Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Ketchikan Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 602 P.2d 434 (Alaska 1979).

Quoted in

Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wilson, 461 P.2d 425 (Alaska 1969).

Cited in

Larson v. State, 564 P.2d 365 (Alaska 1977); Anderson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 645 P.2d 205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Schnabel v. State, 663 P.2d 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Rollins v. State, 748 P.2d 767 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Schouten v. State, 77 P.3d 739 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); State v. Jouppi, 397 P.3d 1026 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017).

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Anderson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 645 P.2d 205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Howell v. State, 834 P.2d 1254 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wilson, 461 P.2d 425 (Alaska 1969); Schnabel v. State, 663 P.2d 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Pfeifer v. State, 260 P.3d 1072 (Alaska 2011).

Notes to Decisions

Applicability of common law. —

This section, which makes the common law applicable in Alaska, refers to the common law of England. It should be noted here that Alaska has the common law of the United States now, some of which is over 300 years old. The ancient common law of England is not controlling over the developing common law of this country. Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968).

Meaning of common-law. —

See Valentine v. Roberts, 1 Alaska 536 (D. Alaska 1902).

The common law is but the accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain what is right and just between individuals with respect to private disputes. Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968).

And scope. —

The common law includes those principles, usages, and rules of action applicable to the government and security of person and property which do not rest for their authority on any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature; a system of elementary principles and of general judicial truths which are continually expanding with the progress of society, and adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade and commerce and the mechanic arts and the exigencies and usages of the country. In re Habeas Corpus Burkell, 2 Alaska 108 (D. Alaska 1903).

The common law is not a rigid and arbitrary code, crystallized and immutable. Rather it is flexible and adapts itself to changing conditions. Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968).

Duty to explicate common law. —

It is the task of the supreme court of Alaska to explicate the common law which will apply in situations not dealing with a constitutional question or statutory interpretations unless and until the Alaska legislature acts to modify it. Surina v. Buckalew, 629 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1981).

Common-law trusts. —

There are no statutes upon the subject of common-law trusts. Powell v. Hammon Consol. Gold Fields, 8 Alaska 153 (D. Alaska 1929).

There is no inhibition against common-law trusts. Powell v. Hammon Consol. Gold Fields, 8 Alaska 153 (D. Alaska 1929).

Negligent misrepresentation. —

One may now maintain an action for negligent misrepresentation, even though that may not have been the case under the common law in years gone by. Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968).

Imputation of unchastity. —

Common-law rule that a statement imputing unchastity to a woman, or even professional unchastity, is not considered slanderous per se, is clearly outmoded. Hollman v. Brady, 233 F.2d 877, 16 Alaska 308 (9th Cir. Alaska 1956).

Separate maintenance. —

Alaska has no law on separate maintenance, but the common law, by this section, has been declared to be in force in Alaska, and a suit for separate maintenance was well known at common law. Moller v. Moller, 66 F. Supp. 507, 11 Alaska 33 (D. Alaska 1946).

Common law as to loss of consortium. —

See Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974).

Actions against tortfeasor’s liability insurer. —

The common-law rule allowing no direct cause of action against a tortfeasor’s liability insurer prevails in this state. Severson v. Estate of Severson, 627 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1981).

Sequestration. —

Given the harsh nature of the remedy of sequestration and the fact that the Alaska legislature has spelled out in some detail the procedure for obtaining other similar remedies while it has not enacted a sequestration statute, the implication is clear that Alaska has decided that sequestration of the nature sought in an action to require a regional corporation organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., to place certain funds in secure and liquid investments pending litigation is not available and has preempted the common law with a complex statutory scheme. Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 424 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1976).

Title by accretion. —

At common law the riparian owner acquires title to additions thereto by accretion. Nordale v. Waxberg, 84 F. Supp. 1004, 12 Alaska 399 (D. Alaska 1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 1022, 12 Alaska 695 (9th Cir. Alaska 1950).

Criminal sentencing. —

A trial court should not propose a nonstatutory mitigating factor to a three-judge panel where the legislature specifically rejected that factor for inclusion in AS 12.55.155(d) . Where the legislature has expressly addressed a consideration, such as the relationship between a defendant’s past conduct and his present offense, and imposed limitations on the trial court’s power to consider that relationship in mitigation of sentence, the trial court should not propose the same mitigating factor to a three-judge panel without complying with the limitations; to do so is to suggest a common-law development inconsistent with legislation. Totemoff v. State, 739 P.2d 769 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).

