162 (Wyo. 1967).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Exclusivity Provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act as a Bar to Third-Party Actions Against Employers. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Service, 586 P.2d 1220, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 244 (Wyo. 1978),” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 587 (1979).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

§ 23. Education.

The right of the citizens to opportunities for education should have practical recognition. The legislature shall suitably encourage means and agencies calculated to advance the sciences and liberal arts.

Cross references. —

See also art. 7, §§ 1 to 17, Wyo. Const., and title 21.

Educational services may be suspended where conduct threatens safety and welfare of others. —

A student may temporarily have his educational services suspended if his conduct threatens the safety and welfare of other students and school employees and thereby interferes with the school district's obligation to provide an equal opportunity for a quality education to all the students of that district. RM v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 2004 WY 162, 102 P.3d 868, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 2004).

Alternative not required where students expelled for selling marijuana. —

Where two students were expelled for one year for selling marijuana, the state constitution did not require that the school district had to provide them with an alternate education because they had been lawfully expelled, the district's actions were the least onerous means of accomplishing its compelling interest in providing for the safety and welfare of its students, and the students had not been denied all educational opportunity as they could have chosen to return to school after their suspensions. RM v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 2004 WY 162, 102 P.3d 868, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (Wyo. 2004).

No educational services past age 21. —

A county school district is neither entitled nor obligated to provide educational services for individuals within the district after a recipient reaches his or her twenty-first birthday. Natrona County Sch. Dist. v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 153 (Wyo. 1988).

Quoted in

State ex rel. R.R. Crow & Co. v. Copenhaver, 64 Wyo. 1, 184 P.2d 594, 1947 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (1947); Erickson v. School Dist., 67 Wyo. 216, 217 P.2d 887, 1950 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (1950); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 1980); Simons v. Laramie County Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 1116, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 496 (Wyo. 1987).

Stated in

Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1995).

Law reviews. —

For article, “School Finance Reform in Wyoming,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 135 (1984).

For comment, “Education for Handicapped Children in Wyoming: What Constitutes a Free Appropriate Public Education and Other Administrative Hurdles,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 225 (1984).

For case note, “EDUCATIONAL LAW — Wyoming Refuses to Recognize Compensatory Education as a Remedy Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1988),” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 529 (1989).

For case note, “Real Property — Wyoming's Private Road Statutes: Approaching a Dead End? Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1995),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 443 (1996).

For article, “Financing Wyoming's Public Schools: The Wyoming Legislature Gets to Try Again,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 469 (1996).

§ 24. Right to bear arms.

The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state shall not be denied.

Cited in

Starrett v. State, 2013 WY 133, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 139 , 286 P.3d 1033 (2012).

Cross references. —

As to state militia, see art. 17, §§ 1 to 5, Wyo. Const.

As to weapons offenses and firearms regulations, see §§ 6-8-101 to 6-8-103 .

As to advisement of loss of firearms rights upon conviction, see § 7-11-507

As to the attorney general's protection of the constitutional right of citizens to bear arms, see § 9-14-101 .

Former § 6-11-115 deemed legitimate exercise of state police power. —

Former § 6-11-115, which prevented certain people from possessing firearms, was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state and was not unreasonable. Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 373 (Wyo. 1982). See § 6-8-102 .

No constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon. —

Where applicant for a gun permit contended he had a fundamental right to own a firearm, guaranteed by the Wyoming Constitution, and that he was, therefore, entitled to a hearing, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that there was no constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon and, just as one may not drive an automobile without a license, one may not carry a concealed weapon without a permit. King v. Wyo. Div. of Crim. Investigation, 2004 WY 52, 89 P.3d 341, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 2004).

Section 6-8-104(a), which proscribes carrying of concealed deadly weapons, is not unconstitutional infringement upon the right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves. State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 658 (Wyo. 1986).

A permit to carry a firearm is a “privilege” and not a “right”. Mecikalski v. Office of the AG, 2 P.3d 1039, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2000).

Cited in

State v. Smart, 22 Wyo. 154, 136 P. 452, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (1913).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of state statutes restricting the right of aliens to bear arms, 28 ALR4th 1096.

Validity of state statute proscribing possession or carrying of knife, 47 ALR4th 651.

Validity of state gun control legislation under state constitutional provisions securing the right to bear arms, 86 ALR4th 931.

Validity, construction and application of state or local law prohibiting manufacture, possession or transfer of “assault weapon,” 29 ALR5th 664.

What constitutes actual or constructive possession of unregistered or otherwise prohibited firearm in violation of 26 USC § 5861, 133 ALR Fed 347.

§ 25. Military subordinate to civil power; quartering soldiers.

The military shall ever be in strict subordination to the civil power. No soldier in time of peace shall be quartered in any house without consent of the owner, nor in time of war except in the manner prescribed by law.

Cross references. —

As to state militia, see art. 17, §§ 1 to 5, Wyo. Const.

As to defense forces and affairs generally, see title 19.

§ 26. Treason.

Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies, or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court; nor shall any person be attained of treason by the legislature.

Cross references. —

For provision that the governor cannot pardon person convicted of treason, see art. 4, § 5, Wyo. Const.

§ 27. Elections free and equal.

Elections shall be open, free and equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent an untrammeled exercise of the right of suffrage.

Cross references. —

For other provisions concerning suffrage and elections, see art. 6, §§ 1 to 22, Wyo. Const., and title 22.

Right to vote is a fundamental right entitled to the strict protection of the courts. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974).

Election on proposed bond issue. —

Statute providing for school district elections on proposed bond issues in which property and nonproperty owners could vote was not in conflict with constitutional requirements of free elections and equality. State ex rel. Voiles v. Johnson County High Sch., 43 Wyo. 494, 5 P.2d 255, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1931).

Local elections. —

Section 15-11-105 is unambiguous, its intended meaning is readily apparent, it does not violate this provision, nor does it violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.Shumway v. Worthey, 2001 WY 130, 37 P.3d 361, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Wyo. 2001).

Quoted in

Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14885 (D. Wyo. 1991).

Cited in

Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975).

§ 28. Taxation; consent of people; uniformity and equality.

No tax shall be imposed without the consent of the people or their authorized representatives. (As amended by Laws 1988, Senate Joint Resolution No. 7; p. 283.)

Cross references. —

As to taxation and revenue generally, see art. 15, §§ 1 to 19, Wyo. Const.

As to license tax in connection with professions and occupations, see title 33.

As to taxation generally, see title 39.

Editor's notes. —

Despite the change in subject matter, the catchline for this section was not changed following the 1988 amendment.

Quoted in

Black v. Teton County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 775 P.2d 484, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 2001 WY 19, 19 P.3d 518, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 2001); RM v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 2004 WY 162, 102 P.3d 868, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 208 (2004).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Remedies for Defects in General Property Tax Assessments in Wyoming,” see 4 Wyo. L.J. 240.

For article, “Gross Products Tax,” see 4 Wyo. L.J. 250.

For article, “An Analysis of Recent Tax Proposals in Wyoming,” see III Land & Water L. Rev. 479 (1968).

For article, “School Finance Reform in Wyoming,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 135 (1984).

§ 29. Rights of aliens.

No distinction shall ever be made by law between resident aliens and citizens as to the possession, taxation, enjoyment and descent of property.

Cross references. —

As to alien suffrage, see art. 6, § 10, Wyo. Const.

As to inheritance rights, see § 2-4-105 .

As to contracts for alien labor, see §§ 27-4-113 to 27-4-115 .

Descent and distribution. —

Collateral heirs living in Ireland were entitled to inheritance under the provisions of a United States treaty with Great Britain. Bamforth v. Ihmsen, 28 Wyo. 282, 204 P. 345, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 28 Wyo. 282, 205 P. 1004, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1922).

Sale by alien heir. —

Where an alien heir inherited property and sold it before the institution of an action by the state claiming an escheat, the state's claim was barred. Dutton v. Donahue, 44 Wyo. 52, 8 P.2d 90, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (Wyo. 1932).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

State regulation of land ownership by alien corporation, 21 ALR4th 1329.

Alien's taking of employment other than type specified in labor certification as warranting deportation under immigration laws, 62 ALR Fed 402.

When is aiding of alien's illegal entry into United States “for gain,” so as to be ground for exclusion under § 212(a)(31) of Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 USC § 1182(a)(31) [8 USC § 1324]) or for deportation under § 241(a)(13) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC § 1251(a)(13) [8 USC § 1227]), 77 ALR Fed 83.

Who is “alien crewman” working in “capacity required for normal operation and service” of vessel, under 8 USC § 1101(a)(15)(D), entitled to work without special certification required in 8 USC § 1182(a)(5), 109 ALR Fed 816.

Validity, construction, and application of § 274(a)(1)(A)(iv) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USCS § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)), making it unlawful to induce or encourage alien to come to, enter, or reside in United States, 137 ALR Fed 227.

Validity, construction, and application of § 274(a)(1)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USCS § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)), making it unlawful to harbor or conceal illegal alien, 137 ALR Fed 255.

§ 30. Monopolies and perpetuities prohibited.

Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state, and shall not be allowed. Corporations being creatures of the state, endowed for the public good with a portion of its sovereign powers, must be subject to its control.

Cross references. —

As to corporations, see art. 10, §§ 1 to 19, Wyo. Const., and title 17.

For rule against perpetuities, see §§ 34-1-138 and 34-1-139 .

For provisions concerning monopolies and discrimination in trade generally, see §§ 40-4-101 to 40-4-123 .

Section inapplicable to restraints on alienation. —

Since it is generally conceded by all of the eminent authors that the subject of restraints on alienation is separate and distinct from the rule against perpetuities, this section is without force in this field. McGinnis v. McGinnis, 391 P.2d 927, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 1964).

Court without authority to carve out exception to rule against perpetuities. —

In view of the fact that the rule against perpetuities is embodied in a statute and in the constitution in Wyoming, a court is without authority to carve out an exception to the constitutional and statutory provision or to circumvent the constitution and statute through the inference of any fictitious device. Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 348 (Wyo. 1983).

Mineral interest following determinable fee valid when vested at time of its creation. —

It is reasonable and proper to identify an interest in a mineral estate following a determinable fee as a remainder which, when vested at the time of its creation, is valid under the rule against perpetuities. Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 348 (Wyo. 1983).

Rule against perpetuities not violated. —

Assignment in trust of all mineral royalties from certain lands to a trustee for the account of beneficiaries was a conveyance in fee simple to the trustee with an immediate vesting of the equitable interest in the beneficiaries, and therefore, the rule against perpetuities was not violated. McGinnis v. McGinnis, 391 P.2d 927, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 1964).

In a chapter 11 core proceeding, the bankruptcy court held that plaintiff’s overriding royalty interests pursuant to the areas of mutual interest clause within the parties’ fossil agreement was a purely contractual interest to which Wyoming’s Rule Against Perpetuities did not apply because the agreement did not create any interest in a specific parcel of land. Gasconade Oil Co. v. Ultra Res., Inc. (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 3574 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2018).

Statute establishing qualification for newspapers entitled to publish legal notices. —

Former statute, providing that a newspaper having the right to publish notices with legal effect must have been established for one year or more, was not in conflict with the provisions of this section. In re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. 226, 11 P.2d 265, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1932).

Contract relating to excess lands and their disposition. —

The provisions of a contract between a water conservancy district and the United States, relating to excess lands and their disposition, were not violative of this section. In re Bridger Valley Water Conservancy Dist., 401 P.2d 289, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1965).

Agreements between utilities to divide territory are invalid on the ground of public policy, as utilities cannot between themselves contract away the jurisdiction of the public service commission. Tri-County Elec. Ass'n v. Gillette, 584 P.2d 995, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 1978).

Applied in

Pirie v. Kamps, 68 Wyo. 83, 229 P.2d 927, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 18 , 26 A.L.R.2d 647 (1951).

Quoted in

Mariano & Assocs. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 737 P.2d 323, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 444 (Wyo. 1987); Shriners Hosps. for Children v. First Northern Bank of Wyo., 2016 WY 51, 373 P.3d 392, 2016 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2016).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Enforceability of sale-of-business agreement not to compete against nonsigner or nonowning signer, 60 ALR4th 294.

Anticompetitive covenants: aerial spray dust business, 60 ALR4th 965.

Standing of private party under § 16 of Clayton Act (15 USC § 26) to seek injunction to prevent merger or acquisition allegedly prohibited under § 7 of the act (15 USC § 18), 78 ALR Fed 159.

§ 31. Control of water.

Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state, which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved.

Cross references. —

As to irrigation and water rights generally, see art. 8, §§ 1 to 5, Wyo. Const., and title 41.

Powers of legislature. —

The legislature has power to authorize the supervision and control of the appropriation and distribution of public waters by administrative officers, pursuant to adjudicated priorities. Hamp v. State, 19 Wyo. 377, 118 P. 653, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1911).

Board of control authorized. —

Provision of statute providing for the powers and duties of board of control are not in conflict herewith. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1900).

Seepage water. —

In accordance with the constitutional provisions and in line with previous holdings of the supreme court, seepage water arising on a farmer's land is subject to appropriation by him (subject to prescribed procedures) for lands other than those upon which the seepage arises. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1957).

Water within reservation. —

A district court may not assign the duties of administering state water within a reservation to a tribal water agency. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1992).

Abatement of dam constituting public nuisance. —

The state may sue in its own court for the abatement of a dam constituting a public nuisance, built in violation of the statutory requirement that all structures be approved by the state engineer. Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 23 Wyo. 271, 148 P. 1110, 1915 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1915).

Contract relating to excess lands and their disposition. —

The provisions of a contract between a water conservancy district and the United States, relating to excess lands and their disposition, were not violative of this section. In re Bridger Valley Water Conservancy Dist., 401 P.2d 289, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1965).

Applied in

Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1961); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1988).

Cited in

In re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. 226, 11 P.2d 265, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (1932); Budd v. Bishop, 543 P.2d 368, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1975).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Constitutionality of the Wyoming Underground Water Statute,” see 3 Wyo. L.J. 140.

For article, “The Disparity Between State Water Rights Records and Actual Water Use Patterns,” see V Land & Water L. Rev. 23 (1970).

For case note, “Water Law — Statutory Forfeiture of Water Rights in Wyoming. Wheatland Irr. Dist. v. Laramie Rivers Co., 659 P.2d 561, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 285 (Wyo. 1983),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 93 (1984).

For case note, “Water Law — Standing Requirement Under the Wyoming Forfeiture Statute. Platte County Grazing Association v. State Board of Control, 675 P.2d 1279, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 244 (Wyo. 1984),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 485 (1984).

Library references. —

18 Nat. Resources & Env't Law Review 19.

§ 32. Eminent domain.

Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes, nor in any case without due compensation.

Cross references. —

See also art. 10, § 9, Wyo. Const., and ch. 26 of title 1.

Intended purpose of this section is to facilitate development of this state's resources. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 490 (Wyo. 1979).

Public policy against landlocking property. —

The right to condemn a way of necessity under constitutional and statutory provisions is an expression of public policy against landlocking property and rendering it useless. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 490 (Wyo. 1979).

Concept of common-law way of necessity is theoretically incompatible with this section. Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1991).

Section 33 of this article supplements this section. Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1975), overruled in part, Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1991).

Eminent domain defined. —

Eminent domain is the right and power of the state to appropriate private property to a particular user for the purpose of promoting the general welfare. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 490 (Wyo. 1979).

State may monitor Indian reserved water rights. —

The provisions in a stream adjudication decree, authorizing the state engineer to monitor Indian reserved water rights, were proper, as they contemplated neither the application of state law nor the authority to deprive the Tribes of water without the assistance of the courts in a suit for the administration of the decree. The role of the state engineer was not to apply state law, but to enforce the reserved rights against state appropriators, as decreed under principles of federal law. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd, 492 U.S. 406, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 106 L. Ed. 2d 342, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3173 (U.S. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S. Ct. 3265, 106 L. Ed. 2d 610, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3337 (U.S. 1989), overruled, Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1998).

Notice. —

Statutes authorizing the taking of property under the power of eminent domain must provide for legal notice, and where none is provided, it should not be implied by the court. Sterritt v. Young, 14 Wyo. 146, 82 P. 946, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1905).

