Revisor’s notes. —
The provisions of this title were redrafted in 1982 to remove personal pronouns pursuant to § 4, ch. 58, SLA 1982, and in 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010 to make other minor word changes.
Chapter 05. Alaska Statutes.
Collateral references. —
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 1 et seq.
82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 1 et seq.
Sec. 01.05.006. Adoption of Alaska Statutes; notes, headings, and references not law.
The bulk formal revision of the laws of Alaska which was authorized by AS 24.20.070 and prepared under the direction of the Alaska Legislative Council and published by The Michie Company, legal publishers, of Charlottesville, Virginia, and titled “Alaska Statutes,” as set out in the 47 titles of the Alaska Statutes, but not including the table of contents, indexes, citations to Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated, 1949, and session laws, chapter, article, section, subsection, and paragraph headings, annotations, collateral references, notes, and decisions, is adopted and enacted as the general and permanent law of Alaska.
History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1963)
Cross references. —
For exception to provision that section headings are not a part of the law, see AS 45.01.117 .
Editor’s notes. —
Section 2, ch. 1, SLA 1963, repealed all general and permanent laws enacted by the territorial and state legislatures before the convening of the regular session of the Third State Legislature on January 28, 1963.
Notes to Decisions
Ketchikan Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 602 P.2d 434 (Alaska 1979).
Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wilson, 461 P.2d 425 (Alaska 1969).
Larson v. State, 564 P.2d 365 (Alaska 1977); Anderson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 645 P.2d 205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Schnabel v. State, 663 P.2d 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Rollins v. State, 748 P.2d 767 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Schouten v. State, 77 P.3d 739 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); State v. Jouppi, 397 P.3d 1026 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017).
Sec. 01.05.010. Adoption of revision. [Repealed, § 2 ch 1 SLA 1963.]
Sec. 01.05.011. Designation and citation.
The bulk formal revision of Alaska law adopted and enacted into law by AS 01.05.006 and as amended and supplemented is known as the “Alaska Statutes” and may be cited “AS” followed by the number of the title, chapter, and section, separated by periods. For example, this title may be cited “AS 01”; this chapter may be cited “ AS 01.05”; this section may be cited “ AS 01.05.011 .” Except as otherwise indicated by the context, citations in accordance with this section include amendments and reenactments of the provision cited.
History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1963; am § 1 ch 127 SLA 1974; am § 1 ch 168 SLA 1990)
Notes to Decisions
Anderson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 645 P.2d 205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
Sec. 01.05.016. Effect of adoption.
The adoption and enactment of the Alaska Statutes do not repeal, affect, or modify
- a special, local, or temporary law;
- a law making an appropriation;
- a law affecting a bond issue or by which a bond issue may have been authorized;
- the running of the statutes of limitations in force at the time the Alaska Statutes become effective;
- the continued existence and operation of a department, agency, or office legally established or held;
- a bond of a public officer;
- a tax, fee, assessment, or other charge incurred or imposed;
- a statute authorizing, ratifying, confirming, approving, or accepting a compact or contract with another state or with the United States or an agency or instrumentality of them.
- All laws, rights, and obligations set out in (a) of this section continue to exist in all respects as if the Alaska Statutes had not been adopted and enacted.
- In addition to their general application, the provisions of AS 01.10, as far as applicable, apply to this chapter, which enacts the Alaska Statutes.
History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1963)
Sec. 01.05.020. Prima facie evidence. [Repealed, § 2 ch 1 SLA 1963.]
Sec. 01.05.021. Effect of repeal on prior offenses and punishments.
- No fine, forfeiture, or penalty incurred under laws existing before the time the Alaska Statutes take effect is affected by repeal of the existing law, but the recovery of the fines and forfeitures and the enforcement of the penalties are effected as if the law repealed had still remained in effect.
- In the case of an offense committed before the time the Alaska Statutes take effect, the offender is punished under the law in effect when the offense was committed.
History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1963)
Notes to Decisions
Howell v. State, 834 P.2d 1254 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Sec. 01.05.026. Supplements and pamphlets prima facie evidence of law; temporary and special acts; authentication.
The laws contained in the most recent cumulative supplement to and replacement pamphlets for the Alaska Statutes constitute prima facie a part of the Alaska Statutes, and the laws contained in the Temporary and Special Act pamphlets constitute prima facie the temporary and special law of Alaska, when prepared in accordance with this chapter and authenticated by the lieutenant governor.
History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1963; am § 1 ch 32 SLA 1971)
Sec. 01.05.030. Citing, amending, or repealing. [Repealed, § 2 ch 1 SLA 1963.]
Sec. 01.05.031. Revision of statutes.
- Subject to the general policies that may be adopted by the legislative council for the preparation and publication of the annual cumulative supplement to and replacement pamphlets for the Alaska Statutes and of the accompanying Temporary and Special Act pamphlets, the revisor of statutes shall revise for consolidation into the Alaska Statutes and the accompanying pamphlets all laws of a general and permanent nature and all laws of a temporary or special nature enacted by the legislature.
The revisor shall edit and revise the laws for consolidation without changing the meaning of any law in the following manner:
- renumber sections, parts of sections, articles, chapters, and titles;
- change the wording of section or subsection titles, or delete subsection titles, and change or provide new titles for articles, chapters, and titles;
- change capitalization for the purpose of uniformity;
- substitute the proper designation for the terms “the preceding section,” “this Act,” and like terms;
- substitute the proper calendar date for “effective date of this Act,” “date of passage of this Act,” and other phrases of similar import;
- strike out figures if they are merely a repetition of written words or vice versa, or substitute figures for written words or vice versa for the purpose of uniformity;
- correct manifest errors that are clerical, typographical, or errors in spelling, or errors by way of additions or omissions;
- correct manifest errors in references to laws;
- rearrange sections, combine sections or parts of sections with other sections or parts of sections, divide long sections into two or more sections, and rearrange the order of sections to conform to a logical arrangement of subject matter as may most generally be followed in the Alaska Statutes;
- change all sections, when possible, to read in the present tense, indicative mood, active voice and if the use of personal pronouns cannot be avoided in a section change the section to read in the third person, and singular number, or any other necessary grammatical change in the manner generally followed in the Alaska Statutes;
- delete or change sections or parts of sections if a deletion or change is necessary because of other legislative amendments that did not specifically amend or repeal them;
- omit all temporary laws, all titles to acts, all enacting and repealing clauses, all declarations of emergency, and all purpose, validity, and construction clauses unless, from their nature, it may be necessary to retain some of them to preserve the full meaning and intent of the law.
- The revisor shall edit and revise the laws as they are enacted by the legislature, without changing the meaning of any law, so as to avoid the use of pronouns denoting masculine or feminine gender.
History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1963; am § 2 ch 32 SLA 1971; am §§ 1, 2 ch 58 SLA 1982)
Notes to Decisions
Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wilson, 461 P.2d 425 (Alaska 1969); Schnabel v. State, 663 P.2d 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Sec. 01.05.036. Improvement of statutes.