Applied in

Van Dyke v. Midnight Sun Mining & Ditch Co., 177 F. 85, 3 Alaska Fed. 458 (9th Cir. Alaska 1910); Northwestern S. S. Co. v. Cochran, 191 F. 146, 3 Alaska Fed. 694 (9th Cir. Alaska 1911); United States v. Pacific & A. R. & N. Co., 5 Alaska 43 (D. Alaska 1914); Bosel v. State, 398 P.2d 651 (Alaska 1965); Olp v. State, 738 P.2d 1117 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Port Graham Corp., 871 P.2d 1135 (Alaska 1994).

Quoted in

Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. Alaska 1969); Smiloff v. State, 579 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1978); Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Balentine v. State, 707 P.2d 922 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Burke, 714 P.2d 374 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Alaska Fed'n for Community Self-Reliance v. Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 879 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1994); Haines v. Comfort Keepers, Inc., 393 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2017).

Stated in

McFarland v. Alaska Perseverance Mining Co., 3 Alaska 308 (D. Alaska 1907); Jansen v. Pollastrine, 10 Alaska 316 (D. Alaska 1942); Territory v. 188 Cases of Mixed Intoxicating Liquors, 10 Alaska 414 (D. Alaska 1944); Bickel v. Polaris Inv. Co., 155 F. Supp. 411, 17 Alaska 389 (D. Alaska 1957).

Cited in

Ketchikan Co. v. Citizens' Co., 2 Alaska 120 (D. Alaska 1903); First Nat'l Bank v. Stout, 9 Alaska 400 (D. Alaska 1938); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. Alaska 1965); Jackson v. State, 657 P.2d 405 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Stiegele v. State, 685 P.2d 1255 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Carney v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 785 P.2d 544 (Alaska 1990); Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002); Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936 (Alaska 2006).

Notes to Decisions

“Laws” refers to statutes and regulations and not the common law. Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).

“Construction”. —

In normal usage, word “construction” applies to statutes, not common law. Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).

Manifest intent of legislature. —

Application for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed as untimely. Although the prisoner was convicted before the limitation period for filing post conviction relief requests was reduced from two years to eighteen months, the prisoner had several months to file his claim after the amended law came into effect. The retrospective application of the limitation period was specified in the amending legislation, and did not constitute violation of due process under Alaska law. Demientieff v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Use in resolving issues relating to AS 01.10.080 . —

The supreme court is enjoined by the legislature to observe the provisions of this section in resolving any issue relating to AS 01.10.080 and its applicability to the five-day recount provision of AS 15.20.430 . Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).

Section modifies AS 01.10.090 . —

See City of Juneau v. Commer. Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1979); Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Odom Corp., 671 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1983).

Applied in

State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Quoted in

Berry v. Coulman, 440 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

Mouritsen v. Mouritsen, 459 P.3d 476 (Alaska 2020); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Notes to Decisions

Legislative intent. —

This section expresses a general legislative intent in favor of severability, albeit a weak one. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980).

Duty of supreme court to nullify statute or part of statute. —

If a statute is susceptible of no reasonable construction avoiding constitutional problems, the supreme court is under a duty to nullify the statute or, if possible, the particular provision found offensive to the constitution. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).

There seems to be little or no authority as to the difference between general and specific severability clauses. Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).

Whereas a specific severability clause creates a slight presumption in favor of severability, a general clause creates an even weaker presumption. For all practical purposes, the difference between the two is negligible. Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).

General ruling which states that the invalidation of an exception automatically precludes severability is overbroad. It remains a question of legislative intent and the rule concerning invalidated exceptions is just another aid in determining that intent. Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).

The test for determining the severability of a statute is twofold. A provision will not be deemed severable “unless it appears both that, standing alone, legal effect can be given to it, and that the legislature intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and held bad should fall.” Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975); Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980).

Severance of initiative provisions. —

Although neither this section nor any analogous section gives courts the authority to invalidate portions of proposed initiatives, courts should be granted such authority, since circumspect judicial exercise of such power will promote, rather than frustrate, the right of the people to enact laws by initiative. McAlpine v. University of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).

When the requisite number of voters have already subscribed to an initiative, a reviewing court should sever an impermissible portion of the proposed bill when the following conditions are met: (1) standing alone, the remainder of the proposed bill can be given legal effect; (2) deleting the impermissible portion would not substantially change the spirit of the measure; and (3) it is evident from the content of the measure and the circumstances surrounding its proposal that the sponsors and subscribers would prefer the measure to stand as altered, rather than to be invalidated in its entirety. McAlpine v. University of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).

Statutes enacted simultaneously. —

The fact that two related statutes, one, the permanent fund statute, which contains an explicit non-severability clause, and the other, a tax exemption statute, which does not contain such a clause are enacted simultaneously, may indicate a legislative intent that the latter be severable. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980).