Indirect benefit to people of Wyoming insufficient to justify condemnation. —

That condemnation of land in Wyoming for irrigation headgate and ditch to be used in reclamation of land immediately across the border in Colorado would indirectly benefit neighboring property in Wyoming and inhabitants of neighboring Wyoming city is insufficient to justify conclusion that proceeding was for benefit of people of Wyoming. Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P. 43, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1913).

But direct benefit will justify taking. —

That the people of another state will be benefited by a particular improvement or use for which private property is sought to be condemned will not prevent the taking if the use will also be a direct benefit to the people of the state. Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P. 43, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1913).

Taking fee in land for way of necessity. —

Statute permitting fee in land to be taken for way of necessity does not deny due process of law or take property without compensation. Meyer v. Colorado Cent. Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1928).

Right-of-way for flume to transport seepage water. —

Where waters seeped from a water association canal onto the land of a farmer, he was entitled to condemn a right-of-way over the canal for a flume to transport water to other lands owned by him for irrigation purposes, even though he had no right to compel continuance of the source of the water. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1957).

Condemnation by a non-public utility company. —

In a condemnation case under Wyo. Const. art. I, § 32 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-815 , by a power company, a certificate of convenience and necessity under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-2-205 and 1-26-816 was not required because the company was not a ‘public utility’ as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann § 37-1-101(a)(vi) in that the company supplied wholesale power to an energy corporation that in turn sold it to its members. Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 2005 WY 108, 118 P.3d 996, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 135 (Wyo. 2005).

When license to construct flume irrevocable. —

A license to construct a flume having been acted upon when grantee had a right to condemn a way was irrevocable. Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 121 P. 522, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1912).

Special assessments for drainage districts did not contravene this section. In re Bench Canal Drainage Dist., 24 Wyo. 143, 156 P. 610, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1916).

Revolving local improvement fund. —

This section is not violated by ch. 155, Laws 1953, authorizing a municipality to set up a revolving local improvement fund from the proceeds of city or state gasoline or state cigarette license taxes, from which fund the city may annually deposit in the local improvement district fund a sum sufficient to meet the difference between the principal amount of assessments due that year and the amount of assessments actually collected that year. Banner v. Laramie, 74 Wyo. 429, 289 P.2d 922, 1955 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1955).

Unemployment Compensation Act, in taking money of employer and giving it to persons who have never been in his employ, serves a public purpose for welfare of all and does not violate this section. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act not applicable to inverse condemnation action. —

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101 to 1-39-121 , did not apply to inverse condemnation actions because there was nothing about the constitutional and statutory right to an inverse condemnation action, and nothing about the WGCA that reasonably suggested that the former should be subject to the latter, as the WGCA abrogated governmental immunity for certain listed torts, while inverse condemnation was not a tort and was a constitutional and statutory remedy that never was subject to governmental immunity. 2013 WY 3, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 2 .

Implied easements do not effect a taking. —

Parcel owners' claim that an implied easement for an apartment building effectuated a takings was properly rejected given case law holding that land subject to an easement passed with that easement and the enforcement or recognition of that easement did effect a taking. Miner v. Jesse & Grace, LLC, 2014 WY 17, 317 P.3d 1124, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2014).

Applied in

Martens v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1998); Wyo. Res. Corp. v. T-Chair Land Co., 2002 WY 104, 49 P.3d 999, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 2002).

Quoted in

Associated Enters., Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist., 578 P.2d 1359, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1978); Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1988); Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 28 P.3d 838, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2001).

Stated in

Hulse v. First Am. Title Co., 2001 WY 95, 33 P.3d 122, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 2001).

Cited in

Wymo Fuels, Inc. v. Edwards, 723 P.2d 1230, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 601 (Wyo. 1986); Price Family Trust v. Hutchinson, 2014 WY 162, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Dec. 16, 2014).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

For case note, “Water Rights — Impairment of Existing Water Rights Under the Wyoming Watershed Act. Associated Enters., Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist., 656 P.2d 1144, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1983),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 83 (1984).

For comment, “Death of the Dark Ages? The Troubled Law of Easements in Wyoming,” see XXVII Land & Water L. Rev. 151 (1992).

For case note, “Real Property — Wyoming's Private Road Statutes: Approaching a Dead End? Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1995),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 443 (1996)

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Good will as element of damages for condemnation of property on which private business is conducted, 81 ALR3d 198.

Right of owner of land not originally taken or purchased as part of adjacent project to recover, on enlargement of project to include adjacent land, enhanced value of property by reason of proximity to original land, 95 ALR3d 752.

Eminent domain: possibility of overcoming specific obstacles to contemplated use as element in determining existence of necessary public use, 22 ALR4th 840.

Eminent domain: industrial park or similar development as public use justifying condemnation of private property, 62 ALR4th 1183.

Construction and application of rule requiring public use for which property is condemned to be “more necessary” or “higher use” than public use to which property is already appropriated — state takings, 49 ALR5th 769.

Application of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5011 (2005), to “Public Use” Restrictions in Federal and State Constitutions Takings Clauses and Eminent Domain Statutes. 21 A.L.R.6th 261.

§ 33. Compensation for property taken.

Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation.

Cross references. —

See also art. 10, §§ 9, 14, Wyo. Const., and ch. 26 of title 1.

Action for inverse condemnation.—

Trial court properly emphasized that in the absence of eminent domain proceedings the action was an inverse condemnation case because eminent domain proceedings were not used by a county for the expansion of a road; according to the county, it did not need to use eminent domain proceedings because it already had an easement for the project. Byrnes v. Johnson Cty. Comm'rs, 2020 WY 6, 455 P.3d 693, 2020 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2020).

This section supplements § 32 of this article. Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 171 (Wyo. 1975), overruled in part, Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 1991).

Legislature cannot infringe upon or take from property owners the right to be compensated, according to the requirement of this section. State Highway Comm'n v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1966).

“Property” as contained in this section, for which an owner must receive “just compensation” when taken or damaged by a condemnor, is treated as a word of most general import and is liberally construed. It is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess, and there is nothing to indicate that the legislature, in providing the right of setoff for benefits, used the word “property” in any different sense. State Highway Comm'n v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 1970 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1970).

“Damaged” and “injuriously affected” are synonymous. —

The term “damaged” used in constitution and term “injuriously affected” used in various sections of condemnation statute are synonymous. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940); Barber v. State Highway Comm'n, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1959); Wyoming State Highway Dep't v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1978).

Damaged property must suffer some diminution in substance. Sheridan Drive-in Theatre v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1963).

Or be rendered intrinsically less valuable. —

See Sheridan Drive-in Theatre v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1963).

And section has no application to depreciation in value caused by proximity of public improvement. —

This section has no application to depreciation in the market value of land caused by some public improvement in close proximity thereto, where there is no physical injury to the property or impairment of any right appurtenant thereto. Sheridan Drive-in Theatre v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1963).

If public use is not of such character as to constitute nuisance. —

See Sheridan Drive-in Theatre v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1963).

Airplane overflight, without impact on surface, not “taking” of property. —

The mere fact of airplane overflight, without evidence of impact on the surface (i.e., substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the surface), did not create a constitutional claim against either the city or its airport board, which adopted an ordinance providing a height limitation in a noninstrument approach zone to the airport, for the “taking” of property through the creation of a flight easement. In addition, the flight easement utilized by airplanes was not created by the passage of the ordinance, but by federal and state declarations of public navigability and by repeated overflights which preceded the home owner's action by considerably more than the 10 years allowed by the applicable statute of limitations (§ 1-3-103 ). Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 579 (Wyo. 1985).

Height limitation in noninstrument approach zone to airport legitimate exercise of police power. —

A city ordinance providing a height limitation in a noninstrument approach zone to an airport was an exercise of the police power, and certain home owners who had a tree in violation of this limitation, who were notified they would have to trim it, and who challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance, failed to demonstrate such a significant impact on their plot as a whole as to counterbalance the significant public interest in protecting the airport flight path. Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 579 (Wyo. 1985).

Not every injury to property is covered by the constitutional guarantee that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 311 (Wyo. 1982).

Damage for which compensation is to be made is a damage to the property itself. Sheridan Drive-in Theatre v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1963).

And not personal inconvenience or injury. —

A mere personal inconvenience or injury, such as damage to a business, is not sufficient to entitle the owner to compensation. Sheridan Drive-in Theatre v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1963).

Inconvenience resulting from construction work which is temporary and reasonable in its character and which is intended for public safety and convenience is an inconvenience which property owners share with the general public, and compensation for such inconvenience is not allowable as long as the obstructions are temporary and reasonable. State Highway Comm'n v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1966).

Emotional distress is not a proper element of damages in an inverse condemnation action. See Miller v. Campbell County, 854 P.2d 71, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1993).

Consequential damages to landowners' remaining property are compensable under the protection afforded by this section. Wyoming State Highway Dep't v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1978).

Special damage must differ in kind, not degree, from public's damages. —

A property owner may recover under the “or damaged” provision of this section only when he has sustained special damage differing in kind and not merely in degree from that sustained by the public generally. Sheridan Drive-in Theatre v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1963).

And requires physical injury or impairment of appurtenant right. —

The classification of special damage requires a definite physical injury or impairment of a right appurtenant to the land, such as drying up wells and springs, destroying lateral supports, preventing surface waters from running off adjacent lands or running surface waters onto adjacent lands or depositing foreign materials on neighboring lands. Sheridan Drive-in Theatre v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 102 (Wyo. 1963).

Property injured by negligence is not taken or damaged for public use. —

Where an injury involves a tort, being caused by the negligence of public officers or their agents, it cannot be said that property is taken or damaged for public use. Chavez v. Laramie, 389 P.2d 23, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1964).

Where allegations of the plaintiffs make it clear the crushing of a sewer line and severing of a water main, with resulting damage to their property, were accidental and unintentional and certainly served no public purpose, there was absent a taking or damaging of property for public use. Chavez v. Laramie, 389 P.2d 23, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1964).

Hence, allegation that property was damaged is insufficient. —

Plaintiffs' allegation that their property was damaged is not enough, since according to this section they would be entitled to compensation from the public only if they alleged and proved their property was damaged for public use. Chavez v. Laramie, 389 P.2d 23, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1964).

Damages to abutting property. —

Where proposed condemnation of portion of street involved damage to abutting property owners, it was a “taking” requiring compensation, unless other countervailing reasons should exist. Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 1940 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1940).

Taking fee in land for way of necessity. —

Statute permitting fee in land to be taken for way of necessity does not deny due process of law or take property without compensation. Meyer v. Colorado Cent. Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212, 1928 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 1928).

Establishment of a roadway, in the absence of consent, constitutes the taking of property by the county for which a party may make a claim for compensation according to constitutional requirements. Kern v. Deerwood Ranch, 528 P.2d 910, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 249 (Wyo. 1974).

City may condemn land. —

Act authorizing city to condemn land within or without the corporate limits is not violative of this or any other provision of the constitution. Edwards v. Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 P. 677, 1911 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1911), reh'g denied, 19 Wyo. 110, 122 P. 900, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1912).

Proposed modification to basements underlying sidewalks does not constitute a taking of private property without just compensation where title to the lands underlying the streets and sidewalks is in the city. Blount v. City of Laramie, 510 P.2d 294, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1973).

Sewer assessments. —

A statute authorizing certain cities to apportion sewer assessments against adjacent land, according to its area, will not be held unconstitutional, under this section, in absence of showing of its unconstitutional operation in an individual case. McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120, 96 P. 697, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1908).

Special assessments for drainage districts do not contravene this section. In re Bench Canal Drainage Dist., 24 Wyo. 143, 156 P. 610, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1916).

Irrigation district law was not unconstitutional as taking property without just compensation. Sullivan v. Blakesley, 35 Wyo. 73, 246 P. 918, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 9 (Wyo. 1926).

Revolving local improvement fund. —

This section is not violated by ch. 155, Laws 1953, authorizing a municipality to set up a revolving local improvement fund from the proceeds of city or state gasoline or state cigarette license taxes, from which fund the city may annually deposit in the local improvement district fund a sum sufficient to meet the difference between the principal amount of assessments due that year and the amount of assessments actually collected that year. Banner v. Laramie, 74 Wyo. 429, 289 P.2d 922, 1955 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1955).

Legislature may not prohibit occupations, unless detrimental to public welfare. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Unemployment Compensation Act, in taking money of employer and giving it to persons who have never been in his employ, serves a public purpose for welfare of all and does not violate this section. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

Failure to refund compulsory contributions to pension account not violative of section. —

The failure to provide for the refund of compulsory contributions to the firemen's pension account to former firemen who have served in that capacity for less than five years is not a taking of their private property for public or private use without just compensation in violation of this section. Atkinson v. Wittler, 647 P.2d 72, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 352 (Wyo. 1982).

Regulation of use of highways. —

Control of highways may in proper cases be extended to prohibiting their use, and legislature may subject private carriers to appropriate regulations. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Courts must determine in first instance whether legislature can prohibit use of highways in particular case, and whether regulation amounting to prohibition is reasonable. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

State or municipal highway regulations must be reasonable, operate with equality and have tendency to accomplish object in view. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Statute prohibiting use of highways by motor transportation companies, except under certificate and subject to regulation by public service commission, is void as applied to private carriers, under this section. Weaver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542, 1929 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1929).

Regulating rates and routes of motor carriers. —

Motor Vehicle Act, making it unlawful for motor carrier to charge less than rate fixed by public service commission and providing that rate and route should not be changed except by order of the commission, does not violate this section. State v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 192, 53 P.2d 13, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1935).

Statute requiring annual dipping of sheep did not take property without compensation. State v. Hall, 27 Wyo. 224, 194 P. 476, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1920).

Measure of damages. —

Under this section, property is damaged when it is made less valuable, less useful or less desirable. The measure of damages in such case is the difference between the fair market value before and after the inflicting of the damage. Hence, it is immaterial whether such damage occurs by reason of the construction or the maintenance of a project, so long as it is directly attributable to such causative factor, and irrespective of whether there has been an actual physical taking of any part of such property. The depreciation in value, however, must be by reason of damage to the land itself or to property rights therein. Personal inconvenience or discomfort to the owner, or interference with the business conducted on the land, is not compensable unless such results are causative factors in the depreciation in the value of the land. Wyoming State Highway Dep't v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1978).

Board of equalization must use full value. —

Constitutional provisions deny constitutional or implied legislatively delegable authority to the state board of equalization to set any assessment ratio which would effectively determine the actual tax, except to use full value. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization, Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 749 P.2d 221, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 572 (Wyo. 1987), reh'g denied, 749 P.2d 221, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1988).

Filing of claims with state not limitation upon guaranteed rights. —

Article 16, § 7, Wyo. Const., which commands the filing of claims with the officer or officers whose duty it may be to audit the same before money can be paid out of the state treasury, is of equal dignity with this section. In fact, the two provisions are not in conflict. The rights afforded by this section are protected even though the directives of art. 16, § 7, Wyo. Const., are complied with, since art. 16, § 7, Wyo. Const., is no more than a regulation of the procedure by which the rights guaranteed by this section will be exercised. It is not a substantive limitation imposed upon such rights. Wyoming State Highway Dep't v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1978).

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act not applicable to inverse condemnation action. —

Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101 to 1-39-121 , did not apply to inverse condemnation actions because there was nothing about the constitutional and statutory right to an inverse condemnation action, and nothing about the WGCA that reasonably suggested that the former should be subject to the latter, as the WGCA abrogated governmental immunity for certain listed torts, while inverse condemnation was not a tort and was a constitutional and statutory remedy that never was subject to governmental immunity. 2013 WY 3, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 2 .

Filing of statutory claim notice with state, pursuant to § 9-2-332 (now § 9-1-404 ), held reasonable as section not self-executing. —

See Wyoming State Highway Dep't v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 291 (Wyo. 1978).

Statute of limitations on filing claims for compensation. —

A statute limiting the time within which to file claims for compensation does not violate this section. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 30 Wyo. 238, 30 Wyo. 239, 219 P. 561, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1923), aff'd, 268 U.S. 276, 45 S. Ct. 491, 69 L. Ed. 953, 1925 U.S. LEXIS 568 (U.S. 1925).