The Legislative Affairs Agency, working in cooperation with the revisor, shall make recommendations to the legislative council concerning deficiencies, conflicts, or obsolete provisions in and the need for reorganization or revision of the statutes, and, at the direction of the legislative council, shall prepare for submission to the legislature legislation for the correction or removal of the deficiencies, conflicts, or obsolete provisions, or to otherwise improve the form or substance of any portion of the statute law of this state. Each title of the Alaska Statutes shall be systematically reviewed at least once each two years for deficiencies, conflicts, or obsolete provisions.
History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1963; am § 1 ch 106 SLA 1974)
Cross references. —
For the responsibility of the Alaska Legislative Council for statute revision, see AS 24.20.070 .
Notes to Decisions
Pfeifer v. State, 260 P.3d 1072 (Alaska 2011).
Chapter 10. Laws and Statutes.
Article 1. Common Law.
Collateral references. —
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 1 et seq.
82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 1 et seq.
Sec. 01.10.010. Applicability of common law.
So much of the common law not inconsistent with the Constitution of the State of Alaska or the Constitution of the United States or with any law passed by the legislature of the State of Alaska is the rule of decision in this state.
History. (§ 2-12 ACLA 1949; § 65-1-3 ACLA 1949)
Opinions of attorney general. —
There is considerable authority at common law which defines the scope of permissible trust investment. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 13.
Notes to Decisions
Applicability of common law. —
This section, which makes the common law applicable in Alaska, refers to the common law of England. It should be noted here that Alaska has the common law of the United States now, some of which is over 300 years old. The ancient common law of England is not controlling over the developing common law of this country. Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968).
Meaning of common-law. —
See Valentine v. Roberts, 1 Alaska 536 (D. Alaska 1902).
The common law is but the accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain what is right and just between individuals with respect to private disputes. Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968).
And scope. —
The common law includes those principles, usages, and rules of action applicable to the government and security of person and property which do not rest for their authority on any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature; a system of elementary principles and of general judicial truths which are continually expanding with the progress of society, and adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade and commerce and the mechanic arts and the exigencies and usages of the country. In re Habeas Corpus Burkell, 2 Alaska 108 (D. Alaska 1903).
The common law is not a rigid and arbitrary code, crystallized and immutable. Rather it is flexible and adapts itself to changing conditions. Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968).
Duty to explicate common law. —
It is the task of the supreme court of Alaska to explicate the common law which will apply in situations not dealing with a constitutional question or statutory interpretations unless and until the Alaska legislature acts to modify it. Surina v. Buckalew, 629 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1981).
Common-law trusts. —
There are no statutes upon the subject of common-law trusts. Powell v. Hammon Consol. Gold Fields, 8 Alaska 153 (D. Alaska 1929).
There is no inhibition against common-law trusts. Powell v. Hammon Consol. Gold Fields, 8 Alaska 153 (D. Alaska 1929).
Negligent misrepresentation. —
One may now maintain an action for negligent misrepresentation, even though that may not have been the case under the common law in years gone by. Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968).
Imputation of unchastity. —
Common-law rule that a statement imputing unchastity to a woman, or even professional unchastity, is not considered slanderous per se, is clearly outmoded. Hollman v. Brady, 233 F.2d 877, 16 Alaska 308 (9th Cir. Alaska 1956).
Separate maintenance. —
Alaska has no law on separate maintenance, but the common law, by this section, has been declared to be in force in Alaska, and a suit for separate maintenance was well known at common law. Moller v. Moller, 66 F. Supp. 507, 11 Alaska 33 (D. Alaska 1946).
Common law as to loss of consortium. —
See Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974).
Actions against tortfeasor’s liability insurer. —
The common-law rule allowing no direct cause of action against a tortfeasor’s liability insurer prevails in this state. Severson v. Estate of Severson, 627 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1981).
Given the harsh nature of the remedy of sequestration and the fact that the Alaska legislature has spelled out in some detail the procedure for obtaining other similar remedies while it has not enacted a sequestration statute, the implication is clear that Alaska has decided that sequestration of the nature sought in an action to require a regional corporation organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., to place certain funds in secure and liquid investments pending litigation is not available and has preempted the common law with a complex statutory scheme. Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 424 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1976).
Title by accretion. —
At common law the riparian owner acquires title to additions thereto by accretion. Nordale v. Waxberg, 84 F. Supp. 1004, 12 Alaska 399 (D. Alaska 1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 1022, 12 Alaska 695 (9th Cir. Alaska 1950).
Criminal sentencing. —
A trial court should not propose a nonstatutory mitigating factor to a three-judge panel where the legislature specifically rejected that factor for inclusion in AS 12.55.155(d) . Where the legislature has expressly addressed a consideration, such as the relationship between a defendant’s past conduct and his present offense, and imposed limitations on the trial court’s power to consider that relationship in mitigation of sentence, the trial court should not propose the same mitigating factor to a three-judge panel without complying with the limitations; to do so is to suggest a common-law development inconsistent with legislation. Totemoff v. State, 739 P.2d 769 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Van Dyke v. Midnight Sun Mining & Ditch Co., 177 F. 85, 3 Alaska Fed. 458 (9th Cir. Alaska 1910); Northwestern S. S. Co. v. Cochran, 191 F. 146, 3 Alaska Fed. 694 (9th Cir. Alaska 1911); United States v. Pacific & A. R. & N. Co., 5 Alaska 43 (D. Alaska 1914); Bosel v. State, 398 P.2d 651 (Alaska 1965); Olp v. State, 738 P.2d 1117 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Port Graham Corp., 871 P.2d 1135 (Alaska 1994).
Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. Alaska 1969); Smiloff v. State, 579 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1978); Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Balentine v. State, 707 P.2d 922 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Burke, 714 P.2d 374 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Alaska Fed'n for Community Self-Reliance v. Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 879 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1994); Haines v. Comfort Keepers, Inc., 393 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2017).
McFarland v. Alaska Perseverance Mining Co., 3 Alaska 308 (D. Alaska 1907); Jansen v. Pollastrine, 10 Alaska 316 (D. Alaska 1942); Territory v. 188 Cases of Mixed Intoxicating Liquors, 10 Alaska 414 (D. Alaska 1944); Bickel v. Polaris Inv. Co., 155 F. Supp. 411, 17 Alaska 389 (D. Alaska 1957).
Ketchikan Co. v. Citizens' Co., 2 Alaska 120 (D. Alaska 1903); First Nat'l Bank v. Stout, 9 Alaska 400 (D. Alaska 1938); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. Alaska 1965); Jackson v. State, 657 P.2d 405 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Stiegele v. State, 685 P.2d 1255 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Carney v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 785 P.2d 544 (Alaska 1990); Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002); Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936 (Alaska 2006).
Article 2. General Definitions, Residency, and Rules of Statutory Construction.
Collateral references. —
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 60 et seq.
82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 364 et seq.
Sec. 01.10.020. Applicability of AS 01.10.040 — 01.10.090.
The provisions of AS 01.10.040 — 01.10.090 shall be observed in the construction of the laws of the state unless the construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.
History. (§ 1 ch 62 SLA 1962)
Notes to Decisions
“Laws” refers to statutes and regulations and not the common law. Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).
In normal usage, word “construction” applies to statutes, not common law. Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).