Application of severability to former presumptive sentencing procedures. —

The overall constitutionality of Alaska’s pre-March 2005 presumptive sentencing law, former AS 12.55.155(f) , was sound because constitutionally-flawed procedures could be replaced by jury trial procedures that conformed to the requirements of Blakely and the severability clause of the section without destroying the essential functioning and purpose of Alaska’s presumptive sentencing scheme; the Alaska legislature has retained the basic framework of presumptive sentencing, including the same scheme of aggravating factors and mitigating factors, but with the proviso that many of these aggravating factors are to be litigated to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt under the current AS 12.55.155(f) . State v. Moreno, 151 P.3d 480 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Invalid portion of the 1972 amendment to former AS 42.10.130, relating to the granting of permits to carriers, which portion discriminated against nonresidents, was held severable. Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).

Applied in

State v. Baker, 393 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1964); Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969); Artus v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 16 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981); Javed v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 921 P.2d 620 (Alaska 1996); Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183 (Alaska 2007).

Forrer v. State, 471 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2020).

Quoted in

Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Fardig v. Municipality of Anchorage, 803 P.2d 879 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); Sonneman v. Hickel, 836 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1992); State v. Palmer, 882 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1994); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994), reversed on other grounds, sub nom. Doe v. Otte, 248 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. Alaska 2001).

Cited in

State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1975); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977); Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles, 21 P.3d 367 (Alaska 2001); Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State, 202 P.3d 1162 (Alaska 2009).

Notes to Decisions

Judicial construction. —

The court is required to construe words and phrases according to their “common and approved usage” unless such words and phrases have acquired peculiar meaning by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction. Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970).

Where the child support order clarified “health care expenses” using an enumerated list, the list was not exclusive. It was not erroneous for the superior court to consider nutritional supplements to be a health care expense to be divided equally among the parents in accordance with the child support order and Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(d)(2). Millette v. Millette, 240 P.3d 1217 (Alaska 2010).

Applied in

Department of Revenue v. Debenham Elec. Supply Co., 612 P.2d 1001 (Alaska 1980); United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983); Lambert v. State, 694 P.2d 791 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Eluska, 698 P.2d 174 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Resek, 706 P.2d 706 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642 (Alaska 1987); State v. Anderson, 749 P.2d 1342 (Alaska 1988); Department of Community & Regional Affairs v. Sisters of Providence, 752 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1988); Alaska Int'l Constructors v. Kinter, 755 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1988); Cleland v. State, 759 P.2d 553 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); State v. Strange, 785 P.2d 563 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); Wylie v. State, 797 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); Hughes v. Harrelson, 844 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1993); Human Resources Co. v. Alaska Comm'n on Post-Secondary Educ., 946 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1997); Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n v. Stevens, 205 P.3d 321 (Alaska 2009), (decided under prior version of section); Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 234 P.3d 1282 (Alaska 2010); Harris v. M-K Rivers, 325 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).

Quoted in

Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wilson, 461 P.2d 425 (Alaska 1969); Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970); State v. Anchorage, 513 P.2d 1104 (Alaska 1973); Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Walker v. State, 742 P.2d 790 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d 451 (Alaska 2006); State v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 624 (Alaska 2007); Fuhs v. Gilbertson, 186 P.3d 551 (Alaska 2008); Atkins v. Inlet Transp. & Taxi Serv., 426 P.3d 1124 (Alaska 2018); Kinmon v. State, 451 P.3d 392 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019).

Stated in

Velez v. State, 762 P.2d 1297 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Alaskans for Efficient Gov't, Inc. v. Knowles, 91 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2004); Lambert v. State, 435 P.3d 1011 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).

Cited in

Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1988); Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Fagan v. State, 779 P.2d 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Marshall v. First Nat'l Bank Alaska, 97 P.3d 830 (Alaska 2004); City of Kenai v. Friends of the Rec. Ctr., Inc., 129 P.3d 452 (Alaska 2006); Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 267 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2011); Rosenblum v. Perales, 303 P.3d 500 (Alaska 2013); Studley v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 389 P.3d 18 (Alaska 2017); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

D.A.W. v. State, 699 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1985); Hughes v. Harrelson, 844 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1993).

Cited in

State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1986).

Notes to Decisions

Jurisdiction over divorce action. —

This section does not affect the common-law rule that Alaska courts have jurisdiction over a divorce action when one of the parties is domiciled in Alaska, where “domicile” is defined as physical presence plus an intent to remain permanently. Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).

Residency requirements for permanent fund dividend. —

A military family did not meet the permanent fund dividend eligibility requirements of AS 43.23.005(a) because they had been absent from Alaska for more than five years. There was a presumption under 15 AAC 23.163(f) that they did not intend to return and remain in Alaska. The Alaska Department of Revenue has the authority to create eligibility requirements for PFDs that exceed those found in this section. Harrod v. State, 255 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2011).