Statute of limitations barred action. —

Limitation period found in Wyoming Governmental Claims Act applied to an inverse condemnation cause of action and to the homeowners' tort claims against a city, and where the undisputed material facts showed that the complaint had been filed well beyond one-year period set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 , the claims were time-barred, and the district court was correct in applying its statute of limitation analysis to all of the state law claims and in dismissing the action on summary judgment. Lankford v. City of Laramie, 2004 WY 143, 100 P.3d 1238, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 184 (Wyo. 2004).

Effect of acceptance of award. —

If the compensation has been accepted by the landowner, it matters not how the amount of the award was arrived at since such landowner will not be heard to complain after having accepted the money. Sterritt v. Young, 14 Wyo. 146, 82 P. 946, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 1905).

Award not excessive. —

Award of jury for $500.00 in value and $15,000.00 in damages was not so excessive as to denote passion, bias and prejudice. State Highway Comm'n v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1966).

Implied easements do not effect a taking. —

Parcel owners' claim that an implied easement for an apartment building effectuated a takings was properly rejected given case law holding that land subject to an easement passed with that easement and the enforcement or recognition of that easement did effect a taking. Miner v. Jesse & Grace, LLC, 2014 WY 17, 317 P.3d 1124, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 2014).

Applied in

M & B Drilling & Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 706 P.2d 243, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 560 (Wyo. 1985).

Quoted in

Thomas v. Jultak, 68 Wyo. 198, 231 P.2d 974, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1950); Associated Enters., Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist., 578 P.2d 1359, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 293 (Wyo. 1978); Tri-County Elec. Ass'n v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo. 1978); Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 1988); Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 28 P.3d 838, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 84 (Wyo. 2001); Bush Land Dev. Co. v. Crook Cnty. Weed & Pest Control Dist., 2017 WY 12, 388 P.3d 536, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo. 2017).

Cited in

Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P. 43, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 15 , L.R.A. (n.s.) 1916C1275 (1913); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 , 109 A.L.R. 534 (1935); Griffith ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't v. Stephenson, 494 P.2d 546, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 234 (Wyo. 1972); Tri-County Elec. Ass'n v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1974); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 662 P.2d 878, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 312 (Wyo. 1983); Miller v. Campbell County, 722 F. Supp. 687, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11685 (D. Wyo. 1989).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Constitutionality of the Wyoming Underground Water Statute,” see 3 Wyo. L.J. 140.

For article, “Governmental Immunity from Damage Actions in Wyoming — Part II,” see VII Land & Water L. Rev. 617 (1972).

For comment, “Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 739 (1983).

For comment, “The Use of Opinion Testimony for Valuing Real Property in an Eminent Domain Suit,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1984).

For case note, “Water Rights — Impairment of Existing Water Rights Under the Wyoming Watershed Act. Associated Enters., Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist., 656 P.2d 1144, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 270 (Wyo. 1983),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 83 (1984).

For comment, “Solar Access Rights in Wyoming,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 419 (1984).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

For comment, “Death of the Dark Ages? The Troubled Law of Easements in Wyoming,” see XXVII Land & Water L. Rev. 151 (1992).

For case note, “Wildlife — Private Property Damage Law — Once Upon a Time in Wyoming There was Room for Millions of Cattle and Enough Habitat for Every Species of Game to Find a Luxurious Existence. In the Aftermath of Parker, Can We All Still Get Along? Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1993),” see XXIX Land & Water L. Rev. 89 (1994).

For case note, “Real Property — Wyoming's Private Road Statutes: Approaching a Dead End? Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 78 (Wyo. 1995),” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 443 (1996)

For article, “The Endangered Species Act and Private Property,” see XXXII Land & Water L. Rev. 479 (1997).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Good will as element of damages for condemnation of property on which private business is conducted, 81 ALR3d 198.

Right of owner of land not originally taken or purchased as part of adjacent project to recover, on enlargement of project to include adjacent land, enhanced value of property by reason of proximity to original land, 95 ALR3d 752.

Validity and construction of law regulating conversion of rental housing to condominiums, 21 ALR4th 1083.

Governmental liability for compensation or damages to advertiser arising from obstruction of public view of sign or billboard on account of growth of vegetation in public way, 21 ALR4th 1309.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as constituting taking or damaging of property, 22 ALR4th 863.

Damages resulting from temporary conditions incident to public improvements or repairs as compensable taking, 23 ALR4th 674.

Seizure of property as evidence in criminal prosecution or investigation as compensable taking, 44 ALR4th 366.

Validity, construction and application of state relocation assistance laws, 49 ALR4th 491.

Inverse condemnation state court class actions, 49 ALR4th 618.

Measure of damages or compensation in eminent domain as affected by premises being restricted to particular educational, religious, charitable or noncommercial use, 29 ALR5th 36.

§ 34. Uniform operation of general law.

All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.

I. General Consideration.

II. Illustrative Cases. I.General Consideration.

Cross references. —

As to special and local legislation, see art. 3, § 27, Wyo. Const. and art. 13, § 1, Wyo. Const.

Section is equivalent of “equal protection” words of fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2692 (U.S. 1980).

Legislature may pass any law not expressly or impliedly inhibited. Budge v. Board of Comm'rs, 29 Wyo. 35, 208 P. 874, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1922).

Section is satisfied by statute applying uniformly within a class. —

The provision hereof is satisfied by a statute applying uniformly within a class of persons based on reasonable distinction or objects of reasonable class and operating similarly on all parties of the state under same circumstances. State v. A. H. Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387, 240 P. 208, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1925); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1935).

No equal protection violation where not same class. —

Although liquor licensees in the county had different Sunday operating hours from those imposed by the city for licensees within its boundaries, there was no equal protection violation because licensees of the county were not in the same class nor under the same circumstances and conditions as licensees of the city. WW Enters. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1998).

Classification must be based upon reason. —

Classification cannot be made without reason therefor and there must be substantial distinction between places embraced in legislation and places excluded. May v. Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1942).

Section does not proscribe reasonable classifications. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1982).

Reasonable basis required for different legislation as to different classes. —

There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation as to different classes, and the differences must not be arbitrary and without just relation to the subject of the legislation. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 292 (Wyo. 1978).

And sustaining facts assumed. —

If any state of facts can be reasonably conceived which sustains the classification made by a statute, such facts will be assumed. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 292 (Wyo. 1978).

Equal protection claims test. —

The four aspects of the test for analyzing state constitution equal protection claims inquire as to (1) what class is harmed by the legislation and has that group been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our laws; (2) what is the public purpose to be served by the law; (3) what is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies disparate treatment; and (4) how are the characteristics used to distinguish people for disparate treatment relevant to the purpose the challenged law purportedly intends to serve. Allhusen v. State, 898 P.2d 878, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1995), (decided prior to 2001 amendments to the Mental Health Professions Practice Act); Board of County Comm'rs v. Geringer, 941 P.2d 742, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1997).

Two tests designed to determine if statutory classifications meet equal protection requirement. Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2692 (U.S. 1980).

It is not what a law includes that makes it special, but what it excludes. May v. Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1942).

Legislation is special if it applies to all within a class without reason appearing why it is not made to apply generally to all. May v. Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1942).

Distinguishing peculiarity must exist giving rise to necessity. —

To constitute general law, as opposed to special law, distinguishing peculiarity must exist giving rise to necessity for the law as to designated class. May v. Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1942).

Criminal acquittees are dissimilar to civil acquittees for equal protection purposes. —

A criminal acquittee has placed his mental illness at issue, proved it by a preponderance of the evidence, and is deemed to have committed a criminal act. Such important differences render a criminal acquittee dissimilar to a civil committee for equal protection purposes. Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, 36 P.3d 586, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2001).

Real property statute of limitations constitutional. —

Section 1-3-111 , which sets forth a statute of limitations for actions involving improvements to real property, is constitutional and does not violate the open courts, uniform operation of general law, and special and local laws provisions of the Wyoming constitution. Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 183 (Wyo. 1991).

Classification of cities without regard to necessity is special legislation. —

Mere classification of cities for purpose of legislation without regard to necessity is special legislation and condemned by constitution. May v. Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1942).

Distinction exists between legislation of general nature and legislation municipal in character, and that of former class is invalid if not applicable generally, even though it may apply to all cities of particular class. May v. Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1942).

Court may consider purpose of enactment. —

Purpose for which enactment creating cities of second class was passed may be considered in determining whether it is special or general legislation. May v. Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1942).

And contemporaneous legislation as to cities of another class. —

In considering constitutionality of statute creating second class city and in determining what is reasonable or arbitrary classification, court may consider nearly contemporaneous enactment relating to cities of first class. May v. Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1942).

Constitutionality of § 14-6-203 . —

The statutory scheme of § 14-6-203 is constitutional; there is no demonstrable prejudice arising out of the failure to assign the burden of proof prior to any hearing; and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to transfer case to juvenile court or on the part of the trial judge in transferring another case to the county court from juvenile court for a preliminary examination with the view that the case would be prosecuted in the district court. Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 194 (Wyo. 1995).

Change in allocation of company's oil production did not violate provision. —

Wyoming Department of Revenue's ruling that changed the allocation of the company's oil production from a production unit for 1980 through 1988 between one county and intervenor county did not violate Art. XV, §§ 3 and 11, Wyo. Const. or Art. I, § 34, Wyo. Const. because the company had the burden of showing unconstitutionality and it failed to meet the burden imposed on it in this regard. Moreover, the arguments were not supported by reference to pertinent authority or by cogent argument. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2006 WY 27, 130 P.3d 438, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 2006).

Applied in

Pirie v. Kamps, 68 Wyo. 83, 229 P.2d 927, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 18 , 26 A.L.R.2d 647 (1951); Tennant v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 355 P.2d 887, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 73 (Wyo. 1960); Steffey v. City of Casper, 357 P.2d 456, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 80 (Wyo. 1960); Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 369 (Wyo. 1983); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 88 (Wyo. 1988); Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1991).

Quoted in

Walgreen Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 70 Wyo. 193, 246 P.2d 767, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1952); Miller v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 Wyo. 502, 337 P.2d 262, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (1959); Galesburg Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1982); White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1989); GWJ v. MH, 930 P.2d 371, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 187 (Wyo. 1996).

Stated in

Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 97 (Wyo. 1961).

Cited in

Delfelder Drainage Dist. v. Givens, 45 Wyo. 123, 16 P.2d 57, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (1932); State ex rel. Keefe v. Jones, 62 Wyo. 61, 161 P.2d 135, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (1945); Eastwood v. Wyoming Hwy. Dep't, 76 Wyo. 247, 301 P.2d 818, 1956 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (1956); Board of County Comm'rs v. Justice Court No. Two, 529 P.2d 977, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 253 (Wyo. 1974); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); Budd v. Bishop, 543 P.2d 368, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1975); State v. Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 188 (Wyo. 1976); Neu v. Grant, 548 F.2d 281, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10584 (10th Cir. 1977); Great W. Sugar Co. v. Johnson, 624 P.2d 1184, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 290 (Wyo. 1981); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 457 (Wyo. 1987); In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992); Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 163 (Wyo. 1996); Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp., 2003 WY 77, 71 P.3d 717, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2003); Huff v. Shumate, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27781, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (2004); Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

Law reviews. —

For note, “Do Classifications Resultant from Automobile Guest Statutes Violate Constitutional Guarantees of Equal Protection?,” see IX Land & Water L. Rev. 251 (1974).

For comment, “Landowner Liability Under the Wyoming Recreational Use Statute,” see XV Land & Water L. Rev. 649 (1980).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — Constitutionality of Wyoming's Co-employee Immunity Statute under Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution.Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 355 (1983).

For case note, “Constitutional Law — Equal Protection Analysis. Awarding Public Works Contracts: Granting Preference to Resident Bidders. Galesburg Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 308 (Wyo. 1982),” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 393 (1983).

For article, “School Finance Reform in Wyoming,” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 135 (1984).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

For case note, “Criminal Procedure — When Should a Jury Trial Be Required in the Wyoming Municipal Courts? City of Casper v. Cheatham, 739 P.2d 1222, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 471 (Wyo. 1987),” see XXV Land & Water L. Rev. 611 (1990).

For case note, “Worker's Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992),” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 271 (1993).

For comment, “‘Primary Purpose’ Pollution Control Tax Incentives: Is the Public Getting What It's Paying For?,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 401 (1996).

For article, “Financing Wyoming's Public Schools: The Wyoming Legislature Gets to Try Again,” see XXXI Land & Water L. Rev. 469 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Exemption of agricultural activities or occupations from business or occupation license or tax, 38 ALR4th 1074.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions, 97 ALR5th 1.

II.Illustrative Cases.

Curative statute legalizing defective organization of county was not invalid as special act. State ex rel. Budge v. Snyder, 30 Wyo. 287, 219 P. 735, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 45 (Wyo. 1923).

Drainage district law did not violate this section. In re Bench Canal Drainage Dist., 24 Wyo. 143, 156 P. 610, 1916 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1916).

Section 15-5-203 does not violate this section. Wyoming State Treasurer v. Rawlins, 510 P.2d 301, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 160 (Wyo. 1973).

Law operating uniformly on all cities of one class or all of several recognized classes was held not unconstitutional. State ex rel. Diers v. Sheldon, 29 Wyo. 233, 213 P. 92, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1923).

Cheyenne “Sunday Closing Ordinance.” —

The discriminations of the Cheyenne “Sunday Closing Ordinance,” under the guise of classification, are violative of this section. Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1964).

Salaries. —

There is little justification in giving cities operating under substantially same form of government and of similar population different powers connected with salaries, but scale of salaries need not be same. May v. Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 1942 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1942).

Hours of work. —

Statute limiting the hours of labor of females violated this section so far as it applied to restaurants. State v. Le Barron, 24 Wyo. 519, 162 P. 265, 1917 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1917).

Statute declaring 8 hours of actual work to constitute lawful day's work on public works was not violative of provision requiring all laws of general nature to have uniform operation. State v. A. H. Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387, 240 P. 208, 1925 Wyo. LEXIS 47 (Wyo. 1925).

Workmen's Compensation Law, providing that compensation should be payable to dependents of persons injured in extrahazardous employment, and that extrahazardous occupations should include bakery kitchens where power machinery was used, was not based on unreasonable classification. Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 43 Wyo. 108, 299 P. 284, 1931 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1931).

For discussion of possible discrimination against nonresident United States citizens in Workmen's (now Worker's) Compensation Act, see Cuthbertson v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 50 Wyo. 441, 62 P.2d 311, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1936).

Section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J), which states that a workers' compensation claimant may not recover on a claim for a mental injury where that mental injury is not the result of a compensable physical injury, does not violate the equal protection clause. Frantz v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 932 P.2d 750, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1997), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

The distinction within the workers' compensation scheme between physically injured workers and workers with stress-related mental injuries is rationally related to the state's goal of efficiently and fairly distributing benefits while cutting costs for employers. Frantz v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 932 P.2d 750, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1997), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Rational basis exists for treating employer differently from his employees with respect to the extent of immunity under § 27-14-104(a), relating to immunity from suit under the Workers' Compensation Act. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, 641 P.2d 1247, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 309 (Wyo. 1982); Parker v. Energy Dev. Co., 691 P.2d 981, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 350 (Wyo. 1984).

Worker's Compensation Act (chapter 17 (now chapter 14) of title 27) does not unconstitutionally discriminate between partners and corporate officers. A partner is an employer and employee, whereas an officer is simply an employee; a rational basis exists, therefore, for the disparate treatment afforded to partners as opposed to corporate officers. Hays v. State, 768 P.2d 11, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1989), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Unemployment Compensation Act does not violate this section, since provision is satisfied by statute applying uniformly within a class of persons, based on reasonable distinction, or objects of reasonable class, and operating same in all parts of state under same circumstances. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo. 1943).

Negligence immunity of co-employees unconstitutional. —

The statute which, under the Wyoming worker's compensation scheme, granted immunity from suits by co-employees to employees who were acting within the scope of their employment, § 27-14-104 , is unconstitutional because it violated the Wyoming Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 92 (Wyo. 1992).

Corporations organized during territorial days. —

Since corporations organized during territorial days became corporations of the state, it may at least be questioned whether this section would not be violated by a statute authorizing “any corporation, organized under any law of this state,” to have a renewal of its franchise, if the statute were to be construed to apply only to corporations organized since statehood. Drew v. Beckwith, Quinn & Co., 57 Wyo. 140, 114 P.2d 98, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 25 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 57 Wyo. 140, 115 P.2d 651, 1941 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1941).