Manifest intent of legislature. —
Application for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed as untimely. Although the prisoner was convicted before the limitation period for filing post conviction relief requests was reduced from two years to eighteen months, the prisoner had several months to file his claim after the amended law came into effect. The retrospective application of the limitation period was specified in the amending legislation, and did not constitute violation of due process under Alaska law. Demientieff v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Use in resolving issues relating to AS 01.10.080 . —
The supreme court is enjoined by the legislature to observe the provisions of this section in resolving any issue relating to AS 01.10.080 and its applicability to the five-day recount provision of AS 15.20.430 . Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).
Section modifies AS 01.10.090 . —
See City of Juneau v. Commer. Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1979); Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Odom Corp., 671 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1983).
State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).
Berry v. Coulman, 440 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2019).
Mouritsen v. Mouritsen, 459 P.3d 476 (Alaska 2020); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).
Sec. 01.10.030. Severability.
Any law heretofore or hereafter enacted by the Alaska legislature which lacks a severability clause shall be construed as though it contained the clause in the following language: “If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.”
History. (§ 1 ch 98 SLA 1949)
Notes to Decisions
Legislative intent. —
This section expresses a general legislative intent in favor of severability, albeit a weak one. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980).
Duty of supreme court to nullify statute or part of statute. —
If a statute is susceptible of no reasonable construction avoiding constitutional problems, the supreme court is under a duty to nullify the statute or, if possible, the particular provision found offensive to the constitution. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
There seems to be little or no authority as to the difference between general and specific severability clauses. Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).
Whereas a specific severability clause creates a slight presumption in favor of severability, a general clause creates an even weaker presumption. For all practical purposes, the difference between the two is negligible. Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).
General ruling which states that the invalidation of an exception automatically precludes severability is overbroad. It remains a question of legislative intent and the rule concerning invalidated exceptions is just another aid in determining that intent. Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).
The test for determining the severability of a statute is twofold. A provision will not be deemed severable “unless it appears both that, standing alone, legal effect can be given to it, and that the legislature intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and held bad should fall.” Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975); Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980).
Severance of initiative provisions. —
Although neither this section nor any analogous section gives courts the authority to invalidate portions of proposed initiatives, courts should be granted such authority, since circumspect judicial exercise of such power will promote, rather than frustrate, the right of the people to enact laws by initiative. McAlpine v. University of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
When the requisite number of voters have already subscribed to an initiative, a reviewing court should sever an impermissible portion of the proposed bill when the following conditions are met: (1) standing alone, the remainder of the proposed bill can be given legal effect; (2) deleting the impermissible portion would not substantially change the spirit of the measure; and (3) it is evident from the content of the measure and the circumstances surrounding its proposal that the sponsors and subscribers would prefer the measure to stand as altered, rather than to be invalidated in its entirety. McAlpine v. University of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
Statutes enacted simultaneously. —
The fact that two related statutes, one, the permanent fund statute, which contains an explicit non-severability clause, and the other, a tax exemption statute, which does not contain such a clause are enacted simultaneously, may indicate a legislative intent that the latter be severable. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980).
Application of severability to former presumptive sentencing procedures. —
The overall constitutionality of Alaska’s pre-March 2005 presumptive sentencing law, former AS 12.55.155(f) , was sound because constitutionally-flawed procedures could be replaced by jury trial procedures that conformed to the requirements of Blakely and the severability clause of the section without destroying the essential functioning and purpose of Alaska’s presumptive sentencing scheme; the Alaska legislature has retained the basic framework of presumptive sentencing, including the same scheme of aggravating factors and mitigating factors, but with the proviso that many of these aggravating factors are to be litigated to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt under the current AS 12.55.155(f) . State v. Moreno, 151 P.3d 480 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
Invalid portion of the 1972 amendment to former AS 42.10.130, relating to the granting of permits to carriers, which portion discriminated against nonresidents, was held severable. Lynden Transp. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).
State v. Baker, 393 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1964); Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969); Artus v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 16 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981); Javed v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 921 P.2d 620 (Alaska 1996); Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183 (Alaska 2007).
Forrer v. State, 471 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2020).
Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Fardig v. Municipality of Anchorage, 803 P.2d 879 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); Sonneman v. Hickel, 836 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1992); State v. Palmer, 882 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1994); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994), reversed on other grounds, sub nom. Doe v. Otte, 248 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. Alaska 2001).
State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1975); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977); Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles, 21 P.3d 367 (Alaska 2001); Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State, 202 P.3d 1162 (Alaska 2009).
Sec. 01.10.040. Words and phrases; meaning of “including”.
- Words and phrases shall be construed according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage. Technical words and phrases and those that have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed according to the peculiar and appropriate meaning.
- When the words “includes” or “including” are used in a law, they shall be construed as though followed by the phrase “but not limited to.”
History. (§ 2 ch 62 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 21 SLA 1991)
Notes to Decisions
Judicial construction. —
The court is required to construe words and phrases according to their “common and approved usage” unless such words and phrases have acquired peculiar meaning by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction. Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970).
Where the child support order clarified “health care expenses” using an enumerated list, the list was not exclusive. It was not erroneous for the superior court to consider nutritional supplements to be a health care expense to be divided equally among the parents in accordance with the child support order and Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(d)(2). Millette v. Millette, 240 P.3d 1217 (Alaska 2010).
Department of Revenue v. Debenham Elec. Supply Co., 612 P.2d 1001 (Alaska 1980); United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983); Lambert v. State, 694 P.2d 791 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Eluska, 698 P.2d 174 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Resek, 706 P.2d 706 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642 (Alaska 1987); State v. Anderson, 749 P.2d 1342 (Alaska 1988); Department of Community & Regional Affairs v. Sisters of Providence, 752 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1988); Alaska Int'l Constructors v. Kinter, 755 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1988); Cleland v. State, 759 P.2d 553 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); State v. Strange, 785 P.2d 563 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); Wylie v. State, 797 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); Hughes v. Harrelson, 844 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1993); Human Resources Co. v. Alaska Comm'n on Post-Secondary Educ., 946 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1997); Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n v. Stevens, 205 P.3d 321 (Alaska 2009), (decided under prior version of section); Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 234 P.3d 1282 (Alaska 2010); Harris v. M-K Rivers, 325 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).
Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wilson, 461 P.2d 425 (Alaska 1969); Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970); State v. Anchorage, 513 P.2d 1104 (Alaska 1973); Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Walker v. State, 742 P.2d 790 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d 451 (Alaska 2006); State v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 624 (Alaska 2007); Fuhs v. Gilbertson, 186 P.3d 551 (Alaska 2008); Atkins v. Inlet Transp. & Taxi Serv., 426 P.3d 1124 (Alaska 2018); Kinmon v. State, 451 P.3d 392 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019); In re Protective Proceeding of Amy D., 502 P.3d 5 (Alaska 2022); Jones v. Biggs, 508 P.3d 1121 (Alaska 2022).
Velez v. State, 762 P.2d 1297 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Alaskans for Efficient Gov't, Inc. v. Knowles, 91 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2004); Lambert v. State, 435 P.3d 1011 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).
Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1988); Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Fagan v. State, 779 P.2d 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Marshall v. First Nat'l Bank Alaska, 97 P.3d 830 (Alaska 2004); City of Kenai v. Friends of the Rec. Ctr., Inc., 129 P.3d 452 (Alaska 2006); Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 267 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2011); Rosenblum v. Perales, 303 P.3d 500 (Alaska 2013); Studley v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 389 P.3d 18 (Alaska 2017); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).
Sec. 01.10.050. Tense, number, and gender.
- Words in the present tense include the past and future tenses, and words in the future tense include the present tense.
- Words in the singular number include the plural, and words in the plural number include the singular.
- Words of any gender may, when the sense so indicates, refer to any other gender.
History. (§ 3 ch 62 SLA 1962; am § 3 ch 58 SLA 1982)
Notes to Decisions
D.A.W. v. State, 699 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1985); Hughes v. Harrelson, 844 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1993).
State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1986).
Sec. 01.10.055. Residency.
- A person establishes residency in the state by being physically present in the state with the intent to remain in the state indefinitely and to make a home in the state.
A person demonstrates the intent required under (a) of this section
- by maintaining a principal place of abode in the state for at least 30 days or for a longer period if a longer period is required by law or regulation; and
- by providing other proof of intent as may be required by law or regulation, which may include proof that the person is not claiming residency outside the state or obtaining benefits under a claim of residency outside the state.
- A person who establishes residency in the state remains a resident during an absence from the state unless during the absence the person establishes or claims residency in another state, territory, or country, or performs other acts or is absent under circumstances that are inconsistent with the intent required under (a) of this section to remain a resident of this state.
History. (§ 1 ch 67 SLA 1983)
Administrative Code. —
For permanent fund dividend program, see 15 AAC 23, art. 1.
For fishery identification system, administrative areas and annual fees, see 20 AAC 5, art. 2.
Notes to Decisions
Jurisdiction over divorce action. —
This section does not affect the common-law rule that Alaska courts have jurisdiction over a divorce action when one of the parties is domiciled in Alaska, where “domicile” is defined as physical presence plus an intent to remain permanently. Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988).
Residency requirements for permanent fund dividend. —
A military family did not meet the permanent fund dividend eligibility requirements of AS 43.23.005(a) because they had been absent from Alaska for more than five years. There was a presumption under 15 AAC 23.163(f) that they did not intend to return and remain in Alaska. The Alaska Department of Revenue has the authority to create eligibility requirements for PFDs that exceed those found in this section. Harrod v. State, 255 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2011).
Jurisdiction over child support action. —
Superior court properly modified a father's child support because "residency" was statutorily defined by focusing on a person's intent; the father affirmatively claimed Alaska residency at trial and intended to return and make Alaska his home, the "tribunal" referred to by statute included both the superior court and the Child Support Services Division, the superior court had evidence before it establishing three relevant time periods based on the father's actual pay that jointly showed his income had changed by more than 15% during the time periods at issue, which both met the threshold for a material change in circumstances and was an appropriate method for calculating support covering past period. Berry v. Coulman, 440 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2019).
Continuing jurisdiction. —
As used in the UCCJEA, the term “presently resides” was to be interpreted consistently with residency under Alaska law, AS 01.10.055 , as that interpretation furthered the stated purposes of the UCCJEA and made AS 25.30.310(a)(2) consistent with the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Thus, it was an error for the superior court to find that it no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA based on the parties' physical presence in South Carolina. Mouritsen v. Mouritsen, 459 P.3d 476 (Alaska 2020).
E.H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 1186 (Alaska 2001).
Dep't of Revenue v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2001).
Heller v. Dep't of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69 (Alaska 2013).
Sec. 01.10.060. Definitions.
In the laws of the state, unless the context otherwise requires,
- “action” includes any matter or proceeding in a court, civil or criminal;
- “daytime” means the period between sunrise and sunset;
- “month” means a calendar month unless otherwise expressed;
- “municipality” means a political subdivision incorporated under the laws of the state that is a home rule or general law city, a home rule or general law borough, or a unified municipality;
- “nighttime” means the period between sunset and sunrise;
- “oath” includes affirmation or declaration;
“peace officer” means
- an officer of the state troopers;
- a member of the police force of a municipality;
- a village public safety officer;
- a regional public safety officer;
- a United States marshal or deputy marshal; and
- an officer whose duty it is to enforce and preserve the public peace;
- “person” includes a corporation, company, partnership, firm, association, organization, business trust, or society, as well as a natural person;
- “personal property” includes money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt;
- “property” includes real and personal property;
- “real property” is coextensive with land, tenements, and hereditaments;
- “signature” or “subscription” includes the mark of a person who cannot write, with the name of that person written near the mark by a witness who writes the witness’s own name near the name of the person who cannot write; but a signature or subscription by mark can be acknowledged or can serve as a signature or subscription to a sworn statement only when two witnesses so sign their own names to the sworn statement;
- “state” means the State of Alaska unless applied to the different parts of the United States and in the latter case it includes the District of Columbia and the territories;
- “writing” includes printing.
- In the laws of the state, “lewd conduct,” “lewd touching,” “immoral conduct,” “indecent conduct,” and similar terms do not include the act of a woman breast-feeding a child in a public or private location where the woman and child are otherwise authorized to be. Nothing in this subsection may be construed to authorize an act that is an offense under AS 11.61.123 .
History. (§ 4 ch 62 SLA 1962; am § 2 ch 66 SLA 1965; am § 10 ch 117 SLA 1968; am § 19 ch 74 SLA 1985; am § 1 ch 60 SLA 1990; am § 2 ch 78 SLA 1998; am § 2 ch 97 SLA 2001)
Revisor’s notes. —
Reorganized in 1985 to alphabetize the defined terms.
Cross references. —
For additional definition of “peace officer”, see AS 11.81.900(b) ; for listing of peace officers for purposes of the Fish and Game Code, see AS 16.05.150 ; for a definition of “police officer”, see AS 18.65.290 ; for legislative findings relating to the 1998 enactment of subsection (b), see § 1, ch. 78, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
Opinions of attorney general. —
The statutory framework of the Alaska Statutes viewed as a whole contemplates that for any publicly employed law enforcement officer to be considered a peace officer within the meaning of present paragraph (7), he or she must be empowered with a full range of police duties and authority and must be currently functioning on essentially a full-time basis in that role. September 18, 1977 Op. Att’y Gen.
Law enforcement officers within the category “peace officers” as used in present paragraph (7) include, but are not limited to, state troopers, fish and wildlife protection officers and police officers employed by police departments of incorporated municipalities. September 18, 1977 Op. Att’y Gen.
Law enforcement officers with limited police authority with respect to specific statutes or ordinances are not police officers and are not necessarily peace officers either, at least within the meaning of present paragraph (7). September 18, 1977 Op. Att’y Gen.
Comparing the classification of “peace officer” in present paragraph (7) with that of “police officer,” it is apparent that police officers, as defined in AS 18.65.290 (6) [now AS 18.65.290 (7)], are always peace officers since they have full police duties that are exercised on a full-time basis. However, the converse of this proposition can never be the case; that is, peace officer status does not automatically vest one with the status of a police officer since peace officers are not necessarily employees of a police department and do not necessarily have the power to enforce all the penal, traffic or highway laws of the state. September 18, 1977 Op. Att’y Gen.