Jurisdiction over child support action. —

Superior court properly modified a father's child support because "residency" was statutorily defined by focusing on a person's intent; the father affirmatively claimed Alaska residency at trial and intended to return and make Alaska his home, the "tribunal" referred to by statute included both the superior court and the Child Support Services Division, the superior court had evidence before it establishing three relevant time periods based on the father's actual pay that jointly showed his income had changed by more than 15% during the time periods at issue, which both met the threshold for a material change in circumstances and was an appropriate method for calculating support covering past period. Berry v. Coulman, 440 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2019).

Continuing jurisdiction. —

As used in the UCCJEA, the term “presently resides” was to be interpreted consistently with residency under Alaska law, AS 01.10.055 , as that interpretation furthered the stated purposes of the UCCJEA and made AS 25.30.310(a)(2) consistent with the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Thus, it was an error for the superior court to find that it no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA based on the parties' physical presence in South Carolina. Mouritsen v. Mouritsen, 459 P.3d 476 (Alaska 2020).

Quoted in

E.H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 1186 (Alaska 2001).

Stated in

Dep't of Revenue v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2001).

Cited in

Heller v. Dep't of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69 (Alaska 2013).

Notes to Decisions

Retirement plan interest. —

Bankruptcy court did not err in holding that a federal tax lien could attach to debtor’s interest in a retirement savings and pension plan, as such interest constituted a “right of property” within the meaning of this section. Raihl v. United States (In re Raihl), 152 B.R. 615 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Alaska 1993).

State as “person”. —

Subsection (8) does not necessarily exclude political entities from the definition of “person”. Accordingly, the State of Alaska was properly considered a “person” for purposes of construing the rule of judicial disqualification provided for in AS 22.20.020 . Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

Peace officer.—

Probation officers are not “peace officers” under AS 01.10.060 (7). Sapp v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2016), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. 2016), superseded, sub. op., 379 P.3d 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).

Special agents of the Alaska Railroad's security force are “peace officers” within the meaning of AS 01.10.060 (7)(F), as interpreted in Sapp v. State, 379 P.3d 1000 (Alaska App. 2016). Therefore, a district court properly denied a motion for judgment of acquittal on a charge of failure to stop for a peace officer because defendant knowingly failed to stop for an agent of the Alaska Railroad's security force; the agent was in active pursuit of defendant for a violation that had just occurred on Alaska Railroad property. Forsythe v. State, 391 P.3d 643 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017).

Applied in

Halligan v. State, 624 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1981); Clark v. State, 738 P.2d 772 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).

Quoted in

Matanuska-Susitna Borough v. King's Lake Camp, 439 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1968); Stroh v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 459 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1968); Hull v. Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 658 P.2d 122 (Alaska 1983); von Gemmingen v. First Nat'l Bank, 789 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1990); Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. ex rel. Gerke v. Gerke, 942 P.2d 423 (Alaska 1997); Lum v. Koles, 426 P.3d 1103 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

Foltz-Nelson Architects v. Kobylk, 749 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1988); D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002); Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 267 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2011); Harris v. M-K Rivers, 325 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1985).

Stated in

Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994), reversed on other grounds, sub nom. Doe v. Otte, 248 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. Alaska 2001); Jonas v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2018).

Cited in

North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534 (Alaska 1978); Fowler v. State, 70 P.3d 1106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); Allen v. Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 147 P.3d 664 (Alaska 2006); Stewart v. Elliott, 239 P.3d 1236 (Alaska 2010).

Notes to Decisions

This section was taken from the laws of Oregon. Mahan v. Sparks, 10 Alaska 292 (D. Alaska 1942); Lowe v. Hess, 10 Alaska 174 (D. Alaska 1941).

It merely states the common-law rule. Lowe v. Hess, 10 Alaska 174 (D. Alaska 1941); Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. Alaska 1969); Alaska Christian Bible Inst. v. State, 772 P.2d 1079 (Alaska 1989).

Common law. —

At common law it was established if the last day on which an act was to be performed fell on a Sunday, then that Sunday was excluded and the time was extended to the following day. Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).

The common-law rule is that when the period of time within which an act is to be performed exceeds one week, an intervening Sunday is included in the computation. Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).

Civ. R. 6(a) on computation of time is similar to this section in certain regards. David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).

Legislative intent. —

The legislature, by virtue of its enactment of this section, manifested its intent to exclude Sundays in the computation of time only when Sunday falls on the last day of a period in question. Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).

The phrase “unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded” was intended by the legislature to exclude a Saturday when court is not in session and the office of the clerk is closed. David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).

When the act required to be performed within a certain period of time is the filing of pleadings with the court, the manifest intent of the legislature appears to require exclusion of the last day from the computation if it should fall on a day when the courts are closed. David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).