Qualification for newspapers entitled to publish legal notices. —

Former statute, providing that a newspaper having the right to publish notices with legal effect must have been established for one year or more, was not unconstitutional as violating this section. In re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. 226, 11 P.2d 265, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1932).

Contract relating to excess lands and their disposition. —

The provisions of a contract between a water conservancy district and the United States, relating to excess lands and their disposition, were not violative of this section. In re Bridger Valley Water Conservancy Dist., 401 P.2d 289, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1965).

Education for children of state is matter of fundamental interest. Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2692 (U.S. 1980).

Intent of framers of education article. —

The framers intended the education article as a mandate to the state legislature to provide an education system of a character which provides Wyoming students with a uniform opportunity to become equipped for their future roles as citizens, participants in the political system, and competitors both economically and intellectually. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 215 (Wyo. Dec. 5, 1995).

Private School Licensing Act. —

No classification had been created by the Private School Licensing Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-401 through 21-2-407 , and it was unnecessary to do any further analysis under the test where those institutions that were already accredited obviously did not have to apply to become accredited, and those institutions that were not accredited had to become accredited within the time frame provided; therefore, no equal protection violation occurred because different classifications were not created under the act or the rules adopted by the Wyoming Department of Education. Newport Int'l Univ., Inc. v. State, 2008 WY 72, 186 P.3d 382, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2008).

Transitional school funding recapture limits constitutional. —

A $250,000 cap imposed on transitional hold harmless payments applicable to wealthy school districts subject to revenue recapture bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest in making the transition to a cost-based school funding system and thus did not violate equal protection provisions of the Wyoming Constitution. Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 985 P.2d 964, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1999).

Distribution of public school funds upon basis of wealth is suspect classification. —

Funding a public school system where money is distributed upon the basis of wealth or lack thereof is in a suspect classification, requiring the court's strict scrutiny test to determine if it is achieving a compelling state interest. Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2692 (U.S. 1980).

School funding from property tax violates section. —

Although the quality of a child's education in the state, measured in terms of dollars available for that purpose, is dependent upon the property tax resources of his school district, the right to an education cannot constitutionally be conditioned on wealth in that such a measure does not afford equal protection. Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2692 (U.S. 1980).

Wyoming's public school finance system unconstitutional. —

See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 203 (Wyo. 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 215 (Wyo. Dec. 5, 1995).

Required licensure of general nondental anesthesiologists constitutional. —

No offense was dealt the equal protection clause of the United States constitution or the Wyoming state constitution by requiring that general nondental anesthesiologists be properly licensed as physicians under the Wyoming Medical Practice Act, chapter 26 of title 33, and not just be declared qualified anesthesiologists by an accredited residency program. Paravecchio v. Memorial Hosp., 742 P.2d 1276, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 507 (Wyo. 1987), reh'g denied, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 523 (Wyo. Oct. 7, 1987), overruled in part, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 2004).

Mental Health Professions Practice Act violates equal protection. —

Under the Mental Health Professions Practice Act, private counselors rights to equal protection have been transgressed; none of the evidence demonstrates that supervision by public, licensed counselors results in the qualification of counselors who are more competent or more ethical and, thus, more likely to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. The differentiation of the public employer or the charitable employer from the private, for-profit employer cannot be justified as a proper classification and, thus, is not a legitimate exercise in police power. This classification is not founded on a reasonable basis, is arbitrary, and constitutes unwarranted discrimination. It is a violation of equal protection and must be set aside. Allhusen v. State, 898 P.2d 878, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1995), (decided prior to 2001 amendments to the Mental Health Professions Practice Act).

The mandatory licensure provisions under § 33-38-110 , the prerequisites to licensure found in § 33-38-106 , and the licensure exemptions set forth in § 33-38-103 violate guarantees of equal protection under Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2 and 34, Wyo. Const. and art. 3, § 27, Wyo. Const.; these provisions must be stricken as contrary to guarantees of equal protection, the guarantee of uniform operation of laws, and as special legislation. The unconstitutional provisions are of no effect, and the law in the form it existed prior to the 1993 amendments is controlling. Allhusen v. State, 898 P.2d 878, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1995), (decided prior to 2001 amendments to the Mental Health Professions Practice Act).

Constitutional to require nonresident hunters to employ guides. —

Section 23-2-401(a), requiring nonresident big game hunters who hunt in federal wilderness areas to employ guides, does not violate the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions, nor the privileges and immunities clause of the United States constitution. O'Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 1144, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 443 (Wyo. 1986).

Section 1-3-111 violates section. —

Section 1-3-111 , which prior to its 1981 amendment provided that no action shall be brought more than 10 years after substantial completion of improvement to real property against any person performing or furnishing design, planning, supervision, construction or supervision of construction of the improvement, violated this section and § 8 of this article, and § 27 of article 3. Phillips v. ABC Builders, 611 P.2d 821, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 273 (Wyo. 1980).

Grand jury constitutional. —

The perceived advantages which flow from the procedure involving a complaint and preliminary examination followed by an information do not justify a conclusion that a defendant is denied equal protection of the law because a grand jury is used. Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 536 (Wyo. 1987).

Prosecutions by information. —

This section is not violated by a statute providing that prosecutions may be by information after preliminary hearing, and suspending the grand jury system. In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 329, 40 P. 520, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1895).

Felons and misdemeanants are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes. —

The defendant argued that he was being treated differently from a person who was serving the same amount of time in the state penitentiary because those in prison were afforded opportunities such as good time, vocational and educational programs, merit programs, library and recreational facilities and therapy programs which were not available in the county jail; however, this equal protection claim failed because felons and misdemeanants are not similarly situated persons for purposes of identification of a classification of similarly situated persons who are being treated differently. Tilley v. State, 912 P.2d 1140, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 42 (Wyo. 1996).

Suspension of license unconstitutional. —

Section 31-7-126 (former) and § 31-7-128(f), which provide for the driver's license suspension of individuals under 19 years of age convicted of possession or consumption of alcohol, represent constitutionally prohibited special legislation that lacks rational differentiation from persons aged 19 and 20 who are also denied the right to use alcoholic beverages, constituting a similar class and, for that matter, those of any age whose excessive use makes their use illegal. Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1992).

Commercial driver's equal protection rights. —

Commercial truck driver's argument that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305(n) violated his equal protection rights by inflicting a greater burden on commercial drivers than non-commercial drivers failed, because the driver conceded that the constitutionality of this section had been upheld in Wilson v. State ex rel. Office of Hearing Exam'r, 841 P.2d 90 (Wyo. 1992), and the driver's briefs included no persuasive argument for revisiting the issue and overturning the prior action. King v. State ex rel. Wyo. DOT, 2007 WY 109, 161 P.3d 1086, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 116 (Wyo. 2007).

Individual IRA not statutorily exempt from process. —

An IRA funded by an individual is not entitled to an exemption under § 1-20-110 (exemption from process of retirement funds and accounts), nor is the classification created by the statute violative of this section of the Constitution. Kingston v. Honeycutt (In re Honeycutt), 908 P.2d 976, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1995).

Funding for county courts. —

Statutory provision allowing the legislature to deny full funding for county courts in counties having populations of less than 30,000 violated the constitutional mandate for equal protection of the laws where there had been disparate treatment of counties having populations of less than 30,000. Board of County Comm'rs v. Geringer, 941 P.2d 742, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 95 (Wyo. 1997).

Funding operation and maintenance of school facilities. —

State's approach to funding operation and maintenance of a school district's facilities did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the differences in funding between school districts was based upon the costs deemed appropriate by the legislature and not based on wealth-based disparities. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 2008 WY 2, 181 P.3d 43, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2008).

Felony murder prosecution for abuse of child. —

Defendant's prosecution for felony murder under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 , based on his abuse of a child under 16, rather than for child abuse, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503 , did not violate equal protection, under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 2, or this section, as the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 , allowing prosecution for first degree murder in cases of child abuse, give fair notice that life in prison or execution are possible penalties. Johnson v. State, 2003 WY 9, 61 P.3d 1234, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. Feb. 18, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 841, 124 S. Ct. 108, 157 L. Ed. 2d 74, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5710 (U.S. 2003).

Declining first-time offender status. —

Trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not violate defendant's right to equal protection of the laws by declining to grant defendant first-offender status under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 ; trial court properly denied such status in order to punish defendant for the premeditated night-time burglary and to deter other students. Kelley v. State, 2009 WY 3, 199 P.3d 521, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 2009).

Former section 14-3-105 validly based on difference in ages and maturity levels. —

Based on the age difference between defendant, an 18-year-old male, and the victim, a 14-year-old female, and their relative maturity levels, it could not be concluded that defendant showed that a fundamental right had been violated by prosecuting him under former § 14-3-105 . Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, 96 P.3d 1027, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 129 (Wyo. 2004).

§ 35. Ex post facto laws; impairing obligation of contracts.

No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be made.

Cross references. —

As to contracts generally, see chapter 23 of title 1.

Sex offender registration act does not violate ex post facto clause. —

In a case where defendant challenged his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act did not violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal or state constitutions because the effects of the Act did not negate the legislature's intent to impose a regulatory scheme as it bore a rational connection to the goal of public safety by providing for identification of individuals convicted of sex offenses, and by making that information available to law enforcement agencies and the general public; and its requirements constituted a reasonable method of achieving the goal of public safety. Kammerer v. State, 2014 WY 50, 322 P.3d 827, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2014).

State ex post facto protection not greater than federal counterpart. —

State constitutional ex post facto clause does not provide greater protection against ex post facto laws than its federal counterpart. Kammerer v. State, 2014 WY 50, 322 P.3d 827, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2014).

This section is an emphatic command to the state legislature. Jensen v. Afton, 59 Wyo. 500, 143 P.2d 190, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1943).

An ex post facto law may be one which alters the situation of an accused to his disadvantage. In re Jones, 500 P.2d 690, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1972).

The real question is whether the accused has been deprived of a substantial right by reason of the change in law. In re Jones, 500 P.2d 690, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1972).

Changes which may be designated as mostly procedural do not, as a rule, come within the ex post facto doctrine. However, that in itself is not the true test; and a statute must be considered to be ex post facto and unconstitutional if it alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. In re Jones, 500 P.2d 690, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1972).

A statute may not be applied retroactively so as to deprive contracting parties of their rights. In re Hagood, 356 P.2d 135, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 1960). See also, Mustanen v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 50 Wyo. 462, 62 P.2d 287, 1936 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (Wyo. 1936).

Legislature could repeal an act establishing an agricultural college which had been located by a vote of the people. State ex rel. Wyoming Agric. College v. Irvine, 14 Wyo. 318, 84 P. 90, 1906 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1906), aff'd, 206 U.S. 278, 27 S. Ct. 613, 51 L. Ed. 1063, 1907 U.S. LEXIS 1163 (U.S. 1907).

For discussion of Wyoming Sex Offenders Registration Act as constitutional, see Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1996).

Defendant tried under mental illness provisions in effect at time of crime. —

The defendant, who committed certain offenses prior to July 1, 1983, was, nevertheless, tried under §§ 7-11-304 and 7-11-305 , relating to mental illness or deficiency, as they existed after their 1983 amendments, effective on the above mentioned date. The defendant's psychiatric witness testified that the defendant could not resist his impulses at the time of the incidents in question, which was sufficient, under pre-1983 § 7-11-304 (a), to relieve a person of responsibility for criminal conduct. The defendant was prejudiced by the court failing to give an instruction under pre-1983 § 7-11-305 (b), under which the state had the obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was able to “conform to his conduct to the requirements of the law,” as defined in pre-1983 § 7-11-304(a), and by, instead, giving an instruction under post-1983 § 7-11-305(b), under which the burden was shifted to the defendant to prove that he could not “conform his conduct to the conduct of the law,” as now defined in § 7-11-304(a) to exclude the “irresistible impulse” test. Lewis v. State, 709 P.2d 1278, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 619 (Wyo. 1985).

Prosecution of crimes by information in place of indictment. —

A statute providing that crimes could be prosecuted by information in place of indictment by a grand jury was not ex post facto in applying to offenses committed before the passage of the act. In re Wright, 3 Wyo. 478, 27 P. 565, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1891).

Ex post facto prosecutorial cost assessment unconstitutional. —

Because the assessment of costs under § 7-11-505 against a defendant convicted prior to the effective date of the statute would be a substantive detriment, such costs could not be assessed without violating the ex post facto prohibition. Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1989), limited, Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 37 (Wyo. 1996).

Habitual offender sentence enhancement not an ex post facto law. —

Habitual offender sentence enhancement statute does not violate constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, 199 P.3d 1052, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (Wyo. 2009).

Appeal by state of dismissal of juvenile proceedings. —

A county attorney cannot appeal a dismissal of proceedings brought against a minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1971, § 14-6-201 et seq., when the proceedings are based upon a violation of law alleged to have been committed prior to enactment of the 1971 law, since the Juvenile Court Act of 1951 contained no provision for appeal on the part of the state. In re Jones, 500 P.2d 690, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 298 (Wyo. 1972).

Ex post facto administrative penalty unconstitutional. —

Even though resulting from the action of an administrative agency, the application of an increased fine and assessment of the penalty of an extended license suspension, authorized by statute enacted after the event occurred, offends as ex post facto. Ballard v. Wyoming Pari-Mutuel Comm'n, 750 P.2d 286, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1988).

Establishment of qualification for newspapers entitled to publish legal notices. —

Former statute, providing that a newspaper having the right to publish notices with legal effect must have been established for one year or more, was not unconstitutional as violating this section. In re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. 226, 11 P.2d 265, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1932).

Reasonable insurance regulation constitutional. —

Where an insurance regulation is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state for the promotion of the safety and welfare of those subject to its jurisdiction, it cannot constitute an impairment of contract. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dep't, 793 P.2d 1008, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 61 (Wyo. 1990).

Issuance of revenue bonds for property purchased by municipality. —

Under a law giving municipalities power to purchase public utility plants, no power could be implied authorizing a town to issue revenue bonds to pay for such a purchase, especially where the property to be purchased had over half the assessed value of all taxable property in the town and the town already had bonded indebtedness of $53,000.00 and the school district of which it was a part, of Jensen v. Afton, 59 Wyo. 500, 143 P.2d 190, 1943 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 1943).

Priority of liens. —

Lien of state under bonds issued by drainage district in which permanent school funds were invested is superior to lien of general taxes. Alamo Drainage Dist. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 60 Wyo. 177, 148 P.2d 229, 1944 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo. 1944).

Applied in

M & B Drilling & Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 706 P.2d 243, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 560 (Wyo. 1985); Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1992).

Quoted in

Miller v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 Wyo. 502, 337 P.2d 262, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (1959); Belco Petroleum Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 246 (Wyo. 1978); Mariano & Assocs. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 737 P.2d 323, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 444 (Wyo. 1987); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Wyoming Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 784 P.2d 627, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 257 (Wyo. 1989).

Stated in

Armed Forces Coop. Insuring Ass'n v. Department of Ins., 622 P.2d 1318, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 332 (Wyo. 1980).

Cited in

Pirie v. Kamps, 68 Wyo. 83, 229 P.2d 927, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 18 , 26 A.L.R.2d 647 (1951); Gardner v. Nation, 522 P.2d 1281, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 210 (Wyo. 1974); Tri-County Elec. Ass'n v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1974); Budd v. Bishop, 543 P.2d 368, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 178 (Wyo. 1975); Allhusen v. State ex rel. Wyo. Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 106 (Wyo. 1995), decided prior to 2001 amendments to the Mental Health Professions Practice Act; Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1995); Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 2017).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 ALR3d 486.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 ALR3d 564.

17A C.J.S Contracts §§ 219 to 228.

§ 36. Rights not enumerated reserved to people.

The enumeration in this constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people.

Powers of legislature. —

The legislature is vested with all legislative powers of the state, and has power to do anything within the domain of legislation which is not repugnant to the state or federal constitutions. State ex rel. Wyoming Agric. College v. Irvine, 14 Wyo. 318, 84 P. 90, 1906 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (Wyo. 1906), aff'd, 206 U.S. 278, 27 S. Ct. 613, 51 L. Ed. 1063, 1907 U.S. LEXIS 1163 (U.S. 1907).