Because AS 11.55.020 (now AS 11.61.220 ) excepts only “peace officers” from the general prohibition against carrying concealed weapons, other persons, including state employees charged with limited law enforcement duties, unless a peace officer within the meaning of present paragraph (7), may not carry concealed weapons. December 22, 1977 Op. Att’y Gen.
A comparison of the language of AS 18.65.010(b) , which describes the general powers and duties of a specially commissioned officer, with that of AS 18.65.080 , which describes the powers and duties of commissioned officers of the Department of Public Safety with particular reference to “member” of the state troopers, supports the conclusion that a specially commissioned officer is a “peace officer” for purposes of both subsection (7) of this section and AS 11.55.020 (now AS 11.61.220 ) when performing law enforcement duties within the limitations set forth on the face of a special commission and furthermore, may carry concealed weapons without violating AS 11.55.010 (now AS 11.61.220 ) while performing these duties to the extent permitted by the commission itself. December 22, 1977 Op. Att’y Gen.
Notes to Decisions
Retirement plan interest. —
Bankruptcy court did not err in holding that a federal tax lien could attach to debtor’s interest in a retirement savings and pension plan, as such interest constituted a “right of property” within the meaning of this section. Raihl v. United States (In re Raihl), 152 B.R. 615 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Alaska 1993).
State as “person”. —
Subsection (8) does not necessarily exclude political entities from the definition of “person”. Accordingly, the State of Alaska was properly considered a “person” for purposes of construing the rule of judicial disqualification provided for in AS 22.20.020 . Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
Probation officers are not “peace officers” under AS 01.10.060 (7). Sapp v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2016), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. 2016), superseded, sub. op., 379 P.3d 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016).
Special agents of the Alaska Railroad's security force are “peace officers” within the meaning of AS 01.10.060 (7)(F), as interpreted in Sapp v. State, 379 P.3d 1000 (Alaska App. 2016). Therefore, a district court properly denied a motion for judgment of acquittal on a charge of failure to stop for a peace officer because defendant knowingly failed to stop for an agent of the Alaska Railroad's security force; the agent was in active pursuit of defendant for a violation that had just occurred on Alaska Railroad property. Forsythe v. State, 391 P.3d 643 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017).
Halligan v. State, 624 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1981); Clark v. State, 738 P.2d 772 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Matanuska-Susitna Borough v. King's Lake Camp, 439 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1968); Stroh v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 459 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1968); Hull v. Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 658 P.2d 122 (Alaska 1983); von Gemmingen v. First Nat'l Bank, 789 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1990); Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. ex rel. Gerke v. Gerke, 942 P.2d 423 (Alaska 1997); Lum v. Koles, 426 P.3d 1103 (Alaska 2018).
Foltz-Nelson Architects v. Kobylk, 749 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1988); D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002); Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 267 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2011); Harris v. M-K Rivers, 325 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).
Sec. 01.10.065. Registered mail, certified mail.
When the use of registered mail is authorized or required by the laws of the state, certified mail, with return receipt requested, may be used.
History. (§ 1 ch 66 SLA 1965)
Article 3. Effect and Effective Date of Statutes.
Collateral references. —
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 164 et seq.
82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 548 et seq.
Sec. 01.10.070. Time statutes become law and take effect.
- All bills passed by the legislature become law upon the governor’s signature or upon the governor’s veto being overridden or, when the governor allows a bill to become law without signature, on the day after expiration of the period allowed for gubernatorial action by art. II, § 17 of the Alaska Constitution. Acts become effective 90 days after becoming law, unless the legislature, by concurrence of two-thirds of the membership of each house, provides for another effective date.
- The actual effective date of an Act having no effective-date provision is determined by starting with the day after it is signed by the governor or the day after the governor’s veto is overridden or the day after expiration of the period allowed for gubernatorial action by art. II, § 17 of the Alaska Constitution, and counting 90 calendar days, the Act becoming effective at 12:01 a.m., Alaska Standard Time on the 90th day.
- The actual effective date and time of an Act having an immediate-effective-date provision is 12:01 a.m., Alaska Standard Time, on the day after it is signed by the governor or on the day after the governor’s veto is overridden or on the day after expiration of the period allowed for gubernatorial action by art. II, § 17 of the Alaska Constitution.
- An Act that specifies a definite effective date becomes effective at 12:01 a.m., Alaska Standard Time, on the date specified. However, if the specified definite effective date is on or before the day the governor signs the Act, the day the governor’s veto is overridden, or the last day of the period allowed for gubernatorial action by art. II, sec. 17, Constitution of the State of Alaska, as applicable, the Act becomes effective at 12:01 a.m., Alaska Standard Time, on the day after the governor signs the Act, the governor’s veto is overridden, or the period allowed for gubernatorial action by art. II, sec. 17, Constitution of the State of Alaska, expires, as applicable.
- When the governor allows a bill to become law without signature, the governor shall give written notice of that fact to the legislature. The date of this notice does not affect the date the bill becomes law or the date the Act takes effect.
In this section,
- “Act” means a bill which has become law;
- “bill” means a legislative document proposing an Act;
- “becomes effective” means becomes applicable; “effective date” does not mean date of enactment (or date of becoming law), although the two will coincide when a bill which has an immediate-effective-date provision is allowed to become law without the governor’s signature;
“becomes law” means is enacted; “enactment” occurs when any one of the following takes place:
- a bill which is passed by the legislature is signed by the governor;
- the period specified in art. II, § 17 of the Alaska Constitution expires without gubernatorial action;
- the legislature overrides the governor’s veto of a bill;
- “passed by the legislature” means that the required majority of each house of the legislature has taken final action in approving the same version of a bill.
History. (§ 5 ch 62 SLA 1962; am § 8 ch 126 SLA 1966; am § 1 ch 115 SLA 1974; am §§ 1 — 3 ch 6 SLA 1984; am § 1 ch 20 SLA 2002)
Cross references. —
For federal law concerning standard time, see 15 U.S.C. 260-267.
Notes to Decisions
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1985).
Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994), reversed on other grounds, sub nom. Doe v. Otte, 248 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. Alaska 2001); Jonas v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2018).
North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534 (Alaska 1978); Fowler v. State, 70 P.3d 1106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); Allen v. Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 147 P.3d 664 (Alaska 2006); Stewart v. Elliott, 239 P.3d 1236 (Alaska 2010).
Sec. 01.10.080. Computation of time.
The time in which an act provided by law is required to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded.
History. (§ 6 ch 62 SLA 1962)
Administrative Code. —
For deregulation ballot: election procedure, see 3 AAC 49, art. 1.
Notes to Decisions
This section was taken from the laws of Oregon. Mahan v. Sparks, 10 Alaska 292 (D. Alaska 1942); Lowe v. Hess, 10 Alaska 174 (D. Alaska 1941).
It merely states the common-law rule. Lowe v. Hess, 10 Alaska 174 (D. Alaska 1941); Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. Alaska 1969); Alaska Christian Bible Inst. v. State, 772 P.2d 1079 (Alaska 1989).