“Holiday” defined. —

“Holiday” has been defined as “a day upon which the usual operations of business are suspended and the courts closed, and, generally, no legal process is served.” David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).

For the purpose of this section, Saturday is a court holiday. David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).

Computation of person’s age. —

Since the computation-of-time statute is merely declaratory of the common law, it cannot be interpreted to abrogate or modify the undeniable common law rule as to when, with respect to the anniversary date of his birth, one attains a given age. Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. Alaska 1969).

The supreme court is enjoined by the legislature to observe the provisions of AS 01.10.020 in resolving any issue relating to this section and its applicability to the five-day recount provision of AS 15.20.430 . Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).

Computing limitation under AS 15.20.430 . —

In computing the five-day period of limitation prescribed by AS 15.20.430 , an intervening Sunday is to be included. Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).

Computation of the limitations period provided by AS 09.10.070 subsequent to the removal of the disability of minority is to be made by excluding the first day and including the last. Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 274 F. Supp. 733 (D. Alaska 1967), aff'd, 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. Alaska 1969).

Filing appeal. —

Under this section, the day on which the judgment is entered should be excluded in computing the time within which an application for an appeal must be filed. Mahan v. Sparks, 10 Alaska 292 (D. Alaska 1942).

Computation for purposes of operability of statute. —

AS 01.10.080 did not prevent the 2001 amendment to AS 28.35.030(n) from going into effect on July 4, 2001, where the bill had been signed by the governor on July 3, 2001, as AS 01.10.080 was a codification of the common-law rule governing the computation of time for the doing of an act required by law, and did not affect the enactment of a law. Fowler v. State, 70 P.3d 1106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).

Applied in

Silides v. Thomas, 559 P.2d 80 (Alaska 1977); Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987); Foltz-Nelson Architects v. Kobylk, 749 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1988); Fields v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 818 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1991).

Quoted in

Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Tundra Tours, Inc., 719 P.2d 1020 (Alaska 1986).

Cited in

Jenkins v. Daniels, 751 P.2d 19 (Alaska 1988).

Notes to Decisions

Alaska has a statutory policy against retroactive interpretation of its statutes. Jones Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas Service Corp., 442 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. Alaska 1971).

This section embodies the general rule on retrospective operation of statutes. Watts v. Seward Sch. Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1966).

Applicability. —

Application for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed as untimely. Although the prisoner was convicted before the limitation period for filing post-conviction relief requests was reduced from two years to eighteen months, the prisoner had several months to file his claim after the amended law came into effect. The retrospective application of the limitation period was not a violation of due process. Demientieff v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Section modified by AS 01.10.020 . —

See City of Juneau v. Commer. Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1979).

Applicability of amendments.—

Trial court erred in applying the pre-2003 versions of AS 09.10.030 and AS 09.45.052(a) , rather than the current versions, which would have required the neighbor to show that she possessed the parking lot in the good-faith belief that she owned the property, because the legislature expressly declared that the amendments applied to claims that had not vested before the amendment and the neighbor's claim had not yet vested. Prax v. Zalewski, 400 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2017).

Retrospective laws are generally unjust, and neither accord with sound legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact. Watts v. Seward Sch. Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1966).

There is absolute prohibition against retrospective laws when their purpose is punitive, they then being denominated ex post facto laws. It is the sense of the situation that that which impels prohibition in such case exacts clearness of declaration when burdens are imposed upon completed and remote transactions, or consequences given to them of which there could have been no foresight or contemplation when they were designed and consummated. Watts v. Seward Sch. Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1966).

Courts do not infer retroactive operation of statutes in ambiguous circumstances. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Provision held not retroactive. —

Application of amendments to Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act, AS 12.63.010 et seq., to crimes committed before the amendments were effective violated the ex post facto clause in Alaska Const. art. I, § 15. It had been held previously that the registration act could not be applied retroactively, and the adoption of Alaska R. App. P. 106 did not make those amendments retroactive. State v. Doe, 297 P.3d 885 (Alaska), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2013).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission correctly affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision that a worker was receiving the maximum amount to which he was entitled because the version of the statute in effect at the time of the worker’s permanent total disability governed his rate of compensation. Louie v. BP Exploration Alaska, Inc., 327 P.3d 204 (Alaska 2014).

Curative legislation. —

The general rule of construction of curative legislation is that retroactivity will be ascribed to it more readily than to that which may disadvantageously, though legally, affect past relations and transactions. Zurfluh v. State, 620 P.2d 690 (Alaska 1980).

Medicaid eligibility rules. —

State did not err by temporarily denying a mother’s Medicaid application filed in September 2008 under AS 47.07.020(m) , because she had transferred funds to her son in February 2007 under then-existing Medicaid eligibility rules. The legislature’s retroactive change to the rules was valid. Pfeifer v. State, 260 P.3d 1072 (Alaska 2011).