Right to associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty under Wyoming constitution. In re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 269 (Wyo. 1984).

Right to travel. —

Ruling of trial court which changed custody from mother to father due to mother's relocation within state, beyond limit contained in divorce decree, amounted to an infringement on mother's constitutional right to travel. Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1999), overruled in part, Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, 293 P.3d 440, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 2012).

Burden on party claiming infringement.—

Defendant’s conviction for sexual contact with a resident of a correctional facility did not violate her due process rights under either the state or federal constitutions because the statutes at issue clearly proscribed her conduct, the State had an undeniable interest in ensuring the relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who supervised their confinement was not undermined by sexual contact, consensual or otherwise, and, although defendant raised the Wyoming constitutional argument below and on appeal, her argument largely echoed her argument under the federal constitution and she provided no analysis of any of the requisite factors or legal reasons justifying resort to independent state grounds. Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, 437 P.3d 830, 2019 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 2019).

Applied in

DS v. Department of Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 245 (Wyo. 1980).

Cited in

Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 1975 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1975); RS v. Johnson County Dept. of Family Servs. (In re JL), 989 P.2d 1268, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 164 (Wyo. 1999); Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, 36 P.3d 586, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 142 (Wyo. 2001); MTM v. LD, 2002 WY 26, 41 P.3d 522, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 2002).

Law reviews. —

For article, “A Loyalty Oath for Candidates,” see 5 Wyo. L.J. 146.

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

§ 37. Constitution of United States supreme law of land.

The State of Wyoming is an inseparable part of the federal union, and the constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land.

Interpretation by United States supreme court is controlling. —

This section necessarily means the constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States supreme court is controlling law in Wyoming. Torres v. Laramie County Sch. Dist., 506 P.2d 817, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 144 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 990, 94 S. Ct. 342, 38 L. Ed. 2d 229, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 1185 (U.S. 1973).

The primacy of the supreme court of the United States in constitutional areas is firmly embedded in the law by judicial decision and the state constitution. Doe v. Burk, 513 P.2d 643, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 177 (Wyo. 1973).

The supreme court of the United States is the final arbiter as to the federal constitution. State ex rel. Mansfield v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 601 P.2d 174, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 471 (Wyo. 1979).

Application of state constitutional provisions not to infringe upon federal constitutional standards. —

There is no reason why the Wyoming supreme court should not apply Wyoming constitutional provisions in the administration of its jurisprudence, as long as they do not infringe upon the constitutional standards of the United States constitution. Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 215 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied, 558 P.2d 509, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 323 (Wyo. 1977).

First amendment not superseded by Wyoming constitution. —

Article 1, § 20, Wyo. Const. (freedom of speech and press), does not provide an avenue of relief that supersedes well-established first amendment law in defamation cases. Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. Sept. 16, 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984, 112 S. Ct. 1668, 118 L. Ed. 2d 388, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2342 (U.S. 1992).

Federal constitution does not impair proper exercise of the state police power. State v. Hall, 27 Wyo. 224, 194 P. 476, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1920).

Applied in

State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 864, 1948 Wyo. LEXIS 23 (1948); Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 1976); Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist., 558 F.2d 982, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12285 (10th Cir. 1977); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo. 1983); O'Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 1144, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 443 (Wyo. 1986); Allgier v. State, 2015 WY 137, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 154 (Oct. 23, 2015).

Quoted in

Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7892 (D. Wyo. 1964); Foster's Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 541 (Wyo. 1986); Neely v. Wyo. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (Wyo. 2017).

Cited in

Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 398 (Wyo. 1982); Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 2014 Wyo. LEXIS 130 (Sept. 10, 2014).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Federal question jurisdiction in declaratory judgment suit challenging state statute or regulation on grounds of federal preemption, 69 ALR Fed 753.

Annotation, construction, and application of 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (and similar predecessor provisions), concerning intervention by United States or by state in certain federal court cases involving constitutionality of statutes, 147 ALR Fed 613.

§ 38. Right of health care access.

1. Each competent adult shall   have the right to make his or her own health care decisions. The  parent,  guardian or legal representative of any other natural person  shall  have the right to make health care decisions for that person.
2. Any person may pay, and   a health care provider may accept, direct payment for health care   without imposition of penalties or fines for doing so.
3. The legislature may determine   reasonable and necessary restrictions on the rights granted under   this section to protect the health and general welfare of the people   or to accomplish the other purposes set forth in the Wyoming Constitution.
4. The state of Wyoming shall   act to preserve these rights from undue governmental infringement.

History. Added by 2011 Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 2, Section 1, ratified in 2012.

Section added. —

This section was added by an amendment proposed by Laws 2011, Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, Section 1, adopted by vote of the people at the general election held November 6, 2012, and certified on November 14, 2012.

Editor's notes. —

2011 Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, Section 2, provided the following statement from the Secretary of State: “The adoption of this amendment will provide that the right to make health care decisions is reserved to the citizens of the state of Wyoming. It permits any person to pay and any health care provider to receive direct payment for services. The amendment permits the legislature to place reasonable and necessary restrictions on health care consistent with the purposes of the Wyoming Constitution and provides that this state shall act to preserve these rights from undue governmental infringement.”

§ 39. Opportunity to hunt, fish and trap.

The opportunity to fish, hunt and trap wildlife is a heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual citizens of the state, subject to regulation as prescribed by law, and does not create a right to trespass on private property, diminish other private rights or alter the duty of the state to manage wildlife.

History. Added by 2011 Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Section 1, ratified in 2012.

Section added. —

This section was added by an amendment proposed by Laws 2011, Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Section 1, adopted by vote of the people at the general election held November 6, 2012, and certified on November 14, 2012.

Editor's notes. —

2011 Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Section 2, provided the following statement from the Secretary of State:

“The adoption of this amendment will recognize and preserve the heritage of Wyoming citizens' opportunity to fish, hunt, and trap wildlife, subject to regulations as prescribed by law.”

Cited in

Hanesworth v. Johnke, 783 P.2d 173, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 233 (Wyo. 1989).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming Fetal Rights—Why the Abortion “Albatross” Is a Bird of a Different Color: The Case for Fetal-Federalism,” see XXVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 627 (1993).

§ 1. Powers of government divided into three departments.

The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.

Cross references. —

For provision that military shall be subordinate to the civil power, see art. 1, § 25, Wyo. Const.

As to legislative department, see art. 3, §§ 1 to 52, Wyo. Const. and title 28.

As to executive department, see art. 4, §§ 1 to 15, Wyo. Const. and title 9.

As to judicial department, see art. 5, §§ 1 to 29, Wyo. Const. and title 5.

Treasurer’s power usurped. —

Public contract bidders must comply with statutory requirements. —

State, not court, empowered to defer prosecution. —

Legislature, not courts, to define crimes and punishments. —

So death penalty statutes do not usurp power of supreme court. —

Parole is executive function; probation is judicial function. —

Parole board authority reviewed upon reverse decision. —

Legislative regulation of entry on pleadings. —

Procedural statute. —

Judiciary cannot determine qualifications for membership in house of representatives. —

Judicial department may not assume “executive” duties unless part of criminal penalty. —

Criminal statute may constitutionally forbid prosecution under reduced charge. —

Court without jurisdiction to expunge criminal record for purpose of restoring civil rights. —

Court may request probation officer to report probation violations. —

Court may find lesser-included or attempted crime. —

State auditor. —

State veterinarian. —

State engineer. —

Power of board of control to adjudicate priorities of water rights. —

State water within reservation. —

Authorizing public service commission to institute civil proceedings. —

Collective bargaining for fire fighters. —

Legislature may enact laws regulating seat belt use. —

Dismissal of charges with prejudice as discovery sanction. —

Treasurer’s power usurped. —

Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1 prohibits any person or collection of persons charged with exercising the powers belonging to one of the three branches of government from exercising powers properly belonging to another branch, except as the Constitution expressly directs or permits. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 31 expressly requires the state treasurer’s approval of contracts for repairing and furnishing areas used by the legislature. Wyoming’s capitol restoration legislation assigns all aspects of the project to the governor and other officials and groups created by the legislature. It, therefore, usurps the treasurer’s authority under Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 31 and violates the separation of powers provision of the Wyoming Constitution. Gordon v. State, 2018 WY 32, 413 P.3d 1093, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 2018).

Prohibition in this section is against the exercise by any department of the government of powers properly belonging to either of the other 2 departments. Carter v. Board of County Comm'rs, 518 P.2d 142, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 1974).

Public contract bidders must comply with statutory requirements. —

The fact that the low bidder could establish itself as qualified to do the work on a state project in the judgment of the trial court on the basis of post-award court proceedings was immaterial, given its lack of response or noncompliance with the prescribed requirements of the proposal forms. Bids for public contracts must substantially comply with the requirements of the specifications for bidding and the directions to prospective bidders. The determination as to whether these requirements are satisfied and the awarding of a contract are acts of discretion which will be enjoined only if done illegally, arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably. State v. Weisz & Sons, 713 P.2d 176, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 458 (Wyo. 1986).

State, not court, empowered to defer prosecution. —

The executive department, not the judicial department, has the power to decide whether to defer prosecution under § 7-13-301 (placing guilty, unconvicted, person on probation). The exercise of that prosecutorial discretion is not subject to judicial review as long as any unjustifiable or suspect factors such as race, religion or other arbitrary or discriminatory classification are not involved. Thus, the requirement that the state consent to the court's deferral of further proceedings and placement of defendants on probation without entry of a judgment of conviction does not infringe on the judicial department's sentencing power in violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in this section. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. Nov. 9, 1990); Mollman v. State, 800 P.2d 466, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1990); Hudson v. State, 800 P.2d 471, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1990); Heggen v. State, 800 P.2d 475, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1990); Cambio v. State, 800 P.2d 482, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1990).

Legislature, not courts, to define crimes and punishments. —

The power to determine what acts are crimes, and the punishment for those prohibited acts, belongs to the legislative branch as an absolute, exclusive and inherent power not shared with the courts. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (U.S. 1983).

So death penalty statutes do not usurp power of supreme court. —

The Wyoming death penalty provisions are not unconstitutional in that they do not usurp the supervisory and rule-making power of the supreme court and expand its jurisdiction in violation of the Wyoming constitution, Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 325 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (U.S. 1983).

Parole is executive function; probation is judicial function. —

Parole is an executive agency function, incident to confinement following sentence; probation is a judicial function within which the probation and parole agents provide supervisory assistance to the judiciary. Hewitt v. State, 835 P.2d 348, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1992).

Parole board authority reviewed upon reverse decision. —

The defendant argued that § 7-13-421(c)(ii) violated the separation of powers requirement in his case because that statute might have permitted the parole board to perform both legislative and judicial functions by allowing the board to extend the period of his possible parole in the event he failed to make restitution. Because the board had not yet exercised its statutory authority, however, the issue raised was not ripe for review. The defendant could seek review when he could demonstrate that the board had made some adverse decision. Brenning v. State, 870 P.2d 349, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1994).

Legislative regulation of entry on pleadings. —

The legislature is constitutionally prohibited from enacting statutes specifying the content of or foreclosing material from pleadings, as these are procedural matters. White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 341 (Wyo. 1984).

Procedural statute. —

Statute which prohibits signing and filing pleadings for any improper purpose is unconstitutional, as it pertains to a procedural matter and thus constitutes an invasion by the legislature of the powers of the judicial branch of government. Squillace v. Kelley, 990 P.2d 497, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 173 (Wyo. 1999).

Judiciary cannot determine qualifications for membership in house of representatives. —

Qualifications for membership in the house of representatives are a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the judiciary to determine. State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 223 (Wyo. 1972).

Judicial department may not assume “executive” duties unless part of criminal penalty. —

Although the surrender of a driver's license as a part of the penalty defined by the legislature for driving while intoxicated can be the function of the court imposing sentence, the legislature has not seen fit to include suspension or revocation of drivers' licenses as part of the criminal penalty, and therefore the provisions in § 31-5-233(e) (prior to its amendment in 1984) for collection of a driver's license by the court and for the issuance of a temporary driver's license by the court are unconstitutional in that they violate this section by directing the judicial branch of the government to exercise powers properly belonging to the executive branch. State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 394 (Wyo. 1983).

Criminal statute may constitutionally forbid prosecution under reduced charge. —

The defendant, charged under § 31-5-233(j), which provides that “any person charged under this section [driving while under the influence of alcohol] shall be prosecuted under this section and not under a reduced charge,” had no right to any plea bargain with the prosecutor nor to the reduction or dismissal of charges against her. Without such a right, she had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 31-5-233(j) on the grounds that it constituted an infringement on the prosecutorial discretion of the executive branch of government, which is a violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Gooden v. State, 711 P.2d 405, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 618 (Wyo. 1985).

A stipulation setting forth the traditional plea bargaining practice in the municipal court of the city of Cheyenne was not sufficient to afford defendant standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 31-5-233(j) (driving under the influence), on the alleged ground that it violates the separation of powers doctrine. Lacombe v. Cheyenne, 733 P.2d 601, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 400 (Wyo. 1987).

Court without jurisdiction to expunge criminal record for purpose of restoring civil rights. —

An expungement of a criminal record by a court, under its inherent powers, of one not pardoned, whose conviction was without error, and only for the purpose of restoring civil rights, would have been an encroachment on the power of the executive branch, i.e., the pardoning power of the governor, and the district court properly refused to take such action as being beyond its jurisdiction. Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 328 (Wyo. 1984).

Court may request probation officer to report probation violations. —

A request of the trial court that the assigned probation officer report violations of the court order to the prosecuting attorney neither constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion nor intrudes into a separation of powers function of the executive agency. Hewitt v. State, 835 P.2d 348, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 99 (Wyo. 1992).

Court may find lesser-included or attempted crime. —

No violation of the separation of powers doctrine occurred when a trial court found a juvenile guilty of attempted shoplifting even though the juvenile petition only charged shoplifting and was never amended to include a charge of attempted shoplifting since a trial court may properly rely on Rule 31 W.R.Cr.P. to find a juvenile defendant guilty of a lesser-included or attempted offense even if not originally charged. MJS v. State (In re MJS), 2001 WY 31, 20 P.3d 506, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 2001).

Validity of statute in relation to constitution is power which vests in courts as one of the checks and balances contemplated by the division of government into three departments — legislative, executive and judicial. Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 227 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2692 (U.S. 1980).

State auditor. —

The state auditor is an officer of the executive department and, under this section, is forbidden to exercise any powers belonging to the judicial department. His disallowance of a claim is reviewable by the supreme court notwithstanding statute which provides that the auditor shall audit claims, and may for that purpose compel attendance of witnesses the same as courts of record. State ex rel. Jeffrey v. Burdick, 3 Wyo. 588, 28 P. 146, 1891 Wyo. LEXIS 16 (Wyo. 1891).

State veterinarian. —

A statute giving certain powers to the state veterinarian in accordance with art. 19, § 1, Wyo. Const., is not invalid as an unlawful delegation of power under this section. Arbuckle v. Pflaeging, 20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1912).

State engineer. —

The state engineer is an executive officer appointed by and subject to removal by only the governor of In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1992).

The state engineer is not subject to impeachment; neither the constitution nor the statutes contemplate that a district court should have the authority to remove or replace the state engineer as the administrator of Wyoming water. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1992).

Power of board of control to adjudicate priorities of water rights. —

The board of control exercises part of the executive power of the state, and the power vested in it by art. 8, § 2, Wyo. Const., to adjudicate priorities of water rights, does not indicate that in this respect the judicial power of the courts has been superseded. Simmons v. Ramsbottom, 51 Wyo. 419, 68 P.2d 153, 1937 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo. 1937).

Act conferring upon state board of control power to adjudicate priorities in public waters of state is not invalid as investing board with judicial powers. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1900).

State water within reservation. —

A district court may not assign the duties of administering state water within a reservation to a tribal water agency. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1992).

Authorizing public service commission to institute civil proceedings. —

The provisions of § 56, ch. 65, Laws 1935, regulating motor carriers, which authorized the public service commission to initiate appropriate civil proceedings to enforce obedience to, or for violation of, the act, did not violate this section. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1935).