Common law. —
At common law it was established if the last day on which an act was to be performed fell on a Sunday, then that Sunday was excluded and the time was extended to the following day. Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).
The common-law rule is that when the period of time within which an act is to be performed exceeds one week, an intervening Sunday is included in the computation. Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).
Civ. R. 6(a) on computation of time is similar to this section in certain regards. David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).
Legislative intent. —
The legislature, by virtue of its enactment of this section, manifested its intent to exclude Sundays in the computation of time only when Sunday falls on the last day of a period in question. Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).
The phrase “unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded” was intended by the legislature to exclude a Saturday when court is not in session and the office of the clerk is closed. David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).
When the act required to be performed within a certain period of time is the filing of pleadings with the court, the manifest intent of the legislature appears to require exclusion of the last day from the computation if it should fall on a day when the courts are closed. David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).
“Holiday” defined. —
“Holiday” has been defined as “a day upon which the usual operations of business are suspended and the courts closed, and, generally, no legal process is served.” David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).
For the purpose of this section, Saturday is a court holiday. David v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 557 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1976).
Computation of person’s age. —
Since the computation-of-time statute is merely declaratory of the common law, it cannot be interpreted to abrogate or modify the undeniable common law rule as to when, with respect to the anniversary date of his birth, one attains a given age. Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. Alaska 1969).
The supreme court is enjoined by the legislature to observe the provisions of AS 01.10.020 in resolving any issue relating to this section and its applicability to the five-day recount provision of AS 15.20.430 . Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).
Computing limitation under AS 15.20.430 . —
In computing the five-day period of limitation prescribed by AS 15.20.430 , an intervening Sunday is to be included. Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1965).
Computation of the limitations period provided by AS 09.10.070 subsequent to the removal of the disability of minority is to be made by excluding the first day and including the last. Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 274 F. Supp. 733 (D. Alaska 1967), aff'd, 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. Alaska 1969).
Filing appeal. —
Under this section, the day on which the judgment is entered should be excluded in computing the time within which an application for an appeal must be filed. Mahan v. Sparks, 10 Alaska 292 (D. Alaska 1942).
Computation for purposes of operability of statute. —
AS 01.10.080 did not prevent the 2001 amendment to AS 28.35.030(n) from going into effect on July 4, 2001, where the bill had been signed by the governor on July 3, 2001, as AS 01.10.080 was a codification of the common-law rule governing the computation of time for the doing of an act required by law, and did not affect the enactment of a law. Fowler v. State, 70 P.3d 1106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Silides v. Thomas, 559 P.2d 80 (Alaska 1977); Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987); Foltz-Nelson Architects v. Kobylk, 749 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1988); Fields v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 818 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1991).
Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Tundra Tours, Inc., 719 P.2d 1020 (Alaska 1986).
Jenkins v. Daniels, 751 P.2d 19 (Alaska 1988).
Sec. 01.10.090. Retrospective statutes.
No statute is retrospective unless expressly declared therein.
History. (§ 7 ch 62 SLA 1962)
Opinions of attorney general. —
A law may be made retroactive without an immediate effective date; hence, in a law passed in 1989 making itself retroactive to January 1, 1989, the retroactivity provision was valid despite the fact that the effective date was ninety days after approval. On the date the law became effective it was to become retroactive to January 1, 1989. June 1, 1989 Op. Att’y Gen. (overruling March 31, 1988 Op. Att’y Gen. to the extent inconsistent with this conclusion).
Notes to Decisions
Alaska has a statutory policy against retroactive interpretation of its statutes. Jones Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas Service Corp., 442 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. Alaska 1971).
This section embodies the general rule on retrospective operation of statutes. Watts v. Seward Sch. Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1966).
Application for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed as untimely. Although the prisoner was convicted before the limitation period for filing post-conviction relief requests was reduced from two years to eighteen months, the prisoner had several months to file his claim after the amended law came into effect. The retrospective application of the limitation period was not a violation of due process. Demientieff v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Section modified by AS 01.10.020 . —
See City of Juneau v. Commer. Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1979).
Applicability of amendments.—
Trial court erred in applying the pre-2003 versions of AS 09.10.030 and AS 09.45.052(a) , rather than the current versions, which would have required the neighbor to show that she possessed the parking lot in the good-faith belief that she owned the property, because the legislature expressly declared that the amendments applied to claims that had not vested before the amendment and the neighbor's claim had not yet vested. Prax v. Zalewski, 400 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2017).
Retrospective laws are generally unjust, and neither accord with sound legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact. Watts v. Seward Sch. Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1966).
There is absolute prohibition against retrospective laws when their purpose is punitive, they then being denominated ex post facto laws. It is the sense of the situation that that which impels prohibition in such case exacts clearness of declaration when burdens are imposed upon completed and remote transactions, or consequences given to them of which there could have been no foresight or contemplation when they were designed and consummated. Watts v. Seward Sch. Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1966).
Courts do not infer retroactive operation of statutes in ambiguous circumstances. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).
Provision held not retroactive. —
Application of amendments to Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act, AS 12.63.010 et seq., to crimes committed before the amendments were effective violated the ex post facto clause in Alaska Const. art. I, § 15. It had been held previously that the registration act could not be applied retroactively, and the adoption of Alaska R. App. P. 106 did not make those amendments retroactive. State v. Doe, 297 P.3d 885 (Alaska), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2013).
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission correctly affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision that a worker was receiving the maximum amount to which he was entitled because the version of the statute in effect at the time of the worker’s permanent total disability governed his rate of compensation. Louie v. BP Exploration Alaska, Inc., 327 P.3d 204 (Alaska 2014).
Curative legislation. —
The general rule of construction of curative legislation is that retroactivity will be ascribed to it more readily than to that which may disadvantageously, though legally, affect past relations and transactions. Zurfluh v. State, 620 P.2d 690 (Alaska 1980).
Medicaid eligibility rules. —
State did not err by temporarily denying a mother’s Medicaid application filed in September 2008 under AS 47.07.020(m) , because she had transferred funds to her son in February 2007 under then-existing Medicaid eligibility rules. The legislature’s retroactive change to the rules was valid. Pfeifer v. State, 260 P.3d 1072 (Alaska 2011).
Procedural changes. —
This section does not address the procedural-substantive distinction. Nevertheless, the settled rule of law is mere procedural changes which do not affect substantive rights may be applied retrospectively. Matanuska Maid v. State, 620 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1980), overruled in part, Rosen v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984).
Procedural changes in the law which do not affect substantive rights may be applied retroactively. Rice v. Rice, 757 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1988).
New evidence rule post-dating crime. —
This section did not bar application of a recently-enacted evidence rule at the trial of a law suit based on events that pre-dated enactment of the evidence rule. Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
Time-barred claims of child sexual abuse not revived. —
AS 09.10.065 did not revive civil claims for alleged child sexual abuse by a Catholic priest that were time-barred before the effective date of that section, October 1, 2001. Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does, 141 P.3d 719 (Alaska 2006).
Restraint of Trade Act. —
The attorney general did not retrospectively apply the Restraint of Trade Act, AS 45.50.562 — 45.50.596 , by requesting documents executed prior to the effective date of the statute. A party suffers no increased liability as a result of the state’s investigatory procedure nor does the procedure otherwise affect a party’s substantive rights. Matanuska Maid v. State, 620 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1980), overruled in part, Rosen v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984).