Procedural changes. —

This section does not address the procedural-substantive distinction. Nevertheless, the settled rule of law is mere procedural changes which do not affect substantive rights may be applied retrospectively. Matanuska Maid v. State, 620 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1980), overruled in part, Rosen v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984).

Procedural changes in the law which do not affect substantive rights may be applied retroactively. Rice v. Rice, 757 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1988).

New evidence rule post-dating crime. —

This section did not bar application of a recently-enacted evidence rule at the trial of a law suit based on events that pre-dated enactment of the evidence rule. Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).

Time-barred claims of child sexual abuse not revived. —

AS 09.10.065 did not revive civil claims for alleged child sexual abuse by a Catholic priest that were time-barred before the effective date of that section, October 1, 2001. Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does, 141 P.3d 719 (Alaska 2006).

Restraint of Trade Act. —

The attorney general did not retrospectively apply the Restraint of Trade Act, AS 45.50.562 — 45.50.596 , by requesting documents executed prior to the effective date of the statute. A party suffers no increased liability as a result of the state’s investigatory procedure nor does the procedure otherwise affect a party’s substantive rights. Matanuska Maid v. State, 620 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1980), overruled in part, Rosen v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984).

The statutory changes in the power to investigate brought about by AS 45.50.590 et seq. affect only procedure and mere procedural changes which do not affect substantive rights are not immune from retrospective application. Matanuska Maid v. State, 620 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1980), overruled in part, Rosen v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984).

Section line highway easements established by the grant of former 43 U.S.C. § 932 and the acceptance in ch. 19 SLA 1923 were not vacated by the 1949 repeal of ch. 19 SLA 1923. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).

Amendment of fee schedule for liquor wholesalers. —

AS 04.11.160 , which became effective on July 1, 1980, and which amended the fee schedule for liquor wholesalers, cannot be applied retroactively. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Odom Corp., 671 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1983).

Modification of rule against perpetuities. —

Former AS 34.27.010 , modifying the common-law rule against perpetuities, did not clearly provide for its retrospective operation, it did not apply to an option in gross created prior to its enactment where application of that section would run counter to the result that would have been reached had the general, majority-view common-law rule been applied. Hansen v. Stroecker, 699 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1985).

Application of AS 04.11.360 violating this section. —

Applying AS 04.11.360 to credit transactions before enactment of that section in 1980 is a retrospective application of AS 04.11.360 which violates both the literal terms of and the reasons for this section. Norton v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 695 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1985).

1970 amendment to AS 47.10.080 not retroactive. —

Refusal to give retrospective effect to the 1970 amendment to AS 47.10.080 reducing the maximum age of commitment of juvenile delinquents to 19 years of age is bolstered by this section. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974).

There is nothing in the amendatory legislation to AS 47.10.080 that indicates an intention that the sentence reduction should operate retrospectively. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974).

Chapter 174, SLA 1957, held to be prospective in its operation. —

See Stephens v. Rogers Constr. Co., 411 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1966).

The statute of limitations on the assessment of taxes, AS 43.05.260(a) , does not bar assessments on returns filed prior to January 1, 1976, that section’s effective date. Department of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp Am., 674 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1983).

AS 16.43.960 not retrospective. —

Since the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission had the authority at common law to revoke a fisherman’s permit prior to the enactment of AS 16.43.960 , AS 16.43.960 was merely procedural in effect and, therefore, could not run afoul of the prohibition regarding retrospective laws in this section. Kjarstad v. State, 703 P.2d 1167 (Alaska 1985).

Public construction wage rates. —

The wage rate determination provisions of the 1993 amendments to AS 36.05.010 (wage rates on public construction) are not retroactive and, thus, were not applicable to contracts with a bid date prior to enactment. Eastwind, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Admin., 951 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1997).

Applied in

State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1977); City of Juneau v. Commer. Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1979); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1985).

Quoted in

Helton v. State, 778 P.2d 1156 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Caspersen v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 786 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1990); ARCO Alaska v. State, 824 P.2d 708 (Alaska 1992); Fowler v. State, 70 P.3d 1106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); Rush v. State, 98 P.3d 551 (Alaska 2004).

Cited in

Morgan v. State, 512 P.2d 904 (Alaska 1973); Ellis v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 944 P.2d 491 (Alaska 1997); Blodgett v. Blodgett (In re Estate of Blodgett), 147 P.3d 702 (Alaska 2006); State v. Alaska Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203 (Alaska 2010); Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2014).

Notes to Decisions

Constitutional prohibition broader than statutory prohibition. —

The prohibition against ex post facto laws has been held to be broader than the prohibition against retrospective civil legislation contained in statutes like subsection (a) of this section. Parker v. State, 667 P.2d 1272 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).