Collective bargaining for fire fighters. —

Sections 27-10-101 to 27-10-109 , pertaining to collective bargaining for fire fighters, do not violate this section. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

Legislature may enact laws regulating seat belt use. —

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1402(f) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine because as a substantive law, its enactment was inherently within the powers delegated to the legislature by the Wyoming Constitution. Huff v. Shumate, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27781 (D. Wyo. 2004).

Dismissal of charges with prejudice as discovery sanction. —

District court did not infringe on the prosecutors' decision to prosecute or decline to prosecute defendant by dismissing the charge against defendant with prejudice as a discovery sanction against the State because the court was not inserting itself into the decision of whether to bring charges but was instead attempting to enforce its own rules. State v. Naple, 2006 WY 125, 143 P.3d 358, 2006 Wyo. LEXIS 128 (Wyo. 2006).

In holding that the Department of Family Services must employ an accurate standard of need in administering the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, the Wyoming Supreme Court did not invade the provinces of either the executive or legislative branches; the court did not order the state to participate in the federal program, order the department to set its standard of need at a particular level, or order the department to employ a particular methodology in determining the accurate standard of need, nor did the court order the state to maintain a particular benefit level and therefore did not order an increase in appropriations. Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1993).

Applied in

Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962); City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., 647 P.2d 1378, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1982); In re Declaration of Abandonment of Wolfley Appropriation, 695 P.2d 159, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 444 (Wyo. 1985); V-1 Oil Co. v. People, 799 P.2d 1199, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1990).

Quoted in

Board of County Comm'rs v. Teton County Youth Servs., Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 393 (Wyo. 1982); Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization, Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 749 P.2d 221, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 572 (Wyo. 1987).

Stated in

Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 504 (Wyo. 1979); Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 351 (Wyo. 1984); Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1994).

Cited in

Fristam v. City of Sheridan, 66 Wyo. 143, 206 P.2d 741, 1949 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (1949); Steffey v. Casper, 358 P.2d 951, 1961 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 1961); Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 126 (Wyo. 1964); Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyo. Community Dev. Auth., 575 P.2d 1100, 1978 Wyo. LEXIS 266 (Wyo. 1978); BHP Petroleum Co. v. State, 784 P.2d 621, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 259 (Wyo. 1989); In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992); Terex Corp. v. Hough, 2002 WY 112, 50 P.3d 317, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 118 (Wyo. 2002); Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp., 2003 WY 77, 71 P.3d 717, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 96 (Wyo. 2003); State v. Newman, 2004 WY 41, 88 P.3d 445, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (2004).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Administrative Regulation Review Act,” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 189 (1979).

See article, “Administrative Regulation Review — Act II,” XV Land & Water L. Rev. 207 (1980).

For article, “Administrative Law, Wyoming Style,” see XVIII Land & Water L. Rev. 223 (1983).

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

For article, “A Critical Look at Wyoming Water Law,” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 307 (1989).

For article, “The Wyoming Constitution: A Centennial Assessment,” see XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. 13 (1991).

Applied in

V-1 Oil Co. v. People, 799 P.2d 1199, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 1990).

Cited in

In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1992).

Law reviews. —

For article, “An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation,” see XXI Land & Water L. Rev. 527 (1986).

§ 1. Composition and name of legislature.

The legislative power shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives, which shall be designated “the legislature of the State of Wyoming.”

There is a clear distinction between the power to legislate and the right to regulate. The former is vested exclusively in the legislature by constitutional edict. The latter is sometimes granted public authorities by legislative sanction. The former ordains the law. The latter merely prescribes means and methods for its application. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

Legislature may pass any acts not inhibited by constitution. —

Under this section, the legislature may pass any acts that are not expressly or by necessary implication inhibited by the state constitution or the United States constitution. Budge v. Board of Comm'rs, 29 Wyo. 35, 208 P. 874, 1922 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 1922).

Courts will not enter legislative field of policy making. —

The disposition of the judicial branch of government has always been to scrupulously refrain from encroaching in the slightest way into the legislative field of policy making where factual or economic factors require latitude of discretion. The courts will not and do not substitute their opinions in such matters for the considered judgment of the lawmakers. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

But will prevent legislature from delegating its power. —

The courts have a function to perform, a constitutional right, and the paramount duty to insist that the legislature not renounce its legislative power by any attempt to delegate it away. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

Nature of legislature's police power. —

The police power of the legislature is great indeed. Its exercise in the protection and preservation of the public safety, its health, its morals, and in behalf of its general welfare is not merely laudable, it is essential. But however great its power, it is nonetheless not beyond limitation. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 85 (Wyo. 1962).

Statute beyond power of legislature. —

The legislature did not possess power to enact a law authorizing a verdict by three-fourths of the jury in civil actions. First Nat'l Bank v. Foster, 9 Wyo. 157, 61 P. 466, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (Wyo. 1900), reh'g denied, 9 Wyo. 157, 63 P. 1056, 1901 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1901).

Delegation of accreditation power. —

Although requirement of accreditation was a delegation of power made by the Wyoming department of education to the accrediting institution, this delegation did not violate the Wyoming Constitution as the Wyoming Constitution does not directly prohibit delegations of public power to private entities or to public agencies, and any constitutional limitation was therefore indirect; here, applicants had sufficient guarantees of due process, and the delegation of accreditation to private entities was reasonable. Newport Int'l Univ., Inc. v. State, 2008 WY 72, 186 P.3d 382, 2008 Wyo. LEXIS 74 (Wyo. 2008).

Applied in

Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962); Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1990).

Stated in

Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 504 (Wyo. 1979).

Cited in

State ex rel. Jamison v. Forsyth, 21 Wyo. 359, 133 P. 521, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (1913); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 , 109 A.L.R. 534 (1935); In re Bridger Valley Water Conservancy Dist., 401 P.2d 289, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 136 (Wyo. 1989).

Law reviews. —

For article, “The Wyoming Constitution: A Centennial Assessment,” see XXVI Land & Water L. Rev. 13 (1991).

§ 2. Members' terms and qualifications.

Senators shall be elected for the term of four (4) years and representatives for the term of two (2) years. The senators elected at the first election shall be divided by lot into two classes as nearly equal as may be. The seats of senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the first two years, and of the second class at the expiration of four years. No person shall be a senator who has not attained the age of twenty-five years, or a representative who has not attained the age of twenty-one years, and who is not a citizen of the United States and of this state and who has not, for at least twelve months next preceding his election resided within the county or district in which he was elected.

Cross references. —

As to when term of office begins, see art. 3, § 5, Wyo. Const.

For additional provisions concerning senate, see §§ 28-3-101 to 28-3-104 .

As to house of representatives, see §§ 28-4-101 to 28-4-104 .

Term limit statute unconstitutional. —

Term limit law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103 , as it applies to candidates for the state legislature, whether adopted by initiative or legislative action, is unconstitutional and unenforceable because it violates art. 1, § 3, Wyo. Const. and art. 3, §§ 2 and 52(g), Wyo. Const. No law, whether enacted by the legislature through the legislative process or by the people through the initiative process, may condition political rights and privileges upon a circumstance or condition such as incumbency. Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 2004).

Right to seek public office for which one has proper qualifications is a fundamental right such as to be a question of great public importance. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974).

Construction of limiting provisions. —

Statutory and constitutional provisions which tend to limit the candidacy of any person for public office or exclude any citizen from participation in the elective process must be construed in favor of the right of the voters to exercise their choice and should be construed strictly and not extended to cases not clearly covered thereby. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974).

Members of the legislature are state officers under the provisions of the election laws. Dillman v. State, 20 Wyo. 404, 125 P. 367, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1912).

Quoted in

State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 223 (Wyo. 1972).

Cited in

State ex rel. Bennett v. Barber, 4 Wyo. 56, 32 P. 14, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (1892); Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (2004).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Validity of age requirement for state public office, 90 ALR3d 900.

§ 3. Legislative apportionment.

Each county shall constitute a senatorial and representative district; the senate and house of representatives shall be composed of members elected by the legal voters of the counties respectively, every two (2) years. They shall be apportioned among the said counties as nearly as may be according to the number of their inhabitants. Each county shall have at least one senator and one representative; but at no time shall the number of members of the house of representatives be less than twice nor greater than three times the number of members of the senate. The senate and house of representatives first elected in pursuance of this constitution shall consist of sixteen and thirty-three members respectively.

Cross references. —

See also §§ 28-2-116 to 28-2-119 .

Section 48 of this article must be read in the light of and construed with this section. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, 377 P.2d 299, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 1963).

Apportionment among counties required. —

Both this section and § 48 of this article require the legislature to be “apportioned” among the counties. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, 377 P.2d 299, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 1963).

And apportionment provisions are mandatory. —

The provisions of the constitution are quite clear, explicit and mandatory. They leave no room for confusion or doubt as to what the legislature is to do about reapportionment and when it is to do it. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, 377 P.2d 299, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 1963).

Federal constitution requires both houses to be apportioned by population. —

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the United States requires that both houses of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned substantially on a population basis. However, mathematical exactness is not required, so long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy. The foregoing rules are applicable regardless of whether the scheme for representation in either house of a bicameral state legislature results from statutory or constitutional provisions. Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7892 (D. Wyo. 1964).

And 1963 Reapportionment Act violated this requirement as to senate. —

The Reapportionment Act of 1963 (ch. 22, Laws 1963), insofar as it provides for representation in the state senate, constitutes an invidious discrimination, and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the United States.Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7892 (D. Wyo. 1964).

But not as to house of representatives. —

The Reapportionment Act of 1963 (ch. 22, Laws 1963), insofar as it provides for representation in the house of representatives, is not an invidious discrimination and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the United States.Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7892 (D. Wyo. 1964).

1991 reapportionment provisions unconstitutional. —

The 1991 Legislative Reapportionment Act (§§ 28-2-113 through 28-2-115 (repealed)), insofar as it provides for representation in the state house of representatives and senate, constitutes an invidious discrimination and violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14885 (D. Wyo. 1991).

Section may be disregarded by legislature. —

This section is inconsistent with the application of the “one person, one vote” principle under circumstances as they presently exist in Wyoming. Consequently, the Wyoming legislature may disregard this provision when reapportioning either the senate or the house of representatives. Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14885 (D. Wyo. 1991).

Section ineffective in reapportionment of senate. —

The conditions and circumstances existing in Wyoming are such that the provisions of this section, which constitute each county an election district and require that each county be represented by at least one senator, are ineffective and are not to be considered when determination is made of the reapportionment of the Wyoming state senate. Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7892 (D. Wyo. 1964).

Since literal compliance therewith would be unreasonable. —

The conditions and circumstances existing in Wyoming are such that literal compliance with the provisions of this section would produce a result that would be wholly unreasonable, untenable and impractical. The end result of literal compliance would be a legislature substantially in excess of 300 members. However, it is obvious that the Wyoming constitutional convention which agreed upon a state constitution intended that the legislative bodies should be comparatively small. It could not have envisioned such an absurd result as would be brought about if the state senate is constituted with each county as a senatorial election district and the county with the least population fixing as near as may be the minimum unit for district representation. Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7892 (D. Wyo. 1964).

Apportionment plan with large population disparity must advance rational state policy. —

As a general matter, an apportionment plan for state legislative districts with a maximum population deviation under 10 percent falls within the category of minor deviations. A plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the state. The ultimate inquiry is whether the legislature's plan may reasonably be said to advance a rational state policy and, if so, whether the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 77 L. Ed. 2d 214, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 78 (U.S. 1983).

Wyoming's apportionment policy supported by legitimate state concerns and applied in nondiscriminatory manner. —

There can be no question that Wyoming's constitutional policy — followed since statehood — of using counties as representative districts and ensuring that each county has one representative is supported by substantial and legitimate state concerns. Moreover, it is undisputed that Wyoming has applied this factor in a manner free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 77 L. Ed. 2d 214, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 78 (U.S. 1983).

Allocation of representative to Niobrara county not violation of equal protection. —

The state of Wyoming does not violate the equal protection clause by allocating one of the 64 seats in its house of representatives to Niobrara county, a county the population of which is considerably lower than the average population per state representative. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 77 L. Ed. 2d 214, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 78 (U.S. 1983).

Where a new county is created from part of another county, the legislative representatives shall be elected to represent both counties until a new apportionment is made. Dillman v. State, 20 Wyo. 404, 125 P. 367, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1912).

Supreme court cannot compel election where apportionment act invalid. —

Though an apportionment act be conceded invalid, the supreme court cannot compel an election under the apportionment found in the constitution. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Schnitger, 16 Wyo. 479, 95 P. 698, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1908).

Law reviews. —

For case note, “Constitutional Law — A Narrow Reapportionment Holding with Broad Implications for Wyoming. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 77 L. Ed. 2d 214, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 78 (1983),” see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 253 (1984).

§ 4. Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Section repealed. —

This section was repealed by a constitutional amendment proposed by Laws 1947, House Joint Resolution No. 5, p. 249, adopted by a vote of the people on November 2, 1948, and proclaimed in effect December 1, 1948.

§ 5. When members elected and terms begin.

Members of the senate and house of representatives shall be elected on the day provided by law for the general election of a member of congress, and their term of office shall begin on the first Monday of January thereafter.

Cross references. —

As to date of general election, see § 22-2-104 .

As to terms of office and offices voted on at general elections, see § 22-2-105 .

§ 6. Compensation of members; duration of sessions.

The legislature shall not meet for more than sixty (60) legislative working days excluding Sundays during the term for which members of the house of representatives are elected, except when called into special session. The legislature shall determine by statute the number of days not to exceed sixty (60) legislative working days to be devoted to general and budget session, respectively. The legislature shall meet on odd-numbered years for a general and budget session. The legislature may meet on even-numbered years for budget session. During the budget session no bills except the budget bill may be introduced unless placed on call by a two-thirds vote of either house. The legislature shall meet for no more than forty (40) legislative working days excluding Sundays in any (1) calendar year, except when called into special session. The compensation of the members of the legislature shall be as provided by law; but no legislature shall fix its own compensation. (As amended by Laws 1971, Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, p. 723.)

Cross references. —

See also §§ 28-5-101 to 28-5-106 .

Increased compensation. —

No member of either house shall, during the term for which he was elected, receive any increase of salary or mileage under any law passed during the term. Board of Comm'rs v. Burns, 3 Wyo. 691, 29 P. 894, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 3 Wyo. 691, 29 P. 894, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1892).

Legislative days. —

The technical rule of law, making a part of a day a whole day, is not recognized as controlling legislative days. A calendar day, even, is not necessarily a legislative day. A fortiori a fraction of a calendar day is not necessarily, or even presumptively, a legislative day. White v. Hinton, 3 Wyo. 753, 30 P. 953, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1892).

Quoted in

County Court Judges Ass'n v. Sidi, 752 P.2d 960 (Wyo. 1988).

Law reviews. —

For note dealing with the effect of stopping the clock on legislation, see 10 Wyo. L.J. 203.

For comment, “Wyoming's Administrative Regulation Review Act,” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 189 (1979).

§ 7. Time and place of sessions.

1. The legislature shall meet at the seat of government at twelve o'clock noon, on the second Tuesday of January of the odd-numbered years for general and budget session and may meet on the second Tuesday of January of the even-numbered years for budget session, and at other times when convened by the governor or upon call of the legislature as herein provided. The governor by proclamation may also, in times of war or grave emergency by law defined, temporarily convene the legislature at a place or places other than the seat of government. The legislature may convene a special session not to last longer than twenty (20) working days as follows:
   1. Upon written request to the presiding officer of each house of the legislature by a majority of the elected members of each house, the legislature shall convene in special session; or
   2. The presiding officers of each house shall also jointly call a special session for the purpose of resolving a challenge or a dispute of any kind in the determination of the presidential electors. (As amended by Laws 1961, Senate Joint Resolution No. 9, 1973, p. 686; Laws 1971, Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, p. 723; Laws 2001, Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, § 1.) Cross references. — As to length of legislative session, see § 28-1-102 . Amendments. — Laws 2001, Senate Enrolled Joint Resolution No. 3, § 1, authorized the submission of a proposed amendment of this section, which was approved by vote of the people at the general election held November 5, 2002, and declared in effect November 17, 2002. The 2001 amendment authorizes the legislature to convene special sessions of the legislature and authorizes legislative leaders of each house to convene a special session to resolve a dispute or challenge to determine presidential electors, specifically by designating the existing provisions as (a), adding “or upon call of the legislature as herein provided ” at the end of the first sentence, adding “The legislature may convene a special session not to last longer than (20) working days as follows,” and adding (a)(i) and (a)(ii). Editor's notes. —

      There is no subsection (b) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

§ 8. Members disqualified for other office.