The statutory changes in the power to investigate brought about by AS 45.50.590 et seq. affect only procedure and mere procedural changes which do not affect substantive rights are not immune from retrospective application. Matanuska Maid v. State, 620 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1980), overruled in part, Rosen v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984).
Section line highway easements established by the grant of former 43 U.S.C. § 932 and the acceptance in ch. 19 SLA 1923 were not vacated by the 1949 repeal of ch. 19 SLA 1923. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).
Amendment of fee schedule for liquor wholesalers. —
AS 04.11.160 , which became effective on July 1, 1980, and which amended the fee schedule for liquor wholesalers, cannot be applied retroactively. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Odom Corp., 671 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1983).
Modification of rule against perpetuities. —
Former AS 34.27.010 , modifying the common-law rule against perpetuities, did not clearly provide for its retrospective operation, it did not apply to an option in gross created prior to its enactment where application of that section would run counter to the result that would have been reached had the general, majority-view common-law rule been applied. Hansen v. Stroecker, 699 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1985).
Application of AS 04.11.360 violating this section. —
Applying AS 04.11.360 to credit transactions before enactment of that section in 1980 is a retrospective application of AS 04.11.360 which violates both the literal terms of and the reasons for this section. Norton v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 695 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1985).
1970 amendment to AS 47.10.080 not retroactive. —
Refusal to give retrospective effect to the 1970 amendment to AS 47.10.080 reducing the maximum age of commitment of juvenile delinquents to 19 years of age is bolstered by this section. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974).
There is nothing in the amendatory legislation to AS 47.10.080 that indicates an intention that the sentence reduction should operate retrospectively. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974).
Chapter 174, SLA 1957, held to be prospective in its operation. —
See Stephens v. Rogers Constr. Co., 411 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1966).
The statute of limitations on the assessment of taxes, AS 43.05.260(a) , does not bar assessments on returns filed prior to January 1, 1976, that section’s effective date. Department of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp Am., 674 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1983).
AS 16.43.960 not retrospective. —
Since the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission had the authority at common law to revoke a fisherman’s permit prior to the enactment of AS 16.43.960 , AS 16.43.960 was merely procedural in effect and, therefore, could not run afoul of the prohibition regarding retrospective laws in this section. Kjarstad v. State, 703 P.2d 1167 (Alaska 1985).
Public construction wage rates. —
The wage rate determination provisions of the 1993 amendments to AS 36.05.010 (wage rates on public construction) are not retroactive and, thus, were not applicable to contracts with a bid date prior to enactment. Eastwind, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Admin., 951 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1997).
State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1977); City of Juneau v. Commer. Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1979); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1985).
Helton v. State, 778 P.2d 1156 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Caspersen v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 786 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1990); ARCO Alaska v. State, 824 P.2d 708 (Alaska 1992); Fowler v. State, 70 P.3d 1106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); Rush v. State, 98 P.3d 551 (Alaska 2004).
Morgan v. State, 512 P.2d 904 (Alaska 1973); Ellis v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 944 P.2d 491 (Alaska 1997); Blodgett v. Blodgett (In re Estate of Blodgett), 147 P.3d 702 (Alaska 2006); State v. Alaska Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203 (Alaska 2010); Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2014).
Sec. 01.10.100. Effect of repeals or amendments.
- The repeal or amendment of a law does not release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred or right accruing or accrued under that law, unless the repealing or amending act so provides expressly. The law shall be treated as remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of the right, penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
- The expiration of a temporary law does not release or extinguish a penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred or right accruing or accrued under that law unless the temporary law so provides expressly, and that law shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of the penalty, forfeiture, or liability or right accruing or accrued.
- When an act repealing a former act, section, or provision is itself repealed, that repeal does not revive the former act, section, or provision, unless it is expressly so provided.
History. (§ 19-1-1 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 4 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 28 SLA 1959)
Administrative Code. —
For eligibility for discretionary parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 1.
Opinions of attorney general. —
Section contemplates penal statute. 1964 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8.
The DMV can take action against a person’s driver’s license after the repeal date of AS 28.22 (mandatory insurance) if the person owned or operated a motor vehicle without the required insurance before the repeal date. June 28, 1988 Op. Att’y Gen.
Notes to Decisions
Constitutional prohibition broader than statutory prohibition. —
The prohibition against ex post facto laws has been held to be broader than the prohibition against retrospective civil legislation contained in statutes like subsection (a) of this section. Parker v. State, 667 P.2d 1272 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Retroactive application of amendment. —
Because the offense occurred prior to the legislature’s amendment to AS 13.30.040 prohibiting the court from releasing a defendant convicted of “a sexual felony,” that amendment did not apply to defendant; the amendment did not contain an express statement under this section indicating that the legislature intended for it to apply retroactively. Olsen v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Construction of general saving clause. —
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a general saving clause or statute preserves rights and liabilities which have accrued under the act repealed and operates to make applicable in designated situations the law as it existed before the repeal, unless such application is negatived by the express terms or clear implication of a particular repealing act, or where not otherwise provided by the repealing act. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 137 F. Supp. 181, 16 Alaska 71 (D. Alaska 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 493, 17 Alaska 280 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957); Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).
A saving statute preserves rights unless the repealing act reveals an intention not to do so. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).
A general saving statute will save rights and remedies except where a subsequent repealing act indicates that it was not the legislative intention that particular rights and remedies should be saved. Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).
And specific saving clause. —
Where there are saving clauses in repealing statutes which are later in time, constituting the express will of the legislature, such have been taken as an indication of legislative intent to save nothing else from the repeal, and the general saving statute in force does not apply. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 137 F. Supp. 181, 16 Alaska 71 (D. Alaska 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 493, 17 Alaska 280 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957).
When a repeal is not accompanied by a specific saving provision, it is presumed that the legislature intended the general saving statute to apply. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).
Savings statute denies retroactive application of repeal of sentencing statute. —
Alaska's saving statute denies the retroactive application of the repeal of former AS 12.55.125(o) ; defendant was placed on probation pursuant to the former section as part of initial sentencing, which erased any doubt that his term of probation was a penalty that the saving statute prevented from being extinguished by the former section's repeal. Chinuhuk v. State, 472 P.3d 511 (Alaska 2020).
Scope of section. —
This section was not intended only to encompass the part of the 1949 compilation entitled the Civil Code, but clearly also encompasses criminal statutes which did not appear in the Civil Code of the 1949 compilation, including highway statutes. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).
Superior court properly imposed defendants' remaining jail time and refused to honor their rejection of further probation because, even though the original statute was repealed, its special probation requirement remained in force for the purpose of sustaining any prosecution for the enforcement of the penalty or liability, defendants could not reject the special term of probation, and had to serve out their statutorily mandated periods of probation, even though they had no further term of imprisonment remaining from their original sentences where another statute made it a separate crime for sex offenders to violate the conditions of their probation in such a situation. 2018 Alas. App. LEXIS 21.