Retroactive application of amendment. —

Because the offense occurred prior to the legislature’s amendment to AS 13.30.040 prohibiting the court from releasing a defendant convicted of “a sexual felony,” that amendment did not apply to defendant; the amendment did not contain an express statement under this section indicating that the legislature intended for it to apply retroactively. Olsen v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Construction of general saving clause. —

It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a general saving clause or statute preserves rights and liabilities which have accrued under the act repealed and operates to make applicable in designated situations the law as it existed before the repeal, unless such application is negatived by the express terms or clear implication of a particular repealing act, or where not otherwise provided by the repealing act. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 137 F. Supp. 181, 16 Alaska 71 (D. Alaska 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 493, 17 Alaska 280 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957); Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

A saving statute preserves rights unless the repealing act reveals an intention not to do so. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).

A general saving statute will save rights and remedies except where a subsequent repealing act indicates that it was not the legislative intention that particular rights and remedies should be saved. Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

And specific saving clause. —

Where there are saving clauses in repealing statutes which are later in time, constituting the express will of the legislature, such have been taken as an indication of legislative intent to save nothing else from the repeal, and the general saving statute in force does not apply. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 137 F. Supp. 181, 16 Alaska 71 (D. Alaska 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 493, 17 Alaska 280 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957).

When a repeal is not accompanied by a specific saving provision, it is presumed that the legislature intended the general saving statute to apply. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).

Savings statute denies retroactive application of repeal of sentencing statute. —

Alaska's saving statute denies the retroactive application of the repeal of former AS 12.55.125(o) ; defendant was placed on probation pursuant to the former section as part of initial sentencing, which erased any doubt that his term of probation was a penalty that the saving statute prevented from being extinguished by the former section's repeal. Chinuhuk v. State, 472 P.3d 511 (Alaska 2020).

Scope of section. —

This section was not intended only to encompass the part of the 1949 compilation entitled the Civil Code, but clearly also encompasses criminal statutes which did not appear in the Civil Code of the 1949 compilation, including highway statutes. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).

Superior court properly imposed defendants' remaining jail time and refused to honor their rejection of further probation because, even though the original statute was repealed, its special probation requirement remained in force for the purpose of sustaining any prosecution for the enforcement of the penalty or liability, defendants could not reject the special term of probation, and had to serve out their statutorily mandated periods of probation, even though they had no further term of imprisonment remaining from their original sentences where another statute made it a separate crime for sex offenders to violate the conditions of their probation in such a situation. 2018 Alas. App. LEXIS 21.

Alaska Supreme Court disagrees that the Alaska saving statute is limited to situations where the repeal of a statute would have abated a prosecution at common law; nothing in this language implies that the saving statute only applies to situations where prosecutions would otherwise be barred by operation of common law abatement and the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. Chinuhuk v. State, 472 P.3d 511 (Alaska 2020).

“Right” means vested right. —

While the legislature did not define the term “right,” other than as one “accruing or accrued,” the term, as used in this section, means a vested right. Bidwell v. Scheele, 355 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1960).

The term “right” has been construed to mean a vested right. Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

And vested property rights are protected against state action by the provision of the 14th amendment of the federal constitution and by § 7, art. I, of the Alaska Constitution. Bidwell v. Scheele, 355 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1960); Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

The terms “vested” and “accrued” are used interchangeably in legal terminology. Bidwell v. Scheele, 355 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1960).

The rule of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (the mention of one is the exclusion of others) requires a holding that the legislature intended to save provisions specifically mentioned in a repealing act and to exclude all others. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 137 F. Supp. 181, 16 Alaska 71 (D. Alaska 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 493, 17 Alaska 280 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957).

The Alaska saving act cannot justify a disregard of the express will of the legislature. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 137 F. Supp. 181, 16 Alaska 71 (D. Alaska 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 493, 17 Alaska 280 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957).

Judgment continued after repeal. —

Final judgment rendered under prior law, by virtue of the general savings provision of this section, continued after the date of repeal of prior law, subject to appeal and such further proceedings as might have been invoked. Coughlan v. United States, 225 F.2d 677, 15 Alaska 659 (9th Cir. Alaska 1955).

And final order executed. —

This section places in the trial court the power to require the execution of a final order issued under prior law. Stringer v. United States, 225 F.2d 676, 15 Alaska 656 (9th Cir. Alaska 1955), rev'd, 233 F.2d 947, 16 Alaska 305 (9th Cir. Alaska 1956).