No senator or representative shall, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the state, and no member of congress or other person holding an office (except that of notary public or an office in the militia) under the United States or this state, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.

Word “appointed” as used in this section does not include election to a civil office by a popular vote of the people. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 197 (Wyo. 1974).

Assisting in prosecution of case. —

This section does not prevent a member of the legislature, who is a member of the bar, from assisting in the prosecution of a case. Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 P. 924, 1899 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (Wyo. 1899).

Law reviews. —

For note, “The Common-Law Rule Against Holding Incompatible Offices — Abolishing the ‘Office’ Limitation. Haskins v. State ex rel. Harrington, 516 P.2d 1171, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 192 , 70 A.L.R.3d 1171 (Wyo. 1973),” see IX Land & Water L. Rev. 667 (1974).

§ 9. Compensation not to be increased during term.

No member of either house shall, during the term for which he was elected, receive any increase of salary or mileage under any law passed during that term.

Cross references. —

See also §§ 28-5-101 to 28-5-106 .

No legislature can fix its own compensation. Board of Comm'rs v. Burns, 3 Wyo. 691, 29 P. 894, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 12 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 3 Wyo. 691, 29 P. 894, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (Wyo. 1892).

Quoted in

County Court Judges Ass'n v. Sidi, 752 P.2d 960 (Wyo. 1988).

§ 10. Presiding officers; other officers; each house to judge of election and qualifications of its members.

The senate shall, at the beginning and close of each regular session and at such other times as may be necessary, elect one of its members president; the house of representatives shall elect one of its members speaker; each house shall choose its other officers, and shall judge of the election returns and qualifications of its members.

Cross references. —

As to contesting legislative elections, see §§ 22-17-109 et seq.

For provisions authorizing president of senate to preside over joint sessions, see § 28-1-101 .

For other duties of president of senate, see § 28-3-101 .

For duties of speaker of house of representatives, see § 28-4-102 .

Exclusive right to judge the title to a legislative seat lies with that body. State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 223 (Wyo. 1972).

And judiciary cannot determine qualifications. —

Qualifications for membership in the house of representatives are a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the judiciary to determine. State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759, 1972 Wyo. LEXIS 223 (Wyo. 1972).

§ 11. Quorum.

A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as each house may prescribe.

§ 12. Rules, punishment and protection.

Each house shall have power to determine the rules of its proceedings, and [to] punish its members or other persons for contempt or disorderly behavior in its presence; to protect its members against violence or offers of bribes or private solicitation, and with the concurrence of two-thirds, to expel a member, and shall have all other powers necessary to the legislature of a free state. A member expelled for corruption shall not thereafter be eligible to either house of the legislature, and punishment for contempt or disorderly behavior shall not bar a criminal prosecution for the same offense.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Goodbye 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982” (part two), see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 509 (1984).

§ 13. Journals.

Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings and may, in its discretion, from time to time, publish the same, except such parts as require secrecy, and the yeas and nays on any question, shall, at the request of any two members, be entered on the journal.

Examination of journals to determine whether act was constitutionally passed. —

It is the duty of the court, where an act is questioned, to examine the legislative journals to determine whether or not such act was passed by a majority of the members elected to each house, as that is a matter which the constitution requires to be shown by the journal. State ex rel. Cheyenne v. Swan, 7 Wyo. 166, 51 P. 209, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1897).

The enrolled bill as signed by the officers of the legislature and the governor is not conclusive on the courts, and the legislative journals may be consulted to determine whether the act has been passed in conformity with the constitutional requirements. State ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Wright, 62 Wyo. 112, 163 P.2d 190, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1945).

Parol testimony inadmissible to impeach journals. —

Where the journals of both houses of the legislature showed that an act was passed on December 15, parol testimony was not admissible to impeach the journals for the purpose of showing that the act was passed on December 16, since the records of the journals were conclusive. White v. Hinton, 3 Wyo. 753, 30 P. 953, 1892 Wyo. LEXIS 19 (Wyo. 1892).

Law reviews. —

For note, “Stopping the Clock in the Wyoming Legislature,” see 10 Wyo. L.J. 203.

§ 14. Sessions to be open.

The sessions of each house and of the committee of the whole shall be open unless the business is such as requires secrecy.

§ 15. Adjournment.

Neither house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.

§ 16. Privilege of members.

The members of the legislature shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, violation of their oath of office and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house they shall not be questioned in any other place.

Cross references. —

As to libel and slander, see Wyo. Stats. Anno. chapter 29 of title 1.

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Defamation: nature and extent of privilege accorded public statements, relating to subject of legislative business or concern, made by member of state or local legislature or council outside of formal proceedings, 41 ALR4th 1116.

§ 17. Power of impeachment; proceedings.

The sole power of impeachment shall vest in the house of representatives; the concurrence of a majority of all the members being necessary to the exercise thereof. Impeachment shall be tried by the senate sitting for that purpose, and the senators shall be upon oath or affirmation to do justice according to law and evidence. When the governor is on trial, the chief justice of the supreme court shall preside. No person shall be convicted without a concurrence of two-thirds of the senators elected.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Ousting the Judge: Campaign Politics in the 1984 Wyoming Judicial Retention Elections,” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 371 (1989).

§ 18. Who may be impeached.

The governor and other state and judicial officers except justices of the peace, shall be liable to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office, but judgment in such cases shall only extend to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the laws of the state. The party, whether convicted or acquitted, shall, nevertheless, be liable to prosecution, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.

Cross references. —

For provision that governor cannot pardon impeached officer, see art. 4, § 5, Wyo. Const.

As to suspension of officer pending impeachment and filling vacancy, see § 9-1-203 .

As to impeachment of governor, see § 9-1-214 .

As to impeachment of secretary of state, see § 9-1-304 .

As to removal of justices of peace, see § 18-3-907 .

Not all state officers are subject to impeachment. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

Phrase “other state and judicial officers,” contained in this section, refers only to state and judicial officers created by the constitution. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

What officers not removable by impeachment. —

A state superintendent of a water district, appointed by the governor, is a state officer who may be removed by the governor, but is not an officer removable by impeachment. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Grant, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1905).

The state engineer is not removable by impeachment, but may be removed by the governor. People ex rel. Emerson v. Shawver, 30 Wyo. 366, 222 P. 11, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1924).

Office of justice of the peace is statutory, not constitutional, office. —

See In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

Thus, language “except justices of the peace” is meaningless. —

Since a justice of the peace is not a state officer in the constitutional sense, the language, “except justices of the peace” contained in this section is now without meaning. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

And provisions of art. 3, § 19, Wyo. Const., no longer apply to justices of peace. —

See In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

The authority which the people have vested in the legislature, with respect to the office of justice of the peace, and the appurtenant right to abolish or modify the privileges and rights of such an office, is irreconcilably repugnant to the provisions of this section and art. 3, § 19, Wyo. Const., which relate to impeachment of state and judicial officers. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

Provisions as relate to justices of peace repealed by implication. —

The provisions of this section and art. 3, § 19, Wyo. Const., as they relate to justices of the peace, were repealed by implication when the 1965 constitutional amendment to art. 5, Wyo. Const., became effective in 1967. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

The provisions of this section and art. 3, § 19, Wyo. Const., as they relate to impeachment of justices of the peace, are irreconcilable with the 1965 constitutional amendment, to art. 5, Wyo. Const., which eliminated justice of the peace courts from the constitution. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Goodbye 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982” (part two), see XIX Land & Water L. Rev. 509 (1984).

For article, “Ousting the Judge: Campaign Politics in the 1984 Wyoming Judicial Retention Elections,” see XXIV Land & Water L. Rev. 371 (1989).

Am. Jur. 2d, ALR and C.J.S. references. —

Abuse or misuse of contempt power as ground for removal or discipline of judge, 76 ALR4th 982.

§ 19. Removal of officers not subject to impeachment.

Except as hereafter provided, all officers not liable to impeachment shall be subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance in office as provided by law. Any person appointed by the governor to serve as head of a state agency, or division thereof, or to serve as a member of a state board or commission, may be removed by the governor as provided by law.

Cross references. —

As to removal of appointed officers and commissioners by governor, see § 9-1-202 .

As to removal of county officers, see §§ 18-3-901 to 18-3-907 .

Statutory provisions. —

In keeping with this section, the legislature originally delegated certain powers of removal to the governor under § 9-1-202 .State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, 401 P.2d 954, 1965 Wyo. LEXIS 140 (Wyo. 1965).

State engineer. —

State engineer is not removable by impeachment, but may be removed by the governor. People ex rel. Emerson v. Shawver, 30 Wyo. 366, 222 P. 11, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 69 (Wyo. 1924).

The state engineer is an executive officer appointed by and subject to removal by only the governor of In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1992).

The state engineer is not subject to impeachment; neither the constitution nor the statutes contemplate that a district court should have the authority to remove or replace the state engineer as the administrator of Wyoming water. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 71 (Wyo. 1992).

State superintendent of a water district, appointed by the governor, is a state officer who may be removed by the governor, but is not an officer removable by impeachment. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Grant, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 30 (Wyo. 1905).

Office of justice of the peace was formerly of constitutional origin in Wyoming. —

See In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

But is now legislative. —

Although usually the office of justice of the peace is considered to be a constitutional office, it is now a creature of statute. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

And, therefore, not subject to constitution's removal provisions. —

See In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

Since a justice of the peace is not a state officer in the constitutional sense, the language, “except justices of the peace” contained in art. 3, § 18, Wyo. Const., is now without meaning. If this language is without meaning, then the provisions of this section are no longer applicable to justices of the peace. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

The authority which the people have vested in the legislature, with respect to the office of justice of the peace, and the appurtenant right to abolish or modify the privileges and rights of such an office, is irreconcilably repugnant to the provisions of this section and art. 3, § 18, Wyo. Const., which relate to impeachment of state and judicial officers. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

Grounds for removal of justice of the peace are no longer limited to those contained in this section. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

Provisions as relate to justices of peace repealed by implication. —

The provisions of this section and art. 3, § 18, Wyo. Const., as they relate to justices of the peace were repealed by implication when the 1965 constitutional amendment to art. 5, Wyo. Const., became effective in 1967. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

The provisions of this section and art. 3, § 18, Wyo. Const., as they relate to impeachment of justices of the peace, are irreconcilable with the 1965 constitutional amendment, to art. 5, Wyo. Const., which eliminated justice of the peace courts from the constitution. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

Acts occurring in justice's prior term as grounds for removal. —

The supreme court was unable to consider acts occurring in a justice's prior term to be, in and of themselves, grounds for removal; however, such acts were considered as evidential facts bearing upon the justice's general course of conduct during his present term — especially as they related to motive and intent concerning acts charged to him during his current term. In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 313 (Wyo. 1977).

Misconduct during former term not grounds for removal. —

County commissioner's acts of misconduct or malfeasance during former term, which were of such a nature that they might be discontinued, were not grounds for removal from office. State v. Scott, 35 Wyo. 108, 247 P. 699, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 11 (Wyo. 1926).

§ 20. Laws to be passed by bill; alteration or amendment of bills.

No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either house as to change its original purpose.

Omission of section of act from enrollment and published statute. —

Where 1 section of an act, which actually passed the legislature, is not included in the enrollment and the published statute, but in its stead a section is included which did not pass the legislature, as affirmatively disclosed by the journals, if the section of the act which did actually pass, and is not included in the enrollment and therefore is not a law, has any material relation to other portions of the act so as to modify, restrict, or extend its application, then such other portions must also fall. State ex rel. Cheyenne v. Swan, 7 Wyo. 166, 51 P. 209, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1897).

Amendment permitted. —

An amendment of a bill by adding another section relating to the state veterinarian did not come within the inhibition of this section. Arbuckle v. Pflaeging, 20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1912).

Section 7-13-301 (placing guilty, unconvicted, person on probation) was constitutionally enacted in compliance with Wyo. Const., art. 3, §§ 20 and 24. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. Nov. 9, 1990); Mollman v. State, 800 P.2d 466, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1990); Hudson v. State, 800 P.2d 471, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1990); Heggen v. State, 800 P.2d 475, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1990); Cambio v. State, 800 P.2d 482, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1990).

Applied in

Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

Quoted in

Miller v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 Wyo. 502, 337 P.2d 262, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (1959); Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 2000).

Cited in

Hansen v. Smith, 395 P.2d 944, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1964).

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Wyoming's Administrative Regulation Review Act,” see XIV Land & Water L. Rev. 189 (1979).

§ 21. Enacting clause of law.

The enacting clause of every law shall be as follows: “Be it Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Wyoming.”

Law reviews. —

For article, “How to Draft a Bill,” see 6 Wyo. L.J. 285.

§ 22. Limitation on time for introducing bill for appropriation.

No bill for the appropriation of money, except for the expenses of the government, shall be introduced within five (5) days of the close of the session, except by unanimous consent of the house in which it is sought to be introduced.

Cited in

Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 181 (Wyo. 2000).

§ 23. Bill must go to committee.

No bill shall be considered or become a law unless referred to a committee, returned therefrom and printed for the use of the members.

Cited in

State ex rel. Hynds v. Cahill, 12 Wyo. 225, 75 P. 433, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (1904); Patrick v. State, 17 Wyo. 260, 98 P. 588, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 17 (1908); Hansen v. Smith, 395 P.2d 944, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1964).

§ 24. Bill to contain only one subject, which shall be expressed in title.

No bill, except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.

I. General Consideration.

II. Illustrative Cases. I.General Consideration.

Cross references. —

For provision that tax must be authorized by law and law must state object to which it shall be applied, see art. 15, § 13, Wyo. Const.

Purpose of section. —

The object of this provision is well understood. It was to prevent surprise or fraud in legislation by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation. English v. Smith, 71 Wyo. 1, 253 P.2d 857, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1953); Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962); Morrow v. Diefenderfer, 384 P.2d 601, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1963); Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963); Green River Dev. Co. v. FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 288 (Wyo. 1983).

The purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent surprise or fraud in legislation. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

This section's purpose is the informing of interested persons as to the legislation passed. Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962).

The purpose of the constitutional provision that no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, is to prevent surprise or fraud in legislation. Weiss v. State, 455 P.2d 904, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 927, 90 S. Ct. 1815, 26 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 1748 (U.S. 1970).

Two purposes are served by this section: first, the prevention of fraud or surprise that could result if provisions contained in the body of a bill were not reflected in a general way in the title itself, and second, to prevent the combination in the same bill or initiative of unrelated and separate subjects that have nothing to do with the subject of the original legislation. Wyoming Nat'l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 1994).

Intent of section. —

This section was not intended to apply to amendments of general statutes consolidated into a code, but was aimed at the separate acts in their original enactment; in the case of amendments to a code it is sufficient that the title refer to the chapter and section specifically, and declare the purpose to amend or supplement it. Board of Comm'rs v. Stone, 7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1898); In re Trent's Claim, 68 Wyo. 146, 231 P.2d 180, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (Wyo. 1951), overruled, Bowers v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 593 P.2d 182, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 394 (Wyo. 1979).

Construction of section. —

This section must be liberally and reasonably construed. State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500, 228 P. 636, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 39 (Wyo. 1924); Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962).

This section must be reasonably construed, for a narrow construction would impede legislation to such a degree that none but a precisian could successfully draft a valid enactment. Morrow v. Diefenderfer, 384 P.2d 601, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1963).

The words contained in this section are not rigid or inflexible but must be subject to interpretation in the light of all circumstances. Morrow v. Diefenderfer, 384 P.2d 601, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1963).

Reasonable adherence for compliance. —

All that is necessary for compliance with this provision of the constitution is a reasonable adherence thereto. Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962).