Alaska Supreme Court disagrees that the Alaska saving statute is limited to situations where the repeal of a statute would have abated a prosecution at common law; nothing in this language implies that the saving statute only applies to situations where prosecutions would otherwise be barred by operation of common law abatement and the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. Chinuhuk v. State, 472 P.3d 511 (Alaska 2020).
“Right” means vested right. —
While the legislature did not define the term “right,” other than as one “accruing or accrued,” the term, as used in this section, means a vested right. Bidwell v. Scheele, 355 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1960).
The term “right” has been construed to mean a vested right. Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).
And vested property rights are protected against state action by the provision of the 14th amendment of the federal constitution and by § 7, art. I, of the Alaska Constitution. Bidwell v. Scheele, 355 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1960); Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).
The terms “vested” and “accrued” are used interchangeably in legal terminology. Bidwell v. Scheele, 355 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1960).
The rule of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (the mention of one is the exclusion of others) requires a holding that the legislature intended to save provisions specifically mentioned in a repealing act and to exclude all others. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 137 F. Supp. 181, 16 Alaska 71 (D. Alaska 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 493, 17 Alaska 280 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957).
The Alaska saving act cannot justify a disregard of the express will of the legislature. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 137 F. Supp. 181, 16 Alaska 71 (D. Alaska 1956), aff'd, 246 F.2d 493, 17 Alaska 280 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957).
Judgment continued after repeal. —
Final judgment rendered under prior law, by virtue of the general savings provision of this section, continued after the date of repeal of prior law, subject to appeal and such further proceedings as might have been invoked. Coughlan v. United States, 225 F.2d 677, 15 Alaska 659 (9th Cir. Alaska 1955).
And final order executed. —
This section places in the trial court the power to require the execution of a final order issued under prior law. Stringer v. United States, 225 F.2d 676, 15 Alaska 656 (9th Cir. Alaska 1955), rev'd, 233 F.2d 947, 16 Alaska 305 (9th Cir. Alaska 1956).
Statute held not to create exception to this section. —
Section 2(a) of the 1953 repealing act relating to the Alaska Property Tax Law carved no exception from the general saving statute and did not interfere with the collection of unpaid taxes which accrued prior to the repeal of SLA 1949, ch. 10. Territory of Alaska v. American Can Co., 358 U.S. 224, 79 S. Ct. 274, 3 L. Ed. 2d 257, 17 Alaska 779 (U.S. 1959). But see City of Anchorage v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 252 F.2d 412, 17 Alaska 481 (9th Cir. Alaska 1958).
Section line highway easements established by the grant of former 43 U.S.C. § 932 and the acceptance in 19 SLA 1923 were not vacated by the 1949 repeal of 19 SLA 1923. Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311 (Alaska 1983).
Income tax liability. —
The taxpayer’s obligation to pay taxes accrues in the year the income is received. In accordance with subsection (a) of this section, a period of limitations provided by a later tax act cannot release a taxpayer from that liability. Department of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp Am., 674 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1983).
Release on bail prior to sentencing. —
The 1982 amendment of AS 12.30.040(b) , effective January 1, 1983, which would have prevented defendant from posting bail prior to sentencing, did not apply since defendant was arrested prior to January 1, 1983, even though conviction occurred after that date. Parker v. State, 667 P.2d 1272 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Provision of current AS 12.30.040(b) that if a person has been convicted of an offense which is an unclassified felony or a class A felony, the person may not be released on bail either before sentencing or pending appeal, does not apply to defendants whose convictions occurred before its effective date of January 1, 1983, and it was error to revoke defendant’s bail on the basis of this provision where defendant had been convicted prior to January 1, 1983. Kwallek v. State, 658 P.2d 794 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Effect of change in age of majority on child custody order. —
Where child custody order required payments until age 19 or otherwise emancipated, amendment of age of majority statute from 19 to 18 altered the legal effect of the order and released the parent from liability when the child reached 18 years of age; a child’s right to future, unaccrued installments of child support was not a vested right. Dowling v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1984).
Judicial review in workmen’s compensation proceeding as a “right accruing or accrued”. —
See Manthey v. Collier, 367 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1962).
Effect of AS 42.05.221(b) on rights of previously certificated utility. —
See Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 580 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).
Repeal by referendum. —
In Alaska the referendum operates as a repeal. State ex rel. Hammond v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1981).
Effect of filing referendum petition before effective date of statute. —
Even though a referendum petition was duly filed over three months before the effective date of AS 39.37.010 — 39.37.150 [January 1, 1976], the rights accrued under the elected public officers retirement system were not subject to any implied condition subsequent of repeal by the electorate, and those rights remain fully enforceable. State ex rel. Hammond v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1981).
Even assuming the extreme likelihood of the subsequent repeal of a legislative enactment, Alaska Const., art. XII, § 7, and subsection (a) of this section preclude the finding of an implicit condition subsequent in the contracts between participants in the elected public officers retirement system [AS 39.37.010 — 39.37.150, rejected at referendum] and the state of Alaska, since subsection (a) provides that “[t]he repeal . . . of any law does not release or extinguish any . . . liability incurred or right accruing or accrued under such law” and finding a condition subsequent to be implicit in the contract under consideration would undermine Alaska Const., art. XII, § 7. State ex rel. Hammond v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1981).
Former statutory defense held not a vested right. —
Former statutory defense of failure on the part of the plaintiff, in an action to recover lands sold for taxes, to tender and pay taxes into court did not constitute such a “right,” “vested right,” or “property” in the defendant as could not be taken away by the legislature. Bidwell v. Scheele, 355 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1960).
Action to reinstate driver’s license after section amended. —
Where defendant, whose driver’s license was revoked, moved for the issuance of a limited license, in reliance on newly amended language in AS 28.15.201 , and did so within the time limitations of R. Crim. P. 35(a), it was error for the trial court to rule the issuance of such license was precluded by this section because defendant was sentenced prior to the amended provisions effective date. Application of this provision prior to the effective date of the amendment was not a retroactive application of an amendment to the sentencing scheme promulgated under AS 28.15.181(d) and 28.15.291(c) [now AS 28.15.291(d) ]. Howell v. State, 834 P.2d 1254 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
B-C Cable Co. v. City & Borough of Juneau, 613 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1980); Newell v. National Bank, 646 P.2d 224 (Alaska 1982); Newsom v. State, 726 P.2d 561 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); Helton v. State, 778 P.2d 1156 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Rice v. Rice, 757 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1988); Caspersen v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 786 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1990); Lipscomb v. State, 869 P.2d 166 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); Stoneking v. State, 39 P.3d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1977).
Collateral references. —
Constitutional requirement that repealing statute refer to statute repealed as applicable to repeal by implication. 5 ALR2d 1270.
Legislative adoption of compiled or revised statutes as giving effect to former repealed or suspended provisions included therein; inclusion of conflicting statutes. 12 ALR2d 423, 430.
Article 4. The Statehood Act.
Sec. 01.10.110. Effect of amendments to Statehood Act.
No amendment (enacted after September 16, 1976) that affects an interest of the state under the Alaska Statehood Act (72 Stat. 339) is effective as to the state unless approved by law enacted by the legislature or the people of the state.
History. (§ 1 ch 192 SLA 1976)