Statute held not to create exception to this section. —

Section 2(a) of the 1953 repealing act relating to the Alaska Property Tax Law carved no exception from the general saving statute and did not interfere with the collection of unpaid taxes which accrued prior to the repeal of SLA 1949, ch. 10. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 358 U.S. 224, 79 S. Ct. 274, 3 L. Ed. 2d 257 (U.S. 1959). But see City of Anchorage v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 252 F.2d 412, 17 Alaska 481 (9th Cir. Alaska 1958).

Section line highway easements established by the grant of former 43 U.S.C. § 932 and the acceptance in 19 SLA 1923 were not vacated by the 1949 repeal of 19 SLA 1923. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).

Income tax liability. —

The taxpayer’s obligation to pay taxes accrues in the year the income is received. In accordance with subsection (a) of this section, a period of limitations provided by a later tax act cannot release a taxpayer from that liability. Department of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp Am., 674 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1983).

Release on bail prior to sentencing. —

The 1982 amendment of AS 12.30.040(b) , effective January 1, 1983, which would have prevented defendant from posting bail prior to sentencing, did not apply since defendant was arrested prior to January 1, 1983, even though conviction occurred after that date. Parker v. State, 667 P.2d 1272 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).

Provision of current AS 12.30.040(b) that if a person has been convicted of an offense which is an unclassified felony or a class A felony, the person may not be released on bail either before sentencing or pending appeal, does not apply to defendants whose convictions occurred before its effective date of January 1, 1983, and it was error to revoke defendant’s bail on the basis of this provision where defendant had been convicted prior to January 1, 1983. Kwallek v. State, 658 P.2d 794 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).

Effect of change in age of majority on child custody order. —

Where child custody order required payments until age 19 or otherwise emancipated, amendment of age of majority statute from 19 to 18 altered the legal effect of the order and released the parent from liability when the child reached 18 years of age; a child’s right to future, unaccrued installments of child support was not a vested right. Dowling v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1984).

Judicial review in workmen’s compensation proceeding as a “right accruing or accrued”. —

See Manthey v. Collier, 367 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1962).

Effect of AS 42.05.221(b) on rights of previously certificated utility. —

See Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

Repeal by referendum. —

In Alaska the referendum operates as a repeal. State ex rel. Hammond v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1981).

Effect of filing referendum petition before effective date of statute. —

Even though a referendum petition was duly filed over three months before the effective date of AS 39.37.010 — 39.37.150 [January 1, 1976], the rights accrued under the elected public officers retirement system were not subject to any implied condition subsequent of repeal by the electorate, and those rights remain fully enforceable. State ex rel. Hammond v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1981).

Even assuming the extreme likelihood of the subsequent repeal of a legislative enactment, Alaska Const., art. XII, § 7, and subsection (a) of this section preclude the finding of an implicit condition subsequent in the contracts between participants in the elected public officers retirement system [AS 39.37.010 — 39.37.150, rejected at referendum] and the state of Alaska, since subsection (a) provides that “[t]he repeal . . . of any law does not release or extinguish any . . . liability incurred or right accruing or accrued under such law” and finding a condition subsequent to be implicit in the contract under consideration would undermine Alaska Const., art. XII, § 7. State ex rel. Hammond v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1981).

Former statutory defense held not a vested right. —

Former statutory defense of failure on the part of the plaintiff, in an action to recover lands sold for taxes, to tender and pay taxes into court did not constitute such a “right,” “vested right,” or “property” in the defendant as could not be taken away by the legislature. Bidwell v. Scheele, 355 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1960).

Action to reinstate driver’s license after section amended. —

Where defendant, whose driver’s license was revoked, moved for the issuance of a limited license, in reliance on newly amended language in AS 28.15.201 , and did so within the time limitations of R. Crim. P. 35(a), it was error for the trial court to rule the issuance of such license was precluded by this section because defendant was sentenced prior to the amended provisions effective date. Application of this provision prior to the effective date of the amendment was not a retroactive application of an amendment to the sentencing scheme promulgated under AS 28.15.181(d) and 28.15.291(c) [now AS 28.15.291(d) ]. Howell v. State, 834 P.2d 1254 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).

Applied in

B-C Cable Co. v. City & Borough of Juneau, 613 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1980); Newell v. National Bank, 646 P.2d 224 (Alaska 1982); Newsom v. State, 726 P.2d 561 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Helton v. State, 778 P.2d 1156 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).

Quoted in

Rice v. Rice, 757 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1988); Caspersen v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 786 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1990); Lipscomb v. State, 869 P.2d 166 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); Stoneking v. State, 39 P.3d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).

Cited in

State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1977).

Collateral references. —

Constitutional requirement that repealing statute refer to statute repealed as applicable to repeal by implication. 5 ALR2d 1270.

Legislative adoption of compiled or revised statutes as giving effect to former repealed or suspended provisions included therein; inclusion of conflicting statutes. 12 ALR2d 423, 430.