Section not applicable to territorial legislation. —

This section, providing that, if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to the part thereof not so expressed, was not retroactive, and hence did not apply to territorial statutes. State v. Smart, 22 Wyo. 154, 136 P. 452, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1913).

Section requires only that all provisions be germane to subject expressed in title. —

This section does not intend that the title shall be an abstract of all the various provisions of a bill, nor does it prevent the incorporation in a single act of the entire statutory law upon one general subject; it requires only that every provision must be germane to the subject expressed in the title. Board of Comm'rs v. Stone, 7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1898).

This section was not intended to prevent the incorporation into a single act of the entire statutory law upon 1 general subject, but only that every provision must be germane to the subject expressed in the title. Weiss v. State, 455 P.2d 904, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 927, 90 S. Ct. 1815, 26 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 1748 (U.S. 1970).

If but one general and comprehensive subject is contained in an act, and all of the provisions are germane to that subject, then the act cannot be said to violate either the spirit or the letter of this section. State v. Pitet, 69 Wyo. 478, 243 P.2d 177, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1952).

Subject in a bill may be as comprehensive as the legislature chooses to make it; it may include innumerable minor subjects, provided all the minor subjects, when combined, form only one general subject or topic. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

This constitutional provision should not be so construed as to prevent the legislature from embracing in one act all matter properly connected with one general subject. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

Duplicity of subject. —

In order to constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects, that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

Provisions beyond subject expressed are inoperative. —

Those provisions which are beyond the subject, as expressed in the title, must be held to be inoperative, since the general public would not be put upon notice of the contents of the act from a reading of the title. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

Generality of title. —

The title of an act of the legislature may be sufficiently general and comprehensive to embrace every means and end necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of the general purpose expressed therein. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1935); Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

The means, methods and instrumentalities for carrying out a general purpose need not be expressed in the title of an act. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

The title of a bill need not encompass all of the aspects of the statute which follows and every person or thing therein affected need not be delineated. Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

Attempted delineation of details and a departure from a more general statement can often result in a bad title. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

Legislature may make title as restrictive as it pleases. —

Since the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as it pleases, it is obvious that it may sometimes so frame a title as to preclude matters which might with entire propriety have been embraced, but which must be excluded because the title is unnecessarily restrictive. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

And the courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

Specific title will not be liberally interpreted. —

If a title is specific, it is not entitled to the liberal interpretation which would prevail otherwise. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

Title need not be abstract of bill. —

It was not intended that the title should be an abstract of all the various provisions that a bill might contain. Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

But the title should not be misleading or give rise to surprise or deception. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

Reference to section to be amended is adequate if amendment is germane. —

A reference in the title to the section to be amended, although not specifying the nature of the amendment, is adequate, where the subject matter of the actual amendment is “germane” to that of the provision amended — the theory being that the reader of the bill will get enough information by looking at the earlier law and the caption of the amendatory bill. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

If the matter contained in an amendatory or supplementary act is germane to the original act, a reference in the title to the section of the statute to be amended or supplemented accurately indicates the general subject of the legislation and is not in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a clear expression of such subject. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

A reference in the title of the amending act to the section or sections of the statute to be amended by number accurately indicates the general subject of the legislation to be affected by the amendment, and is not in violation of this section, if the new matters contained in the amended sections are germane to the subject of the original sections. Morrow v. Diefenderfer, 384 P.2d 601, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1963).

But amendment is limited to matters specified. —

When a title particularizes the changes which are to be made in an amendatory act, the legislation is limited to matters specified. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

If the nature of an amendment is actually specified and the title of the bill indicates that a particular change in the original act is proposed, the title cannot be construed to include all matters germane to the original act. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

While a title need not set out the nature of the changes made, if it does, the body of the amendatory act may not contain any other matter, however germane it may be to the subject of the original act as a whole. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

And anything beyond this limitation would be void regardless of how germane it might be to the subject of the original act. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

Scope of judicial review. —

The objections should be grave, and the conflict between the act and the constitutional palpable, before the judiciary should disregard or annul a legislative enactment upon the sole ground that it embraces more than one subject, or, when it contains but one subject, on the ground that it is not sufficiently expressed in its title. English v. Smith, 71 Wyo. 1, 253 P.2d 857, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1953); Morrow v. Diefenderfer, 384 P.2d 601, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1963).

The court must scrutinize an amending act to see whether there is a common tie between the provisions, permitting the object and purpose of the amendment, or whether it introduces new subject matter not within the purview of existing legislation. Morrow v. Diefenderfer, 384 P.2d 601, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1963).

Applied in

State ex rel. Fawcett v. Board of County Comm'rs, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188, 1954 Wyo. LEXIS 13 (1954); Markey v. Connelly, 367 P.2d 964, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 58 (Wyo. 1962); Forest Oil Corp. v. Davis, 384 P.2d 716, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1963).

Quoted in

In re West Hwy. San. & Imp. Dist., 77 Wyo. 384, 317 P.2d 495, 1957 Wyo. LEXIS 29 (1957); Miller v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 Wyo. 502, 337 P.2d 262, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 18 (1959); Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 77 (Wyo. 1989).

Cited in

State ex rel. Hynds v. Cahill, 12 Wyo. 225, 75 P. 433, 1904 Wyo. LEXIS 2 (1904); Littleton v. Burgess, 13 Wyo. 261, 79 P. 922, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (1905); State v. Kelley, 17 Wyo. 335, 98 P. 886, 1909 Wyo. LEXIS 4 (1909); State ex rel. Jamison v. Forsyth, 21 Wyo. 359, 133 P. 521, 1913 Wyo. LEXIS 26 (1913); State v. Wells, 29 Wyo. 335, 212 P. 1099, 1923 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1923); State ex rel. Van Patten v. Ellis, 37 Wyo. 124, 259 P. 812, 1927 Wyo. LEXIS 72 (1927); Ziegler v. Pickett, 46 Wyo. 283, 25 P.2d 391, 1933 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (1933); Travis v. Estate of Travis, 79 Wyo. 329, 334 P.2d 508, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 10 (1959); Bondurant v. Board of Trustees, 354 P.2d 219, 1960 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 1960); Hansen v. Smith, 395 P.2d 944, 1964 Wyo. LEXIS 124 (Wyo. 1964); Zanetti Riverton Bus Lines v. State Bd. of Equalization, 485 P.2d 387, 1971 Wyo. LEXIS 221 (Wyo. 1971).

Law reviews. —

For article, “How to Draft a Bill,” see 6 Wyo. L.J. 285.

II.Illustrative Cases.

Acts held to contain one subject. —

An act changing and regulating the grand jury system by reducing the number of grand jurors, and by providing that a grand jury shall be summoned only when ordered by court, and also providing for prosecution by information and the procedure thereunder, is not unconstitutional, as containing more than one subject. In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 329, 40 P. 520, 1895 Wyo. LEXIS 28 (Wyo. 1895).

“An act providing for the supervision and use of waters of the state,” is not invalid, as containing more than one subject clearly expressed in the title. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258, 1900 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1900).

“An act creating the office of state inspector of coal mines, fixing said inspector's salary and prescribing his duties, also providing for the proper ventilation of coal mines and for other purposes, and providing for appropriating moneys for a contingent fund for said office” was not unconstitutional, as embracing more than one subject. Koppala v. State, 15 Wyo. 398, 89 P. 576, 1907 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1907), reh'g denied, 15 Wyo. 398, 93 P. 662, 1908 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1908).

An act providing for the organization of new counties and the location of county seats therein temporarily treats of but one general subject. Board of Comm'rs v. Woods, 18 Wyo. 316, 106 P. 923, 1910 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 18 Wyo. 316, 107 P. 753, 1910 Wyo. LEXIS 8 (Wyo. 1910).

Act held to embrace 2 objects. —

Aside from the fact that ch. 194, Laws 1963, as passed, contains provisions beyond the subject expressed in its title, it also appears that both the title and the body of the act itself embrace two distinct objects, in contravention of this section, namely: (1) that of providing for a liquor purchase identification card; and (2) that of amending W.S. 1957, § 12-5. Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 115 (Wyo. 1963).

Sufficiency of title. —

“An act to define the judicial districts of the state and prescribing the time for holding the terms of the district court in the several counties of each judicial district” sufficiently expressed the subject matter of the act. In re Board of Comm'rs, 4 Wyo. 133, 32 P. 850 (Wyo. 1893).

An act designated as an act to amend and reenact a specified section of a code “in such manner as to repeal all limitations arising under contract not in writing, either expressed or implied, shall be brought within 8 years after the cause of action accrues” was not invalid under this section. Board of Comm'rs v. Stone, 7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605, 1898 Wyo. LEXIS 3 (Wyo. 1898).

Subject of amendatory statute relating to dipping of sheep was embraced within title. State v. Hall, 27 Wyo. 224, 194 P. 476, 1920 Wyo. LEXIS 34 (Wyo. 1920).

Where title recited that certain sections were to be amended and others repealed relating to gambling games, the provisions of this section were not violated. State v. Tobin, 31 Wyo. 355, 226 P. 681, 1924 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1924).

Statutory provision for abatement of liquor nuisance and for injunction was not invalid as containing subject not expressed in the title to the act. Tucker v. State, 35 Wyo. 430, 251 P. 460, 1926 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo. 1926).

Act amending statutory provisions requiring publication of legal notices in newspaper established for a year is not void because of defective or restrictive title, including amended section. In re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. 226, 11 P.2d 265, 1932 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1932).

Provision for preference contained in “An act to expedite and simplify the collection and payment by banks of checks and other instruments for the payment of money” was sufficiently embraced in title, as giving such preference is at least one of the means to further and accomplish the main purpose or one of the main purposes of the act. In re Riverton State Bank, 48 Wyo. 372, 49 P.2d 637, 1935 Wyo. LEXIS 44 (Wyo. 1935).

No one who read the title to ch. 93, Laws 1955, and was thus aware of the passage of the law could reasonably claim to have been misled since the statement by fair implication advised all citizens that inclusive rules and regulations for fire protection would be adopted. Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 1962 Wyo. LEXIS 82 (Wyo. 1962).

The fact that the title of ch. 204, Laws 1957, did not mention the right of a representative of a deceased spouse to elect to take against a will would not invalidate it under this section since the subject matter of the amended section is germane to the election rights of surviving spouses contained in the original section. Morrow v. Diefenderfer, 384 P.2d 601, 1963 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 1963).

The title to ch. 91, Laws 1965, “An act concerning the refunding of public securities” embraces the subject of the advance escrow-type refunding provisions of said act in all particulars and expresses said subject with sufficient clarity so as to comply with this section. Rodin v. State, 417 P.2d 180, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1966).

The one general subject involved in ch. 66, Laws 1963, is the abatement of public nuisances, and the title to the act so states. Weiss v. State, 455 P.2d 904, 1969 Wyo. LEXIS 145 (Wyo. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 927, 90 S. Ct. 1815, 26 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 1748 (U.S. 1970).

Where the purpose of the initiative was to discourage abortions, which was reflected in the short title of the bill, the “Wyoming Human Life Protection Act” and where the language of the initiative, criminalizing abortion in most instances and withholding state funding for abortions under certain circumstances, fit within the single-subject rule, the title of the initiative adequately expressed the substantive provisions included within the body of the initiative. Wyoming Nat'l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 1994).

Section 7-13-301 (placing guilty, unconvicted, person on probation) was constitutionally enacted in compliance with Wyo. Const., art. 3, §§ 20 and 24. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 133 (Wyo. Nov. 9, 1990); Mollman v. State, 800 P.2d 466, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 113 (Wyo. 1990); Hudson v. State, 800 P.2d 471, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 172 (Wyo. 1990); Heggen v. State, 800 P.2d 475, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1990); Cambio v. State, 800 P.2d 482, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 114 (Wyo. 1990).

Section 14-2-203 is constitutional. Mahaney v. Hunter Enters., 426 P.2d 442, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1967).

Industrial Development Projects Act is constitutional. Uhls v. State, 429 P.2d 74, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 161 (Wyo. 1967); Powers v. Cheyenne, 435 P.2d 448, 1967 Wyo. LEXIS 191 (Wyo. 1967), reh'g denied, 436 P.2d 961, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 155 (Wyo. 1968).

Sections 27-10-101 to 27-10-109 , pertaining to collective bargaining for fire fighters, do not violate this section. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 1968 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 1968).

§ 25. Vote required to pass bill.

No bill shall become a law except by a vote of a majority of all the members elected to each house, nor unless on its final passage the vote taken by ayes and noes, and the names of those voting be entered on the journal.

Cross references. —

As to approval or veto of legislation by governor and as to passage over veto, see art. 4, § 8, Wyo. Const.

Court may examine journals to determine whether act was constitutionally passed. —

It is duty of the court, where an act is questioned, to examine the legislative journals to determine whether or not such act was passed by a majority of the members elected to each house, that being a matter which the constitution requires to be shown by the journals. State ex rel. Cheyenne v. Swan, 7 Wyo. 166, 51 P. 209, 1897 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (Wyo. 1897).

The enrolled bill as signed by the officers of the legislature and the governor is not conclusive on the courts, and the legislative journals may be consulted to determine whether the act has been passed in conformity with the constitutional requirements. State ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Wright, 62 Wyo. 112, 163 P.2d 190, 1945 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 1945).

Effect of erroneous journal entry. —

Though a journal entry on passage of an act is insufficient, the court is not limited by recital of a single journal entry when upon construing all entries together it is manifest such single entry is erroneous. Arbuckle v. Pflaeging, 20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918, 1912 Wyo. LEXIS 40 (Wyo. 1912).

Law reviews. —

For article, “How to Draft a Bill,” see 6 Wyo. L.J. 285.

§ 26. How laws revised, amended or extended.

No law shall be revised or amended, or the provisions thereof extended by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, or extended, shall be re-enacted and published at length.

Cross references. —

For provision that tax must be authorized by law and law must state object to which it shall be applied, see art. 15, § 13, Wyo. Const.

Purpose of section. —

The purpose of this section was to prevent ill-advised and fraudulent legislation. State v. Pitet, 69 Wyo. 478, 243 P.2d 177, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1952); Frank v. Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1977).

The constitutional restriction in this section was aimed at the mischief of embracing in the same bill before a legislative body incongruous matters having no relation to each other or to the subject specified in the title, by which laws were often adopted without attracting attention. State v. Pitet, 69 Wyo. 478, 243 P.2d 177, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1952); Frank v. Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1977).

Section requires reasonable interpretation. —

This section must be given an interpretation that is reasonable having in mind always the evils that are to be suppressed and with a view of sustaining the legislative action. State v. Pitet, 69 Wyo. 478, 243 P.2d 177, 1952 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1952).

This section does not prohibit additions to or extensions of existing statutes. English v. Smith, 71 Wyo. 1, 253 P.2d 857, 1953 Wyo. LEXIS 1 (Wyo. 1953).

Reference statutes. —

This section does not apply to statutes which refer to existing laws merely for the purpose of pointing out procedure in executing powers which the statute itself, original in form by its own language, grants, and enforcing rights or discharging duties created or imposed by such statutes. Board of County Comm'rs v. White, 79 Wyo. 420, 335 P.2d 433, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1959); Frank v. Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1977).

Reference to existing laws for the determination of positive and substantial rights thereby conferred or taken away is prohibited. Board of County Comm'rs v. White, 79 Wyo. 420, 335 P.2d 433, 1959 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 1959).

Use of the reference technique in the last sentence of former § 9-1-134(a)(iii) which provided, “These securities shall meet the procedural requirements and provisions of W. S. 35-136.2 through 35-136.5 [§§ 35-2-425 through 35-2-428 ] as provided for the issuance of bonds by hospital districts,” is not constitutionally objectionable but makes good sense. Frank v. Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 304 (Wyo. 1977). See § 16-1-107(a)(iii).

Applied in

Long v. State, 745 P.2d 547, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 542 (Wyo. 1987).

Quoted in

In re Trent, 68 Wyo. 146, 231 P.2d 180, 1951 Wyo. LEXIS 21 (1951).

Cited in

Littleton v. Burgess, 13 Wyo. 261, 79 P. 922, 1905 Wyo. LEXIS 7 (1905); Alberts v. State, 745 P.2d 898, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 539 (Wyo. 1987).